Todaro`s migration theory and Lynch`s rural

Todaro’s migration theory and Lynch’s rural-urban
interactions model applied to West Africa
Case studies: Mali and Senegal
Master thesis
Kim Groen
International Relations and International Organisations
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
S145881
First supervisor (Faculty of Arts): F. Joustra
Second supervisor (Faculty of Spatial Sciences): A. Bailey
15-12-2009
Index
Introduction
4
Chapter I: Theoretical framework
7
1.1
Todaro’s theory about migration : rural-urban wage differentials
7
1.1.1
Development of Todaro’s theory
7
1.1.2
Review of Todaro’s theory
11
1.2
Lynch’s model about migration: rural-urban interactions
14
1.2.1
Development of Lynch’s model
17
1.2.2
Review of Lynch’s model
18
Chapter II: Migration trends in West Africa
20
2.1
Differences between the pre-colonial period and colonial period
20
2.2
Migration after decolonisation
21
2.3
Current migration trends and ECOWAS-convention
22
Chapter III: Urbanisation trends in West Africa
27
3.1
Differences between the pre-colonial period and colonial period
27
3.2
Urbanisation after decolonisation
27
3.3
Current urbanisation trends
29
Chapter IV: Approach case studies
31
4.1
Justification of case studies
31
4.2
Approach, variables and assumptions of Todaro’s model
34
4.3
Approach, variables and assumptions of Lynch’ model
37
Chapter V: Case study Mali -Todaro
39
5.1
Informal and formal sector
39
5.2
Characteristics
40
5.3
Reasons
41
5.4
Type of migration
42
5.5
Internal and international migration
43
2
Chapter VI: Case study Senegal -Todaro
45
6.1
Informal and formal sector
45
6.2
Characteristics
45
6.3
Reasons
47
6.4
Type of migration
47
6.5
Internal and international migration
48
Chapter VII: Case study Mali - Lynch
7.1
Flows of food
51
7.2
Flows of people
52
7.3
Flows of finance
53
7.4
Flows of ideas
54
Chapter VIII: Case study Senegal - Lynch
56
8.1
Flows of food
56
8.2
Flows of people
56
8.3
Flows of finance
57
8.4
Flows of ideas
58
Conclusion
61
Bibliography
64
Annex
68
Photo on cover: Advertisements and signs in Bamako. Besides development organisations, Bamako counts many
offices such as Western Union where one can transfer or receive money from for example international migrants.
Source: author, March 2009, Bamako
3
Introduction
‘Being poor is not a precondition for becoming a migrant’
Sadio Traoré (Bamako, 2009)
Migration is not a new phenomenon. While this is an obvious statement, the public
debate and discussions in the media have sparked since 11 September 2001. The discussion
about immigration, whether illegal or legal, European or African-based, and its financial or
human consequences for departure and destination countries, is highly present in
contemporary society. At a higher level, diplomats discuss how to handle migration from
Africa to Europe, with a renewed interest for the relation between migration and development.
An example is cooperation between regional organisations such as the European Union and
the African Union While this link will be briefly discussed in this thesis, the main focus is on
the application of two theories on recent migration and urbanisation patterns in West Africa.
West Africa is one of the fastest urbanising regions in the world, while the recent urbanisation
grade is low compared to the same world regions. Migration, a pre-colonial phenomenon,
could contribute to this process but its exact share is debated. The direction and form of
migration is another point of discussion. This thesis tries to prove the accuracy of a neoclassical migration theory and of a rural-urban interaction model, using two countries in West
Africa as case studies. The main question is therefore ‘to what extent could Todaro’s
migration theory and Lynch’s rural-urban interactions model be applied to recent
developments in West Africa, using the case studies of Mali and Senegal’. The next chapters
will chronologically answer this main question by dividing it into four sub questions:
a) what do the two theories imply, what criticism have they received and how do the theories
differ from each other;
b) what are the main developments in migration flows and urbanisation processes in West
Africa from a historical perspective;
c) to what extent could Todaro’s migration theory be applied to Mali and Senegal;
d) to what extent could Lynch’s rural-urban interactions model be applied to Mali and
Senegal.
The two theories form the theoretical framework and their elaboration will follow in
chapter I. The justification of the choice for these theories originates from their representation
for a certain stream in migration theories. On the one hand, there is the neo-classical point of
view on migration and on the other hand, there is the combination of new developments
which results in a model combining different aspects of flows between areas. The last model
4
tries to incorporate much of the criticism on the first theory in a broader model. The
differences between the two theories are great since the older, neo-classical theory is
considered to be one-sided, while the newer model assumes interdependence within and
between flows as a core feature of the model. This additional value forms another reason for
choosing them. While I want to compare these two streams in migration theory, they also
should focus on rural-urban flows. This leads me to choose the two theories described
hereunder. However, both models have received criticism from different angles which shall
also be discussed in the same chapter.
Michael Todaro’s wrote his migration theory in 1969 and within the field of
development theories, he was the first to use a neo-classical migration theory based on
expectations instead of actual differences.1 The neo-classical theory implies a rational,
economic cost-benefit analysis on an individual basis. It differs from the previous classical
migration theory, according to which migration is only based on differences in actual wages.
This previous approach could not explain why migration continued in the presence of high
urban unemployment figures. Therefore, Todaro has complemented the cost-benefit-analysis
with the probability of getting a job within a certain period. This leads to an expected or
perceived income, on which a prospective migrant bases its decision to migrate or not and
where to. According to Todaro, the main direction of migration flows is therefore rural-tourban because a rural migrant expects a higher income in the capital. Todaro’s theory is often
contradicted in the literature since neo-classical theories were neglecting non-economic
motives.
The rural-urban connection is also made by Kenneth Lynch in his 2005 model. The
choice for this theory stems from the fact that, in contrast to Todaro, Lynch does not focus on
only one direction of migration flows but on the interdependence between rural and urban
areas. It also criticises the distinction between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’. Moreover, his model
combines all new insights by migration theorists without focusing on particular flows or
directions. The cost-benefit analysis does not figure in Lynch’s model since economic reasons
are accompanied by social, political or cultural motives to migrate. Moreover, as opposed to
an individual decision by a potential migrant, Lynch states that the household is the main
decision-making actor. Another difference is that Todaro’s theory could be easier applied to
internal and international migration, while Lynch’s theory is mainly confined to internal
1
P. de Vreyer, F. Gubert, F. Roubaud, ‘Migration, self-selection and returns to education in the WAEMU’, DIAL
(2007) 2
5
migration. However, some of his assumptions do include international elements such as
remittances, flows of ideas and mobility in itself.
Having explained both theories and their criticism, it is necessary to look at migration
and urbanisation patterns throughout history. Chapters II and III provide the historical context
for recent developments in migration and urbanisation in West Africa, including Mali and
Senegal. A time division is made between pre-colonial, colonial and recent developments.
Whether the case studies are representative for West Africa, should follow from the next
chapters.
Chapter IV contains a justification of the case studies. It also includes the approach of
testing the theories on the case studies. The essence of the thesis follows in chapter V until
VIII. These chapters elaborate the application of the theories on the case studies. The theories
will be analysed following a number of assumptions that were chosen for their importance
according to the theorists or for their feasibility, considering the availability of data and
literature.
The conclusion answers the main question. The hypothesis is that the neo-classical
theory by Todaro is outdated, since it received much criticism. A narrow look on migration,
driven by economic considerations and mainly one-way, cannot explain complex migration
flows which move in different directions. I assume the second model is more accurate since it
combines new insights, taking into consideration the criticism on the previous theory.
The value of this thesis originates from different points. First, migration and
urbanisation are hot topics in development studies and also in the domain of international
relations. Exaggerating the consequences or the process in itself can lead to false reflections
of the reality, which on their turn could lead decision makers to base their actions on false
evidence. Second, many sources and their conclusions on migration and urbanisation in West
Africa are in French and therefore not known by ‘the scientific world’, which mainly
communicates in English. Third, a comparison of these two countries has, so far I know, not
been published. In general, data about Mali is not abundant in scientific databases while this is
less but still the case for Senegal. Finally, the study wants to point out the lack of reliable data
since statistical bureaus are not fully equipped and their quality is therefore doubtful.
Especially for Mali, many documents are not available on-line or not up-dated. This said, the
questionable reliability of national data in this thesis is sometimes enlightened by the use of a
regional surveys. Moreover, the national data are also used by the United Nations and often
cited in other literature.
6
Chapter I: Theoretical framework
1.1 Todaro’s theory about migration : rural-urban wage differentials
1.1.1 Development of Todaro’s theory2
The most recent version of the theory of Michael Todaro about migration in the
developing world dates from 1997. It was based on the neo-classical Todaro model from 1969
and those outlines still formed the point of departure for his more recent publications.
According to Todaro, the existent literature on migration had overlooked the negative indirect
and secondary effects of migration on urban employment.
The point of departure in the 1969 migration model was formed by perceived
differences between expected rural income and expected urban income by individual
migrants. This explained the continuation of rural-to-urban migration despite high
unemployment in the cities. The decision to migrate depended on several, but mainly
economic factors. The expected income formed the outcome of the individual consideration of
the actual income in the city or town, the chance of getting a job over time and finally the
costs of migrating. This income had to be compared with the expected revenues which would
have been gathered by staying in the rural area instead. If the sum of the expected financial
outcome was positive, the rural individual migrated. An example: a rural worker would
probably migrate if he expected to earn €60 per month at home and €120 in an urban area.
Only when the urban unemployment rate would increase to 50 % or higher, migrating would
not be advantageous anymore.
Figure 1. Conceptual presentation of Todaro’s migration theory
Source: own presentation
2
This paragraph is based on the two following sources, unless otherwise mentioned. M. Todaro, International
migration, domestic unemployment and urbanization: a three-sector model, Working Paper Population Council
(1986) 5-21; M. Todaro, Urbanization, unemployment and migration in Africa: theory and policy, Working
Paper Population Council (New York 1997).
Michael Todaro was at the time professor of economics at the New York University. He was a senior associate at
the Centre for Policy Studies at the Population Council in New York. He is considered to be on of the leading
economic theorists of migration according to R. Stock, Africa south of the Sahara (New York 2004) 177.
7
Following this logic, a government policy aiming at the creation of urban jobs could
have an adverse effect. As the city would attract a larger number of rural migrants than the
number of (formal) urban jobs created by the new policy, it could result in a higher
unemployment rate. Moreover, there would be secondary costs concerning the (physical)
expansion of basic services like housing, education, health services, infrastructure and
sanitation. It also lowered rural output, assuming a shortage of labour in rural areas, since
most migrants were young and hard working.
His theory evolved in 1986, adding an international aspect to his theory based on the
same expected income differential. Like internal migration, international migration too had
ambiguous effects on the level of unemployment in the departing country. It was generally
thought that this type of migration decreased the high unemployment rate in countries with
labour emigrants. Todaro denied however that international legal short-term migration was
benefiting the departure country by lowering the unemployment level. Paradoxically,
emigration would cause a rise of the urban unemployment level. This conclusion follows from
the assumption that international migration was a step-wise migration. This meant that a rural
migrant first left for the city or town nearby, then migrated to the city and eventually crossed
an international border. New rural migrants would arrive in the city hoping to fill up their
work places, adding to the already great number of earlier arrived rural workers.
Todaro concluded that should the availability of foreign jobs rise, national urban
unemployment should rise as well. Following the solution offered by Todaro to reduce ruralto-urban migration, governments should create employment centres in secondary cities or
rural areas. These centres should prevent rural individuals to migrate to the (primary) cities by
reducing the income differential. Nevertheless, Todaro acknowledged the positive impact of
migration on the national level of unemployment. Moreover, he mentioned non-economic
reasons to migrate like information from friends or relatives, the urge to experience the
modern city or frustration about being underemployed. In general, however, economic
considerations motivated the individual decision to migrate.
In 1997, Todaro combined the two previous publications in his working paper for the
Population Council named Urbanisation, unemployment and migration in Africa: theory and
policy’ In this paper he described four fundamental principles of the migration model. The
first three being an individual, rational cost-benefit analysis, a decision based on expected
economic gains and the expected chance of attaining an urban job which depended on the
estimated urban employment rate. Together these principles formed the decision-making
procedure for a potential migrant. The fourth was the already described paradox so
8
consequence of emigration and the result of the first three principles: migration continued
even if the urban unemployment rate was high. This was rational and in accordance with the
logic of the previous elements.
Following the migration model, Todaro discussed urban growth, its consequences and
causes. Rural-to-urban migration contributed to urban growth, as well as population growth.
Todaro also underscored the (ir)responsibility of governments for designing an apt policy for
growing cities. Precisely the policy emphasis on industrialisation, the development of
technology, and the growth of the already heavily populated cities made the urban areas an
attractive alternative for rural individuals.
Most of these governments also acknowledged that high urban growth was
unacceptable and they wanted to tackle rural-to-urban migration. The disadvantages of urban
growth, being costly services, environmental damage or increased crime rates, would undo the
advantages such as externalities or economies of scale.3 I conclude from this point of view
that the first major challenge for developing countries to tackle urban growth was to slow
down the movement of people from rural to urban areas.
Rural-to-urban migration expanded economic en non-economic imbalances,
originating from colonial times, in two ways. On the one hand, it resulted in an urban labour
surplus and a loss of human capital in rural areas. On the other hand, labour-intensive
technologies were unavailable in the urban sector, it needed more resource inputs and terms of
employment were higher. This meant that a significant increase of jobs was not needed, too
costly or impossible. In this way, developing countries could experience economic growth
without a declining unemployment rate. Analysing migration was therefore of major
importance to understand the underdevelopment of Africa. Migration in excess of urban
labour demand was a cause as well as a consequence of this underdevelopment.
Besides rural-to-urban migration, Todaro also included the informal sector in his
analysis of migration. This sector absorbed surplus labour from the formal labour market,
implying a lower productivity and income in the informal sector. A rural migrant normally
ended up in the informal sector after he failed to find a formal job. Even though working and
living conditions in the city could be the same as in the village, or just slightly better, it
3
Urban growth leads to an agglomeration of people making the provision of, for example, public transport
cheaper than when people live dispersedly. These are economies of scale. See also Todaro, ‘Urbanization,
unemployment and migration’ 6.
9
continued to attracts rural migrants. The informal sector was therefore in many cases very
sizeable, with an average of 50% of the total labour force.4
Although Todaro acknowledged the positive features of the informal sector, he also
mentioned several disadvantages. These varied from environmental damage to again a
potential increase of the urban unemployment. If the informal sector would be stimulated by
legalisation and economic promotion of its activities, unemployment policy could counteract
its original intentions, following the above mentioned reasoning.
Having discussed the reasoning of Todaro’s migration theory, it is necessary to look at
the migrants themselves. Todaro distinguished several general characteristics such as
demographic, educational and economic features. The first demographic characteristic was
that migrants, moth women and men, were typically between 15 and 24 years old. Todaro also
pointed at a new development. In some regions more woman than men migrated, for social,
familial or even economic reasons. These new developments of the type of typical migrant
and their reasons for migrating were of importance to Todaro. In general, however, the
majority of migrants were male.
A second feature was education since Todaro found a positive correlation between the
level of education and migration. The higher the level of education a person enjoyed, the
greater the probability that person would migrate, other factors being equal. He concluded that
given a high unemployment rate, individuals who had only completed primary school would
less likely migrate than their higher educated contemporaries. Again, expectations were
decisive for a potential migrant to migrate or stay.
A third characteristic of a migrant was his or her high level of poverty, since people in
rural areas were generally very poor. Nevertheless, they did not all originate from the same
socio-economic class. Overall, economic considerations were the primary cause of migration,
taking into account push and pull factors.
The policy implications of his theory were first of all that unemployment policy could
actually cause an increase of unemployment. The informal sector played a mayor role because
it could absorb a part of the wave of rural migrants looking for work in the cities. Although
Todaro contradicted himself on this point, governments should therefore acknowledge and
promote the informal sector. Directly or indirectly, economic policy influenced migration
4
Idem 13-15.Todaro uses data from 1981. In Abidjan (Ivory Coast) only 31% of the urban labour force works in
the informal sector. In Kumasi (Ghana) it is 60 to 70%. Since official and moreover reliable data are not easy to
find, the author takes these percentages as crude estimates. A necessary comment is that great differences
between African countries occur but an explanation or accentuation of these differences by Todaro is missing.
