D.R.Congo: Presidential and Legislative Elections July

Transcription

D R CONGO:
PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
JULY - OCTOBER 2006
Report
by
Arild Stenberg
NORDEM Report 2/2007
Copyright: the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM and Arild Stenberg.
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programme of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main
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Preface
With the aim of observing the legislative elections in The Democratic Republic of
Congo on 31 July and on 29 October the European Union established an Election
Observation Mission (EUEOM). The head of mission was General Philippe Morillon,
France, member of the European parliament.
The mission was established in Kinshasa for the first round of elections on 9 June and
stayed in the country until the beginning of September. The mission was initially
designed to stay till the end of the compilation process was concluded. As this took more
time than expected, a decision was made on 15 August to extend the mission by two
weeks. All LTOs were offered to extend their contracts whereby eight LTOs stayed
behind.
The mission consisted of in total 36 Long Time Observers (LTOs), 66 Medium Time
Observers (MTOs - a new construction intended to follow the compilation process
specifically) and 170 Short Time Observers (STOs - observing the process on election
day and the counting). Norway contributed with 6 observers, two long term observers
(Anja Kaspersen and Arild Stenberg) and four short term observers (Maria Fuglevaag
Warsinski, Hilde Kjøstvedt, Odd Jenvin and Sophie Wauters). Kaspersen was deployed
in Kinshasa, Stenberg in the province of Nord-Kivu, responsible for the regions of Beni
and Butembo and the short term observers in Kisangani, Mbandaka, Lumbumbashi and
Goma.
For the second round in October, the mission counted the same number of LTOs and
MTOs. About 200 STOs participated in the mission this time. Two Norwegian LTOs
were deployed, one in the east (Arild Stenberg, Beni, North Kivu) and one in the west
(Tove Gravdal, Bandundu). Two of the Norwegian STOs came back for the second
round: Hilde Kjøstvedt (Boma, Bas-Congo) and Sophie Wauters (Lubumbashi, Katanga)
Around 1.200 polling stations were visited on both election days, covering all 11
provinces.
The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights / NORDEM
University of Oslo
March 2007
Contents
Preface
Contents
Map of Country
Introduction ............................................................................................................................1
Political background ..............................................................................................................3
The Legislative Framework...................................................................................................6
The electoral system ..........................................................................................................6
The Electoral Administration ................................................................................................7
Voter and Civic Education ....................................................................................................8
Voter Registration ..................................................................................................................8
Candidate registration ............................................................................................................9
The Election campaign ....................................................................................................... 10
The Media............................................................................................................................ 12
Personal Observations on the Polling Day ........................................................................ 13
Observation of the opening ............................................................................................ 23
Observation of the polling.............................................................................................. 23
Observation of the closing and counting ....................................................................... 24
The review of Complaints Process..................................................................................... 30
Conclusions and recommendations.................................................................................... 31
Appendices .......................................................................................................................... 33
Observing organisation’s statement/preliminary report................................................ 33
Déclaration préliminaire du 1er novembre 2006........................................................... 42
Map of Country
DR CONGO: PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS - 2006
1
Introduction
Up until now the “Democratic Republic of Congo” has been such in name only. With
these elections, the first in more than 40 years, the DR Congo, formerly Zaïre, is close to
ending the period of transition that has lasted since 2003.
After more than four decades of structural kleptocracy at all levels of the state, civil war,
degradation of state structures, and the destruction of the social and economic life, the
elections represent a possibility for the country to establish a new rule of law.
Since the setting up of the transitional government in 2003, the country has become
more and more stable, although low-level conflict has persisted in the Eastern parts of
the country, notably in Ituri, the Kivus and Katanga. These areas have been marked by
serious human rights violations, uncontrolled militia groups, and a complete lack of state
control as well as illicit military occupations and activities from neighbour countries.
On 25 April 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 (2006),
authorising the temporary deployment of an EU force to support the United Nations
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) during the period
encompassing the elections in the DR Congo.
The European Council approved the launching of the EU military operation code-named
EUFOR RD Congo. The mission was tasked with: supporting and providing security to
MONUC installations and personnel, contributing to airport protection in Kinshasa,
contributing to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,
and to execute evacuation operations in case of emergency.
The EUFOR, mandated by the European Council, thus has a separate mandate from the
EUEOM, which is mandated by the European Commission.
The electoral law promulgated on 9 March 2006 set the legal basis for the holding of the
election of a 500 member National Assembly. On 17 April the Independent Electoral
Commission (CEI) published a provisional list of candidates and on 30 April the final
list was made public. As prescribed in the electoral calendar, updated on 30 April, the
legislative and the presidential elections were held on 30 July 2006. On 29 October the
second round of the presidential elections were held, as well as the provincial elections.
The EUEOM, in their statement of 1 November, confirmed that the elections had been
held in calm and peaceful circumstances, in spite of some serious incidents, especially in
Ituri and the province of Equateur. Heavy rain in some parts of the country and logistical
weaknesses did not pull down the general impression that the population was willing and
eager to designate their representatives in democratic elections:
These elections bring forward a democratically elected president for the first time in
forty years. They also constitute the first step on the way to establish independent
institutions both on a national and a provincial level, and later the selection of senators
and provincial governors.
2
The judicial framework for the elections satisfies the fundamental standards for
democratic elections, in spite of flaws, particularly with regards to the financing of the
political parties and the organisation and independence of the power of justice.
The CEI showed their competence in organising complex elections in a country with
little or no infrastructure. The CEI was supported by important international
organisations, such as the Appui au processus electoral au Congo (APEC) and the
electoral division of the MONUC. The clarifications issued by the CEI in Kinshasa were
meant to amend the situation for the local CEIs, but the delays in publication had the
result that the presicions were applied differently in different parts of the country.
The pre-election period before the last round of elections was marked by a seemingly
non-existing election campaign. The presidential candidates were absent and the climate
was empoisoned. A large number of violent incidents made it difficult for the candidates
to pursue a campaign, particularly in those parts of the country where the opponent was
strong.
Although constantly retaining a fundamental scepticism against the rival camp, the two
opponents a little late signed an agreement, moved by the MONUC, pointing to the
importance of calmness, respect for the preparatory work of the CEI, and to the
guarantee of the constitutional rights of the future loser.
The major audiovisual media of the country concentrated exclusively on the presidential
candidates, and did not hesitate to transmit messages of hate and violence in their effort
to support their own candidate. Despite of their status as a national broadcaster, the
RTNC systematically violated their obligation of equal access to the media for both
candidates. The equal covering of the Radio Okapi (supported by MONUC) and a
number of independent community radios contributed however to a more equal
situation.
The High authority of the medias (HAM) gradually managed to show strength and a
certain equality towards violations from private radio stations. Towards the RTNC they
rested very timid.
On election day, the EUEOM noted distinct improvements in the organisation of the
elections from the first round to the second, particularly as regards the electoral agents’
management of voting procedures and the counting process. Due to better planning, the
collection of the election material after the election went smoother.
Some EU observers noted, however, unequal application of CEI regulations, surely
caused by the late publication of these decisions. This was particularly visible in the
question of special electoral lists, which opened up the possibilities of voting for people
who did not have their name on the ordinary electoral list.
The presence of observers and party witnesses in the compilation centres in the weeks
after election day was crucial for the transparency of the process.
This LTO’s observations correspond with the general observations made by the EOM as
presented in their preliminary statement.
3
Political background
In December 2002, in Pretoria, 350 delegates representing the government, ex-rebels, the
political opposition and the civil society, adopted the Global and Inclusive Accord
(AGI). The transitional constitution was adopted in April 2003. These two texts draw the
lines of a political transition process that would lead to general elections in 2005. Four
vice presidents were appointed: Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Movement du Libération du
Congo (MLC), Azarias Ruberwa from Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
(RCD), Abdulaye Yerodia (Parti Présidentiel) and Z’ahadi Ngoma (Political opposition).
Together with the president, Joseph Kabila, who had risen to the Presidency on 26
January 2001 after the assassination of his father, they formed the “presidential space”
(Espace Présidentiel).
For many reasons the elections were postponed until 30 July 2006. The negotiations
concerning the new constitution lasted several months before it was voted in the
parliament in May 2005. The international community involved itself heavily in the
preparations of the text, along with the principal Congolese parties, except the Union
pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) of Mr. Etienne Tshisekedi. The final
text supposes a unitary, but highly decentralized state, where the provinces will be in
possession of significant autonomy. It also supposes a semi-presidential equability,
where the president, who is elected by absolute majority in a direct universal election,
appoints the prime minister from within the parliamentary majority, but remains
responsible before the parliament. This constitution formed the fundament for the
parliamentary and presidential elections in RD Congo in July 2006.
The political parties immediately started to position themselves before the elections.
UDPS is worth mentioning in particular, since its behaviour and attitude played an
important role in the process. Although it did sign the peace treaty in Pretoria in
December 2002, Mr. Tshisekedi’s party very actively represented a radical opposition
against the election process. It did not involve itself in the transition institutions that were
established later, primarily because they regarded the postponement of the elections as
illegal. They were against the extension of the mandate of the transition institutions and
wanted new negotiations so that the former rebels and criminals who were now in
position, could be replaced. Now, they accused the authorities of organizing the elections
in a way that would be favorable to those already in power. They could be right: it is not
easy to gain influence without being represented in any transitional institutions. On the
other side, with serious internal discords between different fractions, the party might not
yet be ready for an election. Anyway, UDPS exploited efficiently the delays in the
preparations for the elections, and when the president of the Independent Election
Committee (CEI), Mr. Apollinaire Malumalu, in January 2005 recognized that the
elections had to be postponed, the UDPS profited by the occasion and paralyzed the
capital, where at least four persons died after a demonstration against a possible delay of
the elections.
This forced MONUC and the CEI to intensify the preparations for the elections, and
when on the 30 June 2006 the UDPS tried once more to paralyze the capital by
demonstrations, they did not succeed. The appeal for a “dead” city with closed shops
was not followed by the population, leaving the party outside the election process. Their
last demand of being accepted as candidates after the closing date finally failed, and they
4
remained outside and lost much of their influence.
After the success of the referendum on the constitution in December 2005 with a high
turnout, it was clear that the establishment of new, democratically elected institution
would represent a major challenge to all the political actors. Most of them would be sure
to fall from positions given to them in the transition process. As elections came closer,
the tension was more and more noticeable.
The general political climate degraded, with a growing number of acts of intimidation
towards candidates opposed to President Kabila. The arrest of Kuthino Fernando, a
protestant preacher, on 14 May 2006 was the first of a series of actions seemingly taken
to limit the freedom of speech for the opposition. On 23 May, 32 security agents of
Oscar Kashala, presidential candidate; were arrested, and on the same day the houses of
several other candidates were surrounded by the security forces and threatened. On 10
June, Oscar Kashala’s consultant lawyer, Maitre Mukadi Bonyi, was arrested for illegal
possession of arms and sent to Belgium one week later.
With all the obstacles several candidates were exposed to, and the casual arrests that
occurred, a large number of presidential candidates of different backgrounds started to
talk about “a reopening of negotiations”, a slogan often used by UDPS. The repetition of
the words of the now out-of-competition party constitutes the common factor among the
opposition candidates in this pre-electoral phase. The call for renewed negotiations was
not so much a support of the UDPS struggle to get back in the ranks of the participants,
as a feeling that the integrity of the electoral process was at stake, considering the alleged
discredit of the transition institutions.
After the auto-exclusion of Ethienne Tshisekedi, large groups of voters also felt deprived
of a legitimate means of expression. The militant members of UDPS threatened to
destabilize the election process by illegal means, as opposed to the UDPS of former
days, which used to be non-violent.
Two aspects characterized the pre-election campaign against Joseph Kabila: the question
of being Congolese, and the support that the President received from the international
society. Jean-Pierre Bemba was one candidate who particularly questioned the fact that
Joseph Kabila was really Congolese, alluding to the rumors that he was of Rwandan tutsi
origin. More important were perhaps the opposition’s accusations that both the MONUC
and the EUFOR were brought in to assure the safe election of the ostensibly preferred
candidate of the international community: President Joseph Kabila.1
The major political parties
Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD) was created in the
beginning of 2002 to give support to Joseph Kabila after the assassination of his father.
PPRD stands out as a powerful party, particularly strong in Katanga, in the surroundings
1
These allegations were repeated by journalists in meetings with EU observers. The
response was clear: The EU EOM is totally independent and does not take instructions
from any body in the EU system.
5
of Kinshasa, in Maniema and in the Kivus. The president wanted to present himself as an
independent candidate, supported by several political parties. Before the second round of
the presidential elections these parties united under the banner of the “Alliance for the
Presidential Majority” (AMP). The circle around Kabila is also known as the
“presidential movement.”
Movement du Libération du Congo (MLC) was formed as a political-military
movement in 1999, under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Bemba, with the support of
Olivier Kamitatu, president of the National Assembly at the time. The party has its
strength in Equateur, the leader’s home province, and in Kinshasa. Kamitatu has later
left the party, and joined another candidate, Mr. Mbusa Nyamwisi (RCD K-ML).
