Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions E
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Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions E
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions E-Newsletter Issue 54 December 2015 ‘To No One Will We Sell, To No One Deny or Delay Right or Justice’ Chapter 40, Magna Carta 1215 December 2015 - Issue 54 IN THIS ISSUE: PAGE Editorial 1 Provisional Charge Conundrum 2 Message de fin d’année 4 Workshop of Women in Uniform Network 5 Who cares about smelly fish? 6 Le droit pénal général à l’épreuve du radicalisme 8 Droit pénal spécial - Le terrorisme en droit mauricien 10 Extract of the November issue of the Global Prosecutors E-Crime Network (GPEN) Newsletter 12 Case summary 14 Highlights for year 2015 18 EDITORIAL TEAM Miss Anusha Rawoah, State Counsel Ms Zaynah Essop, State Counsel The views expressed in the articles are those of Miss Shaaheen Inshiraah Dawreeawoo, Temporary State Counsel the particular authors and should under no account be considered as binding on the Office. Ms Pooja Autar-Callichurn , Temporary State Counsel Mr Ashley Victor, Public Relations Officer Mr Yashvind Kumar Rawoah, STM Intern (Legal Research) Mr Ajmal Toofany, STM Intern (Legal) Miss Toshika Bobeechurn, STM Intern (Legal) Miss Jouana Genave, STM Intern (Sociology) December 2015 - Issue 54 EDITORIAL Dear readers, 2015 has been an eventful year for the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions from a professional perspective. The ODPP hosted a successful Head of Prosecutorial Agencies Conference (HOPAC) which was attended by DPPS around the world. The conference resolved to the setting up of an informal network of cooperation amongst DPPS and other head of prosecution agencies to exchange information in the fight against international crime In September, Mr Ahmine received an award for his outstanding contribution to the establishment of the Mauritian Asset Recovery Unit (ARU) and the development of the asset recovery regime in Mauritius. The Office of the DPP also collaborated with the Law Reform Commission to make proposals for a new Criminal Code. In this issue, the DPP Mr Satyajit Boolell, SC addresses the issue of the provisional charges. He notes that the procedure is in conformity with section 5 of our Constitution (Right to liberty). The DPP is of that it is high time that we put an end to the use of provisional charges. Mrs Johan Moutou-Leckning, Senior Assistant DPP attended the Mauritius Women in Uniform Network's workshop to mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women. The ODPP was also present at the first meeting of the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime (‘IOFMC’), Fisheries Pillar, in the Seychelles. Mrs Najiyah Dauharry-Jeewa, Senior State Counsel gives an insight of the meeting at page 6. For the last issue of 2015, Mr Ajmal Toofany and myself talk about terrorism and radicalisation. We wanted to shed the light on some provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Criminal Code Act at pages 8 and 10. You will also find the interview of the DPP published in the November 2015 issue of the GPEN Newsletter at pages 12. You will, as usual, find a summary of the latest judgments given by our Courts in November 2015 at page 14. We also share some pictures of 2015 with you at page 18. On behalf of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, I wish you and your family a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year 2016. May it bring us peace, justice and happiness. Ashley Victor Public Relations Officer Page 1 Provisional Charge Conundrum December 2015 - Issue 54 The purpose of a provisional charge (information) is to bring the arrest and detention of a person under judicial supervision and control. It is in conformity with section 5 of our Constitution (right to liberty), which requires an arrestor to bring a detainee suspected of crime before a Magistrate with the least possible delay. Given its distinctive feature, no detainee pleads to a provisional charge and no trial takes place on the basis of a provisional charge. The provisional charge has been part of our criminal procedure law over a century and its origins can be traced back to the repealed Ordinance 35 of 1852. Today, although no reference to a provisional charge is made in our statute books, it has survived as a settled practice and is probably unique to Mauritius. Given its purpose of bringing a detainee under judicial control, one would assume that any transgression or abuse by the police when effecting arrest would be set right by the Magistrate, yet there is a well-founded (but not new) concern, among members of the Bar, that the judicial control is inadequate and provisional charges are being used as a cover for arbitrary arrests and detentions. It would appear that very often police officers have recourse to a provisional charge as a mere routine practice ignoring completely the principles attached to the lodging of a provisional charge. It is in these circumstances that the conundrum exists. On the 20th October, 1994, in pursuance of a search warrant issued under the Official Secrets Act, police searched the premises of a weekly magazine known as Le Mag, and detained overnight its editor-in-chief and another journalist for having “unlawfully published secret news”. Le Mag had allegedly published a “classified” document prohibited under the Official Secrets Act, which purported to be “Functional Directive for Special Mobile Force of Mauritius Police” issued by the Prime Minister’s office. The reaction of the police was clearly disproportionate and after the search they arrested the editor and the journalist who had authored the article. The publisher also was subjected to interrogation. The chairman of Le Mag magazine, Mr. Philippe Forget, was also arrested and could not travel abroad for a full two years. An application on behalf of the journalists was immediately lodged before the District Magistrate to have the provisional charge struck out to no avail. The applicants then referred the matter to the Supreme Court. The learned Judges found the provisional charge to be null and void, as the “offence” set out on the provisional charge “publishing secret news” was not known to the law. The Supreme Court was implicitly stating that the arrest of these two journalists and their chairman was irresponsible and unlawful. (Alain Gordon-Gentil & Ors (Applicants) v State of Mauritius & Ors (Respondents) 1995 MR 38) . In any country under the rule of law, an arrestor must be able to justify the arrest and detention of a person ‘on a minute by minute basis’. And this, for a simple but important reason: it is a universal and fundamental right of every human being not tonot to be deprived of his or her personal liberty save as may be authorized by just laws. The drafters