Unemployment rates, including open employment and underemployment in the informal and formal sector,
could be as high as 30%. This percentage would even be higher for the group between 15 and 24 years old.
10
flows by affecting rural and urban incomes. The difference between rural and urban wages
should decline and more attention was needed to the creation of rural jobs, especially those
that were labour-intensive.
There should also be less excessive investment in post-primary education, given that
more than once pupils became unemployed because of their huge numbers. Finally, Todaro
mentioned a desirable reduction of population growth by family planning, health services and
the policy advices mentioned above.
1.1.2 Review of Todaro’s theory
One of Todaro’s main observations, namely continuing rural-urban migration in a
situation of high urban unemployment, is not refuted by other researchers. But the causes of
this movement, its precise consequences and other types of migration generate much debate
within the field of migration studies. Difficulties surrounding this debate are the lack of
reliable and comparable data over longer periods, the mixed use of the terms ‘urban growth’
and ‘urbanisation’, and different definitions or thresholds of urban and rural areas. The
criticisers of Todaro’s migration model can be grouped around seven elements.
The first element which groups different criticisers are those adhering to the ‘new
economics of labour migration view’. They criticise the element of individual decisionmaking since the whole household or family decides which member of the family migrates.5
The benefits for the family, for example financial remittances, depend on the investments in
the migrant in the form of education and social networks. Migration is thus seen as a
collective action with a gender dimension: migration of women stems more likely from a
communal decision than men.6 A cost-benefit analysis could be positive for the household or
family. Therefore a member can become a migrant even when his individual analysis is
negative.
A second group of criticisers shares the assumption that the dual economy model and
Todaro’s focus on economic motivations of migrants are wrong. According to Christophe
Guilmoto and Frédéric Sandron, the limited micro-economy model which differentiates
between the formal and informal sector should be enlarged. They find the costs of migrating
to be decisive for migrants, whether these are economic, social, cultural or psychological. The
5
S. Castles, M.J. Miller, The age of migration. International population movements in the modern world (New
York 2009) 24.
6
F. Ellis, ‘Household strategies and rural livelihood diversification’, Journal of development studies 35 (1998) 1
1-38, q.v. 12. See also: Castles, The age of migration 20.
11
distance of most migrations is therefore short.7 Todaro’s economic approach lacks a realistic
application since mobility of migrants is limited by political, family or social factors.8 This
implies that expected wage differentials between regions or countries are not as important as
Todaro claims. According to Alden Speace, Todaro treats workers in the informal sector as
unemployed, but the informal sector and unemployment cannot be used synonymously. An
income in the informal sector could even be higher than in the formal sector. This makes it
economically rational to stay in the informal sector, while Todaro views the formal sector as a
logical next step for a migrant.9
A third element in Todaro’s theory which has been criticised, is that rural-urban
migration together with population growth are the main causes of urbanisation. But Chris
Beauchemin and Philippe Bocquier claim that besides natural growth and migration,
reclassification greatly contributes to urban growth in Africa. This means that when a village
passes a certain threshold, say 10.000 inhabitants, it becomes urban. This does not
automatically implies that more migrants are entering the city but it does add to the general
national picture of urban growth. Between 1950 and 1980, more than one fourth of the growth
of urban areas can be ascribed to reclassification, which was much higher than in other world
regions. Moreover, when one focuses at the share of natural growth in total urban growth, it
appeared to be 75% in the 1980s. This is also much higher than in other world regions.10 The
contribution of rural-urban migration to urban growth is not as straightforward as Todaro
presents it and it is certainly not the dominating factor. Although he states that population
growth also adds to urban growth, he does not support this by quantitative research. His
policy implications therefore focus on indirect or direct solutions for rural-to urban migration.
According to Beauchemin and Bocquier, this would only settle part of the problems
associated with urban growth.
A fourth element that has been widely contradicted, is the supposed direction of
migration. According to Todaro, step-wise migration is the most common pattern.11 But
Beauchemin and Bocquier see a more complex process. They contradict that rural migrants
come from nearby areas, as is assumed by the step-wise model. Migrants in secondary cities
7
C.Z. Guilmoto and F. Sandron, Migration et développement (Paris 2003) 27-29.
A. Dang, S. Goldstein and J. McNally, ‘Internal Migration and Development in Vietnam’, International
Migration Review 31 (1997) 2 312-337, q.v. 312.
9
A. Speace Jr, ‘Internal Migration in Developing Countries. By Michael P. Todaro’, International Migration
Review 11 (1977) 2 248-249, q.v. 248-249. Although this review is based on an 1976 article from Todaro,
Speace’s criticism is also applicable to the Working Paper from 1986, discussed above.
10
C. Beauchemin and P. Bocquier, ‘Migration and urbanization in Francophone West Africa: a review of recent
empirical evidence’, Développement et insertion internationale (2003) 7.
11
Todaro, ‘International migration’ 5.
8
12
originate from rural areas as well as from capitals. Moreover, the major type of rural outmigration is international migration and not internal migration to bigger towns.12 This
questions again Todaro’s unambiguous emphasis on internal rural-to-urban migration.
Return migration from abroad and urban-to-rural migration are sparsely mentioned by
Todaro while their share in total migration is rising. Return migration partly depends on age,
since older migrants born in rural areas often return to retire, inherit land or real estate or to
take care of the family. Nowadays, young people return too. City children who fail at school
can return to the village to look for a job or are even sent back to the village schoolhouse.13
A fifth point of criticism considers the demographic characteristics of migrants.
Todaro sees rural migrants as a self-selected group with general characteristics such as age
and gender that differ from non-migrating rural people. Todaro describes migrants as young,
between 15 and 30 years old. Data shows however that less and less youngsters between 15
and 19 years old become economically active because of their increasing enrolment at school
over time.14 Moreover, more adults migrate, whether they return to the village or depart from
it, so the age-bracket is moving up.15 The sex of migrants has also been debated. As Todaro
has mentioned, in some regions rural-to-urban migrants are more often female than male. This
corresponds with research within West Africa.16 But Guilmoto and Sandron contradict this in
general terms. They first confirm that migration costs are especially low for singles,
consequently they are highly mobile. However, single muslim women are an exception
because they constitute a risk for the reputation of the family, limiting their mobility. They
conclude with Todaro that a typical migrant is a young, educated and single male, however
they do not agree with his hierarchy of motivations.17
The sixth element of Todaro’s theory that has provoked debate, is regarding to
economic characteristics. Todaro assumes that migrants have less chances on the labour
market, consequently their unemployment rate should be higher than non-migrants. Empirical
12
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 9-10.
Idem 10.
14
The world’s youth 2006 data sheet’, Population Reference Bureau,
<http://www.prb.org/pdf06/WorldsYouth2006DataSheet.pdf> (2006; accessed on 7-5-2009) 18. In 1990, the
percentage of economically active boys and girls in Africa (average, assuming an equal male-female division)
was 53,5%. In 2005, this percentage decreased to 50%. For Sub-Sahara Africa, the percentages are respectively
58,5% and 54,5%. For Northern Europe, the percentages are 51,5% and 38%. See database International Labour
Organisation, <http://laborsta.ilo.org/> (accessed on 6-8-2009).
15
Interview with Gouro Diallo, Groupe Recherche-Action pour le développement (GRAD), Bamako (26-52009). He works as a consultant.
16
Castles, The age of migration 12. Nevertheless, male migrants still dominate international migration.
17
Guilmoto, Migration et développement 29. They compare the number of migrating unmarried christian and
hindu women with unmarried muslim and buddhist women.
13
13
research in seven West African countries reverses this image. Especially for young migrants,
unemployment rates in the informal sector are the same as for their peers born in the city.18
A final point of criticism is again related to characteristics of migrants, namely to
education. The general educational feature of migrants is that the more years of schooling
they received, the higher the chances they will migrate to urban areas. Urban-to-rural
migration is also practised by high educated individuals. While Todaro is mainly concerned
with the opposite type of migration, his assumption could be correct.
Todaro’s migration model clearly received more criticism than approval. The
denunciation of several key elements of his theory such as the individualistic, economic
motive for migration, the one-sided direction of migration flows, and typical migrant
characteristics, may make this model appear to be outdated. However, several components of
his theory have been recognised by other researchers. As we have seen, the lack or negligence
of Todaro of the previous mentioned aspects of migration, are discussed by different authors
in different articles.
Kenneth Lynch tries to incorporate much of this criticism, but not all, in his model on
rural-urban interactions, which sets him aside of other, previous mentioned, authors. He
distinguishes between different flows but more importantly, he underscores the
interdependence within and between those flows. Thus, in contrast to Todaro, he underlines
the two-sided character of flows, such as flows of people, complemented by flows of food,
finance, ideas, and natural flows. These flows also influence each other since they are
mutually dependent. Examples of this will follow in the chapters VII and VIII. Moreover,
Lynch has changed the level of decision-making from an individual decision-making process
by Todaro to a household decision-making process. This also changes the motives of
migration to non-economic reasons, which forms an additional improvement of Todaro’s
theory, considering the criticisers. Summarising, Lynch fills many lacks in Todaro’s theory by
building a more elaborate model which focuses on rural-urban linkages.
1.2 Lynch’s model about migration: rural-urban interactions
1.2.1 Development of Lynch’s model19
Kenneth Lynch expounds his theory about rural-urban interactions in his 2005 book
Rural-urban interactions in a developing world. His earlier research was oriented towards
18
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 14-15.
This paragraph is based on K. Lynch, Rural-urban interactions in a developing world (London 2005), unless
otherwise mentioned. Kenneth Lynch is a senior lecturer at Kingston University in the School of Earth Sciences
and Geography.
19
14
urban agriculture in African cities in which he first used the multidisciplinary approach that
he continued to use in his 2005 work on classification of rural-urban interactions.20 Lynch
dissociates five types of flows between rural and urban areas namely food, natural flows,
people, finance and ideas. These movements work in both directions. Lynch ideas about
migration and urbanisation are of importance to development studies and development
organisations, stressing the need to integrate rural and urban development programs and
policies.
The essence of his book is the interdependence between rural and urban areas, based
on the five flows mentioned above. Most literature was urban biased or focused on physical
aspects of both areas and where they meet. This meant for example that the physical and
natural characteristics of the peri-urban interface, where urban and rural meet, were being
studied instead of the two-way movements of for example ideas and finances. Due to the
interdependence, he also states that the distinction between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ is false.
Nevertheless, for descriptive purposes, he uses the two terms in his model and so will I.
Figure 2. Conceptual presentation of Lynch’s rural-urban interactions model
Source: own adaption of figure 1.1 from Lynch, Rural-urban interaction, 6.
Lynch warns the reader for making comparisons between countries. Categorisation of
people into rural and urban boxes is surrounded with difficulties as well as the use of standard
or formal definitions of rural and urban areas which can differ per organisation or country.
Lynch himself defines urban growth as ‘the absolute growth in the number of people living in
cities and towns’.21 Urbanisation on the other hand is a ‘relative change in the proportion of
people living in towns and cities as apposed to rural areas’.22 This also refers to the influence
of urban processes on rural culture, economy and society.
20
K. Lynch, T. Binns, E. Olofin, ‘Urban agriculture under threat: the land security question in Kano, Nigeria’,
<http://www.cityfarmer.org/kano.html> (2000; accessed on 11-08-2009); T. Binns, K. Lynch, ‘Feeding Africa's
growing cities into the 21st century : the potential of urban agriculture, Journal of international development 10
(1998) 6, 777-793.
21
Lynch, Rural-urban interactions 97.
22
Idem 97.
15
Interestingly, Lynch notices an upheaval in thinking about urbanisation. The writers of
the Brundlandt report Our common future had a fairly positive view of this phenomenon in
the 1980s, linking it to development and economic growth. This evolved in the following
thirty years to a more negative association with food insecurity, environmental pollution and
rising unemployment. Lynch affirms the actual situation in the developing world as it is
experiencing an unprecedented urban growth. Urban growth and urbanisation are nevertheless
seen from a particular view by existent literature, which does not take into account the
diversity of motivations and directions of flows. Positive and negative consequences for rural
and urban areas as well as interdependent connections between them are underexposed.
Focusing on the movement of people between rural and urban areas, Lynch states that
the course of flows and other types of migration are less often considered in the literature.
These other types are step-wise migration, circulatory migration, cyclical migration (seasonal
migration), multi-locational households and chain migration. Shortly after independence,
rural-to-urban migration contributed greatly to the growth of urban areas in Africa.
Nowadays, natural growth is the biggest contributor. Since the orthodox models of migration
focus on only one direction of movements of people, rural inhabitants seem to depend at least
financially on urban migrants. Other types of revenues are not abundantly researched. This
leads to a shortcoming in migration studies of the different linkages between rural and urban
areas.
The first of these linkages is the movement of people. Cyclical movement, often a
search for seasonal employment, is of great importance to the migrant and his household for
several reasons that differ in time and per region. They vary from securing land tenure by
returning to the village, to saving food in the rural area by leaving the household. Economic
motives cannot explain all flows of migration. Decisions are often taken by the household.
The education system is sometimes oriented towards urban jobs which are more remunerating
than rural jobs. Moreover, environmental reasons, being short or long term hazards, can push
migrants to the cities. In addition, governmental policy can be concentrated on a reduction of
the migration flows to the cities. This can be achieved by agrarian reform or by moving
people to deserted rural areas, sometimes in controversial or unsuccessful ways.23
23
Idem 123. An example of a controversial decision is the government of Ethiopia that moved people to a
disputed area between the country itself and Somalia. An example of an unsuccessful policy is the creation of
attractive small and medium towns in Zambia as special development zones. National policy can also violate
human rights or cause environmental damage by reallocating large groups to sparsely cultivated lands.
16
A second element, and one of the most critical elements linking the countryside and
the cities, is the flow of food. Food is cultivated, traded, commercialised and marketed
between the two areas. Flows of food go in either direction, including to and from the periurban area. Urban agriculture is not a new phenomenon, dating at least from the 1930s, but
only recently it received more scientific attention. No definite judgement can yet be made
about the overall effects of agriculture in the city on rural areas.
A third element of rural-urban interactions are natural flows. Migration to urban areas
can increase local pollution of the air, water or land, change lifestyles but also stimulate the
construction of sewers or lead to more or less land pressure. Clearly no universal statement
can be made about whether natural flows produced by migration or urbanisation work out
negative or positive for urban and rural regions together.
The fourth element is the movement of ideas. This concerns information and
communication technologies such as journals, radio, television and internet. Lynch notes that
the benefits of these applications are probably overestimated. The rural population should
gain a better access to political, social and economic capital. Access to online information
about world market prices of a commodity for example can help farmers to increase their
negotiation position. Yet negative consequences have to be taken into account like an
unrealistic image of the city or the developed world, cultural imperialism, changes in identity
and the strengthening of existing unequal power relations.
Finally, the movement of finances is mainly studied in the light of remittances send
home by urban migrants to the rural household. Other study areas are access to credit or
financial services such as insurances or saving accounts. The emphasis is laid on urban-torural flows, including the extraction of rural capital by urban areas.
Lynch concludes with a recommendation to study more profoundly the nature of ruralurban linkages. A few general assumptions can be made about these linkages in developing
countries. During colonisation, rural areas were exploited by urban ones and eventually both
became exploited by the colonial powers. After independence, governments tried to set up
intermediary towns, new infrastructure and to reorganise the society, intending to decrease the
domination of the capital. Further urbanisation is unstoppable, resulting from increasing
pressure on rural areas and increasingly appealing cities. Nevertheless, urban-to-rural
migration is something to take into consideration for the following decennia, in accordance
with developments in the developed world.
17
1.2.2
Review of Lynch’s model
Due to the recent date of publication, reviews of Lynch’s 2005 work are scarce.
Adriana Allen agrees with Lynch about the lack of scientific and political attention covering
linkages between rural and urban areas. She affirms the fading distinction between ‘urban’
and ‘rural’. Flows between both areas have to be analysed from a functional and relational
point of view.24 Jennifer Franco also confirms the decreasing relevance of the division
between rural and urban areas that came into existence during the colonial period, although it
varies per country.25
Guilmoto and Sandron confirm the importance of the household and social networks
as stressed by Lynch. Their level of analyses is the meso-scale which is located between the
micro-economic view and the macro- or structural view. This scale examines social groups
constituting social capital with relations in migration chains.26 The focus of the two authors is
therefore less oriented towards an individual rational cost-benefit analyses.
