GERENCIA ACADÉMICA, GOBERNANZA Y ADMINISTRACIÓN DE

Transcription

GERENCIA ACADÉMICA, GOBERNANZA
Y ADMINISTRACIÓN DE LA UPR
La gerencia académica, gobernanza y administración de la Universidad de Puerto Rico sigue de
cerca la organización y gerencia de las universidades de la mayoría del mundo. El organigrama
gerencial administrativo de la UPR se encuentra en las Figuras 1a y 1b y es representativa de una
multi-universidad con múltiples recintos, con misiones y metas diferenciadas. Como sistema
complejo que contiene en su seno tres recintos graduados y de investigación y ocho recintos
subgraduados, guarda en su organización alguna semejanza con el sistema publico de educación
superior de California (Universidad de California y la Universidad del Estado de California, si se
ven como un solo sistema) y el de SUNY del Estado de Nueva York. Pero un análisis más
detallado de estos sistemas demuestra que la UPR como sistema es “apsque pares” (que no tiene
par); por esta razón, la UPR hay que analizarla como un sistema único que necesita un sistema
organizativo gerencial hecho para responder a sus necesidades particulares.
El documento adjunto, titulado “Naturaleza y Funciones de la Junta Universitaria en el
Contexto de la Organización de la UPR”, por Jorge A. Cruz Emeric, de septiembre del 2007,
describe con un alto grado de precisión las funciones y responsabilidades de la gerencia
académica: Presidente, Rectores, Decanos y Directores de Departamento que corresponde al
ordenamiento jerárquico y vertical de la universidad en la toma de decisiones, distribución de
recursos, mecanismos de rendir cuentas y flujo de datos e información sobre la operación de la
institución como una corporación a la usanza de la tradición universitaria. También describe y
establece las prerrogativas y responsabilidades de los siguientes cuerpos asesores y/o que toman
decisiones, en los que participan los profesores y estudiantes que constituyen parte de la
gobernanza de la universidad y que siguen la tradición académica, a saber: Junta de Síndicos,
Junta Universitaria, Junta Administrativa, Senado Académico, Claustro de Facultad y Claustro
de Departamento. Es vital entender estas complejas estructuras antes de analizar las fortalezas y
debilidades de la estructura de Gerencia Académica, Gobernanza y Administración de la
UPR.
Para entender y evaluar la gerencia académica, gobernanza y administración de la UPR es
esencial comprender que la organización de las universidades es una organización híbrida y
compleja que consiste de dos partes que obedecen principios organizacionales, que para el
que no está familiarizado con ellos, pueden parecerle antitéticos e incompatibles, pero que
las grandes universidades han logrado hacerlo compatibles y armónicos (ver los siguientes
dos artículos adjuntos a este escrito: “The Center: The Top American Research Universities” y
“The Center: University Organization, Governance, and Competitiveness”, informes anuales de
“The Lombardi Program on Measuring University Performance, 2001 y 2002”). La primera
parte es el escalafón gerencial/ administrativo, el que popularmente se denomina “La
Administración”, que emula la estructura corporativa americana, organizada en forma vertical y
jerárquica con una clara cadena de mando. Ésta es responsable de obtener y distribuir los
recursos que la universidad necesita para mantener la calidad y productividad de los profesores y
estudiantes. La misma está compuesta por la gerencia académica que, en orden descendente de
jerarquía, es: Presidente (del sistema), Rectores (de los Recintos que componen el sistema),
Decanos y Directores de Departamento. La segunda parte de la gobernanza de la universidad
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emana del concepto medieval de “la cofradías o gremios artesanales”, compuesto
primordialmente por los profesores y, en algunos casos, puede incluir la participación de
estudiantes con un ámbito limitado de participación. Estos gremios son primordialmente
responsables por el contenido académico; el ámbito y la calidad de la investigación; la calidad y
pertinencia de los grados académicos que confiere la institución; y por el reclutamiento,
nombramiento, permanencia y ascenso de sus pares que en esencia controla la puerta de entrada
a futuros miembros de la cofradía. Estos gremios son, por su propia naturaleza,
autorregulados, como lo eran las cofradías y gremios medievales y, en última instancia, son
responsables por la calidad, prestigio y productividad de la universidad; de ahí que la plantilla de
profesores y la calidad del estudiantado son determinantes para el éxito de una universidad. La
participación de los gremios de profesores en la gobernanza de la institución está contenida en
las siguientes estructuras universitarias: Comités y Claustro Departamentales, Comités y
Claustro de Facultad y Senados Académicos. En el caso de la UPR, esta participación también
incluye la Junta Universitaria, estructura que es “apsque pares” cuando se compara con otros
Sistemas de Multi-Universidades con Recintos geográficamente distribuidos.
Cuando se aprobó la Ley de la UPR en el 1966, la UPR consistía de tres recintos con una
matrícula total de 28,194 estudiantes, a saber: el Recinto de Río Piedras, con una matricula de
21,133 estudiantes, que ofrecía grados de bachillerato, grados profesionales, algunas maestrías y
un programa de PhD en Estudios Hispánicos; el Recinto de Ciencias Médicas, con una
matricula de 686, era fundamentalmente una Escuela de Medicina y Odontología con algunos
otros grados profesionales y cuatro programas de PhD de reciente creación; el Recinto de
Mayagüez, con una matrícula de 5,370, era el “Land Grant College” de Puerto Rico, con su
actividad centrada en Agricultura e Ingeniería y algunos programas de Maestría; y un Colegio
Regional en Humacao con una matricula de 1,005.
En los 45 años que han trascurrido desde la aprobación de la Ley en el 1966, la Universidad se
ha transformado en forma dramática en tamaño, complejidad de sus ofrecimientos, número y
diferenciación de las misiones y metas de sus recintos, y del entorno y realidad de la Educación
Superior en Puerto Rico. Así que no es sorprendente que las estructuras y reglas para la gerencia
académica, gobernanza y administración no resulten apropiadas para los retos del Siglo 21.
En el 1966, el Sistema de Educación Superior de Puerto Rico y la UPR para todo propósito
práctico eran una y la misma cosa; la ley reconoció esa realidad al definir a la UPR “como
órgano de la educación superior”. En la actualidad, ésta ya no es la realidad. La UPR como
sistema público de educación superior solo educa uno de cada tres estudiantes del Sistema
de Educación Superior de Puerto Rico, admite los estudiantes con los índices más altos en los
exámenes de entrada a la Universidad y tiene el por ciento más alto de estudiantes que provienen
de las escuelas privadas (60%), dejándole en forma creciente la responsabilidad de educar al
mayor número de estudiantes de bajo ingreso al sector privado.
El crecimiento del sector privado de Educación Superior despuntó con la llegada de los fondos
de becas federales (BEOG y Pell Grants) al principio de la década de los ‘70. El 74% de los
fondos operacionales de las instituciones privadas de Educación Superior proviene de fuentes
federales; de esta manera, los fondos federales están financiando un importante y creciente sector
de la Educación Superior en Puerto Rico. Simultáneamente, con este crecimiento del sector
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privado, la UPR incrementó el número de Recintos de 4 en el 1966 a 11; y desarrolló sus
programas doctorales, particularmente en las disciplinas de Ciencia y Tecnología (C&T) de 6 en
el 1996 a 32. Además, la actividad de I+D e Innovación despuntó después del 1986 cuando el
sistema de la UPR obtenía de fuentes federales un total de unos $8M, hasta alcanzar la cifra de
$100M anuales al presente y contar con varios Centros e Institutos de Investigación
transdisciplinarios de I+D e Innovación de frontera. Además, la UPR genera el 90% de todas las
publicaciones en revistas evaluadas por pares, y trae el 90% de los fondos federales para I+D e
Innovación en Puerto Rico. De estos datos se desprende que los tres Recinos Graduados y de
Investigación de la UPR son los principales contribuyentes a I+D e Innovación en C&T que
Puerto Rico necesita para desarrollar su economía del conocimiento. Claramente, las misiones de
estos dos sectores de la Educación Superior se han diferenciado mediante un proceso evolutivo; a
su vez, el sector público se ha dividido de facto en dos subsistemas con misiones claramente
diferenciadas: los tres recintos Graduados y de Investigación que son dominantes en el I+D e
Innovación y la producción de PhD en C&T, y los ocho recintos subgraduados.
La Complejidad de la Universidad de Estudios Graduados e Investigación y sus
necesidades de una Gerencia Académica, Gobernanza y Administración especializada para
cumplir con su misión:
Las Universidades de Estudios Graduados e Investigación (EGI) son entidades de un alto grado
de complejidad como resultado de su misión especializada e inherentemente competitiva, ya que
sus pares se miden en función de su competitividad internacional. El costo de sostener una
Universidad de EGI limita su existencia a jurisdicciones con poblaciones de por lo menos cuatro
millones de habitantes. A la misma vez, una jurisdicción no puede competir en la economía del
conocimiento si no sostiene una de estas Universidades (foro sobre la Universidad de EGI de la
AAAS, febrero de 2011). Puerto Rico ya tiene una Universidad de EGI en los recintos de la UPR
de Río Piedras, Mayagüez y Ciencias Médicas si se organizan los mismos, salvaguardando sus
respectivas autonomías, como un sistema orgánico, coherente y complementario.
Los recursos que la Universidad de EGI necesita para ser exitosa son escasos; y, por lo tanto,
éstas viven en un mundo que requiere competir continuamente por: estudiantes de alta calidad,
profesores/investigadores de reputación internacional, donativos y fondos externos para sostener
las investigaciones, y recursos para sostener el ecosistema de investigación que nutre y facilita la
productividad intelectual. En este ambiente altamente competitivo, pequeñas diferencias en el
talento y habilidad de su plantilla de profesores y la calidad de sus estudiantes se pueden traducir
en grandes diferencias en su capacidad para ser exitoso en el mundo de la investigación de
frontera. Por estas razones, la Gerencia Académica, Gobernanza y Administración de los
recintos Graduados y de Investigación de la UPR tienen que ser altamente ágiles, flexibles y
especializadas para que éstas puedan competir en los foros internacionales. Esto hace casi
mandatario que la nueva Ley provea para un subsistema de gerencia que cobije a los tres recintos
graduados de la UPR.
Como resultado de todos estos desarrollos, la Educación Superior en Puerto Rico se encuentra
ante un panorama radicalmente diferente al que existía en Puerto Rico en el 1966. La nueva Ley
tiene que incorporar esta realidad para optimizar y enriquecer la Educación Superior que es tan
importante para el desarrollo económico y cultural de Puerto Rico.
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RECOMENDACIONES PARA CAMBIOS A LA LEY DEL 1996 RELACIONADOS A
LA ARTICULACIÓN Y OPTIMIZACIÓN DEL SISTEMA DE EDUCACIÓN
SUPERIOR Y A LA GERENCIA ACADÉMICA, GOBERNANZA Y
ADMINISTRACIÓN DE LA UPR
Sistema de Educación Superior de Puerto Rico
La nueva Ley debe hacer reconocimiento explícito del hecho que la UPR está enmarcada como
institución en un Sistema de Educación Superior que tiene un importante y significativo
componente de instituciones privadas. Debe proveer un mecanismo que estimule la
complementariedad, articulación y optimización del Sistema Público y Privado de Educación
Superior de Puerto Rico. En principio y por ley, el Consejo de Educación Superior de Puerto
Rico es la entidad que tiene la encomienda de acreditar y evaluar las instituciones de educación
superior que operen en Puerto Rico. También tiene la función de llevar a cabo Investigación
Institucional del sistema de educación superior y desarrollar una serie de métricas e indicadores
para medir la calidad del sistema y su capacidad para servir óptimamente a las necesidades de
Puerto Rico (Ley # 213 del 2003).
Lo que falta para poder conseguir complementariedad, sinergia, y articulación del sistema de
educación superior para que contribuya en forma óptima al desarrollo de Puerto Rico, son
mecanismos y estrategias que, respetando la autonomía de todas las instituciones de educación
superior, encaucen el desarrollo de nuevos programas y colaboraciones entre el sector privado y
público. Además, la nueva Ley de la UPR debe asignarle la responsabilidad al Presidente y
Rectores de la UPR de promover y proactivamente facilitar la sinergia, complementariedad y
colaboraciones con el sector privado de la Educación Superior.
Recomendación: Con el propósito de conseguir complementariedad, sinergia, y articulación del
Sistema de Educación Superior para que contribuya en forma óptima al desarrollo de Puerto
Rico, se sugiere que el Gobierno asigne un por ciento, o una cantidad a ser fijada de año a año,
de fondos de Estado para encauzar el desarrollo del Sistema de Educación Superior en la
dirección que mejor sirva a las necesidades del pueblo de Puerto Rico. Estos fondos se
distribuirán en forma competitiva entre todas las instituciones del Sistema de Educación Superior
en base a propuestas sometidas por las instituciones para competir por los mismos. Los fondos
serán de naturaleza germinal y no se podrán utilizar para subsidiar la operación en forma
recurrente. Los proponentes deben traer a la mesa fondos de pareo de fuentes federales e
institucionales y estarán comprometidos a sostener los nuevos programas o iniciativas una vez
los fondos germinales hayan expirado (“sustainability plan”). El Consejo de Educación Superior,
o una entidad equivalente, será responsable de determinar las necesidades de nuevos programas o
iniciativas que Puerto Rico necesita y, una vez determinadas éstas, emitir convocatorias
invitando a las instituciones a competir por los fondos. En el caso de proyectos de I+D e
Innovación en Ciencia y Tecnología, se sugiere que el Fideicomiso de Ciencia, Tecnología e
Investigación sea la entidad que corra las competencias.
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Gerencia Académica, Gobernanza y Administración de la UPR
La Ley del 1966 utiliza tres conceptos medulares que nunca define y que han sido objeto de
diversas interpretaciones y confusión en definir la gerencia académica, gobernanza y
administración de la UPR; éstos son: sistema universitario; Plan de Desarrollo Integral;
autonomía y descentralización. La nueva ley debe empezar por definir estos tres conceptos que
son esenciales para su buen funcionamiento.
La Universidad como Sistema Universitario:
La Universidad desde el 1966 ha crecido en número, complejidad y diversificación de la misión
y metas de de sus unidades o recintos hasta obtener las características de un Sistema Complejo.
En el año 2000 se trajo al Dr. Russell L. Ackoff, experto en el estudio de Sistemas Complejos
Adaptativos (CAS, por sus siglas en inglés) aplicados a organizaciones; y, después de un retiro
en el que participaron el Presidente, Rectores, Decanos y representantes de la facultad, concluyó
que la UPR se comportaba como un conglomerado de unidades que no tenían las características
de un CAS articulado y optimizado y orquestado para funcionar como un Sistema Orgánico de
Educación Superior. La responsabilidad de articular, coordinar y orquestar el funcionamiento
óptimo del sistema recae en el Presidente y su cuerpo de Rectores. La Ley provee el mecanismo
de la Junta Universitaria como la entidad donde se articule el pensamiento sistémico y la
gerencia sistémica de la UPR y le da la encomienda de preparar El Plan de Desarrollo Integral
para la UPR que sirva como marco de referencia para guiar su gerencia académica. Después de
45 años y nueve presidentes la UPR todavía esta esperando El Plan de Desarrollo Integral (el
documento “Diez para la Década” no llena las especificaciones de un plan integral que sirva de
guía para encauzar el sistema). Mientras, la Junta Universitaria, con la disolución del Sistema de
Colegios Regionales, creció hasta 38 miembros, un tamaño que no lo hace operacional; de
hecho, se ha convertido de facto en un Senado del Sistema que no es funcional, ni capaz de
contribuir a la articulación, coordinación y optimización de la UPR para que actúe como un
sistema orgánico armónico.
Durante este mismo periodo, la UPR—en buena medida por la iniciativa de un grupo
emprendedor de profesores/investigadores en los Recintos de Río Piedras, Mayagüez y Ciencias
Medicas—se ha diferenciado en dos subsistemas: uno graduado y de investigación, y otro
primordialmente subgraduado con misiones y metas dispares que requieren gerencias académicas
diferentes.
Gerencia Académica al Nivel Sistémico: La nueva Ley de la UPR debe asignarle la
responsabilidad indelegable al Presidente de articular, coordinar y optimizar el Sistema
Universitario de la UPR para que actúe como un sistema orgánico armónico. Será
responsabilidad del Presidente, en forma colegiada con los 11 Rectores del sistema, desarrollar
El Plan de Desarrollo Integral con misiones y metas claramente definidas para cada unidad y que
éstas se complementen y articulen para optimizar los recursos de la UPR y servir a las
necesidades de Puerto Rico. Este plan, por Ley, tendrá que ser sometido a la Junta de Síndicos
para su aprobación dentro del periodo de un año después de aprobada la Nueva Ley.
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Se debe requerir que cada unidad establezca el tipo de institución con el que se desea comparar
para medir su progreso en el logro de sus metas (“Benchmarking”). Para el propósito de gerencia
académica, se creará un programa de Investigación Institucional Sistémico que establezca y mida
las métricas necesarias para medir el progreso de las unidades y el sistema en lograr las misiones
y metas plasmadas en el Plan de Desarrollo Integral, y establezca un sistema de rendir cuentas
académicas en lograr las metas trazadas por el Plan.
El Presidente por Ley tendrá dos Vicepresidentes permanentes, a saber: el Vicepresidente de
Asuntos Académicos (VPAA) y el Vicepresidente de Investigación, Estudios Graduados y
Tecnología (VPIEGT). Estos serán nombrados por el Presidente y deberán ser confirmados por
la Junta de Síndicos y serán puestos de confianza del Presidente. El Presidente podrá nombrar