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma) has its origin in the
Rwanda-supported rebellion group of the same name. Like so many other groups of this
kind it has kept its military construction. It has its roots in the East of DR Congo, and
although it has enlarged its area of influence little by little, South Kivu is still the
stronghold. Their leader, Azarias Ruberwa, was one of the four vice-presidents, who all
knew beforehand that they were in great danger of losing their positions after the
elections, which is just what happened.
Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) with its leader Ethienne
Tshisekedi was by far the most important opposition party before the first round of
elections. However, inner dissent weakened the party, with three different rivals who all
claimed to represent UDPS. They ranged from a moderate aisle to a more radical wing.
The opposition counted other important parties, such as Antoine Gizenga’s Partie
Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU). With his eighty years, Gizenga is highly respected as the
last of the independence heroes. He has much support in his native region of Bandundu
and in certain quarters of Kinshasa. On several occasions PALU allied itself with UDPS
without sharing their most radical positions.
Union Pour la Reconstrucion du Congo (UREC) presented a newcomer on the
political scene: Oscar Kashala, a medical practitioner who recently returned from the
USA to take part in the elections as a candidate for the presidential elections. He is born
in Katanga and had some support there, as well as in Kinshasa.
Coalition des démocrats congolais (CODECO) is the party of Pierre Pay Pay, former
governor of the Central Bank of Zaïre and minister of Economy and Finance with
Mobutu. He is well known and respected in international finance circles.
Union des démocrats mobutistes (UDEMO) had Nzanga Mobutu as their candidate for
president. He is the son of the old president, 35 years of age, and has his education from
Montréal and Paris.
33 candidates for the presidency were accepted: 15 from political parties, 6 independent
ones, and 12 presented by a group of parties. 4 women were among the candidates.
The most important candidates were the ones who were known in all DR Congo. The
president in power, Joseph Kabila, was evidently among the most renowned, along with
some of the vice-presidents: Jean-Pierre Bemba and Azarias Ruberwa. The veteran
6
Antoine Gizenga had to be reckoned among the important candidates, and also the
richest candidate: Pierre Pay-Pay.
As the elections campaign proceeded, nobody was surprised that Kabila and Bemba
ended up as the two candidates with the most votes in the first round. The presidential
camp had hoped to bring the victory home in the first round, but Kabila did not pass the
50 % limit, so the two candidates Kabila and Bemba went on to the second round.
The Legislative Framework
The constitution of the IIIème République, approved by referendum in December 2005,
made up the foundation of the legal framework for the elections in 2006. The elections
are regulated by the following laws and decisions:
•
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•
•
•
•
The Constitution of the Third Republic
The Election Code (9 March 2006)
The Organization of the Independent Electoral Commission, CEI (5 June 2004)
The Organization of the Political Parties (15 March 2004)
The Law on Congolese Nationality (12 November 2004)
The Law on identification and registration of electors 24 December 2004)
Decision of 9 March 2006 on the organisation of the elections (made by the CEI)
The electoral system
The president is elected in a direct universal election for a period of five years, in a tworound system. The second round is conducted between the two top candidates (majority
runoff), if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first round. There is only one
constituency, which covers the whole territory of the republic.
After long discussions the Transitory Parliament developed a system which combined a
majority uninominal election in 61 one-seat constituencies and a proportional election
with open lists in the remaining 108 constituencies.
Seats in the National Assembly distributed by province:
Province
Voters
Seats
Ville de Kinshasa
2 963 912
58
Bas-Congo
1 232 416
24
Bandundu
2 949 237
57
Equateur
2 957 937
58
Orientale
3 257 291
63
Nord-Kivu
2 462 012
48
Sud-Kivu
1 666 615
32
Maniema
629 894
12
Katanga
3 517 922
69
Kasai Oriental
2 021 418
39
Kasai Occidental
2 038 310
40
Total:
25 696 964
500
7
The Electoral Administration
The constitution and the electoral law gave the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI)
an essential role to play in order to guarantee and control the impartiality and the
neutrality of the organization of elections in line with international standards and
national legislation. The CEI faced serious logistic challenges in order to establish the
necessary operational structures in front of the elections. Also, the assistance of the
international society in the election process, as prescribed in the Global and Inclusive
Agreement, contributed to the establishment of a complex electoral structure.
The CEI was given the task to organize, freely and independently, all operations needed
for the referendum and the presidential, legislative, provincial and communal elections.
Having the full responsibility for the electoral process, it was in charge of:
•
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•
•
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Identification and enrolment of voters
Establishment of voter lists
Establishment of candidates’ lists
Organisation of the ballot
The counting and the compilation
The publication of the provisional results
It was also imperative that it was financially independent and that its members benefit
from legal immunity. They had their own budget, financed from abroad, with UN and
EU as main contributors. The legal immunity is in theory only, but the members of the
CEI showed courage and strength when needed, especially in driving the process
forward after the incidents on 20 August, when shooting in the vincinity of the CEI
results centre erupted just before the announcements of the results from the first round
(see also under Election Campaign). The general conclusion is that the CEI played a
crucial role in the elections.
On a national level, the CEI consisted of the plenary assembly, presided by the leader,
Mr. Apollinaire Malumalu. The members were appointed politically by the main
participants in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue: the ex-government of Kinshasa, MLC,
RCD, the non-armed opposition and representatives of the civil society. Their decisions
were normally made by consensus. The office took care of the administration. It had
eight members, each one leading a special commission:
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Civil and electoral education
Inscription of voters and candidates
Operation logistics
Electoral training
Legal affairs and complaints
The progress of the elections and the collection of results
Information, communication and PR.
In each province there was one Bureau de Représentation Provinciale (BRP) with eight
members and on the local level 5-8 Bureau de Liaison (BL), each counting five
members.
8
The CEI benefited considerably from the technical, financial and logistical support from
the international society, especially from the EU, canalized through the APEC (Appui au
Processus Electoral au Congo) with the aid of the Electoral Division of the MONUC.
Every CEI unit in all levels had a corresponding MONUC unit, the two collaborating
completely integrated.2
Voter and Civic Education
It was the responsibility of the CEI to generalize the electoral law and make it known to
the electors. In a country with a high portion of illiteracy and with several local
languages (Lingala, Kikongo, Tshiluba and Swahili), this is essential when the people is
asked to express itself.
The CEI and the UNDP/APEC have collaborated closely in this respect, without really
succeeding. Several projects have been proposed, some have been successful, most have
stranded for lack of money.
The most efficient civic education is a result of the initiative taken by the church, both
the protestant and the catholic. Clergymen have repeatedly and systematically informed
the voters on how to vote, when to vote and often who to vote for. To the observers’
knowledge, names of candidates to vote for were never mentioned, but generally
formulated as recommendations to vote for the candidate who could bring peace to the
area. This again corresponded with one of the slogans of the president in power.
Despite the efforts of organizations from the civil society and the important role of the
church in order to inform the electors, the total impact of the voter and civic education
was very limited.
Voter Registration
The establishment of voter lists constituted a major challenge in this war-torn country,
where the number of internally displaced persons and refugees is very high. The
operation was extra difficult in the region of the Great Lakes, where migration is
common and the real frontiers vague.
The right to vote is attached to the Congolese nationality. The question of nationality is
regulated in the law of 12 November 2004 and the one of 24 December 2004. The
Congolese citizenship is unique and exclusive, i.e. double citizenship is not accepted.
Citizenship is given to persons belonging to an ethnic group which was situated in the
territory that was a part of DRC in 1960. This decision caused much dissatisfaction,
2
Loi portant Organisation, attributions et fonctionnement de la CEI, No 04/009 du 5 juin
2004.
9
especially in the East, where large groups of people enjoyed a double citizenship and
were even considered foreigners by the rest of the population.
All Congolese nationals, aged 18 or more, have the right to vote, exception made for the
police and the soldiers, who were not allowed to vote. People were asked to present
themselves at the enrolment centre closest to their place of residence, where they were
registered and had their photo taken. Later they received an elector card, which was to be
shown on all elections and which also served as an identification card.
The enrolment process started in Kinshasa in June 2005. For several reasons the process
was considerably delayed in other parts of the country. The operations were supposed to
be achieved by 30 September 2005, but in Equateur and in Bandundu it only started on
25 September, certain centres did not open until November.
In South Kivu, special centres were opened for refugees residing in Tanzania, and also
for displaced persons in Ituri, in North Kivu and in Katanga.
The feeble impact of voter education was not noticeable in this phase of the election
process. The perspective of receiving an elector card which could also be used as an
identification card, made it so attractive that people came to the enrolment centres in
large numbers. The voter registration was a success; more than 25 million voters were
registered.
Candidate registration
This phase of the electoral process took place from 10 to 23 March 2006 for the
presidential election, and was extended until 2 April for the legislative election. The
candidates’ conditions were such:
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Congolese nationality
Enjoy civil and political rights
The right to vote
Of age: 30 years for the presidential and for the senatorials, 25 for the legislatives
and the provincials
For candidates representing a political party, the party must be on the list of
approved parties.
All candidates had to pay a deposit before their candidacy was accepted: 50 000 USD for
the presidential candidacy, 250 USD for the others.3 Considering the relatively large sum
of money each candidate had to present in order to be accepted as a candidate, the
number of candidates is rather high, especially since the majority of them did not have a
nationwide basis for their candidacy. Given the lack of transparency in the financing of
3
Loi relative à l’identification et enrôlement des électeurs, No 04/028 du 24 décembre
2004.
10
the parties and the candidates’ campaigns, it is not easy to tell where all this money came
from, but the registration fee did not seem to limit the number of presidential candidates.
Anyhow, none of the observers heard any complaints on this issue. However, one cannot
exclude that such a large amount effectively stopped candidates from running for the
presidency.
The incumbent Joseph Kabila chose to run as an independent candidate. A complaint
was handed in on his candidacy; he was reproached for not having renounced his
military status. The complaint was rejected after it had been established that he had
signed a decree that accepted the voluntary demission from the post as general of the
armed forces.
The total number of candidates for the legislatives was 9 707.
The Election campaign
The election campaign was set to take place in the period between 29 June – 28 July4 .
Some days before the official start of the election campaign, the president made a round
trip to the east of the country in the capacity of the country’s leader. The final meeting on
the question of renewed “negotiations” being scheduled for that period, his absence
abruptly ended the question of “negotiations”. As those discussions also included the
aspect of candidate security as well as a common code of conduct for the campaign,
these questions remained unsolved. The “negotiations” supporters found themselves in a
dilemma; whether to go on with the campaign or to freeze all activities. On 30 June 19
candidates, among them three vice presidents (Bemba, Ruberwa and Z’ahidi Ngoma)
published a common declaration, stating that they would continue their campaign only
on condition that the CEI clarify the most disputed questions: the existence of more than
5 million redundant ballot papers, the alleged enrolment of a large number of foreigners,
the supposed removal of the CEI “central server” to a European country, and finally the
accusation that voter lists had not been made public. These protests were put forward for
one reason: to point the finger to an alleged lack of transparency in the electoral
administration, but it cannot be excluded that some candidates would use this occasion to
prepare later contests of the electoral process and the final result.
The early days of the campaign elapsed without major incidents. Remarkably few acts of
violence were reported, considering the large number of arms and armed groups in the
country. As the campaign period proceeded, however, the political climate aggravated
rapidly, well illustrated by the RFI correspondent being expelled without reason on 3
July5, and, more serious, the assassination of a journalist from the oppositional
newspaper Le Phare, Bapuwa Mwamba, on 7 July, and the illegal prohibition of a
demonstration in Kinshasa on 11 July, which was brutally repelled by the national
police.
4
Décision No 003/CEI/BUR/06 du 9 mars 2006 portant organisation des élections
5
http://www.rfi.fr/francais/actu/articles/079/article_44831.asp
11
The campaign was marked by an obvious disproportion of means at the candidates’
disposal. The absence of regulations in the electoral law on the financing of the parties
and the candidates, and the lack of insight in the parties’ budgets and control with their
expenses, made way for a completely unequal competition. Electoral posters, access to
the media, and airborne transportation of candidates to all parts of the country clearly
show how the three candidates belonging to the presidential circle: Kabila, Bemba, and
to some smaller extent, Azarias Ruberwa, had money to spend, and did so, in a way that
could not be unnoticed by anyone.
The difference of means was aggravated by the use of state resources by the same
candidates, and the badgering by the public administration and the police of those
candidates who were opposed to Joseph Kabila. The consequences of these actions were
easy to see: limited movement for candidates, difficulties in organizing rallies, problems
in distribution of campaign material.
This inequality of access to the public was particularly noticeable in the rural areas
where the lack of infrastructure made distribution and information difficult.
Consequently, the electoral campaign was run on two levels: one which reached the
whole electorate both in rural and urban areas, dominated by the efficient campaign
machines of Kabila’s AMP (Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle) and of Bemba’s
MLC, and one which only reached voters in the big cities.
Finally, the differences regarding the security situation completed the inequality. The
candidates close to the presidency, Kabila and Bemba, profited by the support from their
own private armies, that had never been mixed like other private armies that had been
integrated with neutral elements, thus reducing the loyalty and strong affiliation these
armed groups used to have to their employer. Other candidates had to rely on the
protection of private security agencies or the limited support that the UPI (Unité de
Police Integrée) could give them.