of our own Constitution who were most probably inspired by Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights expressly provided for such a guarantee at Section 5, in the following terms: “No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be Page 2 December 2015 - Issue 54 authorized by law”. They went further in their wisdom by vesting full independence in the Commissioner of Police in the “exercise of his responsibilities and powers” so that he would not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. A police Officer therefore has a duty in the exercise of his powers to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. First, invoke the precise law empowering him to carry out the arrest. Second, he must subjectively suspect that the person has committed an offence, and third he has reasonable grounds to make the arrest (objective test). Unless and until these requirements are satisfied no arrest and subsequently, no provisional charge can and should be envisaged. In many countries the provisional charge simply does not exist. The circumstances of arrest and detention are prescribed and subject to specific time limits. An arrestor may proceed to arrest after the requirements alluded to above have been met. Furthermore, he may detain that suspect if there is a need to secure or preserve evidence relating to the offence. At this stage the arrestor brings the suspect before the Magistrate without lodging a provisional charge in court against him but will have to justify any prolonged detention. The procedure has the advantage of doing away with the provisional charge, and places the burden on the police to first carry out a thorough enquiry, then consider whether an offence has been committed and finally in the light of all circumstances of the case decide on the lodging of a formal information, if any, subject to the consent of the DPP. This will ensure that a person does not run the risk of being charged with levity and without legal foundation. In my view it will assist to reduce significantly any potential abuse from the arrestor and at the same time remove the criminal stigma on a detainee who has yet to face trial. As we embark on Year 2016, I hope for the best that all stakeholders find a meaningful solution to replace the existing practice relating to the provisional charge. It is not too late for us to learn from the experience of other jurisdictions where the provisional charge does not exist and consequently to adopt a Mauritian Criminal Procedural Code, whereby the arrestor will justify detention on a ‘minute by minute basis’ as stated by Clayton and Tomlinson in their book entitled “Law of human Rights”, referred to by the Privy Council in the case of Ramsing v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2012] UKPC 16. Satyajit Boolell, SC, Director of Public Prosecutions Page 3 December 2015 - Issue 54 Message de fin d’année L'année 2015 a été riche en évènements pour le bureau du Directeur des poursuites. L'occasion de survoler notre année et de vous remerciez personnellement pour votre collaboration et le support que nous avons reçu. Avoir le soutien du public est important et renforce notre foi en un avenir rempli de paix et de justice. En janvier, le bureau a accueilli Eugene McConville, consultant en matière de lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent à l'UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) pour deux sessions interactives avec l'Asset Recovery Unit et plusieurs officiers d'autres institutions notamment l'ICAC. En février, David Perry QC, l'un des plus éminents avocats de sa génération nous a fait l'honneur d'être des nôtres pour la deuxième conférence annuelle en mémoire du regretté Rajsoomer Lallah QC. Notre orateur a choisi de nous parler de l'interprétation législative et la pratique du droit. Le bureau du DPP a également accueilli la 13ème Heads of Prosecuting Agencies Conference (HOPAC) du 15 au 18 avril au St Régis Resort, Le Morne. Cette rencontre regroupe les Directeurs des Poursuites Publiques de plusieurs pays où le Common Law est pratiqué. La résolution a été de créer un réseau informel entre les DPPs afin de combattre le terrorisme, la cybercriminalité, la fraude et les crimes financiers. Autre évènement qui a marqué notre année ; la réforme du code pénal mauricien. Après un travail de longue haleine, la Law Reform Commission a soumis son rapport et fait ses recommandations sur la question. Un travail de 4 ans, avec la collaboration du Professeur Romain Ollard de l'Université de la Réunion, a débouché sur ce rapport. Le 23 au 25 février 2015, le bureau du Directeur des Poursuites Publiques a organisé un atelier de travail sur la Traite des Etres Humains. Ce cours a été fait sur mesure par des experts de l’ONUDC Peter Cronie et Reiko Fujibayashi. Nous avons, en août, collaboré avec M. Armoogum Parsooramen pour donné des cours de droit à l’Université du 3eme âge. Notre salle de conférence avait été mise à leur disposition et nos officiers ont dispensé des cours de droit en 4 sessions. Notre salle de conférence était pleine à craquer et nous avons déjà signifié notre intention de renouveler cette expérience. En ce qu'il s'agit des procès devant les différentes cours de justice, je suis satisfait du travail accompli par mes officiers. Dans l'affaire des Somaliens accusés de piraterie en haute mer, et acquittés par la cour intermédiaire, nous avons interjeté appel et nous avons en partie gagné. La cour d'appel a renvoyé l'affaire devant la cour de première instance pour un nouveau procès. Nous avons franchi un immense pas en utilisant un logiciel de vidéo conférence dans cette affaire afin de pouvoir entendre le témoignage des officiers qui ont procédé à l'arrestation des accusés. Sans cette technologie, nous n'aurions pas pu commencer des poursuites. C'est le début d'une nouvelle ère où la technologie nous aidera à poursuivre certains procès même si les témoins ne sont pas à Maurice. Il faut savoir que ce n'était qu'une provision spéciale utilisée quand un enfant est impliqué dans la procédure. Il y a aussi l'affaire Ruhumatally tout récemment, avec beaucoup de points de droits que nous avons su débattre et la cour d'assises nous a donné raison. Même si 2015 a mal commencé, je retrouve une lueur d'espoir en cette fin d'année. Nous restons motivés sur nos objectifs et avons les yeux rivés vers l'avenir. Nous avançons, grâce à vous, vers 2016 avec sérénité. Au nom du bureau du Directeur des Poursuites Publiques et des officiers de ce bureau, je vous souhaite un très joyeux noël et une excellente année. Satyajit Boolell, SC Director of Public Prosecutions Page 4 December 2015 - Issue 54 Workshop of Women in Uniform Network at the Municipality of Port-Louis To mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the Mauritius Women in Uniform Network whose mission and objective is to raise gender awareness, to promote gender equality and to empower women in uniform, organized a workshop at the Municipality of Port Louis on the 25th November 2015. The network covers the following sectors: Mauritius Police Force, Mauritius Prison Service, Mauritius Revenue Authority, Mauritius Fire and Rescue Service and the Nursing Association from the Ministry of Health. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions was represented by Mrs J. Moutou-Leckning, Senior Assistant DPP who delivered a presentation on “Women’s Rights and Protection at her Place of Work”. The latter spoke about women’s right based mainly on Protection of Public Officers Act 1957, the Employment rights Act 2008, the Equal Opportunity Act 2008 and offences under the Criminal Code 1838. The Minister of Gender Equality, Child Development and Family Welfare, Hon Mrs Aurore Perrault , the Australian High Commissioner, Mrs Susan Coles and the US Ambassador, Mrs Shari Villarosa were also present to support this initiative. Page 5 December 2015 - Issue 54 Who cares about smelly fish? I attended the first meeting of the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime(‘IOFMC’), Fisheries Pillar, in the Seychelles on the 20th and 21st of October 2015. Prior to the meeting, I could not help wondering whether, on the scale of things, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing should be on our priority list in the face of various more “compelling” crimes such as cybercrime, money laundering, piracy, human trafficking, and terrorism. However, as the meeting progressed, I soon realised that IUU fishing could not be viewed in isolation. More often than not, it overlapped with other crimes associated with fishing, labour issues and maritime safety. Indeed, a brief by the UNODC on the transnational nature of fisheries crime affecting the whole IOFMC region revealed that: a. Fishermen trafficked for the purpose of forced labour on board fishing vessels are severely abused; b. There is frequency of child trafficking in the fishing industry; c. Transnational organised criminal groups are engaged in marine living resource crimes in relation to high value, low volume species; d. Some transnational fishing operators launder illegally caught fish through transhipments at sea and fraudulent catch documentation; e. Fishing licensing and control systems are vulnerable to corruption; Page 6 December 2015 - Issue 54 f. Fishing vessels are used for the purpose of smuggling of migrants, illicit traffic in drugs ( primarily cocaine), illicit traffic in weapons and acts of terrorism; and g. Fishers are often recruited by organised criminal groups due to their skills and knowledge of the sea and are seldom masterminds behind organised criminal activities involving the fishing industry or fishing vessels. At the close of the meeting, certain key priority areas in combatting IUU fishing were identified: • Strengthen domestic controls of vessels flying their flag; • Improve ability to patrol by sea and air the EEZ (including by electronic means); • Ratify and Implement the 2011 IOTC Port State Resolution (a key tool to undermine IUU fishing).; • Modernize national fisheries laws to address IUU fishing to include criminalization of serious offences (in line with UNTOC definitions); and • Establish through the IOFMC inter agency cooperation and collaboration for information sharing, operations and prosecutions (e.g. Attorney General’s Office, Coast Guard, Customs/Revenue, Fisheries Industry). I pointed out during the meeting that there was an urgent need for training for Officers from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions on issues of IUU Fishing. Paradoxically, although much training and logistics had been deployed at enforcement level, not much had been done on the prosecution side. Moreover, given that the Fisheries and Maritime Resources Act was currently being reviewed in Mauritius, it was imperative that prosecutors be involved in the law revision consultative process. The problem of IUU fishing has to be tackled urgently both in terms of training for prosecutors, strengthening our domestic legislation and, last but not least, sensibilising the population as to the often unforeseen dangers posed by such practices before we end up being caught in a net from which we cannot free ourselves. Najiyah Dauharry-Jeewa, Senior State Counsel Page 7 Le droit pénal général à l’épreuve du radicalisme December 2015 - Issue 54 Le terrorisme n’a cessé de défrayer la chronique ces dernières années. Contrairement aux guerres qui font l’objet de déclarations, ce mode opératoire de la violence renferme la particularité d’être unilatéral en n’offrant aucune opportunité de se défendre. Le principe de proportionnalité, qui définit le droit de la guerre, est étranger au terrorisme qui est réfractaire à toute structure règlementaire. La revendication attachée à l’acte transporte avec lui une pensée qui transcende l’idée de détruire et manifeste d’avantage la destruction d’une idée opposée. L’identité des victimes n’étant pas individuellement définie, l’acte terroriste tend à cibler l’idéologie collective que personnifie ces victimes. La planification est la base de l’acte terroriste, qui est orchestré minutieusement afin que la revendication puisse retentir aussi efficacement que les dégâts occasionnés. Le droit pénal intervient en amont de l’acte matériel pour sanctionner des ententes qui tendent à inciter la déstabilisation de l’ordre interne. Le complot est une entente délictueuse qui tend vers la commission d’une infraction. L’article 87 alinéa 2 du code pénal français de 1810 définit le complot comme «la résolution d'agir, (...) concertée et arrêtée entre deux ou plusieurs personnes ». Le Criminal Code Supplementary Act réprime d’une manière générale à son article 109 le fait de comploter dans le but de commettre une infraction. Plus spécifiquement, le complot est puni par le Criminal Code Act lorsqu’il a pour but «d’exciter les citoyens ou autres habitants de Maurice à s’armer contre l’Etat » (section 60) ou « d’exciter la guerre civile » (section 62). Est également sanctionné, le fait de ne pas révéler la «connaissance de complots formés ou de crimes projetés contre la sûreté intérieure ou extérieure de l’Etat » (section 72). Le paradoxe du terrorisme est que l’atteinte qu’il porte aux droits et libertés fondamentales d’autrui, légitime l’action de l’Etat de porter atteinte, à son tour, aux droits et libertés fondamentales, non seulement des terroristes mais également, du reste de la société. Lorsque la vie d’un individu est menacée par les agissements criminels d’autrui, l’Etat doit «mettre en place une législation pénale dissuasive offrant un cadre préventif et répressif » et « prendre préventivement des mesures d'ordre pratique pour protéger l'individu » (CEDH, 28 oct 1998, Osman c/ Royaume-Uni). La Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme fonde cette obligation positive de l’Etat sur la protection du droit à la vie de l’individu prévue par l’article 2 de la Convention, dont découle l’article 4 de la Constitution Mauricienne intitulé « Protection of the Right to Life ». L’intervention de l’Etat doit toutefois être légitime, proportionnée et ciblée. Le droit à la vie à un caractère absolu et l’Etat peut y porter atteinte que dans des cas très limitatifs. La liberté d’expression a quant à elle un caractère relatif ce qui sous-entend la possibilité d’y porter atteinte lorsque la sécurité de l’Etat est menacée. La CEDH a eu l’occasion de se prononcer suite à diverses publications faisant l’apologie de la violence. La Cour Européenne met à la charge des juridictions nationales le devoir d’opérer le contrôle de nécessité et de proportionnalité de toute décision visant à restreindre la liberté d’expression. Pour qu’une atteinte à la liberté d’expression soit justifiée, elle doit être nécessaire dans une société démocratique et proportionnée au but légitime poursuivi. Ainsi il a été affirmé par la Cour qu’une atteinte proportionnée peut être portée à un ouvrage lorsque celui-ci exhorte à l’usage de la violence, à la résistance à l’armée, au soulèvement et au discours de haine (CEDH, 13 janv. 2005, Dagtekin c/ Turquie). La CEDH affirme que ceux qui publient de «propos ambigus pouvant s'analyser comme un soutien à la violence terroriste » ne bénéficient pas de la protection du droit à la liberté d’expression (CEDH, 25 nov. 1997, Zana c/ Turquie) ainsi que ceux qui publient des lettres et des articles incitant à la violence (CEDH, 8 juill. 1999, Sürek c/ Turquie). Page 8 December 2015 - Issue 54 Force est de constater qu’avec le soulèvement des vagues d’attentats, une pluralité d’opinions et d’idées se sont manifestées et ont été diffusées au moyen de supports variés, dont le contenu visait à faire l’apologie de la violence causée par des actes terroristes. Dans quelle mesure ces propos doivent-ils être condamnés ? Des propos extrêmes ou radicaux faisant l’apologie de violences sont-ils condamnables en droit mauricien ? L’extrémisme s’enracine dans la radicalisation de la pensée et exprime la « motivation » de l’acte de violence. L’idéologie radicale ne constitue non pas l’intention de commettre des violences mais équivaut au « mobile » de l’infraction, la raison d’être de l’acte. Pour le droit pénal, le « mobile » de l’infraction est immatériel. Le principe général est que le « mobile » est un élément constitutif de l’infraction que s’il est prévu par le texte de loi (Police Sergeant Dindoyal vs J. L. Daruty De Grandpre 1943 MR 58) mais peut néanmoins être pris en considération afin de cerner l’intention criminelle (Dabee and anor. vs. The Queen [1965 MR 167]).Par analogie, l’idéologie radicale n’est pas un élément déterminant du processus décisionnel qui mène à une arrestation et à un jugement. C’est dans le cadre des libertés fondamentales garanties par la Constitution que le législateur fait naître des lois visant à mettre en place des instruments juridiques pour protéger l’ordre public étatique contre la manifestation d’idéologies radicales. L’article 3 de la Constitution mauricienne dispose qu’il a existé et qu’il continuera d’exister sans discrimination le droit à la liberté de conscience et le droit à la liberté d’expression. Bien qu’elles puissent être opposées, ces deux libertés se superposent car la pensée se traduit par l’expression d’une chose ou de la personne. La liberté de penser ou encore la liberté d’opinion, de recevoir et de diffuser des informations et des idées ainsi que la liberté de correspondre sans immixtion trouvent leurs origines dans la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen. L’atteinte portée à l’ordre public, la sécurité publique, la moralité publique, la santé publique et la défense sont des causes limitatives qui justifient raisonnablement dans une société démocratique qu’on puisse limiter l’exercice de certaines libertés fondamentales. Quels sont les leviers du code pénal mauricien qui peuvent être activés à l’égard du radicalisme ? « L’incitation à la haine raciale » (section 282), la « sédition » (section 283) ou encore « l’incitation à la désobéissance civile » (section 284) sont des mesures qui pourraient être considérées. Elles demeurent néanmoins incertaines quant au fait de pouvoir englober l’expression d’un soutien à la violence. Loin d’être « menaçantes, abusives ou insultantes », comme le préconise la section 282, une idée peut juste en conforter une autre. Sur la base de la section 283, comment mesure-t-on le degré de « mécontentement ou la désaffection parmi les citoyens de L’ile Maurice » ou « le sentiment de tension ou d’hostilité parmi les différentes classes de citoyen » ? Le Information and Communication Technologies Act 2001 quant a lui sanctionne, à son article 46, la transmission électronique d’un message de nature à menacer ou compromettre la défense étatique, la sécurité publique ou l’ordre public. Le droit pénal mauricien est-il équipé pour faire face à la montée du radicalisme ? Le code pénal français a évolué dans le sens d’une répression de la « provocation aux actes de terrorisme ». Le législateur français, par la loi du 13 novembre 2014 sanctionne le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l'apologie de ces actes. La peine est aggravée lorsque les faits ont été commis en utilisant un service de communication au public en ligne. Le pluralisme de valeurs, qui arbore paisiblement le paysage mauricien est exposé à l’érosion du radicalisme ambiant. En attendant un questionnement juridique du radicalisme et de l’apologie du terrorisme par le droit pénal général, pouvons-nous nous tourner vers le « Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 » pour des éléments de réponse? Ajmal Toofany Page 9 Droit pénal spécial - Le terrorisme en droit mauricien December 2015 - Issue 54 Le monde a été pris de court en novembre dernier avec les attaques terroristes à Paris et au Mali. La sinistre actualité est l’occasion de revenir sur la notion du « terrorisme » en droit mauricien. Ayant le statut de droit pénal spécial, les provisions de la loi antiterroriste dérogent aux principes du droit commun. Le Prevention of Terrorism Act de 2002 La loi principale sur le terrorisme à Maurice est le Prevention of Terrorism Act de 2002. Qu'est-ce qu'un acte terroriste? Même s’il est difficile de trouver un consensus pour une définition exacte et commune qualifiant le terrorisme, la section 3 (2) de la loi explique qu'il s'agit d’un acte qui pourrait sérieusement endommager un pays ou une organisation internationale. Cet acte doit également avoir pour intention, ou pourrait être vu comme ayant l'intention, d'intimider une population, forcer un gouvernement ou une organisation internationale à faire ou s'abstenir de