otros Vicepresidentes con funciones gerenciales específicas, según surja la necesidad, previa
aprobación para su creación, por la Junta de Síndicos. Estos otros vicepresidentes también
requerirán la confirmación de la Junta de Síndicos y serán puestos de confianza del Presidente
La Ley reconoce que la UPR tiene dos subsistemas diferenciados por misiones y metas
claramente definidas: uno de Estudios Graduados e Investigación (EGI), compuesto por los
Recintos de Río Piedras, Mayagüez y Ciencias Médicas, y el otro compuesto por los ocho
Recintos, cuya misión primordial es la enseñanza subgraduada. Ambos subsistemas
requieren gerencia académica especializada para su articulación y optimización sistémica y para
promover sinergia y colaboración entre sus partes.
Será función del VPIEGT, por delegación del Presidente, ejercer la gerencia académica del
subsistema de EGI, en colaboración directa con los Rectores de los Recintos concernidos para
articular, coordinar y optimizar el subsistema de EGI, de manera que éste se comporte como un
sistema orgánico armónico. Promover, en colaboración con los Rectores, los estudios e
investigaciones multidisciplinarias y transdisciplinarias y la sinergia entre estas unidades para
que éstas se comporten como un sistema orgánico de Investigación y Estudios Graduado. El
VPIEGT establecerá un programa de Investigación Institucional con las métricas necesarias para
medir el progreso del Plan de Desarrollo Institucional en alcanzar sus metas en el área de la
Investigación y los Estudios Graduados y, en colaboración con los Rectores, establecerá un
sistema para la búsqueda, acopio y administración (“pre- and post-award management”) de
fondos para promover los estudios graduados y las investigaciones; establecerá una oficina para
la protección de la propiedad intelectual y su comercialización; y será responsable de promover y
supervisar el desarrollo de la ciber-infraestructura que dé sostén a la actividad académica,
administrativa y de investigación del Sistema Universitario.
Será función gerencial académica del VPAA, por delegación del Presidente, ejercer la gerencia
académica del subsistema de los ocho Recintos subgraduados, en colaboración directa con los
Rectores de los Recintos concernidos para articular, coordinar y optimizar el subsistema de
educación subgraduada, de manera que éste se comporte como un sistema orgánico armónico.
Promover, en colaboración con los Rectores, el desarrollo de la educación subgraduada de
excelencia y la creación de nuevos currículos y grados académicos y profesionales que Puerto
Rico necesite para su desarrollo, y la sinergia entre las unidades para que éstas se comporten
como un sistema orgánico de enseñanza subgraduada. El VPAA establecerá un programa de
Investigación Institucional con las métricas necesarias para medir el progreso del Plan de
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Desarrollo Institucional en alcanzar sus metas en el área de la educación subgraduada; en
colaboración con los Rectores, establecerá un sistema para la búsqueda y acopio de fondos para
promover nuevos métodos de enseñanza/aprendizaje y programas que estimulen la excelencia
académica. También tendrá a su cargo la coordinación e implantación de todos los procesos de
acreditación y certificaciones necesarias para darle rigor y validez a la enseñanza en la UPR.
Junta Universitaria: El Presidente con su cuerpo de Rectores, el VPAA y el VPIEGT serán, en
forma colegiada y presidido por él, como primus inter pares, el cuerpo rector del Sistema
Universitario. Éstos constituirán la Junta Universitaria, la cual incluirá, además, al Director de
Finanzas. Con el propósito de dar represtación y participación a la Facultad y a los estudiantes, la
Junta Universitaria tendrá dos miembros de la facultad y un estudiante del Sistema Universitario.
El estudiante será seleccionado por sus pares de entre los miembros de los Consejos de
Estudiantes de los once Recintos. Uno de los profesores será seleccionado de entre los Senadores
electos de los tres recintos de EGI de entre sus pares, y el otro será seleccionado de entre los
Senadores electos de los ocho Recintos Subgraduados por sus pares. Como Gerente Académico
y Administrativo del Sistema, el Presidente tendrá la prerrogativa de reunir y consultar a
cualquier subgrupo de la Junta Universitaria y otros oficiales administrativos para los asuntos
que él/ella estime pertinente, particularmente aquellos que atañan la articulación y optimización
del Sistema Universitario. El ámbito de ingerencia de la Junta serán todos aquellos asuntos que
tengan pertinencia para la articulación, coordinación y optimización del Sistema Universitario y
que contribuyan al funcionamiento de este como un sistema orgánico armónico y/o que
promuevan la sinergia entre sus partes. La Junta Universitaria tendrá las siguientes
responsabilidades especificas: 1) Con el insumo de los Planes de Desarrollo Institucionales
preparados por las Juntas Administrativas de los once Recintos, bajo el liderato de sus
respectivos rectores, desarrollar y aprobar el Plan de Desarrollo Integral del Sistema
Universitario, con misiones y metas claras que sean susceptibles de un avalúo racional, de
manera que la UPR se desarrolle como un sistema orgánico armónico; 2) Aprobar los planes de
Investigación Institucional que preparen el VPAA y VPIEGT; evaluar por lo menos dos veces al
año las métricas e informes que resulten de la Investigación Institucional en el contexto del Plan
de Desarrollo Institucional; 3) Establecer sistemas de rendir cuentas (“accountability”)
académicas y del uso efectivo y eficiente de los recursos fiscales y humanos de la institución; 4)
El Presidente, después de recibir los Proyectos de Presupuesto de las Juntas Administrativas de
los once Recintos y armonizarlos con los recursos disponibles con el insumo de sus directores de
Finazas y Presupuesto, someterá El Proyecto de Presupuesto Sistémico a la Junta Universitaria
para su consideración y aprobación antes de someterlo a la consideración y aprobación de la
Junta de Síndicos; la Junta Universitaria analizará el presupuesto en el contexto de las misiones y
metas de los componentes del Sistema para asegurar una distribución racional de éste.
Los once recintos tendrán Juntas Administrativas con un ámbito de ingerencia y funciones
análogas a la Junta Universitaria, limitado a su respectivo Recinto. La composición de estas
Juntas será igual a lo que se estipula en la presente Ley, la cual asegura representación de
profesores y estudiantes en su cuerpo. En adición, las Juntas Administrativas atenderán los
asuntos de recursos humanos de su Recinto y la aprobación de permanencia y ascenso, de
sabáticas de los profesores y la otorgación de distinciones académicas previa recomendación de
sus Senados Académicos, según se describe en la Ley actual. Los Decanos de Facultad y su
cuerpo de Directores serán los Gerentes académicos/administrativos de sus respectivas
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Facultades y presidirán las reuniones de facultad en la misma forma que está plasmado en la
presente Ley.
El nuevo escalafón Gerencial/Administrativo de la UPR se ilustra en la Fig.2.
Gerencia y Gobernanza Académica, Participación de Profesores y Estudiantes:
La segunda parte de la Gobernanza de la UPR emana del concepto medieval de las cofradías o
gremios artesanales. En el caso de las universidades, éstas cofradías están compuestas por los
profesores. Los profesores son responsables por el contenido académico, el ámbito y la calidad
de la labor erudita y el I+D y la Innovación, la calidad y la pertinencia de los grados académicos
que confiere la institución, la otorgación de grados honoríficos y reconocimientos académicos y
contribuir a las acreditaciones de programas académicos. Los profesores también tienen la
responsabilidad de participar en la selección de los miembros que han de formar parte de la
plantilla de facultativos de la institución, evaluar y recomendar permanencias y ascensos y
distinciones conferidas a miembros de la plantilla. En ese sentido, la cofradía de profesores tiene
un elemento de autorregulación y es responsable de contribuir a la calidad, efectividad y
eficiencia de toda la actividad académica. La participación de los profesores en la gobernanza de
la universidad está concentradas en tres organismos: Claustro de Departamento, Claustro de
Facultad y Senados Académicos, que tienen los siguientes ámbitos de ingerencia y autoridad.
Claustro de Departamento: Será el foro oficial de la comunidad académica de un
Departamento, donde se deliberara sobre todos los asuntos académicos de interés para el
Departamento. Será función esencial del Claustro asesorar y hacer recomendaciones a la
gerencia académica sobre nuevos programas académicos, revisiones curriculares y acreditación
de programas; hacer recomendaciones de cómo armonizar y optimizar los ofrecimientos y la
actividad académica del Departamento y formas de promover colaboraciones interdisciplinarias
y transdisciplinarias dentro del Departamento, con otros departamentos y con otras instituciones
académicas; además, tendrá la misión de facilitar y estimular el pensamiento creativo de
vanguardia y la sinergia entre sus miembros para promover la excelencia académica, la
innovación y la investigación entre sus facultativos y con facultativos de otros departamentos e
instituciones. Todos los profesores con nombramientos de carrera en el departamento (“tenure
track”) serán miembros del Claustro. El Claustro del Departamento será presidido por su director
y gerente académico del mismo. Para darle voz y participación a sus estudiantes en los asuntos
académicos departamentales, todo Claustro Departamental tendrá un representante estudiantil
electo por los estudiantes del departamento.
Comités de Departamento: Los comités de departamento se componen de profesores, electos
por sus pares. Su función y ámbito de acción es: evaluar los ofrecimientos académicos:
recomendar nuevos programas o enmiendas a los currículos existente; evaluar los candidatos a
plazas de profesor en el departamento; evaluar y recomendar la permanencia y los ascensos de
profesores. El Claustro Departamental y el Director del Departamento podrán nombrar otros
comités para atender asuntos específicos que sean germanos con la actividad académica.
Claustro de Facultad: Será el foro oficial de la comunidad académica de una Facultad, donde se
deliberará sobre todos los asuntos académicos de interés para la Facultad. Será función esencial
9
del Claustro asesorar y hacer recomendaciones a la gerencia académica sobre nuevos programas
académicos, revisiones curriculares y acreditación de programas; hacer recomendaciones de
cómo armonizar y optimizar los ofrecimientos y la actividad académica de la Facultad y buscar
formas de promover colaboraciones interdisciplinarias y transdisciplinarias dentro de la
Facultad, con otras facultades y con otras instituciones académicas. Además, el Claustro tendrá
la misión de facilitar y estimular el pensamiento creativo de vanguardia y la sinergia entre sus
miembros para promover la excelencia académica, la innovación y la investigación entre sus
facultativos y con facultativos de otras Facultades e instituciones. Todos los profesores con
nombramientos de carrera (“tenure track”) en la Facultad serán miembros del Claustro de
Facultad. El Claustro del Departamento será presidido por el Decano y gerente académico del
mismo. Para darles voz y participación a sus estudiantes en los asuntos académicos de Facultad,
todo Claustro de Facultad tendrá no más de tres representantes estudiantiles seleccionados de
entre sus miembros por los representantes estudiantiles de los departamentos que constituyen la
Facultad.
Comités de Facultad: Los Decanos de Facultad podrán nombrar o solicitar al Claustro de
Profesores que elijan miembros a los comités que el decano o el Claustro de profesores tenga a
bien crear para atender asuntos pertinentes al funcionamiento académico de la facultad y la
articulación de los componentes de la facultad. Toda Facultad que tenga más de un
departamento, centro o instituto tendrá un Comité de Personal que evaluará y hará
recomendaciones al Decano sobre las recomendaciones de los Departamentos para permanencia
y ascensos, y para sabáticas de Profesores.
Senado Académico: Los Senados Académicos serán el foro oficial de la comunidad académica
de un Recinto, donde se deliberarán sobre todos los asuntos académicos de interés para el
Recinto. Será función esencial de los Senados Académicos asesorar y hacer recomendaciones a
la gerencia académica sobre nuevos programas académicos, revisiones curriculares y
acreditación de programas; hacer recomendaciones de cómo armonizar y optimizar los
ofrecimientos y la actividad académica del Recinto, y formas de promover colaboraciones
interdisciplinarias y transdisciplinarias dentro del Recinto y con otras instituciones académicas.
También tendrá la responsabilidad de establecer los requisitos generales de admisión, promoción
y graduación de los estudiantes; seleccionar de entre sus miembros electos dos representantes a
la Junta Administrativa y participar en la selección de uno de los representantes de la facultad a
la Junta Universitaria; hacer recomendaciones a la gerencia académica sobre la creación y
otorgación de distinciones académicas; y recibir, analizar y hacer recomendaciones al Rector
sobre el informe periódico que éste haga al pleno del Senado sobre el estado de situación de la
institución.
El Senado Académico de un Recinto estará constituido por los siguientes miembros ex oficio: el
Decano de Asuntos Académicos; el Decano de Estudiantes; el Director de la Biblioteca o su
equivalente; los Decanos de Facultad y, en el caso de los Recintos de EGI, el Decano de Estudios
Graduados e Investigaciones (DEGI) o su equivalente. Cada Facultad o Escuela del Recinto
elegirá un miembro al Senado Académico de entre sus miembros que no ocupe una posición
gerencial académica o administrativa. Las facultades que tengan una matricula estudiantil que
exceda el 10% de la matricula total del Recinto tendrán derecho a elegir un segundo senador para
que lo represente en el Senado; en el caso de las facultades que tengan programas graduados, el
10
segundo senador será miembro de uno de sus programas graduados. El término para un senador
electo será de dos años, y ningún senador podrá servir más de dos términos consecutivos. Para
dar voz y representación al cuerpo de estudiantes, El Consejo de Estudiantes del Recinto elegirá
a dos de sus miembros para que lo represente en el Senado Académico. Estos estudiantes
tendrán los mismos derechos y prerrogativas que los Senadores electos por las Facultades.
Por ser el Senado Académico el foro oficial de la comunidad académica de un Recinto, el mismo
será presidido por el Decano de Asuntos Académicos; en el caso de los Recintos EGI, el Rector
podrá nombrar al Decano del DEGI o su equivalente como presidente del Senado en substitución
del Decano de Asuntos Académicos.
El Rector del Recinto asistirá una vez por semestre a una reunión del Senado Académico para
dar un informe sobre el estado de situación de la institución y dialogar con el Senado sobre
cualquier otro asunto apremiante que estime pertinente; en esa ocasión asumirá la Presidencia del
Senado. De considerarlo necesario, informará al Presidente del Senado que convoque al mismo a
otras reuniones extraordinarias para discutir la agenda que él estime pertinente, en cuya ocasión
se desempeñará como el Presidente del Senado.
El presidente de la UPR, previa solicitud y con la anuencia del Rector, podrá dirigirse a cualquier
Senado Académico del Sistema Universitario para atender la agenda que él estime pertinente. El
Presidente del Senado convocará a una reunión extraordinaria para ese propósito, la cual será
presidida por el Presidente de la UPR.
Los profesores participan en la gobernanza de la universidad a través de su participación en los
Claustros de Departamento, Claustro de Facultad y Senados Académicos, y a través de la
representación que éstos tienen en las Juntas Administrativas, la Junta Universitaria y la Junta de
Síndicos que forman el espinazo de la estructura jerárquica gerencial/administrativa de la
institución.
Autonomía y Descentralización
Autonomía: La Ley del 1996 utiliza el vocablo “autonomía” cinco veces en el texto de la Ley
sin definirlo. Esto ha causado un alto grado de confusión en la comunidad universitaria que
tiende a interpretarla como equivalente a una independencia virtual que da derecho al que la
utiliza a actuar sin rendir cuentas por sus acciones. Es mandatario que la nueva Ley defina este
término y encomiende al Presidente de la UPR y sus rectores a definir el alcance, ámbito y
limitación del vocablo “autonomía” cuando lo utilicen en delinear las estructuras de
gerencia/administración fiscal y académicas.
La palabra “autonomía” se utiliza con dos significados diferentes en la Ley:

El primer significado atañe a su autonomía de gobernanza gerencial/administrativa y
fiscal, y su capacidad para generar un plan de desarrollo integral que le permite a la
Universidad actuar sin interferencias indebidas del Gobierno Estatal en sus asuntos
internos. Como Universidad Pública que recibe fondos a través de la Formula del
9.6% del Fondo General del Gobierno para financiar sus operaciones, la Universidad
11
tiene una responsabilidad ineludible de responder a las necesidades de Puerto Rico y a
las Políticas Públicas del Gobierno, salvaguardando la libertad de cátedra de los
profesores y su autonomía interna. La interpretación de dónde está la línea que separa a
la responsabilidad de la Universidad de responder a las necesidades del Estado, los
reclamos o peticiones de acción que pueda hacerle el Gobierno y la autonomía interna de
la Universidad, le corresponde a la Junta de Síndicos, como representantes del interés
publico, en consulta con el Presidente de la UPR.
La dependencia de la Universidad de Puerto Rico de los fondos del Estado es la mayor de
todas las universidades del Estado de los Estados Unidos. Esta dependencia, sin
menoscabo de los fondos que provienen del Estado, debe reducirse para aumentar su
autonomía fiscal mediante el estímulo de la autogestión. La Universidad, por medio de su
Presidente y Rectores, tiene la responsabilidad de promover y facilitar la auto-gestión de
los profesores, la práctica intra-mural, el desarrollo de programas auto-liquidables, la
búsqueda de fondos externos, la comercialización de la innovación, el desarrollo de un
fondo dotal y cualquier otra estrategia que aumenten los ingresos de la institución, en
adición a los fondos que provienen del Estado, para incrementar su solvencia y
autonomía fiscal.