Another point of discussion concerns the flow of finances. The pessimists argue that
remittances are not well invested but used for luxury goods. Moreover, remittances create a
dependency of the receivers on the sender which decreases their incentives and again does not
lead to investments. The optimists however state that productive investments could be made,
for example by using machines instead of manual workers, which lead to higher productions
and income. Dependency is not inescapable and even in the case of buying a luxury good, it
would at least stimulate local business.
The direction of migration forms a leading theme Lynch’s book. Especially counterurbanisation is discussed, which could be defined as a process of relatively more populated
rural areas in relation to urban areas. Return migration is one of the contributors to reversed
urbanisation. Here, Lynch refers particularly to the contribution of urban-to-rural migration
because people desire a pleasant environment. This type of migration already exists in Africa
and shares several motivations with cyclical migration. Lower costs of housing, land etc.
combined with savings from an urban income, could lead to a desire to return. This is not only
applicable to elders but also to young people disillusioned by the city and its images they
received through the movement of ideas. He concludes that eventually the less developed
24
A. Allen, ‘Sustainable cities or sustainable urbanisation?’ in: Palette,.<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sustainablecities/perspectives/allen.pdf> (2009; accessed on 11-08-2009) perspective 3.18.
25
J. Franco ‘Rural democratisation: (Re)Framing rural poor political action’ <http://www.tni.org/> (2007;
accessed on 11-08-2009).
26
Guilmoto, Migration et développement 36-37.
18
world will experience the same pattern of movement of people as the developed world is
experiencing now, although this can take decades.
The obvious question to ask is why Africa should follow the Western developments of
counter-urbanisation. Lynch assumes that the urbanisation process in the developed world is
followed in an analogous way by the less developed world, or at least in some parts of it. It
automatically follows that the reverse phenomenon will also be analogous over time.
Moreover it is not clear whether Lynch assumes that counter-urbanisation will ‘urbanise’ rural
lifestyles, culture and society or that the opposite will happen, namely that rural influences
will dominate these areas.
A precondition for counter-urbanisation is that urban growth caused by natural growth
is less than the out-migration of rural inhabitants. Counter-urbanisation could lead to more
small towns because of the growth of small villages. Thresholds and reclassification will also
play their role in this process. A village can be reclassified as an urban area because of the
inflow of urban migrants which exceeds the threshold for a rural area. This could precisely
increase the national urbanisation grade while urban-to-rural migration increases. Counterurbanisation by the quantitative definition mentioned above could therefore be difficult to
determine. Moreover, the capital could still attract in-migrants where secondary cities could
experience out-migration. This leads to a divers picture of counter-urbanisation. These
limitations are not discussed by Lynch although he presents increasing counter-urbanisation
as a realistic prediction.
In general, other researchers have reaffirmed the two-way flows between rural and
urban areas of several movements such as people, goods (which are limited to food by
Lynch), capital, ideas and technology. Some researchers ad an extra linkage, namely
administrative and service provision or governance.27 Due to urban growth and urbanisation,
administrative boundaries do not longer correspond with the spatial distribution of the
(migrant) population. Moreover, peri-urban areas which combine rural and urban
characteristics are not covered by local governance because they are located outside the
juridical boundaries. This could for instance lead to an unclear or even a competing local
responsibility and accordingly a deficient provision of basic services.
27
I. Smith and P. Courtney, ‘Rural-urban linkages and social cohesion: a position paper’, Cities research centre
<http://www.cureforsustainability.eu/fileadmin/template/projects/cure/files/Seminar_Smith_and_Courtney.ppt>
(2009; accessed on 12-08-2009) Sheet 7.
19
Chapter II: Migration trends in West Africa
2.1 Differences between the pre-colonial period and colonial period
For centuries, migration has been a common phenomenon in West Africa. Especially
labour migration was a recurrent feature in the lives of farmers, for example to grow
subsistence or cash-crops on uncultivated land. Population movements have had multiple
causes such as (tribal) conflicts, expansion of land and people, trade over long distances, treks
of nomadic herders, religious reasons like pilgrimages and later also by the slave trade. In
general, circular and seasonal labour were common movements patterns for West Africans.28
Colonisation changed the social aspect of migration. Before the colonial penetration in
1860 to 1890, group movements dominated flows of people. This type of migration decreased
relatively during colonisation and absolutely at the expense of individual migrants. The
colonial powers wanted to control the movements of people. Temporary migration fitted in
their labour programs, but permanent settlement was not desirable since it could endanger the
colonial order.29
Colonisation also increased the importance of economic motivation to migrate.
Remarkably, there are also examples of tribes or people who experienced more freedom of
movement during colonial rule. Since large areas which were formerly held by certain tribes
were not respected by the European powers, tribes had a possibility to move into other lands.
A third new aspect of population movements in colonial times was the agglomeration
of scattered groups or people and to place them in the proximity of infrastructure. This would
decrease the costs of social services, ensure more control over the population and make them
maintain the route ways. With the colonisation in West Africa, even people from the Middle
East emigrated and controlled part of the commerce or became workers.30 The use of
temporary forced labour in the early period of colonisation was also apparent in West Africa.
A track was constructed between Dakar and Bamako to fully exploit the trade potential of the
region and therefore people were moved to the areas of construction. An unintended side
effect was the spread of Islam.31 This could be explained by matching the geographical
expansion of people against the expansion of ideas, under which religion. The availability of
voluntary labour expanded in time so that the element of forced labour and migration declined
28
Castles, The age of migration 154; J. Goody, ‘Futures of the family in rural Africa’, Population and
Development Review 15 (1989) 119-144, q.v. 123-124.
29
Castles, The age of migration 151.
30
W.A. Hance, Population, migration and urbanization in Africa (New York 1970) 129-132.
31
C. Harrison, France and Islam in West-Africa: 1860-1960 (Cambridge 1988) 10-14.
20
after 1900. Materialistic motivations to migrate outweighed cultural reasons such as the
transition to adult life.32
Colonial influences on migration patterns were important and could partially explicate
recent international flows of migrants to Europe. This can also be seen in paragraphs 5.5 and
6.5 in which national flows for Mali and Senegal are discussed. Besides this, forced
migration, often in the form of refugees, is another form of flows of people. Under European
rule, Africans flew because of conflicts with their oppressor. After colonisation, this type of
migration continued although the oppressors had become other Africans. Since refugees are
not always considered as migrants, their flows are not treated in this paper.
2.2 Migration after decolonisation
Decolonisation influenced migration patterns in several ways. The end of the colonial
period resulted first in a return of European settlers from African countries, in West Africa
mainly from Senegal. Refugees, although often seen as a distinct group, formed another type
of migrant flows that increased. A third change in migration was the increase of restrictions
on the movement of Africans within the region. Moreover, conflicts arising from tensions
between tribes lead to movements of people. The volume of elites that migrated on an
international scale had also risen. These were directed to Africa but African elites also
migrated to Europe. Finally, rural-to-urban migration increased as well, aiming for the most
important cities.33
Before as well as after decolonisation the major population movements were directed
to the coast as migrants moved from a distant, less-developed area to a more developed area.
Migrants mainly aimed for cities and regions where cash-crops were cultivated on a large
scale. Therefore, they moved to farms, plantations or mines.34 Flows in West Africa could be
divided into several main patterns. The first was the movement to peanut fields in Senegal and
Gambia. As will be shown in chapter VI, Senegal experienced high immigration for this
reason. Second, Sierra Leone and Liberia experienced migration to their mines, cash-cropping
areas and cities. Third, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana attracted great numbers of migrants to the
mining sector, farms and plantations and to the cities. Fourth, a smaller number of migrants
moved to Togo, parts of current Benin, Nigeria and Lagos. Besides these coastal areas, other
important flows of people were directed at mines in inner Nigeria and peanut fields in Mali
32
Hance, Population, migration and urbanization 138.
Idem 138-139.
34
Idem 147.
33
21
but its size was smaller than in Senegal. The migration of fishermen was also of importance a
well as the movement of African elite to northern areas and Europe.35
In the 1960s and early 1970s, young males dominated migration flows but the relative
share of female migrants increased for reasons of family reunification. This is reflected by
analysing characteristics of migrants in the case studies. Most migrants were unskilled or
unqualified workers, while commercial and skilled migrants formed a minority. The main
flows originated in rural areas and were directed to other rural areas and to urban areas. Due
to out-migration in emigration countries, the average age increased. The immigration
countries experienced the inverse development.36 In general, poorer nations were labour
exporters to countries which benefited from cheap labour. On a continental scale, most of this
migration was within Francophone or Anglophone regions since these languages were used
for social contacts and on markets.37
Labour migration, which was common before, during and after colonisation, appeared
to be a certain tendency throughout West African migration history. West Africans were
highly mobile for economical reasons but social, cultural, religious or other reasons mattered
as well. Restrictions did exist in some countries, like in Mali under the former socialist
regime. The police and customs officers checked identity cards of rural migrants who wanted
to enter the city and forced them to return to their village. This has been abolished after the
regime change in 1991.38
2.3 Current migration trends and ECOWAS-convention
A new trend is the commercialisation of migration. While low-skilled labourers
characterised traditional migration, recent immigrants are increasingly self-employed. Labour
migration is therefore still of importance, which can be deduced from the continuing flow of
migrants from northern regions to coastal areas where they search for work in mines, factories
and plantations, or in the secondary sector.39 Whether this is also the case for Mali and
Senegal, is explained in chapters V and VI.
35
Hance, Population, migration and urbanization 146-150.
S. Amin, Modern migrations in West Africa (London 1974) 69-70.
37
Goody, ‘Futures of the family in rural Africa’, 124.
38
Interview with Diallo. See also P. Antoine, D. Ouédraogo, V. Piché (ed), Trois générations de citadins. Trente
ans d’histoire social à Dakar et à Bamako (Paris 1998) 17.
39
Castles, The age of migration 154.
36
22
Besides commercialisation as a new development, feminisation40 of migration occurs
as a new trend in West-Africa. Tacoli mentions that although male migrants still form a
majority, there is an increase of female migrants moving independently from men. Their
short- or longer-term migration often leads them to service sector jobs and becomes socially
acceptable when remittances are received by the family.41 According to Sadio Traoré, the
primary reason to migrate is family-associated but economic reasons gain importance. This is
the opposite for men. The consequences of male migration are not automatically bad for the
women that have stayed. They assume a greater responsibility and better access to land.
Nevertheless, they also have to perform more and often physically heavier duties.42 If women
migrate to seek for work in the cities, they often find it in domestic service.
According to Gourro Diallo, poverty is not a necessity for (female) migration. The
daughters of the chief of the village, who do not have a lack of financial means, migrate as
well but for reasons of social status. If one does not migrate, one will not be respected in the
village. Another reason for women to migrate is to collect their own dowry by working as a
housemaid. In some cases, they become prostitutes in the same city which is a fairly recent
development.43
The geographical direction of migration of women and men as well as children is
important, such as the movements from northern to coastal areas or to cities. In a joint study
for the World Bank and OECD, performed in 1981, estimations on the number of migrants to
Savannah regions are far less than the number of migrants to coastal regions. Around 1975,
most of the 1,9 million migrants from Savannah-regions migrated to coastal areas of which a
minority moved internally and a majority moved internationally.44 Besides an international or
internal origin and destination, there are four main types of migration: rural-to-rural, rural-tourban, urban-to-urban and urban-to-rural. Samir Amin wrote in his 1974 book, Modern
migrations in West Africa, that urban-to-rural migration ‘would appear to be hypothetical’.45
This claim is now untenable in West Africa. Although its scale is small and exact figures for
40
In this context: an increasing share of female migrants to the total number of migrants so compared to the
share of male migrants.
41
C. Tacoli, ‘Changing rural-urban interactions in Sub-Saharan Africa and their impacts on livelihood: a
summary’, International Institute for Environment and Development, Working Paper (2002) 7, 20.
42
Interview with Sadio Traoré, demographer at the Centre d'études et recherches sur la population pour le
développement et la problématique de la population et développement durable au Sahel (CERPOD), Bamako
(29-05-2009).
43
Interview with Diallo. This assertion is at least applicable to Mali.
44
K.C. Zachariah, J. Condé, Migration in West Africa (New York 1981) 58. The study included nine countries:
Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso (at the time Upper Volta), Senegal, Mali and
Togo.
45
Amin, Modern migrations in West Africa 67.
23
the whole region are unavailable, NESMUWA-research has shown that some migrants return
to their villages after having worked a life-time in the city. Moreover, youngsters who cannot
find a job in the city, might also return to the village, as we have seen in the first chapter. This
could also be true for the case studies.
The four main types of migration can occur on different levels. On a regional scale, on
which migration could be defined as international migration as well, migration depends in
part on economic circumstances and (violent) conflicts.46 There is a positive correlation
between these two factors and the number of immigrants. Expulsions of migrants by African
governments in times of economic recession or for political reasons, contributed to flows of
people in the region. Land disputes in Côte d’Ivoire, aggravated by the economic situation,
even formed the major source of conflict between immigrants and natives.47 New concepts of
identity had been created which excluded people who were born in the land but whose parents
had been born in abroad. This did not only lead to the exclusion of certain political opponents
but also to hostility to ‘others’, mainly against Burkinabe which resulted in migration
outflows.48 The definition of identity and the rights and plights attached to it, were of great
importance for the classification of people as migrants, natives or to intermediate categories.
The high mobility in West Africa was restricted or enabled by these definitions, as well as by
other legal instruments.
Only since the 1980s, African governments began to restrict cross-border labour
migration more seriously. Some countries installed stricter border controls because of huge
inflows of migrants. The presence of a sizeable group of illegal migrants, led to expulsions in
several countries. Nevertheless, even where migration flows between countries decreased, this
could not be traced back only to border controls and expulsions which should deter other
migrants. One of the most important migration flows was rural-to-urban migration. It was
perceived as a problem by depriving rural areas of its labour force and by causing a surplus
demand of basic urban services of immigrants and born city dwellers.49
A distinction between internal migration and cross-border migration is therefore
necessary. Governments have sovereignty over their nation, their territory and so it is possible
to decide exclusively about legal actions that affect internal migration. Only when migrants
46
Castles, The age of migration 155.
T. Kouamouo, ‘Trouble in the hospitable land’, UNESCO Courier
<http://www.unesco.org/courier/2001_09/uk/doss23.htm> (2001; accessed on 4-9-2009).
48
In the constitution of Côte d’Ivoire of 2000, it is stated that the President and his parents have to be born in
Côte d’Ivoire. It defines the identity concept of ‘Ivoirité’ which has a broader societal impact. C. Bouquet,
‘L’artificialité des frontières en Afrique subsaharienne’, Les cahiers d’outre-mer 222 (2003) 181-198, q.v. 185186.
49
R. David, Changing places? Women, resource management and migration in the Sahel (London 1995) 2-3.
47
24
cross a national border, it becomes inevitable to cooperate with the neighbouring state,
although one-sided governmental decisions were often taken throughout history no matter the
direction of flows. According to policy makers, rural-to-urban flows, whether internal or
international, should and shall decrease mainly by investments in rural agriculture.
International migration is often a long-term migration and more and more women and
men opt for it. Enabling this are better transport opportunities, migrant networks which
provide information and social contacts, and a growing demand in other countries.50 Financial
remittances should then compensate family members for the lack of labour force, especially in
the sowing and harvesting season if there was a shortage in the first place. These can be
invested in machines which could increase the yields. Rural-to-urban migration is therefore
not inherently unfavourable for those who stayed behind. It is nevertheless subject of
discussion for West African governments.
While legal arrangements restrict movements of West Africans, they also enable them
by offering legal opportunities and write out the rights of migrants. Especially within the
Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), citizens are free to move and
enjoy certain benefits which are nevertheless different per country as well as the level of
implementation. Bilateral arrangements were also made between specific West African
countries like between Mali and its neighbours Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and
Guinea.51 Since 1978, the ECOWAS-member states have concluded agreements on the free
movement of people and goods, added in time with capital and services.52
Although the convention of the ECOWAS on free movement of people mentions
migrant workers, it excludes informal workers form this category as ‘persons whose working
relations with an employer have not been established in the host Member State’ are not
defined as migrant workers.53 It can be very hard for a migrant to give proof of working
relations when he or she is employed in the informal sector, moreover because they do not
always have an employer and work for themselves.