faire quelque chose. Cet acte terroriste peut aussi avoir pour but de déstabiliser ou détruire le fondement même des structures politiques, constitutionnelles, économiques et sociales d'un pays ou d'une organisation internationale ou l'influencer. La section 3(1) de la loi de 2002 stipule que l'acte terroriste est réprimandé si un individu a commis l'acte, a menacé de le faire ou a commencé un acte préparatoire en ce sens. Ce qui est intéressant à savoir c'est que l'omission de signaler un acte terroriste est également réprimandée. L'acte terroriste comprend les attaques mortelles contre une personne ou nuire à son intégrité physique. Il s'agit aussi du kidnapping, le détournement d'un aéronef, d'un bateau ou un transport publique ou de marchandises. Cet acte peut aussi être la fabrication, possession, acquisition, transportation, livraison ou l'utilisation d'armes, d'explosives, du nucléaire, de dispositifs chimiques ou biologiques ainsi que la recherche dans le développent d'armes du même genre. La loi réprime également ceux qui déversent des substances dangereuses, causent des incendies, explosions ou inondations, interférent avec la distribution d'eau, d'électricité ou autres ressources naturelles ayant pour effet de mettre en danger la vie humaine. La section 4 de la loi nous parle des « organisations prohibées » ou « bandes organisées ». Ainsi, si deux personnes ou plus s'associent, ou si une personne rejoint une organisation ayant pour mission de participer, collaborer, promouvoir, encourager ou exhorter un acte terroriste, une infraction est commise. Un recours auprès d'un juge en chambre par le Commissaire de Police est nécessaire pour déclarer qu'une organisation est "prohibée". Si une personne appartient ou prétend appartenir à une de ces organisations, il enfreint la section 4 (4). Il aura toutefois une défense à la section 4(4) s'il prouve que l'organisation n'a pas été déclarée "prohibée" quand la personne en charge proférait un discours de nature terroriste et n'a participé à aucune activité terroristes. Page 10 December 2015 - Issue 54 La section 6 réprime toute personne qui donnerait un soutien à un terroriste. La section 7 quant à elle prévoit qu'une personne donnant refuge ou qui cacherait un terroriste commet un délit. La section 8 parle des informations relatives aux actes terroristes. Si une personne ne divulgue pas des informations pour empêcher un acte terroriste, l'appréhension du terroriste, aider la poursuite ou amener le suspect à une condamnation, celle-ci peut être trouvée coupable pour son omission. Le ministre de tutelle, qui est le Premier Ministre, peut sous la section 10 de la loi anti-terroriste déclarer un suspect "terroriste international". Il faut pour cela que le ministre ait des soupçons raisonnables que cette personne est mêlée à un acte terroriste. Si un terroriste international a la nationalité mauricienne, le ministre a le pouvoir de la lui retirer. Une personne ayant été arrêtée dans le cadre d'une enquête relative au terroriste sous les sections 3 à 7, 12 ou 15, peut être détenu pendant 36 heures sans avocat. Les seules personnes habilitées à le voir sont des policiers, ayant pour grade inspecteurs ou plus, ou un médecin du gouvernement. L'interrogatoire doit se faire sous vidéosurveillance. La section 30 stipule qu’une cour mauricienne a la juridiction requise pour juger quelqu'un même s’il n'a pas commis le délit sur le sol mauricien. Le Directeur des Poursuites Publiques est le seul à avoir la discrétion de choisir la juridiction compétente sauf dans le cas de la section 3 de la loi où le suspect ne peut qu'être jugé devant un juge sans jury. Les sentences sous la section 3 est de 5 à 35 ans. Pour les sections 4 à 7, 12 et 15, la sentence est de 3 à 20 ans. La peine pour les articles 8 et 9 est de 2 à 15 et la sentence prévue pour les sections 26 et 29 est une amende de Rs 50 000 à une peine de prison ne dépassant pas 5 ans. Le Prevention of Terrorism (International Obligations) Act 200 Le but principal du Prevention of Terrorism (International Obligations) Act 2008 est de donner force de loi aux trois conventions signées par Maurice. Il s'agit de la Convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires (Vienne, 1980), la Convention sur le marquage des explosifs plastiques et en feuilles aux fins de détection (Montréal, 1991) et la convention internationale pour la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire (New York, 2005). La loi parle également de l'illégalité de la possession, l'importation, l'exportation de matériel radioactif et nucléaire. Le suspect sera jugé devant un juge sans jury et risque 5 à 35 ans de prison. Le Prevention of Terrorism Act (Denial of Bail) 2002 La section 3 de la loi stipule qu'un présumé terroriste n'a pas droit à la liberté conditionnelle s'il est accusé d'une offense sous les sections 3 à 7, 12 et 15 de la loi principale comme le fait valoir la Constitution dans sa section section 5(3A)(a) Ashley Victor Public Relations Officer Page 11 Extract of the November issue of the Global Prosecutors E-Crime Network (GPEN) Newsletter December 2015 - Issue 54 This month’s interview is with Satyajit Boolell, Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in Mauritius. Since Mr Boolell became DPP he has taken a proactive approach to the prosecution of cybercrime; he set up a cybercrime unit in 2009 and has instigated training programmes with the Council of Europe and European Union. Both Satyajit and his prosecutors frequently attend GPEN webinars. In his limited spare time he reads travel books, plays golf and indoor soccer and enjoys sharing meals with his family. I asked Mr Boolell if he could tell us a bit about himself and his role? I was appointed Director of Public Prosecutions by the Judicial and Legal service Commission in February 2009 after a long spell at the Attorney General’s Office. As DPP, I am responsible for and exercise control over all prosecutorial matters. The powers vested in the DPP by the Mauritian Constitution are subject to important constitutional safeguards and it is my duty to ensure compliance with these safeguards. The decision whether to prosecute must satisfy the reasonable prospects test, in other words based on the evidence available a court is more likely than not to convict a defendant. Any decision on my part not to prosecute a defendant may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Mauritius. It is a healthy process in a democracy as it ensures scrutiny of my decisions. The Office of the DPP in Mauritius is constituted of some 60 barristers, all appointed by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission. They are, I must say, dedicated officers, committed to their work, and in that respect significantly contribute to make my task as DPP less onerous. Last year, law officers from my Office produced the first edition of the