El segundo significado atañe a la autonomía relativa de los Recintos relativos a la
Universidad de Puerto Rico como Sistema Universitario. La definición formal que aplica
a este tipo de autonomía proviene del estudio del ordenamiento de organizaciones, y lee
como sigue: autonomía se puede definir como el grado al cual una subunidad de una
organización o gerente académico/administrativo puede actuar sin el consentimiento
previo de otros (International Journal of Business and Economics, 2003, Vol. 2, #1, 5773). La Universidad de Puerto Rico, como sistema complejo y adaptativo (CAS), debe
promover la autonomía máxima posible hasta los niveles donde las decisiones se
puedan tomar en la forma más expedita, eficiente y efectiva sin menoscabo a la
integridad del Sistema Universitario. Le corresponde a los Rectores y al Presidente en
forma colegiada definir y proveer los mecanismos para implantar la autonomía relativa de
los Recintos, Decanatos y Departamentos. Para que esta autonomía sea funcional se
requiere que todos los recintos hayan definido con claridad su misión y metas que sean
medibles y auditables, y que se haya aprobado el Plan de Desarrollo Integral que articule
el Sistema en uno armónico y optimizado. Para poder auditar la efectividad y eficiencia
de la delegación de autoridad y responsabilidades a los distintos niveles del sistema es
esencial el desarrollo pleno de la Investigación Institucional, con métricas medibles, y un
sistema riguroso de rendir cuentas (“accountability”) académicas y fiscales. El sistema de
rendir cuentas y las auditorias, al final de cada año, determinarán el grado de autonomía
autorizada y, de ser necesario por falta de efectividad y eficiencia, la restricción o
eliminación de la autonomía relativa a las unidades que no hagan buen uso de ésta.
Descentralización: El vocablo “descentralización” aparece una sola vez en la Ley del 1966,
utilizado en la siguiente forma: “Descentralización del Sistema Universitario”. Si la
descentralización era necesaria en el 1966, ahora, 45 años después, la necesidad de descentralizar
es aún más apremiante. La UPR no es solo un Sistema Complejo Adaptativo (CAS) por la nolinealidad de sus interacciones y retroalimentaciones entre todos los niveles del sistema, sino que
12
ahora es un sistema sumamente “complicado” que está compuesto por 11 Recintos semiautónomos dispares; y cada uno, a su vez, está compuesto de múltiples Departamentos,
Facultades y Escuelas y, ahora, también incluye Institutos y Centros de Investigación,
Innovación y Labor Creadora. Tratar de operar un sistema tan complicado en forma
centralizada, donde toda la autoridad y poder decisional se encuentre en la gerencia
académica/administrativa del nivel más alto es patentemente inoperante y lleva a grandes
ineficiencias e inefectividad.
Una vez completado el Plan de Desarrollo Integral establecido, el sistema de Investigación
Institucional, las métricas para medir el logro de su misión y metas, un sistema de rendir cuentas
académicas y fiscales, y auditorias periódicas del sistema para medir la efectividad y eficiencia
del mismo, el Presidente con su cuerpo de Rectores, en forma colegiada, establecerán e
implantarán un proceso de descentralización. Este proceso esta íntimamente correlacionado con
los grados de autonomía que se le asignen a los distintos componentes del sistema. Será
responsabilidad del Presidente con su cuerpo de Rectores asegurar que se salvaguarde la
articulación, coordinación y optimización del Sistema Universitario para que éste actúe en forma
coherente y armónica, y pueda responder a los retos internos y externos. Cuando la
descentralización demuestre que es contraproducente para el buen funcionamiento de la
institución, será responsabilidad del Presidente y los Rectores revertir el proceso de
descentralización.
Será función esencial del proceso de descentralización y su implementación, el estimular y
facilitar la formación de redes de comunicación y alianzas estratégicas entre profesores,
departamentos y con otras instituciones para estimular la formación de Centros, Institutos y
proyectos interdisciplinarios y transdisciplinarios. También creará los espacios creadores que
fomenten la autogestión y la comercialización de la propiedad intelectual.
Proceso de Consulta
La Ley del 1966 menciona la palabra “consulta” cuatro veces relativo al nombramiento de la
gerencia académica/administrativa: Rectores, Decanos y Directores de Departamento, y se
refiere a la creación de un sistema de consulta para el nombramiento del Presidente. Contrario a
los conceptos de autonomía y descentralización, la consulta se define en el Art.15, (a) (9). Sin
embargo, la definición no ha impedido que la consulta sea fuente de discordia entre la facultad y
la gerencia académica/administrativa y la Junta de Síndicos. En el último análisis, nadie está
satisfecho con el sistema y procedimientos de consulta: la autoridad nominadora, porque
entiende que tiene la prerrogativa final de nombrar al que él/ella entienda que es la persona más
apropiada para el puesto o porque es la persona de su confianza; algunos sectores de la facultad,
por sentirse que “no se honró la consulta” cuando entienden que no se actúo de acuerdo a sus
recomendaciones; y para algunos sectores porque equiparan la consulta a una elección de la
gerencia académica/administrativa.
Según se ha complicado la gerencia académica/administrativa y la naturaleza inherentemente
compleja del sistema híbrido de gerencia académica, que contiene un elemento jerárquico
administrativo y una gobernanza de participación activa de la facultad, la gerencia
académica/administrativa requiere un proceso de desarrollo y peritaje que el profesor promedio
13
no posee. Por esto, las grandes universidades, particularmente las de EGI, tienen mecanismos
para desarrollar en forma incremental su gerencia académica/administrativa o reclutarla de otras
instituciones de educación superior. Por esta razones, el proceso insatisfactorio de “consulta” se
substituirá por uno de “Búsqueda, Evaluación y Selección”.
El proceso de “Búsqueda, Evaluación y Selección” (BES) se implantará mediante la creación
de un Comité de BES que estará constituido por tres miembros que seleccionará la autoridad
nominadora (Junta de Síndicos para el Presidente, el Presidente y la Junta de Síndicos para
Rectores, el Rector para Decanos, y el Decano para Directores de Departamento), un miembro
de la facultad seleccionado por el cuerpo correspondiente de gobernanza de la facultad
(Senado(s) Académico(s), Claustros de Facultad, o Claustros de Departamento) y por un
estudiante seleccionado por los Consejo(s) de Estudiante(s) o el cuerpo correspondiente a nivel
de Facultad o Departamento. Será la encomienda y responsabilidad del Comité BES, en un
término a ser fijado por la autoridad nominadora, de llevar a cabo las siguientes funciones: (1) en
consulta con la autoridad nominadora y siguiendo de cerca la misión y metas del Plan de
Desarrollo Integral o el de la unidad correspondiente, establecer el perfil de la persona que se
desea reclutar para la posición gerencial académica/administrativa; (2) iniciar una búsqueda
proactiva y amplia en y fuera de la institución de candidatos que llenen los requisitos del perfil
deseado; (3) entrevistar los candidatos que soliciten la posición y evaluar su plan de trabajo, su
experiencia gerencial académica/administrativa y sus credenciales académicas; (4) será
responsabilidad del representante de la facultad y el estudiante recibir y recopilar el insumo de
sus respectivos constituyentes después de haber difundido el plan de trabajo y las credenciales de
los candidatos mediante una pagina de web; y (5) seleccionar todos los candidatos que llenen el
perfil deseado y someter sus recomendaciones a la autoridad nominadora. Será la
responsabilidad indelegable de la autoridad nominadora hacer la selección final y nombrar el
candidato seleccionado.
En adición la Ley, requerirá que se establezca un plan de sucesión (“succession plan”) para
desarrollar y cultivar un cohorte de gerentes académicos/administrativos que tengan las
destrezas, liderato y experiencia para ocupar las posiciones de gerencia académica/administrativa
a todos los niveles, según surjan vacantes.
Términos fijos para los nombramientos, evaluación y plan de sucesión de los Gerentes
Académicos/Administrativos: Todos los gerentes académicos/administrativos serán nombrados
por términos fijos por la autoridad nominadora. Los términos serán los siguientes: seis años para
el Presidente; cinco años para los Rectores y Decanos; y tres años para los Directores de
Departamento. La autoridad nominadora evaluará en forma exhaustiva la gestión del gerente
académico/administrativo un año y medio antes de finalizar su término, basado en el plan de
trabajo que el gerente académico/administrativo propuso cuando comenzó su término, y su
ejecutoria y liderato en contribuir al Plan de Desarrollo Institucional de su unidad y el Integral
del Sistema de la UPR. La autoridad nominadora, basándose en la evaluación del gerente
académico/administrativo, podrá extender el nombramiento de éste por un término adicional para
que complete su plan de trabajo, que no excederá los siguientes límites: tres años para el
Presidente; dos años para Rectores y Decanos; y un año para directores de Departamento. Todos
los gerentes académicos serán puestos de confianza de la autoridad nominadora y podrán ser
removidos de sus puestos antes de finalizar su término cuando éstos no estén cumpliendo
14
cabalmente con sus responsabilidades, o cometan faltas que no son consistentes con la conducta
apropiada de un académico, o violen la Ley de Ética Gubernamental.
Para asegurar la continuidad del sistema gerencial académico/administrativo, será
responsabilidad de la autoridad nominadora constituir un comité de BES para reclutar al sucesor
del gerente académico/administrativo un año antes de que éste finalice su término.
Sistema de Conocimiento, Información y Datos Vitales
que Reflejen el Estado del Sistema Universitario a todos sus Niveles
La sana gerencia de un sistema complejo como la UPR requiere que todo conocimiento,
información y datos vitales que caractericen y describan el estado del sistema sea accesible y
transparente a todos los miembros de la Comunidad Universitaria y al pueblo de Puerto Rico.
Será la responsabilidad indelegable del Presidente con su cuerpo de Rectores y Vicepresidentes
establecer un Sistema de Conocimiento, Informaron y Datos Vitales (SCID) que logre este
propósito, y que el mismo esté disponible mediante una página de Web para asegurar su
diseminación amplia y transparente a toda la Comunidad Universitaria y al Pueblo de Puerto
Rico. El VPIEGT, que es responsable de la ciber-infraestructura del Sistema, en estrecha
colaboración con el VPAA, será directamente responsable de establecer el SCID; y todos los
gerentes académicos/administrativos tendrán la responsabilidad de suplir la información y datos
vitales para mantener el SCID actualizado. El SCID contendrá por lo menos la siguiente
información que rinda una descripción fiel del estado de la institución en su desarrollo
académico y sus estados financieros: los Planes de Desarrollo Integral del Sistema y los
Institucionales de los Recintos; todos los datos vitales e información que emane de la
Investigación Institucional y los informes que resulten de sus investigaciones; todos los estudios
que resulten de la comparación con los pares que los Recintos y el Sistema utilice para medir el
progreso en alcanzar sus metas de desarrollo académico; los informes periódicos del estado de
situación del Sistema y los Recintos que el Presidente y los Rectores tienen la responsabilidad de
emitir para comunicarse con sus respectivos constituyentes; el presupuesto anual de la
Institución; y los estados financieros certificados de la Institución.
La gerencia académica/administrativa de un sistema tan complejo como el de la UPR requiere
que la información y datos vitales necesarios para la toma de decisiones y para el avalúo de la
actividad académica y fiscal fluyan en forma expedita, transparente y exacta de la alta gerencia
hasta la base del sistema gerencial y, en forma recíproca, de la base hasta la alta gerencia. Será
responsabilidad del Presidente y de los Rectores, con el peritaje de sus administradores y
expertos en ciber-infraestructura, establecer un sistema de información y datos que permitan una
gerencia que esté en cumplimiento con las metas institucionales y que utilice en forma efectiva y
eficiente los recursos institucionales. Este sistema, que es necesario para la toma racional de
decisiones, contendrá la información y datos vitales necesarios para: el establecimiento de
prioridades académicas, presupuestarias y fiscales; las auditorías académicas y las auditorías
sobre el uso óptimo y efectivo de los recursos fiscales y de infraestructura de sostén para la
actividad académica e investigativa; y para medir y avaluar el cumplimento de la institución con
la misión y las metas trazadas en los Planes de Desarrollo de cada unidad y del sistema.
4-28-11 (2:57 PM)
Figura 1a
Organigrama Esquemático de la UPR y sus Recintos
Junta de Síndicos
Grupo de Trabajo
con Rectores
Junta Universitaria
Presidente
Sistema UPR
Gerencia y Administración
del Sistema Universitario
(Ver Diagrama Organizacional Adjunto)
Senado
Académico
Rector 1
Decano
Director
Departamento
…
…
Junta
Administrativa
Decano
Director
Departamento
…
…
…
Rector 11
Figura 1b
Organigrama Institucional
Universidad de Puerto Rico
Administración Central
Junta de Síndicos
Junta de Apelaciones no Docentes
Vicepresidencia en
Investigación y Tecnología
Editorial UPR
• Investigación
• Centro de Recursos,
Ciencia e Ingeniería
• Institutos de Investigación
• Propiedad Intelectual y
Patentes
• Sistemas de Información
• Internet 2
• Proyecto Transferencia en
Tecnología
• Atlantea
Presidente
Vicepresidencia en
Asuntos Académicos
Junta Universitaria
Ayudantes
• Plan de desarrollo
• Investigación Institucional
• Programas Académicos
• Licencias
• Acreditación
• Reconocimiento de Grado
Asuntos Legales
Vicepresidencia en
Asuntos Estudiantiles
• Vinculación Preuniversitaria
• Admisiones
• Asistencia Económica
• Servicios Estudiantiles y Clima
Institucional
• Programa Cultural
• Proyectos especiales
Junta de Síndicos
Oficina Desarrollo y
Exalumnos
• Relaciones Universitarias
• Relaciones Gubernamentales
• Exalumnos
• Desarrollo
• Asuntos Federales
JS de
Compras
Oficina Servicios
Administrativos
• Compras
• Propiedad
• Seguridad
• Imprenta
• Adm. de Documentos
• Servicios Generales
• Sistemas y Procedimientos
Oficina Finanzas
• Finanzas
• Nómina
• Contabilidad
• Seguros
• Recaudaciones
• Adm. Fiscal de Recursos
Externos
• Adm. Efectivos e Inversiones
• Área Fiscal de Asist.
Económica
Oficina Recursos Humanos
• Certificación y Retribución
• Reclutamiento
• Beneficios Marginales y
Licencias
• Asesoramiento Laboral
• Centro Pre-escolar
Oficina Presupuesto
Junta de
Diseño
Oficina Desarrollo Físico y
Infraestructura
• Diseño y Construcción
• Jardín Botánico
• Calidad Ambiental y Seguridad
Ocupacional
JS Mejoras
Permanentes
Figura 2
Esquema Gerencial Administrativo de la Ley UPR en una Nueva Ley
Junta de Síndicos
Junta Universitaria
Presidente
Sistema UPR
Subsistema de Recintos de Estudios
Graduados e Investigación
[3 Recintos]
Subsistema de Recintos
Subgraduados
[8 Recintos]
VPAA
Articulación del
Subsistema
VPI EGT
Articulación del
Subsistema
…
Junta
Administrativa
…
Rector 1
Rector 1
…
…
Decano
Director
Departamento
Decano
VPA: Vicepresidente de Asuntos Académicos
VPIEGT: Vicepresidente de Investigación,
Estudios Graduados y Tecnología
Director
Departamento
Junta
Administrativa
Naturaleza y Funciones de la Junta
Universitaria en el Contexto de la
Organización de la UPR
Jorge A. Cruz Emeric, Ph. D.
Secretario Ejecutivo
Junta Universitaria
4 de septiembre de 2007.
1
Objetivos



Repasar la estructura
organizacional de la
Universidad.
Entender el ámbito de acción
de los diversos cuerpos y
funcionarios que componen
la organización
Entender cómo encaja la
Junta Universitaria dentro de
ese esquema organizacional.
2
Base legal de la Universidad

Corporación pública.

