Montenegrin Journal of Political Science

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Montenegrin Journal of Political Science
ISSN 1800-9328
Montenegrin Journal
of Political Science
volume 3 | number 3 | january 2014
Montenegrin Journal of Political Science
www.fpn.co.me
Editor in Chief | Glavna urednica: Sonja Tomović-Šundić
Editorial board | Redakcija :
Srđan Darmanović
Saša Knežević
Miloš Bešić
Nataša Ružić
Olivera Komar
Boris Vukićević
International Advisory Board | Međunarodni urednički odbor:
Ivo Banac, Yale University
Nenad Dimitrijević, Central European University
Florian Bieber, University of Graz
Josip Glaurdić, University of Cambridge
Daniel Bochsler, University of Zurich
Diego Garzia, European University Institute
Siniša Vuković, Johns Hopkins University
Danica Fink-Hafner, University of Ljubljana
Anton Grizold, University of Ljubljana
Vlado Miheljak,University of Ljubljana
Ivan Šiber, University of Zagreb
Dejan Jović, University of Zagreb
Vladimir Goati, Belgrade Institute for Social Research
Čedomir Čupić, University of Belgrade
Ratko Božović, University of Belgrade
Ana Čekerevac, University of Belgrade
Ilija Vujačić, University of Belgrade
Predrag Simić, University of Belgrade
Gordana Djurović, University of Montenegro
Aneta Spaić, University of Montenegro
Assistant editors | Pomoćnici urednika: Ivan Vuković, Olivera Komar
Civis (MJPS) is an interdisciplinary, independently peer-reviewed journal that publishes articles,
book reviews and research results in the field of political science.
Journal is published yearly by the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Montenegro.
This issue is now available at www.fpn.co.me
Civis (MPSJ) je interdisciplinarni, nezavisno recenzirani časopis koji objavljuje članke, prikaze
knjiga, kao i rezultate istraživanja koji su najšire vezani za oblast politike.
Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta Crne Gore objavljuje časopis jednom godišnje.
Ovo izdanje je dostupno na www.fpn.co.me
Sadržaj
005 The case for political integration in the Commonwealth
Carribean - Lessons from European integration / Attila Molnár
o23 Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as
political actors / Roland Kyška
o41 Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na
primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010) / Filip Milačić
o59 From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’:
U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt / Slaven Živković
o77 Multikulturalna kritika liberalnog univerzalizma i odbrana
manjinskih prava
/ Elma Huruz
091 Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced
development: case study of Croatia / Sanja Hajdinjak
Prikaz knjige autora Šaćira Filandre: BOŠNJACI NAKON SOCIJALIZMA – O bošnjačkom identitetu u postjugoslovenskom dobu, BZK Preporod/Synopsis, Sarajevo/Zagreb, 2012. / Sarina Bakić
111
{ 5 } Attila MOLNÁR
Attila MOLNÁR
The case for political
integration in the
Commonwealth
Carribean - Lessons
from European
integration
Abstract
The present article sets out to analyse the possibility of political
integration among the countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The
inquiry relies on insights into and lessons learned from the history of European
integration, CARICOM’s model, partner, greatest beneficiary, and, as the article
demonstrates, ad hoc rival. The example of the European Community (EC)/
European Union (EU) is invoked to analyse the institutional architecture of
CARICOM, and to sketch possible trajectories of functional and political spillover.
It is argued that, in spite of the discouraging attempt made at federalism in the
late 1950s, potentially fertile seeds of political union have been sown in the
Caribbean, including (1) economic cooperation with regional redistribution, (2)
well-operating functional institutions at the federal level, and (3) the Caribbean
Court of Justice (CCJ), which, in a limited manner, carries the promise of
becoming a supranational authority. However, the future implementation
of such institutions continues to depend on the willingness of member states
and their political elites, especially those of the more economically developed
countries of the region.
Keywords: Caribbean Community, European Integration, political
union, regionalism
The author is a PhD student
at the University of Vienna
(e-mail: [email protected]
gmail.com)
1 Mogućnost stvaranja
političke integracije u
komonveltskim Karibima:
Iskustva evropskih integracija
{ 6 } The case for political integration in the Commonwealth Carribean - Lessons from European integration
Introduction
In September 2010, in accordance with the significant reform of
the EU’s foreign policy architecture brought on by the Treaty of Lisbon, EU
Member States introduced Draft Resolution A/65/L.64 to the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA). The aim of the draft was to make it possible for
EU countries to speak at the UN with a united voice, through their common
EU representative. The draft resolution ended up being tabled with a motion
which received 76 votes in favour, 71 against and 26 abstentions, with those
voting for postponement including many of the EU’s closest developing
country partners (Molnár, 2012: 325-326). During the debate, ‘speakers
representing the African Group, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and
various small island developing States requested more time to analyse the
text and its implications, arguing that it would alter the working methods
of the Organization and interaction among States’ (UNGA, 2010).
When the debate on the issue resumed eight months later, the
UNGA adopted a very similar draft (A/65/276), almost unanimously. As
the Delegate of Hungary, speaking on behalf of the EU, highlighted at
the debate, the removal of any reference to the Treaty of Lisbon from the
original draft was to be seen as an explicit possibility for the Assembly to
decide on similar measures for other regional organisations (UNGA, 2011).
This version of the draft was found acceptable by most of its previous
opponents, including all of the Caribbean states. Among other speakers, the
Delegate of the Bahamas, on behalf of CARICOM, welcomed the changes
made, and, most notably, ‘considered the text to be a precedent’ (Ibid).
The episode illustrates that speaking with one voice on the international
stage is an issue that ranks high enough on the agenda of CARICOM and
other regional groupings to have made their member states drive a rather
captious bargain with the EU at the UN. And all this seemingly without
having even a remote possibility of speaking with one voice themselves.
Departing from the abovementioned dilemma, the present article
enquires into the possibility of political integration in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, which can be credibly argued to confirm the tenets of the
liberal intergovernmentalist school of integration (Moravcsik, 1996), as
integration in the CARICOM case apparently increases the sovereignty of
its constituent states - by gaining ‘power with others’, as opposed to over
others (Nye, 2011) - rather than decreasing it. Through integration, the small
and mini-states of the Caribbean region become able access to choice sets
that would not be accessible to them on an individual basis. The present
study relies on lessons drawn from European integration, based on which
the liberal intergovernmentalist thought was originally conceived. As the
institutional comparison (Chapters 4-5) will demonstrate, the EC/EU served
as CARICOM’s model and partner, its greatest beneficiary as well as an ad
hoc rival.
{ 7 } Attila MOLNÁR
Relying on the aforesaid theoretical framework, the ‘coming apart’
of European and Caribbean countries through the period of decolonization,
and the historical roots and initial conception of the Caribbean
integration project are firstly introduced. In that regard, decolonization
and the ensuing potential democratization can be seen as a correlate of
decentralisation (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003: 152) and, for the purposes
of this study, regional integration. The comparison that follows after the
historical-descriptive account is based on Balassa’s (1961) classical account
of economic integration, tracing and contrasting the road from free-trade
area to – hypothetical – political union.
The study argues that, in spite of the discouraging attempt made
at federalism in the late 1950s, potentially fertile seeds of political union
have been sown in the Caribbean. The most important such ‘seeds’ include
(1) economic cooperation with regional redistribution, (2) well-operating
functional institutions on the federal level, and (3) the Caribbean Court of
Justice, which, in an admittedly limited manner, carries the potential for
gaining supranational authority. It will be demonstrated that differences
in the level of countries’ economic development do not preclude the
integration project, but merely provide points of caution as to proceeding
with it. Such caution, paired with the puzzle case of Haiti, assigns the
integration project the logic of variable geometry, with increasing
redistribution policies on the regional level in order also to develop, rather
than erode, solidarity. The foci of the study are the fifteen states of the
Caribbean Community (for a list of countries, see Table 1). While there exist
two other regional organisations in the region – the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) – it
is only meaningful to discuss questions of political union with regard to
CARICOM. As Revauger eloquently points out, the OECS can be understood
to be for CARICOM what Benelux is to the EU, while the ACS is comparable
to the Council of Europe (Revauger, 2008: 861-63).
The geography of the Caribbean has traditionally played an
important role in the history and development of the countries of the region.
With some territories more than a thousand miles apart, the emergence
of any sense of unity among them has been very limited for most part of
the region’s colonial history (O’Brien, 2011: 632). With the development
of air travel, and with a boost in telecommunications and internet-based
technology, however, the region has ‘shrunk’, with its countries moving
closer to each other on various dimensions of exchange and interchange.
As perhaps the most important contrast to the European experience,
the smallness of all CARICOM countries must not be overlooked. Small
states literature tends to focus on three different groups of countries: (1)
‘microstates with a population of less than one million’, (2) ‘small states in
the developed world’, and (3) ‘small states in the so-called third world’ (Hey,
2003: 2). Clearly, most countries of the CARICOM-15 are to be considered
‘small’ along at least two of these three definitions – (1) and (3) – while some
{ 8 } The case for political integration in the Commonwealth Carribean - Lessons from European integration
of the region’s more economically developed countries (e.g. Barbados,
Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) might be argued to belong
to (1) and (2). Rather than undermining the comparison, however, this
distinction from European integration reinforces the study, as small states
in any of these categories ‘tend to emphasize internationalist principles,
international law, and other “morally minded” ideals, secure multinational
agreements and join multinational institutions whenever possible [and]
aim to cooperate and to avoid conflict with others’ (Hey, 2003: 5). A recipe
for regional integration, as one might argue.
1. Decolonisation and the Seeds of Integration
Starting with the arrival of Columbus in 1492 at present-day
Bahamas, and from the sixteenth century onwards, the Caribbean basin
was colonised by the British, French and Spanish, intermittently fighting
colonial wars for the possession of the islands and littoral areas of the
region. European powers encountered little resistance to their ventures
while gaining control of the tropical paradise, only partly populated by the
native Amerindian Caribs. The colonisers shipped in slaves from Africa to
work on plantation economies which primarily produced sugar and tropical
crops for their European-based empires. As a result, the demographics of
the Caribbean became dominated by a black majority, a minority with
a European settler background, and a very small minority of remaining
natives.
By the late nineteenth century, the hegemon and only global
power of the era, Britain, undertook various administrative reforms with a
view to rationalising the governing structures of its Caribbean territories.
In 1871, six small island entities of the Leeward Islands (the Northern isles
of the Lesser Antilles), were merged into a federation, resulting in harsh
opposition by the islands’ inhabitants, who, as Revauger explains, clung to
their autonomy in the face of what they saw as imperial oppression (2008:
858). In 1887, chiefly because of the overly high costs of governing the
small and badly-endowed Tobago independently, the islands of Trinidad
and Tobago were merged into a union that was highly asymmetrical
(Ibid). In 1908, as the epitomy of colonial ‘cosmopolitanism’, a Canadian
trade commissioner was appointed to administer colonies in the region
(Ibid). Such administrative reforms remain significant factors in questions
concerning regional integration today.
Prevailing throughout the First World War with relative noninvolvement, and with still a long way to go until independence, the power
set-up of the Caribbean was fundamentally altered by the end of the War.
With the debut of the United States as a great power, the countries of the
region, formally still European colonies, where conspicuously incorporated
into the U.S. sphere of influence. While subsequent decades were marked by
{ 9 } Attila MOLNÁR
recurrent U.S. interventions – both military and economic – this was merely
symptomatic of the increasing ‘potential of the U.S. to intervene, with a
corresponding decline of the relative power of European states; a disability
and disengagement of preventing such interventions, and of intervening
themselves’ (Molnár, 2010: 34). The looming spectre of interventionism, in
the tense context of the Cold War, arguably contributed to the ‘fragmented
nationalism’ Knight (1990) refers to in his seminal historical account of
the region. Such fragmentation would doom the federalist idea for the
rest of the twentieth century. In all likelihood, however, the former British
colonies, due to their British political heritage, as well as significantly smaller
exposure to interventionism than their non-Anglophone neighbours, have
been relatively well-positioned to overcome such divergence.
In 1947, representatives of the Commonwealth Caribbean met at
Montego Bay, Jamaica, ‘to discuss the possibility of federation’ (O’Brien, 2011:
633). A decade later, the West Indies Federation (WIF) was launched with
the aim of establishing a political union in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
The Federation operated a Federal Government comprising a cabinet
and a prime minister, as well as a bicameral legislature with a popularlyelected lower house, and an upper house with members nominated by
the Governor General in consultation with the prime minister. The Federal
Government also began to design policies and functional institutions at
the federal level, some of which (such as the University of the West Indies)
still exist until today. It is important to note that both the political and the
policy-making architecture of the Federation was created under British
authority, which, in an era when the zeitgeist was colonial independence,
ran counter to popular sentiment regardless of its technocratic rationality.
This fact undermined federalism-in-the-making from its outset. However,
the devastating blow to the WIF came in 1961, when Norman Manley,
Jamaica’s world-renowned civil rights advocate and prime minister at the
time – as well as a devout Caribbean federalist – gave in to widespread
popular sentiment against the WIF in his country, and called for a referendum
in which 54 percent of Jamaicans would opt for exit from the WIF (Ibid: 634).
Trinidad and Tobago followed suit, which, by 1962, marked a bitter end to
the Caribbean federalist idea for the twentieth century. But what are the
trends for the twenty-first?
2. A Community of small and smaller economies
Today, the fifteen CARICOM countries represent significant diversity in size,
demographics, and economic development. Table 1 lists their population
data and per capita gross domestic product (GDP).
{ 10 } The case for political integration in the Commonwealth Carribean - Lessons from European integration
Table 1. Population and GDP of the CARICOM countries
Country
Population
Antigua and Barbuda
The Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Montserrat
Saint Lucia
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Total population / Total GDP (PPP):
89,018
316,182
287,733
327,719
73,126
109,011
741,908
9,801,664
2,889,187
5,164
162,178
50,726
103,537
560,157
1,226,383
16,743,693
GDP per
capita (PPP)
22,100 USD
30,900 USD
23,600 USD
8,300 USD
13,600 USD
1,300 USD
7,500 USD
1,200 USD
9,000 USD
3,400 USD
12,900 USD
16,400 USD
11,700 USD
9,500 USD
20,300 USD
100 billion USD
Source: CIA, 2012
As previously noted, all fifteen countries fall into what both
International Relations and Economics refer to as ‘small countries’, with an
aggregate population roughly equal to that of a middle-sized European
country: the Netherlands. The total GDP (PPP) of the region adds up to
approximately 100 billion USD, which is less than that of the region’s single
largest country, non-CARICOM-member Cuba. In European comparison, it
is roughly equal to the corresponding the figure for Bulgaria.
Apart from Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago, the countries of the region fall well below the size at which a
‘Westphalian’ state of Europe, Asia or the Americas can be construed to
operate. Therefore, pooling of resources has to be seen as an absolute
necessity for providing even a minimal level and scope of public goods
modern states are expected to provide. A prevailing success story of
resource-pooling is the University of the West Indies (UWI), an Anglo-Saxonstyle university for both undergraduate and graduate studies, founded in
1948. Running three campuses in Mona (Jamaica), St. Augustine, (Trinidad
and Tobago), and Cave Hill (Barbados), UWI is the only university in the
Anglophone Caribbean (not counting the University of Guyana on the
{ 11 } Attila MOLNÁR
South American continent) providing education and conducting research
along the complete range of scientific disciplines.
An indiscriminate and unequivocal shorthand categorisation
of the countries as ‘small’, is a simplification that disguises much of the
region’s social and economic realities. The population of Montserrat, for
example, a highly volcanic small island with the latest of major eruptions
dating 1995, and with an agricultural productivity of minimal volume and
industry virtually non-existent (hence its very low GDP), is equal to that of
a very small European town. On the other hand, Trinidad and Tobago, an
attractive investment target and one of the most productive economies of
the region, – due, in no small part, to its unique natural oil and gas reserves
– has a population slightly smaller than that of Estonia. Haiti, while home to
more than half of the citizens of CARICOM, was already the poorest country
in the Western hemisphere prior to its devastating earthquake of 2010 (CIA,
2012).
While different in size and development, most countries of the
region have economies of relatively similar structure. As tourism accounts
for most of the region’s GDP, there is certainly some truth to the stereotype
of it being ‘a place to pursue [the] quest for the three S’s: sun, sand and surf’
(Erisman, 1989: 141). Where sufficient arable land is available, agriculture is
also a significant source of income, with sugar having been the traditionally
most important commodity. By today, this traditional sector has largely been
superseded by tourism and governments’ increasing efforts to commit to
the development of sectors with higher value-added, such as the financial
services sector – primarily offshore banking. For example, according to the
CIA World Factbook (2012), the old sugar industry in Saint Kitts and Nevis
has been shut down by the government with a view to developing banking
services based on the success story of the Bahamas. Such policies fall in
line with Griffith’s advice that phasing out old, colonial industries which
have mainly endured out of path dependency, not of prevailing demand;
and phasing in goods and services suited to the modern environment, is
a major instrument towards achieving development and competitiveness
in the region (2002: 79-102). The two ‘big’ Anglophone countries (Jamaica,
and Trinidad and Tobago), as well as the two South American littoral states
(Guyana and Suriname) retain natural resources and mining industries
which also produce for export. Trinidad and Tobago has become one of the
most developed countries of the region largely on account of its petroleum
resources, which have been the cornerstone of its economy and exports
since the 1950s.
Craigwell and Maurin (2001) found through econometric and
statistical analysis that, in spite of continued contemporary efforts at
integration (see Chapter 3), there has been no convergence in the per
capita GDP of the CARICOM countries since the 1980s. They listed four
main reasons for this being the case: (1) ‘unequal endowment in natural
resources’, (2) ‘particular policy choice[s]’, (3) ‘lack of mobility of capital
{ 12 } The case for political integration in the Commonwealth Carribean - Lessons from European integration
and labour’, and (4) ‘the unequal distribution of skilled workers’ (Ibid: 201).
While factor (1), similarly to uneven exposure to natural disasters, is not
human-made, the clear message conveyed by factors (2), (3) and (4) is
that sufficient economic integration has not been realised. Craigwell and
Maurin insist that the only way for the countries of CARICOM to achieve
convergence and take a meaningful part in international trade – which
poses an increasingly vexing problem with the shift in the EU’s focus to
its neighbourhood (Byron, 2004: 11), and a respective relative decline of
preferential treatment (Mesquita Moreira et al., 2007: 127) – is by addressing
the shortcomings of the integration scheme (Ibid: 200). What is especially
required is to authentically achieve the single market (Ibid). While doing so,
it is of paramount importance that the harmful effects of trade diversion
and the asymmetrical benefits of liberalisation to larger and richer countries
be offset by cohesion-focussed redistribution policies, such as the existing
Regional Development Fund (Ibid: 128). With this problem properly
addressed, it should be noted that ‘integration gains in non-tradables are
likely to dwarf the traditional gains from trade [, and that,] to maximize those
non-tradable gains, the region must broaden the focus of integration and
undertake more ambitious efforts than have been seen so far’ (Ibid: 129).
In other words, pooling resources in the region becomes Pareto-efficient if
coupled with the evening-out of regional differences. The elephant in the
room, however, is clearly Haiti, whose needs to enable effective economic
and social integration go far beyond what the capabilities of CARICOM
allow for, and therefore require a broader effort from the international
community that is not easily seen on the horizon.
3. Towards a Caribbean demos?
When discussing Caribbean integration, one should cast an eye on
Europe, where economic integration has been able to translate into political
only with the parallel existence of political convergence, and a number of
shared constitutional and institutional traits throughout its constituents. If
no such common ground exists, the spillback of integration or disintegration
might easily occur. This can be one of the lessons that drawn from the
inorganic, forced ‘integration’ of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) in Europe, and the West Indies Federation in the Caribbean.
Bearing this requirement in mind, Table 2 surveys the politics of the fifteen
Caribbean countries, while also taking note of dominant religious beliefs as
arguably key social factors.
{ 13 } Attila MOLNÁR
Table 2. Politics and religion in the CARICOM countries
Country
Colonial
past
Political system
FH
Rating
Religion
Antigua and
Barbuda
British
Westminster
2.5
Protestant
The Bahamas
British
Westminster
1.0
Protestant
Barbados
British
Westminster
1.0
Protestant
Belize
British
Westminster
1.5
Roman Catholic, Protestant
Dominica
British
Parliamentary,
unicameral
1.0
Roman Catholic, Protestant
Grenada
British
Westminster
1.5
Roman Catholic, Protestant
Guyana
British
Presidential,
unicameral
2.5
Protestant, Hindu, Roman
Catholic
Haiti
French
Parliamentary,
bicameral
4.5
Roman Catholic, Protestant
Jamaica
British
Westminster
2.5
Protestant
Montserrat
British
UK overseas territory,
unicameral
-
Protestant
Saint Lucia
British
Westminster
1.0
Roman Catholic, Protestant
Saint Kitts and Nevis
British
Parliamentary,
unicameral
1.0
Protestant
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
British
Parliamentary,
unicameral
1.0
Protestant
Suriname
Dutch
Presidential,
unicameral
1.5
Hindu, Protestant, Roman
Catholic, Muslim
Trinidad and Tobago
British
Westminster
1.5
Roman Catholic, Protestant,
Hindu
Source: Colonial Past, Political System, and Religion: CIA, 2012; FH Rating:
Freedom House, 2011
Although, as previously argued, suspicions about federalism
amongst populations socialised in a strife for independence cannot be
overlooked; to frame former colonial ruler Britain as a ‘defining other’ for the
Commonwealth Caribbean, might be an exaggeration. In fact, the majority
of these countries is a Commonwealth realm until today, having the Queen
of the United Kingdom as their head of state, with typically a Governor
General, appointed by the Queen, performing the functions of the office
in practice. Furthermore, the fact that most of the former British colonies
‘inherited’ well-functioning, Westminster-type political systems with
{ 14 } The case for political integration in the Commonwealth Carribean - Lessons from European integration
bicameral legislatures (as well as Protestantism) from their former colonial
power, is a key factor in understanding the political and social dynamics of
the region. The prevalence of Roman Catholicism in Belize, Grenada, Saint
Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago is an even older ‘inheritance’, to be accounted
for by the presence of the Spanish and French, with whom the British had
fought fierce colonial wars before they could assume full control of these
territories. Belize, located on the Central American mainland, is also the only
one of the countries where English is not the predominant language: it is
only spoken by 3.9% of the population, while Spanish and Creole are widely
spoken throughout the country (CIA, 2012).
While the decision of some of the mini island states to opt for
unicameralism can easily be explained by their size, the choice of a
unicameral legislature and semi-presidential system in Guyana followed
a significantly different pattern. It is worth noting that, during their rule,
the British had imported South Asian (‘East Indian’) workers to Guyana, as
they had done so to Trinidad and Tobago. While the latter, however, with
a South Asian population of 40% (Ibid) opted for the Westminster model,
the Guyanese choice of political system should be viewed in conjunction
with both independence and the Cold War. In this divided society, ethnic
strife between inhabitants of South Asian and African origin was intensified
by a clandestine operation of the United States against independence
movement leader Cheddi Jagan, and, as Revauger argues, it was also in
this context and under the pressure of the U.S. that Britain opted for a
unicameral legislature with proportional representation (1998: 859). Jagan
was elected Chief Minister of then British Guiana, only to be removed soon
after by Britain, which was alarmed by the possibility of Soviet communist
expansion in the Western hemisphere.
Also to be viewed as a special case is the second one of ‘the Guyanas’,
Suriname, a former Dutch colony, and one of two CARICOM member states
that follow the civil law tradition – besides former French colony Haiti. With
Dutch as the official language, but with English and Surinamese (a local
language) widely spoken, and with a significant South Asian immigrant
population and Hindu as the plurality religion (CIA, 2012), Suriname makes a
notable contribution to diversity in the Caribbean. With colonial and greatpower pressures relatively absent, Suriname, in a way embodying greater
ethno-cultural diversity than the rest of CARICOM, can also be construed as
a Caribbean model case for accommodating differences.
All in all, the strong rule in the region is well-functioning,
parliamentary democracy. Telling is the fact that fourteen of the fifteen
countries are ranked ‘free’ by Freedom House (2011), with Haiti being
the only one ranked ‘partly free’. Arguably, in the twenty-first century,
fundaments of regionalism go beyond allied interests, and towards a
shared understanding of politics and a commitment to democracy. History
has seen ‘federations’ based on coercion crumble as soon as their coercing
{ 15 } Attila MOLNÁR
great power was vanquished (e.g. the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia); and,
today, loose confederations which lack common ground (arguably most
regional organisations) have rather slim chances of developing closer
integration.
On the other hand is the course of integration in Europe, admittedly
erratic and indefinite, where experiments of political integration are
continually being conducted, and the possibility of establishing political
union can never be ruled out. What these phenomena indicate is that an
organic and lasting community can most probably only be built on a set of
shared values. What is meant by shared values is a common understanding
of the ‘good’ functioning of politics, society and the economy, as articulated
in the accession criteria of the EU (the ‘Copenhagen criteria’): ‘democracy,
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’;
‘a functioning market economy’ and the acceptance of community
norms, i.e. the ‘acquis’. It is true that, past the immediate years following
the Cold War, when regional integration happening worldwide was seen
to primarily emanate from economy; today, the political dimension of
regional integration is becoming increasingly important, with ‘institutions
of regional governance’ getting much of the emphasis (Byron, 2004: 13). As
Jessica Byron, a renowned Kittitian-Nevisian scholar so eloquently observes
about her native region:
‘The Caribbean’s niche in the global economy is largely based on
the labour power, talents and creative energies of its human resources.
In this increasingly knowledge-based global economy, the region’s most
buoyant products are proving to be the natural environment and tourism
products of all kinds, entertainers, sportsmen and women, medical and
educational professionals and writers’ (Ibid: 15).
For the efficient production of goods so genuinely post-industrial,
democracy is arguably key. Shared identity is a crucial anthropological
component of unity. That said, the trend that members of the Caribbean
diaspora identify as Caribbean, rather than as nationals of the country whose
citizenship they hold, is revealing (Revauger, 1998: 867). This can naturally
be argued to be the case because of convenience, as the majority in the
societies in which such diasporas exist (mostly the United States and United
Kingdom), is in complete ignorance of the existence of, let alone national
differences between, the smaller countries of the region. Being confronted
with ignorance, however, cannot be considered the major explanatory
factor behind integrated identification, and there is reason to assume that
living on the soil of other nations enhances national unity whose roots have
existed beforehand. To mention a European analogy, a scenario in which
Hungarians, Latvians or Luxembourgers – nationals of perhaps equally
‘obscure’ origin – living, for example, in the United States, would, out of
semantic convenience, mutually identify as ‘Europeans’, seems rather more
difficult to imagine anytime soon.
{ 16 } The case for political integration in the Commonwealth Carribean - Lessons from European integration
In conclusion, while economic, political and linguistic fragmentation
has always existed in the Caribbean, such fragmentation has been reinforced
by convulsive federalist efforts of the 1950s, and those of independence
movements of the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that integration has developed
in the face of such dividing forces is remarkable, which opens space for
arguments in favour of the potential for political integration in the nottoo-distant future. It is to the development of existing integration that the
article now turns its focus.
4. Economic integration – ‘From CARIFTA to
Caribbean Community’
From the ruins of the WIF, and parallel to the end of colonial rule
over its member states, the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was
set up. CARIFTA, based on the model of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), was an effort to improve the region’s bargaining position, being
especially alarmed at Britain’s repeated pleas for accession to the EC, and
the expected loss of preferential treatment (O’Brien, 2011: 636). Apparently,
not only has Caribbean integration been modelled on European, but the
dynamics of the former are to be understood, from its inception, in close
conjunction with those of the latter.
It is known from the theory of economic integration that countries
entering into a free trade regime with similarly-structured economies can,
in the longer term, increasingly benefit from developing a customs union,
i.e. a common external tariff border. Bearing similar export and import
interests, and interests with regard to the protection of their domestic
economies, the foreign trade profiles of such countries are obviously
similar. Hence, interests for devising import tariffs for third countries
are aligned. To develop, oversee and maintain such a tariff regime, the
establishment of supranational institutions is necessary. Such institutions
provide opportunity for the ‘functional or sectorial spillover’ (Cram, 1996:
46) of integration into other, trade-related areas, ‘concrete achievements
which’, in turn have the potential to create ‘a de facto solidarity’ (Schuman,
1950) and prevailing unity among the nations involved.
A difference in interests within CARIFTA, however, must not be
overlooked. Complete liberalisation of trade would have benefited the
larger, and more economically developed countries – the MDCs (TOC,
1973: Art. 3), while the smaller, and less developed countries (LDCs) would
have been outcompeted (O’Brien, 2011: 636-37). Therefore, as O’Brien
notes, while setting up CARIFTA, a number of cohesion-aimed concessions
became necessary, therefore a Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) was
called into existence (Ibid: 636-63). It was through such measures that
integration could survive. Payne highlights the role played by Michael
Manley – son of Jamaica’s world-famous statesman and first premier,
{ 17 } Attila MOLNÁR
Norman Manley – who succeeded in the Jamaican elections of 1972, and
prompted the CARIFTA Secretariat to publish ‘From CARIFTA to Caribbean
Community’, laying down the framework of future economic cooperation
(quoted in Ibid: 637).
One year later, the then independent four countries (the MDCs)
signed the TOC, with eight further countries to accede a year later (the
Bahamas joined in 1983, Suriname in 1995, and Haiti in 2002). The objectives
of the Treaty were (1) economic integration into a common market, ‘taking
into account the need to provide special opportunities for the [LDC]s’, (2)
foreign policy coordination, and (3) functional cooperation (Art. 4.). The
Community’s two ‘principal organs’ (Art. 6) became (1) the Conference of
Heads of Government (the Conference), with ‘primary responsibility [...] to
determine the policy of the Community’ (Art. 8 (1)) and ‘the final authority
for the conclusion of treaties on behalf of the Community’ (Art. 8 (4)); and
(2) the Common Market Council (Art. 6), whose task was to operate and
develop the common market (Art. 7 (1b) Annex, quoted by Ibid: 639).
Voting in the Conference (Art. 9 (1)), as well as the other institutions (Art.
13 (2)), was based on unanimity. Abstentions did not count as vetoes,
‘provided that not less than three-quarters of its members including at
least two of the More Developed Countries vote in favour’ (Art. 14). The
work of the Conference was supported by seven thematic Committees
of Ministers (Art. 10), while the neutral Community Secretariat, headed
by a Secretary-General, was charged with administrative tasks (Art. 15).