In the absence of any ideological differences between the candidates, the campaign more
and more tended to concentrate on the question of exclusion: President Kabila was
presented as a foreigner who was supported by a western conspiracy. There were also
cases of people being presented as “non originals”, people from Katanga and Bas Congo
were accused of being fifth columnists, belonging to the enemy. Such statements of hate
were often the origin of serious incidents in the campaign. In Ruthuru (North Kivu) four
persons were killed by unidentified aggressors during a meeting organized by an
independent candidate. Ten days later, on 27 July, in Kinshasa, six people were killed in
a clash between police and soldiers during a demonstration for Jean-Pierre Bemba. One
security agent of Azarias Ruberwa was killed under dim circumstances on 28 July.
In the provinces of the two Kasais, Bandundu and Equateur, the population’s refusal to
welcome the candidates from the presidential movement provoked much friction and
denials of other candidates to campaign. The destruction of polling material en route to
170 polling stations in Mbuji Mayi on 29 July, and the arson of 40 stations in Mweka
(Kasai Occidental) on the day of the election, where two persons were killed, constitute
the most serious breaches of the civil rights during the electoral campaign.
Just before the announced publication of the results from the first round, on 20 August, a
serious incident took place in Kinshasa. Late afternoon this day, several rounds of
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automatic gun shots were heard from the Forescom roundabout, not far from the
MONUC centre. The shooting became heavier and moved towards the MLC headquarter
and the TV chain CCTV (Bemba). It lasted more than two hours, during which the
gunmen moved along the axe that separated the MLC office and the CEI results centre.
This incident, which caused the death of at least five persons, was the main reason for
the delay of the publication of the results.
The fighting was taken up again the next day towards 3 PM, when Kabila’s men
plundered the surroundings of Bemba’s residence. Clashes between the forces from the
two remaining candidates were accompanied by artillery fire, making the western part of
the capital a war zone of the city guerrilla.
The August incident was much discussed afterwards and interpreted in different ways by
the two opponent camps. No matter who started it and what intentions they had, the
presence of the MONUC forces and the determined action shown on this occation made
an end to the previously claimed allegations from the opposition that the MONUC forces
were deployed in order to secure the re-election of Kabila.
This incident led to an increase in tension before the second round. Two distinctive
camps became visible: The presidential alliance AMP (Alliance pour la Majorité
Présidentielle) and the national union UPN (Union Pour la Nation). Out-of-competition
candidates were approached by representatives of the two alliances and irresistible offers
were posed. Candidate no. three in the first round, Antoine Gizenga, agreed to join the
AMP. In doing so, he advised his electors to vote for Kabila in the second round. The
Kabila camp offered him the post as prime minister after the elections.
The Media
The media situation in DRC is best characterized by a great diversity and a liberal tone.
However, a handful of candidates monopolized the access to the media during the
campaign. Most of the press organs observed, private as well as public, clearly gave
advantages to certain candidates, without paying heed to the decisions of the HAM
(High Authority of the Media). Despite the effort of the HAM to guarantee equal access
to the media, the inequality between the candidates was obvious.There was a big
difference in media coverage for the candidates from the “presidential space” and the
others, the first ones benefited greatly from the access to media, whereas the latter did
not. The Radio Television Nationale Congolaise (RTNC) did not fill its role as a national
source of information for the public, as long as 75 % of its time was reserved for the
incumbent candidate Kabila. The members of the “presidential space” obviously
disposed of means far beyond those of their rivals.
The written press in general covered the election campaign with relatively equal access
for the candidates, except for one paper which gave Joseph Kabila 73 % of its columns.
The radio is the most wide-spread media in DRC. There is a variety of radio stations, and
they very often gave time to their preferred candidates.
The television was the media the presidential candidates seemed to concentrate on. The
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private TV stations gave room for those candidates who had most money to spend. The
candidates who had their own TV stations, like Kabila (Digital Congo) and Bemba
(CCTV and CKTV) gave themselves continuous commercial spots on the screen. On the
other hand, these candidates chose not to be present in the television debates organized
by the HAM.
In order to assure an equal access to the media, the HAM requested to have transferred
the 4 million dollars equal to the sum that the candidates had to pay as security for their
inscription. This was not granted, and the feeble economic situation made it difficult to
fulfil the task given to the HAM. Despite the weakness in the beginning of the campaign,
the HAM did suspend six TV stations on 17 July. Finally, only three stations respected
the 24 hour suspension.
Numerous attacks on the press freedom were revealed during the election campaign. The
most serious was the assassination of Bapuwa Mwamba, an independent journalist, and
the expulsion of the RFI correspondent Ghislaine Dupont.
Personal Observations on the Polling Day
First round
Anja Kaspersen, Kinshasa
Opening
St. Luc à Ngaliema, Avenue Nguma
Opening somewhat uninspired and late
Presence of party witnesses and national observers
Campaign material close to the polling station
Closure and counting
CPS Lingwala (1064), Croissement avenue Kabinda et Huileries, (2CV – 12 BV)
One electoral list was added on voting day.
Some errors were found on procedure and understanding. Too much room was given to
the party witnesses, who in fact acted as assistants for the personnel in the polling
station.
On the whole a positive impression, it all comes down to mistakes and not fraud.
The duration and the difficulties, the multitude of documents to fill in as well as the
difficult working conditions made the counting a tiresome and demoralizing process.
The wish to finish the work as fast as possible may have had a negative effect on the
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quality of the final result lists.
It needs to be added that nothing had been done to prepare the reception of the material,
and when this was finally done by the UN, it was done without much attention to the
need for the necessary transparency in the process.
The UN soldiers who had received orders to bring back the material had to do this
according to the UN regulations, i.e. no civilian was allowed to go on a UN vehicle. In
some cases, this led to a situation where the responsible election personnel was separated
from the material they were supposed to watch.
Another observation needs to be mentioned: the sudden reopening of the liaison offices
(BL), renamed as relays offices (BR), just to serve as a temporary storehouse for the
material on its way to the CLCR. However, nothing had been done to prepare the
reception of this enormous quantity of material which kept coming in continuously to the
BR, while no instructions were given from the CEI. Finally, the UN lorries managed to
get all the material in its right place within a week.
General conclusions
The most remarkable fact is the feeling of total improvisation until the end of the voting.
Nothing was prepared for the counting teams, nothing for the return transport, and
nothing for the storage of the material in the CLCR.
The reopening of the storehouses by the MONUC and the haphazard transportation
illustrates the substantial improvement that the CEI needs to organize in order to
improve and give credibility to future elections.
Hilde Kjøstvedt, Mbandaka, Equateur
Observation of the opening
The team arrived at the polling station at 0530 hrs. At that time, about 40 persons were
present outside and inside the polling station. The majority was witnesses from political
parties and/or candidates, national observers, police officers or polling station personnel.
They were all easily identifiable by uniforms or badges. The president of the polling
station said she would not allow more than ten observers and witnesses inside the polling
station at the same time.
The building housing the polling station was covered by walls on the two short sides
only, making it possible to observe what was going on inside the polling station from the
outside. The four polling booths were turned towards the solid short wall, ensuring
secrecy for the voters in the best possible way. The polling station itself occupied only
one third of the space of the building, and was separated from the rest only by a 1 m high
wall. The voters waited outside the building, but the others were moving around inside
the building. The team found it hard to judge whether witnesses and observers were
actually “inside” or “outside” the polling station.
The president of the polling station went through the opening procedures in public at
about 0615 hrs. She held up the empty ballot boxes and the two different voting lists.
15
There was no list of registered voters posted outside the polling station. The team
observed that the president was filling in the protocol of the opening. She confirmed that
she had received the exact number of ballots, but also said she had not counted them.
Observations of the polling:
Opening and closure excepted, the team observed six polling stations throughout the day.
One of the voting centres had not yet opened at 0800 hrs. It consisted of five tents,
which, according to the chief of the centre had not arrived until 2000 hrs the previous
day and had to be set up on the morning of the election day. Approximately 150 voters
were queuing to vote.
Two of the voting centres allocated to the team turned out to be situated on the other side
of the river and thus inaccessible. Since there was ample time, the team decided to
observe two polling stations at the same voting centre. One voting centre had been
moved since the voter registration and referendum took place. Voters that the team spoke
to had not been informed about this.
None of the polling stations had lists of candidates with names and pictures posted
outside. All of the polling stations had lists of erased voters, but only one of them had
erased those names from their voters’ list as well. One polling station had as many as 64
erased voters, none of which were erased from the voters’ list.
The personnel, observers, witnesses and police officers at the various polling stations
were predominantly male. A chief at one voting centre complained that the personnel he
had picked as a crew for the polling stations in his centre had later been replaced by the
Independent Election Committee (CEI). The chief said the personnel he had picked had
all been teachers, but according to him, the CEI had said they were not qualified.
In general, the polling station personnel appeared to be well aware of their role, the rules
and the procedures of the polling. In some polling stations, there were more than ten
observers and witnesses. The polling station presidents appeared to be aware that this
exceeded the legal limits, but also said that they did not object because more witnesses
secured more transparency, and none of the witnesses tried to interfere with the
procedures.
In one polling station, the team observed that the personnel invariably called the same
witness to help illiterate voters. After a while, one of the local observers protested, and
the personnel started picking other witnesses to assist them. At one time only did the
team observe two persons – husband and wife – voting together inside the same polling
booth. The personnel were aware of the fact, but did not interfere.
At around midday, a police officer at one polling station informed the team that there
were problems outside the CEI offices. Passing it, the team observed approximately 400
persons outside the CEI. The building was surrounded by ten to twelve police officers in
riot gear, armed with batons. The team was told by several persons that the people were
migrant workers who had registered to vote in another circumscription and had not been
allowed to vote in the city of Mbandaka. They had gathered to protest at the CEI.
Observation of the closing and counting:
16
The team arrived at the polling station at 1645 hrs. The chief of the voting centre
addressed the polling station personnel, saying they should close at 1700 hrs sharp, no
matter what the observers and witnesses said. The team was told that the polling station
had opened at 0600 hrs. There were no voters waiting to vote, and the polling station
closed as scheduled.
In addition to the team, 23 observers were present. One of them represented the African
Union, the rest were witnesses (11) and local observers. The president and vice president
of the polling station conducted the counting, starting with the presidential election. No
one verified if the number of ballots cast corresponded to the number of persons that had
voted. During the counting, no differentiation was made between invalid and void
ballots. As it grew darker, it became difficult to make out the marks on the ballots, and
observers and witnesses often complained that they were not able to see and verify the
marks. As the counting wore on, fewer and fewer complaints were made.
At approximately 1950 hrs, the team heard four volleys of machine gun fire coming
from the direction of the CEI office. The long term observers were notified, and shortly
thereafter, the team was evacuated to the UN base. The team did not return to the polling
station that day. The shooting was connected with the incident that the team had
observed earlier outside the CEI office.
Observation of the tabulation, 31 July
The team returned to the polling station where they had observed the closing and
counting the day before at approximately 1200 hrs. The result of both the presidential
and the legislative elections were posted on the wall outside the polling station. Inside,
the team met the president and the vice president, who were the only persons left. They
were filling in the protocols for both elections. All the forms were already signed by
witnesses and observers. The team was told that all the witnesses and the other
employees had left at approximately 0900 hrs, when the counting of the legislative votes
had been concluded. The president and the vice president said they had not slept or eaten
since the elections began the previous day.
Odd Jenvin, Lubumbashi, Katanga
The team observed the opening of the presidential and legislative elections at the polling
station École Primaire Mimbulu in the village of Mimbulu in the constituency of Kipushi
in the Kipushi territory.
During the elections the team visited a total of 5 polling stations in Kipushi, a town of
approximately 30.000 inhabitants situated only a few hundred meters from the Zambian
border.
Because of the security situation in the area the team returned to Lubumbashi in the
evening. The team observed the closing and counting of votes at the Polling station CS
Fleuve d’Eau Vive in Annexe commune in the constituency of Lubumbashi town.
The team arrived at the polling station EP Mimbulu at 05.50. EP Mimbulu was a Centre
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de Vote consisting of 4 Bureaux de Vote (A to D) with a total of 2274 registered voters.
The team observed the opening of Bureau de Vote D with 474 registered voters.
At the time of arrival the team observed around 15 voters waiting for the polling station
to open. The 5 members of the Bureaux de Vote D were all present (The President, the
two Assesseures, the Secretary and the Assesseur suppléant).
There was a great deal of uncertainty among the 5 members regarding the voting
procedures. This included how the voters should be registered in the electoral list, the
proceedings regarding the presidential election and the legislative elections, the use of
the technical equipment (how to assemble the ballot box), as well as the positioning of
the booths.
Police was present but not very visible during the time the team visited this polling
station.
There were no witnesses or national observers present in Bureau de Vote D at this time.
The opening was scheduled to 06.00 but was delayed to 07.15. At the opening there
were around 50 voters lining up at the entrance.