Estructura y gobierno definida por la Ley #1
del 20 de enero de 1966.
Leyes importantes
 Ley #1 del 20 de enero de 1966
 Ley #2 del 20 de enero de 1966
 Ley #16 del 16 de junio de 1993

3
Ley #1 del 20 de enero de 1966


Ley de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.
La Ley define las funciones de los diversos cuerpos y
funcionarios ejecutivos, las facultades corporativas de la
organización.
 Consejo de Educación Superior (Hoy Junta de Síndicos)
 Junta Universitaria
 Senado Académico
 Junta Administrativa
 Claustro
 Estudiantado
4
Ley #16 del 16 de junio de 1993


Enmienda la Ley Num. 1 del 20 de enero de 1966 para eliminar
al Consejo de Educación Superior como cuerpo rector y crear la
Junta de Síndicos de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.
La Ley define la composición de la Junta de Síndicos, sus
deberes y atribuciones.
5
Estructura de gobierno del Sistema
El gobierno central de la institución es responsabilidad de:
 La Junta de Síndicos -- es el máximo cuerpo ejecutivo.


El Presidente de la Universidad -- es el principal oficial
ejecutivo.
La Junta Universitaria -- integra al sistema universitario.
6
Diagrama organizacional del sistema
Junta de Síndicos de la
Oficina de Auditores
Internos
Junta del Fondo de Retiro de la
Presidente de la
Junta Universitaria
Rector de Unidad
Institucional Autónoma
Cuerpos deliberativos y funcionarios
de la unidad insitucional
7
Estructura de gobierno de la Unidad
Institucional



El gobierno en cada unidad institucional es responsabilidad de:
Rector -- es el principal oficial ejecutivo del campus
Senado Académico -- se concentra mayormente en asuntos de
la academia.
Junta Administrativa -- se concentra mayormente en asuntos
administrativos y de distribución de recursos.
8
Diagrama organizacional de la unidad
institucional
Junta de Síndicos
Presidente
Junta Universitaria
Rector
Junta Administrativa
Decanos Institucionales
Senado Académico
Decano de As. Acad.
Oficinas bajo Rectoría
Decano Facultad
Claustro de la Facultad
Director de Departamento
Claustro del Departamento
9
Interacción


Cada cuerpo y funcionario tiene
su ámbito de acción.
No hay conflicto entre
funcionarios y cuerpos cuando
cada uno entiende su rol y
trabaja en armonía con el resto
de la organización.
10
Deberes y atribuciones



La Ley de la Universidad de Puerto Rico define los
deberes y atribuciones de cada cuerpo deliberativo y
de los funcionarios ejecutivos de mayor jerarquía.
El Reglamento General de la Universidad de
Puerto Rico precisa con mayor detalle los deberes y
atribuciones de los funcionarios y de los cuerpos
deliberativos.
La Junta de Síndicos asigna o especifica deberes y
atribuciones dentro del marco de la Ley mediante
certificaciones.
11
Junta de Síndicos
12
Junta de Síndicos: Deberes y atribuciones
Según la Ley 16:



Planificación: Aprobar el plan de desarrollo
integral de la Universidad y revisarlo anualmente.
Desarrollo del sistema: Autorizar la creación,
modificación y reorganización de recintos,
centros y otras unidades institucionales.
Reglamentación: aprobar o enmendar el
Reglamento General de la Universidad, el
Reglamento General de Estudiantes, el
Reglamento de Estudiantes de cada recinto y
cualquier otro reglamento de aplicación general.
13


Estructura gerencial:
 Disponer la creación y eliminación de cargos de
funcionarios auxiliares del Presidente de la
Universidad.
 Autorizar la creación y eliminación de cargos de
decanos que no presidan facultades.
Apelaciones: Resolver las apelaciones que se
interpusieran contra las decisiones del Presidente, de la
Junta Universitaria y de la Junta de Apelaciones del
personal técnico administrativo en el sistema
universitario.
14

Nombrar funcionarios:



Nombrar en consulta con los Senados Académicos u
organismos equivalentes de las respectivas unidades,
al Presidente de la Universidad de Puerto Rico y a los
rectores de las unidades autónomas.
Aprobar los nombramientos del Director de Finanzas
y de aquellos otros funcionarios auxiliares del
Presidente de la Universidad que requieran su
aprobación.
Establecer los procedimientos para la sustitución
temporal de los funcionarios universitarios.
15

Presupuesto y distribución de recursos:



Considerar y aprobar el proyecto de
presupuesto del sistema universitario
que le someta el Presidente anualmente,
Aprobar y mantener un sistema de
contabilidad y auditoria para el uso de
los fondos de la Universidad conforme a
la ley y los reglamentos.
Rendir anualmente al Gobernador y la
Asamblea Legislativa un informe acerca
de sus gestiones y del estado y finanzas
de la Universidad.
16

Administrar beneficios del personal universitario




Adoptar normas respecto a los derechos y deberes
del personal universitario.
Fijar sueldos y emolumentos a los funcionarios de la
Universidad nombrados por la propia Junta.
Mantener un plan de seguro médico y un sistema de
pensiones para todo el personal universitario, el cual
incluirá un plan de préstamos.
Establecer normas generales para la concesión de
becas y cualquier otra ayuda económica en el sistema
universitario público.
17



Crear y otorgar distinciones académicas por su
propia iniciativa o a propuesta de los Senados
Académicos.
Adoptar un reglamento interno.
Organizar su oficina, contratar y nombrar el personal
necesario para ejercer las facultades que se le
señalan por la ley.
18
Presidente de la
Universidad
19
Presidente de la UPR



Principal oficial ejecutivo de la institución.
Debe armonizar las iniciativas de los
funcionarios y organismos del sistema y tomar
sus propias iniciativas para promover el
desarrollo de la Universidad, particularmente en
aquellas actividades que rebasen los límites de
una unidad institucional.
Con la colaboración de la Junta Universitaria
coordinará y supervisará las labores
universitarias logrando la integración del
sistema.
20
Presidente: Deberes y atribuciones
Como principal oficial ejecutivo:





Hacer cumplir los objetivos, normas, reglamentos y planes
presupuestarios desarrollados para la Universidad.
Representar oficialmente la Universidad.
Presidir la Junta Universitaria.
Someter a la Junta de Síndicos los reglamentos de aplicación
general y todos aquellos acuerdos de la Junta Universitaria que
requieran su aprobación.
Establecer y mantener relaciones con universidades y centros
de cultura de Puerto Rico y del exterior.
21
Rol de planificación:



Formular con el asesoramiento de la Junta Universitaria y
someter a la consideración de la Junta de Síndicos, el plan de
desarrollo integral de la Universidad y sus revisiones anuales, a
base de los proyectos y recomendaciones originados en las
unidades institucionales autónomas.
Formular el proyecto de presupuesto integrado para todo el
sistema universitario basado en los proyectos de presupuesto que
sometan los rectores y directores, una vez aprobado por las Juntas
Administrativas de las unidades institucionales autónomas, y
someter el mismo con las recomendaciones de la Junta
Universitaria a la consideración y aprobación de la Junta de
Síndicos.
Rendir un informe anual a la Junta de Síndicos sobre todos los
aspectos de la vida universitaria.
22
Autoridad nominadora:




Someter a la Junta de Síndicos los nombramientos de los
rectores de las unidades institucionales autónomas., del
Director de Finanzas y de aquellos otros funcionarios que
requieren la confirmación de aquella.
Nombrar y contratar el personal técnico y administrativo
de su oficina, y de dependencias universitarias que no
estén bajo la jurisdicción administrativa de cualquier recinto
siguiendo las disposiciones de la Ley.
Resolver las apelaciones que se interpusieren contra las
decisiones de los rectores y directores.
Es miembro ex-officio de los Claustros, Senados
Académicos y Juntas Administrativas del sistema
universitario.
23
Junta Universitaria
24
Integración del sistema: función esencial
Mantener integrado el sistema universitario, respecto a la
planificación de conjunto.
Asesorar al Presidente en la coordinación de la marcha de las
diferentes unidades institucionales en lo referente a aspectos
académicos, administrativos y financieros.
Administración
Claustro
Estudiantado
25
Junta Universitaria: Deberes y atribuciones
De acuerdo a la Ley de la Universidad:



Considerar el plan de desarrollo de la Universidad que le
someta el Presidente, y formular las recomendaciones que
juzgue pertinentes sobre el mismo, para la consideración de la
Junta de Síndicos.
Considerar el proyecto de presupuesto integrado para el
sistema universitario según haya sido formulado por el
Presidente de la Universidad para ser sometido a la Junta de
Síndicos, y formular las recomendaciones que juzgue
pertinentes.
Resolver las apelaciones que se interpusieran contra las
decisiones de las Juntas Administrativas y de los Senados
Académicos de cada recinto.
26
De acuerdo al Reglamento General:




Colaborar con el Presidente en la gestión de
dirigir el sistema universitario.
Asesorar al presidente en cuestiones de
política general institucional del sistema.
Mantener informado al Presidente sobre el
sentir de los diversos sectores del Sistema en
cuanto a las cuestiones principales que afecten
la vida académica.
Proponer para la consideración del Presidente,
o para que éste eleve a la Junta de Síndicos
con sus recomendaciones, medidas de política
institucional.
27


Hacer recomendaciones al Presidente o a la Junta de
Síndicos sobre todos aquellos asuntos que el Presidente o la
Junta de Síndicos le someta, o a su propia iniciativa.
Hacer recomendaciones a la Junta de Síndicos, a través del
Presidente, sobre las propuestas que surjan de las juntas
administrativas y senados académicos que requieran acción
de la Junta de Síndicos.
Academia
Recursos
Fiscales
Administración
28
Unidad autónoma
29
Rector



El Rector ejerce la autoridad máxima administrativa y académica
dentro del ámbito de su unidad institucional conforme a lo
dispuesto por la Ley y las normas y reglamentos universitarios.
El Rector es nominado por el Presidente, previa consulta de
éste a su respectivo Senado Académico. Su nombramiento
debe ser aprobado por la Junta de Síndicos.
El Rector sirve a la voluntad del Presidente y la Junta de
Síndicos.
30
Claustro
Compuesto por el Rector, (lo preside), los decanos y
los miembros del personal docente.
 Dividido según organización aprobada por la Junta de
Síndicos.
 El Reglamento General define las funciones y
prerrogativas del Claustro.
Participación claustral se da a través de:



Senado Académico
Facultad
Departamento
31
Senado Académico


Foro oficial de la comunidad académica para
discutir los problemas generales que interesen a la
marcha de la Universidad y para los asuntos sobre
los cuales tienen jurisdicción.
Mediante representantes electos, el Senado
representa al claustro ante la Junta Administrativa,
Junta Universitaria y Junta de Retiro.
32
Senado Académico: Deberes y atribuciones
Planificación Académica
 Determinar la orientación general de los
programas de enseñanza e investigación
en la unidad institucional, coordinando las
iniciativas de las facultades y
departamentos.
 Establecer los requisitos generales de
admisión, promoción y graduación de los
estudiantes.
33
Reglamentación




Establecer para su inclusión en el Reglamento General las
normas generales de ingreso, permanencia, promoción de
rango y licencias de los miembros del Claustro.
Hacer recomendaciones a la Junta Universitaria
relativas a enmiendas al Reglamento General de la
Universidad que esta le proponga.
Someter a la Junta Universitaria, con sus
recomendaciones, asuntos relacionados con el
Reglamento de Estudiantes.
Establecer normas generales sobre todos aquellos
asuntos de la unidad institucional pero que no envuelvan
responsabilidades institucionales en común.
34
Consulta y asesoramiento




Entender en consultas relativas a los nombramientos de los
rectores y directores, y de los decanos que no presidan
facultades.
Elegir a sus representantes ante la Junta Universitaria y la
Junta Administrativa.
Hacer recomendaciones a la Junta de Síndicos relativas a la
creación o reorganización de facultades, escuelas o
dependencias.
Hacer recomendaciones a la Junta de Síndicos relativas a la
creación y otorgamiento de distinciones académicas.
Rendir anualmente un informe de su labor a los Claustros
correspondientes.
35
Junta Administrativa: Deberes y atribuciones





Asesorar al rector en el ejercicio de sus funciones.
Elaborar proyectos y planes de desarrollo de la
unidad institucional.
Considerar el proyecto de presupuesto de la unidad.
Conceder, a propuesta del rector, las licencias,
rangos, ascensos en rango académico y la
permanencia del personal docente y técnico de la
unidad institucional conforme a lo dispuesto por el
Reglamento General de la UPR.
Aparte de las funciones que le asigna la Ley, esta
junta actuará como cuerpo consultivo del Rector y
colaborará con éste en la realización del programa
universitario. (Sección 24.6)
36
Facultad: Deberes y atribuciones

Planificación Académica

Proponer al Senado Académico programas académicos y
proyectos de extensión y educación continuada.
 Tomar acuerdos para intensificar las labores de la
facultad, a fin de hacer más efectivo el cumplimiento de
los objetivos para los cuales ha sido creada la
Universidad.
 Recomendar al Senado Académico, para su
consideración y trámite a los organismos
correspondientes, la creación, eliminación, o
reorganización de dependencias o departamentos
adscritos a su unidad respectiva.
Elegir sus senadores académicos.

37
Facultad: Deberes y atribuciones

Asesoramiento




Exponer sus puntos de vista al Rector para que este los
considere y los someta con sus recomendaciones a quien
corresponda, sobre todo asunto relacionado con el
funcionamiento de la facultad, el Recinto o el Sistema
Universitario.
Participar en los procesos de consulta para nombramientos,
ascensos, permanencias, licencias del personal docente y
cuestiones presupuestarias, a través de los mecanismos
establecidos para esos propósitos.
Recomendar, los nombres de los candidatos a grados
universitarios de la facultad correspondiente.
Proponer al Senado Académico el otorgamiento de
distinciones académicas y honoríficas a ser otorgadas por la
Junta de Síndicos.
38
Departamento: Deberes y atribuciones

El Reglamento General le asigna al departamento:


Llegar a acuerdos y hacer recomendaciones para lograr el
desarrollo más efectivo de los objetivos departamentales según
la disciplina, incluyendo el establecimiento de normas
educacionales
Aprobar los programas de estudio de su unidad para su
consideración por la facultad.
39
Estudiantado


Conforme a lo dispuesto por la Ley de la
Universidad de Puerto Rico, los estudiantes
son considerados parte de la comunidad
universitaria.
El Reglamento General de Estudiantes
define:



Los derechos y deberes de los
estudiantes
Su participación en los procesos de
toma de decisiones por medio del
Consejo de Estudiantes
La representación estudiantil ante las
reuniones de departamento, facultad,
Senado Académico, Junta Administrativa
y Junta Universitaria.
40
Resumen