Ten further Community-level Associate Institutions were established with
functional responsibilities at the regional level. The Caribbean Development
Bank; the Caribbean Investment Corporation; the West Indies Associated
States Council of Ministers; the East Caribbean Common Market Council
of Ministers; the Caribbean Examinations Council; the Council of Legal
Education; the University of Guyana; the University of the West Indies; the
Caribbean Meteorological Council; and the Regional Shipping Council (Art.
14). Law made by the Council would not have direct effect, and was not
directly applicable; its implementation was left completely to the member
states (Art. 31 quoted by Ibid).
Mention has already been made of the role of the EC at the
inception of Caribbean integration, but some European developments
throughout the two decades that followed are to be highlighted with a
view to a better comparison. Throughout the 1970s, and most of the 1980s,
following an era of ‘sclerosis’, the ‘bicycle’ of integration was pushed ahead
by already developed community institutions, namely the Court of Justice
and the Commission. Already since the 1960s, the ECJ, in its landmark cases
(Van Gend en Loos, Costa v. ENEL, and Cassis de Dijon, among others),
developed the core principles of community law (primacy, direct effect,
direct applicability), as well as other principles that directly contributed to
further developing the already-established and well-functioning structures
{ 18 } The case for political integration in the Commonwealth Carribean - Lessons from European integration
into what became the single market. Building largely on the efforts of
the first Delors Commission, and especially those of Commissioner Lord
Cockfield, who drafted the famous white paper proposing measures for
eliminating some 300 barriers to trade, the Single European Act of 1986
finally codified the tenets of the single market programme. This paved the
way for subsequent monetary, and, notably, political integration starting
with the Maastricht Treaty.
In contrast, the Caribbean Community of the time was an
organisation characterised solely by intergovernmentalism. This can be
seen to be in strong coherence with the political culture of the Caribbean,
which was ‘highly personalist’ (Payne, quoted in O’Brien, 2011: 640) at the
time. The complete lack of supranationanity, as well as the absence of an
equivalent of the European Commission, left the Community with what has
been referred to as the ‘implementation gap’ (The West Indian Commission,
quoted in Ibid), which, coupled with the oil crisis and political turbulence of
the 1970s and 1980s, eroded in statu nascendi anything reminiscent of the
EC’s community method (Ibid). Recognising this, the Conference decided in
1989 to set up a West Indian Commission (WIC), which, by 1992, produced
a report titled ‘Time for Action’, which envisioned the establishment of a
Commission, a Supreme Court and ‘‘community law’’ for the Commonwealth
Caribbean (The West Indian Commission, quoted in Ibid).
5. Traces of federalism, promises of political
union
Although much of the debate on CARICOM’s relevance for the
past decade has focused on its trade rationale, it is increasingly obvious
that CARICOM’s raison d’etre for the future will be rooted in the political
functions and sense of identity of the community (Byron, 2004: 22).
Following the WIC’s report, the Inter-Governmental Task Force was set
up, which, between 1993 and 2000, drafted nine protocols to the TOC,
to become the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC), also establishing
the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). The Common Market
Council became the Community Council of Ministers, ‘the second highest
organ’ after the Conference, and the seven Committees of Ministers were
replaced by four Ministerial Councils (RTC, Art. 10(1b) and Art. 10(2)). While
the Conference retained its role as the highest political and policy-making
organ, the Council for Foreign and Community Relations was to assume
responsibility ‘for determining relations between the Community and
international organisations and Third States’ (Art. 16 (2)).
n spite of this institutional development, foreign policy coordination
among CARICOM members has, for the most part, been characterised by
national divides and personal idiosyncrasies (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008: 203).
It is notable how the Conference did not convene between 1975 and 1982
{ 19 } Attila MOLNÁR
because of ‘policy differences among the leaders of Jamaica, Guyana and
Trinidad and Tobago’ (Kenneth Hall quoted in Byron, 2004: 6 – footnote
4). This can partly be seen as a natural consequence of the overarching
dominance of the prime minister and the cabinet in the Westminster model,
but, as Braveboy-Wagner notes, this ‘personalism’ has recently been on the
decline, and foreign policy decision-making is becoming more pragmatic
and more contested (2008: 233). This may be interpreted as a positive
development, but the fact remains that most countries of the region fall
well below the size at which the (human) resources necessary for running
effective foreign policies – even at the regional level – could be considered
to be available. Therefore, political integration in their case appears a strong
prerequisite of foreign policy making.
To tackle the ‘implementation gap’, the CARICOM Bureau, ‘a poor
substitute for the CARICOM Commission’ (O’Brien, 2011: 642), lacking the
sole right to initiate legislation, was called into existence by the RTC. It should
be mentioned, however, that, on top of assistance in implementation, the
RTC does provide the Bureau, alongside the Community Council, with
the right to ‘initiate proposals for development by the Ministerial Councils
within their respective areas of competence’ (RTC, 2001: Art. 20 (2)). The RTC
also introduced qualified majority voting (QMV – by at least three quarters
of the member states), in the Councils, whose decisions thus taken, were
binding (Art.29 (1-2)). A member state was allowed to opt out of a decision
if the issue was determined by QMV ‘to be of critical importance to [its] [...]
national wellbeing’ (Art. 29 (3-4)). This can be construed as a rather restrictive
version of the EU’s so-called ‘Luxembourg compromise’, as it requires QMV
to override QMV, instead of providing for the possibility of veto. However,
with the continued absence of direct effect and direct applicability, member
states retain a de facto veto as to what eventually becomes community law.
Parallel to this, however, for the observance of community legislation that
has been transposed into national law, the RTC created the Caribbean Court
of Justice (CCJ): ‘a significant change to CARICOM’s institutional structure’
(O’Brien, 2011: 643). The Court is assigned ‘compulsory and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the interpretation
and application of the Treaty – including’ (a) ‘disputes between Member
States’ and (b) ‘between Member States [...] and the Community’, (c) referrals
from national courts’ (including the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court and
‘(d) applications by persons’ (Art. 211). Even though the CCJ thus created
bears qualities of supranationality, O’Brien and Morano-Foadi point out that
the prevailing absence of (1) a ‘guardian’ of the Treaty similar to the European
Commission, and of (2) direct effect, place limits on speculations about to
the CCJ’s role as the motor of integration (2009: 404, 410-14; O’Brien, 2011:
644-45).
{ 20 } The case for political integration in the Commonwealth Carribean - Lessons from European integration
Conclusion
Based on the consideration that changes in the world economy
and political world order jointly necessitate ever tighter cooperation among
small islands states, this article has argued the case for political integration
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. By surveying the economic and political
dynamics of the region, it has been canvassed that, while economic, social
and cultural diversity does exist among the countries of CARICOM, this in
itself does not preclude the political integration project. The case of Haiti
remains a puzzle that cannot be resolved by regional integration only, and
requires reliance on extensive economic and political support from the
broader international community.
The example of the EC/EU has been invoked to sketch possible
trajectories of functional and political spillover, as well as to analyse
the institutional architecture of CARICOM. It has been demonstrated
that while CARICOM is an organisation clearly based on the principle of
intergovernmentalism; the spillover of economic integration, established
practices of functional institutions, and, most recently, the establishment
of the CCJ, carry with them seeds of political integration. The future
implementation of these institutions, however, continues to depend on
the willingness of member states and political elites, especially those of the
MDCs.
Acknowledgement
I am deeply indebted to Professor Anton Pelinka of Central
European University (CEU), Budapest. Professor Pelinka’s valuable thoughts
provided the intellectual point of departure for the original manuscript of
this study, prepared at CEU in 2012.
{ 21 } Attila MOLNÁR
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{ 23 } Roland Kyška
Roland Kyška
Hacktivists or
cyberterrorists?:
Webactivists as
political actors
Abstract
As internet began to impact on public consciousness in last years,
we can see how political activists are using digital technologies as extremely
effective tools. Internet profoundly affected the way how people communicate,
now it is much easier to co-ordinate campaigns or to expose governments and
corporations to public ridicule.
As activists become computerized, we are going to see an increase of
hacktivist operations, like virtual sit-ins and blockades, e-mail bombs, computer
viruses and worms, web hacks and computer break-ins. Hacktivism combines
political activism and hacking techniques. But where is the difference, the
border between hacktivism and cyberterrorism? Many people believe, that
these tactics could be used to enhance real-world attacks. Is the only difference,
that hacktivism operations have not claimed lives or caused much more than
nuisance and financial loss?
For the abovementioned reasons it is necessary to properly define and
describe these two categories. It can help us in the future better understand and
epistemologically sort continuously growing numbers of “innovative” on-line
activities of different kinds of political activists.
Keywords:
participation
hacktivism, cyberterrorism, civil society, web 2.0,
The author is a doctoral
candidate at the Faculty of
International Relations of
the University of Economics,
Prague, Czech Republic
(e-mail: [email protected]
com)
1 Web-aktivisti kao politički
akteri
{ 24 } Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as political actors
Introduction
The expansion of new information and communication
technologies, continuously growing Internet penetration and mass
popularity of web services among the general public in the recent years
has not only radically changed the media environment but also other
features of the social life. The Internet has radically impacted many areas,
ranging from trading, education and entertainment up to the public and
political life. However, the initial web-optimism is now being replaced by
disillusionment, also in the form of negative phenomena introduced to our
lives by the informatization.
In the long-run, the Web has been considered as an ideal room for
deliberation, sharing opinions and the public discussion. One of the generally
referred positive effects of the internetization is the democratization
potential of the web (Kyška, 2012). Positive examples mentioned in this
respect are anti-regime protests in Moldova or the so called Arab Spring.
On one hand, the Internet helped directly in organizing protests, providing
information about events in the country (Beaumont, 2011) and prepared
the public for a higher level of civil and political engagement (Wheeler and
Mintz, 2012: 259).
An example of positive aspects of the public space democratization
thanks to informatization in western democracies is the concept of the
so called e-governance. According to the definition of Commonwealth
Network of Information Technology for Development Foundation
e-governance encompasses the use of the Internet by the civil society,
non-government organisations and professional associations in order to
mobilize the public opinion and influence decision-making processes;
to increase electronic delivery of government and commercial services
and information; electronic publication of draft laws and legal standards
for public feedback and further steps in the build-up of infrastructure
streamlining access to those services (Country profiles of e-governance,
2002).
Among other proclaimed positives, it is worth mentioning new
communication tools and setting up of new virtual communities.
However, opinions pointing out at negative consequences of
the Internet development have increased on their intensity in the past
years. Müller (2012: 187-188) warns from permanent accumulation of
different data, which is, not rarely, on the verge of violation of individual
rights. Rise of virtual communities often constitutes a new form of space
commodification and the cyberspace is thus becoming a prolonged arm of
capitalism instead of a platform for development of the principle of critical
public or. And, last but not least, there are fears of new forms of social
inequalities and social exclusion.
From the viewpoint of the speed and vigorous nature of radical
{ 25 } Roland Kyška
changes the Internet brought into the social life in the past decades, there
are many existing areas in the field of practical application or the science
that do not sufficiently reflect their scope and specific nature. The Internet
has rather caused a revolution than evolutionary development and caught
many unprepared. It is good to realize that even though the origins of the
Internet as an experimental network operated by a Pentagon research
agency go back as far as 1969, the Internet opened to the public as late
as in 1983 and the first cornerstone of the information highway in Slovakia
was built in 1991 (Škop, 2009: 294-295).
Even despite that, we are talking about digital revolutions now:
opposition demonstration in Moldova were described as a tweeter
revolution, the role of web and social media during the so called Arab
Spring is the subject-matter of research in many expert articles and books.
We cannot fully agree with Hill, who, even despite the fact that he considers
the role of the Internet as irrelevant, identified their reasons as of primarily
economic nature and attributed the global increase of activism to the
economic crisis. He views the Internet only as the medium of new dynamics,
without causal connection between social protests and communication
technologies (Hill, 2013: 27).
The Internet broadly changes the human thinking, the way of
receiving information as well as actions. It has never been so easy to search
and receive information; it is rather its classification and the overpressure
caused by it that seems to be the problem. On the other hand, the Web
made participation easier as it enables active involvement in protests,
expressing one’s own opinions, including commenting official government
documents from the comfort of one’s home, without any need to make
any more demanding physical activity.2 The same way it makes organising
and coordination of campaigns more efficient, it makes it easier to criticise
governments or corporations and also brings in new, so far unknown
activities, whose mirror image cannot be easily, if at all, found in the off-line
world.
Many virtual acts thus often require new epistemology because, by
viewing and assessing them in the traditional view, we could succumb to
the tendency of abbreviated and simplified perception. The purpose of this
paper is to identify both categories, their correlants and to point out at their
growing influence on international and domestic policy.
1. Cybercrime and its origins
We can find the origins of cybercrime in the revolutionary, anticultural period that characterised the 70s. It was an era broadly defined by
fighting the scientific understanding of the reality and technology. Later,
in the 1990s, it was transformed when the anti-culture (paradoxically and
ironically, as it later showed up) combined itself with forms of technology
2 This is also the source of a
slightly pejorative expression
clicktivism, which, on the other
hand, precisely expresses the
doubts whether participation
in the form of simple mouse
clicking is a full-fledged
substitute of its traditional forms.
{ 26 } Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as political actors
that seemingly offered certain means of escape from extensive social
regulations. Under these conditions, the cyber culture includes the effort
to liberate individuals that was gradually assumed and limited by bug
international technological systems (Završnik, 2008: 30). Završnik refers to
the following more or less accepted definition of the cybercrime in legal
discourse: crimes threatening ICT – information and network security
(crime against computer integrity or crime in narrow interpretation);
crimes misusing ICT to commit traditional criminal acts (a crime pertaining
computers); and crimes pertaining the content, such as child pornography,
defamation and violation of intellectual property rights (Ibid: 35).
Cybercrime, with regard to its global character, induces new
situations also in the field of law, international law and agreements
between different countries concerning its detection, prosecution and
counteraction. Nevertheless, the legal practice faces the same problem of
insufficient definition of merits of Internet criminal acts (2007: 14). Polčák
points out to the Agreement of the Council of Europe on Cyber Crime
that was opened for signing on 23 November 2001 in Budapest where
the member states undertook to prosecute the following types of criminal
acts in their jurisdictions: unauthorised access to the system; unauthorised
interference with the communication; damaging of data; interference
with the operation of information systems; misuse of technical means to
the above acts; falsifying using computers; computer frauds; production,
distribution and possession of child pornography on data media; violation
of authorship rights and related rights; providing assistance or instructions
to the above acts.
Brenner approaches the document with a certain degree of
scepticism even despite its comprehensiveness and points out at the
flabbiness of national governments to ratify it (2007: 217). Despite the fact
that it was signed by 38 countries, only eight of them ratified it in the first three
years - Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and
Macedonia. In order to achieve the goals of the Agreement – to harmonize
national material and procedural standards concerning cybercrime – it is
necessary that all countries of the world ratify and implement it. At the end
of October 2013, i.e. almost 12 years after the signature of the Agreement
in Budapest, two out of 47 members of the Council of Europe still have
not signed it - Russia and San Marino - and 9 countries have not ratified
it - Turkey, Sweden, Poland, Monaco, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Ireland,
Greece and Andorra (Convention on Cybercrime, 2004).
Due to the fact that sanctions for cybercrimes radically differ
among countries and national procedures are extraordinary inconsistent,
cyberterrorists have established themselves in countries with laws
favourable for them, which, however, does not mean that their threats are
of less serious nature. The specificity of this type of crime rests in the fact
that anyone can be harmed by attackers with computers connected to the
{ 27 } Roland Kyška
Internet sitting a godforsaken Internet café in a third world country just as
if they were sitting in any Internet café in the inland USA (Donovan and
Bernier, 2009: 281).
Also the above categorisations of cybercrime imply that there are
several types that differentiate not only by their intensity, content but also
by motivations of actors, which can include sexual deviant conduct (e.g.
dissemination and maintaining records of child pornography), ignoring
copyright, frequently claimed as freedom to disseminate content on the
Internet up to traditional frauds with the effort to make profit. Therefore,
extending the definition of cyberterrorism requires an abstraction of above
motivations because it is the motif of action that seems to be decisive for
our needs.
2. Cyberterrorism
The Internet and similar network systems are, in many aspects,
ideal for terrorist organisations, their activities and operations. Terrorists use
the Internet for covert communication, including new commands. On the
Internet and web, they try to access information about potential targets or
technical data in areas such as construction of weapons. They also use the
Internet as a platform for spreading propaganda on terrorist groups and
cases as well as for recruiting new members. Last but not least they use the
Internet itself as the tool for their attacks (Wagner, 2005: 5).
Regarding Wagner’s, otherwise very appropriate enumeration, it is
necessary to add that terrorists use the Internet also to raise funds to finance
their organisations or implementation of their operations and attacks.
An encyclopedic definition describes cyberterrorism as hacker incidents,
cybercrime and highly destructive computer viruses that massively spread
in the Nineties and those tools are increasingly used for political objectives
(Martin, 2011: 149). Finding a coined definition is not easy and, as pointed out
by Conway (2007: 78), there are a lot of inaccurate and erroneous definition
that arise mostly under the fact that most discussion on cyberterrorism are
held in popular media that primarily focus on ratings and number of visitors
rather than on generating functional definitions. This term was chronically
overused and misused especially after attacks on 11 September 2001, when
it became a “popular” expression which, however, has different meanings
for different people. It has become popular to create new words by putting
attributes cyber-, information or computer in front of other words. It may
induce a feeling that it is a brand new phenomenon but that is often not
the case and, on the contrary, this procedure causes confusion. And, last
but not least, a missing generally accepted definition of terrorism as such is
the biggest obstacle in defining cyberterrorism.
According to Denning (2001a), cyberterrorism is, in general, perceive
as a computer attack or the threat of an attack in order to intimidate or
{ 28 } Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as political actors
force governments or companies carry out political, religious or ideological
goals. The attack should be sufficiently destructive or disruptive to generate
fear comparable to that from physical acts of terrorism. Attacks that lead
to death or bodily injury, extended power outages, plane crashes, water
contamination, or major economic losses would be examples. Depending
on their impact, attacks against critical infrastructures such as electric power
or emergency services could be acts of cyberterrorism. Attacks that disrupt
nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.
Mehan introduces a definition of cyberterrorism as politically
motivated use of computers by terrorist groups, ethnics or national groups
and secret agents either as weapons or as goals in order to generate
violence, affect the public, influence national policy (2008: 33). Also an
attack on information systems that is destructive or disturbing enough to
generate public fears and panic comparable to physical terrorist attack can
be deemed an act of cyberterrorism.
Targets of cyberterrorists are not only computers and computer
systems, they are becoming the tools. FBI identified numerous cases of
intrusions to emergency telephone systems to places water is accumulated,
to gas pipelines, oil pipelines, electric networks, nuclear power plants and
natural gas storage facilities. There is a suspicion that any attacks originate
in Al-Qaeda and their purpose is, of course, to prepare new attacks. Similar
estimates are based on the fact that analysis of one of computers owned
by Al-Qaeda confiscated in Cabool helped to discover a computer program
simulating catastrophic breakdown of a dam barrier (Corte Ibáñez, 2009:
110).
Thus, fears of causing mass feeling of insecurity, panic or social
unsafety are topped with increasingly more realistic fears that cyberterrorism
could introduce new methods of actually disastrous damages either by
means of already mentioned deliberate failure of technologies preventing
from releasing water from dams, collapse of energy networks, including
systems inside nuclear power plants or fatal failure of navigation systems
and air traffic control.
As stressed by Novotná, the continuously increasing dependency
of civil sector on computers makes that segment an attractive target of
computer attacks for those whose do not hesitate to ignore limitation and
bans set by international humanitarian law. At present, we can observe
the need to re-evaluate assessment of potential new weapon systems as
well as other weapons that do not immediately fall in the scope of weapon
systems (2008: 26).
A computer attack at the time of conflict can “militarize” earlier
harmless tools – computers and computer systems. A computer attack
provides attackers with the option of asymmetric overloading of gravity
centres different from military armed forces, especially the civilian
population. Armies of certain countries can hardly sustain a standard military
{ 29 } Roland Kyška
battle against the most developed countries of the world. They redirect
their activities to possibilities of fighting in the cyber space that provides,
not only government but also non-state actors, with global availability, the
possibility to threaten public security and military efficiency on the basis of
the moment of surprise and substantial level of anonymity, suppression of
operations and easy spread of the attack (Ibid: 62). Cyberterrorism thus differs from cybercrime primarily by its
political motivation. Another counter position is its effort to influence the
public. Onset of the Internet and almost free dissemination of information
strengthened the symbiotic relation between terrorism and communication
means. Terrorists are aware that media promotion of their crimes can
multiply the intimidating and symbolic effects, especially when provided in
audio-visual format. Terrorism needs publicity (Corte Ibáñez, 2009: 108).
3. Hacktivism
What we now know as the ‘hacker ethics’ started in the 1950s among
MIT students. Its main principle was the right of all users to unlimited access
to computers and information. Anarchistic and libertarian oriented hacker
ethics perceived decentralized programming and access to information as
questioning the cult of professionalism and information elitism that was
typical for technocracy (Heath and Potter, 2012: 315).
A manifest titled The Conscience of a Hacker published on 8 January
1986 by a hacker using nickname The Mentor (1986) is considered to be the
basic source of hacker ethics. It describes hackers as people frustrated with
the educational system and limitations of the society who are, however,
prepared to learn and change the society:
‘We explore [...] and you call us criminals. We seek after knowledge
[...] and you call us criminals. We exist without skin color, without nationality,
without religious bias [...] and you call us criminals. You build atomic bombs,
you wage wars, you murder, cheat, and lie to us and try to make us believe
it’s for our own good, yet we’re the criminals. Yes, I am a criminal. My crime
is that of curiosity. My crime is that of judging people by what they say
and think, not what they look like. My crime is that of outsmarting you,
something that you will never forgive me for. I am a hacker, and this is my
manifesto. You may stop this individual, but you can’t stop us all [...] after all,
we’re all alike’.
Heath and Potter warn that cyber libertarianism on the Internet
failed for the same reason libertarianism failed everywhere in the world
(2012: 319-320). Unlimited freedom does not support peace, love and
understanding. It only created the Hobbesian natural condition. Sociology
analysts of the cyber space claim, in general, that the hacker culture is based
on many highly positive and constructive values and beliefs which form the
precondition of comprehensive cooperation, sharing and criticising ideas
{ 30 } Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as political actors
and general network interaction necessary for creative programming. The
constitutive qualities of original hacker cultures were autonomy of projects
and institutional autonomy (Završnik, 2008: 39).
Chatam points out at untrue but continuing stereotype that
hackers are young men with limited parental supervision who spend all
their leisure time at the computer (2008: 36-37). Hackers are men and
women, aged up to 65 years, with various backgrounds, organised and
non-organised people. Hackers are divided to script kiddies3 or expert
hackers. Also crackers4 and phreackers are often mistakenly referred to as
hackers. The first category consists of those, who break or remove measures
intended as protection from unauthorised copying (thus enabling use of
the product without it being duly purchased by the user). The others attack
public telephone networks.
According to Denning (2001b), the phenomenon that occurs as a
result of convergence of activism and hacking, where ‘hacking’ is used to
designate those operations that use computers in an unusual and often
illegal way, usually by means of special software, is called hacktivism.
Taylor defines hacktivism in a similar manner, as a combination
of traditional methods of political protest with technological knowledge
of computer hacking (2001: 59). Ziegler can see origins of hacktivism in
the so called culture jamming, i.e. the tactics of anti-consumerism social
movement, primarily resting in the use of tools of outdoor advertising
(billboards, posters, advertisements on buses, etc.) to comment the very
media or other social phenomena (2002: 14). Culture jamming should be
distinguished from vandalism, whose principle is to destroy. In this case, it
is rather about clear political messages, very often transmitted in the form
of creative and witty finishing of existing advertisements.
Among basic types of hacktivism are:
a) Virtual blockade, DDoS attack, virtual occupation
Virtual blockades or occupation (sit-in) are cyberspace versions
of these activities, their purpose is to draw attention to the protesters
and their cases by disrupting normal operation and blocking accesses to
equipment (Denning, 2001b). DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks
form a separate category whose essence rests in the fact that a server is
attacked from several computers at the same time by so many requests
that is becomes overloaded. Attackers who use their own computers for
the purposes of DDoS use anonymising services to avoid simple detection.
We can say that no server can resists a strong DDoS attack (Švantner, 2013).
Similar attacks were recently induced by intervention of authorities
against pirate websites (e.g. switching off of the “file sharing server”
Megaupload). The best known one was the so called Operation Payback,
3
The expression script kiddie
or skiddie is used by hackers to
designate those who do not
have sufficient experience or
knowledge and therefore use
‘scripts’ for attacks (scripting,
i.e. computer programming
language) or programs
developed by other persons. In
principle, it is assumed they are
mostly younger hackers who
have not got involved in hacking
so deep to be able to write their
own programs. See also: Script
Kiddies: The Net’s cybergangs
(Available on: http://www.zdnet.
com/script-kiddies-the-netscybergangs-3002080125/).
Words hacker and cracker
are often incorrectly used as
synonyms, in fact they are in
principle antonymous expression.
Hackers have highly professional
knowledge of computer systems,
their goal is, however, to point
out at shortcomings or possibly
express their disagreement with
their violation. Crackers are real
cybercriminals who steal and
violate the copyright.
4
{ 31 } Roland Kyška
aimed at sites of organisations dealing with the copyright or fighting
various types of piracy, regulators or law firms. After the outbreak of the
Wikileaks case, attackers extended their agenda also to websites of banks
or card operators (Ribeiro, 2013).
In Slovakia, probably the biggest wave of DDoS attacks was caused
by the so called Gorila case,5 when hackers attacked, at the beginning of
2012, websites of the Penta financial group, political parties SDKÚ-DS and
Smer-SD and several companies owned by the financial groups - Dôvera
health insurance company, Tatralandia, Primabanka (Kernová, 2012).
b) E-mail bombs
E-mail bombs are used to overload system of electronic mail and
make it impossible for the addressee to receive legitimate messages. The
tendency to make use of them occurs among disappointed groups with
specific political requirements (Taylor, 2001: 65). Dennig (2001b), who
marks e-mail bombs as a specific type of virtual blockade, warns that e-mail
bombs used as a means of protest against government policies are often
tools of revenge or molestation.
In Slovakia, there were two attempts of e-mail bombing in 2011 by
the UM! initiative, which invited its supporters to send one message each
with the same text of the call for reduction of the legislative immunity to
300 e-mail addresses of members of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic (two addresses of each Member of Parliament).
c) Web-hacking and breaking into computers
The purpose of web hacking is to change the content in the
presentation of a particular institution or an individual in order to point
out at their negative aspects, actions or attitudes that are not in line with
attacker’s ones but also to mock. This type of hacktivism usually also induces
large interest of the media. Another example of web hacking is the attack
of Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) to British daily Financial Times, its blogs and
tweeter account. Hackers published several links on it supporting the Syrian
President Bashar Assad. Hackers impersonating SEA attacked websites of
several western media, among others also The New York Times and The
Washington Post (Haughney and Perlroth, 2013).
Sometimes different activities fall within more categories, such
as the hacking attack on website of Tibetan exile government which was
altered by attackers so that it would infect visitors with a harmful virus. The
suspicion of the attack of August 2013 point out at the Chinese government.
5
Shortly before Christmas 2011
a document allegedly from
an operation of the Slovak
Information Service with cover
name Gorila occurred on the
web. Supposedly it contained
transcripts of tapping records
from an apartment that was
used by one of the strongest
domestic financial groups
Penta for secret meetings
especially with representatives
of political elites. According to
the transcripts, they discussed
influencing political decisions
by representatives of financial
circles, staffing important
position in the government,
corruption, illegal financing of
political parties, etc. In response
to the published documents,
there was a series of protest
meetings in several Slovak
towns with the participation of
thousands of people. Protests
in Bratislava even turned into
violence several times, when
demonstrators attacked on the
seats of the National Council of
the Slovak Republic, the Office
of the Government of the Slovak
Republic and the President of the
Slovak Republic.
{ 32 } Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as political actors
d) Computer viruses and worms
Hacktivists use computer viruses and worms in order to disseminate
their political protests as well as to damage target computer systems.
Viruses and worms are forms of a malicious code that infects computers
and disseminates over computer networks. The difference between them
is that worms are autonomous software that disseminates by itself while
viruses usually spread in response to user actions (e.g. opening of e-mail
attachment).
4. Differentiation criteria between
cyberterrorism and hacktivism
Just like between cybercrime and cyberterrorism, there is also an
extraordinary thin border line between cyberterrorism and hacktivism. It
is the political motivation that remains the key criterion of differentiation
while it seems that the principal issue of the definition will not be the use
of tools but rather the target of the attack.
No society can operate with a certain level of violence in the
politics, even though in its quasi symbolic form of strike patrols or mass
demonstrations (Hobsbawm, 2009: 99). By means of the internetization of
the society, this violence is transferred to the cyberspace and, as we have
already presented, it can often have even fatal consequences also in the
real life. That political violence has its degrees and rules, however, they are
now much less clear in its cyber version that in the ‘off-line world’.
Similar to non-virtual activities, it is necessary to distinguish between
revolutionary actions that question senseless or obsolete conventions and
actions that violate legitimate social standards. In other words, we must
distinguish between dissent and deviance. Dissent is like civil disobedience.
It appears when people are, in principle, willing to play according to the
rules but they have sincere and well intentioned objections to a specific
content of an extended set of rules (Heath and Potter, 2012: 84).
Therefore, in order to differentiate, we derive, from the group of
attacks, any cyber attacks on the critical infrastructure that are, with no
doubt, clear terrorist acts. In line with the definition of the Ministry of
Interior Affairs of the Slovak Republic, the critical infrastructure is that part
of infrastructure (selected organisations and institutions, objects, systems,
facilities and services), whose destruction or malfunction would pose a
threat to or disruption of political and economic life of the country or a
threat to lives and health of the population.
According to the above quoted definition of cyberterrorism by
Denning (2001a), “attacks, which disrupt non-essential services or cause
especially costly difficulties are not them (acts of cyberterrorism)”. This
definition, however, leaves very loose criteria for determining the already
mentioned border line as it is not clear what exactly non-essential services
{ 33 } Roland Kyška
are and where the border line of costly difficulties is. Thus, the following
criteria are becoming the criteria of differentiation:
a) Target of the attack: We can talk about hacktivism if its target is
not the critical infrastructure, threat to life or health of the population; on
the contrary but only if non-essential services represent the target. Such
attack must not raise public fears and panic comparable to physical terrorist
attacks.
b) Political nature of the act: The motif of hacktivism is to express
a political attitude, disagreement with the existing regime or an effort to
make one’s political opinions visible. Hacktivism is a form of political protest and
it is not possible to consider it as a tool of increasingly active civil society 2.0.