Observation of the polling
The team visited 5 Centres de Vote in Kipushi during election day: École Mwanga,
Institut Imani, École Amsini and the 2 Centres de Vote at École Mixte O.U.A.
The team visited one Bureau de Vote in each of the 5 Centres de Vote. No episodes of
intimidation were observed. Some observations were universal:
In all Bureaux de Vote that the team visited there were more than 6 witnesses and
observers present.
None of the Bureaux de Vote had lists and photos of candidates. And none had the
electoral list posted at the entrance.
Police was present at all Centres de vote but was not very visible. No armed persons
observed inside or nearby the polling stations.
The elections took place very peacefully. All voters that the team talked to expressed
enthusiasm about the elections.
Observation of the closing and counting
The team observed the closing and counting at Bureau de Vote B at the Centre de Vote
CS Fleuve d’Eau Vive in the Annexe commune in Lubumbashi town constituency.
The polling station closed at 17.00. There were no voters in line at the time of the
closing. Therefore, no voters were appointed witnesses to the counting as stated in the
formal counting procedures.
The President, the two Assesseures, the Secretary and the Assesseur suppléant were
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present. There were 5 witnesses from the political parties and 5 observers including the
EU team present at the start of the counting.
With the exception that no distinction was made between blank and void votes, the team
observed no serious irregularities in the counting of the presidential votes. However,
after the counting of legislative votes, a discrepancy between the number of presidential
votes (425) and legislative votes (424) was discovered.
Two MONUC soldiers entered the Bureau de Vote B unannounced at around 01.00.
Both were in uniforms but unarmed as far as the team could observe. The two soldiers
remained for about 5-10 minutes and took several photos of the witnesses, national
observers and the 5 members of the polling station. There were no verbal protests against
the presence of the MONUC soldiers, but some of the witnesses and national observers
expressed discomfort with the presence of the MONUC soldiers.
Shortly after the two MONUC soldiers had left, a MONUC officer entered the Bureau
de Vote B asking the president to provide the results of the counting of the presidential
votes. The MONUC officer was given the results and left the polling station after a few
minutes.
The team left the polling station at 03.45. The counting of the legislative votes was then
finished and the president had called for a one-hour break. The team returned to the
polling station at 10.00 to find that the compilation of the votes was concluded and that
the president was preparing the final results of the elections to be posted outside of the
Bureau de Vote B.
Sophie Wauters, Goma, North Kivu
The team conducted its observations in 9 Polling Centers (PCs), each of them holding
between 5 and 7 Polling Stations (PSs).
The team observed that voting procedures were generally well followed by polling
station officials and the secrecy of the vote was generally well maintained.
Nevertheless, the team noted a number of recurring patterns of irregularities throughout
the PSs observed:
As noted in Art. 56 of the Electoral Law (EL) each PSs should have completed the
“opening” part of the Protocol reflecting the time of opening of the PS and the number of
the presidential and legislative ballots.
None of the PSs visited could present the “Protocol”. The respective presiding officers of
the PSs argued that they were told to complete all the paperwork “after the counting was
completed”.
Some PSs acknowledged the presence of a “liste des radiés” or list of ineligible voters.
Since the Independent Electoral Commission printed the voters lists PRIOR to removing
the names of ineligible voters (i.e. registered twice, considered as foreigners, not having
reached the age to vote etc.), each PS should erase the names of those ineligible voters
from their voters register.
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In its area of observation, the team found 4 PSs in possession of this list but none of
them had erased the names contained in it from their voters register. Questioning the
electoral agents in charge of this task he/she replied that this would be taken care of
AFTER the closing of the polling process.
The missing materials such as sufficient indelible ink and sufficient light (art. 54 of the
EL) were a problem in some PSs. Although most of the time, the voting booths were
oriented towards the window because of lack of light, the secrecy of the vote was still
maintained.
Art. 54 of the EL also implies the posting of the lists of presidential and legislatives
candidates with their photos inside the PSs throughout Election Day. The team has not
seen any list posted in any PS.
Despite the shortcomings noted, the team believes that the mistakes made by election
officials were because of inexperience rather than due to any deliberate intention to
compromise the integrity of the process.
Art 56 of the EL: before the opening of the PS and while witnesses and observers being
present, the presiding officer shall proceed with the counting of presidential and
legislative ballots. This did not happen.
The team verified the serial numbers and confirmed that the number of respective ballots
was correct.
Before the opening of the PS and in front of queuing voters, witnesses and observers the
presiding officer verified that both ballot boxes were empty and sealed them.
The PS opened at 6h45.
The presiding officer did not complete the opening part of the Protocol with the abovementioned facts.
Once the voters were allowed to enter the PS and their name ticked off the voters list, the
presiding officer handed over a signed ballot and its serial number!
The team flagged a substantial number of irregularities without clear impact to the
integrity of the process and rated this PS station C in the overall appreciation of the
procedures.
For six out of seven polling stations where the team spent an average of 30 minutes,
please refer to the recurring irregularities mentioned above.
The seventh PS caught a full hour of the attention of the team and a separate “events
report” has been drafted by the team in relation with its findings and handed over to the
Long Term Observer.
20
Each of the presiding officers of the seventh PC was providing contradicting information
with regard to the number of presidential ballots they received in the morning from the
President of the PC. As already mentioned, no opening part of the Protocol could be
referred to and therefore the team had difficulties in ascertaining the sayings of the
respective presiding officers in that PC.
The presiding officer in each PS and the President of the PC itself would contradict
themselves in answering the questions on the number of presidential ballots received.
The president of the PC admitted in the end that he stored 520 presidential ballots SAFE
in his office. The team visited the office of the president of the PC and confirms his
sayings. The latter also admitted that he was of the idea that each bulk of ballots
contained 1.300 presidential ballots as opposed to 130.
The team rated this PC as D (= irregularities that are susceptible to affect the integrity of
the process).
Art 42 of the EL: opening time and therefore closing time could not be verified since the
opening part of the Protocol had not been drafted.
Art 60 of the EL: at closing time, approx 50 voters were still queuing and admitted to
vote.
Art 61 of the EL: no Protocol of the closing of voting operations was drafted at that time.
The counting and compilation of results started approximately at 1830 and finished at
0530 in the morning.
Art 54 of the EL: even if the PS has been provided with a lamp from the Central
Electoral Commission, this was largely insufficient to properly read the results on the
ballots.
Art 63 of the EL: the transparent counting and tabulation of the results was excellent.
The compilation of the results was noted on a separate booklet.
Art 64 of the EL: the invalid ballots were not marked as such but differentiated from the
void ballots.
Art. 66 of the EL: the team questioned the presiding officer of the PS who confirmed that
the final documents and protocols would be drafted the next day! After the team
questioned the integrity of the process if doing so, the presiding officer checked his own
manual and then complied with rules as per EL. The 10 witnesses present, were all
asleep. The presiding officer woke them up to enable them to sign the Protocol. Each of
them signed without reading the content.
Maria Fuglevaag Warsinski, Kisangani, Province Orientale
STO team 100-05 observed the constituencies of Makiso and Kabondo. These included
part of Kisangani city and extended in opposite directions from the city out to remote
21
villages.
EUEOM team 100-05 arrived at 05.05 at the two Voting Centres in Centre Home Feyes,
with eight polling stations. The Voting Centre manager controlled the situation well and
all the presidents of the polling stations were well-educated teachers who seemed to have
a good understanding of the tasks they were given.
Upon arrival there were no large crowds outside the voting centres. The school had
electricity, which helped in preparing for the day. In the courtyard of the school the
organizers had efficiently arranged all the desks from the classrooms in front of each
polling station, with additional ropes separating the stations.
The team was in place to observe the arrival of the voters. This polling station had 520
registered voters. The staff had received 650 ballots for the presidential election and 650
ballots for the legislative election. The verification of the amount was made through a
code number on each ballot, so the first and last ballot was verified with the exact
number giving the total figure of ballots received.
The polling station members had a very good manual to guide them through the whole
process with detailed explanations and illustrations. All the members of the polling
station were present, and additionally there were three party agents and two local
observers. Before opening the station the members prepared the sensitive materials and
organized the room for voting. The ballot boxes were taken out, turned around and
showed to the waiting voters before being sealed.
The polling station was opened for voters at 06.00h and the proceedings to receive the
first voters went very well. The party agents and observers quietly followed the process.
During the Election Day EUEOM team 100-05 visited a total of twelve polling stations
in ten voting centres. As the day went on there was an increase of voters coming to vote
with peak attendance at noon. The general atmosphere amongst voters was good. There
was enthusiasm among the voters in the queue and impatience to vote, but all in a good
mood. Most voters seemed decided on their vote although the huge legislative ballots
seemed to give more practical difficulties for many of the voters. No voters were
observed turned away, as all arrived with their Voter ID card.
Family voting was observed mostly in relation to illiterates, who needed help in voting.
Claimed family members were not always asked to show ID. In many cases the pink
indelible marker was used as ink for a fingerprint signature in the electoral list after
voting. This was a typical mistake by many voting centre staff. In most cases of observed
voting by illiterates, the voter was helped by the voting station president and one local
observer to vote.
Throughout the day party agents behaved in a good manner, with only a few exceptions
where some individually tried to overly help illiterates in the voting. A diversity of
parties where present in the voting station as well as several different local observers,
22
with no signs of conflict between them. The managers and members of the polling
station and the voting centres gave a good overall impression with regards to their
enthusiasm and their comprehension of the proceedings and their duties. By the early
afternoon most of the voters had voted and in the last hour before 17.00h there were few
voters left in both the city and the rural areas.
The polling station that was chosen for the closing was in the university campus in
Makiso just outside the town. Campus Central hosted two Voting Centres. The station
had 581 registered voters. The last half hour two voters appeared before the station
closed. The total numbers of voters that had voted during the day was 484. Four party
agents and two local observers were present the last half hour and on the counting of the
presidential votes. After the polling station was closed five voters also came to be
present as witnesses, they where all students at the campus.
At 17.00 the polling station closed. The staff members made one table in the middle of
the room for everyone. The staff brought forward three ballot boxes, one for presidential
election, and two for legislative election. The sealing was checked on all boxes. Then the
ballot box for the presidential election was opened and the ballots dropped on the table.
The president and the vice-president picked out one ballot at the time, showed it, and
found who the voter had voted for, before taking the ballots down and putting them in
three piles, one for a political party one for a political movement and one pile for others..
Around the table all the political agents, national observers and the secretary of the
polling station noted the results.
The president did not count the votes first but based the total figure and the accuracy of
the vote on the amount of votes given with the invalid and void votes included. The
resulting final numbers were compared and the figures that matched with the total figure
of voters, with the agreement of all participants, were selected as the accurate ones.
At eight in the evening the counting of the legislative election started. This counting was
to be totally exhausting for everybody present. Again during the counting the president
and the vice president were in charge of the process whilst all the others present took
down the figures. This time they verified the figures as the counting proceeded. During
the process the vice-president fell asleep. Several other hands began to select and hold up
ballots and on three occasions the president forgot to open the second page on the ballots
claiming the name on the ballot.
There had been few invalid ballots and void ballots in both the presidential and
legislative results. All present cooperated during the process, with no disagreement and
the polling station members did a good job, until the counting was completed, although
once again the total figures and the amount of ballots were not counted properly. The
ballots for both presidential and legislative elections were only counted once.
At 0200 the next morning the counting finished with all involved exhausted by non-stop
counting for six hours. From 0200h in the morning until 0500h, the polling station
members tried to figure out how to fill out the verbal process and how to divide the
documents, as they had many papers to fill out and many envelopes to seal.
23
This was the most critical moment in the counting process with a combination of fatigue,
but also with a lack of proper training for this crucial point in the work failed them. It
seemed that they thought the man in charge to do this job, was the voting centre manager
but he only visited twice. It was two more hours before he came to help them finish the
process. There were the verbal process of the vote, the verbal process of the counting and
several additional documents with the final figures. There were four envelopes that were
addressed to the different electoral organs and additionally there were the copies for
party agents and the copy to put on the wall. Team 100-05 stayed until the verbal process
was displayed on the wall outside the polling station.
During the whole night and morning there was only one policeman to guard the polling
station which was located at a quite isolated place .The lonely police man additionally
slept through most of the night, at no time did any other police or UN personnel come to
monitor the situation.
Arild Stenberg, Beni, North Kivu
The polling station opened at six o’clock. All the personnel was present. The formalities
were respected, even if ballot papers were not counted publicly in front of the people
who were present at the opening. The president showed the empty ballot boxes to those
present. The members of the polling station were allowed to vote before the voters were
let in.
The voting operations were carried out well. No cases of irregularities were observed.
The identification of the polling station was clearly visible and the voter lists posted in
front of the building, so that it was easy for the voters to find the polling station where
they belonged. In some cases the candidate lists were not posted. In other cases there was
a shortage of ink cushions and there was poor quality of the ink which was used for
marking the index finger of the voters.
Many of the polling booths were badly lit. This caused practical problems for old people
and others with reduced eyesight. Many voters had to leave the booth in order to see
clearly what was printed on the ballot paper. This was not good for the secrecy of the
voting.