Cada cuerpo y funcionario
tiene su ámbito de acción.
No hay conflicto entre
funcionarios y cuerpos
cuando cada uno entiende
su rol y trabaja en armonía
con el resto de la
organización.
41
TheCenter
The Top
American
Research
Universities
John V. Lombardi
Diane D. Craig
Elizabeth D. Capaldi
Denise S. Gater
Sarah L. Mendonça
July 2001
An Annual Report from
The Lombardi Program on Measuring University Performance
Copyright 2001, TheCenter at the University of Florida
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
The University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
The American Research University: A Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
American Higher Education and the Research University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Quality Engines: The American Research University Prototype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
The Competitive Context for Research Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Measuring Institutional Competitiveness for Research Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Ranking and Measuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
The Impact of Enrollment and Medical Schools on Research Competitiveness . . .25
Change in Competitive Performance on Federal Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
Data Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Part I: The Top American Research Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Universities Ranking in Top 25 Nationally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
Universities Ranking in Top 26–50 Nationally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
Private Universities Ranking in Top 25 among Privates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
Public Universities Ranking in Top 25 among Publics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
Private Universities Ranking in Top 26–50 among Privates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Public Universities Ranking in Top 26–50 among Publics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Part II: TheCenter Research Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
Private Support and Faculty Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56
Advanced Training and Undergraduate Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
Change (Federal Research, Endowment, Enrollment) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
Institutional Characteristics and TheCenter Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
Student Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
Part III: The Top 200 Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
Total Research Expenditures (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88
Federal Research Expenditures (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
Endowment Assets (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96
Annual Giving (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100
National Academy Membership (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104
Faculty Awards (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108
Doctorates Awarded (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
Postdoctoral Appointees (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116
SAT Scores (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120
National Merit and Achievement Scholars (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124
Source Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129
Data Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135
T h e To p A m e r i c a n R e s e a r c h U n i v e r s i t i e s
Page 1
Page 2
Introduction
The task of building and sustaining an American
research university challenges every member of the
institution’s extended community. Progress in this
permanent quest requires enthusiasm, commitment,
talent, and resources, but it also requires reliable
comparative data. The task for universities is to
improve, not only measured by what they did last
year or the year before, but also in comparison to
what their counterparts and competitors at other
universities have accomplished. Reference points for
comparative success serve the utilitarian purpose of
measuring progress.
The Top American Research Universities annual
report charts the comparative performance of
institutions, reflecting our conviction that research
university success comes from the effective investment in and management of individual institutions.
American universities exist in many different
bureaucratic arrangements, and public universities
in particular often form parts of complex statewide
system structures. Nonetheless, the key decisions
about faculty and students that produce successful
research universities take place primarily at the
campus level. For that reason, this publication
focuses on the performance of individual campuses,
not of systems, and adjusts the data to reflect the
performance of each campus within a system.
The Top American Research Universities also presents
a categorization of research universities into groups
based on their performance on nine measures, as
described in the text and in the introduction to the
tables. Institutions in the top group rank among the
top 25 on all nine of the measures; in the second
group they rank in the top 25 on eight measures;
and so on. This method does not produce a single
ranked list, but instead it reflects our observation
that the difference separating these top universities
is not sufficiently great to justify making a single,
rank-ordered list.
We think that the very best universities compete
at top levels on most everything they do. Others
compete well on some measures but not as well on
others. TheCenter groups identify clusters of institutions with roughly comparable performance on a
variety of measures. In this year’s report, we have
extended our coverage to include not only the
universities that compete among the top 25, but also
those that compete in the range 26–50 on at least
one of the nine measures.
In this edition, we highlight the national competition among universities in the Top American
Research University tables, although we also include
the tables for the Top Private and Top Public institutions separately, as in the previous report. This
focus on the national rankings recognizes that the
competition for faculty and students is primarily a
single competition in which both public and private
universities participate, regardless of their control
or ownership. A university’s private or public
ownership (or control) influences some institutional
characteristics that bear on its competitiveness
within the national context, rather than creating
independent competitive contexts.
In addition to the expanded tables, this edition
of The Top American Research
Universities also includes data
The task for universities
for a variety of institutional
characteristics that may be
is to improve, not only
of interest to many observers.
We include information
measured by what they
on those universities that
did last year, but also in
we define as major research
universities with over
comparison with their
$20 million in federal
research expenditures, and
competitors.
we include data on the top
200 institutions for the measures used in constructing our categories. Each university, however, exists within a unique context and
has different interests in data such as these. For this
reason, TheCenter provides all of the data in this publication as well as additional tables of related information on its website [http://thecenter.ufl.edu] in
two formats. This publication, including the tables,
appears as a .pdf file, available for downloading
and printing. All of the published data, as well as
some additional tables, appear on the website in
Microsoft Excel format suitable for downloading
and additional analysis. This gives others the
opportunity to analyze the data for their own purposes. The website also includes a variety of other
information including an extensive bibliography.
Page 3
In the text of The Top American Research
Universities, we offer a description of a model for
the research university, and we use the data as
the basis for the discussion of a variety of issues,
especially the patterns of change in federal
research expenditures over the past decade.
We have discovered that the audience for these
materials is much wider than we had anticipated,
including academic experts, students, public
policy administrators, legislators, trustees, alumni,
and international scholars and observers. Some
of our comments, reflecting the work of many
scholars of American higher education, will appear
obvious to the experts, although less familiar to
those outside the university.
In developing this second edition of The Top
American Research Universities, we benefited greatly
from many suggestions from our colleagues, but
Page 4
special thanks go to the members of our Advisory
Board, whom we list on page 147. Their observations, suggestions, and critique have helped us
immeasurably.
The work reflected in this publication draws on
the exceptional support of Ms. Lynne Collis, who
manages TheCenter’s administrative services. Without
her expertise, dedication, and initiative, this publication would not have appeared. The authors also
thank Mr. Gregory A. Harris for his excellent contributions to this project and Ms. Anney Doucette for
her careful work with many aspects of the data
collection and verification.
The Top American Research Universities is a project
made possible through the generosity of Mr. Lewis
M. Schott in establishing The Lombardi Program
on Measuring University Performance. The authors
greatly appreciate his confidence and support.
The University
The American Research
University: A Perspective
American Higher Education
and the Research University
Any effort to summarize American higher education struggles with the large variety of missions,
structures, and characteristics represented by the
over 4,700 institutions offering some form of postsecondary education. Community colleges, trade
schools, denominational colleges, liberal arts institutions, small and large state colleges and universities,
elite private colleges and universities, and medical
institutions all inhabit overlapping parts of the same
educational space.
This diversity of institutions represents one of
the great strengths of American post-secondary
schooling. Institutions exist to serve virtually any
student, whatever their preferences, needs, values,
and abilities. The system lacks formal, structural
elegance, but it more than compensates with its
comprehensive scope and its remarkable resilience
and dynamism.
This lack of formal structure poses a major
challenge for those who would analyze, categorize,
and evaluate these institutions, because few fit
into neat categories suitable for data collection
and comparative analysis. Institutions as different
as community colleges, research universities,
and elite liberal arts colleges teach students a
relatively standardized curriculum for the first
two years. All undergraduate institutions, from
large comprehensive state-supported universities
to small privately endowed sectarian colleges,
compete for college-bound high school graduates.
Although these colleges and universities teach
students within the context of a four-year
undergraduate curriculum leading to a bachelor’s
degree, they nonetheless differ substantially in
size, characteristics of student populations, and
overall institutional mission. Nationally competitive research takes place at approximately the
same scale whether in public institutions with
as many as 50,000 students or in small private
universities with less than 1,000. No effort to
understand these institutions on a single scale
can hope to succeed.
The overlapping missions, diverse governance
mechanisms, and multiple sources of funding tend
to obscure the highly competitive behavior of
American higher education. Institutions compete
with each other for funding, students, faculty, and
recognition. The nature of this competition, more
than the specific characteristics of the institutions
themselves, defines groups of institutions: liberal
arts colleges compete primarily with other liberal
arts colleges, comprehensive state institutions
compete with others like themselves, research
institutions compete with other research universities.
Institutions also compete across categories, not
only within them. Community colleges and comprehensive state universities often compete for the
same students within a defined geographic area.
All public institutions in a given state compete with
each other for tax-based support. Prestigious public
and private universities compete with small elite
liberal arts colleges for top students.
Some forms of competition, however, define institutions sufficiently to create a category of analytical
interest. Research provides a
defining characteristic for a
The overlapping missions,
set of institutions whose performance in many areas
diverse governance, and
of academic life sets the
multiple sources of
standards for most of
American higher education.
funding tend to obscure
The definition of a
research university for the
the highly competitive
purposes of this report
behavior of American
involves two primary
characteristics.
higher education.
• First, these universities
compete successfully for
federal research funds. Major research institutions
spend at least $20 million a year from these sources,
while other research institutions spend less.
• Second, research universities are regionally
accredited institutions whose academic programs
award accredited academic degrees.
The following figures provide a perspective
on this group of institutions. Of the 1,950 non-
Page 5
Non-proprietary Institutions
Offering BA/BS Degrees
(N=1,950)
Institutions with Any Federal
Research in 1990–99
(N=617)
Institutions with Over $20M
Federal Research in FY 1999
(N=154)
48
604
247
106
370
1346
Private
proprietary postsecondary institutions that offer at
least a bachelor’s degree, some 617 reported expenditures from federal sources on research in at least one
year during the period 1990–1999. Within this
group of institutions that compete for federally
sponsored research, only 154 major research universities spent over $20 million on research from federal
sources in fiscal year 1999.
The Four Research Groups
250
Private (N=247)
Public (N=370)
Number of Universities
200
134
150
48
100
41
106
73
50
0
24
87
104
Over $20M
$5–20M
$1–5M
Under $1M
(N=154)
(N=97)
(N=128)
(N=238)
1999 Federal Research
These 154 institutions account for 91% of annual
federal research expenditures. The other 463 universities, taken together, account for the other 9% of
the total, and our report divides this larger group
into three additional categories for some analysis
based on the institution’s 1999 federal expenditures.
TheCenter has an interest in all research universities
and provides data online for all categories of federal
research spending [http://thecenter.ufl.edu].
However, this report continues to focus primarily on
Page 6
Public
those institutions with over $20 million in
federal research expenditures, as in the previous
Top American Research Universities report issued
in 2000.
The highly evolved and complex American
research universities in this top category share many
things in common, but they differ significantly in
size, structure, organization, and finance. Some
have student populations as large as 30,000 to
50,000, while others have fewer than 1,000
students. Some have a majority of their students
in undergraduate programs, others have a majority
of graduate and professional students, and a few
have no undergraduates at all.
Research universities operate with significantly
different formal organizational structures. Some
operate as private, not-for-profit corporations and
display clearly defined organizations governed by
Federal Research Market Share
by Research Group
Over $20M
91%
$5–20M
6.7%
$1–5M
1.9%
9%
Total
Under $1M
0.4%
The Research University
self-perpetuating boards. Others operate as public
entities under state constitutional or legislative provision with ownership or control assigned to boards
of trustees or regents. These boards are selected,
appointed, or elected in accord with differing criteria. Some public research universities may share a
governing board with other institutions, only some
of which may emphasize research. Public research
universities also have complex relationships that link
them directly to state legislatures and statewide
coordinating commissions. On occasion, they have
both local and statewide governing boards.
These research universities do many things in
addition to research, further complicating an analysis
of their research performance. As educational institutions, research universities can sustain any number
of academic specialties, support a wide array of professional schools, engage in extensive off-campus
educational activities in continuing professional
education, and perform services for public and private constituencies. Individual universities combine
these functions in many different ways, ensuring
that no two universities will have identical missions.
For all of their complexity, American research
universities serve as primary institutions for
advancing knowledge in virtually all fields of
human activity, from the arts and humanities
through the social and behavioral sciences and from
the professions to the mathematical, physical, and
biological sciences. No university cultivates research
in all areas of human inquiry, but there is at least
one university with a research program in almost
every area of knowledge.
The strength of the American research university
results from a combination of reinforcing elements.
For most institutions, the standard mission includes
the education of undergraduate students to become
useful and productive citizens in what are traditionally four- or five-year programs; the preparation of
graduates in the professions of education, law, medicine, business, engineering, or journalism; and the
training of advanced students in Ph.D. programs in
a number of specialized fields. Research universities
in particular emphasize intensive and extensive
research programs in many academic and professional areas. Local, state, and national agencies,
recognizing the high social and economic value of
these institutions, provide significant tax-based
assistance to private and public universities through
research grants, facilities funding, financial aid for
students at all levels.
In return, the research university generally implements its obligation to the public by producing
educated and useful citizens, transferring academic
research results into products and services that
enhance national prosperity and defense, and
engaging the university in a wide range of public
service work. Although there is great variation in
the methods and techniques, in the mix and balance,
and in the success of American research universities
in delivering this combination of functions, almost
every institution participates in most aspects of this
combined activity.
Quality Engines: The American
Research University Prototype
Even though these institutions demonstrate a
bewildering variety in the details of their organization, all of them express a common research university prototype. This prototype models the behavior
American research
of research universities as
organizations, even if, like
universities serve as
all synthetic constructs, it
does not represent the operaprimary institutions
tions of any particular instifor advancing knowledge
tution in detail.
The model presented here
in virtually all fields
views research universities
as organizations with two
of human activity.
related but relatively independent structures.
• The first is an academic core, composed of a
group of faculty guilds that have primary responsibility for the academic content and quality of the
enterprise.
• The second is an administrative shell, responsible for the acquisition and distribution of resources
and for the management of the enterprises that
support the faculty guilds.
The Academic Core: Faculty guilds are the most
important part of the university because they define
Page 7
and create the university’s academic substance. The
guilds enable the university’s many other functions
related to teaching and research.
Disciplinary considerations define guilds such as
chemistry, history, physics, psychology, philosophy,
medicine, and law. Moreover,
within the university, each
Faculty guilds are the
faculty guild serves as the
local branch of a national
most important part
guild of the same specialty.
For example, all of the profesof the university
sors in a university history
because they define the
department belong to the
same national guild, even
university’s academic
though the local university
employs them. The national
substance and maintain
guild establishes the intellectual standards for their work;
its quality.
the local university deals with
their employment and work
assignments. The same holds true for chemists,
psychologists, and the members of other guilds.
Each guild defines itself in terms of the intellectual methodology that its members apply to their
field of study. Historians, for example, have a
methodology for the use of historical evidence in
the development of explanations about past events.
The guild’s definition of standards based on these
methods and the evaluation of quality based on the
standards are what define the guild’s responsibility.
Members of the guild must meet these academic
and methodological standards, or the guild will
not recognize the validity of their work.
As has been the case for all guilds since medieval
times, the methodological standards guarantee that
the members’ products meet guild criteria. If a
guild-certified historian writes a biography of
Simón Bolívar, for example, we can have confidence
that the interpretation presented uses documents
and evidence in accord with the history guild’s
standards of accuracy and reliability. The guild does
not guarantee the correctness of the resulting interpretation, only that the guild-certified historian
used appropriate methodology properly in ways
that permit other expert members of the guild to
review and validate that work.
Page 8
The same is true in science, which perhaps
offers a better illustration. Scientists have precise
methodologies, both for doing their work and for
validating its results. When physicists, for example,
present the results of their work, most people lack
the expertise to evaluate the scientific validity of
the process used to arrive at the announced result.
Instead, the public relies on a validation by the
physics guild before accepting the result as a reliable
scientific finding.
Each guild has its own process for validating the
work done by its members and for reviewing results
presented by aspirants for membership or advancement in the guild. All guilds, however, rely on a
variation of the peer review system that mobilizes
the talents of expert guild members to validate
the work of other guild members. This process
often involves experts replicating the experiments
and a peer review of results before presentation
to the public through publication. Whatever
the process, however, the guild sets and enforces
the standards for the field to ensure the quality
of guild-certified results.
The analytical methodology, more than the
subject matter studied, distinguishes one guild
from another. For example, although historians
and sociologists study similar phenomena
(revolution, poverty, social change), they employ
significantly different methodologies, and these
differences separate the sociologists’ guild from
the historians’ guild.
The expanding range of knowledge constantly
produces new information and suggests new
explanations. These, in turn, often require new
methodologies. Over time, new guilds emerge
with definable methodologies that serve to advance