50
Tacoli, ‘Changing rural-urban interactions’ 20.
Findley, S.E., ‘Mali: seeking opportunity abroad’,
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=247> (2004; accessed on 4-9-2009)
52
Members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Niger, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Mauritania withdraw in 2000. Its overall
objective is ‘to promote cooperation and integration, with a view to establishing an economic and monetary
union as a means of stimulating economic growth and development in West Africa.’ www.comm.ecowas.int
(accessed on 4-9-2009). Free movement of people within the ECOWAS includes: abolition of visas, right of
residence and establishment, suppression of barriers and police check points, creation of ECOWAS travel
certificate, circulation of ECOWAS passport and harmonization.
53
Supplementary protocol a/sp.2/5/90 on the implementation of the third phase (right of establishment) of the
protocol on free movement of persons, right of residence and establishment. Chapter I, article 1.2.iii. (1990)
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=asp020590&lang=en (accessed on 4-9-2009).
51
25
While judicial arrangements were made, there were also political developments that
acknowledged problems and solutions surrounding migration and urban growth. The Bamako
declaration by ten West African ministers from 1999 considered new developments such as
the involvements of women and youngsters, it stressed the importance of investments in rural
areas to decrease the rural exodus and the need to invest in cities as well so they could
become growth centres. A migration policy should be formulated in every country which
should include helping return migrants and providing information on host countries for
emigrants.54
Clearly, migration is a concern for governments, either positively or negatively. The
movement of people has been defined by international organisations, multilateral agreements,
bilateral accords and national legislation, although not necessarily in the same way and
therefore consequences can vary as well. The main migration patterns for 1988 until 1992 are
presented by figure 1.
Figure 3. The main migration flows between 1988 and 1992.
source: ‘Intra-regional migration: A territory of extreme mobility’, Atlas on regional integration in West Africa,
<http://www.atlas-ouestafrique.org/spip.php?rubrique51> (2006; accessed on 3-12-2009).
Legenda: immigration country: Côte d’Ivoire. Imigration country: Mali, Niger, Guinea. Zero-balance migratory
countries: Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso. Other countries were excluded in the research. Fat arrow:
migratory flow > 20.000. Small arrow: migratory flow < 20.000. 67: number of migrants X 1000.
54
‘Conférence ministérielle sur les migrations et l'urbanisation en Afrique de l'Ouest: Déclaration de Bamako’
<http://www.insahpub.net/vedo_document.cfm?id=485> (2000; accessed on 17-9-2009).
26
Chapter III: Urbanisation trends in West Africa
3.1 Differences between the pre-colonial period and colonial period
Urbanisation in Africa is a recent development since it was coupled with colonisation.
Prior to the European penetration, trade systems led to a concentration of people in particular
urban centres. There were also religious centres which grew through the arrival of pilgrims or
students of which some settled permanently. Only with the arrival of colonisers, urbanisation
became a real phenomenon.55 The link with the historical tendency in migration flows in the
previous chapter is obvious. The European powers created centres of power from where they
could easily trade or rule over the population. Forced labour migration, which meant in
practice movements from rural to eventually urban areas, led to greater settlements in
important commercial areas.
The main difference between the two periods is that urbanisation only took of when
the European colonisers entered West Africa and used labour migration for commercial or
other goals which led to agglomeration of people and therefore to cities. Since urbanisation is
a relative process, it meant that the rural population relatively decreased.
3.2 Urbanisation after decolonisation
The move of people to cities, forced or voluntarily, continued after independence. If
we take a look at the urban ratio, or urbanisation level, in the nineteen countries in West
Africa56, we see the following:
Table 1: Percentage change of urban ratio from first until last year within period
Period
1960-1970
1970-1980
1980-1990
1990-1995
1995-2020
Percentage change
40%
50%
24%
12%
62%
Source: adaption of J. Cour, S. Snrech (ed.), Preparing for the future. A vision of West Africa in 2020 (1998) 133
The last period has a time span of 35 years but its change in urban ratio in percentage
terms is relatively low compared to the first two decades after independence. This also holds
for the case studies as shown in chapters VII and VIII. Perhaps, the height of urbanisation has
passed. Most countries experienced an average urban population growth rate between 4% and
6% per year. The average growth rate of the rural population in the same period was 1,5%.
The city formed the destination of many rural migrants during the earlier periods. Therefore,
urban growth was mainly due to rural in-migration. However, its share in urban growth
55
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 4.
West Africa consist in this case of Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Benin,
Cape Verde, Mauritania, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali and Togo.
See J. Cour, S. Snrech (ed.), Preparing for the future. A vision of West Africa in 2020 (Paris 1998) 133
56
27
diminished in the 1970s and 1980s to eventually 25%. Natural growth and reclassification
became responsible for the absolute growth of cities. Surprisingly, natural growth was higher
in urban areas than in rural areas or similar which seems contrary to the common opinion.
This is due to a lower urban death rate and a young and fertile urban society.57 Rural fertility
is assumed to be much higher than urban fertility rates but natural increase depends on birth
and death rates, especially of children, as well. This could explain a higher urban natural
increase compared to rural natural increase.
Urban growth has slowed down between the 1960s and 1990s from 11,5% per year to
4,7% which makes the urban centres in West Africa one of the fastest growing in the world.
Its urbanisation level is nevertheless one of the lowest.58 Migration is one of the causes of
urban growth, but its contribution to urban growth as well as to urbanisation is disputable.
Different authors use different percentages which could lead to political decisions which are
not based on real numbers.
Beauchemin and Bocquier mention a United Nations-study which estimated that 75%
of urban growth was due to natural increase in the 1980s. They also found that reclassification
was responsible for more then 25% of urban growth between the 1950s and the 1980s. This
means that rural settlements have crossed the threshold such as 10.000 inhabitants and
consequently, it becomes an urban area. This leads the two authors to the conclusion that the
contribution of migration to urban growth was less than commonly assumed. Comparatively
speaking, natural growth instead seems to contribute and more to growth of cities.59 The
assertion that the share of urban in-migration is decreasing, could be partially explained by
simply assuming that the more rural residents migrate to cities, the smaller the number of
rural residents which are left to migrate as well.
An OECD-study which predicts the future of West Africa has an opposite opinion and
foresees a great contribution of rural out-migration to cities. This is simply concluded from
the rural-to-urban migration trend since independence which will continue.60 While it is stated
in the introduction that it is important to reflect the past and look forward in time, it seems
they forget to look at recent data which indicates a change in the main cause of urban growth.
3.3 Current urbanisation trends
57
D. Potts, ‘Recent trends in rural-urban and urban-rural migration in Sub-saharan Africa: the empirical
evidence and implications for understanding urban livelihood insecurity’, Environment, Politics and
Development Working Paper Series 6 (2008) 2-3.
58
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 7.
59
Idem 7. See also chapter I, page 6.
60
Cour, Preparation for the future 20-21.
28
Philippe Bocquier criticises the accuracy of predictions of urbanisation grades throughout
the world.61 He focuses especially on predictions made by the United Nations. Focusing on
West Africa while using his own methodology, he finds an important adjustment which
affects 73% of its population. Nevertheless, he warns the reader of jumping to conclusions,
since his method encounters difficulties surrounding changing definitions, lack of recent data
and different national definitions. According to the prediction of the United Nations, the urban
population in West Africa in 2030 would be almost 59%. Bocquier however projects the
urban population in 2030 as 50% of the total West African population.62 This is a large
difference of 8,8%, although both predictions state that in 2030, halve of West Africa’s
population will live in urban areas.
Urban areas are capital cities, principal and secondary cities and other towns. There are
different migration flows between these types and between rural areas. Migration in Africa is
often seen as a move to the capital. Nevertheless, Beauchemin and Bocquier show that
capitals received less migrants than a few decades ago and that in a minority of countries the
two succeeding types of cities also received less migrants.63 Overall, capitals, secondary and
principal cities have a positive net migration rate while rural areas have a negative net
migration rate. This could mean that rural residents move from their village to a larger village,
to a near town, to a bigger town, to the capital and eventually to a foreign city or sometimes to
a foreign rural area like plantations along the coast of West Africa. This is described as stepwise migration.
Another new development, or at least a new field in migration studies, is the blurring of
the distinction between rural and urban, between subsistence workers and wage labourers,
between their geographical division, labour characteristics, gender specific tasks etcetera.
Agriculture is practised in rural, peri-urban and urban areas which could lead to conflict
between inhabitants over resources as water and land. It could result in a clash about the need
for urban housing and the need for land to cultivate for rural as well as urban residents. This
will also be discussed in the analysis of Lynch’s model. Exactly the contrast between rural
and urban seems to disappear, partly due to the social bonds that migrants have with their
families and villages. Moreover, they could return every year or more often in the case of
short-term migration. The question is how we should classify these types of migrants or if it is
even possible to make a sharp distinction.
61
P. Bocquier, ‘World urbanization prospects: an alternative to the UN model of projection compatible with the
mobility transition theory’, Demographic research 12 (2005) 198-236, q.v. 9.
62
Bocquier, ‘World urbanization prospects’, 215, 222.
63
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 9.
29
John Goody wrote as early as 1989 that this distinction became less clear for two reasons.
First, migrants can often claim agricultural land when they return so they preserve strong
linkages with the rural area. Second, urban agriculture is an alternative for a shortage of
food.64 More recent research by Harry Englund and Cecilia Tacoli performed during the end
of the 1990s, confirms this point of view and shows the difficulty to pigeon-hole people and
activities.65
While the rural-urban dichotomy has raised questions about its validity, it is nevertheless
necessary to determine the urbanisation grade since this is a relative shift to certain living
areas of inhabitants. The growth of metropolis in West Africa does therefore not per se mean
a higher urbanisation grade. The largest cities in West Africa in 1990 and 2020 are to be
found in Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Guinea and Cameroon. The top ten list of the
biggest cities in absolute population numbers disguises their growth factor which differs
greatly between 4,1 times for Douala in Cameroon and only 2,4 times for Greater Dakar in
Senegal.66
Natural growth is of main importance, being a cause of urbanisation. Between 1960 and
1990, the average population growth was 2,7% annually, varying between the 19 West
African countries from more than 4% in Côte d’Ivoire to 1,5% in Cape Verde.67 One of its
causes is the fertility rate, as high as 6,4 children per woman in 1993 on average.68 In 2008,
this is 5,6 children. The extremes have increased in this period while the median fertility rate
has increased.69 Concluding, in the last decade, fertility rates have fallen, differences between
the lowest and highest fertility rates have somewhat grown and the median fertility rate was
stable. This would mean that although natural growth is diminishing, it is now a main
contributor to urban growth, according to Beauchemin and Bocquier. This can only be true if
urban in-migration has fallen even sharper.
64
Goody, ‘Futures of the family in rural Africa’ 127.
H. Englund, ‘The village in the city, the city in the village: migrants in Lilongwe’, Journal of Southern African
Studies 28 (2002) 1 137-154; Tacoli, ‘Changing rural-urban interactions’.
66
Zachariah, Migration in West Africa 134.
67
Cour, Preparation for the future 34.
68
Idem 37. Data from 1993.
69
‘Total fertility rate in 2009’, Population Reference Bureau/Datafinder.
<http://www.prb.org/Datafinder/Topic/Bar.aspx?sort=v&order=d&variable=30> (2009; accessed on 16-9-2009).
65
30
Chapter IV: Approach case studies
4. 1 Justification of case studies
Table 2. Comparison of Mali and Senegal by a selection of elements.
Country
1.
2. Population
NESMUWA 2005
(additional
(in millions)
survey in
capital, year)
Mali
Senegal
Sources: 70
1992+2001
1989+2001
11,6
11,8
3.
% urban
population of
total
population
(2005)
30,5
41,6
4.
% population
growth 20052020
35,6
28,4
5.
Important
regional/inte
rnational
migration
country
X
X
6.
Landlocked
countries
X
--
World Urbanization Prospects defines West Africa as consisting out of the 17
countries mentioned in table 3. Other organisations differ in this definition. For example, the
International Migration Organization also includes the Central African Republic, Chad,
Gabon, Cameron, Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea. Due to the elaborate database of
World Urbanization Prospects which includes e.g. statistics about rural and urban population
growth, their definition of West Africa is the most practical.
Figure 4. West Africa
Source: author’s selection of map no. 4045 rev. 4 United Nations January 2004. Department of peacekeeping
operations cartographic section. http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/africa.pdf accessed on 30-82009
70
Source 1: Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization 6. Source 2, 3, 4: World Urbanization Prospects: The
2007 Revision Population Database http://esa.un.org/unup (accessed on 13-08-2009). Source 5: ‘Organized
crime and irregular migration from Africa to Europe’, Regional Office of West and Central Africa and the
Research and Analysis Section of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006) 10.
31
The selection of case studies was based on the following argumentation which
contains six steps. First, countries which were not included in the Network of Surveys on
Migration and Urbanization in West Africa (NESMUWA), were excluded from this paper.
The NESMUWA was the first international research project completed in 1993. It covers data
from 1988 until 1992. Until this moment it is the most recent survey about migration in West
Africa on which basis it is possible to make comparisons. They made use of the same
methodology and analysis in all eight countries.71 This limits potential case studies to Burkina
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. Excluded
countries are highlighted in red in table 3, to be found at the end of this paragraph. These
countries are also all members of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), founded in 1975. At least theoretically, it has established free movement of
people and capital and harmonisation on certain policy domains, which could be of great
importance to the size and direction of regional migration.72
Secondly, Nigeria is ruled out as a case study due to its too large deviation of the
average West African population and the median NESMUWA country. It has also used a
different methodology than the other seven countries.
Thirdly, Cote d’Ivoire is exempted because it constitutes an extreme in column 3 and
4, having both the highest urbanisation grade and the lowest annual urban growth. Moreover,
it forms a deviation from other countries for several indicators on migration and its
importance in West African migration flows especially to and from Burkina Faso and it has
already served as a case study.73
71
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization 6.
The French translation of NESMUWA is REMUAO, Réseau migrations and urbanisation en Afrique de l’Ouest.
It was created and financed a.o. by the International Development Research Center and coordinated by CERPOD
in Bamako. It measures flows between rural and urban areas. Moreover, it gives an insight in not only internal
migration but also explains international migration. It also produces data over flows to and from capital cities as
well as secondary towns and rural areas. NESMUWA has not been repeated in more recent years, according to
lack of finances. (Interview with Traoré). This leaves it to be the most suitable research on which I can base the
paper, taking into account that some of his data could have fundamentally changed over time.
72
‘ECOWAS: programmes and activities’, < http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/en/pps/ecowas.pps> sheet 18. 1408-2009. 15 Of the 17 countries in table 1 are members, Mauritania and Saint Helena are currently not members.
Free movement of people includes: 1. Abolition of visas 2. Right of residence and establishment 3. Suppression
of barriers and police check points 4. Creation of ECOWAS Travel Certificate 5. Circulation of ECOWAS
Passport 6. Harmonization of documents, regulations and formalities.
73
A. Konseiga, Regional integration beyond the traditional trade benefits: labor mobility contribution; the case
of Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire (Frankfurt am Main 2005); A. Konseiga, ‘Household migration decisions as
survival strategy: the case of Burkina Faso’, Journal of African economies 16 (2006) nr.2 198-233; C.
Beauchemin, S. Henry, P. Schoumaker, ‘Rural-urban migration in West Africa: toward a reversal? Migration
trends and economic conjuncture in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire’ (2004).
32
Fourthly, Mauritania can be excluded as well due to the lack of data on international
migration in the NESMUWA research.74
Fifthly, having spent more than four months in Mali during an internship at the Royal
Dutch Embassy in Bamako, I received and collected much information about internal,
regional and international migration. This consists out of interviews, literature and data from
NEWMUWA research which are not always published online or available in the Netherlands.
Mali is also a of great importance to international migrants, where overland routes to the
Mediterranean cross via Gao. Mali is therefore a case study. This leaves Senegal, Guinea,
Niger and Burkina Faso. Due to the limited scope of the paper, it would be best to compare
two case studies to be able to write a realistic conclusion about the application of the theories
discussed in chapter I.