The importance of the best possible defining coining of both
aforementioned expressions rests in the fact that while in one case it is a
regular effort or even obligation of the society to resist them, while, on the
contrary, in the second case it can be about simulators of development of
the society itself with acts that are limiting, on one hand, but often using
illegal or at least controversial practices, however pursuing legitimate
goals. In the end, protest movements have always gone “to the edge” in the
history, unless not beyond it.
No postmodern definition, especially when concerning a highly
inventive environment with a liquid framework such as Internet activism
cannot have the ambition to be a closed and final one. After all, even very
similar acts can be assessed in completely different ways. We will try to
point out at the ambiguousness of the set criteria in the case of qualifying
particular acts on example of two cases.
4.1 Attack on the National Security Authority of the
Slovak Republic
In April 2006, a group of hackers broke into the network od the
National Security Authority of the Slovak Republic (NBÚ SR), when they
guessed the administrator password ‘nbusr123’, i.e. a simply composed
one consisting of the abbreviation of the authority and three consecutive
numbers. Subsequently, they uncovered several amateur errors thanks
to which they managed to get as far as to the database of the authority
(Hanker, 2006). On a specialised site blackohole.sk hackers published the
whole procedure, including the information that they downloaded an
18-gigabyte database from the archive of the NBÚ SR. At the end of their
article they stated a promise: ‘due to allegations of high treason and threats
of being burnt at the stake we will not publish the documents’ (Anonymous,
2006).
Hackers really never published the documents. Based on evidence
taking by the NBÚ SR, there was no material but only a moral damage
incurred (Tódová, 2009). In fact, the prosecutor’s office accused two
{ 34 } Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as political actors
students, however, the first instance court and the appellate court relieved
both of them with the argument that it has not been proven that it was
really them who were hiding themselves behind the nicknames of attackers.
Based on published information, the attack on NBÚ SR did not
have primarily a political motif. Attackers themselves, in the description
of their procedure, claim that “everything started with joking with friends
who noticed the error in email interface on the address webmail.nbusr.
sk, thanks to which it was possible to carry out system commands on the
server” (Anonymous, 2006). Hackers probably found the error in the system
which was, in their opinion, a sufficient temptation to not only uncover its
extent but also to get better reputation in their circles.
The attack on the institution such as the NBÚ SR can be
automatically assigned to a group of cyberterrorist attacks, due to its
severity. In any case, it is an essential service, which is the precondition
of the Denning’s definition. The National Security Authority is the central
body of state administration for protection of confidential facts, encryption
service and electronic signature. As a national security authority it performs
tasks arising under membership of the Slovak Republic in the NorthAtlantic Treaty Association (NATO) and the European Union (EU), provides
for protection to foreign confidential facts provided to the Slovak Republic
in accordance with international treaties and, at the same time, cooperates
with national security authorities of other countries and security authorities
of international organisations.
The hackers’ arguments are based on the claim that their purpose
was to point out at insufficient security of the National Security Authority
which is confirmed by the fact that they never published the collected
data. Even the prosecutor, at the court proceeding, admitted that the
defendants (later acquitted of the guilt), did a lot of preventive work when
they uncovered serious shortcomings in the system and, based on their
discovery, there was finally a progressive solution of the situation at the
NBÚ SR implemented.
Thus, if we add, to the two above mentioned criteria a third one,
which is the contribution to the development of the society, even despite
the nature of the target of the attack and its initial apolitical nature, this case
could be characterised as a hacktivist act; in particular with regard to the
action that was not, primarily, motivated by material gains, on the contrary,
immediately after publishing the act, hackers appealed to the attacked
institution to respond, i.e. to remove the shortcomings.
{ 35 } Roland Kyška
4.2 Wikileaks
The Wikileaks project certainly belongs to the best known and
most symptomatic cases of Internet hacktivism. Its authors publish on the
Internet such information they believe, that it is in the public interest to
make such information public. After all, the documents were, in many cases,
secret or confidential. In the first stage, operators of the site provided dozens
of thousands of secret messages of US diplomacy to renowned media all
over the world - New York Times, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, Le Monde and
El País. In the first stage, media selected and verified the information and
published in an editable format.
Thanks to Wikileaks, a lot of really important information has been
made available to the public, e.g. about murdering of civilians in Afghanistan,
torturing or mutilating bodies of victims by American soldiers. On the other
hand, publication of messages could significantly threaten human lives or
strategic goals. Briefly after publishing of information, the project founder
Julian Assange was contacted by several human rights organisations
that requested him to treat the information in a more careful manner.
Publishing names of Afghanis cooperating with the USA could easily turn
them into targets of Taliban. A much more negative reaction was aroused
by publication of the list of objects all over the world USA consider strategic
for its national security. It mostly included oil pipelines, communication
or transport hubs. The list could have become a list of potential terrorist
targets, whose importance was supported by their designation by the US
government as important ones.
In the case of published American diplomatic cables, espionage,
the court has sentenced, with final effect, soldier Bradley Manning to 35
years in prison for providing hundreds of thousands of documents on
the Wikileaks site. He has been convicted of 20 charges in total, including
seven espionage charges, five theft charges, two computer fraud charges,
five military counts of violating a lawful general regulation, one of wanton
publication of intelligence on the internet. According to the statement
Chelsea Manning6 provided to British daily The Guardian, she herself
did not feel like a peace activist or pacifist but rather like an advocate of
transparency who believes that the American people should be better
informed. 7
The founder of the portal, Julian Assange, was granted political
asylum in Ecuador and he has been staying at the embassy of the country
in London, which he cannot leave. Assange is prosecuted for sexual crimes
he allegedly committed in Sweden.
The effort to disclose certain errancies of American army or the
government and to provide the public with more information can be
deemed a contribution to the society. The scope and imprudence on
the part of Wikileaks in its approach to publishing the huge quantity of
6
In the meantime, the former
soldier Bradley Manning
requested for hormonal
treatment and change of the
gender; today she is known as
Chelsea Manning. She signed the
quoted document under that
name.
Statement of Chelsey Manning
is available on: http://www.
theguardian.com/world/
interactive/2013/oct/09/chelseamanning-statement-fulldocument.
7
{ 36 } Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as political actors
information shows that also in this case there is a really thin line between
criminal act and act in the benefit of the society. In such case we talk about
publishing the documents, not about criminal liability of soldier Manning,
who was, by the way, nominated by petition of anti-war activists to the
Nobel Peace Prize.
Publication of documents such as the list of strategically important
object can, according to the above definitions, border on cyberterrorist act.
On the contrary, publication of much information was clearly in the public
interest. However, can one activity negate another one?
Similar questions increasingly occur also in other cases, such as
concerning the currently probably best known whisteblower Edward
Snowden, who uncovered, in June 2013, a massive tapping by the National
Security Agency of the USA. Based on them, Americans illegally tapped
millions of common citizens, foreign politicians and global leaders (Marton,
2013: 6-7). Also Snowden argues that he wanted citizens to have more
information and revealed illegal activities of the government. On the other
hand, the government argues that his disclosures could help terrorists and
threaten activities of not only the USA but also of its allies.
Concluding remarks
It is necessary to perceive a substantial difference between premodern and modern communities. Individuals in the modern time are in
the state of continuous transformation, they must continuously redefine
themselves, become someone different that they have been so far (Bauman,
2010: 83). The Internet only accelerated the separation of place and space,
which is viewed by Giddens (2010: 24-25) as one of the elementary signs
of the modernity. In pre-modern societies, the place and space are equal
to a large extent, as spatial dimensions of the social life are, for majority
of the population and in most cases, determined by the ‘presence’ – local
activities. The rise of modernity separates the space from the place even
more by supporting relations between “absent” others who are territorially
distant from situation of immediate interactions. The place of action is not
structured by what is present on the stage; the ‘visible form’ of the place of
action hides distant relations that determine its nature.
Both above described phenomena should determine our view and
exploration of new features in the virtual space. Also two new phenomena
brought about by the Internet – hacktivism and cyberterrorism cannot be
lookup upon without being aware of post-modernity factors as mentioned
by Bauman and Giddens. Today, it is simpler than ever before to carry
our activities that are not bound to a place in the pre-modern sense.
Cyberterrorism and hacktivism are ideal examples of it; attacks can be made
from a completely different place than the one of their target. That turns
them into tools and weapons that make it possible not only to demonstrate
{ 37 } Roland Kyška
one’s civil opinions or disobedience but also to strongly intervene to the
international development, change our view of waging wars or guerrilla
attacks.
It is not easy to precisely determine often thin borderline between
two new phenomena accompanying the onset of the post-modern
information era – cyberterrorism and hacktivism. Virtual blockades, e-mail
bombs, altering web sites or viruses are often attributed to ‘hacktivism’, as
they have not claimed any casualties so far and have caused more serious
difficulties or financial damages, there are many who fear and warn that
such practices may outgrow to more complicated attacks in the real world.
Cyber attacks can thus act as the ‘power multiplier’ of another type of
attacks, for example bomb attacks, if they raise panic by publishing false
information on the web or by sabotaging financial communication or
emergency infrastructure (Martin, 2011: 149).
Most probably it is not possibly to exert any strictly categorising
judgments that could define and attribute different acts on the Internet to
one of two or potentially other groups. However, that should not prevent
from efforts to define these categories as precisely as possible and anchor
the concepts that can help better understand and classify continuously
cumulating “innovative” on-line acts in the future.
Continuous development of information and communication
technologies complicates this process to a large extent and requires
relentless concentration on the issue. Today, we can say to a certain level
of certainty that the highly inventive environment where they originate,
the sophisticated nature of attacks as well as (usually hidden and especially
financial) engagement of government in attacks makes them a new strong
tool of creating the policy.
{ 38 } Hacktivists or cyberterrorists?: Webactivists as political actors
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{ 41 } Filip Milačić
Filip Milačić
Sličan početak, različit
kraj. Konsolidacija
demokratije na
primjeru Crne Gore,
Hrvatske i Srbije
(1990- 2010)
Abstract
This article will examine the process of the consolidation of democracy
in Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. These countries are chosen for various of
reasons, among which one ‘possesses’ special scientific importance: those are
the countries with similar initial conditions and different outcomes. Under
similar initial conditions I understand the following: lack of liberal tradition,
the nature and length of previous authoritarian systems, system change as
control from above and creation of new states, the unresolved problem of the
statehood, ethnic heterogeneity and socio-economic development. Regarding
different outcomes, I argue the following: Croatia is more consolidated than
Montenegro and Serbia, but Montenegro is more consolidated then Serbia,
what I will test with Wolfgang Merkel´s model of four levels of consolidation of
democracy and measure with BTI (Bertelsmann Transformation Index).
So my puzzle is the following one: How can one explain, despite similar
initial conditions, such different outcomes?
The method that I use in order to give an answer to my puzzle is John
Stuart Mill’s Method of Difference (1843). And in accordance with this method,
I argue that these different outcomes are to be explained with actor-oriented
theories (key actors´ decisions) and constitutional engineering (institutions).
Causal analysis will be performed with explaining outcome process-tracing
form Beach and Pedersen (2012) and will include the statehood problem, as
an independent variable, as well as the influence of external factor (EU), as an
intervening variable.
Keywords: democratic consolidation, statehood, EU, process-tracing
Autor je doktorant na
Humbolt Univerzitetu, Berlin
(e-mail: [email protected]
com)
1 Success and Failure of the
Consolidation of Democracy.
The cases of Croatia,
Montenegro, and Serbia
(1990-2010)
{ 42 } Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010)
Uvod
Posmatrajući istraživanja transformacije sistema od pada
komunizma u istočnoj Evropi, može se doći do dva zaključka. Prvi, uprkos
kasnijem intenzivnom istraživanju defektnih demokratija, da se konstatovati
da su u fokusu istraživanja u navedenom periodu ipak bile uspješne
transformacije srednjeevropskih i baltičkih zemalja. Drugi, transformacije
država jugoistočne Evrope nisu naišle na veliko interesovanje, iako se
taj proces zbog brojnih posebnosti razlikuje od transformacija kod
ostalih postkomunističkih zemalja, što se ogleda u kombinaciji između
demokratizacije i nation-state building putem rata, a koja je dovela do
veoma bitnih razlika u pogledu aktera, njihovog manevarskog prostora,
njihovih zadataka, kao i do razlika u institucionalnim aranžmanima.
Ipak, navedeni nijesu jedini razlozi za svrsishodnost bavljenja
procesom konsolidacije demokratije u tri države jugoistočne Evrope (Crna
Gora, Hrvatska i Srbija) sa sljedećim ključnim pitanjem: koji su razlozi za
uspjeh i neuspjeh konsolidacije demokratije? Naučna važnost ovog primjera
da se vidjeti, prije svega, u činjenici da se ovdje radi o državama koje su
u proces transformacije ušle sa brojnim sličnostima, tj. sličnim polaznim
tačkama (similar initial conditions), a koje su prema brojnim autorima
odlučujuće kada je u pitanju uspjeh konsolidacije demokratije (Rustow,
1970; O´Donnell, Schmitter i Whitehead, 1986; Karl i Schmitter, 1991; Munck,
1994; Horowitz, 1994; von Beyme, 1994; Gunther, Diamandouros i Puhle,
1995; Linz i Stepan, 1996; Elster, Offe i Preuß, 1998): manjak liberalne tradicije;
isti karakter i trajnost prethodnih autoritarnih režima; istovjetna promjena
sistema koja je izvršena „sa vrha“, kao i kroz raspad stare i formiranje nove
države; neriješen problem državnosti; etnička heterogenost; i društvenoekonomski razvitak.1 Uprkos tome, na kraju procesa posmatranja (19902010), navedene države imaju različite rezultate (different outcomes)
u konsolidaciji demokratije, pri čemu hipoteza ovog rada glasi da je
Hrvatska konsolidovanija demokratija od Crne Gore i Srbije, dok je Crna
Gora konsolidovanija demokratija od Srbije. Mišljenja sam da su navedene
situacije, u kojima imamo slične polazne tačke, a različite rezultate, od
velikog naučnog značaja ne samo zbog toga što su rijetke, već jer takođe
pružaju priliku da se jasno vidi koje mjere i odluke vode ka konsolidaciji
demokratije, a koje ne.
Za navedenu tvrdnju o nivou konsolidacije demokratije biće
korišten model konsolidacije demokratije Volfganga Merkela (2010), a koji
se sastoji od četiri nivoa: konstitucionalna konsolidacija, pod čime Merkel
podrazumijeva konsolidaciju ključnih institucija, kao što su šef države, Vlada,
Parlament, sudski i izborni sistem; reprezentativna konsolidacija, koja se
odnosi na konsolidaciju partijskog sistema i interesnih grupa; konsolidacija
ponašanja, gdje Merkel naglašava ulogu potencijalnih veto igrača (vojska,
krupni kapital, paramilitarne i terorističke grupe, radikalni sindikati...)
2
Iako su u društvenoekonomskom razvitku prisutne
razlike, iz sledeća dva razloga
smatram da se njima ne mogu
pripisati različiti rezultati pri
konsolidaciji demokratije: u
slučaju sve tri države riječ je o
socio-ekonomskom razvitku koje
je Hantington klasifikovao kao
„tranzicijska zona“ (Huntington,
1991: 60); premisa teoretičara
modernizacije – „Što je država
bogatija, to su veće šanse da
će se demokratija održati“
(Lipset, 1959) - nije primjenjiva
na primjeru ovih država jer je
Srbija, uprkos većem društvenoekonomskom razvitku, 20 godina
kasnije manje konsolidovana
demokratija od Crne Gore.
{ 43 } Filip Milačić
koji svojim djelovanjem mogu ugroziti proces konsolidacije; i na kraju
konsolidacija civilnog društva i građanske kulture. Drugim riječima, hipoteza
ovog rada glasi da je iz perspektive institucionalne, reprezentativne, kao
i konsolidacije potencijalnih veto igrača, civilnog društva i građanske
kulture Hrvatska konsolidovanija od Crne Gore i Srbije, dok je Crna Gora
konsolidovanija od Srbije. Stoga se postavlja sljedeće pitanje: kako objasniti
ovakve rezultate?
1. Mil i „Method of Difference“
Metoda koja se čini najprikladnijom za jedan ovakav slučaj je
Milova (1843) Method of Difference, koja se upravo bavi sličnim početnim
uslovima i različitim ishodima. Riječima samog Mila:
„Ako slučaj u kojem se javlja fenomen pod istragom, i slučaj u kojem
se ne javlja, karakterišu sve zajedničke okolnosti, sem jedne, koja se samo
javlja u poslednjem; okolnost po kojoj se dva slučaja razlikuju je posledica,
razlog ili ključan dio razloga fenomena“ (Ibid: 391).
Poznato je da su brojni naučnici, kao i sam Mil, izrazili skeptičnost glede
uspješne upotrebe navedene metode (Mill, 1843; Skocpol i Somers, 1980; Van
Evera, 1996; George i Bennett, 2005). Razlozi njihove skepse treba tražiti u činjenici
da nije lako naći slučajeve koji su u tolikoj mjeri komparabilni, što je neophodno
da bi se ostvarila „kontrola“ koja važi za sine qua non svakog naučnog poduhvata.
Međutim, siguran sam da, zbog već navedenih slinosti, izabrani slučajevi
ispunjavaju uslove Metode različitosti i da su u dovoljnoj mjeri komparabilni za
uspostavljanje kontrole. Stoga se u radu prati jednostavna logika: konstalacije koje
se mogu naći kod sve tri države, ne mogu biti uzrok različitih rezultata, usled čega
se postavlja novo pitanje - kako ih objasniti iz ove perspektive?
2. Komplementarna upotreba različitih teorijskih
pristupa
Uspjesi i neuspjesi konsolidacije demokratije mogu se objasniti
različitim teorijama: teorijama o sistemima koje govore o presudnoj ulozi
ekonomije i društva; strukturalnim teorijama koje stavljaju naglasak na državu
i društvene klase; kulturnim teorijama kojima su kultura i religija najvažniji;
i teorijama o akterima koje uspjeh ili neuspjeh konsolidacije demokratije
vide u konkretnom političkom djelovanju. Tačnije, strukturalisti tvrde da su
šanse za uspjeh konsolidacije demokratije ˝path dependent˝ i određene
kriterijumima kao što su nivo razvijenosti, stope ekonomskog rasta, tajming,
stepen i način industrijalizacije, raspodjela moći između društvenih klasa i
blizina zapadnjačkoj kulturi. Na drugoj strani racionalisti minimiziraju ulogu
strukturnih faktora i smatraju da šanse u najvećoj mjeri zavise od strateških
odluka aktera. Drugim riječima, „strukturalista bi proučavao ogradu oko
{ 44 } Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010)
stoke, dok bi biheviorist proučavao aktivnosti stoke unutar granica ograde“
(McFarland citiran u Elster, 1993: 113). Suprotno od navedenog, mišljenja
sam da je konsolidacija demokratije suviše komplikovan proces da bi se
objasnio samo jednom teorijom. Analiza struktura, bez osvrta na aktere, i
obratno, sadržala bi previše manjkavosti. Stoga se priključujem mišljenju
brojnih autora da se putem komplementarne upotrebe različitih teorijskih
pristupa trebaju pokušati eliminisati manjkavosti pri objašnjenju fenomena
(Karl i Schmitter, 1991; Offe, 1994; Merkel, 1994; Mayntz i Scharpf, 1995;
Merkel i Puhle, 1999). S obzirom na to da pomenute sličnosti između tri
države eliminišu brojna potencijalna objašnjenja, „jer stanje koje je prisutno
u oba slučaja ne može biti odgovorno za razlike u njihovim rezultatima”
(George i Bennett, 2005: 156), dolazi se do zaključka da se razlike u
konsolidaciji demokratije mogu objasniti sa teorijama o akterima i njihovim
djelovanjem na mikro nivou. Naime, već navedene sličnosti (početni uslovi)
prouzrokovale su veoma slične strukturne prepreke (confining conditions)
(Karl, 1990: 7) i šanse, a koje su dovele do stvaranja veoma sličnih uslova i
manevarskih prostora za djelovanje aktera.
Na ovaj način će biti spojene strukturne i sistemske teorije sa
teorijama o akterima, jer se u ovom radu zastupa mišljenje brojnih autora
da su parametri koje ove teorije predstavljaju veoma bitni u procesu
konsolidacije demokratije, pri čemu čine da su brojne opcije ili putanje
moguće, na raspolaganju ili vjerovatne, tj. nemoguće, nisu na raspolaganju i
malo su vjerovatne (O´Donnell, Schmitter i Whitehead, 1986; Karl i Schmitter,
1991; Huntington, 1991; Merkel, 2010). Različiti rezultati triju država dokazuju
tzv. djelujući karakter politike i potvrđuju da slični strukturni faktori ne čine
da je rezultat unaprijed poznat, jer „demokratija još uvijek mora da bude
izabrana, implementirana i ovjekovječena od strane ‘izvršitelja’” (Schmitter,
1992: 159). Uspjeh, tj. neuspjeh u procesu demokratizacije je bio više
rezultat preferenci, strategija, ciljeva i percepcija relevantnih aktera, njihovih
odluka da prate partikularne ili opšte interese, njihove spremnosti da
sklope kompromise u vezi pravila igre, kao i postojanja dogovora elita (elite
settlement, elite pacts ili institutional garantismo) (Rustow, 1970; Przeworski,
1986, 1993; O´Donnell/Schmitter, 1986; Di Palma, 1990; Schmitter, 1992;
Burton, Gunther i Higley, 1992; Colomer, 1995).
Uz to, djelovanje političkih aktera analitički se povezuje sa
institucionalnim kontekstom, jer se čitav proces konsolidacije demokratije
ne može u potpunosti objasniti bez osvrtanja na institucije. Riječima Olsena
i Marča, „perspektiva koja vidi politiku kao organizovanu oko interakcije
pojedinačnih aktera ili događaja, da bude dopunjena sa perspektivom koja
politiku vidi kao zajednicu pravila, normi i institucija” (1989: 171). Drugim
riječima, izbor institucija (constitutional engineering), tj. način na koji su
demokratski konflikti organizovani, iz brojnih razloga igrao je veoma važnu
ulogu u procesu demokratizacije. Institucionalni okvir predstavlja ˝pravila
igre˝ jednog sistema i time manevarski prostor političkih aktera. Politička igra
se drugačije odvija u, primjera radi, predsjedničkom ili polu-predsjedničkom
{ 45 } Filip Milačić
sistemu sa većinskim izbornim sistemom u kojem dominiraju zero-sum igre
i rješenja, nego u parlamentarnom sistemu sa proporcionalnim izbornim
sistemom, kojeg krasi stvaranje koalicija, reprezentativnost i podjela
moći. Navedene karakteristike naročito dolaze do izražaja kada je riječ o
etnički heterogenim državama, kao što je slučaj s Crnom Gorom, Srbijom i
Hrvatskom. Štaviše, važnost institucija ogleda se i u tome da one „regulišu”
upotrebu i pristup moći, pri čemu neke aktere privilegiju, dok neke ne,
odnosno da „institucije utiču na rezultate [...] i [da] pojedini institucionalni
aranžmani mogu učiniti pojedine rezultate teško ostvarljivim” (Przeworski,
1993: 68). Od njihove „arhitekture” takođe zavisi da li posjeduju mogućnost
rješavanja problema, da li osiguravaju red i pružaju usluge, da li promovišu
inkluzivnost, koje političke aktere će stvoriti i kako će na njihovo djelovanje
uticati.
3. Kako doći od A do B?
Ključno pitanje je stoga sljedeće: kako iz perspektive teorije o
akterima i izbora institucija objasniti različite rezultate u konsolidaciji
demokratije? U ovom radu biće propagirana teza da se različiti rezultati
najbolje mogu objasniti uz pomoć varijable nation-state building problem.
No, takođe smatram da se stanje demokratije u sve tri države ne može u
potpunosti objasniti ako se nema u vidu i uticaj spoljnog faktora, tačnije
Evropske unije.
Međutim, nije samo dovoljno tvrditi da je A izazvalo B, i čitav proces
između njih klasifikovati kao black boxed, već se mora jasno pokazati kako
se u korelaciji između A i B došlo do takvog rezultata, pri čemu se uvodi
najvažniji dio analize- causal mechanisms. Oni se mogu definisati kao
„kompleksan sistem koji proizvodi rezultat uz interakciju brojnih djelova”
(Glennan citiran u Beach i Pedersen, 2012: 7) ili kao „vjerodostojne hipoteze,
ili skup vjerodostojnih hipoteza koje bi mogle biti objašnjenje društvenog
fenomena, pri čemu se objašnjenje bazira na interakcijama između
individua ili individua i pojedinih društvenih grupa” (Schelling, 1998: 32).
Velika važnost kauzalnih mehanizama ogleda se u činjenici da će se uz
njihovu pomoć identifikovati kauzalni put (causal path), lanac (causal chain)
i veze (causal links) između konsolidacije demokratije i nation-state building
problema, kao i uticaja EU.
4. Fundamentalni preduslov
Rješenje problema državnosti važi u komparativnoj politici za
fundamentalni preduslov demokratizacije političkog sistema, što potvrđuje
i činjenica da je to i jedini preduslov sa kojim su saglasni svi „konsolidolozi”
(Schmitter, 1995: 49). Za Rastoa je problem državnosti background condition
(1970: 350) bez čijeg ispunjenja, prema Šmiteru i Karlu, „ništa ne može
{ 46 } Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010)
biti ostvareno da se sistem pomjeri iz produžene neizvjesnoti tranzicije u
relativnu mirnoću (dosadu) konsolidacije” (1994: 184). Linc i Stepan tvrde
da „bez države ne može biti državljanstva; bez državljanstva ne može biti
demokratije” (1996: 28), dok Dal smatra da „kriterijum demokratskog procesa
pretpostavlja pravednost same teritorijalne jedinice”(1989: 207). Rueb (1996),
dalje, govori o tome da problem državnosti usporava konsolidaciju jer se
akteri bave okvirom u kojem će se procesi odvijati, a ne poboljšanjem već
postojećeg okvira. Pomenuto navodi na zaključak da „što je veći procenat
ljudi na jednoj teritoriji koji ne žele da budu članovi te teritorijalne jedinice,
kako god da je konstruisana, to će biti teže konsolidovati demokratiju u
okviru te teritorijalne jedinice” (Linz i Stepan, 1992: 124).
Stoga se u ovom radu polazi od toga da navedeni problem utiče
na tri elementa (Jellinek, 1905: 394): državna vlast, državna teritorija i narod.
Drugim riječima, kao preduslov funkcionisanja jedne demokratije važi da
politička zajednica ima jasne i priznate granice u okviru kojih ima monopol
na primjenu sile, u kojima važe određena pravila igre i sa jasnom predstavom
ko se podrazumijeva pod demos (narod). Ovaj problem je od početka
dominirao političkim procesima u sve tri države, pri čemu se u radu akcenat
stavlja na način na koji su politički akteri pokušali da ga riješe i kakav je uticaj
to imalo na konsolidaciju demokratije. Naime, u radu se analizira nationstate building politika aktera i njen uticaj na proces demokratizacije. A
usljed činjenice da su u sve tri države dominirali nacionalisti i nacionalistička
mobilizacija, pa time i nation-state building politika koju su karakterisali
nacionalizam, rat i isključivost, tvrdim da je ona prouzrokovala blokadu
demokratizacije, etnifikaciju političkog sistema i duboku polarizaciju
društva, što će biti predstavljeno na dva nivoa:
4.1 Karakteristike vladajuće nation-state
building politike
Problem državnosti za razvitak demokratije, iako važi za ogroman,
postaje još kompleksniji kada je riječ o heterogenim državama, što je
čak i Mil prije više od stotinu godina konstatovao, tvrdeći da je stvaranje
slobodnih institucija u takvim državama gotovo nemoguće (1873: 242).
Njegovo razmišljanje je i dalje aktuelno, pa tako Linc i Stepan smatraju da
„što je u većoj mjeri populacija države stvorena od različitih nacionalnih,
jezičkih, religioznih ili kulturnih društava, to će kompleksnija biti politika, jer
će dogovor o fundamentima demokratije biti još teži” (Linz i Stepan, 1994:
24). Navedenoj grupi država pripadaju i Crna Gora, Hrvatska i Srbija, pri
čemu se poslednje dvije mogu definisati i kao interno i eksterno heterogene
(Elster, 1991: 450). Jedna takva konstelacija se najbolje može opisati sa
Brubejkerovim trouglom - „nacionalne manjine, novonastala država u kojoj
žive, i eksterna nacionalna ‘matica’ kojoj pripadaju ili se može tumačiti kao
da joj pripadaju usled etnokulturne sličnosti, ali ne putem državljanstva”
{ 47 } Filip Milačić
(1995: 108). Dvije države, dakle, nije karakterisao samo problem manjina,
već i problem iredentizma, što je dodatno uticalo na nation-state building
politiku i razvitak same demokratije. Tačnije, takva konstelacija je iskorišćena
od političkih aktera, čije su pozicije bile ugrožene zbog početne liberalizacije
i demokratizacije, da propagiraju etnokratske političke strategije i da
svoje interese ostvare kroz etničko-nacionalističku mobilizaciju, što je Ofe
okarakterisao kao politička racionalnost etničke politike (1994: 147). Radi
opstanka na vlasti, oni ne samo da su naglašavali primordijalne identitete,
kao što su etnicitet i religija, već su i svjesno huškali protiv drugih etničkih
grupa, zbog čega je novonastali ideološki vakuum bio prilično brzo
ispunjen nacionalizmom. Nastali nacionalizam nije bio njegova „tolerantna”
verzija, u kojoj je „nacionalni identitet gurnut u domenu privatnog života i
kulture” (Fukuyama, 1994: 26), već onaj koji propagira dominaciju kulture,
jezika i religije jedne grupe, isključenje „stranih” elemenata i dehumanizaciju
drugih etničkih grupa. Igranje na nacionalističku kartu bila je plodna taktika
ne samo zbog mogućnosti eksploatisanja neprijateljstava iz prošlosti, već i
zbog tadašnjih dubokih društveno-ekonomskih nesigurnosti i poteškoća.