understanding. In other cases, efforts to create new
guilds do not succeed because no coherent, intellectually sound, and distinct methodology emerges.
The guild does not pass judgment primarily
on whether a scholar’s idea is right or wrong, but
rather it ensures that scholarly ideas receive rigorous
analysis and proof regardless of the political or
personal interests that may surround them. Scientists
may believe that they have found the key to eternal
life, but public acceptance of this result requires
Quality Engines
validation by other members of the appropriate
science guilds through a critical review according
to applicable methodological standards.
The guilds also define the university’s undergraduate curriculum in a negotiated conversation with
other guilds. This negotiation establishes the
content and delivery of knowledge contained in the
traditional frame of four- or five-year undergraduate
degree programs. Each component of this degree
reflects guild-certified knowledge. Doctoral and
other advanced degree programs belong exclusively
to the guilds.
Finally, the guild controls the acquisition, promotion, tenure, and retention of faculty. Although
other actors in the university (administrators, union
officials, students, and others) influence this process
in various ways, the guild holds primary responsibility for the quality of the faculty. Because their
own members hire and retain their successors,
guilds behave as self-replicating organizations.
If the guilds replicate themselves at the same
quality level, the university overall will maintain
its current level of quality. If they replace themselves
at a lower level, the university declines, and if they
hire their replacements at a higher level of quality,
the university improves. Research universities pay
close attention to guild management of faculty
talent, because they know that the university’s
quality and productivity depend on the faculty.
A diagram of the core structure of the model
research university would show a number of guilds,
each separate from the others, linked by their common participation in the instructional enterprise
and by their common concern for the support and
promotion of research. They would appear as separate entities because the members of one guild
cannot generally participate in the work of another
except as guests or in jointly owned interdisciplinary
projects. Members of one guild may not normally
transfer their academic standing directly to another
guild without a complete review of their qualifications by the other guild.
The guilds would also appear as separate entities
to emphasize that they belong intellectually more
to their national guild than to their local university.
This feature of guild behavior requires some
discussion. The national guild sets the same methodological standards for determining the quality and
reliability of its products everywhere. Local guilds
apply these same methodological standards, whether
they operate in New York or Texas, Minnesota or
California. However, the level of productivity and
quality required for membership by each local guild
will vary from university to university.
In major research universities, as an example,
the local history guilds will require new members
to possess not only a Ph.D. with a dissertation completed and approved according to the standards of
the guild, but also a record of publication in significant peer-reviewed journals and the promise of a
major scholarly book. For
permanent status within
The university’s
these high-quality local
guilds, historians will
academic standing is the
publish at least two major
peer-reviewed books. At
aggregate result of the
a comprehensive state universuccess of the guilds in
sity, the level of research
quality and productivity
the recruitment and
expected by the local history
guild for permanent status
retention of faculty.
will include perhaps only the
completion of a Ph.D. and
the publication of one or two peer-reviewed articles.
A university’s quality and competitiveness depend
on the quality and competitiveness of its faculty, and
the local guild sets the level of performance for new
and continuing faculty members. The university’s
academic standing, then, is the aggregate result of
the success of each of these local guilds in the
recruitment and retention of faculty. This model of
guild behavior applies to competitive research universities and sets the standards for almost all other
colleges and universities.
The Administrative Shell: The second structure
within the American research university is the
administrative shell. Most observers see the shell
when they first encounter the university. The shell
contains a traditional corporate structure: hierarchical and orderly, with a chain of command as well
as the other accouterments of modern corporate
America. It provides the formal, legal governance
Page 9
mechanism of the university, including a board of
trustees or regents, a president, and vice presidents,
deans, other administrators, and members of faculty
senates who carry out corporate line and staff
functions on behalf of the university and manage
governance as well as administrative issues.
To most people, this is the university’s
management. In one sense, this is true. The
board owns the university. The president is legally
responsible for the institution’s management. The vice
The criteria for
presidents and deans report
through an administrative
distributing money create
hierarchy. The faculty senate
approves new degrees and
much stronger incentives
curricular changes.
for guild behavior than
At the same time, the
people in the shell do not
do strategic plans or
actually do the work that
makes the university valuable.
mission statements.
That work takes place primarily in the guilds or under
guild supervision. The shell mobilizes and distributes resources that support the work of the guilds,
and it protects the guilds from harmful external
forces. The shell manages the interactions between
guilds. Most importantly, the shell manages the
university’s money and creates the incentives that
motivate guild behavior.
Participants in the administrative shell typically
demonstrate a fondness for public displays of institutional homogeneity, as expressed in the form of mission statements, strategic plans, and the like. These
high-minded products generally have minor impact
on the guilds and their work — unless the shell
administrators match these plans with the incentives
created by the distribution of money. The criteria for
distributing money create much stronger incentives
for guild behavior than do strategic plans and mission statements articulated by institutional leaders.
Deans and department chairs occupy a special
intermediate role between the functions of the shell
and those of the core guilds. While deans, and chairs
to a somewhat lesser extent, serve as administrative
officers in the formal organization of the university,
they serve more as guild representatives to the shell
Page 10
than as administrative managers of the core. Deans
receive their appointments from vice presidents and
presidents, and they recognize their responsibility
to these shell officers. Deans also know that their
success depends on their ability to earn and retain
the respect and support of their fellow guild
members and to successfully represent guild
interests in the competition for resources managed
by the shell organization. Department and program
chairs respond even more closely to the interests
of their guild colleagues than do deans. We might
think of deans and chairs as “guild masters,” for
they manage the operation of the guilds both
on behalf of the guild members and on behalf of
the shell organization.
In this model, it is important to focus on institutional purpose. Some might say that the research
university produces students, research products,
economic development, and public service. While
the university does produce these things, the
delivery of goods and services to society is actually
a secondary benefit from the university’s primary
pursuit of internal quality, as represented by
research and students.
Quality Engines: Research universities, in our
view, exist to accumulate the highest level and the
greatest amount of internal academic quality possible. The goal is to gather inside the university the
most research-productive faculty, the brightest students, and the highest-quality academic and cultural
environment achievable. Although the research university delivers a wide variety of products to external
constituencies, such as graduates, technology, economic development, and public service, its primary
focus is on the creation of internal quality. This is
why we call research universities “quality engines.”
In pursuing the goal of maximum internal
quality, the research university will almost automatically graduate its students, promote economic development, and serve the public interest. However, the
production of these goods and services does not drive
university success, although it may motivate others
to help the institution to succeed.
The model clearly illustrates a relationship
between the academic core of guilds and the university’s shell. The shell’s primary responsibility is to
Quality Engines
find the money needed to compete effectively for
the best faculty (including all of the subsidies for
their research) and for the best students (including
all of the amenities and academic and educational
enhancements that attract them).
The shell organizes structures and systems to
raise private endowments and gifts, to lobby for
public funds, to compete for federal dollars, to
seek foundation revenue, and to create a hospitable
and supportive academic and cultural environment.
The shell raises this money and creates this environment so that the guilds succeed in recruiting
and retaining quality faculty, in subsidizing
research, and in promoting similar activities
that create internal quality.
Shell participants often take a more direct role
in the recruitment and retention of undergraduate
students, in whom the guild has less of a direct
interest. The interactions between the guilds
and the shell, and also between the shell and the
external environment, are much more complex
and more closely interrelated than presented
here. Nonetheless, the model of quality engines
focuses our attention on the research university’s
revenue-seeking behavior in support of the guild’s
success and by extension the institution’s success
in the competition for quality.
The model sees the university as an enterprise
that is its own primary customer. On the surface,
this appears a bit contradictory, since the revenue
that supports the university comes from outside the
institution and the institution organizes itself to
capture relentlessly as much revenue from all of
these sources as possible. Most observers would
assume that the university sells a product or service
directly to those who provide it with money. While
the university does provide value to those who pay,
the process that it uses to provide the value and the
mechanisms for payment dilute much of the relationship between buyer and seller that characterizes
transactions in the for-profit world.
For example, research universities sell the talent
of their research faculty and staff to the federal
government to do research that is in the national
interest. At the same time, universities also purchase
access to (and a competitive advantage in) the federal
competition for grants through subsidies of research
facilities and talent. The universities compete
against each other for federal grants, but they
also invest their internal funds heavily for the
opportunity to compete. The funds that universities
use to subsidize the competition for federal research
The university
come from annual giving,
earnings on endowment,
maximizes its revenue
state agencies, returns on
to purchase quality
patents and licenses,
internal savings, and other
research, quality
surplus-generating activities
of the institution.
students, quality
Instead of seeing the university as a producer of goods
faculty, and a quality
and services for an external
academic environment.
competitive marketplace, we
can think of the university as
a consumer of the quality that it purchases from the
external marketplace. In this view, the university
maximizes its revenue from all sources to purchase
quality research, quality students, quality faculty,
and a quality academic environment. It then uses
the existence of this quality environment to attract
additional external investors who buy access to
the environment and contribute to its creation
rather than purchasing ownership of any particular
university product.
The goal of research universities, then, is to
accumulate the highest level and the largest amount
of quality it can through the competitive purchase
of scarce quality elements. Whether the institution
is an elite private institution with a $14 billion
endowment and $266 million of federally funded
research or a public institution just barely over
the $20 million level of federal research with an
endowment of only $15 million, they behave in
remarkably similar ways.
The details of the revenue-seeking behavior of
individual universities vary depending on circumstances, history, opportunities, and private or
public control. TheCenter’s annual reports track the
performance of research universities as they pursue
the maximum accumulation of research and undergraduate student quality.
Page 11
The Competitive Context
for Research Universities
The research university’s essential elements are
scarce. Universities and their people live in an environment of competition for everything: outstanding
students, good grades, faculty positions, promotion
and tenure, publication opportunities, grants,
research and teaching space, and resources to support
academic specialties are a few examples.
The most important competition for faculty
begins with the hiring process, when one open
position attracts many applicants but the applicant
pool contains only a few top candidates. Potential
faculty members compete with each other to appear
in the top group of aspiring research faculty, and
universities compete with each other to purchase
the services of the individuals in the top group.
Availability of Research and Teaching Talent:
The discussion of the process for recruiting, promoting, tenuring, and retaining faculty is long, and
we will not engage it fully here. For our purposes in
charting the performance of research universities, a
critical distinction about this competition for the
best faculty requires emphasis.
Research university competition for faculty is
about research, not about teaching. Much confusion
and rhetoric attaches to this view, as observers of
university life argue about
the relative merits of teachResearch talent and
ing and research. For our
purposes, this argument is
productivity are much
beside the point. The issue
less available and much
is not whether teaching or
research has more intrinsic
less predictable than is
value, but whether teaching
talent is more plentiful
teaching talent.
than research talent.
Research talent and
productivity is much less available and much less
predictable than teaching talent, and this difference
determines the university’s focus on research rather
than teaching in the acquisition and management of
faculty. Although teaching requires skill, knowledge,
creativity, and commitment, this is not the issue.
The issue is that almost all faculty with the basic
credentials for a research university appointment
Page 12
(a Ph.D. or its equivalent and a reasonable record
of scholarly accomplishment) will teach well.
The likelihood is high that a university, in hiring
promising research faculty members, will also
acquire excellent teachers.
Like teaching, research also requires skill, knowledge, creativity, and commitment, but research
talent is scarce. The guilds cannot predict with high
levels of confidence which of the most promising
research graduates of the best doctoral programs in
the country will sustain a high level of nationally
competitive research productivity over a working
career. By selecting and reviewing credentials carefully, the guild can improve its chances of hiring
and retaining people who will indeed perform as
researchers throughout their careers, but the risk
nonetheless remains substantial.
As time goes on, even with the most careful
screening, the proportion of a cohort of promising
faculty who remain productive in research will
decline. A few will not produce nationally competitive research at all; many will produce well for six
to eight years and then cease to compete at national
levels. Others will create sustained and productive
research programs and will maintain their vitality
and competitiveness over a career of thirty or more
years. By contrast, in any given cohort of faculty
hired by a research university, all but a very few
will teach effectively, and many will teach superbly
for the thirty or more years of their careers.
From a management perspective, this creates a
problem, because the labor force required for universities to succeed in the national research competition
is relatively inflexible. Once the long six-year period
of probation ends, faculty become permanent university employees. Tenure confers this security of
employment and is the structure that creates an
inflexible labor force, but it is also a requirement
for a successful university research enterprise.
The topic of tenure is complex and has an extensive and often polemical literature. Suffice it to say
here that university research that extends human
knowledge does not prosper where the investigator’s
livelihood is dependent on evaluations of short-term
success. The pursuit of short-term research results
often leads people to work on the things they already
know well rather than on the things they do not
know. The pursuit of new knowledge entails a
substantial risk of being wrong (scholars can
only be right all of the time if they already know
the answers to the questions they ask). The
employment security of tenure is a necessary
requirement to encourage this risky exploration
of the unknown, and it represents a cost in the
university’s support of research.
Universities compete with each other by paying
a premium in the faculty marketplace for successful
research faculty at various stages in their careers
because such individuals are scarce. Universities pay
almost no premium for successful teaching faculty
at any stage in their careers because such individuals
are abundant. Indeed, the emergence of a lively
market in inexpensive adjunct and part-time
teaching talent indicates a negative premium for
teaching experience.
The limited availability of research talent and
the competition to acquire this talent explain why
the conversation about mobilizing resources for
institutional quality focuses primarily on the
competition for and support of research faculty.
Supporting Research Competition: This model
of research universities as quality engines highlights
the close relationship between competitive success
and money. Money makes it possible for the institutions to compete for the scarce talent of research
faculty and to support all of the elements of plant,
equipment, personnel, and university environment
that they require.
University people see themselves as pursuing
a higher mission and do not like to think of
themselves as part of enterprises that generate and
spend revenue. Yet in no university does the higher
mission prosper without the investment of money
in people, plant, and equipment.
The centrality of money to this competition
affects every single program, whether it is fine
arts and music or physics and chemistry. The art
department needs studio space and materials; the
music school needs rehearsal space, instruments, and
recording equipment. The physics and chemistry
departments require laboratory space and scientific
instruments. The best faculty in every guild want
nationally competitive salaries, and the best students
want nationally competitive undergraduate programs
and financial aid packages.
The quality engine’s success depends in the first
instance on its ability to generate money. All things
being equal, the more money the university can
invest effectively in the competition for quality, the
better it will become. Research university shells, as
predicted by our model, organize the mechanisms
for maximizing revenue.
The competition among
All things being equal,
universities for people and
resources is fierce. If a
the more money the
research project will take
university can invest
five years to develop, the
university that starts first
effectively in the
will finish first. The university that gets the three
competition for quality,
best faculty in the world in
the better it will become.
a particular field will have
a competitive edge. While
research faculty move from
institution to institution for higher salaries and
better research support, they do not move every year.
If the faculty with the critical talent needed for a
research project moved last year, they will not likely
move this year.
The advantage in the competition goes to those
who have the money today to buy the services of
talented people and the equipment and resources
needed. What matters most for the research university is not its total assets or the aggregate value of
its endowment, buildings, and equipment. Rather,
what matters most is the cash generated by these
assets and other activities, which the university can
immediately spend to compete.
Competitive university research operates at the
outside edges of human knowledge, and small differences in talent and ability often make big differences
in research success. If a university fails to recruit
the top quantum physicists for its project, it will
find itself disadvantaged in competing against
the university that has those top physicists. The
disadvantage will rapidly become serious as the
competing university moves quickly ahead in the
process of discovery.
Page 13
Research is also a high-risk business, and
institutions find it difficult to predict exactly
which research investment will produce the most
competitive result in the medium term of five to
ten years. The larger the cash flow that a university
can mobilize to invest in different research initiatives, the greater the chance that it will have
successful results, and the better its ability to
withstand failures.
Individual scientific research programs may
have a lifespan of ten years,
and in that time the instituUniversities frequently
tion will invest many millions
from its own resources (in
use decision mechanisms
addition to whatever it can
that rely primarily on
win in grants and external
support) for salaries, space,
traditions, politics, or
equipment, and support
personnel. If it spends
personal preferences that
its revenue well, the university will see returns on this
limit the effective use of
investment in the form of
rational criteria.
discoveries, publications,
grants, contracts, and scholarly reputation. If it invests ineffectively, it will
see its quality decline despite that investment.
Universities encounter significant challenges
in managing the institution’s investment choices.
Universities and their faculty engage in many
activities, produce many things, and have multiple
constituencies. Every activity can benefit from
the investment of additional dollars, and all activities have internal and external support groups
that argue for additional investment in their
preferred activity. Almost all of these activities
reflect quality programs.
As the model would predict, the process for making investment decisions in a university is complex.
This is because the guilds have their own interests
centered on guild advancement, and the shell often
lacks the technical and political support to make
effective investment choices. Deans and chairs represent not the interests of the university but those
of the guilds or collections of guilds under their
administration. Pressures from both the academic