Finally, according to a United Nations document about irregular migration from 2006,
there are three primary countries where West African migrants start their journey to Europe.75
These are Mali, Senegal and Niger. Senegal, being a country with access to the sea, is of
importance especially to reach the Canary Islands. It would be of more interest to compare a
landlocked country, Mali, with a non-landlocked country, Senegal, to see in how far they
differ or match qua migration and urbanisation developments.76 This is also of interest in the
light of historical movements, since migration flows were often directed towards costal areas.
Therefore, these two countries will serve as case studies in chapters V until VIII. Table 2
shows the outcomes for the other West African countries. The countries with red boxes were
ruled out as case studies, for the reasons described above.
Table 3. Comparison of West African countries by a selection of elements.
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Cote d’Ivoire
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
1.
NESMUWA
(additional
survey in
capital, year)
2.
Population
2005
(in millions)
-X 2000
-X 1996
--X 1997
--X 1992+2001
X
8,5
13,9
0,6
18,6
1,6
22,5
9,0
1,6
3,4
11,6
3,0
3.
% urban
population of
total population
(2005)
4.
% population
growth 20052020
5.
Important
regional/international
migration
country
6.
Landlocked
countries
18,3
33,6
--
X
46,8
23,6
--
--
33
44,0
--
--
30,5
40,4*
35,6
40,2
X
--
X
--
74
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 23, table A.7.
‘Organized crime and irregular migration’, 10.
76
See also figure 1.
75
33
Niger
X
13,3
16,3
40,3
X
X
Nigeria
X
141
--Saint Helena
-0,006
Senegal
X 1989+2001 11,8
41,6
28,4
X
-Sierra Leone
-5,6
Togo
-- 2001
6,2
272,5
41,7
28,8
Total West
(median) 12,6
(average) 32,4 (average) 35,1
Africa
NESMUWA
Sources: Source 1: Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 6; Source 2, 3, 4: World Urbanization Prospects;
Source 5: ‘Organized crime and irregular migration’, 10
* Population in urban areas is 59% in 2001 according to the statistics of UNHABITAT, which is a large
deviation from World Urbanization Prospects. UNHABITAT Statistics,
<http://www.unhabitat.org/stats/Default.aspx> accessed on 30-8-2009.
4.2 Approach, variables and assumptions of Todaro’s model
The case study of Mali as well as of Senegal will not directly test the theory of Todaro
by using his mathematical model. The case studies will instead be used to analyse to what
extent certain assumptions of Todaro on migration in Africa are correct. The reason why this
theory will not be empirically tested follows now.
The theory of Todaro is based on the expected relative income differential model. It
includes two variables, namely the actual rural-urban wage differential and the probability of
finding a job.77 Data on these variables is not abundantly present for Mali. Given the first
variable, the difference between rural and urban wages, the time period is small. The
differences are mentioned in some labour surveys done by the Malian statistical institute
(DOEF). These surveys were executed on a national scale in 2004 and 2007.78 There is also
information for 1995.
Table 4. Income and wages in Mali (1995-2007)
1995 2004* 2007
Average monthly income (CFA)
Rural
7.110
Urban
22.885
% population under minimum wage
Bamako
39,40% 32,5%
Other urban areas
41% 44,0%
Rural areas
49% 57,7%
* 3000 CFA under minimum wage
Source: M.G. Konaté, ‘L’étude prospective du secteur forestier en Afrique’, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations
<http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/AB571F/AB571F06.htm> (2001; accessed on 2-10-2009) 23; ‘Activité,
emploi et chomage au Mali’, Departement Observatoire de l’Emploi et de la Formation (2004, 2007).
Secondly, the second variable is even less mentioned by sources. Again, only the two
latest labour surveys mention the average number of months being unemployed. Since the two
77
Todaro, Urbanization, unemployment and migration 38.
‘Activité, emploi et chomage au Mali’, Departement Observatoire de l’Emploi et de la Formation (1997, 2000,
2004, 2007).
78
34
variables could only be found for a very short period, a conclusion based on these data will
not be reliable.
Table 5. Average period of unemployment in Mali (2004-2007)
2004 2007
National
80
57
Rural
90
61
Bamako
44
55
Source: Activité, emploi et chomage au Mali’, Departement Observatoire de l’emploi et de la formation (2004,
2007).
For Senegal, I draw the same conclusions. First of all, general wages for rural and
urban areas could not be found in national surveys. If we replace this variable by
expenditures, assuming the higher the expenditures, the higher the income, we find data for
1994, 2001 and 2005. While the data more or less corresponds with the data on Mali, it also
comprehends a too small time frame. The second variable could not be found at all in these
surveys or in other sources.
Table 6. Expenditures person/y in Senegal (1994-2005), comparison between areas.
Expenditures (rate)
1994
2001
2005
Other urban areas to Dakar
1,4
1,6
1,7
Rural to other urban areas
2,0
1,8
1,6
Source: ‘Enquête Sénégalaise auprès des ménages 1994-1995. Rapport de synthèse’, Direction de la prévision et
de la statistique (1997) 60; Enquête Sénégalaise auprès des ménages 2001-2002’, Direction de la prévision et de
la statistique (2004) 138; ‘Rapport de l’enquête de suivi de la pauvreté au Sénégal 2005-2006’, Agence nationale
de la statistique et de la demographie (Dakar 2007) 45. The surveys were executed by ‘la Direction de la
prevision et de la statistique’ and its successor ‘l’Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie’.
This leads to the conclusion that testing the model of Todaro with the mentioned
variables, on the basis of my collection of data, will not lead to a credible conclusion.79
However, Todaro holds certain assumptions which are already described above, which could
be tested for Mali as well as for Senegal. These assumptions are not directly incorporated in
the model but are part of his theoretical framework on migration. The following assumptions
will be tested:
1. Migrants are more often found in the informal sector than born city dwellers.
2. Migrants are in general male, young and educated.
3. Economic reasons are the main motive for migration.
4. The typical type of migration is rural-to-urban migration.
5. Internal migration is more frequent than international migration.
First, when a migrant arrived in the city, he was most frequently absorbed by the
informal sector. Todaro devoted much effort to the division between the informal and formal
79
Data on unemployment figures: see annex 2.
35
sector. If a migrant could not find a job in the formal sector, he turned to the informal sector
which had its advantages and disadvantages. Should a government stimulate the informal
sector, this could again attract more rural migrants and increase unemployment. However,
Todaro saw a more positive role for the informal sector as well, as it was a source of income
and employment for urban residents including migrants.
Second, Todaro described general characteristics of migrants, who were mainly male
although some regions experienced a feminisation of migration. This last phenomenon was
not only due to women who followed their men but more and more to women who sought
economic opportunities. Migrants were young, between 15 and 24 years old, and poor since
most migrants originated from generally poor rural areas. He also found that persons who had
a higher education, were also more probable to migrate because lower educated youngsters
expected to have less chances of finding an urban job.
Third, economic labour migrants formed the bulk of urban in-migrants in Africa. They
expected to find work in the informal sector within a certain period, with a certain income and
with certain costs of migrating. The sum of this lead to an expectation of their earnings in the
city which they compared to their rural income. A positive cost-benefit analysis caused
individuals to migrate to urban areas, whether this would be within the country or abroad.
Fourth, as mentioned earlier, especially rural-to-urban movements characterised
internal migration. While Todaro mentioned return migration, he held rural-to-urban
migration responsible for high urban unemployment figures. His model for internal migration
was meant to be applied to rural migrants since he compared the expected income differential
between urban and rural wages. This was the dominant form of migration. He also assumed
that a migrant moves from a village to a secondary city and finally to the capital. This is
called step-wise migration.
Finally, rural-to-urban migration is defined on a national scale. Todaro began his
theory in 1969 with internal migrants and developed his theory and extended this to
international migrants. He stated that the stimulus to emigrate became stronger every year
since the income differential between the destination and home country stayed positive.
International migrants moved from rural to urban areas and eventually to a foreign
destination. International migration also stimulated rural-to-urban migration as well as urban
unemployment as mentioned above. While he did not explicitly stated that the volume of
internal migrants was more than international migrants, his focus is in every publication on
internal migration.
36
4.3 Approach, variables and assumptions of Lynch’ model
Compared to the mainly quantitative testing of Todaro’s assumptions, this paragraph
on Lynch will contain a more qualitative analysis. It will be based on secondary sources,
meaning scientific literature on rural-urban characteristics. While the previous paragraphs
were concerned with migration, the testing of Lynch’s model will also be directed to the
process of urbanisation. Research has been done on the question to what extent migration or
natural increase contribute to the growth of cities. There is however a need to compare rural
and urban rates, if one wants to establish urbanisation. According to Lynch, urbanisation is
after all a ‘relative change in the proportion of people living in towns and cities as apposed to
rural areas’80. This implies that growth of the city in itself does not signify urbanisation, but
only when the growth of the villages or urban areas is smaller.
Certain assumptions of his model will be tested for Mali and Senegal. These originate
from his book and were also briefly discussed in the first chapter. Nevertheless, an
explanation on the meaning of the assumptions will follow, which could answer the question
whether the distinction between rural and urban areas is flawed. The assumptions are:
1. Flows of food are multi-directional, creating interdependence.
2. Natural flows between rural and urban areas occur with positive or negative
effects.
3. Flows of people between rural and urban areas are multi-directional and not
defined to one type of migration.
4. Flows of finance are mainly urban-to-rural and controlled in urban areas.
5. The positive impact of flows of ideas are overestimated.
The first assumption is related to the interdependence between both areas. The
existence of urban agriculture indicates an urban-urban flow of food, but it could also be used
for consumption by the producer. In peri-urban areas, both areas meet in the production and
trade of food. Food flows in different directions, rural-to-urban as well as peri-urban to rural.
The cultivation of food, no matter where it takes place, affects other areas. These connections
blur the difference between rural-agricultural and urban-industrial areas. In the case of Mali
and Senegal, the urban area is not characterised by industrial activities but by the service
industry as well as by some industrial activities. It would therefore be better to speak of the
distinction between agricultural, rural and non-agricultural, urban areas.
80
Lynch, Rural-urban interactions 97.
37
The natural flows were defined in the first chapter. These are pollution, pressure on
land, development projects or environmental projects. Since this type of flow has not been
discussed in Todaro’s theory, it could be a useful extension of migration theory. Nevertheless,
the thesis analyses socio-economic aspects of movements of people. Natural effects do not
fall into this category and will therefore not be discussed. Moreover, my field of knowledge
does not include natural or biological phenomena.
Lynch’s ideas about flows of people, or migration, contrast with Todaro’s assumption
on the premise of rural-to-urban interactions. Lynch does not focus on one direction of
migration but points out the multidirectional nature of movements of people. He includes
cyclical movements, which could be shorter than six months. This normally excludes defining
them as migration flows. Lynch is therefore more concerned with mobility than migration.
Migration could contribute to the growth of cities and urbanisation, depending on other
factors and the type of migration. If different types and directions become more important
over time, it should be less correct to attribute urbanisation to migration.
The fourth interaction is mainly oriented towards remittances and financial services as
insurances and savings. These flows are urban-to-rural. Lynch states that the control over
these services was and is in the hands of urban residents. The effect of financial remittances is
very much debated.
The last rural-urban interaction is the flow of ideas. This includes the transmission of
ideas by the media by different technologies, such as internet, television. It could also be
referred to as social remittances, which has more recently drawn the attention of migration
and development theorists. This type of remittances such as attitudes and skills, increases the
social capital of the receivers. This is however, a broader explanation than transfers of ideas.
Lynch includes the image that migrants send home to those stayed as flows of ideas as well.
The effects of the transmission of ideas by media could be positive or negative for rural
populations. On the one hand, it could lead to empowering people but also to exploitation.
The five flows mentioned above could be added up, forming a theoretical framework
to analyse rural-urban interactions. The extent of the interdependence between the two areas
will form the answer to the question whether Lynch’s theory could be applied to the specific
case studies.
38
Chapter V: Case study Mali - Todaro
The first case study is Mali, a land locked country in the north-east of West Africa.
Parts of the country are situated in the Sahel but it also benefits from the Niger and Senegal
river. In 2008, its population counted 12,7 million inhabitants and its place on the Human
Development Index was 168 out of 179. The rural population represented 70% of the total
population in 2005.
Table 7. General data on Mali
Year 2008
Mali
Population
12,7 million
HDI
168
GNI/capita in PPP
$1090
Remittances/GDP (2004)
3,2%
Development aid (2007)
$1017 million
Rural population (2005)
69,5%
Source: Human Development Indices: A statistical update 2008 - HDI rankings <http://originhdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> (accessed on 18-9-2009); Key development data and statistics, World Bank,
<http://web.worldbank.org/ > (2009; accessed on 18-9-2009); World Urbanization Prospects.
5.1 Informal and formal sector81
Most rural migrants end up in the informal sector, following Todaro’s reasoning. This
seems logical when the informal economy provides work for over 50% of the total working
urban labour force82 and only 31% on a national scale.83 The underlying question is if
relatively more migrants work in this sector than city natives. Data for the capital shows that
especially for young migrants, unemployment rates in the informal sector are the same as for
their contemporaries born in the city, at least if one considers the first job.84 It seems the
younger they are, the less the difference between migrants and non-migrants. The relation
between the informal sector and migration is therefore not so evident as Todaro presumes.
It is also important to mention that generally, migrants have a lower unemployment
rate than non-migrants. For every unemployed male migrant, there are 1,9 unemployed nonmigrants in Bamako. In secondary towns this rate is 1,7. The rate for females is also above 1
81
Paragraph 2.1 until 2.5 will be based on the following sources, unless otherwise mentioned. ‘Activité, emploi
et chomage au Mali’, Departement Observatoire de l’Emploi et de la Formation. (1997, 2000, 2004, 2007).
82
Those who are member of the labour force and have worked for at least one hour during the last seven days
(before the interview by DOEF) .
83
‘Bilan d’emploi. Étude sur le secteur informel 1996’, Departement Observatoire de l’emploi et de la formation
(1997) 15; A. Traoré, ‘The labour market in Mali’, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Appliquée et Théorique
(2003) 10 <http://www.gpn.org/data/mali/mali-analysis-en.pdf> (2003; accessed on 30-9-2009).
84
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 14 -15.
39
in urban areas.85 This is probably due to selection since only those migrants move, who expect
to succeed and that their estimation of success are fairly accurate. However, the
unemployment amongst educated is higher than for non-educated migrants.
5.2 Characteristics
All labour surveys show the young age of migrants and a domination of female
migrants within the country . Most of them are between 15 and 29 years old. Girls migrate at
a younger age than boys and the average migration period is four until five months, which
corresponds with seasonal cycles. While the gender of migrants has changed since the 1990s,
which was lightly accentuated by Todaro, their age has not since young migrants still form the
bulk of all migrant. For international migrants however, men still dominate. This is also the
case for West Africa in general. Although it seems that the percentage of female migrants as a
share of international migrants is even slightly decreasing, the difference between 1990 and
2010 is only 1%.86 An increase of the percentage of female migrants compared to male
migrants, feminisation of migration, is a trend in West Africa. Mali seems a representative
case study in this case.
Education is also an important characteristic of migrants since this factor appears to
decide in which sector someone will work. Here, migrants are in an advantageous position.
Presuming an equal education level of non-migrants and migrants, internal migrants work
relatively more often in the formal sector and less often in the informal sector. Moreover, the
emigration rate of high educated (by Malian standard) is higher than for lower education
levels.
Table 8. Emigration rate by education level in Mali (1975-2000)
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Total
0,50%
Total
0,70%
Total
0,80%
Total
0,80%
Total
0,90%
Total
0,90%
Low
0,40%
Low
0,70%
Low
0,80%
Low
0,80%
Low
0,80%
Low
0,80%
Medium
2,70%
Medium
1,20%
Medium
0,70%
Medium
0,60%
Medium
1,70%
Medium
1,80%
High
10,60%
High
10,70%
High
10,50%
High
7,70%
High
12,20%
High
14,40%
85
Idem 13-14. The authors warn however that high educated non-migrants often state that they are unemployed,
but at the same time could work in the informal sector. They see this is as being unemployed. Therefore
unemployment could be overestimated for non-migrants.
86
‘International migrant stock: the 2008 revision’, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division <http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp> (accessed on 13-10-2009).