Problem iredentizma je naročito pogađao Srbiju, jer je čak 40 odsto srpske
populacije živjelo van njenih granica. Otuda i nacionalistička politika „svi
Srbi u jednoj državi” i jedan, u poređenju sa Hrvatskom, mnogo agresivniji
nacionalizam. U Hrvatskoj je nacionalizam bio u najvećoj mjeri prema unutra
orijentisan, a u njegovom manjem dijelu prema vani- pokušaj prisvajanja
Herceg-Bosne. Iako je nacionalizam u Crnoj Gori bio u mnogo manjoj mjeri
izražen nego u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji, i procesima u ovoj državi je u potpunosti
dominirao nation-state building problem, sa sljedećim ključnim pitanjima:
da li država treba da bude nezavisna? Koja komponenta nacionalnog
identiteta treba da bude dominantna (crnogorska ili srpska)? Koja je uloga
u tom procesu namijenjena manjinama?
Navedena Brubejkerova trougao konstelacija još je povoljnija za
nacionalističke elite kada se dodatno radi o raspadu država, pri čemu se
moraju povući nove granice i definisati demos, kao što je to bio slučaj sa
navedenim državama. Produkt jednog takvog scenarija je bila nation state
building politika putem rata, s ciljem stvaranja „prirodnih granica” i etnički
čistih područja. U slučajevima ove tri države radi se o sledećim ratovima, a
koji se takođe mogu nazvati i ratovi protiv demokratizacije: rat u Hrvatskoj,
Bosni i na Kosovu. Važnost ovih ratova ne ogleda se samo u tome što usljed
njih preduslovi razvitka demokratskog sistema nisu bili ispunjeni: politička
zajednica sa jasnim i priznatim granicama u okviru kojih ima monopol na
primjenu sile, u kojima važe određena pravila igre i sa jasnom predstavom
ko se podrazumijeva pod demos. Rat je takođe bio izvor legitimiteta
nacionalističkih elita i njihovog autoritarnog režima po principu „nekada su
oni opravdavali rat; sada rat opravdava njih” (Varady i Dimitrijević, 1994: 79)
i doveo je do stvaranja totalitarne nacionalne svijesti. Uz to, rat propagira
centralizaciju, disciplinu i hijerarhiju, ograničava ljudska i politička prava,
{ 48 } Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010)
sprečava politički pluralizam i stvara veto igrače.
Kao važan dio nation state building politike takođe treba posmatrati
i isključivu nation building politiku koja je privilegovala nacionalne simbole
većinske nacije (jezik, religija i kulturni simboli) i koja je osnov državljanstva
bazirala na etničkoj pripadnosti, čime je isključena mogućnost višestrukih
identiteta, a što je Brubejker (1995) nazvao nationalizing state policies. Cilj
navedne politike je bio diskriminacija manjina, ograničavanje njihovih prava
i pretvaranje u građane drugog reda. Drugim riječima, ovdje je riječ o nationstate politici koja zagovara da je država „od i za naciju” (Ibid: 114), politika
koju je Hejden nazvao „ustavni nacionalizam”, i pod kojom podrazumijeva
„ustavno i pravno uređenje koje privileguje članove etnički definisane nacije
u odnosu na druge stanovnike države” (1992: 655). Jedna takva politika,
koja stavlja akcenat na etnos, zajedničku kulturu, jezik, religiju i mitove, a
ne na demos i na pojedinačnog građanina, i koja takođe propagira da se
suverenitet nalazi u rukama jedne etnički definisane nacije, nema dodirnih
tačaka sa principima liberalne demokratije.
Pored već navedenih iredenta i problema sa manjinama, Ofe
navodi još devet razloga koji gore skiciranu etnifikaciju političkog života
objašnjavaju kao racionalnu strategiju političkih aktera, i koji su u velikoj
mjeri primjenjivi u slučajevima Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1994: 151):
prevazilaženje starog režima, ekonomska funkcija granica, slabost državne
vlasti, sjećanje i anticipacija neprijateljstava, etnički identitet kao kolektivni
resurs, etnicitet kao strateški resurs elita, nestanak asocijativnih struktura,
nepostojanje ravnoteže sukoba i nacionalizam kao izvor solidarnosti. Uz
navedenih devet razloga, dodao bih još jedan, koji je igrao veoma važnu
ulogu u slučaju triju država- potiskivanje i ublažavanje dubokih društvenoekonomskih nesigurnosti i poteškoća kroz dramatizaciju etničkih
konfrotacija i kroz potenciranje nacionalne ujedinjenosti na bazi mitova.
4.2 Konkretan uticaj vladajuće nation-state building
politike na konsolidaciju demokratije
Kroz sljedeće kauzalne mehanizme biće predstavljeno kako je
nation-state building politika političkih aktera uticala na sva četiri nivoa
konsolidacije demokratije Merkelovog modela:
4.2.1. Uticaj na konstitucionalnu konsolidaciju
- Kauzalni mehanizam 1a: nation-state building politika, koja
je podrazumijevala institucionalizaciju i donošenje ustava iz etničke
perspektive, sprječavala je konsolidaciju demokratije. To je sprovedeno
na sljedeći način: veoma moćan predsjednik države; nepostojanje
konsenzualnih elemenata; isključive institucije.
- Kauzalni mehanizam 1b: politički akteri iskoristili su nation-state
{ 49 } Filip Milačić
building problem da krše demokratska pravila igre. Nacija i nacionalna
nezavisnost opravdavali su kršenje pravila demokratije, što je sprovedeno
na sljedeći način: stvaranje neformalnih institucija i personalizacija moći;
dominacija egzekutive; deinstitucionalizacija političkih sukoba i zloupotreba
postojećih institucija.
Iz etničke paradigme, koja je zauzimala centralno mjesto, rodile
su se strategije koje su državu smatrale za instrument jedne nacije, a što
je trebalo da oslika i institucionalna arhitektura. Ovdje je riječ o jednom
negativnom uticaju jer akteri nisu sprovodili strategiju, kao što je npr.
Lajphartov (1984) model konsocijativne demokratije (consociational
democracy), ili neki drugi sličan institucionalni aranžman koji „čini da se
umjerenost isplati” (Horowitz citiran u Diamond i Plattner, 1994: 23), a što bi
bilo za očekivati jer se radi o etnički heterogenim državama. Tako se, primjera
radi, iz navedene perspektive mogu objasniti izborni sistemi koji nisu sadržali
elemente pozitivne diskriminacije manjina, s ciljem njihovog uključenja u
proces donošenja odluka, kao i institucionalno veoma moćni predsjednici
države u slučaju Srbije i Hrvatske. Jedna takva koncentracija moći u rukama
predsjednika pospješuje zero sum igre, i na taj način smanjuje podsticaje
za stvaranje koalicija i dogovora pri rješavanju društvenih problema, što
heterogena društva dodatno polarizuje. Moćni predsjednici bili su produkt
dominantne nation-state building politike, sa ciljem da u kriznim vremenima
predstavlaju jedinstvo čitavog naroda (većinske nacije) i njegovog „svetog
cilja”, kao i da budu predstavnici etničko-nacionalističke mobilizacije, a
ne pouvoir neutre (Rueb, 1994: 280) djelovanja. Takva konstelacija bila je
„pozivnica” za autokratsko djelovanje jer je lider odgovoran „samo njegovom
narodu” (Varady i Dimitrijević, 1994: 80), što je dovelo da eliminisanja checks
and balances i kontrole njegove moći, kao i do degradiranja ostalih institucija
sistema.
Osim toga, političko vođstvo je iskoristilo nation-state building problem
da u ime nacije,„viših razloga”i„svetih ciljeva”sprovede i legitimiše antipluralističke,
antidemokratske, antiliberalne i autoritarne mjere, što je, između ostalog, uspjelo
kroz„njegovanje” postojanja stranih i domaćih neprijatelja. I dok je za vrijeme rata
to bila „druga strana”, nakon njega je tu ulogu preuzela domaća opozicija koja
je optuživana za izdaju nacionalnih interesa i na takav način tretirana. Štaviše,
u ime „nacionalnog oslobođenja” vršena je ne samo zloupotreba institucija,
već i sprovođena institucionalizacija sa ciljem osiguranja rezultata u skladu sa
partikularnim interesima.3 Premise „institucionalizacija neizvjesnosti” (Przeworski,
1993: 63) ili „rezultati su neizvjesni, dok pravila to ne mogu biti” (Di Palma,
1990: 44) nisu igrale nikakvu ulogu, već se institucionalizacija može opisati
kao „napravljena od krojača za krojača” (Elster, 1998). Sve tri države je takođe
karakterisala deinstitucionalizacija političkih konflikata i premještanje procesa
donošenja odluka iz formalnih i legitimnih u neformalne institucije. U slučaju
Srbije i Hrvatske to su bili krugovi ljudi oko predsjednika države, dok su u slučaju
Crne Gore to bili najviši funkcioneri vladajuće partije, koji su vladali u oligarhskom
stilu, što dodatno potvrđuje činjenicu da je demokratsko ustrojstvo u ove tri
3
Primjera radi, u Hrvatskoj
su se svi izbori u devedesetim
godinama održali po drugačijim
izbornim zakonima.
{ 50 } Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010)
države bila samo fasada.
4.2.2. Uticaj na reprezentativnu konsolidaciju
- Kauzalni mehanizam 2: nation-state building politika dovela je
do etnifikacije partijskog, kao i sistema interesnih grupa, što je sprječavalo
konsolidaciju demokratije. Partijski sistemi su se „zahvaljujući” problemu
državnosti i iz njega nastaloj nacionalističkoj politici razvili na osnovama
etničke konfliktne linije, koju ne karakterišu samo zero sum igre, već i u kojoj
etničke teme imaju prednost u odnosu na sve ostale. Razvoj partijskog
sistema na etničkoj osnovi doveo je do stvaranja nacionalističkih i etničkih
partija, čiji je partikularistički i isključivi program izazvao oštru polarizaciju
u društvu: na jednom polu su se nalazile etno-nacionalističke partije, a na
drugom snage koje su se zalagale za pluralističko društvo. Uz to, partije
koje propagiraju prijatelj-neprijatelj podjele, kao i podjele na osnovu
nacionalnosti, rase, jezika ili religije mogu se klasifikovati kao klijentelističke
(Kitschelt, 1999: 59). Dominacija klijentelističkih partija ne samo da sprječava
konsolidaciju demokratije, već i pospješuje razvitak autoritarnog sistema.
Ove tri države nisu bile plodno tle za takav razvitak partijskog
sistema isključivo zbog etničke heterogenosti, već i zbog nerazvijenosti
drugih konfliktnih linija: centar-periferija, grad-selo, religija-sekularna država
i kapital-rad. Njihovim nedostatkom ne samo da nije bilo moguće stvaranje
tzv. cross-cutting cleavages, što bi u velikoj mjeri spriječilo rasplamsavanje
etničkog konflikta, već su zbog njihovog nedostatka etnicitet i nacionalizam
bile jedine kategorije na koje bi se kolektivno djelovanje moglo orjentisati
(Offe, 1994: 167). Jedan takav scenario sprječavao je konsolidovanje
demokratije, jer na etničkim osnovama konsolidovan partijski sistem dovodi
do sumnje, a ne povjerenja, neprijateljstva, a ne ljudskosti, polarizacije, a
ne sposobnosti za kompromis, kao i šikaniranja, a ne tolerancije (Diamond,
1994: 19). Drugim riječima, takav scenario isključuje stvaranje kompromisa
koji su osnova demokratskog sistema, jer ovdje nije riječ o „manje ili više”,
već o „ili-ili” konfliktima (Elster, Offe i Preuß, 1998: 147), propagira sistem
vrijednosti koji važi za neupitan, kao i shvatanje političkih procesa na sledeći
način: postoje dva mišljenja, moje i ono pogrešno. Stoga takav partijski
sistem karakteriše visok stepen fragmentacije, ekstremizma i polarizacije, te
se klasifikuje kao polarizujući pluralizam (Sartori, 1976: 131).
5. Uticaj na konsolidaciju ponašanja neformalnih
političkih aktera (potencijalnih veto igrača)
- Kauzalni mehanizam 3: nation-state building politika putem rata
dovela je do stvaranja moćnih veto igrača, koji su sprječavali konsolidaciju
demokratije. Etno-radikalna politika stvorila je moćne aktere koji su pokušali
da svoje uske interese ostvare izvan institucija sistema i protiv njegovih
legitimnih predstavnika. Najmoćniji od njih, koje takođe treba posmatrati i
{ 51 } Filip Milačić
kao veto igrače, nalazili su se u policiji i vojsci (obavještajne službe i specijalne
jedinice),4 kao i u vidu nacionalističkih i etničkih grupa (kasnije udruženja
branitelja i dobrovoljaca). Uz to, misljenja sam da pravoslavnu i katoličku
crkvu takođe treba smatrati za moćne veto igrače, iako one nisu direktan
produkt nacionalističke politike. Međutim, s njihovom politikom u vezi
problema državnosti one su aktivno sprječavale konsolidaciju demokratije.
6. Uticaj na konsolidaciju civilnog društva i
građanske kulture:
- Kauzalni mehanizam 4: nation-state building politika dovela je do
razvitka civilnog društva na etničkoj i religijskoj osnovi, što je sprječavalo
konsolidaciju demokratije. Na primjeru triju država potvrđuje se Bermanova
teza o prisnom odnosu između nacionalizma i razvitka necivilizovanog
društva (citiran u Croissant, Lauth i Merkel, 2000: 25), tj. razvitka „mračne
strane” civilnog društva. Razvitak civilnog društva na etničkoj i religijskoj
osnovi jako se razlikuje od Patnamovog ili Tokvilovog shvatanja civilnog
društva, jer je u ovom slučaju etnicitet dominantna integraciona snaga.
Privrženost aktera nenasilju, kao i religijskoj i političkoj toleranciji, tj.
civilnom društvu kao „ideološkoj pijaci” (Diamond, 1994: 6) ne postoji. Ali
zato postoje kategorije kao što su unutrašnji neprijatelj i peta kolona, koje
dominiraju diskursom civilnog društva. Socijalni kapital koji takva društva
proizvode i od kojeg, prema Patnamu (1993), zavisi kvalitet demokratskih
i asocijativnih struktura, samo je rezervisan za jednu etničku grupu, zbog
čega takva društva ne samo da ne njeguje toleranciju i pravednost, već ne
posjeduju ni edukativnu i integracionu funkciju, što sprječava konsolidaciju
demokratije (Croissant, Lauth i Merkel, 2000: 27). Štaviše, takva civilna društva
jako su podržavana od strane autoritarnih režima jer ona predstavljaju
organizacioni potencijal koji može biti iskorišten od autoritarnih lidera za
njihove partikularne interese (Ibid: 39). Naime, na etničkoj osnovi razvijeno
civilno društvo doprinosi polarizaciji društva, olakšava nastanak populističke
i plebiscitarne politike, i takođe olakšava „napade” egzekutive na druge dvije
grane vlasti, kao i ograničavanje političkih i građanskih prava manjina. Uz to,
jedno takvo civilno društvo ne može obavljati funkcije zaštite, posredovanja,
socijalizacije, komunikacije i zajedništva, koje se smatraju veoma važnim za
razvitak demokratije i njenu konsolidaciju.
Nation-state building problem u Hrvatskoj je riješen 1998.
godine, kada je i posljednja oblast, istočna Slavonija, reintegrisana, a time i
sproveden državni monopol nad primjenom sile na čitavoj teritoriji. Takođe
treba i napomenuti da se četiri godine ranije hrvatsko vođstvo udaljilo od
važnog dijela nation-state building politike- prisvajanje Herceg-Bosne.
Crna Gora je 2006. godine postala od svih strana priznata nezavisna
država. Međutim, nation-state building problem time nije u potpunosti
riješen, jer identitetska pitanja i dalje igraju veoma važnu ulogu u
4
Primjera radi, Jedinica za
specijalne operacije (JSO)
Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova
Srbije.
{ 52 } Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010)
crnogorskom političkom životu. Ovaj problem u Srbiji nije bio značajan samo
zbog snažnog nacionalizma i projekta „Velika Srbija”, već i zbog albanske
manjine koja nije željela da bude dio nove srbijanske političke zajednice.
Problem državnosti u Srbiji još uvijek nije riješen jer zvanična vlada, kao i
gotovo čitava opozicija i dalje vide Kosovo kao dio Srbije. Stoga u Srbiji niti
jedan element ovog problema nije riješen: ko se smatra za demos, jasne i
priznate granice, kao i monopol na upotrebu silu u okviru njih.
Imajući navedeno u vidu, razlike u konsolidaciji demokratije upravo
polaze od toga što je Hrvatska ne samo prva, nego i jedina u potpunosti
riješila problem državnosti, tj. najranije je počela da se bavi procesima u
okviru, a ne više samim okvirom. Razlike u konsolidaciji demokratije u
slučajevima Crne Gore i Srbije takođe se objašnjavaju činjenicom da je Crna
Gora velikim dijelom riješila taj problem, dok u Srbiji taj problem još uvijek
dominira političkim životom.
7. Važnost spoljnog faktora
Iako se u ovom radu tvrdi da je proces demokratizacije proces na
koji, prije svega, najviše utiču domaći akteri, takođe se propagira teza da on
ima i spoljne aspekte, a ne da je par excellence unutrašnja stvar (Schmitter,
1996: 27). Tačnije, polazi se od toga da na ovaj proces takođe mogu uticati
i spoljni faktori, pri čemu oni ne igraju podređenu, već važnu ulogu. No,
na kraju sve zavisi od odluka ključnih domaćih aktera, jer, kako je to Barnel
slikovito opisao, „možete dovesti konja do vode, ali ga ne možete natjerati
da je pije” (2004: 113).
Važnost pozitivnog uticaja spoljnih faktora na proces
demokratizacije potencirana je od brojnih autora (Di Palma, 1990;
Huntington, 1991; von Beyme, 1994; Linz i Stepan, 1996; Carothers, 1999;
Pridham, 2005; Merkel, 2010). Uprkos tome, stiče se utisak da ova varijabla
nije dovoljno razrađena i da je djelimično potcijenjena kada je riječ o
tranziciji, i naročito konsolidaciji demokratije, a za šta postoje konkretni
razlozi- ne samo da analizu konkretnog uticaja nije empirijski i teorijski lako
obuhvatiti, već je nju i analitički i konceptualno teško ocijeniti i evaluirati.
Iako postoje brojne međunarodne organizacije koje se bave „promocijom
demokratije”, mišljenja sam da je Evropska unija daleko najuspješnija od
njih, što potvrđuju i primjeri Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije. Evropska unija ne
samo da je značajno doprinijela konsolidaciji demokratije u ove tri države,
već bi taj proces bio sporiji, a možda čak i zaustavljen, da nije bilo uticaja EU.
Etnički konflikti i stvaranje hibridnih režima doveli su do toga da je tranzicija
ka demokratiji u ovim državama trajala gotovo jednu dekadu. Stoga podsticaj
u vidu članstva u EU, za razliku od drugih istočnih i srednjeevropskih država,
nije igrao nikakvu ulogu u tranzicionom procesu triju država. Vlast tadašnjeg
političkog vođstva bazirala se na mjerama koje nisu bile kompatibilne sa
liberalnom demokratijom, te za njih benefiti članstva nisu bili atraktivni,
{ 53 } Filip Milačić
jer bi podrazumijevali odustajanje od takvih mjera. Uticaj potencijalnog
članstva u EU dolazi tek kasnije, kada ove države dostignu status izborne
demokratije.5 No, ovdje se postavlja veoma važno pitanje- kako je EU bila u
poziciji da vrši tako značajan uticaj, tj. zašto je EU bila uspješnija od ostalih
spoljnih faktora? Za navedeno su zaslužna četiri faktora:
Najprije, da bi uticaj EU uopšte mogao da bude uspješan, mora
postojati „nepoklapanje između evropskih institucija i unutrašnjih struktura”
(Risse, Cowles i Caporaso, 2001: 7), pri čemu može biti riječ o institucionalnom
nepoklapanju ili o nepoklapanju u vezi sa politikama (Boerzel i Risse, 2000:
5). Ovaj preduslov pomenuti autori povezuju sa pritiskom za usvajanje
(adaptational pressure) glede pravila, pri čemu slabo poklapanje (poor
fit) implicira mogućnost snažnog, a dobro poklapanje (good fit) slabog
pritiska za usvajanje (Risse, Cowles i Caporaso, 2001: 2). Autori tako dolaze
do zaključka da države, u kojima su institucionalna konfiguracija i policies
kompatibilni s institucionalnom konfiguracijom i politikama EU, neće
podlijegati jakom pritisku za usvajanje pravila (Ibid). Drugim riječima,
najbolji uslovi za efektivnu i uspješnu promociju demokratije se nalaze u
zemljama sa defektnom demokratijom, jer se one nalaze u tranzicionom
procesu (Bunce i Wolchik, 2005; Merkel, 2010).
otom, važnost uloge EU u ovim procesima omogućena je kroz
unutrašnje prilike. Ne samo da je u sve tri države među političkom elitom
bio prisutan pro-evropski konsenzus, čime je članstvo u EU dobilo status
nacionalnog cilja ili status „javne nužnosti” (Grzymala-Busse i Innes, 2003:
65), već su evropske integracije, i sa njima povezane nade o zapadnjačkom
blagostanju, uživale jaku podršku u čitavom društvu.
Dalje, politički kriterijumi za članstvo u EU (tzv. Kopenhaški
kriterijumi) u velikoj mjeri su kompatibilni s kriterijumima konsolidovane
demokratije, zbog čega ovdje može biti riječi o demokratizaciji kroz
integraciju. Ili, riječima Volfganga Merkela, „podsticaj da budu članice kluba
bogatih evropskih demokratija i da dođu u priliku da uživaju trgovinske,
ekonomske, kao i strukturne subvencije, pokazao se kao snažan disciplinujući
faktor za elite na putu ka konsolidovanoj demokratiji” (2010: 445).
Konačno, proces pristupanja EU, koji se sastoji od više etapa i
nagrada u vidu finansijske podrške i institucionalnog vezivanja, i koji na
kraju vodi do punog članstva kao glavne nagrade, veoma je pogodan za
sprovođenje političkog uslovljavanja (political conditionality). Navedeni
proces se može okarakterisati kao gate-keeping proces (Grabbe, 2001:
1020) ili continuous negotiations (Schelling cit. u Kelley, 2004: 46) u kojem
svaka faza predstavlja pregovaranje sa posledicama za narednu fazu, što
omogućava EU da zaustavi proces zbog neispunjavanja uslova, ili, pak, da
nagradi državu kandidata zbog urađenih zadataka (prelazak na novu fazu),
čime se pospješuje ispunjavanje uslova.
5
Tek u maju 1999. godine
Evropska komisija je preporučila
stvaranje Sporazuma o
stabilizaciji i pridruživanju,
što važi za početak procesa
pridruženja.
{ 54 } Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010)
8. Uticaj EU na konsolidaciju demokratije
Dajući odgovor na prethodno, dolazi se do ključnog pitanja o ulozi
spoljnog faktora: na koji način konkretno je EU uticala na konsolidaciju
demokratije? Evropska integracija u vidu uslovljavanja za članstvo, tj. političkog
uslovljavanja (political conditionality) sa top-down strategijom doprinijela je
konsolidaciji demokratije kroz dolje prikazani kauzalni mehanizam:6
8.1. Uticaj na konstitucionalnu konsolidaciju
Kauzalni mehanizam: uticaj EU na parametre djelovanja političkih
aktera (interese i preference) doveo je do promjene institucionalne
konfiguracije sistema, što je doprinijelo konsolidaciji demokratije. Podsticaj
u vidu članstva u klubu bogatih evropskih demokratija igrao je ulogu
katalizatora za reforme u sve tri države. Puno članstvo u EU važilo je kao
nagrada za sprovođenje reformi, što je uticalo na preference, opcije i
interese političkih aktera. To je dovelo da promjene njihovog etnokratskog,
isključivog, antipluralističkog i antidemokratskog parametra djelovanja,
koji politiku vidi kao „politiku kao rat”, a ne kao „politiku kao pregovaranje”
(Sartori, 1987: 224) i koji nema dodirnih tačaka sa konstitucionalizmom,
ljudskim pravima i ostalim elementima liberalne demokratije. A to je, dalje,
dovelo da sljedećih institucionalnih promjena: ukidanje institucionalizacije
iz etničke perspektive; ukidanje neformalnih institucija; odustajanje od
instrumentalizacije postojećih institucija i deinstitucionalizacije političkih
konflikata; uvođenje sistema checks and balances. Drugim riječima, pozitivna
uloga EU ogleda se u „sprovođenju demokratizacije kroz institucionalizaciju
demokratskog vladanja” (Pridham, 2005: 98).
Iako se u radu tvrdi da je EU imala direktan uticaj jedino na
konstitucionalnu konsolidaciju, EU je kroz sledeće kriterijume za članstvo
imala i indirektan uticaj na konsolidaciju partijskog sistema: manjinska prava
i državljanstvo za sve, puna saradnja sa međunarodnim sudom u Hagu, kao i
politika dobrog susjedstva. Prihvatanje i ispunjavanje ovih kriterijuma, čime
je napuštena nacionalistička politika i čime su oslabljene nacionalističke
stranke, imalo je pozitivan efekat na tada etnificirani partijski sistem.
6
Kao najintenzivniji period
uticaja EU na konsolidaciju
demokratije posmatram
fazu koju su Šimelfenih i
Zedelmajer nazvali democratic
conditionality (2005: 211).
Ona podrazumijeva period od
početka procesa pridruživanja
pa sve do početka pregovaranja
o članstvu.
9. Kako objasniti razlike?
Iako se u slučaju sve tri države može konstatovati snažan uticaj
Evropske unije na konsolidaciju demokratije, ipak ne možemo govoriti o
istom stepenu efikasnosti i uspješnosti. Na kraju 2010. godine Hrvatska
se nalazi pred završetkom pregovora o članstvu, Crna Gora ima status
kandidata za članstvo, a Srbija se još uvijek bori da ga dobije, što dovodi do
još jednog važnog pitanja- kako objasniti ove razlike?7
7
Navedene razlike su zadržane
do danas, tj. i u 2014. godini su
prisutne. Hrvatska je punopravna
članica Evropske unije, Crna Gora
se već drugu godinu nalazi u
procesu pristupnih pregovora,
dok su sa Srbijom ovi pregovori
tek otvoreni pod izvjesnim
uslovima.
{ 55 } Filip Milačić
Mišljenja sam da se navedene razlike najbolje mogu objasniti
uz pomoć modela koji su razvili Šimelfenih i Zedelmajer (2005), a koji je
baziran na sledećem ključnom pitanju - kako, zašto i pod kojim uslovima
država, koja nije članica EU, usvaja pravila koja zahtijeva EU, i kako njihovo
sprovođenje utiče na domaći politički sistem? Tačnije, autori nude tri vrste
objašnjenja - the external incentives model, social learning model i lessondrawing model (Ibid: 9). Prvi model, koji predviđa usvajanje pravila kao uslov
za nagradu, čini se najpogodnijim za objašnjenje razlika. Riječ je o modelu
racionalnog izbora koji je orijentisan prema akterima, koji stavlja akcenat
na to kako EU utiče na ponašanje aktera kroz pozitivne i negativne mjere,
i sastoji se od četiri elementa (jasnoća uslova, veličina i brzina nagrada,
kredibilitet uslovljavanja, veto igrači i troškovi usvajanja) (Ibid: 12). A imajući
u vidu činjenicu da su prva tri elementa bila ista za sve tri države, razlike
se mogu naći u četvrtom elementu - veto igrači i troškovi usvajanja. Naime, razlike se mogu objasniti različitim kontekstima, tj. uslovima
u kojima je vršen uticaj, jer je Hrvatska jedina od ovih država ušla u taj proces
sa riješenim pitanjem državnosti. U slučaju Crne Gore i Srbije neriješeni
problem državnosti proizveo je veći broj veto igrača, kao i veće troškove
usvajanja pravila, što je onemogućilo još efektivniji uticaj EU na konsolidaciju
njihovih demokratija. U brojnim slučajevima političkim akterima u Crnoj
Gori i Srbiji benefiti pristupanja EU bili su manji od eventualnih troškova
usvajanja određenih pravila i mjera, što se poklapa sa tezom Šimelfeniha i
Zedelmajera da „vlada usvaja pravila Evropske unije ukoliko benefiti nagrada
od strane EU premašuju unutrašnje troškove usvajanja” (Ibid). Navedeno
potvrđuje i činjenica da je Crna Gora napravila najveće korake ka članstvu
u EU upravo od momenta kada je postala nezavisna država i u velikoj mjeri
riješila problem državnosti.
Zaključak
Iako je primarni cilj ovog rada da se prikaže i analizira uticaj nationstate building problema, kao i uticaja spoljnog faktora na konsolidaciju
demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije, mišljenja sam da
prikazani konkretan način njihovog uticaja na demokratske procese,
tj. razvijeni kauzalni mehanizmi i hipoteze, u velikom dijelu mogu biti
generalizovani i na druge primjere primijenjeni. Uticaj nation-state building
problema, kao i promocija demokratije uz pomoć spoljnih faktora su dvije
stavke, koje se tiču nemalog broja država. U navedenom se takođe može
ogledati relevantnost i značaj mog rada.
{ 56 } Sličan početak, različit kraj. Konsolidacija demokratije na primjeru Crne Gore, Hrvatske i Srbije (1990- 2010)
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{ 59 } Slaven Živković
Slaven Živković
From ‘people’s
revolution’ to
‘democratic elections’:
U.S. foreign policy
towards Egypt
Abstract
Political protests and demands for changes in the region of Southwest
Asia and Northeast Africa, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, are the biggest challenge
faced by the U.S. foreign policy during the presidential term of Barrack Obama.
The Egyptian revolution from the beginning of 2011 is the clearest example
of the ‘awakening of the people’ and is one of the few that truly arose from
dissatisfaction of Egyptians. The United States seemed to be caught completely
unprepared by the revolution. In only a couple of days, the White House made
a shift from supporting President Mubarak to openly supporting the opposition
parties. Even after the fall of Mubarak, the Obama administration did not fully
grasp the complexity of the situation in Egypt. Democracy, contrary to the
expectations of many in Washington DC, could not take root overnight. The
power and the influence of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ were underestimated. The
consequences of the US policies toward Egypt, contributing to the escalation
of crisis in this country, can still be felt today. At the same time, the American
diplomacy no longer appears to have the same amount of influence in the land
of the Sahara and the Nile.