core and the external constituencies of revenue
Page 14
providers, combined with often remarkably poor
management data, inhibit the effective use of
resources to build competitive quality.
Universities frequently use decision mechanisms
that reflect the complicated relationships of their
many constituencies and that rely primarily on
traditions, politics, or personal preferences. These
common mechanisms limit the effective use of the
rational criteria that will guide the institution to
identify the optimal choice for acquiring internal
quality. When a university has large amounts of
discretionary revenue, it can often afford ineffective
systems and nonetheless remain competitive.
However, universities with fewer resources will find
that these ineffective decision methods inhibit their
efforts to improve.
Decisions about spending money have a disproportionate impact on research because research is a
money-losing proposition with significant multiplier
effects. Universities must generate as much revenue
as possible so that they can buy as much quality
research as possible. Each investment of internal
funds creates the opportunity to acquire additional
external funds in support of research. Good investments create large multipliers and research grows
rapidly; poor investments have small multipliers
and produce much slower growth.
Research, even though it can serve as a multiplier,
creates an expense, not a surplus. Although externally funded grants and contracts are large items
in any research university’s revenue stream, they
represent the multiplier effect of the additional
university funds that these projects always require
to pay their full cost.
Some of these required payments from internal
resources appear explicitly: for example, underpayment for indirect costs is a characteristic of federal,
state, and especially foundation sponsored projects.
Although the effective recovery of indirect costs
varies from institution to institution, no university
recovers the full audited costs of research. The
difference between the audited and the reimbursed
expenses is a cost to the university of the successful
competition for grant-funded research projects.
Universities subsidize research in many other
ways. Released time from teaching for faculty who
do research in the humanities, social sciences, arts,
and professions (fields with fewer substantial external grants) is a cost of research for the university.
Funded grants from federal and other agencies often
require an explicit university payment from internal
funds, called “cost sharing,” as a condition for
acquiring the grant.
The competition for quality human resources
impels universities to fund endowed positions for
research faculty, the cost of which they rarely charge
in full to research grants. Institutions also subsidize
graduate students through stipends both to attract
the quality research faculty who teach them and to
provide talented labor for research projects.
The direct competition for research faculty often
involves even larger subsidies. When a university
succeeds in attracting a highly productive faculty
member in the sciences from another institution, for
example, the recruitment package usually includes
many expenses beyond the individual’s increased
salary and benefits. The university will pay for the
cost of moving the scientist’s laboratory to the new
university, the cost of laboratory renovations and set
up, the cost of new equipment to replace equipment
belonging to the prior institution. It will also pay to
acquire the newly hired faculty member’s students
and assistants, costs that include moving them and
setting up their research space.
Universities do this because the newly acquired
faculty member’s team will bring larger and more
significant research grants to the university, thereby
increasing institutional quality. The institution also
knows that it will never recover most of these relocation costs. Instead, the increased research grants
and contracts brought by the newly acquired
faculty member will require additional subsidies.
The gain is in the acquisition of internal quality
for the institution, thus improving the multiplier
of university investments in research, but the university must first generate the revenue that it needs to
invest in this quality.
As the quality engine model shows, university
success comes from the ability to spend wisely an
ever-increasing revenue stream. For a research university, spending it well means increasing research
productivity by acquiring the best faculty and
programs, competing successfully for the most
prestigious grants, and ultimately, publishing the
most significant advances in the arts, humanities,
social sciences, professions,
and sciences.
Universities and colleges
The Undergraduate
Competition: Competition
sell undergraduate
among research universities
also includes an aggressive
education primarily as
effort in the teaching enteran experienced process
prise. While the research
competition focuses on the
rather than as a
acquisition of scarce faculty
research talent, undergradupurchased product.
ate programs compete for
the limited number of
top-quality students.
The perceived quality of a university’s undergraduate program depends in considerable measure on
the quality of its student body. The better the quality of students that the university can recruit, the
better the quality of undergraduate program it will
have. This assumption about undergraduate quality
is an important reality of the university marketplace.
The undergraduate competition focuses primarily
on non-academic issues that parents and students
assume are relevant to the educational experience.
This is an interesting phenomenon because undergraduate education is ostensibly about acquiring
the defined body of knowledge that the degree
certifies. If we decompose undergraduate education
into its component parts, however, we find that the
formal academic curriculum follows a relatively
standard form at most universities and resembles
a commodity product.
This is true because accreditation agencies,
financial aid organizations, public regulatory agencies, legislatures, and consumers of undergraduate
education prefer a relatively standardized curriculum. Over time, the formal content of the undergraduate degree has tended towards a high degree
of standard content from one university to another.
While the curriculum may vary in terms of electives
and the degree of emphasis placed on science,
humanities, ethics, or religion, the basic content
of a four- or five-year bachelor’s degree has become
Page 15
almost a commodity product, even if the way it is
delivered and the faculty who deliver it vary significantly from institution to institution.
In addition, even though the quality of the undergraduate content and the quality of the teaching
may differ from institution to institution, the
consumers generally cannot easily recognize these
differences directly. Undergraduate consumers do
not constitute repeat buyers in the marketplace
for the most part. The differences in quality from
institution to institution, while perhaps significant
in some instances, have no obvious external measure.
Instead, consumers look for indirect measures of
presumed academic quality. As a result, universities
tend to compete for students based more on the
quality of the experience that students will receive
at the university while pursuing the standard
curricular structure, rather than on highly
differentiated content
within the curriculum.
Without clear indicators
Universities and colleges
sell undergraduate education
of undergraduate
primarily as an experienced
process rather than as a purquality, consumers
chased product. They issue
take the quality of
a token of successful participation in that process — the
students as a signal
degree or diploma — but the
degree certifies participation
of quality content.
that meets relatively generic
standards and does not necessarily guarantee a particular result or a defined level
of competence. Different participants will take away
different results from the experience, even though
they all receive the same degree.
Universities and colleges imply that the degree
represents a product containing a measurable and
standard amount of education or knowledge. Efforts
to measure this learning in some clear and reliable
way have so far failed to establish a definition of the
content of a standard undergraduate degree. The
apparent commodity characteristic of the content
and the difficulty of measuring the result of the
process lead universities to compete for students
based on the quality and variety of experiences and
opportunities that the process provides.
Page 16
As is the case with all providers of name-brand
commodities, universities invest heavily in differentiating the presentation and the context of their
undergraduate process to compete for quality
students. The differentiation involves such things
as smaller classes, enhanced extracurricular activities,
and elaborate entertainment for participants through
sports, art, music, theater, and similar amenities.
Universities enrich the basic commodity content
with learning experiences such as overseas campuses,
honors programs, off-campus fieldwork, internships,
and individualized study.
Universities offer a wide range of experiences
to accompany the commodity content by providing
activities such as leadership opportunities in
clubs and student government. They offer
special non-academic services such as psychological
counseling and travel opportunities, as well as
elaborate recreation, intramural sports, and
fitness programs.
Success in this competition comes from attracting
a high-quality student population to the campus.
This is a self-reinforcing phenomenon. Without
clear and direct indicators of quality, consumers
take the quality of enrolled students as one of the
most important signals of quality content. The high
quality of existing students attracts high-quality
applicants, and from this group the university can
select an even higher-quality student body.
All of this activity in pursuit of the quality
student costs money. Enhanced facilities consume
revenue. High-quality students expect preferential
treatment in the form of tuition discounts and other
financial aid considerations. In large, public universities with low tuition, a tuition discount is not a
major benefit, but special housing, small classes for
honors students, and special extracurricular opportunities all cost money and help to attract the best
students. Indeed, the competitiveness of the honors
programs at public institutions is such that their
admissions standards are often higher than those
at most elite private colleges (and of course much
higher than the general admission standards of the
public institution itself). The undergraduate financial model that supports this competition varies
by institutional control.
Private institutions use substantial subsidies
drawn from endowment income and annual gifts
to support the tuition discounts that attract the best
students. This limits the size of the student body
that they can support. Public universities, with taxsupported payments for instruction, often respond to
the political process and state funding systems when
setting enrollments. Public institutions use their
discretionary dollars to create special programs and
enrich the educational experience that they offer to
the most desirable students.
The undergraduate financial system depends
less on the sale of admission to students and more
on the acquisition of funds from multiple sources
to support the experience of students. Many who
do not participate directly in undergraduate
education nonetheless pay for its success. Some
funding comes by virtue of social policies such
as state and federal payments for student financial
aid. Alumni and other private individuals
contribute to scholarships and programs for undergraduates because they value a continuing identification with the undergraduate experience. Others
support quality undergraduate programs through
bequests, endowments, and capital gifts that secure
the immortality of permanent recognition. The
motives for these purchasers of undergraduate
quality are many, but each purchase recognizes
value in the process, although many of those who
contribute to the cost of undergraduate education
(state and federal legislators and private donors in
particular) do not actually receive a direct benefit.
Colleges and universities invest heavily in
enhancements to the undergraduate experience,
because they know that the quality of students and
of student life attracts other students and signals the
overall quality of the institution to donors, alumni,
faculty, legislators, and others. For the same reasons,
colleges and universities invest in elegant campuses,
ivy-covered buildings, student recreation facilities,
cultural entertainment programs, alumni halls,
intercollegiate sports, and other non-academic
features of college life. The techniques used to fund
the endless additions to the undergraduate process
and to enhance the physical and experiential elements of college life vary among institutions, but
the drive to generate revenue for investment in this
competition for high-quality students is visible in
all institutional types.
The Combination of Undergraduate and
Research Competition:
High-quality research
Research universities, by
universities compete directly
with the single-function, elite
virtue of the complexity
undergraduate colleges for the
scarce talent of superior stuof their activities,
dents. It is no surprise, then,
cross-subsidize research
to discover that the undergraduate part of the research
from teaching and
university functions in ways
that mimic the elite college.
teaching from research.
However, where the elite college emphasizes the benefits
of a smaller size, the research universities tend to
emphasize the benefits of their nationally preeminent research faculty and the breadth of their offerings. In this competition for quality undergraduates,
the research university has some advantages.
Research universities, by virtue of the complexity
of their activities, find ways to cross-subsidize
research from teaching, and teaching from research.
The most obvious example involves the physical
plant. Facilities that the university builds for
research often support some forms of teaching as
well, either through laboratory use or by housing
faculty who teach. Similarly, facilities constructed in
support of teaching also house faculty who conduct
research. Libraries serve both teaching and research,
but the support of a research program allows a much
larger and richer library for undergraduates than the
university could afford based on its undergraduate
program alone. At the same time, in public universities, tax-generated funding for libraries often follows
formulas based on enrollment, and the existence of a
larger undergraduate population may make possible
a richer research library than the university could
afford on the basis of its research activity alone.
Computing resources, like libraries, often have a
scale in support of teaching and research that they
could not reach based on one or the other alone.
The most important shared element, of course, is
the faculty. Research universities can have a larger
Page 17
faculty than they could justify by the teaching
mission alone, because the institution subsidizes a
portion of faculty time for research purposes and
competes for research dollars that sustain additional
parts of the faculty’s costs. The university will not
necessarily have more faculty members teaching
smaller classes. Instead, the students will have the
opportunity to engage a wider range of high-quality
research faculty talent.
The key distinction is the word “opportunity.”
In the competition that surrounds the standard
content of undergraduate education, the opportunity
for participation is often just as important as a
student actually engaging research faculty. Many
students do not care to engage faculty beyond the
minimum requirements,
while others anticipate
Some institutions avoid
that they will engage but do
not actually do so.
confronting the data,
Research faculty may not
but those who seek
teach many of the large,
lower-division undergraduate
improvement know that
courses, but they frequently
teach upper-division courses
they must monitor the
for majors. As a result, students in general may not have
numbers reflecting their
many encounters with distincompetitive position.
guished research faculty, but
they usually will have at least
some encounters, thus validating the opportunity
for participation.
Both the presence of the research enterprise
and the high national visibility of such activity
enhance the institution’s ability to generate
revenue from other sources in support of undergraduate education. Donors, for example, in giving
to scholarships and other funds that the university
uses to recruit the best undergraduate students,
may be responding just as much to the institution’s
research reputation as they are to the actual quality
of the undergraduate program.
Conversely, undergraduate education also
supports research. The best research faculty often
value their membership in an academic community
that includes quality undergraduate programs and
student life. They seek an academic environment
Page 18
that includes sports facilities, recreation, music,
fine arts, and other entertainment and culture
brought by the existence of the quality undergraduate experience. All faculty value their membership in a university community that they perceive
to be intellectually elite, and the quality of the
undergraduates is one of the tokens of elite status
that universities use in recruiting stellar faculty.
Many research faculty also seek the opportunity
to teach talented undergraduates.
In some circumstances, the relationship between
undergraduate education and research is more direct
and revenue-related. In public universities, the
undergraduate mission — seen by state agencies as
a primary activity — often generates an amount of
revenue that exceeds the direct cost of undergraduate
education. In such cases, undergraduate students
become a profit center, generating revenue above
their costs that the university can then reinvest to
subsidize quality research.
States sometimes fund universities based on
formulas that anticipate providing the university
with some research support for every undergraduate
student enrolled. This reflects the belief that faculty
research contributes to the quality of undergraduate
education. As mentioned above, states often use
formulas based on undergraduate enrollment in
funding facilities for infrastructure, library, or
computing, thus creating a subsidy for research
facilities at the same time.
This revenue synergy between teaching and
research at public universities offsets their relatively
small endowments as compared to their private
university competitors. It also helps to explain the
relatively large size of undergraduate populations at
public research institutions. In a private institution,
which lacks publicly funded subsidies for education,
the size of the undergraduate population is more a
function of the revenue available to subsidize quality
students. Increasing the size of the student body
usually does not increase available revenue, especially
if the university must pay more to educate the
students than their discounted tuition can cover.
The drive to acquire quality students and research
faculty creates a universal imperative: to generate
the revenue needed to compete for these scarce but
essential elements. The university, represented by its
shell structure, organizes its systems into a revenuegenerating organization on behalf of faculty research
and student quality. In this competition, institutions
require both the availability of the revenue and its
effective investment to produce a top American
research university.
Measuring Institutional
Competitiveness for
Research Universities
Ranking and Measuring
The operation of research universities is a
required topic for everyone interested in improving
institutional performance. Often, the rhetoric of
improvement implies a positive-sum game in which
everyone can improve by doing the right thing. In
one sense, this is true, for every university can
improve its internal operations and enhance its
performance as a result.
The message of positive-sum improvement,
however, implies that the choice of what to improve
is a local concern. If every university could improve
without regard to other participants in the higher
education environment, then improvement relative
to others would not be particularly important. The
significant question would then be internal: how
well does the institution perform on whatever
internal agenda it defines?
University improvement programs often appear
in this format, proposing to enhance some aspect of
the local environment as if what happens elsewhere
is of minor concern or serves primarily as a source
of examples of desirable programs and activities.
The advantage of this perspective is that such
improvement programs generally have weak mechanisms for determining success or failure, since any
change can appear to be beneficial. Its inherent flaw,
however, is that it ignores the reality of competition
for scarce but essential resources.
As the quality engine model shows, quality
elements are scarce, and universities acquire them
through competition against other institutions.
Competition for students, faculty, and research
defines the performance of the research university.
Some institutions may prefer to avoid confronting
the data that describe their success in this competition; however, those who seek improvement know
that they must monitor the numbers reflecting their
competitive position.
Universities and their constituents often focus
on process issues rather than on performance. They
worry about the process for distributing revenue, for
hiring faculty, and for recruiting students. They pay
much less attention to the results and especially to
the comparative results. However, if the process for
distributing revenue to the guilds produces internal
harmony and high levels of participation but fails to
improve either undergraduate quality or research
performance, then it is actually a failed process,
regardless of the state of internal harmony.
Sustaining undergraduate programs and research
at nationally competitive levels of quality and
productivity requires constant measurement, close
attention to revenues and expenditures, and close
faculty and administrative management. A few
universities perform at top competitive levels;
others compete more effectively in some things
and less so in others.
TheCenter’s data identify some of the characteristics of the institutions that excel in this national
competition. The data in this publication (presented
in more detail online) display these characteristics.
Institutions are often frustrated by the lack of tools
The drive to acquire
that are currently available
for measuring their success in
quality students and
the competition for faculty,
students, and dollars. In part,
research creates a
this is the result of the locauniversal imperative:
tion of universities within
corporate space. As not-forto generate the revenue
profit enterprises, they enjoy
a self-justifying existence
needed to compete for
that requires them to provide
these scarce but essential
only a limited number of validated references to the pubelements.
lic. Although universities
provide an endless stream of
Page 19
reports and surveys to external
agencies and governing organAlthough universities
izations, these rarely offer the
complain bitterly about
data necessary for effective
management or for reliable
the unreliable nature of
institutional comparison.
Detailed, standardized
rankings, they advertise
information does exist for
a variety of accounting
their own success in
purposes that are useful for
spurious rankings with
demonstrating the fulfillment
of the institution’s
enthusiasm.