Mauritius Criminal Law Review and I was pleased to note that cybercrime occupied prime space. When I assumed office in 2009, among the numerous priorities I had on my mind, was the setting up of a Cybercrime Unit. I wanted law officers, at least some of them, to develop and gain a deeper understanding of the legal principles which are applied to cybercrimes. The Unit is now operational and is constituted of six officers. It was fascinating for me and a team of officers to participate in the GPEN Webinar which was entitled “Is badness online acceptable”. I thought the opportunity could not be missed. Some twenty officers took part in the session. We were gathered in our lecture hall to watch the session which was beamed on a wider screen. The use of technology for webinars is an example of technology at its best. At the press of the button, we were connected to the global community, appreciate and share their respective experiences and challenges But as rightly pointed out at the webinar there is also a dark side to technology and virtually every advance has been seen by criminals as a potential niche to be exploited for criminal purposes. Please can you tell me about Mauritius and the main forms of Cybercrime you have to deal with and any cross border cooperation you have experienced? Mauritius has a population of some 1.2 million and is situated some 800 kilometers off the east coast of Madagascar. The history of the island in a way is quite recent as it goes back to three centuries. I am making abstraction here of earlier occupation by Arabs and Portuguese sailors whose passages on the island were brief. The Dutch occupied the island in 1638 and named it after the Dutch Page 12 December 2015 - Issue 54 prince Maurice Van Nassau. They were interested mainly in the local products and took away what they could see as a potential commercial benefit. The French occupied the island after the Dutch passage. They opted for a permanent settlement in 1715. They renamed the island “Ile de France”, introduced laws, religion, built communities and grew crops but their rule was abruptly brought to an end almost a century later in 1810, when the British took over the island and signed the Treaty of Capitulation Act 1810. The combined effect of the Treaty of Capitulation and to a large extent the liberal approach adopted by the British by not reneging on French laws already in place, enabled Mauritius to develop a unique legal system based on both French and English influences. The French Penal Code, Civil Code, as well as the Code of Civil Procedure remain the basis of the substantive law in Mauritius today. Mauritius became a sovereign nation by virtue of the Mauritius Independence Act in 1968. It remained a constitutional monarchy until 1991 when the constitution was altered to make Mauritius a Republic with a President as a Head of State. As is the case of many former colonies, Britain endowed Mauritius with what is commonly referred to as a Constitution based on the Westminster model. Being small does not mean that Mauritius is shielded from the onslaught of cybercriminals. In fact we are even more vulnerable because of our high dependency on technology and Internet communications. The difficulty is for law enforcers to keep pace with the rapidly evolving nature of such crimes when we know that Cybercrime has the unique quality of being able to morph into different forms of anti-social and undesirable behaviour that may not fit into existing penal categories. We are already being confronted with fraudulent activities like phishing, pharming and other forms of data interceptions, child pornography and grooming, copyrights infringement, as criminals find their ways to exploit our digital environment. And as is often the case, cybercrimes are committed through anonymity and involve several jurisdictions. Whilst laudable attempts have been made by the Government to fight cybercrimes, I believe from my experience as DPP, the main problem remains the fundamental mismatch between the territorially oriented legal enforcement mechanisms and the multi-jurisdictional character of such crimes. The international community has no choice but to join hands and work together. Mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties provide only part of the solution. In my view, we need a fundamental game change by creating a multilateral platform which facilitates and coordinates investigations, prosecution and law enforcement. This proposition may sound ambitious but inspiration may be obtained from EuroJust and the Global Action on Cybercrime. Please can you tell me your hopes for the future of cybercrime prosecution in Mauritius? This is indeed a difficult question as it is inextricably linked to the success of international cooperation on cybercrime and electronic evidence. Mauritius is already engaged on the Global Action on Cybercrime project and European Union/Council of Europe joint initiative which encouraged enforcement agencies worldwide to engage in international cooperation to implement the provisions of the Budapest Convention. We make efficient use of the access to the 24/7 network Contact Points as envisaged under the Convention. It is an important network and hopefully will grow regionally as well. The biggest obstacle remains the time factor - how soon can the evidence be gathered. There are obviously issues relating to freedom of expression which enjoy varied degrees of tolerance in different jurisdictions and similarly in respect of the laws of privacy which is inexistent in some jurisdictions. One other aspect is the issue of dual criminality which is not always met by States. Page 13 December 2015 - Issue 54 SUMMARY OF SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS: November 2015 DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v JOTTEE D [2015] SCJ 395 By Hon. Mrs. A. Fui Cheong, Judge & Mr. O.B.Madhub, Judge Dying Declaration – Admissibility – Enquiry in the misbehavior of jury Grounds of Appeal – Additional Grounds of Appeal – Outside Delay The Appellant was charged with having on or about the 06th May 2006, criminally, willfully and with premeditation killed one Marie The Director of Public Prosecutions gave notice that he would move Greta Menes. He pleaded not guilty to the charge. On the 23rd of to add an additional ground of appeal, namely: November 2012, he was found guilty as charged by a jury by a “Because notwithstanding the case of DPP v/s Coureur, the learned Magistrate failed to appreciate that all the elements of the offence have been proved beyond reasonable doubts.” majority verdict of 8 to 1. He was sentenced to undergo 42 years of To the already existing two grounds of appeal which were lodged on grounds but at the hearing stage dropped several grounds and 23rd of May 2013. The motion was objected on the ground that the argued on the following grounds