40
Source: F. Docquier, Brain drain database (1975-2000), <http://go.worldbank.org/4IJSEHH7P0> (accessed on
14-9-2009). The emigration rate to six receiving countries within the OECD (US, UK, France, Germany,
Canada, Australia). The total database represents approximately 77 percent of the world’s migrant population.
Chapter II already showed that skilled workers become more and more important in
West Africa. Mali does not really represent this development since the growth of the share of
low-skilled emigrants is greater than for highly skilled emigrants. However, the share of
highly skilled migrants continues to increase and stays the highest percentage. This could
have several reasons such as owning capital, knowledge of other countries, high national
unemployment among higher educated or replacement migration. This type of migration takes
place when an elder person helps his son or other family member to come to Europe and
replace him so he can retire in his country of birth.87 Moreover, remittances from the first
generation could be invested in higher education for the second generation. The correlation
between the level of education and migration, can therefore be confirmed.
5.3 Reasons
A regional research named the Network of Surveys on Migration and Urbanization in
West Africa (NESMUWA), executed in 1988 to 1992, confirms the assumption of Todaro on
economic motives for rural-to-urban migration. However, this is only correct for male
migrants, women on the contrary mainly migrate for marriage or other family reasons.88 The
national labour surveys show some interesting changes. The survey from 1997 only mentions
the rural exodus and still associates it with labour migration. The following surveys all show a
preference for joining the family as the main reason for female migration. However, in 2004
and 2007, men also mainly migrate for these reasons, followed by study-related motives and
labour-migration. This contradicts fundamentally with Todaro’s assumption. The main
difference between men and women is that much more women move because they follow
their family and that much less women indicate study as a reason for their migration. The
differences are also bigger in urban areas. This also shows that, as in current West Africa in
general, poverty is not a precondition to migrate.
Surprisingly, in 2007 more female migrants in other urban and rural areas than men
indicate a job search as a main reason. This is not true for migrants who moved to Bamako.
Over time, educational reasons fluctuate strongly but labour migration has become less
important. For women, family reasons still dominate but less strongly as in 2000. Female
labour migration has increased and even dominates over male migrants outside the capital.
87
88
Interview with Traoré.
V. Hertrich, S. Keita (coord.), Questions de population au Mali (Bamako 2003) 198.
41
5.4 Type of migration
Migration between similar areas is much less frequent than migration between
different localities. Nevertheless, together these form 20% of all migrations in 1988 until
1992.89 Moreover, Todaro’s focus on rural-to-urban migration is downplayed by the labour
surveys. Bamako’s migrants mainly come from other cities and from the region around the
capital.90 For the period 1988-1992, most migrants moved from a rural area to other urban
areas than the capital (24,8%) but immediately followed by migration from other urban areas
than the capital to rural areas (19,0%).91 This affirms the NESMUWA-research which states
that urban-to-rural migration is indeed happening in West Africa. Mali proofs a good example
of this development.
Stepwise migration is assumed by the 200 and 2007 labour survey, completed with the
extra possibility of emigration but without supporting data. Migration by stages is also
confirmed by Sadio Traoré but he states that international migrants move primarily via
secondary cities instead of via the capital to other countries.92 Beauchemin and Bocquier have
also established that rural Malian migrants mainly leave for an international destination,
instead of a destination within the country.93 This also undermines the stepwise model used by
Todaro.
Another type of migration, urban-to-rural migration such as return migration, gains
importance. It has increased since 1963 for other urban areas as well as for the capital to rural
areas.94 Return migration can be practised for traditional reasons such as family, retirement
and inheritance. Recently other economic reasons have joined the previous motives for
internal return migration, such as losing an urban job or failing to find one after failing or
finishing school.95 This partly explains why the age of return migrants has lowered in the
1990s compared to the previous decennia, due to the economic crisis in the 1980s. However,
89
P. Bocquier, S. Traoré, Urbanisation et dynamique migratoire en Afrique de l’Ouest. La croissance urbaine en
panne (Paris 2000) 75.
90
Rural migrants only form 20% of all migrants to Bamako in 2000, 33% in 2004 and 28% in 2007.
91
Antoine, Trois générations de citadins 19. Rural-to-urban migration forms 43% of all migrations (excluding
rural-to-rual migration), followed by urban-to-rural migration (35,7%) and urban-to-urban (21,4%). Population
of 15 years and older.
92
Interview with Traoré.
93
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’, 9.
94
I.H. Maga,, S. Traoré a.e., Trente années de biographie ou l’évolution des systèmes migratoires ouestafricaines depuis 1960 (Bamako 2006) 55. 1963-1972: 0.45, 1973-1982: 0.55, 1983-1992: 0.61. This is an
indication of migration intensity. It measures the probability for an individual to be coincidentally ‘drawn’ from
the home land in 1988 and ‘found’ in the arrival country in 1992. Bocquier, Urbanisation et dynamique
migratoire, 110.
95
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’ 9.
42
return migration to Bamako is less than to other regions such as Timbuktu and Mopti, for
internal migrations as well as for emigrants.96
5.5 Internal and international migration
International migrations account for 49% of all migrations between 1988 and 1992.
This is opposite from what is established by the labour surveys of 2004 and 2007. Namely,
the first survey ascertains that 83% of all migrants are Malian migrants from inside the
country which moreover excludes Malian return immigrants. Since the NESMUWA research
was also conducted in Senegal with the same methodology, I will use this research as a guide
line to be able to make country comparisons.97
A person older than 15 years who is subject to migration, has a chance of 13% to
emigrate and a chance of 10% to migrate internally between different areas.98 The net
migration between Mali and the region (the other countries within the NESMUWA research)
is greater than separately with the rest of Africa and with the world. The migration rate for the
region represents 43% of the total international migration rate. Most emigration flows are
destined in the region.99 Mali experienced a negative net migration rate from 1950 until
recent. Most West African countries are also net-emigration countries.
Table 9. Net migration rate for Mali. High (fertility) variant. (1950-2050)
Period Net migration rate Period Net migration rate
1950-1955
-1.6
2000-2005
-2.4
1955-1960
-2.0
2005-2010
-3.2
1960-1965
-2.7
2010-2015
-2.8
1965-1970
-3.4
2015-2020
-2.5
1970-1975
-3.0
2020-2025
-2.2
1975-1980
-5.1
2025-2030
-2.0
1980-1985
-5.8
2030-2035
-1.8
1985-1990
-5.8
2035-2040
-1.6
1990-1995
-5.7
2040-2045
-1.4
1995-2000
-5.7
2045-2050
-1.3
Source: http://esa.un.org. Definition Mali: Based on refugee statistics compiled by UNHCR, on the number of
Malians enumerated in other countries of the region and on the results of the NESMUWA surveys carried out by
CERPOD. Rate = per 1,000 population.
96
‘Enquête Malienne sur les migrations et l’urbanisation 1992-1993. Rapport national descriptif’, NESMUWA
(1996) 60.
97
Bocquier, Urbanisation et dynamique migratoire 75. The definitions are probably different because
NESMUWA excludes migrations which were short than six months and it uses a certain administrative level.
The national definition does not mention a period or administrative level at all to determine migration and
migrants. The time period is also different but that fact cannot explain the difference between the outcomes.
NESMUWA measures the number of migrations for a certain person between 1988 and 1992. For example they
count migration of a village person to a city and after a year back to the village as two migrations.
98
Idem 77.
99
Idem 103-104.
43
Within West Africa, most emigration between 1976 and 1980 was directed to Côte d’Ivoire,
followed by Burkina Faso. Most immigrants came from Burkina Faso again and Guinea. In
the period 1988-1992, Malian emigrants still mainly moved to the same countries which is
also true for immigrants, additionally followed by Mauritania. The direction of the flows of
people did not change much between those periods, but the absolute number of migrants
increased heavily.
Figure 5. Intraregional migration for Mali (1976-1992)
Mali: intraregional migration 1976-1980 (1000x)
Guinea
Niger
Nigeria
Mauritania
Senegal
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire
0
20
40
60
Emigration
80
100
120
140
Immigration
Mali: intraregional migration 1988-1992 (1000x)
Mauritania
Guinea
Niger
Senegal
Nigeria
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire
0
20
40
60
Emigration
80
100
120
140
Immigration
Source: Cour, Preparing for the future 138-139. The emigration to Côte d’Ivoire in 1976-1980 is 353, which is
cut off in the graphic at 140 for reasons of clarity.
44
Chapter VI: Case study Senegal - Todaro
The second case study is Senegal, a coastal country in the western part of West Africa.
It encloses Gambia and benefits from several rivers such as the Senegal which also flows into
Mali. In 2008 its population counted 12,2 million inhabitants and its place on the Human
Development Index is higher than Mali’s position, namely 153.
Table 10. General data on Senegal
Year 2008
Senegal
Population
12,2 million
HDI
153
GNI/capita in PPP
$1760
Remittances/GDP (2004)
6,7%
Development aid (2007)
$ 843 million
Rural population (2005)
58,4%
Source: Human Development Indices; Key development data and statistics; World Urbanization Prospects.
6.1 Informal and formal sector
The informal urban labour market in Dakar provides almost 75% of the jobs in 2001.
Compared to born city-dwellers, less migrants work in the informal sector than as civil
servants and migrants are therefore relatively well represented in the public sector. This
contradicts with the underlying assumption of Todaro that migrants have a greater tendency to
perform informal labour. Nevertheless, he is in the right on an absolute scale since three out
of four migrants work in the informal sector.100 This does not automatically mean that
migrants are confined to the informal sector, since non-migrants could also mainly work in
the informal sector. Research has revealed that in 1989, young migrants had a lower chance to
work in the informal sector as young non-migrants. They also had more chances to work in
the formal sector, when education levels were equal. Older migrants work more often in the
informal sector but the next generations have more chances in the formal sector.101
6.2 Characteristics
For the period 1988-1992, female migrants constituted 45% of all migrants. Compared
to previous periods, there is a feminisation of migration as in West Africa as a whole. The
percentage of female migrants is higher for internal migrants (52%) than for international
migrants (32%). When a migrant crosses a topographical frontier, he or she also introduced
100
However the differences are small. Less than 39% of all persons working in the informal sector are migrants,
this is 42% for the administration and less than 47% for public enterprises. See ‘L’emploi, le chômage et les
conditions d’activité dans l’agglomération de Dakar. Résultats de la phase 1 de l’enquête 1-2-3 de 2002’,
Direction de la prevision et de la statistique (2004) 4, 20.
101
Beauchemin, ‘Migration and urbanization’, 14-15.
45
into a new society, economy and political system or climate. The difference between their
home land is greater for international migrations than internal movements. Since women are
more vulnerable or perceive these changes as more risky than men, it partly explains why still
more men emigrate.102 A national survey in 2001 mentions that most internal migrants are
under 30 years. They mainly migrate for one until ten years. Most of them are young, between
15 and 34 years old.103 The share of female migrants in the total of international migrants is
described by the United Nations. The share of female migrants in the total of international
migrants has increased between 1990 and 2010 from 48% to 52%.104
The level of education matters to what extent someone who is susceptible to migrate,
will indeed migrate. Between 1975 and 2000, the emigration rate for high-educated
Senegalese doubled. More high-educated persons migrate than lower educated persons. The
growth between 1975 and 2000 was greatest for medium-educated but with an emigration rate
of 15,7% for high-educated, this category continues to have the highest percentage. This
corresponds with Todaro’s assumption. Skilled migrants become more important, compared
to the 1960s and 1970s when unskilled migrants formed the main group of migrants in West
Africa. Senegal’s emigration rates show that highly skilled workers increasingly emigrate and
the difference between 1975 and 2000 is also greater than for low skilled workers. Therefore,
Senegal is a representative case study for West Africa.
Table 11. Emigration rate by education level in Senegal (1975-2000)
1975
Total
Low
Medium
High
0,70%
0,70%
1,20%
6,70%
1980
Total
Low
Medium
High
1,20%
1,10%
1,30%
10,60%
1985
Total
Low
Medium
High
1,30%
1,20%
1,30%
8,70%
1990
Total
Low
Medium
High
1,30%
1,20%
1,30%
8,20%
1995
Total
Low
Medium
High
1,50%
1,20%
2,60%
12,80%
2000
Total
Low
Medium
High
1,60%
1,10%
3,00%
15,70%
Source: F. Docquier, Brain drain database (1975-2000) http://go.worldbank.org/4IJSEHH7P0 accessed on 14-92009. The emigration rate to six receiving countries within the OECD (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada,
Australia). The total database represents approximately 77 percent of the world’s migrant population.
102
S. Traoré, P. Bocquier, ‘Synthèse régional’, Études et traveaux du Cerpod 15 (1998) 75-77. An other
publication of the same authors provides slightly different percentages. Of all international migrants, 32% should
be female instead of 35%. Bocquier, Urbanisation et dynamique migratoire 85.
103
Rapport de la synthèse de la deuxième enquête sénégalaise auprès des ménages’, Direction de la prevision et
de la statistique (2004) 227, 230.
104
‘International migrant stock’ (accessed on 13-10-2009).
46
6.3 Reasons
Again, the NESMUWA-research confirms the assumption of Todaro on economic
motives migration. This research is only valid for rural-to-urban migrants. There are also large
disparities between men and women. Clearly, men share economic motives, especially for
men between 30 and 49 years old. Women mainly hold family reasons or marriage
responsible for moving, but for girls between 15 and 29 years old, labour motives also
account for 30%.105
The national household survey from 1994 assumes that work and study form the
principal reasons to migrate. This is not supported by data.106 The succeeding national survey
presents family and marriage as the main reason for migrants. The biggest difference between
men and women is that for men, labour opportunities take the second place while for women
this is the fourth most important reason. Differences between age groups are significant but
for migrants between 20 and 29 years old, family reasons explain their mobility.107 This is
contrary to international migration, since their main reasons are being unemployed or having
found a job abroad. This is especially true for emigrants originating from rural areas.108
Another survey which has been executed for seven African capitals, including Bamako and
Dakar in 2002, confirms the preference for family reasons for internal migrants in Dakar,
namely almost 60%. The search for work accounts for 30% of the arrivals of migrants.109 This
also shows the representativeness of Senegal as a case study, since West African migrants do
not mainly internally migrate for economic reasons such as poverty. This has been stated in
paragraph 2.3 on current migration trends. The representativeness is at least true for internal
migration.
6.4 Type of migration
Other types of migration, besides rural-to-urban and urban-to-rural, are more
important in Senegal than in Mali. Almost 25% of all migratory movements between 1988
and 1992 were between similar areas.110 Moreover, following Todaro’s logic, most migrants
in Dakar should come from rural areas and thus, rural-to-urban contributes migration heavily
to urbanisation. For the period 1988-1992, most migrants moved from a rural area to the
capital (22,2%) but this was immediately followed by migration from the capital to rural areas
105
Hertrich, Questions de population 198.
‘Enquête sénégalaise auprès des ménages 1994-1995’ 29.
107
‘Rapport de la synthèse de la deuxième enquête’ 212-213.
108
Idem 235.
109
‘L’emploi, le chômage et les conditions d’activité’ 8.
110
Bocquier, Urbanisation et dynamique migratoire 75.
106
47
(19,6%).111 This confirms the diversification of the direction of migration, which also holds
for West Africa at large.
The national household survey of 1994-1995 confirms that most migration flows are
directed towards the capital.112 But it is not true for 2002 when migrants mainly originated
from urban areas, namely 60%. Rural migrants represented only 30% while international
migrants formed the remaining 10% of all migrants in Dakar.113 Seasonal migration is still
very common but a permanent part-time job is the most frequent type of labour for
migrants.114 On a national level, migration rates in urban and rural areas are almost equal
which signifies that a rural exodus is not dominating other migrations. Most emigrants
originate from rural areas instead of urban areas.115 This contradicts with the step-wise
migration model described by Todaro. This is confirmed by the NESMUWA-research for the
period 1988-1992. Around 70% of the male rural migrants move directly abroad, instead of
first to a city or secondary town.116
6.5 Internal and international migration
As in Mali, rural migrants leave more often for international destinations than for
internal destinations. Again, the capital has a high positive internal migration rate. Overall,
37% of all migrations between 1988 and 1992 are destined to or originated from other
countries.117 A person older than 15 years who is susceptible to migrate, has a chance of 10%
to emigrate and a chance of 13% to migrate internally between different areas.118
France and Central Africa have ceased to be the most important destinations for
emigrants. More than 50% of the emigrants move to Europe, the US or Canada and 30%
moves to African countries outside the region (countries outside the UEMOA).119 Within
West Africa, most emigration between 1976 and 1980 was directed to Côte d’Ivoire, followed
by Mauritania. Most immigrants came from Guinea and again Mauritania. In the period 1988111
Antoine, Trois générations de citadins 19. Rural-to-urban migration forms 38% of all migrations (excluding
rural-to-rural migration), followed by urban-to-rural migration (32%) and urban-to-urban migration (30%) by a
population of 15 years and older.