The old, the blind and a lot of analphabets needed assistance from the election personnel.
Normally they were assisted by a member of the polling station and a member of a
political party. Sometimes the party member was left on his own with the voter, even
with several voters. One cannot exclude the possibility that the party member did more
than was requested of him to help the voter choose the right party to vote for.
The control of the voters was good, despite the bad quality of the ink. All the voters that
came to the polling station were allowed to vote, also those who came with a duplicate
instead of the original voter card. Nobody who did not bring a voter card or a duplicate
was allowed to vote.
24
No election material was observed in the surroundings of the polling station; no case of
intimidation or disturbance was seen either. The security agents did not carry guns. The
system of rotation among the representatives of the political parties worked well. On two
occasions two representatives from one party (PPRD) were present at the same time in
the polling station. This was early in the morning, perhaps before the head of the Voting
Centre had finalized the allocation of the representatives. No protests were handed in.
The voters came early; they pulled up in a queue, very patiently. Towards afternoon, the
lines started to decrease.
The president of the polling station declared the elections closed 11 hours after the
opening. At the closing nobody was waiting in line to vote, and nobody arrived later.
The unused ballot papers were not counted before the counting started.
All the material for the counting was present. The personnel tried to check if the number
of ballot papers in the ballot boxes corresponded with the number of voters. There was a
discrepancy, both for the presidential and for the legislatives. This was mentioned in the
report.
It was obvious that the personnel in the polling station did not have enough training for
the procedures of the counting. Their work was characterized by uncertainty and
inefficiency. They did not separate the void ballot papers from the invalid ones. The
president was not in control of the operations. During the evaluation of the ballot papers
one of the observers, a journalist, was the one who actually decided if a ballot paper was
to be regarded valid or not.
The work was carried out under difficult circumstances, with little light and with only
one calculator at disposal. The exhaustion and the lack of experience of all the personnel
delayed the process considerably, during which even the international observers were
consulted for assistance. The observers had to inform them that they were not in a
position to do so. The national observers assisted, and their calculations were more
reliable than those of the polling station officials. Finally, the results were posted on the
wall outside the polling station.
General conclusions
The elections went well. The few cases of irregularities were mostly due to negligence
with the electoral personnel. No attempts of election fraud or cheat were observed.
The electoral personnel took the task very seriously and the voters obviously had
confidence in them. Especially in the morning, voters had to wait for a long time, and
they did so very patiently while the security personnel organized the lines.
Despite the difficult conditions with little light in the room and especially in the polling
booths, the general impression was that the secrecy of vote was sufficiently attended to.
Second round of the presidential elections
25
Hilde Kjøstvedt, Boma, Bas-Congo and road to Matadi, Bas-Congo
Observations of the opening
The team arrived at the voting centre at 0500 hrs. There were about 50 persons present
outside and inside the centre, most of whom were polling station personnel, witnesses
from political parties and/or candidates, observers and police officers. The majority were
identifiable by uniforms or cards. However, some of the observers and witnesses did not
always wear their cards in an easily visible manner. The polling station in which the
team made its observations opened at 0630 hrs, after the president had gone through the
opening procedures in a satisfying manner. The president confirmed that he had received
the exact number of ballots, but said he had not counted them. Since the ballots for the
presidential elections were not equipped with serial numbers, it was impossible for the
team to verify that there actually were 600 ballots there without having to count all of
them. The list of registered voters and candidates for the presidential and provincial
elections were posted outside the polling station. A short dispute broke out between the
president and the witnesses when it turned out that some of the witnesses did not carry
their voter’s card on them. The voter’s card is the only card with a picture of the carrier
attached, and must be worn in order to render any other cards valid. The president sent
four witnesses out of the polling station to talk to the chief of the voting centre. They did
not return to the polling station in the team’s presence.
Observations of the polling
Apart from the opening and closure, the team observed nine polling stations throughout
the day, most of which were situated in the town of Boma. It had been raining heavily
since 0530 hrs, and there were no significant queues outside any of the polling stations.
Due to the rain, many of the lists and notes that were supposed to be posted outside the
polling stations (voter’s lists, candidates’ lists, number of polling station etc.) had been
moved inside the polling station or had simply fallen down and been destroyed by the
water. Many polling stations were badly lit and, due to the weather also darker than
normal. The team observed that in at least four polling stations in two different voting
centres, the polling booths had been turned to face the interior of the station instead of
towards the wall. The presidents of the polling stations said this was done to increase
visibility for the voters. Given the small size of these polling stations, it was the team’s
opinion that secrecy of vote was virtually non-existent.
The team then drove 120 km towards Matadi, intending to observe polling at two voting
centres in two villages along the road – Kinzau-Mvuete and Sanda. In Kinzau-Mvuete,
the local leader of the MLC (Bemba’s party) was present outside one voting centre. He
made his presence known to the team, and asked to check the team’s accreditation cards,
which he was welcome to do. People on their way to or from the voting centre stopped
and talked to him, but the team did not understand the conversation since it was carried
out in Lingala. From what the team did observe the situation seemed nothing but calm
and congenial. Due to a minor car accident, the team did not have time to make any
observations in Sanda, because it had to be in Matadi by 1500 hrs in order to hand over
completed observation forms to the LTOs.
The personnel, observers, witnesses and police officers at the various polling stations
were predominantly male. In general, the polling station personnel appeared to be well
26
aware of their role, the rules and the procedures of the polling. The number of witnesses
greatly outnumbered the number of observers, and the lowest number of observers and
witnesses the team observed was six (4 witnesses, 2 observers), whereas the greatest
number was 15 (4 observers, 11 witnesses). There was a controversy between the
witnesses regarding balance – according to the observers from MLC, observers from
PPRD (Kabila’s party) and AMP (the platform for which Kabila runs as president), must
be counted as one actual party. This was pointed out to the team on several occasions. In
any case, in all polling stations except one, there were several witnesses representing the
MLC and the PPRD/AMP, as opposed to only one witness for the other parties. At most,
there were 3 observers from PPRD, 2 from AMP and 3 from MLC in the same polling
station.
The team observed several cases in which illiterate observers received voting assistance.
In one case, the president asked the illiterate for which presidential candidate she
intended to vote. The woman loudly answered “Bemba”, and the president then called an
MLC witness to complete the bulletin on the president’s desk. When the same voter was
asked for which provincial candidate she intended to vote, she answered that she did not
know. Two other witnesses were called forward by the president, and they chose, in
common, a candidate from the bulletin.
The team arrived at the polling station at 1600 hrs. At that time, there were
approximately ten people waiting in line to vote. The president did not close the polling
station at 1700 hrs, despite the fact that the protocol stated that the polling station had
opened at 0600 hrs. People were allowed to continue to vote. At 1730 hrs, the president
called what he referred to as “his superiors”, evidently someone at the CEI. He explained
to the observers and witnesses that he had asked the CEI permission to extend the voting
to 2000 hrs, since due to the bad weather, the voter turnout had been lower than
expected. The CEI had conceded, and the polling station remained open until 1900 hrs,
when a representative from the CEI came and told the president to close. Only 7 voters
had come to cast their vote in the meantime.
In addition to the team, there were 25 witnesses and observers present. Three of them
were international observers from the Republic of South Africa, the rest were national
witnesses (17) and observers (5). The president and vice president of the polling station
conducted the counting, starting with the presidential election. It was verified that the
number of votes cast corresponded to the number of persons that had voted, and invalid
and void ballots were separated. There was a brief controversy between the witnesses
and the personnel on the validity of one ballot, which was settled by the president
deciding that any ballot in which the intention of the voter was clear should be
considered valid (i. e. it did not matter what kind of marking the voter had put). The
protocol for the presidential election was completed in a satisfactory manner, as were the
various envelopes that were to be sent to the CEI.
During the count of the provincial votes, the two assistants who were supposed to keep
track of the number of votes per candidate kept dozing off. They were thus not able to
keep track of the number of votes, and a recount had to be made. By then it was already
0200 hrs, and most of the personnel, witnesses and observers were drowsy or sleeping.
As the LTOs ordered the team to leave the polling station at 0410 hrs, the count was not
27
yet over.
Sophie Wauters, Lubumbashi/Kamalondo, Katanga
Observations of the polling process
The team conducted its observations in 10 Polling Centers (PCs), within 5 geographical
locations in Lubumbashi city, each of them holding 4 or 5 Polling Stations (PSs). Each
visited polling station had five polling executives out of which one was appointed
Presiding Officer of the PS.
The European Union Elections Observation mission amended the country specific
checklists after the first round, which considerably lengthened the observation per PS.
The Independent Electoral Commission provided additional training to its electoral
agents prior to the second round. The change was perceptible in the PSs. The team
observed that polling station officials generally mastered the voting procedures better
and the secrecy of the vote was generally well maintained.
Nevertheless the team noted a number of recurring patterns of irregularities throughout
the PSs observed.
As noted in Art. 56 of the Electoral Law (EL) each PSs should have completed the
“opening” part of the Protocol reflecting the time of opening of the PS and the number of
the presidential and provincial ballots.
None of the PSs visited could present the “Protocol”. The Presidents of the PSs kept
notes on a notepad where they recorded the opening time of the PS and the number of
presidential and provincial ballots that they received.
Art 55 of the EL notes that a UNIQUE ballot per poll and district is to be provided by the
Independent Electoral Commission.
In all the PSs visited, the team found out that the presidential ballots were not provided
with a serial number as opposed to the provincial ballots.
Art. 54 of the EL also includes the posting of the lists of presidential (2 candidates) and
provincial candidates (588 candidates or a fourteen pages ballot) with their photos, inside
the PSs throughout Election Day.
Only 3 out of 10 PSs visited had the lists posted as per art. 54 of the EL.
Consequently and as opposed to art. 54 of the EL, the team observed that a substantial
number of voters were not able to execute the voting operation alone and independently.
The voters not able to find the name of their candidate on the provincial ballot and would
receive assistance from one or more party-affiliated observers designated by electoral
officials in the PS, which might have compromised the secrecy of the vote.
Despite the shortcomings noted, the team believes that the mistakes made by election
28
officials were because of inexperience rather than due to any deliberate intention to
compromise the integrity of the process.
The team arrived at 0540 hrs and spent 1 hour and 25 minutes in the polling station.
The voter list contained 534 voters amongst whom 7 had been erased by the Independent
Electoral Commission.
As per art. 39 the party-affiliated observers, candidate representatives and non-partisan
civic observers are chosen amongst individuals on the voter lists.
Nevertheless, during the voting procedure of this category of voters, a party affiliated
observer who was wearing his accreditation card, presented his voter’s card to the
electoral agent to be checked on the voter list. The electoral agent flagged that this
observer had been erased from the voter list, did not allow him to vote and asked him to
leave the PS.
Art 56 of the EL: before the opening of the PS and while witnesses and observers being
present, the Presiding Officer shall proceed with the counting of presidential and
provincial ballots. This did not happen.
The presidential ballots did not have their UNIQUE serial number printed on it and the
provincial ballots of an A3 size with 14 pages were properly packed in 5 separate carton
boxes recalling the sequence of serial numbers outside the carton box. Before the
opening of the PS and in front of queuing voters, witnesses and observers the Presiding
Officer verified that both ballot boxes were empty and sealed them.
The PS opened at 0600 hrs. The Presiding Officer did not complete the opening part of
the Protocol with the above-mentioned facts.
The team rated this PS station B with some irregularities observed with no impact to the
integrity of the process.
In the eight PSs above, the team observed the polling during an average of 37 minutes.
Please refer to the recurring irregularities mentioned above.
The closing
Art 42 of the EL: opening time and therefore closing time could be verified on the
notepad containing the essential information of the voting operations but not on the
“protocol”.
Art 60 of the EL: at closing time, no voters were queuing. The PS closed at 1700 hrs
29
Art 61 of the EL: no Protocol of the closing of voting operations was drafted at that time.
The counting
The counting and compilation of the presidential poll started at 1700 hrs and finished at
1930 hrs. No results sheets or protocols were drafted at that stage. The electoral agents
favored to continue with the provincial poll, for which the ballot contained 14 pages and
588 candidates. The counting and tabulation of the latter started at 2000 hrs and lasted
until 0030 hrs.
Art 63 of the EL: the ballots were counted accurately and the tabulation of the results
was excellent.
Art 64 of the EL: the “NUL” ballots were differentiated and marked as such.
Art. 66 of the EL: Both results sheets for the presidential and provincial poll were drafted
once the counting and tabulation of both polls was completed.
Art. 61 of the EL allow the party affiliated members and candidate representatives to
request a copy of the completed and signed result sheets or “protocols”. None of them
did.
Arild Stenberg, Beni, North Kivu
In Beni Territoire the voters came massively from the early morning, just like last time,
and the final turnout ended up with 74 % (round one: 70 %).
The personnel mastered very well the electoral procedures. All the material was present,
in most cases all had been gone through the day before, to be sure that nothing was
missing. In many centres there was a reserve lamp for the counting during the night.
The opening went well, as did the voting procedures during the day. The procedures of
the closing and the counting functioned well, much better than in the first round.