which are hereunder reproduced motion was made well outside the delay for appeal and no verbatim: exceptional circumstances, which would allow the court to exercise its discretion in favour of the Appellant was advanced. The Court referred to the case of P.Veeren v The State of Mauritius (2012 SCJ 14) in which case the Court had then serious reservations as to the circumstances in which an additional ground of appeal was being sought to be added and also with no valid reason given to explain why the additional ground of appeal was not raised within the statutory delay. Irrespective the Court in the case of P.Veeren v The State of Mauritius (2012 SCJ 14) exercised its discretion and exceptionally allowed same to be argued “considering the seriousness of the charge and the term of 34 years of penal servitude which was imposed.” In addition to the above, the Court relied on the cases of Labonne J M v The State [2011 SCJ 71] and Aulum v The State [2009 SCJ 46] and exercised their discretion in favour of the Appellant and allowed the additional ground of appeal to be argued. The Court further held the following: “In any event should the appeal succeed on the two grounds invoked, the question whether the offence had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, would arise.” CHARLES J.D.H v THE STATE [2015] SCJ 410 By Hon. Chief Justices Mr. K.P.Matadeen, Mr. C. Chan Kan Cheong, Judge & Mrs. G. Jugessur-Manna, Judge penal servitude. The Appellant appealed against his conviction on a number of “1. That the learned Judge was wrong to rule that the dying declaration is not unconstitutional. 4. That the learned Judge failed to direct the jury that the socalled dying declaration does not stand in law. 6. That the learned Judge was wrong in his directions to the jury inasmuch as he imported facts or possibilities which were not evidence adduced during the trial. 8. That the learned Judge having ruled that he has powers to inquire into the misbehaviour of the jury failed to hold a hearing to hear evidence on these issues.” The facts of the case are as follows: the appellant and the deceased were paramours and had been living together as husband and wife for about 13. They had two children from their relationship. Over time, their relationship had started to deteriorate. A few days before the incident, on 29 April 2006, following an argument, the deceased left the house and took the two children with her. She returned on a few occasions to collect her personal belongings. On 05 May 2006, she noticed that two flush doors were missing. She reported the matter to the police and accompanied them to her house. On the following day, on 06 May 2006, the deceased again went to her house in Solitude. When she entered the house, she saw the Page 14 appellant in the living room. He had a “balti” containing kerosene December 2015 - Issue 54 with him The latter splashed the kerosene all over her, lit a matchstick and set her ablaze .She started screaming and ran out of the house. The appellant ran after her and extinguished the fire. However, it was too late and the deceased was badly burnt. She was conveyed to SSRN hospital in the appellant’s van by a neighbour. Although the appellant’s left forearm got burnt, he did not accompany the deceased to the hospital. Instead, he proceeded for treatment to Chisty Shifa Clinic in Port Louis and then went to report the matter to the police station in company of his lawyer. Since the deceased had sustained second to third degree burns almost all over her body, she was transferred to Victoria Hospital in Candos, where she was admitted in the Intensive Care section of the Burns Unit. On the next day, that is, 07 May 2006, PS Jokhoo, in company of WPC Moorootia, met nursing officer Peerally at the Burns Unit and were authorised to meet with the deceased. The latter was awake and conscious. She informed PS Jokhoo that she had no hope of survival. She then related how the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set fire to her. After the recording of that statement, her state of health deteriorated until she passed away at the hospital on 13 May 2006. On the other hand, the appellant had given a number of statements to the police wherein he denied the charge. In a gist, he explained that his relationship with the deceased had started to deteriorate since the beginning of that year. He claimed that on the material day, the deceased already smelled of kerosene. Following an argument, she lit a match stick and set fire to herself. He immediately tried to extinguish the fire by covering her with a sheet and other articles of clothing. She ran out of the house and he covered her with an empty bag of cement, whereupon the fire was extinguished. When the formal charge was put to him, he maintained that the deceased had, following a dispute between them, set fire to herself. During the trial, the Appellant gave evidence under oath and maintained his version that is to the effect that the complainant committed suicide and denied having murdered her. Ground 1 challenges the learned Judge’s finding in law that the dying declaration was not unconstitutional. The Appellate Court held that they found no fault in the Learned Judge’s legal reasoning on the issue of constitutionality and thus Ground 1 failed because the Learned Judge was right to find that: (a) The right to cross examine under Section 10(2)(e) of the Constitution was not an absolute right – R v Davis [2008 UKHL 36]; Nembhard v The Queen [1979] Privy Council Appeal No.30) (b) The real question was whether having regard to all circumstances of the case the accused had benefited from a fair trial notwithstanding the non-availability of one or more witnesses for cross examination [Al Khawaja and Tahery v The United Kingdom (Grand Chamber Strasbourg 15 December 2011] (c) The dying declaration was admissible, subject to the overall fairness of the trial. As far as Ground 4 was concerned, the Appellate Court found that the ground was misconceived for the following two reasons: (1) more than 20 pages of the learned Judge’s summing up were devoted to the issue of dying declaration. (2) Secondly, it was not for the learned Judge to specifically direct the jury that the “dying declaration does not stand in law”. The learned Judge summarised the case for the prosecution and the case for the defence on this issue. He also set out all the legal requirements of a dying declaration and, ultimately, left it to the jury to decide, based on the facts and evidence before it, whether or not to accept the dying declaration. The Appellate Court was thus satisfied that the approach adopted and the directions given by the Learned Judge on the issue was comprehensive, clear and legally correct. Ground 6 failed because the Appellate Court could not conclude that the Learned Judge imported facts or possibilities which were