112
‘Enquête sénégalaise auprès des ménages 1994-1995’ 29. It does not provide any data to support this
statement.
113
‘L’emploi, le chômage et les conditions d’activité’ 8; ‘Rapport de la synthèse de la deuxième enquête’ 24.
114
Seasonal labour: 32,7. Permant labour part-time: 47,1. For women, seasonal labour is their main activity, for
men it is the other category. ‘Rapport de la synthèse de la deuxième enquête’ 224.
115
Idem 209.
116
‘Enquête sur les migrations et l’urbanisation au Sénégal 1992-1993. Rapport national déscriptif.’, CERPOD,
Institut du Sahel (Bamako 1997) 99.
117
Bocquier, Urbanisation et dynamique migratoire 75-80.
118
Idem 77.
119
Rapport de la synthèse de la deuxième enquête’ 232.
48
1992, Senegalese emigrants mainly moved to Mauritania and Guinea. Most immigrants
originated from these countries as well.
Figure 6. Intraregional migration Senegal (1976-1992)
Senegal: intraregional migration 1976-1980 (1000x)
Guinea
Burkina Faso
Mali
Mauritania
Côte d'Ivoire
0
20
40
60
Emigration
80
100
120
140
Immigration
Senegal: intraregional m igration 1988-1992 (1000x)
Nigeria
Burkina Faso
Mali
Mauritania
0
20
40
60
Emigration
80
100
120
140
Immigration
Source: J. Cour, S. Snrech (ed.), Preparing for the future. A vision of West Africa in 2020 (1998) 138-139.
While 70% of the Malian emigrants mainly moved within the region, only 40% of the
Senegalese moved to countries implicated in the NESMUWA-research.120 The direction of
emigrations has changed over time, as well as the net migration rate between 1950 and 2010.
While Senegal had a positive net migration rate from 1950 until approximately 1975 and was
therefore an immigration country, the country has since then become an emigration country
like Mali. The current difference is that the absolute number of emigrations and immigrations
for Senegal approach each other more than for Mali. This could also be concluded from the
migrations in the NESMUWA-research. It is also representative for West Africa since more
and more countries become net-emigration countries.
120
Bocquier, Urbanisation et dynamique migratoire 103.
49
Table 12. Net migration rate for Senegal (per 1,000 population). High (fertility) variant.
(1950-2050)
Period Net migration rate Period Net migration rate
1950-1955
-1.6
2000-2005
-2.4
1955-1960
-2.0
2005-2010
-3.2
1960-1965
-2.7
2010-2015
-2.8
1965-1970
-3.4
2015-2020
-2.5
1970-1975
-3.0
2020-2025
-2.2
1975-1980
-5.1
2025-2030
-2.0
1980-1985
-5.8
2030-2035
-1.8
1985-1990
-5.8
2035-2040
-1.6
1990-1995
-5.7
2040-2045
-1.4
1995-2000
-5.7
2045-2050
-1.3
Source: http://esa.un.org. Definition Senegal: Based on estimates of net international migration derived as the
difference between overall population growth and natural increase during the 1988-2002 inter-census period.
50
Chapter VII: Case study Mali - Lynch
This chapter contains the testing of four assumptions of Lynch on rural-urban
interactions in Mali. These are the flows of food, people, finance and ideas, described in
chapter I and IV. Each assumption could be confirmed or refuted, resulting in a subconclusion to what extent Lynch’s theory is applicable for Mali.
7.1 Flows of food
One of the possible outcomes of diversifying income by urban residents is urban
agriculture.121 The source of revenues is extended from informal service jobs such as carrier
or market vendor to farming and gardening. Since land for cattle-grazing is not available in
the old centre of Bamako, urban agriculture is mainly limited to horticulture.
Figure 7. Urban horticulture in Bamako
source: The foreground is formed by urban horticulture (lettuce, herbs, carrots), the building in the background is
the Chinese Embassy. The area is named Hippodrôme, the old centre of the capital where many diplomatic
missions are present. Photo taken by author, 28-3-2009 in Bamako.
The cultivation of fruit, vegetables etc. in the city could be done on wasteland, land
unsuitable for building or private land. Peri-urban agriculture is also mainly horticulture, since
the urban demand for it is high and transport between the areas is easy. One of the links
between urban and rural areas is formed by the land located in between. The urban pressure
on land resulting from housing needs, industrial activities or even space for waste dumping,
121
The definition of urban agriculture is ‘an industry located within (intra-urban) or on the fringe (peri-urban) of
a town, a city or a metropolis, which grows or raises, processes and distributes a diversity of food and non-food
products, (re-)using largely human and material resources, products and services found in and around that urban
area, and in turn supplying human and material resources, products and services largely to that urban area.’
The peri-urban area differs from this in distance, possibilities for agricultural and non-agricultural activities,
transport. It could also be defined, although less concrete by an area where ‘ the advantages of combining farm
and non-farm work can be maximised’. L.J.A. Mougeot, ‘Urban agriculture: definition, presence, potentials and
risks’, La Red de Apoyo al Trabajo Popular <http://www.trabajopopular.org.ar/material/Theme1.pdf> (2000;
accessed on 9-11-2009) 6.
.
51
could conflict with the rural and peri-urban need for pastureland. Interestingly, the spatial
expansion of the city is perceived differently by women and men. It is seen as more positive
by the first sex since their traditional rights to farmland access were already restricted and
because of their proximity to production and selling areas.122 The assumption of the
multidirectional character of food flows is tenable and so is the interdependence between
different areas, caused by these flows.
7.2 Flows of people
Rural residents could also diversify their income by having a job in the informal
service sector in an urban area during the dry season. This could be labelled as circular or
seasonal mobility, since the definition of migration often beholds an absence of at least six
months.123 The level of multiactivity is higher for rural areas than for Bamako and other urban
areas. This is related to the seasonal character of farming.124 Five percent of the urban
residents also practises two or more occupations, including agriculture. The subsequent urban
pressure on land could be negative for rural farmers, losing plots, but it also leads to a labour
demand which could be positive for them. Another option for rural farmers is to migrate or to
become a wage labourer.125 Again, the multidirectional nature of movements of people is
accentuated.
However, the time period matters. While pastoral movements have been present since
pre-colonial times in West Africa as well as in the Malian society, rural-to-urban migration on
a greater scale was motivated by colonial interests. After the decolonisation of Mali in 1959, a
huge stream of rural out-migration started off, contributing to the growth of Bamako and
speeding up the process of urbanisation. Moreover, the return of Malians from Senegal, after
the disintegration of the political federation between the two countries in 1960, contributed to
the growth of Bamako.126
The share of migration in the growth of Bamako, compared to the natural increase is
not clear. While figures for West Africa were mentioned in chapter II, more specific data is
scarce. There is data on the share of migration in the total population, but it is of more interest
122
Tacoli, ‘Changing rural-urban interactions’ v.
Idem iv.
124
‘Activité, emploi et chomage au Mali’, (2004, 2007). In rural areas, more than 20% of the population
practises more than one occupation during the year.
125
Tacoli, ‘Changing rural-urban interactions’ 11.
126
Antoine, Trois générations de citadins 17.
123
52
to know the share of migration to urban growth.127 The NESMUWA-research only provides
data for the period 19988-1992 in which migration represents 1% of the total demographic
growth of Bamako and natural growth 3,5%. Therefore, migration is responsible for less than
30% of the population growth of the capital.128 Data for other periods could not be found.
Data for the whole of West Africa shows that 75% of urban growth is due to natural increase
in the 1980s. While this cannot be compared to the whole of Mali, it still forms a
representative case study since the increasing importance of natural growth seems true for
Mali as well as for West Africa.
According to Tacoli, a comparison of the national surveys from 1986 and 1997 shows
a decreasing share of the urban population, although Bamako has demographically grown.129
This is indicating counter-urbanisation, described by Lynch as a new phenomenon, but does
not correspond with United Nations figures on the urban population, which increases
continually since 1950.130 The discrepancy cannot originate from different definitions since
the UN uses the same census. Other explanations are unknown. Whether Mali is or was
experiencing counter-urbanisation is therefore not obvious. Other effects and types of
migration are apparent anyway and therefore Lynch assumption is confirmed.
7.3 Flows of finance
Access to finance is a continuing problem for farmers in Mali. While enterprises in the
formal sector also have difficulties to negotiate long-term loans131, the lack of small credits
constraints the production by farmers. The direction of this financial flow is often urban-torural since financial institutions such as banks are located in the capital with dependences in
smaller cities. NGO’s are present in rural areas, representing rural-to-rural financial flows but
their share is small. Besides financial services from the formal sector and loans and gifts from
family members, remittances are another example of finance flows. These could be send from
abroad and are mainly informal.132 They would not profit from discounts on formal transfers.
127
Data for the total population is available which shows the same percentage for the share of migration in the
total population increase. While the 1970s and the period between 1998-1992 have a low percentage, around
20%, the 1980s experience a great migratory deficit due to a.o. drought. The share of migration is - 69% so that
the recent developments, since the 1980s, in Mali show that the growth of the population is less and less due to
migration. Bocquier, Urbanisation et dynamique migratoire 109.
128
Antoine, Trois générations de citadins 19.
129
C. Tacoli, ‘Urbanisation and migration in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in: M. de Bruijn, R. van Dijk, D. Foeken (ed),
Mobile Africa. Changing patterns of movement in Africa and beyond (Leiden 2001) 147.
130
World Urbanization Prospects (accessed on 12-11-2009).
131
Interview with Issa Keita, president of the Association Malienne des Exportations des Produits Agricoles et
Cueillettes (1-4-2009).
132
‘Migrant remittances. A development challenge’, African Development Bank (2008) 11.
53
Migrants send remittances home which are, in line with the more pessimist view, spent
on consumption goods and only little of it is invested in agricultural production. Another
destination for the money is education and health, which could eventually be positive for
production and income of the family. This holds for the poorest households but the better-off
families do invest in production.133 The direction of these flows is mainly urban-to-rural,
confirming Lynch’s hypothesis.
7.4 Flows of ideas
Flows of ideas can be subdivided in several categories. The here discussed categories,
examples and aspects are not exhaustive and do not cover all types of flows of ideas. This
paragraph is meant to sketch some of the fields in which transmission of ideas can take place.
One of these is the positive image that Malian emigrants send to their fellow-countrymen
which could differ from reality. Gouro Diallo gives an example about an emigrant who
returns to Mali for a short period and shows his expensive looking car to friends and relatives.
This should represent the prosperity he gained in Europe, while in reality he just rented the
local car to disguise the real situation of a miserable wage in the ‘European paradise’.134 This
could impress potential migrants, convince them to follow their friend and emigrate as well.
This could be assumed to be correct for West Africa in general as well. As Lynch has
mentioned, unrealistic images of the city are a negative consequence of the flows of ideas.
Another aspect of the flows of ideas is the importance of means of communication.
Ideas can be transmitted by migrant networks, for example by phone calls, pictures or even by
emails although this last category is not present in most rural areas. Internet gains influence in
urban areas as well as television in rural areas but both are still confined to the better-off. In
general, there is a diversification of communication technologies which could lead to a more
diverse flow of ideas and its impact. The flows of ideas also matter to the effect of flows of
finance. It could be necessary to change the mentality of a farmer so he will be able to invest
to increase the agricultural production. This relates to the acceptance of technological
innovations such as mechanisation.135
Another aspect of the flow of ideas is related to the political and public opinion about
labour migration. Flows of ideas are created by the media and interest groups about the labour
centre in Bamako, a joined effort by the European Union and the Malian government. Its
133
Tacoli, ‘Changing rural-urban interactions’ 12.
Interview with Diallo.
135
Interview with Traoré.
134
54
official goal is to execute the national migration policy, with a special accent on the relation
between migration and development.136 Interest groups on the contrary, such as the
Organisation of Deported Malians frame this cooperation as a way to hire ‘Kleenexworkers’.137 This is because they are disposable and will be ‘thrown away’, thus forced to
return, after France has benefited from their legal temporary labour. While the centre could
raise hopes of some Malians finding legal work in Europe since it promotes this as well, the
strongly worded protests by interest groups promote the image of labour exploitation by
Europe.
There are also flows of information in other regions on agricultural domains such as
using the radio to broadcast legal reforms or activities.138 Another sign is the presence of a
radio-station that provides health-related information in the local language.139 This is
mentioned by Lynch as a tool which increases the political, social and economic capital of the
rural population. The effects of flows of ideas cannot be said to be overestimated in the case
of Mali. Some negative consequences are mentioned, while the latter project could have
positive effects. No definite conclusion can be made for flows of ideas, unless that
interactions exist, probably characterised by an unequal interdependence.
136
Mali is home to the Centre d’Information et de Gestion des Migrations (CIGEM) which is a pilot project, set
up by the European Union and the Malinese government. Should this centre succeed in its objectives, it could be
extended to other countries in the region. Since it opened its doors to Malians in the end of 2008, it will be
difficult to judge its progress but so far it seems it has not fulfilled its expectations. http://www.cigem.org/
accessed on 10-11-2009.
137
According to the article ‘First EU advisory centre on migration opened in Africa’ in: Migration report
oktober 2008 (2008) Europäsisches forum für migrationsstudien, the president of the Organisation for Deported
Maliens means something different with his reference to ‘Kleenex workers’. Namely, this should mean ‘ "clean"
migration in accordance with European needs’. I think this is misunderstood or a political solution to reformulate
his original intentions.
138
The NGO International Institute for Communication and Development, has a project in the province of
Sikasso. ‘Its aim is to improve communication and information between local farmers’ organisations in the
province of Sikasso and the regional and national authorities. The project contributes to raise the farmer's voice
in the political debate around agriculture’. http://www.iicd.org/projects/mali-jefako-gelekan accessed on 10-112009.
139
Oxfam, ‘Mali: Providing safe water and sanitation’
https://www.oxfam.org.uk/donate/direct/pages/2009LBF001.html accessed on 10-11-2009.
55
Chapter VIII: Case study Senegal - Lynch
The application of Lynch’s theory to Senegal follows the same structure as the
previous chapter. Flows of food, people, finance and ideas will be analysed, using mainly
qualitative literature. This will lead to an answer to the sub question to what extent Lynch’s
theory is useful to describe rural-urban interactions in Senegal.
8.1 Flows of food
As in Mali, urban agriculture provides food for the urban population. The function and
place of urban and peri-urban agriculture is the same as in Mali. In Senegal, it also creates
conflict between different institutional authorities and especially between administrations on
different levels.140 Conflicting interest between rural and urban residents and overlapping
legal and administrative responsibilities can cause friction. Urban residents have multiple
activities that provide income. Rural residents do not share these options, there are little
possibilities for gaining non-farming income.141 Out-migration of household members then
becomes an option but could also be done to lighten the burden on the household food stock
for the dry season, while earning income. This has also been described by Lynch. The effects
of migration could be reinforced by remittances when invested in agricultural machinery. This
could increase productivity, create trade and thus a flow of food. However, the effect of
investments on the output of food depends among other things on technical skills, as well as
on environmental circumstances and infrastructure for trade possibilities. Concluding, the
multidirectional character of the flows of food can be affirmed for this case study. This case
study in its turn can confirm its value for West Africa, since it affirms the fading distinction
between rural and urban areas in West Africa, described in chapter II.
8.2 Flows of people
As has been mentioned in chapter I, the distinction between a rural and urban person is
flawed according to Lynch. Abdou Salam Fall confirms that Senegalese migrants are linked
with their place of origin by different kinds of relations. This too confirms the
representativeness of Senegal as a case study for West Africa. The linkages could be
140
O. Cissé, N.F. Diop Gueye, M. Sy, ‘Institutional and legal aspects of urban agriculture in French-speaking
West Africa: from marginalization to legitimization’, Environment and Urbanization 17 (2005) e.o.1, 143-145,
q.v. 152.