The formalities around the voting operations were generally respected. There was no
sign of intimidation anywhere. The presidents of the polling stations had been instructed
from CEI Kinshasa to welcome the electors and to inform them better on the procedures
of the voting.
The secrecy of the voting was hard to keep. With the difficult conditions, with poor light,
the electors very often had to go out of the polling booths in order to find their preferred
candidate on the big sheet which was the ballot paper. In doing this they even asked for
assistance from the party witnesses or the election personnel.
The rooms of the voting centres were generally small and sometimes very crowded. It
was difficult for the personnel to keep full control, especially when the guard at the
entrance let in too many people. This fact also harmed the secrecy of the voting.
Analphabets and others who would need assistance, had most often the possibility of
appointing a person to help them, as says the election law. Seldom, and much more so
30
than in the first round, the party witnesses and the election personnel were the ones who
gave assistance.
The election campaign ended before election day, not necessarily according to the limits
described in the election law, but well before Sunday. Consequently, on election day,
nothing was seen of campaign material, like posters or banners, around the voting
centres. In town, all the big posters of the president candidates were covered.
The day after the publishing of the provisional results for the presidential elections, the
poster of Bemba, with the inscription “President of the Republic”, was torn down.
Three groups of voters made use of their right to vote by derogation: the party witnesses,
the local observers and those members of the polling station who were not on the voter
list of that particular polling station. In some cases, the wives of soldiers and policemen
were allowed to vote by derogation.
In general, the number of party witnesses and local observers was considerably higher
than in the first round. The number of accreditations was almost tripled.
The local CEI in Beni gave accreditation to representatives of individual political parties.
However, CEI in Kinshasa distributed accreditation cards also for witnesses representing
the alliances (AMP and UPN). When visiting polling stations, it was discovered that
some political parties had several witnesses present in the same polling station, one
representing PPRD, the other representing AMP, which is the alliance the PPRD belongs
to. Equally for the opposition, one witness would be there for MLC, and another for
UPN. The election personnel did not know how to handle this situation, and accepted
both witnesses.
The party witnesses followed the process in their way, more or less attentive, only rarely
did they intervene or pose questions. They did not ask for a copy of the results, but they
did sign the final result document.
When in doubt on the voter’s choice on a particular ballot paper, the party witnesses
were asked to give their view. The election personnel listened to the answers, but made
an independent decision, which was never objected to.
On finding a blank ballot paper, the personnel handed it over to the witnesses for
confirmation. In the dark, any witness could easily have ticked the paper, thus making it
a valid paper for his or her party. No such situation was observed.
The review of Complaints Process
The provisional results undergo a judicial control before they are declared definite. After
the publishing of the provisional results the CEI handed over the Procès Verbaux
(written reports from each polling station) along with all relevant material to the Judicial
Supreme Court (CSJ), who will exercise the control.
If no complaint is received within 48 hours, the supreme court proclaims the final results,
31
as prescribed in the election law. The principal question, if the supreme court is capable
of completely or partly annulling the results on its own initiative, remains controversial.
Complaints must be delivered to the CSJ within three days after the announcement of the
provisional results. The contradiction between these three days and the 48 hours
mentioned above must be resolved. Complaints may be handed in by candidates,
political parties or groups, or their representatives. No voter is allowed to deliver
complaints.
The limits for presenting complaints seem short, especially considering the size of the
country and the lack of transportation and infrastructure. Even if the short limits helps to
avoid complaints, the right to complain seems to be purely formal. Also the fact that the
Congolese elector does not have the possibility to complain, risks harming the judicial
control of the election process.
The CSJ may correct the results in case of material errors. It may also decide to annul the
election completely or partly. For the presidential election it has 7 days to decide, for the
legislatives it disposes of 2 months.
Conclusions and recommendations
The judicial framework around these elections satisfies the international standards of
democratic consultations, despite important shortcomings, especially as regards the
financing, freedom of movement and participation of the political parties. The CEI took
on the challenge to organize the elections in this enormous country with little or no
infrastructure. Some lessons were learned from the referendum that helped them improve
their own organization, particularly more decentralization and a reinforcement of the
local structures.Yet, as the process made painfully clear, significant challenges remain.
It is however necessary to stress the complexity of the process and the extent of the
technical difficulties that emerged. That being said of course, good should not become
the enemy of the best, and as important it is to recognise the difficulties and
complexitites of the process, it should not distort the fact that the process suffered from
grave irregularities. The question that needs to be raised is to what extent this actually
had an impact on the electoral result and the importance that adds to a clear and
transparent working method of the CEI.
Some of the CEI regulations, made only a few days before the elections, were not
applied equally in all parts of the country and communicated in a somewhat hapazardly
way considering the sensitivities involved.
Considering the vast number of candidates, the electoral campaign was nevertheless
characterized by a clear disproportion of means to the advantage of the candidates
belonging to the presidential core or his cabinet, as well as by the obstacles that were put
in the way of the other candidates to even conduct a campaign. In the tense political
climate the question of exclusion was often raised, although the security situation never
got out of control. Numerous cases of intimidation and attacks on the freedom of the
press were however observed throughout the country.
32
Despite some attempts to restrain the media, the HAM did not dispose of sufficiently
strong means to carry out their task to control the TV channels owned by the candidates,
who in fact monopolized the media coverage of the campaign.
A great number of organizations from the civil society made an impressive effort to
inform the electorate in front of the elections. However, this was not enough, especially
in the west and in the central regions the necessary information did not reach the public.
On election day, the organizers of the elections managed to open the vast majority of
polling stations in due time. The voting operations were conscientiously managed by a
devoted personnel, and the counting process ended up with reliable results. The large
number of national observers and party witnesses, as well as the presence of generally
non-intrusive security personnel, contributed highly to the positive progress of the
scrutiny.
The question of 5 million excessive ballot papers was never convincingly explained to
the public by the CEI. This affected the transparency of the elections, and the integrity of
the whole process, although measures were taken to ease the tension, such as the public
destruction of incorrect papers, as observed by one of the LTO teams in North Kivu.
Bearing in mind the high number of candidates, and the fact that the majority election
with two or three seats in a constituency only is very likely to exclude minorities, the
election system has been questioned: Do these elections really reflect the voters’ will?
And will the elected representatives represent all the population in the constituency?
Furthermore, the use of open lists made the voting extremely difficult, the counting and
the compilation were sources of mistakes and errors, as well as manipulations and
contestations in a tense political environment. The different steps in the establishment of
the final results proved to be the most delicate phase of the election process, nourishing
the fear of a massive rejection of the result from a large part of the population.
The compilation of the results is crucial to the election process, and needs to be carried
through with the utmost transparency on a decentralized level. The publication of local
results is the only way to assure the voters that the result is reliable.
Appendices
Observing organisation’s statement/preliminary report
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Déclaration préliminaire du 1er novembre 2006
Sur invitation de la Commission électorale indépendante (CEI) et prenant acte de
l’importance de ces élections pour la réussite du processus de transition en République
Démocratique du Congo (RDC), la Commission européenne a décidé de déployer une
Mission d’Observation électorale (MOE UE) pour observer les scrutins présidentiels,
législatifs et provinciaux de 2006. La MOE UE est dirigée par le Général Philippe Morillon,
membre du Parlement européen. L’équipe cadre de la MOE UE a maintenu une présence
continue entre les deux tours. Elle a été rejointe par les observateurs long terme depuis le
9 octobre.
La MOE UE opère conformément à la Déclaration de principes pour l’observation
internationale d’élections du 27 octobre 2005. Avec un total de 300 observateurs
ressortissants des Etats Membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que de la Norvège, de la
Suisse, et du Canada, cette Mission constitue le plus large dispositif d’observation
électorale jamais déployé par l’Union européenne. Une délégation de 8 membres du
Parlement européen, conduite par Jürgen Schröder, s’est associée à la MOE UE et se joint
à la présente déclaration. Les observateurs ont été déployés sur l’ensemble des 11
provinces de la RDC afin de mener une évaluation exhaustive et documentée du processus
électoral. Le jour du scrutin, les observateurs de la MOE UE ont visité plus d’un millier de
bureaux de vote.
La MOE UE suit actuellement le déroulement de la compilation des résultats dans la plupart
des centres locaux de compilation des résultats (CLCR) et restera dans le pays pour
achever l’observation du processus électoral jusqu’à son terme. Elle publiera alors ses
conclusions et recommandations détaillées dans un rapport final qui prendra en compte la
totalité du processus électoral.
Résumé
- Conduits avec efficacité par la Commission électorale indépendante (CEI), les scrutins
présidentiel et provinciaux du 29 octobre se sont généralement déroulés dans le calme et
de façon ordonnée, en dépit de plusieurs incidents graves en Equateur et en Ituri, des
fortes intempéries qui se sont abattues sur une partie du pays, et d’incidents logistiques
occasionnels. Par leur participation importante à travers le pays et le calme dans lequel ils
se sont rendus aux urnes, les électeurs ont, une fois encore, démontré leur volonté de
choisir leurs représentants politiques par la voie démocratique.
- Ces scrutins doivent permettre la désignation d’un premier président démocratiquement
élu et marquent le premier acte de la mise en place d’institutions représentatives au
niveau des provinces, devant à terme permettre l’élection des sénateurs et des
gouverneurs de provinces. Il s’agit de deux étapes essentielles vers la mise en place
d’institutions légitimes en République Démocratique du Congo depuis plus de quarante
ans.
- Le cadre juridique et réglementaire satisfait aux principaux standards internationaux en
matière de consultations démocratiques, en dépit de lacunes relatives notamment à
l’encadrement du financement des partis politiques ainsi qu’à l’organisation et
l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire.
- Tirant les leçons des scrutins du 30 juillet, la CEI a mené un important effort
d’amélioration et de clarification de ses procédures. La diffusion tardive de ses décisions a
cependant nui à leur application uniforme à travers le pays.
43
- La CEI a, une nouvelle fois, démontré sa capacité à organiser des scrutins
particulièrement complexes dans un pays-continent pauvre en infrastructures. Elle s’est
appuyée sur le soutien décisif de ses partenaires internationaux, en particulier à travers le
projet d’Appui au processus électoral au Congo et la Division électorale de la MONUC. Elle
a, en outre, fait la preuve de sa détermination en reprenant rapidement le travail dès la fin
des affrontements du mois d’août et en maintenant inchangé le calendrier des scrutins du
29 octobre.
- L’engagement international s’est également manifesté par l’envoi de nombreuses
missions d’observation, en complément de l’effort considérable consenti dans ce domaine
par les organisations de la société civile congolaise. Les partis politiques ont, pour leur
part, déployé des témoins de bureaux de vote en très grand nombre à travers le pays.
- La période préélectorale a constitué une véritable « non campagne », marquée par
l’absence des candidats présidentiels et par un climat délétère. La multiplication d’incidents
violents a profondément réduit la capacité des deux coalitions à mener campagne dans les
fiefs traditionnels de leurs adversaires. Plus longue, la campagne pour les élections
provinciales est en revanche demeurée singulièrement atone.
- Tout en maintenant une attitude de vive défiance réciproque, les deux camps ont
tardivement signé trois actes parrainés par la MONUC, portant sur un appel au calme, sur
le respect des travaux préparatoires de la CEI et sur la garantie des droits fondamentaux
du futur vaincu.
- Se plaçant en violation flagrante de la législation congolaise et des actes d’engagement
signés, les grands médias audiovisuels du pays sont restés au service exclusif des
candidats présidentiels et ont relayé des messages de haine et d’incitation à la violence,
offrant au passage une couverture quasi-exclusive à leur candidat de choix. Malgré son
statut de média public, la Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise (RTNC) a
systématiquement violé son obligation d’égalité d’accès des candidats à l’antenne, au seul
profit du président sortant. La couverture équilibrée de Radio Okapi, émettant dans tout le
pays, et la multitude de radios communautaires contribuent toutefois à une plus grande
pluralité.
- Bénéficiant d’un soutien international renforcé depuis la fin août, la Haute Autorité des
Médias (HAM) a fait preuve d’une grande fermeté et d’une certaine équité dans ses
décisions concernant les chaînes privées. Elle est restée timorée à l’égard de la RTNC.
- Le jour des scrutins, la MOE UE a constaté de nettes améliorations dans la maîtrise par
les agents électoraux des procédures de vote et de dépouillement par rapport au scrutin
précédent. Mieux planifié, le ramassage des plis à l’issue des opérations est également en
net progrès.
- Les observateurs de la MOE UE ont cependant relevé l’application inégale de certaines
procédures, notamment du fait de leur publication tardive. L’utilisation parfois intempestive
de listes d’omis, de listes électorales spéciales et de registres de dérogation pour des
électeurs non admis à voter et l’assistance fréquente des témoins aux électeurs nécessite
un suivi attentif afin d’en évaluer l’incidence sur les scrutins.