not evidence adduced during the trial. The Court held that the Learned Judge in effect extensively set out the evidence and possibilities raised by both the Prosecution and the defence in a factual, analytical and objective manner. As far as ground 8 was concerned, the Learned Judges held that Page 15 there was no need for an enquiry to be held with regards to the misbehavior of the jury. The Appellate Court held that the Learned Judge rightly applied the test in relation to the issue of whether an enquiry is required as set out in the case of United States of America v Villar (United States Court of Appeal No 08 – 1154). Hence Ground 8 failed as well. The Appeal was thus dismissed. ROBERTS P W v THE STATE [2015] SCJ 413 By Hon. Mr. O.B.Madhub, Judge Dying Declaration – Admissibility – Enquiry in the misbehavior of jury December 2015 - Issue 54 The court however specifically referred to the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Jimmy Marthe [2013 SCJ 386a] in which it was held that consideration should be given to matters such as – the stage of the proceedings, the means of the applicant which could determine his capacity to organize his absconding; and the network from which the applicant might benefit. In that judgment, the Court also highlighted the constraints which a This is a bail application from a south African national who stood small island like Mauritius might have. charged with the offence of voluntary homicide of his girlfriend, one In the present matter, with regards to the issue of absconding the Lee-Ann Palmarozza. The trial stands fixed for hearing as from the Court held that the risks of the applicant absconding, the more so 14th of March 2016. that a formal charge had already been lodged against him and a The Respondent is objecting to the release on bail of the applicant trial date scheduled and the applicant being a person of on the following grounds: considerable means, could not be qualified as fanciful but real. (a) The applicant is likely to abscond and The Court took into consideration the following factors: (a) (b) There is a strong possibility he might interfere with the thespecificities of our island, (b) the seriousness of the charge, prosecution witnesses (c) the fact that he does not have any strong ties in Mauritius, (d) As regard the interference with prosecution witnesses, evidence was the alleged eagerness of the Applicant to return to South Africa on adduced to the effect that the alleged crime occurred at the IRS Villa the 2nd of January 2015, when he attempted to leave the island of the applicant, at Anahita Resort, Beau Champ, and from the even though he was only a witness, and (e) the fact that applicant’s information filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions, a number release can create public disquiet and create a lack of trust of the of witnesses cited therein are employees of the resort or reside within public in our justice system. the vicinity of the resort. Based on the above, the application was refused. On the issue of absconding, the respondent placed strong reliance on the fact that the applicant attempted to leave the country, on the 2nd January 2015, whilst he had given an undertaking that he would remain at the disposal of the police and stay within the territory, pending the completion of the inquiry. However, at that point in time when he gave this undertaking, he was interviewed as a witness and not yet considered a suspect. STATE v RAYAPEN J M [2015] SCJ 419 By Hon. A.Caunhye, Judge Attempt to possess dangerous drugs - Sentence The Accused is charged with an offence of attempting to possess dangerous drugs for the purpose of delivery in breach of sections 30(1)(f)(ii), 45(1) and 47(2) and 5(a)(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended by Section 12(b) of Act 30 of 2008. The Court referred to the general well settled principles governing the release of bail and referred to the following cases: Noordally v Attorney General [1986 MR 204]; Hurnam v The State [2006 UKPC Accused having pleaded guilty to the charge, I accordingly find accused guilty as charged. 49]; Maloupe v The District Magistrate [2000 MR 264] and On 23 July 2011 officers of the Anti-Drug and Smuggling Unit Deelchand v DPP [2005 SCJ 215]. (ADSU) had intercepted at SSR International Airport a Malgasy Page 16 December 2015 - Issue 54 National who had brought into Mauritius 350.4 grams of heroin. The police set up a controlled delivery exercise in Grand Bay which led to the arrest of the Accused. Accused was waiting in a car to take possession of a trolley bag which was to be handed over to him for the purpose of onward delivery. The trolley bag initially contained the 350.4 grams of heroin which had been imported into Mauritius but which had been replaced by dummy parcels for the purpose of the controlled delivery exercise. The averment of trafficking was dropped. With regards to the sentence, the mitigating factors which the Court considered to be relevant for the purpose of determining the sentence were as follows: (a) The personal circumstances and age of the accused. He has an old mother and a teenage daughter who are dependent on him, (b) His repentant attitude when he gave evidence under oath in Court (c) His plea of guilty which entitled him to a substantial “Les mensonges compromettent les droits de l’Homme, compromettent la démocratie et portent atteinte aux intérêts d’une nation et de son peuple. A ce titre les menteurs doivent être considérés comme des criminels.” Marc Roussel discount in sentence. Based on the above, and the fact that the accused has several previous convictions for drug offences, the Accused was sentenced to undergo 13 years of penal servitude. Page 17 HIGHLIGHTS of YEAR 2015 December 2015 - Issue 54 2 3 4 1. Visit of Mr David Perry QC for the 2nd Annual Memorial lecture at the ODPP 2, 3 & 4: Anti-Money laundering workshop by Mr. Eugene Cornville, AML Consultant at the UNODC 5 & 6: Training of Law Enforcement officers & Prosecutors on « Trafficking in Persons ». 7: Training of CDU officers 8: Session interactive avec le Prof. Romain Ollard Page 18 HIGHLIGHTS of YEAR 2015 December 2015 - Issue 54 9 9 & 10: Training on Legal Issues with the University of 3rd Age Mauritius 11 11 13 13: Youth leadership training programme at ODPP 14 12 11 & 12: one-day training workshop at Rajsoomer Lallah Lecture Hall 15 14 & 15: 5-day Training programme for Prosecutors and Enquiry Officers Page 19 HIGHLIGHTS of YEAR 2015 December 2015 - Issue 54 4 13th Heads of Prosecuting Agencies which was held in Mauritius from 11th to 15th April 2015 Page 20 December 2015 - Issue 54 Miss Anusha Rawoah Mr Ashley Victor Ms Zaynah Essop Mrs Pooja Autar-Callichurn Mr Yashvind Rawoah Miss Shaaheen Dawreeawoo Miss Jouana Genave Mr Ajmal Toofany Miss Toshika Bobeechurn
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