141
C. Tacoli, ‘Rural-urban interactions: a guide to the literature’, Environment and urbanization 10 (1998) e.o.1,
147-166, q.v. 157.
56
financial, in the form of remittances, but also human in the form of family visits. These are
both urban-to-rural flows. Another example is the control of young migrant girls by migrant
networks.142 This could be considered as a flow of influence from the rural to the urban area
since the goal is to prevent a girl ‘becoming an urban resident’, which means ‘protecting’ her
against all dangers perceived by the other migrants and rural family members. While more
than 80% of the migrants in the survey by Fall maintain relations with their place of origin,
20% of the migrants do not visit it. The main reasons for returning are family and religious
ceremonies. The urban network that has been developed by migrants has two sides. On the
one hand, it could decrease urban influences by social control. On the other hand, it could also
make interactions with the place of origin less important. This is made possible by migrants
seeking more social contacts within the city due to the economic hardship.143
While the previous paragraph mainly described social interactions and networks, the
mobility of persons in itself is just as well important. The diversification of types of migration
has already been demonstrated in paragraph 6.4. Another type of mobility which has not been
mentioned before, is that of women who are in a polygamous marriage with a husband who
works in urban areas. The women then take turns to live with their husband in the city, while
the others stay in the original place.144
A similar lack of data as found for Mali, the share of migration in the urbanisation
grade, is also found for Senegal. The NESMUWA-research provides data for the period
19988-1992 in which migration represents 0,5%-1% of the total demographic growth of
Dakar and natural growth represents 3,5%. Therefore, migration is responsible for less than
30% of the population growth of the capital.145 This was also concluded for Mali. Data for
other periods could not be found.146 The two case studies stand for general developments in
West Africa in this case, since Senegal and Mali experience an increasing importance of
natural growth against migratory growth.
8.3 Flows of finance
Perhaps the most known financial flow is that of remittances from urban to-rural areas,
whether with an internal or international origin. The money transfer can be made at family
142
A.S. Fall, ‘Migrants’ long-distance relationships and social networks in Dakar’, Environment and
urbanization, 10 (1998) e.o. 1, 135-147, q.v.137.
143
Idem 138-139.
144
Idem 142-143.
145
Antoine, Trois générations de citadins 19.
146
Data about the share of migration in the demographic growth of the total population are available for three
periods, respectively for the 1970’s (8%), 1980s (-7%) and 1988-1992 (-7%). The share of migration is much
smaller in Senegal than for Mali. Bocquier, Urbanisation et dynamique migratoire 109.
57
reunions or religious celebrations, not necessarily via an office unless in the case of
emigration. It could also be invested in schools, health centres or availability of electricity.147
An urban crisis or hardship could lead to less revenues by the receiver of remittances. This is
what happened in Senegal so the urban income of a family member is linked to the rural
income of those who stayed.148 Some destination countries like France have set up websites
on which migrants can compare tariffs for money transfers. Naturally, this is only profitable
for those who send formal money transfers, which is partly applicable for this case study.
Since Senegal’s GDP consist for 19% out of remittances, comparisons between money
transfer offices could make a great difference.149 It is estimated that between 30% and 80% of
a budget of a households follows from remittances. Despite the very rough estimation, it does
show the dependence of households and that remittances are present in all social classes. How
financial flows arrive has only since recently seen diversification, for example, through
cooperation between emigrants and NGO’s in the place of origin.150 The availability of
financial resources could have effect on flows of food, as described earlier. Whether
remittances lead to higher production, stays a non-answered question.
While urban-to-rural financial flows are apparent in Senegal, there is also evidence of
rural-to-rural flows or of a change of control of urban-to-rural flows to rural areas. An
example is given by Johan Lütting, who wrote about access to health care for the rural poor.
He frames this as ‘new forms of risk sharing at the local level’151. Lütting concludes that, in
general, poor rural residents profit from insurance schemes but that the poorest do not since
they cannot afford the premium.152 Summarising, the direction of flows is mainly urban-to
rural, which confirms Lynch assumption.
8.4 Flows of ideas
As for the previous case study, this paragraph is meant to touch on some of the fields
in which a transmission of ideas can take place. Considering the flow of images of destination
areas, this is the same as for Mali. Senegalese emigrants and out-migrants could depict a more
positive image of Europe, the journey to the other continent and its labour market than in
147
Fall, ‘Migrants’ long-distance relationships’, 138, 142.
Tacoli, ‘Changing rural-urban interactions’, 6.
149
‘Migrant remittances’, 11.
150
R. Black a.o., ‘Migration and pro-poor policy in West Africa’, Sussex Centre for Migration Research
(2004) 12, 15.
151
J. Lütting, ‘Health insurance for the poor? Determinants of participation In community-based health insurance
schemes in rural Senegal’, OECD Development Centre, Working Paper 204 (2003) 23.
152
Idem 2, 23.
148
58
reality. Lynch considers unrealistic depictions as negative consequences of the flows of ideas.
In general, Senegal also shares other elements with Mali, such as migrant networks that
transmit ideas and media sources in local languages. Another flow of ideas considering
destination countries could come from television and internet, which are mainly perceived as
positively influencing potential migrants. While especially illegal migrants could experience
hardship in Europe and different social and cultural values, such as family values, they could
also transmit this image to their peers and family. On the one hand, migrants try to disguise
the reality by showing of during return visits. On the other hand, they can also transfer other
attitudes and values to those who stayed. Flows from arrival to departure points can therefore
be positive and negative.
As described earlier, an increasing social control by the urban migrant network,
influenced by ideas from the place of origin can also be considered as a flow of ideas. The
rural area has a specific idea on how young migrants should behave themselves and to what
urban influences they should (not) be exposed. This is then transferred to the urban network,
which maintains relations with the place of origin, which works as a sort of extension of the
village.
One example of flows of ideas and its impact is that of a development project with the
goal to provide ICT to illiterate Senegalese. A university in Dakar makes information
technology more accessible for this group which is mainly poor and lives in rural areas.153
This is an example of a national urban-to-rural flow and dominated by the urban side. It is not
clear if there was a rural demand before the University started this project since it describes
the project as helping students developing new skills. However, it does mention the needs of
the rural-population and ICT-problems before the project but whether the project is demanddriven is not obvious. Another argument that the flow of ideas influences potential migrants,
is the urban-biased education system. This attracts teenagers to migrate to urban areas.154
A following, more positive argument, is that providing information on HIV and AIDS
to migrants, could decrease the infection rate. Rural migrants have a higher infection rate than
urban migrants and non-migrants, probably due to a lack of social control and a bigger sexual
153
‘Senegal’s ICT Resource Centre is developing ICT applications that address the needs of village
communities. This research and development focuses on new human-machine interfaces that allow illiterate
populations to access information using voice or graphic icons on portable telephones and personal digital
assistants (PDAs). ‘Senegal ICT Resource Centre: Creating R&D Capacity’,
<http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-86457-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html> (accessed on 13-11-2009)
154
‘Rural youth situation, needs and prospects - an overview with special emphasis on Africa’, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (1991) part I.
59
network.155 The point here is that a flow of information, whether urban or rural based, could
lead to behavioural changes. In theory, this could also spread outside the migrant community
to family members and non-migrants in areas of origin, if migrants transfer attitudes to those
groups.
To assess the overestimation of positive consequences of the flow of ideas is not
possible in this paragraph, due to its size and lack of scientific consensus. In accordance with
Mali, there are examples of both negative as well as positive influences but, obviously, these
cannot form a sound argument for accepting or contradicting Lynch’s assumption.
155
N. Meda e.o., ‘Low and stable HIV infection rates in Senegal: natural course of the epidemic or evidence for
success of prevention?’, AIDS 13 (1999) e.o. 11, 1397-1405, q.v. 1401.
60
Conclusion
It would be too easy to state that what Todaro’s migration theory is lacking, is filled
up by Lynch’s rural-urban interactions model, since both theories have been extensively
criticised. The first sub question about the content of the theories and their reception by other
theorists, showed the differences between the two theories. Lynch made valuable additions
such as changing the decision-making actor to households instead of individuals; analysing
different flows and types of migration instead of only step-wise, rural-to-urban migration; and
broadening the scope of motives instead of narrowing this down to a economic rationale. Of
course, his model also received criticism and with relevance to this paper, the argument
against counter-urbanisation is the most important. However, the case studies shave shown
some indications that make counter-urbanisation perhaps more likely such as return migration
from elders as well as youngsters to rural areas. In general, Lynch’s model received less
criticism than Todaro’s since most authors agree with his additions on the last theory.
Before applying the theoretical assumptions to the case studies, chapter II and III
discussed urbanisation patterns and migration flows in a historical context,. The division of its
histories in three periods proved useful for answering the second sub question. Changes in
migration flows in colonial times continued to be valid for developments within the last
period, the 1980s until recent. While group movements and pastoralism were main types of
pre-colonial migration, individual and labour migration gained importance in the colonial
period. Especially coastal areas attracted migrants from land-inward regions. Rural-to-urban
migration dominated the first decades after decolonisation but recent trends showed a
differentiation of types and directions of migration; a feminisation and commercialisation of
migration and the concluding of judicial agreements.
Urbanisation is linked to migration but only since the colonial period, it became a real
phenomenon for economic and political reasons. It was synonymously used with migration in
the 1960s and 1970s. But recent urban growth was mainly caused by natural growth which
made the governmental focus on rural-out migration less useful to tackle the problems
surrounding the expansion of urban areas. Since urban areas expanded and migrants continued
to have contacts in their places of origin, the distinction between rural and urban areas seemed
to fade. Eventually, the historical description of migration and urbanisation was used to
clarify the representativeness of the case studies for West Africa. The migration and
urbanisation developments returned in the following chapters which tested the applicability of
the two theories on Mali and Senegal.
61
The third sub question ‘to what extent could Todaro’s migration model be applied to
the case studies’, could be answered by ‘to little extent’. Todaro’s migration model has been
tested for five variables. The first of these assumptions was the tendency of migrants to work
in the informal sector, more than non-migrants. Both case studies showed the incorrectness of
this assumption, at least for younger generations. Also, unemployment figures were often
lower for migrants than for non-migrants.
His second assumption on certain characteristics of migrants proved partly true. Most
migrants were indeed young. Moreover, especially international migrants were highly
educated. The feminisation of migration was not strongly apparent in his theory but he
mentioned that for certain regions, female migrants dominate internal flows of people. This is
true for Mali, for Senegal and for West Africa in general. However, on an international scale,
women also constituted around 50% of all international migrants. Their share should increase
for Senegal and minimally decrease for Mali.
The third assumption of Todaro referred to the economic motives of migrants. Both
case studies partly contradicted this hypothesis for internal migrants and showed that for both
sexes together over time, labour motives became less important and instead family reasons
gained relevance. For international migrants, Todaro’s assumption held at least for Senegal.
The fourth assumption on the type of migration was also undermined by both case
studies. Stepwise migration is disappearing since rural migrants emigrate more than they
internally migrate so they skip urban areas in the country. Moreover, one cannot speak of a
domination of rural-to-urban migration. Also, return immigration has become important as
well as within the country.
Todaro’s final assumption proved that his focus on internal movements was misplaced
since almost halve of all migrations for Mali were international movements. This was less the
case for Senegal, namely almost 40%. Emigration from Mali was also much higher than from
Senegal. Overall, most assumptions of Todaro could be rejected on basis of the case studies.
Over time, preferences of destinations for migrants changed, as well as their gender, motives
and ways of migrating. In general, Mali and Senegal were reasonably comparable concerning
the outcomes of all assumptions and were representative for West Africa as a whole.
The fourth sub question considering the applicability of Lynch’s model, could be
positively answered. His model has been applied to the case studies using four assumptions.
The first assumption on the multidirectional flow of food, could be confirmed for both case
studies. Interdependence between rural, urban and peri-urban areas has been established too,
as well as the blurring of the difference between these areas, which was a general
62
development in West Africa. While work in rural areas was confined to agricultural activities
and work in urban areas to services and industrial activities, the case studies showed a more
complex picture by multiactivity by both inhabitants.
The second assumption was also tenable for Mali and Senegal. The diversification of
the direction of migration has already been established by analysing the previous theory. The
analysis of Lynch’s assumption reinforced this proof. But Lynch’s assumption of counterurbanisation could not be affirmed. However, in general, the presence of multidirectional
flows of people was obvious in the case studies which corresponded with the findings for
West Africa.
The third assumption on flows of finance, which were mainly urban-to-rural and
dominated by the place of origin, was more complex than the two previous statements. While
currently these flows were indeed urban-to-rural, there was also evidence of other flows. But
since the scale of rural-to-rural financial flows was small, both case studies confirmed
Lynch’s hypothesis.
The last assumption, about the positive consequences of the flows of ideas which were
often overestimated, was the hardest to analyse since there were many examples of these
flows but no definite results. Interestingly, flows of ideas were not only urban-to-rural such as
the transmission of unrealistic images on the city by out-migrants or television, they could
also be rural-to-urban such as the extended control on migrants by migrant networks. Since
positive and negative consequences could be found, no definite conclusion could be made for
both case studies.
Concluding, given the available data and its restrictions, Todaro’s migration theory
was contradicted by both case studies as well as by broad developments in West Africa. His
emphasis on one-way migration, economic motives and certain characteristics has proven
wrong. Lynch’s model, on the contrary, seemed more appropriate for analysing migration
flows in and out of Mali and Senegal since three out of four assumptions could be confirmed.
An obvious consequence of the limited amount of data and its restrictions, would be to
stress the importance of research to gather, process and analyse information on migration.
While the governments of both countries have acknowledged its importance, the exact size is
still unknown. Since these development countries do not see migration research as a priority
in their national policy, we should not expect improved data any time soon. It would be more
sensible to look for international or regional organisations, often with help in the form of
financial aid, management support or other specialities, from donor countries already active in
Mali and Senegal.
63
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Annex
Annex 1. Selection of unemployment rates in Mali (1976-2007)
Unemployment rates (1976-2007)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
National
Rural
07
20
01
00
97
96
94
04
20
20
20
19
19
19
93
19
89
85
87
19
19
19
19
76
Bamako
Source: ‘Activité, emploi et chomage au Mali’, Departement Observatoire de l’Emploi et de la Formation (1997,
2000, 2004, 2007), CIA World Factbook 2001, Traoré, A., ‘The labour market in Mali’, (2003) 13
http://www.gpn.org/data/mali/mali-analysis-en.pdf accessed on 21-09-2009, ‘L’emploi, le chômage et les
conditions d’activité dans les principales agglomerations de sept Etats membres de l’UEMOA’, Afristat, Dial,
<http://www.uemoa.int/Publication/2004/RapSectInform.pdf> (year unknown; accessed on 10-10-2009) 8
Definitions of unemployment sometimes differ by using a certain age category and definition. This could be the
national definition (including the discouraged unemployed) or the official International Labour Organisation
standard (excluding this last category). The national definition is at least used for 2004 and 2007 plus for
Bamako in 1996 and 2000. For the other years, it is uncertain which definition is used.
Annex 2. Selection of unemployment rates in Senegal (1988-2006)
Unemployment rates Senegal (1988-2006)
30
25
National
20
Other urban
15
Rural
10
Dakar
5
0
1988
1991
1994
2001
2005
2006
Source: Enquête Sénégalaise Auprès des Ménages 1994-1995, 2001-2002, Direction de la prévision et de la
statistique (Dakar 1997, 2004); ‘Enquête sur les priorités. Présentation des résultats préliminaires 1993’,
Direction de la prévision et de la statistique. (Dakar 1993); ‘Rapport de l'enquête de suivi de la pauvreté au
Sénégal 2005-2006,’ Agence nationale de la statistique et de la demographie (Dakar 2007). Other urban: urban
areas without including the capital Dakar.
The definitions differ sometimes per year. For 1991, the definition is unknown. Definition for 1994: Those who
are actively available for a job and searching but who did not work for at least 6 months in the 12 months before
the survey. I assume this is the same for year 1988 since the latest survey compares these two years. For 2001:
Those who did not continually work for three months in the last 12 months and who are looking or waiting for a
job during this period. For 2005: Those who did not work for the last 7 days before the survey, but who are
searching and available for the two following weeks.
68