Keywords:
Barrack Obama
the United States, Foreign policy, Egypt, Arab spring,
The author is an
undergraduate student at
Faculty of Political Sciences,
University of Montenegro
(e-mail: [email protected]
yahoo.com)
1 Od narodne revolucije
do demokratskih izbora:
američka spoljna politika
prema Egiptu
{ 60 } From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt
Introduction
The so-called ‘awakening of the people’ throughout the Arab
world, in a region called the Middle, or Near East in the geopolitics, is the
greatest challenge in foreign policy faced by the administration of Barrack
Obama. Arab Spring, or Jasmine revolution, issued protests, rebellions, and
important political developments in Northeast Africa, and Southwest Asia.
The people, fighting in the streets, tried to replace autocratic regimes that
had up to several decades of ‘experience’ in power. The demands were
more or less the same in every country of the Arab world; people have
felt the injustice and wanted democracy, right here and now. Regimes,
hardened in their own despotism, lost touch with those they ruled. Day by
day, their policies lost trust of the people, and themselves slowly became
the minority. The result, in such circumstances, was as expected - they
were faced with the inevitable revolution. That is why the most important
question was not what prompted the people to revolt, but why did it take
so long (International Crisis Group, 2011: 6)?
Although from the first moment, when he was chosen by the
American people as the president, Barack Obama insisted that the United
States unconditionally support the democratic aspirations of all peoples at
any point of the world, the Arab Spring caught the U.S. foreign policy on
the wrong foot in certain moments. The results achieved during the Arab
Spring have imposed a number of issues for America. There was a need to
review the way White House promoted democratic values abroad, or accept
the fact that there will be democracies in the world that are not friendly
to U.S. (Morse, 2012: 2). The 2011 revolution in Egypt directly imposed this
question, when the Mubarak’s autocratic, but friendly regime to the United
States, has been destroyed and the government has been taken, through
democratic means, by a political structure strongly colored by the Muslim
ideology.
The way America had treated the crisis in Egypt from its beginning
shows that many decisions were made momentarily and that the entire
policy was not well thought out and planned for long enough. Such
positioning in the first days of the revolution, made it significantly harder
for the U.S. to clearly state what they wanted in the days of a new Egyptian
turmoil, considered by many authors to be a military coup. Democratic
values, as the Holy Grail that America disseminates throughout the world,
were not loud enough, in the days when the military forced the first
democratically elected President of Egypt Mohamed Morsi to leave his rule.
Since the situation in Egypt is a constantly evolving one, it is important
to have in mind that this article tends to examine the U.S. foreign policy
towards Egypt from the days of the revolution to the first elections in the
post-Mubarak era. This period gives the major facts that determined the
shaky position of United States in all later Egyptian crisis moments. The goal
is not to display the situation up to nowadays.
{ 61 } Slaven Živković
1. From realism to idealism and back?
– The basics of Barrack Obama’s foreign policy
Among many authors, but also among the citizens of America, for
a long time it was believed that with the election of Barack Obama as the
president, the U.S. foreign and security policy had gone through a change
from Bush’s realism to Obama’s idealism. Such an opinion was dominant
in the early days of Obama’s term. However, the passion for idealism
was quickly replaced with the actual view of Obama’s moves, and the
understanding that his actions are largely a matter of pragmatism. In fact,
Obama was progressive, where it was possible, and pragmatic, where it was
necessary. Pragmatism was, after all, dominant (Indyk et al. 2012: 3).
The difference is evident in many examples. Obama made a
rather friendly handshake with Hugo Chavez who, during the previous
administration, was not allowed to be anywhere close to the President
of the United States. In addition, Obama signed with Russia a new START
(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), with a very positive attitude and good
faith that it would be respected. His Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
(2011) refused to talk with the Chinese about human rights issues and put
forward a rather surprising remark that ‘the United States already knows
China’s position on the matter’. Although Obama has put human rights and
promotion of democracy in the center of the flag which U.S. foreign policy
should have flown. To show how important democracy is for him, both at
the national level, and in the whole world community, he invested great
efforts to transfer decision-making process from G8 to G20. However, that
body suffers constant criticism from other countries that it is ‘self-appointed’
and ‘makes decisions that others cannot control’.
The framework, in which Obama places the U.S. foreign policy,
was already in sight in 2007, in his article for ‘Foreign Affairs’ at a time
when he was a Senator of Illinois, and when he fought for the Democratic
Party’s presidential nomination. Under the strong influence of his famous
predecessors Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy,
Obama said that America’s leading role in the world must be restored,
including: solving the crisis in Iraq, and the final U.S. withdrawal from the
territory, the restructuring of their own army and stopping the spread of
nuclear weapons, a powerful struggle against terrorism with the renewal
of friendships with a number of countries around the world, insisting on
the establishment of democracy in as many countries, and restoring world
confidence in America. He recalled famous quotes of his predecessors:
’As Americans, we are not destroyers but builders’ (Roosevelt) [...] ‘If a free
society cannot help the many who are poor; it will not save the few who are
rich’ (Kennedy) (Obama, 2007).
Even then it was clear, and it was confirmed in the early days of
Obama’s term, that America, however, made a great shift, though hidden,
{ 62 } From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt
in foreign and security policy with the change of the first man. However, it
is perhaps exaggerated given the fact that Obama’s foreign policy suffers
from its desire to be un-Bush (Cohen, 2009: 2). He is trying to stop the
pendulum of American foreign policy, which cannot find a balance between
diplomacy and force, on the side of diplomacy. But his flirtation with ‘semiauthoritarian’, if not autocratic regimes, as well as slightly strained relations
with his old friend – Israel, has shown that things cannot overnight become
black and white. America neither in the eyes of its citizens, nor in the rest
of the world does enjoy the status of an exceptional nation anymore. Its
‘peaceful capitalism’, as the phrase that ‘won’ the Cold War, is not seen as its
greatness nowadays. ‘I believe in American excellence, as much as I doubt
that the British believe in British or Greeks in Greece’, Obama said in France.
Earlier in Ghana, he denied that the mission of America is to introduce
democracy around the world: ‘Every nation should live democracy in its
own way,2 according to its own tradition’. The shift is made from democracy
to human rights. When he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama, in
the most elegant way, stood for the defense of human rights: ‘While we
respect the unity and diversity of the cultures and traditions of each country,
America will always be a voice for those aspirations that are universal’.
It is no secret that Obama realized that security must be more
important than democracy. However, the American president must be
given praise for one thing; he restored the confidence of the world in
America. The media, around the world, were hurrying to proclaim him the
‘rock star of the world of politics.’ More or less in every country he visited he
was greeted warmly. According to the survey results of the ‘Pew Research
Center’ trusts in Europe that ‘America will do the right thing in world affairs,
increased from 25% from the Bush time, to the 85% at the time of Obama’
(Pew polls, July 2009). However, the question remains - what exactly can
Obama do with it? While trust has increased, a large number of decisions
and initiatives of Barack Obama have not been greeted with enthusiasm in
Europe. His promise to close the notorious Guantanamo prison contributed
to his popularity, but the Obama’s Administration is yet to find a way to do it.
Therefore, by carefully disguised rhetoric, Obama quickly returned
partly to Bush’s policy that the security of the United States is most important,
and does not shy to defend it using force. In his Nobel Peace Prize speech
said: ‘Whatever the mistakes made, the fact is that the United States helped
to ensure global security over the past six decades with the blood of our
citizens and the strength of our military.’ It was par excellence rhetoric of
Reagan and Bush, spoken in front of an audience that was not prone to
such words (Nau, 2010: 4). Democracy became a rear term in Obama’s
speeches. Similar happened with his administration, especially with Hillary
Clinton. That is the reason why, after his visit to Cairo in 2009, Ayman Nour, a
prominent opposition politician said: ‘His [Obama’s] less frequent talk about
democracy gives non-democratic regimes security that they will not deal
with the pressure. And it has a negative effect on democracy in the Arab
2 Critics could not resist to
connect this with Gorbachev’s
‘My Way’ doctrine, which is
often referred to under the
legendary Frank Sinatra’s
song lyrics, and created wellknown results in the USSR.
{ 63 } Slaven Živković
world’. The message to Obama was clear - you are either with them or you
are with us.
The impression is that the U.S. foreign policy favored Egypt’s
president, Hosni Mubarak, until 2011. The Egyptian regime was seen
as friendly. Once again, the practice has shown that when it comes to
non-democratic regimes, the U.S. is ready, if necessary, to look away.
Obama administration’s policy towards the Middle East largely remained
unchanged from the time of Bush Administration. Large peace conferences
were replaced by special envoys that Obama sent all over the world, but the
idea remains the same. For the area of the Middle East, George Mitchell was
appointed as a special envoy.
In these circumstances, and after all the turbulences and probably
not so visible but very evident turmoil in foreign policy, America has met the
‘awakening of Arab nations’. After the first waves of revolutions, apparently,
that policy turned out to be if not defeated, then knocked-out a few times.
2. The new Tunisia
– January revolution in Egypt
Protests are not something that is unknown to the Egyptians.
Despite the fact that the country had been ruled for several decades by a
single leader, and that people had had relatively little impact on the creation
of Egyptian politics, the Egyptians knew from time to time to express their
dissatisfaction by the means of street protests. The number of protesters
would, nonetheless, always be small and, as a rule, the police forces would
easily outnumber them. The rhetoric of protest in the past was not directly
aimed against the government, or the ruler. Protesters tried to criticize what
would be called in democratic societies ‘public policy’ without demanding
resignations.
The 21st century broke all the taboos. As of 2000, protests against
the second Palestinian intifada, then in 2003 against war in Iraq proved that
there is still smoldering dissatisfaction with the Government’s decisions.
In 2005, they have even gone a step further, for the first time Egyptians
protested about election results, and they did it immediately after the
elections. The first time one could hear the open charge that the elections
were rigged, and the protesters for the first time carried signs reading ‘Down
with Mubarak!’ although some of the leaders, mainly from the ‘Muslim
brotherhood’, did not like it’ (CNN, 12 December 2005). In those years there
was also a notable increase in activity and impact of the labor unions. They
began to exceed the requirements of the rule and set ultimatums. That was
certainly most visible in a conflict between their followers’ and well-armed
police forces during the protests in 6 and 7 April 2008, in the city of Mahalla
al-Kubra, due to rising food prices.
{ 64 } From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt
There were also a large number of groups in a number of social
networks that have worked on association of young people who are
dissatisfied with government. The young ones, who make 15 of the 17%
of Internet users in Egypt, were the leaders of the revolution (Khamis and
Vaughn, 2011: 4). However, until the end of January 2011, their actions
primarily related to the virtual world. They also run a number of innovations
in the study of theory of the organization of the masses. Analysts concurred
in the assessment that the revolution in Egypt was ‘retweeted ‘ (Lotan et
al. 2011). Therefore, it is widely accepted that in Tahrir Square in Cairo so
many people gathered on 25 January 2011 because the government made
a mistake in the virtual world - that morning they have limited internet
access to their citizens. Twitter has officially confirmed that their site was
blocked in Egypt on 25 January. Many were furious because of this, they
had nowhere else to go and they went out into the streets.
While the history of protests in Egypt is something that is clear and
public, it is much more difficult to answer the question of what was the
‘trigger’ of the revolution. The primary issue from the start was not: why the
revolution, but - why the revolution today? Answers can be found in several
events.
First are the parliamentary elections in Egypt in 2010. According
to the official results, National Democratic Party has once again beaten all
opposition parties, and even increased the number of votes and MPs in both
houses of parliament. It was an obvious mistake that kind of dictatorship
was not capable to afford. Mubarak has tried to maintain the illusion of
democracy, among Egyptians and the rest of the world. But that is not easy,
when his party has 420 seats in parliament, which consists of 518 seats, with
53 ‘independent’ members, many of whom were controlled by the NDP. The
real opposition was virtually left with no MP functions. Literally, they were
expelled to the street, and they began to work on the street. Mubarak’s
dictatorship gave the wrong answer to the question - if you can have 100%
of MPs, or 80%, what would you choose?
The police became increasingly brutal towards citizens. Day by day
the reports say the police clashed with the protesters, used live ammunition
and killed a large number of disgruntled citizens of Egypt (Al-Ahram, 3 June
2012). Mubarak’s dictatorship is slowly turning into a hardly bearable police
state.
However, most of analysts believe that all these events ‘spilled
gasoline on Egypt and the revolution in Tunisia lit the match’. Mohammed
Bouazizi, a Tunisian who set himself on fire in protest, started a revolution
in Tunisia, and a chain reaction in the Arab world, became an icon in Egypt.
Between 15 and 19 January at least seven people in Egypt attempted to
imitate Bouazizi’s act (International Crisis Group, 2011: 7). Dissatisfied people
raised the question - why couldn’t the screenplay in Tunisia be transferred
to Egypt?
{ 65 } Slaven Živković
It all started on the social networks. Facebook page launched an
initiative to gather people out to the streets on the 25 January to show
displeasure. This date was not chosen randomly. In Egypt, 25 January is
celebrated as the National Police Day. One of the demands of the protesters
Facebook page, which has been removed,3 was the resignation of Habib alAdliyya, Minister of the Interior. In addition, they requested the termination
of the ‘Emergency Law’ provisions and limitation of the presidential terms
to two mandates for one person, by new constitutional reforms. In a few
days, more than 80,000 people joined the Facebook group. Very important
was role of ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ organization that was proscribed under
Mubarak, but which was still known to be able to generate a large number
of people. They agreed to send its young members to protest, and rather
shyly invited their followers to join them. It was tricky, but fantastically
thought out move at a time, if we take into account what happened in the
following days and months. The ‘Muslim Brotherhood” was at the moment
probably the biggest winner of the Egyptian revolution.
A lot of unhappy people appeared on the streets of Cairo on 25
January. It is difficult to estimate their number, as the demonstrators were
scattered around Cairo. On the first day of the protest representatives of
Amnesty International noted that the police used ‘disproportionate and
unnecessary use of live rounds and lethal force against protesters, which
yesterday reportedly led to the death of another demonstrator’ (Amnesty
International Report, 28 January 2011). First estimates show that, a few
days later when the protests become a single place for all groups, on 28
January in Tahrir Square there were over 100,000 disgruntled (Sharp, 2011:
2). Until that day, the police arrested the 1,120 protesters. Those arrested
included some of the leading men of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, including
Mohammed Morsi. Those were probably the first protests in which the
police forces were outnumbered. In addition, police officers, realizing the
extent of the protests and the number of protesters faced by, refused to use
live ammunition and to openly confront the protesters. Therefore, President
Mubarak, in the night of 28 and 29 January replaced them. Army got out
on the streets in order to calm the situation. However, they also refused to
fire on 31 January, said the protesters have legitimate demands, and soon
joined them (Amnesty International Report, 1 February 2011).
On 29 January Mubarak, for the first time since the start of the
revolution, addressed the nation. He announced that he would dismantle
the government, and he appointed Ahmad Shafiq, the minister of aviation
at the time, as the prime minister. Also, he appointed intelligence Chief
Omar Suleiman as his vice president.4 The protests have continued. In
his second speech, on 1 February, when the ‘March of Millions’ brought
together more than 250,000 people on the streets of Cairo (Sharp, 2011: 6),
Mubarak called for a ‘peaceful transfer of power’. The crowd still continued
to chant ‘Leave! Leave!’ The protests continued the next day more intensely
than ever. On these days it became clear that the army was still on the
3 According to the
International Crisis Group,
their researchers accessed this
page on 24 January 2011,
and passed the requirements
of Protestants (International
Crisis Group, 2011)
According to the Article 82 of
the Egyptian constitution, the
Vice-president will take over
the country if the President is
unable to perform his duties.
In 30 years as president of
Egypt, Mubarak had never,
until 29 January 2011, named
the vice president.
4
{ 66 } From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt
side of the president, but not without dissenting opinions, among high,
but less influential, army officials. On 4 February mass protests continued,
but the peace talks began. Mohamed ElBaradei, Amr Moussa, Ahmed
Zewaii and many others worldwide prominent Egyptians sympathized with
the protesters. Promises that Mubarak will not run again for president in
elections that were scheduled for September of that year did not satisfy the
protesters neither. The most important demand was clear - Mubarak must
resign immediately! On the evening of 10 February Mubarak gave his last
speech as president of Egypt. He said he would not step down before the
September elections, and added: ‘Egypt is the land of my birth, and it will
be the country of my death’. On the very next day, 11 February (18th day of
the protest) Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that President Hosni
Mubarak resigned and that power, due to Mubarak’s orders, and because of
the complexity of the situation in which the country found itself, takes the
Supreme/Higher Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces – SCAF.
3. American foreign policy towards Egypt
– pro or contra revolution?
The U.S. policy toward Egypt is a very sensitive issue in the context
of the overall security and political situation in the Middle East. Historically,
the good relations between the two countries began in 1970 when Anwar
Sadat became the president of Egypt. Egypt has become increasingly
important for America especially in 1978 when the Camp David agreement
between Egypt and Israel was signed. This agreement served as the basis
for the peace treaty between the two countries, signed a year later in
Washington.5 The practice of the U.S. administration from that moment
is that any Egyptian regime, while respecting provisions of the signed
agreement, will have the support of the White House. That was the case
with Hosni Mubarak.
Despite numerous contradictory statements on the issue of
democratization and respect for human rights, and occasional and very
slight American insistence that Egypt must seriously address these issues,
relations between the two countries have evolved during Mubarak’s
presidency. Mild criticism coming from time to time from Cairo as well,
objected that White House does not put enough pressure on Israel to work
on reconciliation with Palestine, and thus compromise the foundation
on which America wants to build peace in the region. Nevertheless, the
level of assistance that the United States each year sends to Egypt remains
unchanged. Between 1948 and 2011 America, on behalf of the bilateral
agreement, helped Egypt with $71.6 billion, including $1.3 billion of annual
help, paid by the United States in the name of military aid to Egypt since
1987 until today (Sharp, 2013: 9). 6
5 The Israel-Egypt 1979 Peace
Treaty is available at: http://
www.icsresources.org/
content/primarysourcedocs/
IsraelEgyptPeaceTreaty.pdf
Egypt is the second largest
recipient of U.S. aid, after
Israel.
6
{ 67 } Slaven Živković
The aid, that the Americans have never conditioned with
reforms, focused mainly on solving problems that worried greatly the U.S.
Administration at the beginning of the revolution in Egypt on 25 January.
The issues that particularly worried the White House, Jeremy M. Sharp
(2011), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs in U.S. Congressional Research
Service, reduced to the following:
‘1. The safety and security of American citizens in Egypt and U.S.
efforts to evacuate Americans who want to leave Egypt; 2. The Egyptian
government’s respect for human rights and the security forces treatment
of civilian protesters; 3. The possible misuse of U.S.-supplied military
equipment to the Egyptian army if soldiers should fire upon peaceful
demonstrators; 4. The reform of the Egyptian political system into a more
democratic space with free and fair elections for president in the fall of
2011; 5. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics; 6. Any new
Egyptian government’s respect for Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel, its
commitments to securing the Suez Canal as an international waterway, and
plans for military and counterterrorism cooperation with the United States’.
Because of the fifth and sixth items on the list, an American professor
of political science Singerman Diane and Edward Walker, U.S. ambassador to
Egypt (1994-1997), agree that America will always stand for democratization.
However, history has many times witnessed cases that force with a very
undemocratic agenda comes to power through democratic means. Egypt
is the lifeblood of the Arab world, and the number of events in Egypt can
easily be replicated in the entire Arab world. That is the reason why all five
U.S. presidents supported Mubarak without insisting on democratization.
Obama is no exception. First of all – stability, than – reforms, if possible.
On 25 January, the first day of protests in Egypt, the Western
powers were still on the side of Mubarak. America immediately called on
all parties to refrain from using violence. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
said to Reuters attitude of the White House: ‘We support the fundamental
right of expression and assembly for all people and we urge that all parties
exercise restraint and refrain from violence. Our assessment is that the
Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the
legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people’ (Reuters, 25 January
2011). Obama did not talk about the situation in Egypt in his speech to
the Congress but, instead, once again pointed out that the United States
supported democratic aspirations of all peoples.
What in the words of Hillary Clinton seemed to many like a pretty
strong position, and a clear message of support for Mubarak, overnight
received a turn to the diplomatic understanding of the situation. America
slowly began to adjust to any changes. On the very next day, 26 January,
addressing the media after a meeting with Foreign Minister of Jordan Nasser
Judeh, Hillary Clinton felt the need to slightly revise her attitude towards
Egypt. Firstly she said that parties must refrain from the use of force. She
also pointed out the following:
{ 68 } From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt
‘We support the universal rights of the Egyptian people, including
the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly. And we
urge the Egyptian authorities not to prevent peaceful protests or block
communications, including social media sites. We believe strongly that
the Egyptian Government has an important opportunity at this moment
in time to implement political, economic, and social reforms to respond
to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people. The United
States is committed to working with Egypt and with the Egyptian people
to advance such goals’ (Clinton remarks, 26 January 2011).
Since Mubarak announced on 28 January that he would take
certain steps, to partially meet the demands of protesters, Obama talked
to him on the phone. In his observations on the situation in Egypt (Obama
remarks, 28 January 2011) the day after Mubarak speech, the U.S. president
said that his Egyptian counterpart, has an obligation to give his promises an
actual meaning. America has cooperated with Egypt on a number of issues,
especially those related to the stability of the Arab world, but that does not
mean that America will insist that Egypt meets the demands of its citizens
for economic, social and political reforms. He pointed out that ‘ultimately
the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people’ and that
he believed that ‘the Egyptian people want the same things that we all
want - a better life for ourselves and our children, and a government that is
fair and just and responsive’ (Ibid). He did not miss, however, to emphasize
that on the resolution of these issues America will work together with the
Egyptian government, and the Egyptian people. Once again, he left open
possibilities for all scenarios.
Between the two Obama’s speeches on the situation in Egypt,
in only a few days, Hillary Clinton, in an interview with ABC News, on 30
January avoided to answer the question on stability in Egypt. She said the
friendship between America and Egypt lasts for more than 30 years, but
that Mubarak’s government reform and the appointment of the first vicepresident during his presidency are not sufficient, and that the government
must take decisive steps to peaceful transition to a society towards
democracy (ABC News, 30th January 2011).7 Although carefully disguised,
no one missed to note that this is the first time since the protests began in
Egypt the highest American officials use these kind of formulations. And
Obama in his speech on 1 February, after another phone-meeting with
Mubarak finally resolutely called for the democratization of Egypt. He said
that the truth is in the communion of the people in the streets, and that
transformation must begin immediately:
‘Through thousands of years, Egypt has known many moments of
transformation. The voices of the Egyptian people tell us that this is one of those
moments; this is one of those times’, Obama said (Obama remarks, 1 February 2011).
And after almost a week since the beginning of the revolution, it
seemed that America with those Obama’s words, finally took a clear position
- sided with the protesters. Frank Wisner, the special U.S. envoy to Egypt,
7 See Clinton’s interview at:
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=QXGVZeW8ZL0.
{ 69 } Slaven Živković
whom Obama appointed to the position on 31 January, stirs the passions
on 5 February, when he said that Mubarak should stay in power to carry
out a constitutional reform (Politico, 6 February 2011). The White House
immediately distanced itself from Wisner’s words. Already on 10 February,
Obama said that the changes in Egypt must be irreversible and once
again called on the authorities to find a way to peacefully resolve the crisis
and implement reforms. When Egyptian vice-president Omar Suleiman
informed the public that Mubarak resigned, Obama in his speech pointed
out that this is ‘one of those moments in which we witness the making of
history‘, and with apparent pleasure emphasized that ‘the Egyptian people
spoke, his voice is heard and Egypt will never be the same’ (Obama remarks,
11 February 2011). 8
The first impression was that Egypt had triumphed. Mubarak
quickly replaced its presidential chair with the trial one. However, no one,
not even the United States was certain about how the situation would
develop in the coming months, as important as the 18 days of the Egyptian
revolution. The fight for a place in the new conditions of Egyptian political
life remained to be fought for the heterogeneous mass of protesters.
Although never explicitly expressed, it was clear that in America there
was fear that the new ruling power could be much less friendly to the U.S.
than Mubarak. Democracy was not really worth sacrificing four decades of
building good relations with Egypt.
4. Elections – the birth of democracy?
Reactions in most parts of the world were very positive after
Mubarak’s resignation. Congratulations to the Egyptian people were
coming from a number of addresses, even from those that by the last day
favored Mubarak. Concern that the country, from the hands of a dictator,
in what was estimated as very vulnerable state, goes into the hands of the
army and generals who have earned the rank under Mubarak, did not abate.
That is why Obama said to the military that ‘nothing less than
genuine democracy will carry the day’ (Obama remarks, 11 February 2011).
While Hillary Clinton, a few days later, said to Al Jazeera that she ‘hopes Egypt
will be a model in the region when it comes to democracy’ (Al Jazeera, 15
February 2011).
Yet, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was in full charge
of the affairs in Egypt. Passions subsided in Tahrir Square, but people knew
why they fought and did not want to just leave the achievements of the
revolution to the military leaders. Dissatisfaction in the first moments
of the protests, although not expressed, was still visibly smoldering in
Cairo and other cities. Demonstrators have failed to remain unique after
the revolution, and many have continued to work in different directions.
Prominent Egyptians Amr Moussa, Mohamed El Baradei and others have
8 Obama’s full speech
after Mubarak step
down is available at:
www.whitehouse.gov/
photos-and-video/
video/2011/02/11/
president-obama-historicday-egypt.
{ 70 } From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt
announced that they will run in the upcoming presidential election. The
Muslim Brotherhood has already announced on 15 February that they are
working on the establishing of a political party ‘Freedom and Justice Party’.
After the Revolution all conditions for this - many years banned but in life
very present - organization to start operating legally were met. This news
certainly could not have delighted United States (Sharp, 2011: 20). Party
was declared legal, and began real engagement already in June 2011. Its
top officials immediately said the party would not be as theocratic as has
been speculated, but also that it will have its candidate in the presidential
elections. Obama had previously said that the Muslim Brotherhood
is ‘one of the factions in Egypt, but not the one that has the support of
the majority’ (The Telegraph, 7 February 2011). The situation seems to be
quickly changing, and the White House had to meet the challenges. It was
becoming apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood will be a part of the post Mubarak government in Egypt. As much as ‘Islamophobia’ was represented
in American society, it was clear that Islamist forces have to play, probably
a key role in the transition to democracy in Arab societies (Fathy, 2011). On
1 July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that Obama administration
‘is ready for dialogue with all the peaceful forces that are committed to
resolving the problems in Egypt, by non-violent means, including the
Muslim Brotherhood’ (CNN, 1 July 2011).
The general opinion was that, a few months after Mubarak’s
resignation, transition does not run as planned. The people demanded the
withdrawal of Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, which was the ‘commander in
chief’ of the SCAF, and thereby the most powerful person in Egypt those
days. They believed that he is still an emblem of the Mubarak regime, and
is responsible for the slow transition. Yet the army was successful. SCAF
has remained at large, unique, while a group of young leaders from the
Muslim Brotherhood set aside and formed their own political party - the
Egyptian Current Party. They were looking for a new revolution. But, they
only succeeded to dissolve and further destabilize the opposition.
In such conditions with deep divisions and mild constitutional
changes, parliamentary elections in Egypt were ahead. On the eve of the
election on 21 July, SCAF announced that it will not allow foreign observers
to monitor the elections, they said - it would be a violation of Egyptian
sovereignty and interference in internal affairs.
Protests have continued up to the election. Political parties were
not satisfied with the pace of reform. Everybody wanted SCAF to hand
over the government to the civilians, or to the lower house of Parliament
established in April. Divisions in the opposition, however, were present.
While the bourgeois parties sought more time until the next parliamentary
and presidential elections, religious structures demanded immediate
elections. The reason is obvious - at that point, and in such vulnerable
Egypt, religious parties have had a better chance to take the victory.
{ 71 } Slaven Živković
However the situation in Egypt was such that public confidence
that the elections would be regular, and a true reflection of the will of the
Egyptian people, was too low. ‘I cannot see how a legitimate election can
take place when you have such state-sponsored brutality happening in the
heart of the capital city of the country,’ Democracy Now!’s correspondent
Sharif Abdel Kouddous stated (22 November 2011).
Elections for the lower house of Parliament were still held from
28 November 2011 to 11 January 2012. Islamist forces had won 360 seats
out of 498. ‘Freedom and Justice Party’ political structure of the Muslim
Brotherhood won by far the most votes, and alone had 235 seats in the newly
elected parliament. About 50 million of Egypt’s 85 million people had the
right to vote on a turnout of 54%. Although the number of analysts raced
in the assessment that the first free, democratic elections were held in the
Egypt, the reality however, was different. Notwithstanding the dominance
of the election it was clear that the Muslim forces will not be allowed to
govern Egypt. The army deliberately let them have their convincing victory.
As a last example of this behavior parliamentary elections in 2005 are cited.
U.S. President Bush before the election insisted on a greater degree of
democracy, Mubarak ‘gave’ to the members of the Muslim brotherhood 88
MPs in the elections, and Bush quickly realized that America would prefer
to see Mubarak’s autocratic regime in Egypt, than democracy in the hands
of the Muslim Brotherhood. ‘In this spirit, Anwar El- Sadat, Hosni Mubarak,
and now Mohamed Tantawi tactically empowered Islamists as a foil to gain
Western support, arms, and money’ (National Review, 6 December 2011). Thus, even before the election rumors and even some serious
evidence that SCAF secretly funded its ‘enemy’ party Muslim Brotherhood
and other Islamist forces appeared (Huffington Post, 23 November 2011).
Immediately after the elections, the new evidence had surfaced on a
number of electoral frauds’. One of the candidates, a Wafd Party candidate
named Ibrahim Kamel, explained how he acquired government documents
indicating that fewer than 40 million Egyptians were eligible to vote,
while the current elections included 52 million voters, implying 12 million
fraudulent ballots. This increase was achieved, he said, by taking the names
and identification numbers of legitimate voters and duplicating them
between two and 32 times in other electoral precincts’ (National Review, 24
January 2012).
Is Obama thinking as his predecessor?