- La présence des observateurs et des témoins dans les Centres locaux de compilation des
résultats (CLCR) durant toute la phase de l’établissement des résultats est un élément de
transparence indispensable. De même, la publication des résultats de façon décomposée
par bureau de vote est seule à même de garantir l’intégrité comptable des résultats
nationaux et par circonscription. La MOE UE suit le déroulement de la compilation des
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résultats dans la plupart des Centres locaux de compilation des résultats et restera dans le
pays pour achever l’observation du processus électoral jusqu’à son terme.
Conclusions préliminaires
Contexte politique
Les scrutins du 29 octobre se sont tenus dans un climat caractérisé par une polarisation
croissante et une défiance très marquée entre les deux camps. Cette défiance ne s’est
estompée symboliquement que dans les toutes dernières heures précédant le vote, par la
signature de trois textes importants, sous l’impulsion de la Communauté internationale : le
« Communiqué conjoint » portant sur la collaboration avec la CEI et l’acceptation des
résultats, l’« Appel conjoint » au « calme, à l’ordre et à la sérénité » pour la journée du 29
octobre (signés le 28 octobre), et enfin, la « Déclaration d’intentions post-électorales des
deux candidats » rappelant les droits et devoirs constitutionnels du vainqueur et du vaincu
du second tour (signé le 29 octobre).
Marquée par l’absence de tout meeting dirigé par l’un ou l’autre des deux candidats, la
période de campagne n’a pas pour autant été exempte de violences, physiques comme
verbales. Très largement centrée sur l’enjeu présidentiel, en l’absence d’une réelle
mobilisation pour les provinciales, elle a été dominée par un climat de menace sécuritaire,
invoqué par les deux camps en justification de l’attitude de retrait de leur candidat
respectif. Les invectives et déclarations incendiaires ont monopolisé les échanges, en
l’absence de tout projet de société substantiel, faisant du second tour de la présidentielle
une compétition acrimonieuse entre les factions qui s’étaient affrontées à la fin du mois
d’août à Kinshasa.
L’accélération du réarmement au cours des derniers mois, la mauvaise volonté affichée par
les deux camps en matière de contrôle des médias et des groupes armés, la très longue
attente qui a précédé la signature de documents appelant à l’apaisement avant et après
les scrutins, et enfin l’annulation du débat télévisé entre les deux candidats, ont imprimé
une dynamique générale négative aux semaines précédant le second tour de la
présidentielle. Les incidents de la fin août, illustrant le risque d’un refus par la force du
choix des électeurs, a continué de porter une ombre sur le processus, notamment par le
biais de menaces de contestation des résultats. Ce contexte tendu confère une importance
particulière à l’intégrité comptable des résultats du second tour.
Cadre juridique et réglementaire
Socle du cadre juridique des élections en RDC, la Constitution de la IIIème République,
entrée en vigueur le 18 février 2006, prévoit la création d’Assemblées provinciales,
nouvelles institutions élues qui seront amenées à jouer un rôle essentiel dans un Etat
caractérisé par des provinces aux compétences élargies. Réunies dans les 11 chefs-lieux
des provinces actuelles jusqu’à la mise en place des 26 nouvelles, les Assemblées
provinciales procèderont à l’élection des sénateurs puis des gouverneurs et des vicegouverneurs.
Le cadre juridique et réglementaire électoral contient non seulement les dispositions de la
Constitution de la transition s’appliquant jusqu’à la mise en place des nouvelles institutions
de la RDC ainsi que la loi électorale et ses mesures d’application entrées en vigueur le 9
mars 2006, englobe aussi les dispositions essentielles permettant la tenue de scrutins
démocratiques. Ce cadre est conforme aux principaux standards internationaux en matière
d’élections, en consacrant le principe du suffrage universel, largement mis en œuvre par la
loi, et les droits civils et politiques des citoyens dont l’exercice est indispensable à un
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déroulement démocratique du processus électoral. Toutefois, la législation congolaise
comporte des lacunes importantes, notamment en matière de financement public des
partis politiques, d’organisation et d’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire. La représentativité
des institutions en terme de genre, principe constitutionnel, n’y est pas mise en œuvre par
des mesures spécifiques. Le cadre réglementaire a bénéficié, pour ces scrutins,
d’améliorations successives pour former un ensemble relativement complet, malgré des
imperfections et lacunes.
Le système électoral choisi pour les élections provinciales, identique à celui des
législatives, combinant le scrutin majoritaire uninominal à un tour dans un tiers des
circonscriptions, et le scrutin proportionnel avec listes ouvertes dans les circonscriptions à
plus d’un siège, est, outre sa complexité, susceptible d’exclure les minorités et de porter
atteinte à la légitimité représentative des députés. Ceux-ci pourront être élus avec un
nombre relativement faible de voix, compte tenu de la taille réduite des circonscriptions
électorales et du nombre élevé de candidats.
La loi électorale attribue, à la Cour Suprême de Justice (CSJ), le rôle de juge du
contentieux présidentiel et, aux Cours d’Appel, celui de juges du contentieux des
provinciales, sans donner des précisions procédurales importantes, au-delà de celles
précisant la gratuité de la procédure, les délais d’introduction des recours, particulièrement
courts, et de celui dont disposent les juridictions pour statuer. Le délai pour statuer dans le
cas d’un appel n’est, entre autres, pas précisé.
Administration électorale
Assemblage institutionnel complexe issu des accords de Sun City, la Commission électorale
indépendante (CEI) a réussi à démontrer une efficacité opérationnelle en constante
amélioration malgré les lourdeurs induites par la nécessité d’intégrer en son sein les
différentes composantes et entités de la Transition. Dans le contexte particulièrement
tendu qui a suivi les affrontements de la fin du mois d’août, elle a, en outre, fait preuve de
sa détermination en reprenant rapidement les opérations de compilation des résultats des
élections législatives, tout en maintenant inchangé le calendrier des préparatifs des
scrutins du 29 octobre. Avec l’appui décisif de ses partenaires internationaux, elle a
démontré à nouveau sa capacité à organiser des scrutins simultanés particulièrement
complexes dans un pays-continent dénué d’infrastructures.
Tirant les enseignements des scrutins du 30 juillet, et tenant compte de recommandations
formulées par les Missions d’observation comme par ses partenaires, la CEI a apporté
quelques améliorations significatives et précisions sur les procédures régissant la tenue
des scrutins. Elle s’est surtout efforcée d’assurer une meilleure planification des activités
préparatoires et de renforcer la formation de ses agents sur les principales faiblesses
relevées lors du premier tour – notamment l’utilisation des listes, des procès-verbaux et la
qualification des bulletins nuls. La diffusion tardive de certaines précisions relatives au rôle
des témoins ou aux catégories admises à voter par dérogation, reprises dans une circulaire
publiée à quelques jours du scrutin, n’a pas permis leur application homogène.
En réponse aux critiques sur le choix de clientélisme et d’appartenance politique de son
personnel technique à l’issue du premier tour, la CEI n’a effectué que quelques
remplacements. Toutefois, des cas de détournement de fonds et de fraudes découverts par
la CEI, ainsi que certaines faiblesses importantes, liées notamment à la gestion du
personnel local et au problème récurrent du paiement des agents, n’ont pas encore trouvé
de solution définitive.
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Le nombre des bulletins de vote, imprimés et distribués par l’Afrique du Sud jusqu’aux 14
hubs principaux, a été réduit en comparaison des réserves importantes produites lors du
premier tour. La distribution du matériel électoral à partir de ces hubs jusqu’aux 209 sites
de formation a été assurée par la MONUC. La CEI s’est, quant à elle, chargée du
déploiement vers les 11 856 centres de vote, malgré les difficultés logistiques dues au
manque d’infrastructures et aggravées par la dégradation des équipements et moyens de
transports utilisés lors du premier tour.
L’enregistrement des candidatures pour les élections provinciales a été conduit avec
efficacité par la CEI, avec la mise en place des Centres de Réception et de Traitement des
Candidatures supplémentaires après enregistrement des candidats à la députation
nationale. Le traitement du contentieux par les Cours d’Appel a conduit à la validation de
candidatures rejetées pour défaut de pièces justificatives, corrigeant partiellement des
déficiences de la CEI dans l’application de procédures de rectification des dossiers de
candidatures avant clôture des listes provisoires de candidatures. Malgré le temps assez
long pris pour la transmission des décisions judiciaires vers la CEI, les listes définitives ont
été finalisées à temps, pour permettre une procédure de vérification des bulletins de vote
par les candidats et leur production à temps.
Listes électorales
La mise à jour des listes électorales par l’inclusion des personnes inscrites sur les listes
d’omis et listes spéciales aux scrutins du 30 juillet n’a pas été effectuée, en raison du
temps relativement limité dont disposait la CEI pour préparer les scrutins du 29 octobre.
En outre, la liste de bureaux de vote habilités à utiliser des listes des omis et des listes
spéciales, rendue publique seulement quelques jours avant le jour des élections, s’est
révélée incorrecte, un nombre considérable d’autres bureaux de vote se trouvant dotés de
listes incomplètes. Les listes électorales d’omis et spéciales ne sont pas toutes parvenues
aux centres de vote pour lesquels elles étaient prévues. Dans la mesure où les vérifications
(cartes d’électeur valide correspondant au centre de vote concerné, absence d’encre
indélébile sur le doigt de l’électeur) ne sont pas toujours menées de façon satisfaisante,
des doutes subsistent quant à la qualité d’électeur et au vote unique des votants dans un
nombre important de centres.
L’indication des personnes radiées directement sur les listes électorales, et non pas sur une
liste annexe, a constitué en revanche une amélioration importante permettant l’application
des mesures d’interdiction de certains électeurs. Certains cas de contestation de la qualité
d’électeurs devant les juridictions congolaises devront être traités afin de compléter les
radiations. L’établissement de listes complètes apparaît comme un élément de comptabilité
indispensable pour les prochains cycles électoraux.
Sensibilisation
Responsable de la coordination des projets de sensibilisation des électeurs et de la
vulgarisation des procédures électorales, la CEI a tenté de corriger les lacunes importantes
relevées lors des précédents scrutins en matière de sensibilisation. La faible réceptivité de
l’électorat aux enjeux des élections provinciales révèle cependant les limites de ces
tentatives de fin de période. Un nombre importants de projets initiés dès avant le premier
tour des élections n’ont pu bénéficier du plein soutien du projet d’Appui au processus
électoral au Congo (APEC), en raison des contraintes financières dues à la complexité et à
la prolongation du processus électoral. En outre, les programmes de sensibilisation de la
CEI diffusés dans les médias, déjà insuffisants lors du premier tour, ont été ultérieurement
réduits. Les Eglises ont cependant continué de jouer un rôle fondamental d’éducation
civique et de sensibilisation.
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Campagne électorale
Contrastant nettement avec l’intensité de la campagne du premier tour, la période
préélectorale a cette fois constitué une véritable « non campagne », caractérisée par
l’absence des deux candidats aux quelques grands rassemblements publics de la période et
par l’annulation du débat télévisé qui devait initialement les opposer. Les deux candidats
ont limité leurs interventions publiques à deux points de presse télévisés chacun, dont un
entretien donné par le président sortant à la chaîne de télévision publique RTNC à
quelques heures de la clôture de la campagne. Les tournées de mobilisation de l’électorat
dans les provinces ont été essentiellement dominées par quelques porte-drapeaux issus de
chaque camp, comme Vital Kamerhe (secrétaire général du PPRD) et Joseph Olenghankoy
(directeur national de campagne de Jean-Pierre Bemba) auxquels ont été associés les
proches parents des deux candidats.
La campagne pour les élections provinciales s’est avérée particulièrement terne,
handicapée par les faibles moyens financiers déployés par les candidats (à l’exception du
Katanga), la discrétion de l’UN dans cet exercice et par la sensibilisation réduite de
l’électorat aux enjeux de ces scrutins.
L’attitude de retrait observée par les candidats à la présidentielle n’a aucunement
contribué à un apaisement du ton de la campagne. Celle-ci s’est concentrée sur de très vifs
échanges d’invectives personnelles et d’incitations à la violence, autour des thèmes de la
prétendue nationalité « réelle » du président d’un côté, et des présumés « crimes » du
vice-président, de l’autre. L’emploi fréquent de manifestants violents, parmi lesquels des
démobilisés ou des mineurs, a accéléré la montée de tensions tout au long de la période.
Dans ce contexte, les principales personnalités en déplacement dans les provinces ont été
régulièrement prises pour cible. Le premier cas de violence dirigée contre un haut
responsable a cependant eu lieu hors des frontières, lorsque le Directeur de cabinet du
président, Léonard She Okitundu a été agressé par des inconnus dans une rue de Londres.
En RDC même, les heurts entre partisans de l’UN réunis autour de Joseph Olenghankoy et
manifestants de l’AMP derrière Lambert Mende, à Lodja (Kasai Oriental) ont constitué le 16
octobre le premier incident significatif de la campagne. Dès cette date, la plupart des actes
de violences ont été liés aux réactions de forces politiques, localement dominantes, à la
présence de représentant du camp adverse. Ainsi à Bukavu, et surtout à Lubumbashi, les
directeurs provinciaux de campagne de l’UN ont été pris à parti, entraînant de graves
violences plusieurs jours durant, dans la capitale du Katanga. Ailleurs dans cette province,
les représentants de Jean-Pierre Bemba ont également été systématiquement harcelés,
rendant de fait inexistante la campagne de l’UN, comme dans d’autres régions de l’Est
(Nord Kivu, Sud-Kivu, Ituri). A Kindu (Maniema), deux poseurs d’affiche de l’UN ont été
gravement blessés par des partisans de Joseph Kabila le 22 octobre, et quatre jours plus
tard, à Lodja, deux personnes étaient victimes d’attaques de militants favorables à la
présidence. Cet incident a suscité une très vive réaction de la population, entraînant la
destruction notamment des trois principales stations de radio locales.