Concluding remarks
Regardless of the election results SCAF has remained the most
important factor in the post-revolutionary Egypt, and its leader Mohammed
Hussein Tantawi head of the country. That is the reason in which Egyptians
saw the defeat of the revolution, from which had already been more than a
{ 72 } From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt
year, and there were no major reforms. Mubarak was in jail, but a revolution
was not just about him. Although the majority of Egyptians believe that
democracy is something worth fighting for - 67%, the percentage is still
lower than it was in a revolutionary 2011 - 71%. In contrast, the number of
those who believe that Islam must have a significant role in Egyptian political
life increased - 66 % in 2012, compared to 47 % in 2010, and approximately
60 % of the population believes that the ruling term structure must strictly
follow the Quran. For the first time after 25 January 2011 the advantage on
the side of those who believe that a strong economy is more important
than a good democracy is mild - 49% versus 48%. Only 37% of Egyptians
stated that the United States wants democracy in the Middle East (Pew
polls, July 2012). Are people tired?
Although the fighting continued, unabated at times, it was
noticeable that demonstrators were not so numerous. Tahrir Square was no
longer able to gather so many people. Even the Muslim Brotherhood could
not gather more than a few thousand protesters. At the time, apparently
most seem to be committed to waiting for presidential elections, and to
see whether the army will keep its promise and make the transfer of power
in the hands of the person who wins the free presidential election.
The revolution in Egypt, and all the events that followed showed
that Egypt is not a typical example of Arab spring rebellion. Although people
managed to overthrow Hosni Mubarak, they are yet to achieve any of the
greater revolutionary goals. Still one can say Egypt is at least on halfway to
reaching revolutionary dream. Although the first post-Mubarak Parliament
was dissolved just a few weeks after the election, they managed to elect
Constitutional Assembly, the body that has drafted a rather controversial
constitution. Battle for the more democratic constitutions is in the hearth
of the Arab spring revolts, so the Egypt example proves all the weakness
of the strongly divided masses through the Arab world regarding the long
term reforms. No matter how far revolution went, Arab world is still a shaky
area, where new dictators can insensibly arise every day: as a political party,
religious movement, army leaders or a single person.
America is no longer able to ‘bring’ the constitution to the new
democracies. In fact, their foreign policy towards Egypt proved that people
no longer believe in United States as world hegemonic leader, good cop
that will bring democracy by no means, throughout the world. Revolution
in Egypt and other numerous revolts in Arab world once again showed
the pragmatism of Barrack Obama and his Administration. This kind of crisis
management is in accordance with ‘foreign policy doctrine’ – first peace,
than democracy.
23 May 2012 is a historic day for Egypt on its path to democracy.
Regardless of all that followed. On that day the polls in the first presidential
election were opened. The first elections in which up to the closing of the
polling stations and the counting of ballots was not clear who will win. In
the days of voting, Egypt looked like Turkey and Pakistan, countries that are
{ 73 } Slaven Živković
de facto democratic, but in which the influence of the military is so strong
that people believe that military leaders can do what they want. Despite
minor incidents and conflicts, the general opinion is that the election days
in Egypt went very well.
Elections are democracy in practice. But the months that followed
and the events that happened in Egypt; unequivocally demonstrate once
again that ‘genuine democracy’ takes a lot more. A word of the United
States is not so loud. American foreign policy has paid the price of their
slow-match.
{ 74 } From ‘people’s revolution’ to ‘democratic elections’: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt
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{ 77 } Elma Huruz
Elma Huruz
Multikulturalna
kritika liberalnog
univerzalizma i
odbrana manjinskih
prava
Abstract
Liberal theorists attitudes about rights of minority cultures have
been very different so far. The main point of dispute between the egalitarian
liberals and multiculturalists is the role of government in protecting minority
communities. While one group of theorists argued that the liberal commitment
to universal rights and the concept of universal citizenship excludes acceptance
of group - differentiated rights, others have expressed their willingness to accept
the legal recognition of minority cultures and their rights. Modern liberal theory
holds that the state must comply with the principle of neutrality by ignoring
all differences among citizens, including individual, national and religious
affiliation, economic status, etc. Model of civic nationality (citizenship) should
contribute to it, which implies the right and duty of citizens to assume the
same rights and obligations in relation to the state. Some of the questions that
we’ll open in this text are: how does the recognition of the rights of minorities
and securing group-differentiated rights may affect the virtues and practices
of democratic citizenship? Could the recognition of minority communities
undermine the unity and stability of the wider political community?
Keywords:
multiculturalism, liberalism, minority rights, universal
citizenship, recognition, stability
Autorka je saradnica
u nastavi na Fakultetu
političkih nauka Univerziteta
u Sarajevu
(e-mail: [email protected]
ba)
1 Multicultural critique of
liberal universalism and
defense of minority rights
{ 78 } Multikulturalna kritika liberalnog univerzalizma i odbrana manjinskih prava
Uvod
Klasični liberalizam je na ekonomskom polju za svoje osnovno
načelo proglasio slobodno poduzetništvo dok je na političkom ta uloga
pripala slobodi pojedinca unutar države i naspram minimalistički pojmljene
pravne države. Liberalno shvatanje države je sadržano u karakteriziranju
njene prirode u čisto formalnim terminima preko kojih se želi reći kako
je država politička zajednica koja se konstituira putem formalnih i sasvim
besadržajnih procedura. Zapravo, što su državne procedure formalnije i
besadržajnije, to su one bliže liberalnom idealu univerzalnosti koji se može
najbolje iskazati pojmom „prazne univerzalnosti“.2 U tom smislu, liberalno
pojmljena država nema ništa s običajnom zajednicom kao što je to nacija,
koja se preovlađujuće konstituira na osnovu zajedničkog porijekla, tradicije
i jezika. S obzirom na to da se liberalna država, kao što je spomenuto,
integrira na osnovu formaliziranih procedura ispražnjenih od bilo kakvih
vrijednosnih predodžbi (što je suprotno od slučaja konstituiranja nacije),
ona formalno ne nudi svojim podanicima bilo kakve koncepcije pravde
ili dobrog života. Suprotno od toga, data je sloboda svakom pojedincu,
kao ljudskom biću koje je racionalno i sposobno napraviti vlastiti izbor, da
napravi odabir najboljeg načina života (Mesić, 2006: 15-21).
U periodu nakon Drugog svjetskog rata velika je važnost pridavana
ljudskim pravima. Vjerovalo se da će praksa garantiranja temeljnih
građanskih i političkih prava svim pojedincima neovisno o etničkoj, rasnoj
i drugoj vrsti pripadnosti, posredno rezultirati zaštitom kulturnih manjina.
Međutim, kako je činjenica da se moderna društva temelje na kulturnim
raznolikostima (od seksualne orijentacije, religije, preko klasne pripadnosti,
etniciteta do političkih nazora) postalo je jasno da je neophodno naći
poveznicu između svih tih moralno – filozofijskih i svih drugih nazora.
Stavovi liberala su se po pitanju priznanja manjinskih kultura tako oblikovali
u skladu s dvije osnovne pretpostavke koje nosi klasični liberalizam: prvom,
da je individua, a ne kolektiv osnovni politički subjekt, i drugom, da se
diskurs slobode veže za individuu, a nikako kolektiv. Ovakvim stavovima
se izražava sveprisutno antikolektivističko gledište koje je u prvom slučaju
otvoreno i eksplicitno za razliku od drugog, koje se posredno otkriva preko
eksplikacije značenja izraza „individualna sloboda/prava“. Ipak, argumenti
koje su pojedini liberali nudili u odbranu manjinskih prava su glasili: da
je individualna sloboda na neki način vezana uz pripadnost pojedinca
vlastitoj nacionalnoj skupini; te da grupno–diferencirana prava mogu biti
u službi promoviranja jednakosti između manjine i većine. Za drugu struju
liberalnog mišljenja, kojoj pripada Mill, pitanje nacionalnih manjina se može
riješiti jedino prisilnom asimilacijom ili ponovnim povlačenjem granica a
nikako davanjem manjinskih prava. Tri faktora su, prema Kymlickinom
mišljenju, svojim udruživanjem navela liberale da „prihvate pogrešno
primijenjen antagonizam prema priznanju nacionalnih prava: (1) gubitak
O tome šire vidjeti u: Divjak
(2007).
2
{ 79 } Elma Huruz
iluzija o sustavu manjinskih prava Lige naroda, (2) američki pokret za rasnu
desegregaciju i (3) ’etničko buđenje’ među useljeničkim skupinama u
Sjedinjenim Državama“ (Kymlicka, 2003: 85).
1. Problem manjinskih prava
Državnici su u periodu nakon Drugog svjetskog rata težili održati
međunarodni mir i stabilnost, te stoga nisu željeli raspravljati o problemu
manjinskih prava za koji su smatrali da bi mogao predstavljati faktor rizika.
Istina, odnosi etničkih manjina i većine su u različitim zemljama i različitim
periodima često bili plodno tlo za nicanje krvavih sukoba.3 U državama
zapadne demokratije čije je formiranje imalo etničku bazu, većinska
zajednica i etničke manjine koje u njima žive su „svjesni složenosti odnosa
većine i manjine, te opasnosti koje mogu iz toga proizaći, činili su i čine
brojne međusobne ustupke i kompromise dolazeći do određenih modela
koegzistencije. Međutim, niti su većinski narodi niti etničke manjine olako
pristajali na kompromise i ustupke” (Tatalović, 1998: 37). U svakoj od tih
država se ipak pojavljuje različit model koegzistencije većine i etničkih
manjina koji se izgrađuje u interakciji više faktora kao što su povijesno
naslijeđe te aktuelne međunarodne okolnosti. Zbog toga ne možemo
govoriti o jednom univerzalnom modelu koji bi bio primjenjiv u svim
slučajevima.
Ravnopravnost i nediskriminacija su osnovni zahtjevi manjinskih
skupina, što znači da se njihovi pripadnici tretiraju jednako kao i ostali
članovi šire političke zajednice. S obzirom na to da se članovi manjinskih
grupa u izvjesnoj mjeri ipak razlikuju od ostalih, dosljedna primjena
principa jednakosti bi ipak rezultirala njihovim neravnopravnim položajem.
Pojedince je moguće tretirati jednako, no, kada su grupe u pitanju tada treba
uzeti u obzir njihovu posebnost, tako da se principi jednakosti ne mogu
primjeniti i na pojedince i na grupe. Individualna prava daju pravnu snagu
i štite pojedinca dok grupna prava daju također prava pojedincima, ali kao
pripadnicima određenih grupa. „Politika grupnih prava može se etablirati
tako da etničkoj ili nacionalnoj zajednici dâ pravnu strukturu javnog društva
koje je ovlašteno za reguliranje važnih interesa pripadnika manjina kao što
su obrazovanje i kultura“ (Stanković i Pejnović, 2010b: 181). U međunarodnoj
zajednici danas je prihvaćen stav da pojedincima pripadaju građanska
i politička prava, dok ekonomska, socijalna i kulturna prava pripadaju i
pojedincima i grupama. Međutim, međunarodno priznanje grupnih prava
predstavlja veliki izazov “za definiranje prava grupa koje se unutar države
nalaze u nedominantnom i/ili diskriminacijskom položaju “ (Ibid: 84).
Liberali priznaju da je blagostanje svakog normalnog pojedinca
u velikoj mjeri determinirano članstvom u zajednici (Barry, 2006: 146148). Kymlicka kulturnoj pripadnosti daje veliki značaj čak je po važnosti
izjednačava s Rawlsovim primarnim dobrima svrstavajući je pod pravednost
Šire o tome vidjeti u:
Tatalović (1998).
3
{ 80 } Multikulturalna kritika liberalnog univerzalizma i odbrana manjinskih prava
(2004: 167). Ako bismo kulturnu pripadnost na taj način posmatrali,
objašnjava Kymlicka, onda bi bilo logično da se ukaže potreba za posebnim
političkim pravima i statusom za manjinske kulture. Priznavanje grupnih
prava manjina bi trebalo poslužiti kao garancija očuvanja njihovih identiteta
koji su, zbog svoje malobrojnosti naspram dominantne grupe, u velikoj
mjeri ugroženi i izloženi asimilaciji, njegov je ključni stav. S druge strane,
upravo se oko pitanja grupnih prava odvija većina diskusija i kritika unutar
savremenog liberalizma jer se preovlađujuće smatra da davanje grupnih
prava nije u skladu sa temeljnom liberalnom vrijednosti individualne
autonomije.
Da bismo uopšte govorili o pravima manjina potrebno je
definirati sam pojam manjina. U vezi sa sadržajem ovog pojma, i pored
kompleksnosti prilikom definiranja, možemo reći da postoji svojevrstan
konsenzus. „U najširem smislu riječi manjina označava subordiniranu ili
marginalnu skupinu koju se može definirati etničkim, rasnim ili nekim
drugim posebnim obilježjem ( ili biljegom)“ (Čačić-Kumpes, Kumpes, 2005:
174). Bitno je spomenuti da brojnost neke grupe nije presudan faktor koji
tu grupu određuje kao manjinu jer je mnogobrojnost bez moći i dalje usko
vezana za podređeni položaj, odnosno manjinski položaj u sociološkom
smislu riječi.4 Različiti su kriteriji koji služe kao baza za definiranje pojma
manjina, pa ga tako pojedini istraživači5 određuju uzevši u obzir manju
društvenu moć, neravnopravnu zastupljenost u politici, privredi, izloženost
netrpeljivostima, diskriminaciji, etnocentrizmu, kulturnoj isključenosti,
ugnjetavanju od strane većinske skupine i slično.
Glavno pitanje oko kojeg se vodi spor unutar liberalne teorije,
odnosno egalitarnih liberala i multikulturalista jeste uloga države u zaštiti
kulturnih zajednica. Kymlicka tako ističe da su u kulturno pluralnim društvima
neophodna grupna prava kako bi se spriječilo propadanje i nestanak
pojedinih kulturnih zajednica, odnosno kulturnih manjina (2004: 140-142).
Na drugoj strani Barry, sa pozicije egalitarnog liberala, tvrdi da je pitanje
kultura puno manji i ne tako učestao problem nego što to multikulturalisti
žele priznati (2006: 25). Multikulturalizam je, prema njegovom mišljenju,
politika koja nije sposobna uzeti u obzir svu kompleksnost nepovoljnog
položaja manjina te riješiti mnogo bitnija pitanja poput siromaštva. Zbog
toga bi teoretičari multikulturalizma trebali analizirati mnoge druge uzroke
zbog kojih su članovi neke skupine obespravljeni ili diskriminirani ne
zadržavajući se samo na kulturi, zaključuje Barry.
Posebna vrsta manjinske grupe čije definiranje iziskuje kompleksan
i veoma delikatan pristup jeste etnička manjina. Jednu od najobuhvatnijih
definicija i diferencijacija etničkih manjina nalazimo u teorijskim radovima
Willa Kymlicke, koji je bio i član ekspertne komisije angažirane na formiranju
prijedloga definicija etničkih manjina.6 Autori tih prijedloga razlikuju tri vrste
manjinskih skupina, koje i Kymlicka spominje: nacionalne manjine i etničke7
skupine te starosjedioce (urođenike) (Kymlicka, 2003: 31-32). Nacionalne
manjine Kymlicka opisuje kao „zajednice koje su oformile zaokružena i
Kao primjer možemo
navesti žene i crnce u
Južnoafričkoj Republici za
vrijeme aparthejda, koji su i
pored svoje nezanemarljive
brojnosti u manjinskom
brojčanom odnosu
zastupljeni u najuticajnijim
područjima mnogih društava,
u državnim institucijama i
strukturama gdje se donose
najvažnije odluke. Jednako
tako je bilo slučajeva kada su
brojno daleko manje skupine
imale mnogo veći uticaj
i povlastice u odnosu na
pripadnike većinske skupine
(najčešće slojevi koji su potekli
od nekadašnjih osvajača i
kolonizatora).
4
Jedan od uspješnijih
pokušaja definiranja pojma
manjina je učinio Francesko
Capotorti, specijalni izvjestitelj
UN-ove Potkomisije o
suzbijanju diskriminacije i
zaštitu manjina, u Studiji
o pravima koja pripadaju
etničkim, vjerskim i jezičnim
manjinama, koji kaže da je
to „brojčano manja grupa od
ostalog dijela stanovništva
jedne države, u položaju da
ne dominira, čiji članovi – koji
su državljani te države - imaju
s etničkog, vjerskog ili jezičnog
gledišta karakteristike po
kojima se razlikuju od ostalog
dijela stanovništva i koji,
barem implicitno, pokazuju
osjećaj solidarnosti u svrhu
očuvanja svoje kulture,
tradicije, vjere ili jezika” (E/
CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, para.
568.).
5
{ 81 } Elma Huruz
funkcionalna društva na svojim istorijskim zavičajnim teritorijama pre nego
što su bila uključena u veću državu“ (Kymlicka, 2001:37). On spominje
dvije vrste nacionalnih manjina, „nedržavotvorne nacije“ i „starosjedilačke
narode”, mada napominje da razlika između njih nije do kraja precizirana.
Nedržavotvorne nacije su nacije koje trenutno nemaju vlastitu državu,
odnosno državu u kojoj bi činili većinu, ali su u prošlosti imali osnove da
je zahtijevaju. Takve su nacije obično bile osvajane ili anektirane od neke
druge, veće države ili carstva, ili su bile ujedinjene s nekim kraljevstvom
preko kraljevskih vjenčanja (Ibid).
Karakteristika koju dijele i nedržavotvorne nacije i starosjedilačke
zajednice jeste da su se po pravilu opirali državnom građenju nacije i to
tako što su zahtijevali vlastite institucije samouprave koje bi funkcionirale
na njihovom vlastitom jeziku, vlastite škole, medije, sudove i slično. Oni
su u osnovi tražili neki oblik autonomije, obično regionalnog tipa no u
nekim ekstremnim slučajevima to je znalo poprimiti oblik zahtjeva za
otvorenom secesijom. Instrument koji je često korišten u te svrhe je
bio nacionalizam. Razlog tome je što dok „ideologija nacionalizma po
pravilu smatra punu nezavisnost kao ’normalnu’ i ’prirodnu’ krajnju tačku,
ekonomski ili demografski razlozi mogu da je za neke nacionalne manjine
učine neizvodljivom“ (Ibid). Druga vrsta manjinskih skupina koje Kymlicka
spominje su etničke skupine,8 a u tu grupu autor svrstava useljenike koji
su napustili svoju domovinu, odnosno vlastitu nacionalnu zajednicu, kako
bi se inkorporirali u neko društvo. Treću kategoriju čine starosjedioci. Oni,
kako kaže Kymlicka, posjeduju obilježja nacionalnih manjina, a naselili
su određeno područje prije većinskog stanovništva te su obično tada,
koloniziranjem i osvajanjima postali manjina. Zbog toga im pripadaju
posebna prava koja obuhvataju i pravo na potpunu samoupravu.
2. Neutralnost liberalne države
Zakonodavstva zapadnih demokratija se susreću s problemom
inkorporiranja manjina, a to se dešava jer je njihovo djelovanje orijentirano
samo na dva entiteta, državu i pojedinca. S obzirom na to da manjina
ne spada ni u jednu od navedenih kategorija, međunarodno pravo je
pokušalo naći rješenje u inkorporiranju manjina u oba pola. Tako su jednom
svrstavani u prvi entitet države, a u drugom slučaju prišlo se manjinskoj
zaštiti u obliku zaštite pojedinca (Stanković i Pejnović, 2010c:139). Na sličan
način je Kymlicka pokušao pomiriti liberalni individualizam sa modelom
očuvanja kulturne različitosti. On tvrdi da su pojedinci, u državama u kojima
postoji problem zaštite prava manjina, u društvo inkorporirani, ali ne po
univerzalističkom principu već na konsocijacijski način,9 odnosno prema
pripadnosti određenoj kulturnoj zajednici.
Savremena liberalna teorija, ipak, smatra da se država ne bi trebala
miješati u lične planove pojedinaca kao ni njihove koncepcije ispravnosti.
Kymlicka je učestvovao u
radu ekspertne grupe koja
je radila na formuliranju
definicije etničkih manjina
i njihovih prava. Grupu od
devet članova je angažirala
Fondacija Friedrich Naumann
s ciljem da se izradi nacrt
„Deklaracije o pravima
manjina“. O prijedlozima
okupljenih stručnjaka se više
puta raspravljalo na različitim
nivoima a 2000. godine
u Berlinu je Deklaracija
službeno usvojena. Iako je
to samo prijedlog koji se
dalje treba razmotriti, ipak
je Deklaracija proizvod do
sada najcjelovitijeg pristupa
u definiranju etničkih
manjinskih grupa i njihovih
prava.
6
Pojam nacionalne manjine,
i pored toga što je danas
u opštoj upotrebi, nije
precizno određen unutar
jedne međunarodno
prihvaćene pravne definicije
mada ni u akademskoj
literaturi nije drugačija
situacija. Jedno od složenijih
određenja je predložio J.J.
Preece koji smatra da je
“nacionalna manjina grupa
brojčano inferiorna ostatku
populacije neke države, u
nedominantnom položaju,
jasno određena i historijski
ustanovljena na teritoriju
te države, čiji članovi – kao
njezini državljani (nationals)
– posjeduju etnička, vjerska,
jezična ili kulturna obilježja
koja ih razlikuju od ostatka
stanovništva, te pokazuju,
barem implicitno, osjećaj
solidarnosti usmjeren na
očuvanje svoje kulture,
tradicije, vjere ili jezika”
(Preece, 1998:28). Jedno od
određenja pojma etničke
manjine ponudila je
Potkomisija za sprečavanje
7
{ 82 } Multikulturalna kritika liberalnog univerzalizma i odbrana manjinskih prava
„Neutralnost države očituje se u javnom djelovanju koje ignorira sve
različitosti među građanima, uključujući individualne, nacionalne i religijske
pripadnosti te ekonomski položaj, odnosno država sve građane treba
tretirati kao jednake“ (Stanković i Pejnović, 2010b: 172). Liberalna država
sukladno svojim temeljnim principima poput tolerancije i neutralnosti, ne
zalazi u poimanja i odluke pojedinaca o ispravnom načinu života. Jednako
tako, ona ne priznaje etničke ili bilo kakve druge kategorije koje bi djelile
društvo čineći tako svojevrsnu bazu za neku vrstu diskriminacije. Takav se
stav, posebno među egalitarnim liberalima,10 brani njegovim zalaganjem za
pravičnost, a koja se temelji na jednakom odnosu prema svim pojedincima.
Dakle, liberalni teoretičari „smatraju, s jedne strane, da su pojedinci
temeljna jedinica moralne vrijednosti, a s druge, da država nije prirodno
okruženje već nužnost tako dugo dok osigurava uvjete života pojedinca”
(Stanković i Pejnović, 2010a: 80). Liberali naročito negativan stav zauzimaju
protiv davanja grupnih prava teokratskim i patrijarhalnim kulturama, koje
zahtijevaju političku vlast kako bi primjenili tradicionalnu rodnu podjelu
uloga i vjersku ortodoksiju u ime kulturne solidarnosti i čistoće, a pri tome
čine štetu individualnoj autonomiji. Neutralnost države11 je sadržana u
javnom djelovanju koje sve različitosti među građanima, bilo da su to
nacionalne, religijske, ekonomske i slično, smatra nebitnim te ih ignorira
postupajući prema svima jednako.
Liberalizam je, da bi ostvario princip jednakosti i potisnuo parcijalne
identitete, izgradio model građanskog državljanstva (citizenship)12 koji
podrazumijeva pravo i obavezu građana (državljana) da preuzmu jednaka
prava i obaveze u odnosu na državu. Nepostojanje zajedničkog identiteta
liberalni teoretičari su vidjeli kao prijetnju stabilnosti zajednice. Zbog toga
su model univerzalnog građanstva13 kao oblik zajedničkog identiteta
proglasili poželjnim. Ovaj model je trebalo da poveže pojedince liberalno–
demokratske političke zajednice i to uz pomoć formiranja zajedničkih
političkih vrijednosti i političke kulture.14 Građansko državljanstvo sve ljude
unutar jedne države posmatra kao slobodne i jednake, bez obzira na realne
razlike, ponajprije kulturne, koje ih obilježavaju. Većina zapadnih teoretičara,
priznajući činjenicu kulturne raznolikosti, su se ipak služili „idealiziranim
modelom polisa u kojem sugrađani dijele zajedničko porijeklo, jezik i
kulturu“ (Brčić, 2008: 52). Na taj način su zanemarili činjenicu da su politička
i kulturna zajednica15 dva koegzistirajuća ali sasvim odvojena entiteta. Taj je
model međutim, smatra Kymlicka, zastario i nije primjenjiv za heterogene
političke zajednice, koje čine većinu u savremenom svijetu (2003: 77).
Postoji velika mogućnost da se upravo nametanjem opšteg
građanskog statusa manjinama, koje sebe smatraju posebnim nacijama i
narodima, podstaknu konfliktne situacije u multinacionalnoj državi. Mnogi
pokušaji da se uništi osjećaj zasebnog identiteta nisu rezultirali ničim do
učvršćavanjem tog osjećaja na jednoj, te averziji prema ideji zajedničkog,
nametnutog identiteta na drugoj strani. Tu averziju je moguće ublažiti
jedino ukoliko bi se kod ljudi stvorio osjećaj solidarnosti koji je neophodan
diskriminacije i zaštitu
manjina prema kojem su
etničke manjine definirane
kao “nedominantne skupine
stanovništva, koje imaju i
žele očuvati etničke, vjerske ili
jezične tradicije ili osobine po
kojima se razlikuju od ostalog
stanovništva” (cit. prema
Tatalović, 1998: 39).
Etnički principi nisu
nužno štetni po građanske
principe niti za normalno
funkcioniranje demokratije,
međutim, vrijedi i obratno,
građanski principi ne moraju
ugrožavati postojanje i
provođenje etničkih principa.
Pored toga, Kymlicka
opaža kako su prisutni
konstantni napori od strane
etno-nacionalnih grupa
da održe svoj identitet,
institucije a često i da dobiju
samoupravno područje. Šire
o tome vidjeti u: Kymlicka
(2008).
8
Konsocijativizam koristi
obično kao politička metoda
i način uređivanja odnosa
između etničkih zajednica
sa ciljem sprječavanja
sukoba. Da bi bili efikasni,
konsocijacijski sistemi traže
da se ispune barem tri
osnovna uslova. Prvi uslov
kojeg Lijphart spominje jeste
da suprostavljene etničke
zajednice moraju odustati
od ambicije za brzom
integracijom ili asimilacijom
članova drugih zajednica u
vlastitu zajednicu, odnosno
odustati od stvaranja
nacionalne države.
Drugo, političke vođe etničkih
zajednica moraju imati
visok stepen motivacije
za rješavanje sukoba i
očuvanje konsocijacijskog
sistema dugi niz godina te se
plašiti posljedica mogućeg
etničkog nasilja ili rata. I treće,
političke vođe suprostavljenih
9
{ 83 } Elma Huruz
za stabilnost i socijalno jedinstvo unutar jedne političke zajednice.
Iris Marion Young ideal univerzalnog građanstva posmatra kao
jedan od načina koji je u multikulturalnim društvima upotrebljivan da bi se
došlo do asimilacije manjina u dominantnu kulturu. Pri tome, „različitost” je
trebalo potisnuti u privatnu sferu istovremeno kreirajući homogeni politički
prostor (1990: 99-102). Politika „priznavanja razlike“16 je, kako kaže Young,
politika poštivanja socijalnih i političkih nejednakosti ljudi u društvu. Ta je
politika, međutim, sredstvo koje se primjenjuje radi smanjivanja razlika, kao
i političke i socijalne inkluzije. Primarni zahtjevi pravde su, prema njenom
mišljenju, usmjereni najprije na strukturalnu nejednakost pa tek onda
na kulturne razlike koje se mogu uočiti između pojedinaca i grupa (Ibid:
75). Inače, glavni koncept unutar shvatanja pravednosti koje iznosi Young
jeste koncept kulture. Prema tom konceptu pravedno društvo zahtijeva
međusobno uvažavanje i ravnopravnost između pripadnika društva.
Barry, s pozicije liberalnog egalitarizma, podržava model
građanskog državljanstva koji, prema njegovom mišljenju, uvažava i
kulturne razlike. S obzirom na to da je tako, nema potrebe za proširenjem
prava zbog etnokulturnih razlika, smatra Barry. „Kulture jednostavno nisu
vrsta entiteta kojem se prava mogu pripisati“ (2006: 79). Nasuprot tome,
Kymlicka tvrdi da je kulturna pripadnost kriterij koji u velikoj mjeri uvjetuje
nejednakost životnih uslova, a liberalna koncepcija manjinskih prava, koju
on nudi, nastoji osigurati jednake životne uslove i to kroz osiguravanje,
pored individualnih, i grupnih prava ( 2003:52).
Neutralnost je stav kojeg su zapadni teoretičari najčešće
preporučivali prema etnokulturnim manjinama, baš kao i prema religiji.
Kultura je, prema tom mišljenju, nešto što bi trebalo prakticirati samo u
privatnoj sferi. Princip etnokulturne neutralnosti je, zapravo, služio kao
izgovor da se ne priznaju bilo kakvi zahtjevi manjina koji utemeljenje
nalaze u kulturnoj različitosti. Suprotno tome, Kymlicka smatra da je
ideja o etnokulturno neutralnoj državi samo mit jer svaka država samim
odabirom službenog jezika promovira određenu kulturu, što je dio procesa
građenja nacije (nation building) koji uključuje i „razvoj nacionalnih medija,
prihvatanje nacionalnih simbola i praznika, preimenovanje ulica, gradova
i topografskih naziva, kao što su reke ili planine, u većinski jezik kako bi
se očuvala uspomena na heroje ili događaje većinske grupe, i tako dalje“
(2001: 33).
I pored deklarirane neutralnosti, liberalna demokratska država
prilikom „građenja nacije”17 promovira najčešće dominantnu, većinsku
kulturu. To se manifestira kroz predstavljanje države prema spoljnom svijetu,
njene specifičnosti, historije, zakona i slično. Ipak, ono što je najuočljivije
jeste da država kroz svoje javne institucije brine o obrazovanje građana
na službenom jeziku. „Primarno, tipičan proces građenja nacije obuhvaća
jedinstven obrazovni sustav koji prenosi slične, ako ne i iste vrijednosti
generacijama građana“ (Stanković i Pejnović, 2010a: 81). Cilj procesa
„građenja nacije“ jeste da se stvori predodžba o ljudima unutar jedne
etničkih zajednica moraju
imati stanovitu političku
autonomiju kako bi mogli
pregovarati i sklapati
kompromise. Šire o
konsocijacijskom modelu
vidjeti u: Lijphart (1992).
Barry ipak tvrdi da se
egalitarnom liberalizmu
sasvim nepravedno
pripisuje osobina da
odbija davanje bilo kakvih
beneficija marginaliziranim i
deprivilegovanim grupama.
On dodaje kako su „sve
uskrate za koje žrtva nije
odgovorna predstavljaju
prima facie razlog da se to
popravi ili kompenzira” (2006:
135).
10
Da bi država bila neutralna
prema pojedincima
koji žive po različitim i
sukobljenim vrijednosnim
koncepcijama dobrog
života, ona mora „ujedno
da pokaže nepristasnost
prema uverenjima i praksama
koje neki od tih pojedinaca
odobravaju, a drugi ne
odobravaju u tom smislu
da norma uzdržavanja ne
sme da zavisi od prihvatanja
ma koje od kontroverznih
vrednosnih koncepcija kao
valjane” (Kiš, 2003: 208).
11
12
Engleski pojam citizenship
se odnosi na građansko
– državljanska prava, na
građansko državljanstvo ili
državljansko građanstvo
putem kojeg se u okviru
nacionalne države ostvaruju
građanska, politička i
socijalna prava (Mesić, 2006
: 59). U radu ćemo termine
građansko državljanstvo
i univerzalno građanstvo
upotrebljavati sinonimno.
13
Kymlicka napominje da
je univerzalnog građanstva
zapravo bila američka
{ 84 } Multikulturalna kritika liberalnog univerzalizma i odbrana manjinskih prava
države koji su ujedinjeni u jednu naciju. Tom cilju služi jedinstven, službeni
jezik nacije, nacionalni obrazovni sistem, nacionalni simboli i himna, set
jedinstvenih zakona itd. Proces „građenja nacije“ ima pozitivne efekte u
obliku demokratizacije društva. To je evidentno obzirom da svi građani,
bez obzira na svoje regionalno ili etničko porijeklo, spol, religiju, imaju
mogućnost učešća u demokratskim procesima unutar države. Takođe,
„difuzijom zajedničkog jezika i institucija u društvu ponuđena je mogućnost
jednake prilike svim građanima: za obrazovanje, jednakost pred legalnim i
državnim institucijama“ (Ibid: 82). Negativna strana je sadržana u činjenici da,
prilikom javnog promoviranja jezika i kulture većine kojeg proces građenja
nacije sa sobom neminovno nosi, obično bude prekršen liberalni princip
jednakosti među građanima države. To znači da su manjinske kulture te koje
trpe štetu zbog odsustva pomoći države u njihovom očuvanju. Dodatnu
kompleksnost problemu s moralnog aspekta daje činjenica da članovi tih
zajednica nisu sami odgovorni za svoju nacionalnost, rasu, dob i slično, iz
razloga jer ništa od toga nisu sami ni birali.
3. Državna stabilnost i manjine
Tenzije između onih koji zastupaju manjinska prava i onih koji teže
idealu građanskog državljanstva su dobile svoju težinu nakon što su ovi
prvi otvoreno izrazili sumnje da koncept građanskog državljanstva za cilj
ima kamuflirati namjeru da se manjine mirno povinuju pravilima većine
(Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 2). Bez obzira koliko atraktivne bile navedene
teorijske koncepcije, obje bi trebale, prema mišljenju Kymlicke i Normana,
povesti računa podjednako o zahtjevima etnokulturnih manjina, ali i o
promoviranju odgovornog demokratskog građanstva. Oni smatraju da
„vitalnost i stabilnost moderne demokratije zavisi, ne samo od pravednosti
njenih institucija, nego i od kvalitete i stavova njenih građana: na primjer,
od njihovog poimanja identiteta, i od toga kako oni vide potencijalno
natjecanje raznih formi nacionalnih, regionalnih, etničkih, ili religijskih
identiteta; njihove sposobnosti da toleriraju i rade zajedno s drugima koji
su od njih drugačiji; njihove želje da participiraju u političkim procesima
kako bi promovirali javno dobro i držali političke autoritete odgovornima…”
(Ibid: 6).
Ono što se najčešće smatra problemom kada govorimo o
manjinama jeste pojava manjinskog nacionalizma. Ranije smo spomenuli
proces “građenja nacije “ (nation building) kojeg su države koristile da
bi etablirali zajednički nacionalni jezik, identitet i kulturu. Istovremeno
su etnokulturne manjine „u okviru većih nacionalnih država, pokrenule
zahtjeve za osnivanjem vlastite države“ (Kymlicka, 2008: 94). Prvi Kymlicka
naziva „državnim nacionalizmom”18 a drugi „manjinskim nacionalizmom”.
Nacionalne manjine su u sukobu s državnim nacionalizmom obično
uspjevale odoliti pritisku za njihovom asimilacijom u većinsku kulturu, te su
strategija za pristupanje
problem kulturnog pluralizma
i to u kontekstu integriranja
dobrovoljnih useljenika
i nedobrovoljnih robova
koji su dolazili u SAD-e kao
pojedinci ili s porodicama.
Potpuno drugačiji koncept
je primjenjen u slučaju
inkorporiranja povijesno
samoupravnih skupina
(američki Indijanci,
Portorikanci itd.) od kojih se
većini odobrilo neki stepen
autonomije unutar američke
federacije (Kymlicka, 2003 :
263).
14
Ideja univerzalnog
građanstva vuče svoje
korijene još iz razdoblja
prosvjetiteljstva. Obzirom
da je prosvjetiteljski projekat
čovjeka predstavljao kao
slobodnog pojedinca ne
vezujući ga za bilo koju
teologiju i teleologiju, koji je
sam sebi moralni autoritet,
on nije vezan niti jednom
koncepcijom dobra ili svrhom.
Ipak, to ga ne spriječava da
pokušava negdje pronaći
utemeljenje svog moralnog
autoriteta. U okviru svoje
transcedentalne filozofije
Immanuel Kant nudi
pojedincu takvo utemeljenje
u praktičnom umu. Vidjeti šire
u: Brčić (2008).
15
Sukladno liberalnoj teoriji
politička zajednica je okvir
unutar kojeg pojedinci
koriste određena prava i
odgovornosti. „Ljudi koji
obitavaju unutar iste političke
zajednice jesu sugrađani.
S druge strane, postoji
kulturna zajednica u kojoj
pojedinci oblikuju i revidiraju
svoje ciljeve i ambicije“
(Kymlicka, 2004: 139). Tu
zajednicu, dodaje Kymlicka,
odlikuju neke zajedničke
karakteristike poput kulture,
jezika i povijesti koji određuju
njihovu kulturnu pripadnost.
Međutim, prema njegovom
{ 85 } Elma Huruz
se mobilizirale unutar manjinskog nacionalizma.19 On je trebao poslužiti kao
okvir unutar kojeg se namjeravala postići samoupravna politička zajednica,
u obliku nezavisne države ili kao autonomni region unutar veće države
(Ibid: 95). Manjinski nacionalizam, prema Kymlickinom mišljenju, promovira
demokratiju u okviru samoupravne nacije ali otežava demokratsku
kooperaciju na federalnom nivou. Međutim, svaki pokušaj da se manjinski
nacionalizam odbije20 pozivajući se na tu činjenicu, značio bi propagiranje
upravo onog što osporavaju nacionalne manjine, formiranja jedinstvenog
naroda a ne dva ili više koji bi imali pravo na samoupravu (Ibid: 140).
Na koji način prava manjina mogu uticati na vrline i prakse
demokratskog građanstva te kako bi davanje prava manjinama uticalo na
jedinstvo i stabilnost šire političke zajednice? Najčešće se pretpostavljalo da
bi manjinska prava mogla proizvesti negativan uticaj na građanske prakse
ili da bi mogla onemogućiti nastojanja države da efikasno promoviraju
građanstvo. Kritike su se, kako primjećuju Kymlicka i Norman, u najvećoj
mjeri odnosile na moguće „politiziranje etniciteta“ uz naglašavanje da bi
svako isticanje etniciteta u javnom životu moglo donijeti razdor (2000:
10). Zbog toga bi liberalne demokratije trebalo da spriječe politiziranje
etničkih identiteta na taj način što će odbiti bilo kakva prava manjina kao
i politike multikulturalizma koje bi obuhvatale eksplicitno i javno priznanje
etničkih grupa. Radikalnije forme ovih kritika su prava manjina opisivali
kao prvi korak na putu ka građanskom ratu jugoslovenskog tipa. Oni malo
blaži kritičari, iako nisu tvrdili da manjinska prava vode u građanski rat, su
smatrali da bi ona mogla narušiti sposobnost građana da ispunjavaju svoje
demokratske dužnosti, na primjer tako što kod njih slabe komunikaciju
i osjećaj povjerenja i solidarnosti preko granica grupe. Tako bi, čak i ona
manjinska prava koja sama po sebi nisu nepravedna, u nastojanju da daju
značaj etnicitetu mogla narušiti norme i prakse odgovornog građanstva,
što bi u daljoj perspektivi oslabilo normalno funkcioniranje države (Ibid: 10).
Bitna stavka unutar rasprave o manjinskim pravima u kontekstu
liberalnih vrlina i demokratskog građanstva, jeste pitanje liberalne
tolerancije i njenih limita. Kymlicka postavlja pitanje: „nije li fundamentalno
netolerantno prisiljavati miroljubivu nacionalnu manjinu ili vjersku sektu –
koja ne predstavlja nikakvu prijetnju bilo kome izvan skupine – da reorganizira
svoju zajednicu prema ’našim’ liberalnim načelima individualne slobode?”
(Kymlicka, 2003: 222). Pravu težinu tom pitanju daje činjenica da je tolerancija
jedna od osnovnih vrijednosti liberalizma a da se nerijetko događa da i sami
liberali zanemare taj princip insistirajući na primatu vrijednosti individualne
slobode ili lične autonomije. Ukoliko se zajednici koja ne cijeni ličnu
autonomiju i odbacuje mogućnost revidiranja i eventualnog odbacivanja
tradicionalnih praksi pokuša nametnuti autonomija gotovo je izvjesno da
će se njeni članovi otuđiti od liberalnih institucija. Liberalizam utemeljen
na toleranciji, nasuprot tome, bi mogao dobiti veću podršku i pružiti širu
osnovu legitimnoj vlasti. U praksi to znači da bi trebalo uvažiti sve skupine,
bile one liberalne ili neliberalne, sve dok one ne pokušavaju drugima
mišljenju, sasvim je moguće
da je riječ o dva aspekta iste
zajednice: „oni, koji imaju isto
državljanstvo, podjednako
tako mogu imati istu kulturnu
pripadnost“ (Ibid). To znači
da se kulturna pripadnost
može preklapati s državnom,
odnosno pripadnosti
političkoj zajednici kao što
je to predviđeno konceptom
„nacionalne države“.
Međutim, ova dva oblika
zajednice ne moraju se nužno
preklapati.
„Teza je da se naš identitet
djelimično oblikuje
priznavanjem ili odsustvom
priznanja, često pogrešnim
priznavanjem od drugih,
tako da osoba ili grupa ljudi
mogu trpjeti stvarnu štetu,
stvarno iskrivljenje, ako im
ljudi ili društvo oko njih
odslikavaju ograničavajuću ili
ponižavajuću ili prezirnu sliku
njih samih” (Taylor, 1995: 5).
16
17
Oni koji provode praksu
građenja nacije (nationbuilding) nastoje napraviti
vezu s prošlošću kako bi
time poništili činjenicu da
je njihova nacija nastala
na osnovu neke birokratske
odluke ili međunarodnog
sporazuma te da se njihova
nacionalna svijest tek
oblikuje, smatra Yael Tamir.
Oni stoga usmjeravaju svoja
nastojanja na projiciranje
slike „prave nacije“ pozivajući
se na zajedničku historiju,
kulturu, jezik, tradiciju, rituale
(1993: 64).
18
Kymlicka spominje podjelu
i na liberalni i neliberalni
nacionalizam, te komentariše
teoretičare koji ovu podjelu
poistovjećuju s onom
na “građanski” i “etnički”
nacionalizam. Prema
tom modelu građanski
{ 86 } Multikulturalna kritika liberalnog univerzalizma i odbrana manjinskih prava
nametnuti svoje vrijednosti. Na taj način se, smatra Kymlicka, legitimiraju
unutrašnja ograničenja a isključuje mogućnost davanja izvanjskih zaštita,
što je prema njegovom mišljenju loša praksa (Ibid: 223).
Kymlicka razlikuje dvije vrste zahtjeva koje neka etnička ili nacionalna
zajednica ljudi može postaviti kao svojevrsna ograničenja manjinskih prava.
Prve naziva „unutarnjim ograničenjima” a druge „vanjskim zaštitama” (Ibid:
54). Unutarnja ograničenja se odnose na unutargrupne relacije, pri čemu
etnička ili nacionalna grupa ima na raspolaganju upotrebu moći koju joj
daje država radi ograničenja slobode svojih članova. Unutar svake zajednice
postoje očekivanja u vezi s tim kako se njeni članovi trebaju ponašati, kada
se pojedinac usprotivi tim normama i očekivanjima za njega slijede sankcije.
„Ove sankcije se mogu pojaviti u formi izbjegavanja, ekskomuniciranja,
odricanja od strane porodice, izbacivanja iz raznih udruženja, i tako dalje;
ostracizam jedne ili druge vrste predstoji nam kao ultimativna kazna za
narušavanje nekog unutrašnjeg pravila“ (Levy, 1997: 40-41). To, međutim, ne
podrazumijeva odsustvo državne intervencije u vidu zaštite individualnih
prava. U slučajevima kada dolazi do masovnog i sistematskog kršenja
individualnih prava država je dužna reagirati. Kymlicka nema precizan
odgovor na pitanje u kojem momentu je nužna intervencija države ali
nudi nekoliko kriterija poput nivoa „ozbiljnosti kršenja prava u manjinskoj
zajednici, stepena konsenzusa unutar zajednice o legitimnosti ograničenja
individualnih prava, mogućnosti disidentskih pripadnika grupe da napuste
zajednicu ukoliko žele, postojanja istorijskih sporazuma sa nacionalnom
manjinom“ (Kymlicka, 2003: 244).
Druga vrsta zahtjeva etničkih ili nacionalnih zajednica koje Kymlicka
naziva „vanjskim zaštitama“ su usmjereni ka zaštiti grupe od vanjskih
odluka kao što su ekonomske ili političke odluke društvene zajednice.
Svrha manjinskih prava i jeste prvenstveno zaštita od eventualnih spoljnjih
ugrožavanja, dakle bitno je zaštititi manjinsku zajednicu od dominantne
kulture. Na drugoj strani, ukoliko se posegne za unutrašnjim ograničenjima,
postoji opasnost od narušavanja individualnih prava. Po tom osnovu
liberalna teorija manjinskih prava „nalaže prihvaćanje vanjskih zaštita tamo
gdje one promiču pravedan odnos među grupama, ali i odbacivanje
unutarnjih ograničenja koja ograničavaju prava pripadnika grupa na
osporavanje i revidiranje tradicionalnih autoriteta“ (Stanković i Pejnović,
2010b: 178). Ipak, većina liberalnih demokratija se u svojim nastojanjima da
dosegnu veći nivo multikulturalnosti u javnoj politici fokusiraju na vanjske
zaštite.21
Unutrašnja ograničenja i vanjske zaštite se ne moraju poklapati niti
biti objedinjene. Pojedine etničke ili nacionalne zajednice mogu zahtijevati
vanjske zaštite kako bi bili zaštićeni od šireg društva a da pri tome svojim
članovima ne nametnu bilo kakva unutrašnja ograničenja. „Druge skupine
ne zahtijevaju nikakvu izvanjsku zaštitu od šire zajednice, ali teže za većom
moći nad ponašanjem vlastitih pripadnika“ (Kymlicka, 2003: 56). Postoje
naravno i one grupe koje postavljaju obje vrste zahtjeva. Sve tri oblika
nacionalizam „definiše
nacionalnu pripadnost
isključivo kroz pridržavanje
demokratskih principa,
dok etnički nacionalizam
definiše nacionalnu
pripadnost kroz pojmove
zajedničkog jezika, kulture i
etničkog porekla” (2001:72).
On za taj model kaže da
je zapravo stranputica
jer i u najliberalnijim
demokratijama program
građenja nacije prevazilazi
uski krug političkih principa a
uključuje i širenje zajedničkog
jezika i nacionalne kulture.
Prava razlika između
liberalnog i nelibralnog
nacionalizma je prije vezana
za širinu, sadržaj i otvorenost
nacionalne kulture te načini
uključivanja u nju, zaključuje
Kymlicka.
19
„Konflikt između
državnog nacionalizma i
manjinskog nacionalizma
ostaje najsnažnija
dinamika (i najveća
prepreka) u državama
postkomunističke Evrope
koje su odnedavno krenule
na put demokratizacije”.
Isto tako, dodaje Kymlicka,
čak i u stabilnim zapadnim
demokratijama se manjinski
nacionalizam nije umanjio
već naprotiv intenzivirao u
slučajevima poput Kvebeka,
Škotske, Portorika, Katalonije i
Flandrije (2008: 95).
Kymlicka ilustrira mjere
koje su države poduzimale s
ciljem da suzbiju manjinski
nacionalizam, a jedan
od primjera se odnosi na
mjere koje je Francuska
tokom osamnaestog i
devetnaestog stoljeća uvodila
kako bi zabranila upotrebu
baskijskog i bretonskog jezika
u školama ili publikacijama,
te zabrane bilo kakvog
političkog udruživanja koje
20
{ 87 } Elma Huruz
grupno–diferenciranog građanstva mogu se, prema Kymlickinim riječima,
upotrijebiti kao izvanjska zaštita. To znači da se sva tri tipa ovih prava,
pravo na specijalnu grupnu predstavljenost, pravo na samoupravu kao i
polietnička prava, pomažu da se manjina zaštiti od ekonomske i političke
moći šireg društva. Većina etničkih i nacionalnih skupina u zapadnim
demokratijama zahtijeva izvanjske zaštite. Unutrašnja ograničenja se u
manjoj mjeri zahtijevaju i obično se pravdaju kao neizbježan nusproizvod
izvanjskih zaštita.
Odnose između većinske zajednice i manjina unutar multinacionalne
države bi trebalo graditi na osnovu mirnih pregovora. Pri tome bi bilo
idealno da akteri mogu postići konsenzus,22 no u suprotnom, kada ne
dijele zajedničke principe i ne prihvataju načela druge strane, ostaje im da
potraže neku drugu osnovu uvažavanja kao što je modus vivendi.23 Ipak,
ukoliko u liberalnoj demokratskoj državi neka nacionalna manjina postupa
neliberalno i nepravedno prema drugim ili svojim članovima, liberali imaju
pravo i odgovornost da otvoreno reagiraju bar time što će unutar te skupine
promovirati načela poput autonomije, slobode i tolerancije.
bi promoviralo manjinski
nacionalizam (2001:38).
Jedan od najslikovitijih
primjera mjera vanjskih
zaštita jeste zabrana pisanja
komercijalnih reklama na
engleskom jeziku u Kvebeku.
Ova pokrajina je usvojila
posebne zakone koji uređuju
oblast upotrebe jezika a
jedan od njih nalaže da
sve tvrke s više od pedeset
zaposlenika, moraju poslovati
na francuskom jeziku.
Također, pod ovu vrstu zaštita
se ubrajaju zakonski propisi
protiv jezika mržnje. Vidjeti:
Levy (1997).
21
22
„Često se mislilo kako je
u kulturno pluralnoj zemlji
nemoguće postići politički
konsenzus“, navodi Kymlicka.
Stoga je dominacija jedne
kulturne skupine bila sasvim
logičan proizvod takvih
razmišljanja (2004: 211).
Ipak, Zgodić smatra da i
pored različitih interpretacija
poimanja fenomena
konsenzusa unutar
socioloških i politoloških
teorija „figurira uvid:
minimalni, bazični društveni
i politički konsenzus oko
temeljnih vrijednosti jedna
je od ključnih pretpostavki
funkcioniranja i reprodukcije
modernih pluralističkih
demokratija“ (2006: 236).
23
Modus Vivendi – lat. “način
života“, uvjeti koji barem
privremeno omogućuju
pravilne mirne odnose
između dviju (protivničkih)
strana (Klaić, 1968: 863).
{ 88 } Multikulturalna kritika liberalnog univerzalizma i odbrana manjinskih prava
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{ 91 } Sanja Hajdinjak
Sanja Hajdinjak
Rent-seeking and
corruption in tourism
as factors of induced
development: case
study of Croatia
Abstract
The paper analyses rent-seeking and corruption in tourism induced
development in Croatia. Paper is based on the assumption that natural beauties
and manmade attractions provide a source of scarcity rent similar to natural
resources such as land, oil or precious stones. In addition, I argue that relative
tourism dependency on national and regional level provides additional stimuli
for rent-seeking by providing incentives for government to introduce tourism
supporting mechanisms. Broader political, social and legislative context determines
whether scarcity and differential rent seduce business elites towards rent instead
of production seeking. The paper brings forward elements of decentralization and
spatial planning legislation in Croatia, which help greasing the engine of tourism
land use speculation. Finally, the paper analyses civil society engagement and
patterns of response to land use speculation. I argue that civil society as well as
political culture of the citizens enables a weak balance between productive and
grabbing equilibrium (Mehlum et al., 2006) in tourism development.
Methodologically, the research is based on the analysis of land use and
spatial planning documents, reports on changes in spatial plans, legislation acts,
developmental strategies, tourism master programmes, as well as secondary
resources such as academic papers with the theme of tourism development.
Moreover, research of the tourism land use rent-seeking and corruption was
facilitated by seven semi-structured interviews with representatives of civil society,
three experts in the field of land use and spatial planning and five interviews
with experts in the field of tourism. Interviewees were selected with snowballing
technique and all were conducted between 15 August and 30 September 2013.
Keywords:
and civil society
tourism development, corruption and rent-seeking, institutions
The author is a doctoral
candidate of political
economy at Central
European University
(e-mail: [email protected]
ceu-budapest.edu)
1 Uticaj rentijerstva i korupcije
na razvoj turizma u Hrvatskoj
{ 92 } Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced development: case study of Croatia
Introduction
Tourism is one of the most important sectors of Croatian economy.
While it indeed constitutes of many individual activities from a wide range
of classical economic sectors, such as hospitality, trade and real estate
business, tourism has traditionally been perceived as part of a service
economy. Due to natural capital in the form of natural beauties, unique
manmade sites and favourable climate on which sector is based on, tourism
delivers an additional and easily earned source of income for the economy.
Because of the characteristics of given natural capital and manmade sights,
rent created by economic activity is to an extent similar to the rents created
in economic use of natural resources such as for example timber woods
(Richter and Steiner, 2007).
This paper argues that in combination with weak institutional
framework, natural beauties provide a chance for rent seeking and
corruption in land use. Moreover, due to relative dependence of tourism
in coastal areas, but also on the national level, legislative mechanisms are
developed for support of tourism activity. Mechanisms aimed at supporting
tourism activity are introduced at national level and lead to differential rents.
Whether rents provided by utilization of natural capital and supportive
mechanisms motivate speculative and criminal activities depends on the
wider social, institutional and political context. On one hand, the paper
focuses on decentralization and spatial planning legislation in Croatia as
supportive of speculative efforts. On the other hand, I focus on the type
and nature of civic engagement and political culture. I argue that in Croatia
civil society acts as a counterbalance by slowing down or in some cases
preventing the land use corruption.
Methodologically the paper relies on fifteen semi-structured
explorative interviews with both elected representatives and academic
experts in the field of tourism, spatial planning and land use, as well as with
representatives of the NGOs actively engaged on the issue of tourism land
speculation. I started by explorative interviews with experts in wider tourism
sector and used the snowballing technique to select representatives of the
civil society, political elites or academically engaged experts in the field of
land use and regional studies. Additionally, research for the paper is based
on the extensive analysis of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources
include tourism master plans, changes of spatial and urban plans with focus
on the cases of golf course and overall tourism development, legislative
acts and available statistics provided by international organizations. I
also analyses an extensive body of academic literature dealing with the
relationship between rent-seeking and tourism.
The paper has the following structure. Section one describes the
relationship between natural resource rents and rent seeking theory in
tourism sector. Section two introduces Croatian case study and argues
that relative tourism dependence can encourage political elites to develop
{ 93 } Sanja Hajdinjak
mechanisms for support of the sector. Based on the example of the Law
on Golf Courses I argue that such mechanisms can support speculation in
tourism land use. Section three introduces decentralization efforts and the
resulting socio-economic context of decision making in spatial planning.
Section four deals with the spatial planning legislative framework and the
opportunities it creates for rent-seeking in tourism related projects. Section
five focuses on the engagement of the civil society in sensitizing the public
on the potential problems. Final section provides an analysis, summarizes
the findings and provides a conclusion.
1. Tourism land use and rent-seeking potential
Land use corruption has recently started to receive increasing
attention, mostly alongside with the development of academic interest in
land grabbing (Borras Jr. and Franco, 2010; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick,
2009; Poljanec-Borić, 2012; Sassen, 2008). It is characterized by neglect of
long term public interest and policies favouring specific interest of certain
elites (Transparency International, 2011).
Corruption practices in land use can be divided into two wider
categories, administrative and political corruption. Administrative corruption
refers to cases in which procedures are complicated while little information
is available on services and fees. The form varies from small bribery for
property registration, change or falsification of titles, to development
of favourable land use plans (Transparency International, 2011). Political
corruption applies in scenarios of low institutional transparency and
accountability where illegal or in some cases legal actions serve the
interests of the political or business elites. Since circles of elites tend to
be intertwined and have an influence on the important governmental
institutions and bodies such as parliament and the committees, political
corruption tends to be extremely hard to document, analyse and prevent.
In some cases assessment of political and administrative corruption
can be further aggravated by political culture which renders corruption
in a subjective manner. Political and administrative corruption and often
entangled, which makes development of useful categorizations a difficult
task. Besides, as has been frequently cited in the literature (Kaufmann and
Wei, 1999; Wei, 2001), corruption does not necessarily have a negative
impact on economic growth, but might rather stimulate the economy like
oil greases an engine. Gylfason (2001) has argued that political corruption
can speed up licence issuing, increase efficiency and therefore encourage
economic growth. Moreover, some acts of political corruption are formally
considered legal, such as cases of land seizure through forced evictions, or
land buyouts for significantly less than market value, followed by a change
in spatial planning purpose, and final sales for significantly higher amount
of money (Transparency International, 2011).
{ 94 } Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced development: case study of Croatia
While corruption is characteristic for land use planning (Dodson et
al., 2006) and real estate business in general (Hsieh and Moretti, 2002; Mele,
2000; Ratcliffe and Stubbs, 2013), tourism sector represent an interesting
case as such (Roca, 2013). Tourism is specific because it is based on natural
capital and manmade sites, hence the economic activity results with a
scarcity and secondary rents similar to those occurring in extraction of
natural resources. However, the literature has so far neglected the politicoeconomic aspects of tourism development and speculative processes
happening in the background. Land considered for tourism development
has potential to deliver higher rent, which makes it more attractive for
potential investors who want to extract value from it.
In order to deliver revenues, natural beauties also require less
invested capital, whether in the form of human labour or technology to
return profit. When natural or manmade attractions on which tourism
is based represent a unique resource, economic activity tends to have
characteristics of monopoly or oligopoly. The more unique the resource is,
the higher is its absolute rent due to the lack of substitutability (Richter
and Steiner, 2007). Similar to locational rent created due to proximity of
particular routes, corridors or other types of strategic positions, tourism land
delivers a rent due to low substitutability and abundant natural resources.
Hence, natural or manmade tourism attractions can be seen as motivating
rent-seeking behaviour among productive elements due to the ability
of obtaining easy revenues with fewer investments than in comparable
projects. However, natural endowments would have such an effect only in
institutional and legislative framework which allows discretionary decision
making process.
In case of unique attractions such as UNESCO world heritage sites
or national and natural parks, the value of the land in the surrounding area
increases without any capital investments since these sights are unique
and have no substitutable goods. While the real value of the land increases,
without necessary infrastructure and construction permits the land has
nominally low value. Low nominal value of the land results from the legal
obstacles to construction due to concerns over environmental sustainability.
However, in the cases of fragile institutional and legislative framework
disregard for environmental protection can occur as consequence of
achieving interests of the few.
In the cases of tourism dependence I argue that tourism resources
can create additional stimuli for rent-seeking and corruption practices.
Tourism land use encourages business class to seek control over resource
rents often though illegal means. On the other side of the equation,
political elites are more inclined to meet grabbing business elites on the
half way since alternative economic activities are lacking. When tourism is
a predominant economic activity on local, regional or even national level,
governmental policies may support its development through legislation,
fiscal and parafiscal easement, or currency devaluation.
{ 95 } Sanja Hajdinjak
Richter and Steiner explain that in the case of tourism natural and historical
wonders create absolute rent due to low substitutability and sensitivity to
price differentials. Differential rent is created by a state’s decision to lower
the factor costs of a given product relative to the factor costs in other
countries (Richter and Steiner, 2007).
2. Tourism dependence in Croatia: the curious
case of the Law on golf courses
Even in socialist Yugoslavia, tourism was recognized as Croatian
main ‘industry’ and had been supported from the central level due to its
contribution to foreign currency in the state coffers (Kobasić, 1987; PoljanecBorić, 2011). The war has led to a structural break and temporary demise
of tourism activity during which the GDP decreased fourfold (Currie et al.,
2004). In the aftermath of war as a consequence of transition to capitalism
and unsuccessful privatization, many of the important industrial branches
were severely decimated and the importance of the tourism on the national
level increased (Holzner, 2005). Moreover, especially the counties along
the Adriatic coast, with the demise of overall industry, became even more
tourism dependant. According to the recently developed experimental
Tourism Satellite Accounts for Croatia, the assessment is that in 2011
tourism indirectly, with multiplier effect included, contributed 14% of the
GDP (Šutalo et al., 2011). In last seven year for which World Bank’s data are
available, tourism has accounted on average for 38.5% of Croatian overall
exports (World Development Indicators, 2014).
Data assessing the exact contribution of tourism to regional GDP
is not existent, but several papers such as (Krtalić and Družić, 2006; Regić,
2010; Uravić et.al, 2009) have provided qualitative description of the extent
coastal regions are dependent on tourism. In media tourism is portrayed as
the key part of the Croatian economy and the growth forecasts are highly
dependent on tourism. While tourism is certainly not the only source of
revenues, due to economic, cultural and historic reasons it is considered to
be a Croatian strategic sector (Poljanec-Borić, 2010).