Très fréquentes dès les premiers jours de la campagne dans les fiefs traditionnels de la
présidence, où ils ont été parfois le fait des forces de sécurité de l’Etat, les violences contre
des représentants du camp adverse se sont multipliées en fin de campagne dans les
régions tenues pour favorables à Jean-Pierre Bemba. La visite de Nzanga Mobutu à Lisala
(Equateur), a ainsi été marquée par des jets de pierres nécessitant l’intervention de la
police, tandis qu’au Bas-Congo, le directeur provincial de campagne de l’AMP était
empêché de battre campagne, à Boma, où des militants pro-Bemba ont ouvertement
menacé le camp adverse de violences. A Kikwit (Bandundu), le 27 octobre, un bureau du
PALU (favorable au président sortant) était pris d’assaut par des militants de l’UN, tandis
qu’à Idiofa, la résidence d’un élu du PALU faisait l’objet d’une attaque par des
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manifestants. A Mbuji Mayi (Kasai Oriental), le même jour, un cortège de l’AMP était reçu
par des jets de pierres.
Dérapage armé le plus grave de la période, un vif accrochage s’est produit le 26 octobre, à
Gbadolite (Equateur), à l’occasion de la présence dans les locaux de Radio Liberté (proBemba) de Nzanga Mobutu (UDEMO), candidat malheureux au premier tour et allié récent
de Joseph Kabila. Les échanges de tirs entre ses hommes et des éléments armés de la
faction bembiste ont occasionné le décès d’au moins 4 personnes et rendu nécessaire
l’extraction de Nzanga Mobutu sous protection de la MONUC.
Médias
Les deux candidats présidentiels ont reçu, pendant la campagne, un écho démesuré de la
part de réseaux audiovisuels et d’organes de presse entièrement dévoués à leur cause.
Digital Congo, Horizon 33, RTGA ont été monopolisés par Joseph Kabila tandis que CCTV et
CKTV l’étaient par Jean-Pierre Bemba. Egalement affectée par un positionnement politique
sans nuance, la RTNC, seul réseau audiovisuel public, s’est entièrement mise au service du
candidat Kabila, tout au long de la période observée. Dans la presse écrite, une telle
symétrie entre les deux candidats n’a pu être observée. Longtemps acquise aux vues de
l’UDPS, la presse d’opposition n’a pas entièrement reflété les positions de Jean-Pierre
Bemba. Les titres acquis au camp présidentiel se sont livrés, en revanche, à une
surenchère d’attaques personnelles et de désinformations à l’endroit du candidat Bemba.
Reflétant le net contraste entre une campagne présidentielle enflammée et une campagne
provinciale profondément atone, les candidats aux élections provinciales ont généralement
boudé les spots mis à leur disposition par la HAM (financement de 80 radios à travers le
pays).
Les incidents du mois d’août à Kinshasa ont amorcé une radicalisation des médias des
deux camps qui ont diffusé incitations à la haine et propos injurieux en nombre
accompagnant la diffusion en boucle d’images de violences attribuées au camp adverse. Le
camp Bemba a envenimé la polémique portant sur les origines du président sortant,
assumant un discours ouvertement xénophobe. Les médias de la mouvance présidentielle
ont, pour leur part, fait porter à l’adversaire la responsabilité de tous les actes de violence
rapportés, l’accusant de fomenter des troubles. L’implication directe de la MONUC, après le
22 août, dans les négociations sur les engagements de bonne conduite des médias des
deux parties, comme la mise en place par la MOE UE, d’une unité de monitoring des
violations des accords conclus, ont constitué deux importantes réponses de la
Communauté internationale à l’instrumentalisation politicienne des médias.
Destiné à endiguer ces débordements, un Acte d’engagement a été signé le 4 septembre
par les états-majors des deux candidats et une partie de la presse audiovisuelle kinoise.
Un « Comité technique des médias » a été mis en place par la MONUC pour encadrer son
respect. Ostensiblement outrancier tout au long de l’entre-deux-tours, le ton général des
médias n’a perdu en virulence qu’à l’approche des scrutins mais a été compensé par le
recours à des sous entendus implicites, rendant le discours plus sournois. L’adoption, le 12
octobre, du dernier Code de bonne conduite en date souligne l’ambivalence du secteur
médiatique, partagé entre ses intentions louables et sa soumission paralysante à la sphère
politique.
Face à cette dérive, la HAM a durci ses positions après les incidents de Kinshasa,
condamnant régulièrement les dérapages des deux camps. Exception marquante, la RTNC
est longtemps restée exempte de tout contrôle. La HAM n’a, en effet, dénoncé la partialité
du réseau public que très tardivement, et sans l’accompagner d’une quelconque mesure
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répressive. Chargée d’organiser un débat contradictoire entre Kabila et Bemba, elle fut
contrainte de l’annuler à cause de divergences profondes entre les Etats-majors des deux
parties sur les modalités de l’exercice plutôt que de faire le choix d’imposer les conditions
d’un débat que le camp présidentiel refusait. A défaut, Jean-Pierre Bemba s’est exprimé
sur ses propres chaînes le 26 octobre, date initialement prévue pour le débat et Joseph
Kabila, sur la chaîne publique RTNC notamment, quelques heures seulement avant la fin
de la campagne. La diffusion du point de presse présidentiel par le réseau public de
couverture nationale a constitué une violation grave de la neutralité de principe de toute
chaîne publique. Le caractère tardif de cette émission a, par ailleurs, interdit toute diffusion
d’un message concurrent par le candidat Bemba, avant la fin réglementaire de la
campagne. Dans les provinces, la faiblesse de ses moyens restreint considérablement la
régulation des médias locaux par la HAM.
Enfin, les autorités n’ont pas assuré la protection du réseau médiatique du candidat Bemba
à travers le pays. Radio Liberté, CCTV et CKTV ont subi plusieurs coupures ou incidents de
gravité variable. Ces entraves délibérées à la liberté d’expression de l’adversaire se sont
poursuivies jusqu’aux dernières heures de la campagne. Elles témoignent de la soudaine
prise de conscience par les différents acteurs du rôle capital des médias dans une course
présidentielle.
Déroulement des scrutins
Conduits par la CEI avec efficacité, les scrutins du 29 octobre 2006 ont enregistré une
participation importante, bien que sensiblement en baisse par rapport aux scrutins du
premier tour et des législatives. Soulignant l’attachement des électeurs congolais au
processus électoral, ils se sont généralement déroulés dans le calme, en dépit d’incidents
graves ayant causé la mort de plusieurs personnes en Equateur et en Ituri. En participant
largement aux scrutins, les femmes ont également confirmé leur forte implication dans le
processus. Elles sont en revanche restées sous-représentées parmi les personnels
électoraux.
L’ouverture de nombreux bureaux de vote a été retardée par les fortes pluies qui se sont
abattues sur une partie de l’ouest du pays, en particulier sur les provinces du Bandundu,
du Bas Congo et de Kinshasa, et, plus rarement, l’absence de matériel électoral,
notamment à Tshikapa (Kasai Occidental) et dans certains centres de vote de la capitale.
Les agents électoraux ont toutefois su réagir avec efficacité et pragmatisme, limitant ainsi
à quelques heures l’attente subie par les premiers électeurs. Ailleurs dans le pays, les
bureaux de vote ont ouvert à l’heure prévue par la CEI. Ils étaient dotés du matériel
électoral indispensable, les erreurs de livraison de bulletins de vote (en nombre insuffisant
ou ne correspondant pas à la circonscription du BV) étant restées marginales. La
distribution des listes des omis et listes électorales spéciales s’est en revanche effectuée de
manière plus irrégulière.
Accrédités en grand nombre pour ces scrutins, les observateurs nationaux ont surtout fait
sentir leur présence en fin de journée, lors des opérations de dépouillement. La forte
mobilisation des témoins de partis politiques a assuré une représentation pluraliste dans la
grande majorité des bureaux de vote, malgré des déséquilibres régionaux en faveur de l’un
ou l’autre des candidats à la présidence, et des cas isolés d’accès refusé à des témoins par
des présidents de bureaux de vote. Les témoins n’ont cependant pas pris l’entière mesure
de leur rôle potentiel dans la régularité des résultats des scrutins : à l’issue du
dépouillement, ils se sont, pour la plupart, contentés de relever les résultats, omettant le
plus souvent de réclamer leur copie certifiée des feuilles de résultats, prévue à cet effet
par la CEI.
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On note dans l’ensemble une nette amélioration dans l’application des principales
procédures de vote et de dépouillement par rapport au tour précédent, en dépit de la
persistance de lacunes en matière de réconciliation comptable – notamment dans le
décompte des bulletins de vote reçus. La publication tardive des clarifications apportées
par la CEI sur certaines procédures clé a nui à leur égale mise en œuvre à travers le
territoire. Les observateurs ont ainsi de nouveau relevé l’utilisation intempestive de listes
électorales spéciales et listes des omis dont la distribution n’a pas été conforme à
l’inventaire publié par la CEI des bureaux de vote habilités à y recourir. Les registres de
dérogation à l’usage des catégories d’électeurs autorisés à voter dans des bureaux ne
correspondant pas à leur centre d’inscription d’origine, ont également fait l’objet d’un
certain laxisme. De même, les interventions fréquentes des témoins pour aider les
électeurs à voter, souvent en absence d’une identification de leur statut, s’écartent
largement des procédures électorales et pourraient avoir eu une influence sur certains
votes. Dans l’ensemble, cependant, la liberté de vote des électeurs a été jugée
satisfaisante par les observateurs. Enfin, le dépouillement dans les bureaux de vote a
montré une meilleure maîtrise de la qualification des bulletins nuls et valables.
L’ensemble des irrégularités et des quelques présomptions de fraude relevées, fera l’objet
d’un travail d’analyse, de recoupement d’informations et de centralisation par les
observateurs et par l’équipe cadre de la MOE UE, qui permettra d’en évaluer de façon
précise l’incidence sur les résultats.
La phase de compilation des résultats, ouverte le lendemain du scrutin, constitue une
étape primordiale et sensible du processus électoral. L’attention devra être portée sur le
traitement des plis de leur réception à l’archivage. La planification efficace du ramassage
des plis à Kinshasa constitue un élément encourageant. Elément de transparence
indispensable, la publication des résultats décomposés jusqu'au niveau du bureau de vote,
reprenant le nombre des électeurs ayant voté à titre d’omis, est seule à même de garantir
l’intégrité comptable des résultats nationaux et par circonscription. Ces résultats
décomposés devront être mis à la disposition du public à chaque étape du processus
d’agrégation (CLCR et CNCR), et publiés sur le site Internet de la CEI. Le résultat des
délibérations sur les réclamations et contestations devra également être consigné dans un
procès-verbal et rendu public simultanément à la publication des résultats des scrutins par
la CEI. Il devra également figurer sur le site Internet de celle-ci.
Dans l’attente de l’établissement des résultats, l’ensemble des acteurs doit se garder de
toute publication prématurée de tendances des résultats du second tour de l’élection
présidentielle, contraire à la législation, et dangereuse pour l’achèvement de l’élection
présidentielle dans un climat apaisé. Les contestations éventuelles des résultats des
scrutins du 29 octobre devront être portées, dans les trois jours, devant la Cour Suprême
de Justice. Celle-ci dispose d’un temps extrêmement limité pour traiter les affaires dont
elle sera saisie. Le formalisme dont elle a fait montre lors de l’examen des recours dans les
contentieux des présidentielle et législatives pourrait constituer un obstacle à l’efficacité du
rendu de la justice. Les magistrats des Cours d’appel, formés par les membres de la CSJ et
soutenus par le PNUD, disposeront de 2 mois pour traiter du contentieux de leurs
provinces.
Le processus électoral s’est déroulé dans un cadre généralement sécurisé, grâce au
déploiement d’agents de la Police nationale congolaise (PNC) spécialement formés à cette
tâche par une importante assistance internationale. Les gros problèmes de paiement des
agents, toujours en cours de résolution, n’ont pas sensiblement affecté la mobilisation des
agents de la PNC, qui ont assuré avec succès la sécurisation des différentes phases du
processus. Dans certains territoires, la PNC sécurise l’acheminement du matériel électoral
51
jusqu’aux CLCR. L’intégration d’éléments paramilitaires et militaires, non spécifiquement
formés à ces tâches de sécurisation, suscite en revanche de fortes inquiétudes.
Copyright © MOE UE RDC - Tous droits réservés

D.R.Congo: Presidential and Legislative Elections July

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