Tourism is a prevailing sector in the Croatian coastal regions,
making the local decision makers more inclined to focus on attracting
tourism investments. In the short-term perspective when other
developmental options are missing, even investments which might hurt
the long-term public interest can reflect positively on the balance sheet.
In addition, interconnection between political and business elites ensures
that important decisions regarding spatial planning and land use lean in
favour of particularistic rather than common interest. In order to get access
to valuable land, investors promise benefits for the local communities such
as kindergartens, sports centres and other facilities for wider use. If local
decision makers are faced with limited options for development, additional
{ 96 } Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced development: case study of Croatia
gifts can help tilt the public opinion in their favour. Even on the national
level tourism is an important contributor to the GDP and governments’ ally
in keeping budget deficit at bay. In order to ensure flow of foreign currency
in state coffers despite harsh competition from other countries, political
elites choose to support tourism activity through specific mechanisms.
As an example of legislative support for tourism development
which creates differential rent Croatian parliament has brought in 2008
the Law on golf courses (2008). Tourism studies literature has emphasized
the need to diversify from the so call ‘sun, sea and sand’ type of bathing
tourism product which with reduction of traveling costs became available
in countless number of destinations across the world (Poon, 1993). It has
been argued that such product is less efficient since tourist arrive mainly
during the summer season, while accommodation infrastructure lurks
empty throughout the rest of the year (Butler, 2001; Higham and Hinch,
2002; Jang, 2004). Moreover, the infamous 3S tourism has often been
connected with commercialization, mass arrivals, congestion and general
damaging effects on the environment (Berno and Bricker, 2001; Brau and
Lanza, 2008; Sharpley and Telfer, 2002; Sharpley, 2009). Therefore, emphasis
should be placed more on culture, traditions, local customs, rural tourism,
sports, adventure and alternative type of tourism goods (Marusic et al.,
2011). Tourism studies have argued that golf is one of the most significant
segment of sports tourism since golfers tend to belong to higher income
level, are able to spend more money than average tourist and repeat their
visits (Ziakas and Boukas, 2013).
Croatian tourism policy features the idea of diversification from
mass bathing tourism since the first tourism master plan was developed in
1993 (Ministry of Tourism and Trade and Institute for Tourism, 1993). In the
meanwhile golf as a means of attracting better-off and wealthier visitors and
extracting as much as possible from tourism became a mainstream mantra
among local political elites and tourism ministers. Despite the serious policy
promotion of golf activity in two consecutive tourism master plans (Ministry
of Tourism and Trade and Institute for Tourism, 1993; Ministry of Tourism,
2003), political elites decided for a legislative tool which would open the
door for golf investors wider. In the context of the Croatian case study, the
Law on the golf courses was made with a specific intention of supporting
development and diversification of tourism. However, based on its content,
instead of offering new contents, it seemed to provide legal grounds for
land speculation and construction of additional accommodation capacities.
The law defines that ‘building golf courses is of specific interest
for Republic of Croatia, while the opening article proscribes ‘segregation
of forests from the forest basis, for building quality Mediterranean and
European destination for golf’ (the Law on golf courses, 2008). Forests in
question are property of Republic of Croatia with 91% of the total surface
used for economic purposes, 7% for protective purposes and 2% for special
purposes (Hrvatske Šume, 2008).2
Economic purpose
according to definition
provided by Croatian Forests
(Hrvatske Šume, 2008)
encompasses protection
and enhancement of overall
functions benefiting common
interest and production
of forest goods. Protective
purpose corresponds to
protection of land, water,
settlements, various objects
and property. Special purpose
refers to protected natural
areas, forests designated for
production of forest seeds,
forests indicated for scientific
research and forests required
for defence of the Republic of
Croatia.
2
{ 97 } Sanja Hajdinjak
Although protection and preservation of forests is based in the Croatian
constitution, the Law on golf courses directly derogates the status of forests
by placing golf as a more important strategic interest (Oraić and Pisk, 2012).
Moreover, Croatian media reported that Mirela Holy as parliamentary
representative of the largest opposition party criticised the law for
offering special treatment to golf investors and singling them out as more
important than other investments in the field of recreation and tourism, but
also from investors in the other sectors of the economy (Dnevnik.hr, 2010).
Additionally, by allowing construction of multilevel accommodation and
supporting units on uninhabited area on 25% of the planned surface of the
golf course, the law imposes legal grounds for apartmanisation disguised
as a special strategic interest for Croatia (A statement on golf on Srđ, 2013;
Oraić and Pisk, 2012). 3
Additionally, the Law on Agricultural Land (2013), proscribes
conversion of agricultural land units into golf courses on state owned land
without payment of a fee as a form of compensation for destruction of
agricultural land. Since a similar fee is applied to other types of construction
sites which have a long-term effect on the environment, the Law on
Agricultural Land provides additional aspect of preferential treatment for
the golf investors (Ibid). Finally, the law has proscribed that in the case of
public ownership of the land planned for golf development, the owner
(state or local unit of self-governance) is obliged to sell for the market
price the property to the investor without public tender. Oraić and Pisk
(2012) have argued that the Law on golf courses established conditions for
reversed expropriation in which roles of private investor and state as owner
are exchanged. Such legal provisions pose a threat to private ownership,
since the control over the property is considered to be changed before the
expropriation is confirmed by the state authorities.
Under the pressures from the side of NGOs and due to integrity
issues in the ruling Croatian Democratic Union the Law on Golf Courses was
revoked in 2011. However, conversion of agricultural land for development
of golf fields, as defined by the Law on Agricultural Land still requires no fee
for environmental damage and loss of valuable agricultural area. Until 2009
spatial plans have envisioned development of more than 89 golf courses in
Croatia, 55 along the coast (Advisory board for land use Republic of Croatia,
2010). Although the Law on the golf courses has been revoked, the golf
development in particular remained key aspect of several projects which
have received significant media attention.
This section has outlined the relevance of tourism sector for the
Croatian economy and has analysed the Law on golf courses as an example
of legal act introduced for tourism support. The section also points out in
which way incentivising legislation might create ground for tourism land
use speculation. The following section introduces some cases of potential
tourism induced rent-seeking practices and elaborates on their common
characteristics.
Term apartmanisation in
Croatian public discourse
denotes a process of
uncontrolled development of
accommodation capacities
along the coastline.
Apartmanisation is perceived
to be characterised by
disharmony with natural
sustainability and local
architectural traditions
through waste of uninhabited
land.
3
{ 98 } Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced development: case study of Croatia
3. Rent-seeking practices in golf tourism
On the basis of extensive desk research in this section I outline
several cases which created concern over rent-seeking and speculation in
tourism land use. Qualitative analysis of online media portals focused on the
way in which textual media reported and interpreted golf projects in the
last decade. I specifically focused on the primary sources of data including
spatial plans and reports on changes in spatial plans on the level of six
coastal counties and corresponding units of self-governance. Perspective
of investors was researched through analysis of the media space business
elites ensured in local newspapers (E-Zadar, 2010; Kalajzić, 2011) business
magazines (Business.hr, 2010a, 2010b), and video clips on YouTube which
portrayed investors’ point of view (Golf park Dubrovnik Maja Frenkel na
DUTV, 2013). Seven semi-structured interviews with representatives of
most active organizations of the civil society were conducted in the period
from 15 August to 30 September 2013. The paper focuses on the golf
projects which were most publicized, Rivijera Brijuni and Srđ, but also cases
such as Brkač (Motovun), Vransko Lake (Biograd) and Oštrica (Šibenik) golf
developments (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Rent-seeking golf practices in Croatia
Source: Author’s analysis
{ 99 } Sanja Hajdinjak
On the basis of the desk research and interviews, I argue that
each of these projects has several common characteristics. Examples of
tourism land use rent seeking in Croatia are characterized by interest in
land with low nominal value, which due to its proximity to either natural or
historical attractions can be very profitable for the investor with relatively
low investments. Public interest is threatened as inappropriate financial
compensations are paid to municipalities for the uninhabited land which
after change of land use and due to tourism potential has much higher value.
In addition, in some cases potential environmental damage endangers the
very source of the revenues. ‘Land-grabbing’ can also be perceived as loss of
the land for other, non-tourism activities which can have a developmental
function for the community.
Interviewees outline the case of former military area on the Istria
peninsula which includes the areas of Fažana, Vodnjan and Pula. As a
military area the land was closed for the public and environmentally well
preserved. While some parts of the military area have been opened for
public, Muzil peninsula is still closed, although it has already been planned
to host a tourism monoculture. Representatives of the NGOs have argued
that it is also the last area to which the city can spread and develop, unless
considering spreading in the hinterlands. Moreover, developed spatial
programme study suggests development of 2000 accommodation units,
as well as construction of a golf course on the area (Muzil Park - Urban
Studies Program, 2013). Beside allegations of suspicious concession making
that this paper does not deal with in greater detail due to lack of reliable
resources (iPress, 2013a, 2013b), direct transition into tourism monoculture
is problematic since it neglects other contents that could be developed for
citizens. Although former military area of peninsula Muzil is still state owned
property, public discussions on the issue of its future development are
organized merely to legitimize changes in general urban plans and urban
plans of development (Pula City Council and Urbis, 2013) which define the
peninsula for tourism purpose.
Similar has been pointed out in two semi-structured interviews
with activists engaged in raising awareness about the Srđ project.
Additional interview was conducted with an expert in the field of urbanism
and spatial planning following the development of golf on Srđ. Golf and
tourism area above Dubrovnik was previously featured in urban plans as the
area for recreational purposes of the city. However, in several steps the area
was de facto transformed into area for golf development with following
accommodation and tourism capacities. According to recently adopted
plans, only 17% of the area is planned for recreation and the rest is planned
for golf courses and accommodation units (Dubrovnik City Council, 2013).
Moreover, based on the estimates made in 1989 by State society for physical
culture, even the whole area of Srđ does not sufficiently cover the need for
recreational space for a town the size and growth potential of Dubrovnik.
Golf development above Dubrovnik, which is a UNESCO world heritage
{ 100 } Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced development: case study of Croatia
site, is a classic example of rent-seeking based on natural and manmade
attractions. Moreover, one expert in the field of spatial planning described
a series of speculation affairs with land titles, sales of land for lower than
market value, illegal changes of urban plans and several changes of
investors interested in the golf project.
Areas suggested for golf and further tourism development in
Šibenik are suggested to be encompassed in environmental network Natura
2000, making it therefore unadvisable for development of golf or further
development of tourism accommodation facilities. In addition, sceptical
voices of the local population in the cases of Srđ and Oštrica have outlined
that karst rocks combined with hilly and windy terrain will hardly make for
a naturally suitable terrain for construction of a golf course. Moreover, it
can be argued that the ambition to develop a golf course at the border of
the natural park also aims at collecting rents based on the natural resource
of the protected environmental area. Hence, it has been suggested that
planned golf courses are a mere excuse for construction of hotels and villas
on valuable natural resource.
Tourism experts in Croatia strongly point out that tourism in the
coastal area of Croatia should be moving in direction of increasing quality
of the offer and extending seasons, rather than quantity of accommodation
capacities (Ministry of Tourism, 2003: 202). However, all mentioned golfcentred projects are characterised by accompanying real estate business
and significant increase in accommodation capacities. Moreover, planned
increase of accommodation capacities is not based on the analysis of tourism
needs, but rather designed to enable speculation of the real estate market
in a form of urbanization of currently non-urbanized areas (Coalition of
NGOs, 2011). Such construction developments in the currently uninhabited
areas are therefore merely disguised as golf and tourism development with
aspirations of extracting potential absolute and differential rent.
Natural beauties and manmade sites in tourism deliver absolute
rent on top of which combination of tourism dependence and tourism
support mechanism result in differential rent. In the presence of bad
quality institutional and legislative framework, productive equilibrium is
substituted with a grabbing one which is conducive to corruption and rentseeking (Mehlum et al., 2006). The paper continues firstly with elaboration of
institutional setting in Croatia and analyses how the framework effects rentseeking and corruption practices in tourism induced land use. Therefore
I introduce decentralization efforts and the impact decentralization has
had on spatial planning and land use. Secondly, I introduce legislative
framework and interpret its effects on speculative practices in land use
planning. Thirdly, I also include the analysis of civil society engagement,
analyse the nature of their involvement, as well as its effects on curbing
land use corruption.
{ 101 } Sanja Hajdinjak
4. Decentralization effects
The Law on Local and Regional Self-governance was introduced in
1992 and has defined responsibilities of local self-government units to be
those of the relevance for self-governance unit in the field of urban design of
settlements and dwelling, zoning and urban planning, communal activities,
child care, social welfare, primary health care, personality development
and primary education, culture, physical culture and sports, consumers
protection, protection and improvement of the natural environment, fire
and civil defence. The same Law has also proscribed that regional units
perform the tasks of regional significance, particularly the tasks referring to
the school system, health system, zoning and urban planning, economic
development, traffic and traffic infrastructure, planning and developing
the network of educational, health, social and cultural institutions (Law on
Local and Regional Self-governance, 2001).
While the law proscribes a certain level of self-governing
responsibility for both local and regional units, financing does not seem to
be synchronized with the level of responsibilities. Own sources of funding
on the local authorities level include personal income surtax, beverage
tax, summer house tax, company name tax, tax on use of public space and
revenue from own assets and fees. Local level authorities also enjoy access
to shared sources such as personal income tax which is shared with regional
authorities and real estate transaction tax which is shared with central state.
Finally, constitutional provision from article 131 of the Croatian constitution
guarantees support in the form of grants and subsidies for the local level
municipalities and towns which are financially less able. Higher, regional
level authorities’ revenues are based on the inheritance and gift tax, road
and motor vehicle tax, boat tax and games on chance tax.
Division of fiscal responsibilities between counties on the one hand
and municipalities and town on the other hand is disproportionate. As Raos
argues, counties as units of higher organizational order should be entitled
to collect more taxes than lowest level towns and municipalities. Moreover,
although Law on Local and Regional self-governance from 2001 grants wider
responsibilities to counties than to towns and municipalities, in political
practice, middle level of governance has less importance than the lowest
units of self-governance (Raos, 2013). Additionally, after 1992, a significant
number of new municipalities and town has been institutionalized. Until
1992 there were 101 towns in Croatia, but this number has been increased
to 127. Number of municipalities has reached up to 429, which has led to
paralysation of the decentralization efforts. Significant number of counties
is not able to collect enough taxes to cover the expenses and largely
depends on grants and subsidies from the central level (Antić, 2002).
Practice has showed that such dependence relationship annuls the
decentralization efforts, while simultaneously increasing the fertile grounds
{ 102 } Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced development: case study of Croatia
for corruption in determining priorities in allocating grants and monetary
subsidies to towns and municipalities from the state budget (Babić et al.,
2010). As many of the units of self-government lack funding to cover the
costs of self-governance, selling municipal property appears as one of the
easiest ways to fill the budget.
The aforementioned law proscribes that spatial planning, as well
as changes of spatial plans and issue of construction and locality permits
is entrusted with local and regional level units (Law on Local and Regional
Self-governance, 2001). Spatial plans can be changed following a public
discussion on the changes, but ought to be in accordance with higher
rank county level spatial plans (Physical Planning System, 2006). While
the law proscribes public discussion there is no commitment to accept
and deal with potential suggestions and comments regarding potential
changes. Moreover, for general public it is rather hard to follow changes in
spatial planning due to lack of applied skills in reading spatial plans which
require certain level of specialized knowledge. The inability of the local
communities to effectively participate in spatial planning leaves significant
place for discretion decision making. Spatial plans are designed for a midlong period of 3-4 years, but due to relative ease with which plans can
be changed (Kranjčević, 2005), there is no legislative means of ensuring
continuity across several electoral cycle (Krtalić, 2009).
This section has elaborated on the effects decentralization in
its current form has on the potential for land use speculation. Following
section introduces lacking component of legislative framework in spatial
planning and urban development as a further aspect supporting tourism
land use speculation.
5. Legal basis for spatial planning and land
speculation
Three semi-structured interviews were held with experts on spatial
planning in Croatia. Experts had both academic and political background
and outlined following problems in legislation as relevant in opening space
for corruption and rent seeking. Moreover, I consulted several Krtalić’s
papers and books (2000, 2006, 2009, 2013) which provide a comparison
between systems of spatial planning and land use in Croatia and selected
European countries.
Firstly, the law does not proscribe developmental plan or sectoral
developmental concept which is voted in the assembly of the unit of local
self-governance and introduced with qualified majority of 2/3 of votes for
a period of three to four electoral cycles. Lack of a legal act that provides
guidance for future development means that any ad hoc investment
proposal can be accepted since it is not broadly defined what the common
interests of the local unit are.
{ 103 } Sanja Hajdinjak
Secondly, the law fails to proscribe conduct of areas in which
tourist activity of accommodation renting is being undertaken. It is not
defined that in the areas of tourism purpose accommodation facilities are
by definition for use of multiple users and require payment of a rental fee for
use. When such provisions are lacking, it leaves discretion space for investors
to develop apartment complexes which are meant as second homes rather
than rental units. Tourism specified areas can be used for apartmanisation
in which constructed accommodation units in tourism zones are sold to
private owners. Selling real estates to private owners violates the purpose
of tourism which is based on the turnover in use of tourism capacities.
Thirdly, regulations regarding financing urban infrastructure leave
a discretion space as to whether local community or investor develops
and funds the basic infrastructure. Financing urban infrastructure is not
determined according to urban density and real costs (on the basis of
communal standard) on the level of the detailed executive urban plan, but
based on volume of the construction. As one of the expert interviewees has
pointed out, such proscription leads to a situation in which it is unclear if the
local level unit covers the costs up to or also on the place of construction.
In the cases where local community does not provide the communal
infrastructure on the place of construction, investor becomes the owner of
the infrastructure and has the right to charge to the local level unit use of
infrastructure. Moreover, in some cases infrastructural costs can be higher
than the communal fees. Since communal taxation is the one of the most
important sources of revenues for the local unit of self-governance, such
tourism development has a negative impact on the budget.
This section has focused on legal provisions in spatial planning
and has pointed out to three elements which increase discretion space
in decision making. In opposition to European practices, such legislative
framework provides decision makers and local elites with an opportunity
for rent seeking behaviour disguised as developmental efforts. Next
section introduces civil society efforts as a counterbalance to effects of
decentralization and fragile legislative framework which are supportive to
speculation in tourism induced development.
6. Civil society
In the case of tourism land use, civil society engagement in Croatia
has been mostly of a reactive nature. Only a handful of organizations has
the institutional capacity to sensitize public over tourism land use issues
and to invest formal efforts into preventing land speculation through legal
action.
Interviewees from the civil society were selected on the basis of
snowballing method. In the aforesaid period, I have conducted seven semistructured interviews. In the area of tourism rent-seeking and speculation
{ 104 } Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced development: case study of Croatia
Green Action and Green Istria have been the most vocal associations. Both
organizations strongly engage in local and national level campaigns which
sensitized public about potential issues of environmental degradation and
land use speculation. Moreover, these are the only organizations oriented
to sustainable development, which focus also on political and economic
rather than purely environmental aspects of land use speculation. Green
Action is based in the capital of Croatia and has upon invitation of local
level initial movements lent support in several major campaigns against
land use speculation such as Motovun golf development, Srđ (Dubrovnik)
golf development, Vransko Lake (Biograd) golf development and Muzil
(Pula) concession of land for tourism purpose. Green Istria has more of a
regional focus and has dealt mostly with land use issues in the area of Istria,
but has in last decade developed its scope to provide capacity building
help for smaller NGOs.
Other NGOs with a more environmental focus on tourism land use
issues include Sun (Sunce), Man on the Earth (Čovjek na Zemlji) and Eko
Kvarner. NGOs with a broader scope of areas of activism such as Transparency
International, GONG and Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
have also participated in sensitizing population on potential tourism land
issues. The role of NGOs was particularly important in providing the capacity
to interpret spatial plans and changes in existing documents which are, due
to the style of writing and use of technical language, otherwise difficult to
understand and follow for general public.
As issues in tourism land use emerge, reactive movements
with regional or local basis develop along. One of such cases of reactive
social movements developed along the case of tourism and golf area
development in the Dubrovnik area. Under the name of ‘Srđ is ours’ civic
engagement has developed horizontally and encompassed wide network
of local NGOs and volunteers. Their civic engagement was well organized
since activists facilitated the first citizen initiated referendum in the history
of Croatia. The referendum was held last March and while majority of citizens
of Dubrovnik area voted against suggested tourism development, a 50%
plus one threshold vote entry was not achieved, hence the developments
were continued. However, the movement ‘Srđ is ours’ has managed to
sensitize the public and has also invested legal efforts in attempting to stop
the project of tourism and golf development.
While the case of Srđ became problematized on a national level
and has developed to include some of the professional organizations
such as Croatian Association of Architects, some other tourism land issues
have been problematized mostly on a local or regional level. In cases of
golf in Motovun and in Šibenik, these local and reactive efforts were
sufficient to temporarily prevent new developments. While the civil society
responds to potential tourism land use issues reactively, it also shows
relatively high capability levels in organizing its response, most likely due
to the connection with and organizational capital of several existing and
{ 105 } Sanja Hajdinjak
organized non-governmental associations. Moreover, civil society has also
managed to trigger the response of the citizens by mobilizing wider public
in attempt to protect the common interest. Although certain elements of
the institutional and legislative framework support tourism rent-seeking,
civil society represents a sufficient counterbalance to avoid grabbing
equilibrium.
Civil society relationships with units of local self-governance are
as argued in the literature expected to be tense (Cabrera, 2008). Since
units of local self-governance in Croatia have a high level of autonomy in
spatial planning, local sheriffs are the first point of reference for speculation
and bribery. However, as has been pointed out in several interviews the
relationship with local population is ambiguous since the public in the
units of local self-governance often approaches the reactive movements
against investors once the local NGOs start information campaign among
the public on the potential problems of the projects.
In some cases, however, local population is in favour of the tourism
induced projects due to personal gains promised by the investors, or
because they perceive tourism land use (even with potential speculation)
still more productive than the alternative, which can be a status quo without
any development. One of the interviewees has pointed out that in some
cases investors tend to advertise possible benefits for the municipality or
even ‘bribe’ by offering socially beneficial items such as kindergartens or
donations to local societies, which can convert certain segments of local
population to side with the investors, especially when potential gains are
inflated and alternative options for development limited. While investors
might offer some facilities which are useful for the local community,
such generosity often covers a personal interest and a gain which makes
smaller scale investment into local community justified and well paid-off.
The following section provides last piece of analysis and concludes with
suggestions for the future research.
Analysis and conclusions
The paper has analysed tourism land use speculation in the Croatian
case study from the point of intertwined impact of tourism dependence,
decentralization efforts, spatial planning legal framework and engagement
of civil society. The paper analyses the impact which tourism dependence
has on the development of pro-tourism legislative action. Such support
helps in creation of differential rent on top of absolute rent received in the
use of the natural capital and manmade attractions. The paper shows that
tourism natural and manmade resources motivate rent-seeking activities,
but that use of common resources for narrow and particularistic interest
occurs in combination with fragile and non-transparent institutional and
legislative framework.
{ 106 } Rent-seeking and corruption in tourism as factors of induced development: case study of Croatia
The paper finds lack of funding on local self-governance level,
lack of perceived developmental options and lack of transparency in
decision making process as main institutional aspects of decentralization
which support speculation in land use. Based on three expert interviews
and comparative literature, the papers also outlines lack of legally binding
documents proscribing mid-term development, lack of tourism purpose
area regulations and lack of clarity on the issue of infrastructure as main
mechanisms supporting speculation in tourism land use.
Finally, seven semi-structured interviews with the representatives of
the most active civil society representatives show that civil society provides
reactive, but well organized response to the issue of political speculation
in land use. The quality of response most likely reflects existence of several
institutionally strong organizations which lend organizational support to
the local movements. Moreover, the paper argues that political culture
of civic activism among citizens has developed at least up to a level of
defending against attempts of seizing decision making process for the sake
of achieving narrow, particularistic goals. In this sense, civic engagement
has served as a counterbalance to weak and unsatisfying overall institutional
framework.
Engagement of civil society in a form of reactive and semiinstitutionalized movements against land speculation manages to sensitize
the public about potential problems and, to an extent, postpone execution
of tourism projects which might violate long-term public interest. Such
initiatives are in part of the public perceived as protection of community
interest and of environmental sustainability against use of natural beauties
for specific, private and short-term interest of investor with the cost of the
natural capital loss. On the other side, induced by media interpretations of
the events, part of the public perceives it as resistance of activist groups to
development. Such image tends to be counterproductive in the long-run
since it creates an anti-investment climate and induces a type of (investors)
‘witch hunt.’In such atmosphere it is hard to recognize when the resistance
against investments is a defence of common interest and when is it a
case of anti-developmental climate. While these are extremely important
issues, there has been relatively little written on the topic. Therefore,
future research should focus on analysing investment climate in tourism
dependant countries, perhaps in a comparative perspective. Moreover,
while this paper analyses the case of Croatia, the universe of cases in which
tourism land use rent-seeking and dependency intertwine is much larger.
Hence, future research should also focus on researching the patterns of the
theoretical phenomenon in other case studies and contexts.
{ 107 } Sanja Hajdinjak
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{ 111 } Sarina Bakić
Sarina Bakić
Prikaz knjige autora
Šaćira Filandre:
BOŠNJACI NAKON
SOCIJALIZMA – O
bošnjačkom identitetu
u postjugoslovenskom
dobu, BZK Preporod/
Synopsis, Sarajevo/
Zagreb, 2012.
U Bosni i Hercegovini ništa nije kao ranije, pa ni sa narodima i
njihovim identitetima. Bosna i Hercegovina se u svakom pogledu izmijenila:
duhovno, kulturno, materijalno, socijalno, i politički, i organizacijski. U
sukobu su staro i novo, tradicionalno i moderno. U sukobu su ideje i pokreti,
strah i sloboda, mržnja i dobro. Ali, šta se desilo sa narodima i identitetima?
Predmet knjige Bošnjaci nakon socijalizma - O bošnjačkom identitetu u
postjugoslovenskom dobu predstavlja pokušaj kritičke analize socijalnih,
političkih i kulturnih osnova rađanja i razvoja bošnjačkog identiteta. Tema
koju je autor izabrao za svoje višegodišnje istraživanje jeste aktuelna i
značajna.
Na prvi pogled može izgledati da fenomen bošnjačkog identiteta
nije nepoznat društvenoj nauci u Bosni i Hercegovini i regionu, ali
neposrednijim i studioznijim čitanjem ove knjige se može primijetiti da
ne postoji veći broj radova koji temeljno i analitički ulaze u istraživanje
suštine bošnjačkog identiteta i njegovih društveno-političkih premisa. To se
naročito odnosi na način istraživanja ovog fenomena u okviru konkretnih
društvenih i političkih odnosa koji su oblikovali položaj Bošnjaka, te da se
bez ustezanja govori o svim problemima sa kojima su se Bošnjaci suočavali.
U istraživanju suštine bošnjaštva i teorijskom promišljanju njegovih
Autorka je doktorantkinja na
Fakultetu političkih nauka
Univerziteta u Sarajevu
(e-mail: [email protected]
hotmail.com)
{ 112 } Prikaz knjige autora Šaćira Filandre: BOŠNJACI NAKON SOCIJALIZMA – O bošnjačkom identitetu
u postjugoslovenskom dobu, BZK Preporod/Synopsis, Sarajevo/Zagreb, 2012.
relevantnih aspekata, Filandra je uspio da prikaže ne samo genezu i dijalektiku
uslova u kojima je nastala i razvijala se ideja bošnjaštva, već i širi sociološki
i politološki aspekt gledanja na ovu problematiku. Pri tome se autor nije
zadržao samo na teorijskoj elaboraciji problema, nego je, i najvećim dijelom,
akceptirao i aktuelne refleksije na cjelokupnu bosanskohercegovačku
stvarnost. Posebno je značajno što je detaljno rasčlanio sve momente koji
rasvjetljavaju političke procese koji su uslovili i determinisali sadržaj i oblike
ispoljavanja bošnjačkog identiteta.
Identitet se prije svega treba promišljati na vrlo afirmativan
način u smislu identifikacije elemenata koji kroz opšte životno iskustvo s
vremenom postaju zajednički sadržaj memorije većine pripadnika neke
nacije, omogućujući joj osjećaj određenog istorijskog smisla i pozicije
među drugim narodima. Sadržaj takvog iskustva čine geografski, istorijski,
politički, kulturni i religijski faktori koji su međusobno povezani, a iz čitanja
knjige profesora Filandre, neki i dominiraju. U ovom kontekstu, prvenstveno
mislim na religijski faktor, koji je u periodu XX vijeka za Bošnjake predstavljao
primarnu formu kolektivnog identiteta. I danas u Bosni i Hercegovini,
bošnjaštvo i religija međusobno tijesno korespondiraju.
Sadržaj ove naučne studije o bošnjačkom identitetu struktuiran
je na sljedeći način: Islamska zajednica u raspadu Jugoslavije, zatim
slijede dijelovi o pitanju imena Bošnjaka te bošnjačke i muslimanske
nominacije izvan Bosne i Hercegovine. Nakon toga, Filandra govori o
Bošnjacima u kontekstu države Bosne i Hercegovine, političkog pluralizma
i nacionalnog ekskluzivizma. Jedno od najinteresantnijih poglavlja se
odnosi na promišljanje autora o konceptualizaciji identiteta, politizaciji
tradicije, politici simboliziranja i instrumentalizaciji istorije. Također, Filandra
u posebnom dijelu akcentira pitanja novih elita, simboličke geografije,
političkog identiteta i bosanskog jezika. Posebna pažnja je iskazana kada je
u pitanju fenomen vehabija u Bosni, te osvrt na oblike integracije društva. Na
kraju, umjesto zaključka elaborira se današnji položaj Bošnjaka u kontekstu
jednog složenog društveno-političkog faktora u Bosni i Hercegovini.
Knjiga Bošnjaci nakon socijalizma - O bošnjačkom identitetu u
postjugoslovenskom dobu predstavlja važan doprinos raspravama koje se
odnose na problematiku razvitka bošnjačkog identiteta. Raspon pristupa
autora Filandre pitanjima koja se akcentiraju, analiziraju i demistifikuju, ili se
ponekad ostavljaju nedorečenima, je dosta širok, ali u isto vrijeme i specifičan,
te nosi autorovu prepoznatljivost u savremenoj bosanskohercegovačkoj
akademskoj i političkoj javnosti, ako ga uporedimo sa nekim drugim
knjigama na istu ili sličnu temu.
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