fiduciary responsibilities,
but these data do not usually
serve a useful management purpose.
Systems for ranking and classifying universities
abound, and many of these systems use data that are
unreliable or inappropriate for this purpose. Many
rankings attempt to capture in one number an
aggregate evaluation of the institution’s worth relative to others. No currently available data offer sufficient reliability or coverage to accomplish this task.
The widely varying results from year to year of the
most popular of these rankings, outlined in a paper
published online by TheCenter, offer eloquent testimony to the unreliability of the measures, since colleges and universities in the top categories rarely
change their competitive performance significantly
from one year to the next. These popular rankings
will often move institutions up and down in ways
that do not reflect real changes in performance.
In addition, universities compete in the marketplace of public opinion based on prestige or reputation, which is often a highly subjective evaluation.
Prestige is a form of name-brand recognition derived
from historical visibility, from promotional campaigns that project institutional identity, and from
the halo effect of real accomplishments. As a result,
colleges and universities emphasize what is unique
and different in their environment. They collect
information that identifies them as unique in a
comparative context. Special characteristics demonstrated by institutionally unique data are a hallmark
of much university-generated public relations
information. Prestige, or reputation, also reflects
past behavior and publicity more than current
Page 20
performance, and its unreliability severely
limits the validity of rankings that use reputation
as an indicator.
Various national groups publish many rankings
of universities, colleges, and programs, and these
rankings fill a vacuum created by the inability of
universities to agree on standard, validated measures
of performance or on common criteria for judging
competitiveness. Although many universities
complain bitterly about the unreliable nature
of the rankings (and they truly are often quite
unreliable), these same universities nonetheless
advertise their own success in spurious rankings
with great enthusiasm.
In the competition for the best students and
faculty, universities embrace positive rankings in
the effort to enhance their reputations. They also
use positive rankings from virtually any source to
persuade donors and other revenue providers that
the institution’s unique and valuable mission
deserves a gift or grant or additional state or federal
subsidy. The highly publicized but methodologically
questionable rankings serve this purpose. They
create an illusion of distinction and differentiation,
offer a presumably impartial validation of qualities
promoted by the institution, and create an opportunity for self-promotion that outsiders find difficult
to challenge and that insiders find difficult to resist.
Within the many rankings done by organizations
with different purposes and using different methodologies, universities can usually find at least one that
ranks them highly on some criteria.
These rankings, in spite of their visibility, do
not help university managers, although they may
indeed help the public relations effort. No business,
not-for-profit or otherwise, can allow promotional
materials alone to serve as accurate measures of its
competitive success. To do so is to forfeit the opportunity to improve the university’s performance.
Without clear measurement and a commitment
to competitive success, universities tend to replicate
themselves at the same level (or at slightly declining
levels) of performance. Absent institutional commitment, the external competition for the best students
and faculty will slowly erode a university’s quality.
Beyond the minimal requirements of enrollment
and meeting the institution’s steady state financial
commitments, nothing in the external environment
compels a self-generating research university to
become better than it already is. The drive to
compete at a high level generally comes from
within the institution.
For research universities, the risks inherent in
unmeasured management are significant. This is
because success is so heavily dependent on the institution’s ability to generate the money for effective
investment in research and student subsidies. An
institution that manages its money poorly loses
the opportunity to generate surpluses to invest in
research and student quality. An institution that
raises too little endowment to generate income or
inadequate annual giving to sustain its subsidies, for
example, will eventually fail to maintain its market
share in the research competition, thus losing its
competitive edge in recruiting the best students.
An institution that invests without measuring
results will waste its resources.
In the competition for quality undergraduates
and research performance, the total size of the university’s budget does not matter as much as the
way that the institution uses its money. If a large
institution with a budget in excess of a billion dollars spends large portions of its revenue on activities
that are unrelated to research or undergraduate quality, it will have a less competitive research university
than a much smaller institution that spends most of
its money on research and undergraduate quality.
The first requirement for a successful research
university is to generate revenue. The second
requirement is to spend it well. The detailed and
specific methods that universities use internally to
make good choices vary from place to place and from
time to time, but a number of measures do exist that
serve as reasonably reliable indicators of an institution’s competitiveness in the national marketplace.
A discussion of these measures appears below.
Defining the Competition: Although the
quality engine model depicts research universities
operating two theoretically separable economies for
teaching and research, most institutional accounting
systems do not separate the revenue and expenses
clearly enough to analyze these economies separately.
Rather than trying to identify research or teaching
revenue and expenses as separate elements, it is more
useful to imagine that the university purchases its
undergraduate and research quality by drawing the
money from one common fund. This is not true in
detail, of course, since most university money is
restricted to specific purposes in both private and
public institutions.
Nonetheless, universities gain more by thinking
of all of the revenue as being available for any purpose: money is money. Institutions that first identify
the best uses for their revenue (whether in improving the quality of the undergraduate student body or
in improving the quality of the research enterprise),
before considering various restrictions and limitations created by the providers of the revenue, will
make better choices. They will identify the highest
and best use of each dollar, and then, if necessary,
they can make adjustments, reallocations, or
transfers to meet required fund restrictions.
By making their choices first, however, many
universities find that they can accommodate fund
restrictions and still stay on track with their optimal
expenditure plan. If the university begins its budget
plan by considering the limitations on funds, it will have
The first requirement
considerable difficulty identifor a successful
fying the highest and best
uses for the money.
research university is
The most useful measures
of a university’s competitiveto generate revenue.
ness mark the institution’s
success in securing quality
The second requirement
research, a quality student
is to spend it well.
body, and quality faculty.
The university with the most
research, the highest student quality, and the most
distinguished faculty is thus the most competitive.
Of course, such measures do not mean that
universities with smaller numbers are of less intrinsic value or that their smaller number of research
faculty are less distinguished or less productive than
the larger number at the more competitive institution. The data only identify which institutions
compete most successfully for the largest share of
the quality elements that all universities seek.
Page 21
These data help to clarify general impressions
about university performance. The differences
between institutions with similar performance
characteristics are not great, which is why TheCenter
classifies institutions into groups based on their
performance within the top 25 or the top 50 institutions on a variety of measures. More important than
the classification of institutions into these groups,
the comparable data provided by TheCenter allows
universities to measure the effectiveness of their
improvement initiatives.
Indicators of Competitiveness: Although we
cannot measure research university competition
directly at the institutional level, a number of comparable indicators exist that, when taken together,
give a reasonably good sense of a university’s
competitiveness. This publication reports on these
indicators, which the 2000 edition of The Top
American Research Universities described in detail.
In the following summary of each of the
measures, we have included a high-median-low
graphic that captures the range of performance of
private and public research institutions on each
measure within each of the four research groups
or categories (over $20 million, $5 to $20 million,
$1 to $5 million, and under $1 million in federal
research expenditures). To reduce the effect of outliers, the high represents the 75th percentile and
the low represents the 25th percentile.
Briefly, the most important indicator of research
competitiveness is the institution’s annual federal
research expenditures. This number, reported by
Federal Research
by Research Group and Control
Public
75th Percentile
Median
25th Percentile
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
$180,000
$160,000
1999 Federal Research (x $1,000)
Private
$140,000
$120,000
$100,000
$87,152
$80,000
$60,000
$55,873
$40,000
$20,000
$11,384
$9,992
$2,361
$0
Page 22
$2,234
$233
$219
the National Science Foundation (NSF), reflects an
institution’s research expenditures in the areas of
science and engineering from funds awarded by the
various programs of the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation,
and other agencies of the federal government,
including the departments of Defense and Energy.
These dollars, generally distributed through an
intensely competitive peer-reviewed process, reflect
the active scientific community’s judgment on the
competitiveness of the faculty at each institution.
An additional value of this measure is that it
indicates the effectiveness of the institution in
supporting research, for the more money a university
spends in support of research, all things being
equal, the more research it will get. Of course, if a
university spends its money in support of research
that does not result in publication or other peerreviewed results, its standing in this competition
will not improve. For these reasons, most observers
of the competition among American research universities watch the federal research expenditure number
as the most reliable single indicator of research
competitiveness.
NSF also reports the annual federal awards of
grants and contracts for research received by each
institution, which is a significantly less useful measure. Awards often reflect multi-year commitments;
expenditures capture the actual work done on projects during a given year. Awards also include dollars
that subsequently flow to other universities under
subcontracts. For institutions moving rapidly ahead
on a research promotion agenda, the awards number
may help to demonstrate their growing success in
competing for greater amounts of research funding,
but as a comparative measure of current university
performance, the expenditure data are more reliable.
Universities, both private and public, in addition
to the federal expenditures, report expenditures from
non-federal sources, including corporations, state
governments, and foundation or for-profit research
enterprises. These expenditures, more broadly
defined than the federal number, include a variety of
specially designated state funds that are allocated to
institutions within the state for agriculture or other
research purposes. Such funding may not be nation-
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
1999 Total Research (x $1,000)
$250,000
$200,000
$150,000
$126,001
$114,024
$100,000
$50,000
$15,522
$0
$21,005
$3,294
$3,454
$503
$576
ally competitive. Nonetheless, these expenditures,
combined with the federal expenditures, reflect total
research activity and provide a useful indicator of
research performance, even if the national peer
review process does not referee all of the projects
included in this number. Most of the non-federal
portion of this total research, especially when funded
by foundations, requires institutional subsidies as
well. Thus, many observers recognize total research
expenditures as another useful indicator of research
competitiveness.
Universities that do not have large portfolios of
corporate or agricultural research will argue that the
total research measurement puts them at a disadvantage in any comparison. While that may be true,
institutions still make many choices in how they
will spend their revenue in support of research. Some
will take advantage of medical schools; others will
leverage their opportunities in agriculture. Some
will take advantage of successfully constructed linkages between industry and programs in engineering
to generate corporate funding. Others will benefit
from alumni who direct large foundations that make
research grants. The issue here is not the relative
value of the different types of research but rather the
strategies and successes of universities in creating the
revenue necessary to expand their research portfolios.
In making choices about how to compete for
external research funding, some universities compete
in all sectors of the research market, while others
compete only in the parts of the market where they
identify a comparative advantage. The federal and
Endowment Assets
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
$3,500,000
$3,000,000
2000 Endowment Assets (x $1,000)
Over $20M
$300,000
total research expenditures capture most of this
activity, and together these two serve as useful
indicators of competitive research success. In the
discussion of changes in research competitiveness
included in this edition of The Top American Research
Universities, however, we maintain our focus on federal research expenditures.
Although it is difficult to derive a valid measure
of the total financial resources that are available to
a research university, two measures provide some
indication of the university’s ability to compete for
private funds. Endowment represents the university’s
permanent fund that continues to generate income
each year. Annual giving includes the total gifts
received by the university in the most recent year.
While endowment reflects a long history of private
giving, as well as the growth of the fund through
retained earnings and appreciation, it also serves as
$2,500,000
$2,000,000
$1,500,000
$1,278,774
$1,000,000
$500,000
$258,000
$189,547
$60,852
$0
$164,011
$38,636
$160,248
$20,805
Annual Giving
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
$240,000
2000 Annual Giving (x $1,000)
Total Research
$200,000
$160,000
$120,000
$93,629
$80,000
$40,000
$46,712
$33,346
$12,547
$0
$15,112
$7,655
Page 23
$12,137
$3,013
Public
75th Percentile
Median
National Academy Membership
25th Percentile
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
45
2000 National Academy Members
40
35
30
25
20
15
13
10
5
5
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Faculty Awards
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
The number of doctorates awarded reflects
the university’s commitment to advanced study
in all fields. Postdoctoral appointees demonstrate
the commitment of the institution to subsidizing
the cost of advanced training, much of which is
in support of research, as well as their success
in competing for grants that include postdoctoral support.
Finally, as our model indicates, the best research
universities spend a significant portion of revenue
on the maintenance of high-quality undergraduate
programs, and the median SAT score of the entering
freshman class serves as an indicator of success in
this competition. Graduate student quality would
also be a useful indicator, but the data for such an
indicator are not available in a form we can use in
this project.
Under $1M
30
Doctorates Awarded
25
20
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
350
15
13
300
7
5
0
1
2
1
1
0
0
an indirect indicator of the annual income available
from this source for current competitive expenditures. Annual giving reflects the most recent
efforts of the institution in the private marketplace
for donations.
Data that directly measure faculty quality
and productivity at the institutional level are
rare, but national figures do exist on the numbers
of National Academy memberships and prestigious faculty awards of various kinds. These
distinctions, which recognize individual faculty
merit in a wide range of scholarly disciplines,
serve as useful indicators of an institution’s success
in acquiring scarce faculty talent. Taken together,
the two measures identify faculty recognized for
distinction in the sciences, the humanities and
social sciences, as well as most other fields of
academic scholarship.
Page 24
2000 Doctorates Awarded
10
250
200
186
150
149
100
50
41
28
8
0
0
0
0
Postdoctoral Appointees
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
450
400
350
1999 Postdoctoral Appointees
2000 Faculty Awards
Private
300
250
200
150
206
139
100
50
19
0
10
0
0
0
0
Median SAT Scores
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
1450
1400
1350
1343
1999 Median SAT Score
1300
1250
1200
1178
1159
1150
1155
1128
1100
1050
1000
1050
1010
1010
950
900
These nine measures provide the basis for
categorizing The Top American Research Universities.
We believe that it is useful to identify those
institutions that compete at the top levels (within
the top 25) and at the next level (within the top
26–50) on one or more of these measures. Although
we continue the practice of showing private and
public institutional categories separately, we focus
primarily on the categorization that includes all
research universities within a national context.
In some ways, we find this to be more useful,
since the competition for faculty, students, and
revenue often puts private and public universities
into direct competition with each other on a
national basis.
The Impact of Enrollment and Medical
Schools on Research Competitiveness
Some universities have remarkable success in
the competition described by these data, but the
critical determinants of university performance
do not appear so clearly. In conversations among
university people, two elements receive much
attention. Some argue that increasing undergraduate enrollments brings a major competitive
advantage. Others believe that the presence of a
medical school gives universities a competitive
advantage in today’s research marketplace. While
our data indicate that enrollment and medical
schools may very well make some difference, the
impact is not as straightforward or as significant
as one might assume.
Private and Public University Enrollment,
Federal Research, and Faculty Numbers: Most
observers of American research universities recognize
that private universities tend to have smaller enrollments than their public counterparts. As indicated
above in our discussion of the quality engine model,
enrollment size responds to many pressures but
probably reflects the financial model underlying the
institution. Because research universities are complex
organizations, however, simple assumptions about
the relationship of enrollment to institutional
competitiveness in research and student quality
generally do not hold.
To explore the impact of enrollment, we first
examined the relationship between undergraduate
headcount enrollment and federal research. We
made a few adjustments to the data. For the analysis,
we excluded stand-alone medical institutions.
These institutions are significant competitors in
the research marketplace but do not include undergraduate education within their primary mission.
After these adjustments, the universe that we examined included those 575 universities reporting any
federal research between 1990 and 1999, although
we focused primarily on institutions with over
$20 million in federal research.
The scatterplot displays undergraduate enrollment and federal research for the 129 major research
universities in this adjusted universe with over
$20 million in federal
expenditures. It clearly
Large and small
illustrates that private
universities generally have
institutions, private
smaller enrollments than
do their public counterparts,
and public, appear
but at the same time, it
at all levels of research
shows no simple linear
relationship between
performance.
undergraduate enrollment
size and success in the
federal research competition. Large and small
institutions, private and public, appear at all levels
of research performance.
The same pattern also holds for those research
universities with less than $20 million. At every
level of federal research, public universities tend to
Page 25
Undergraduate Enrollment and Federal Research:
Over $20 Million Universities
40,000
Private (N=43)
Public (N=86)
1999 Undergraduate Enrollment
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
Public median: 17,857
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
$0
Private median: 6,108
$50,000
$100,000 $150,000
$200,000
$250,000
$300,000 $350,000
$800,000
be larger than are their private counterparts, but the
relationship between undergraduate size and federal
research success is weak.
Enrollment size is of some significance, nonetheless, in understanding the different financial
models that underlie private and public research
university competition. In our model of research
universities described above, what matters is the
availability of funds to invest in the acquisition
and support of research faculty and of quality
undergraduate programs.
In the case of public universities, the size of
an institution’s undergraduate enrollment responds
to many pressures. In some instances, public
universities grow in response to state mandates
for increased public access to undergraduate
education. Such institutions may well have many
students and may use the revenue from enrollment
to support a large portfolio of instructional and
service enterprises that are of significant value but
are unrelated to research or to the acquisition of
quality students. In the event that teaching and
Page 26
service do not produce revenue exceeding their
costs, their contribution to research or student
competitiveness will not be great. Large institutions
may also incur a quality penalty. In accommodating
the large number of undergraduates required by
state access goals, they may not have the resources
to invest in the programs and other amenities that
attract the highest quality undergraduates.
Nonetheless, because most public universities
receive substantial portions of their total budgets
based on undergraduate enrollments, it is not
surprising to discover that they generally grow
larger than their private counterparts, whose
revenue is not as enrollment driven. Indeed,
private universities have between one-fourth to
less than one-half of the median undergraduate
enrollment of public institutions at every level
of federal research.
However, undergraduate enrollment has an
obvious impact on the number of faculty members
at an institution. In public universities, the larger
number of students can support a larger number
Enrollment and Medical Schools
of faculty than at their smaller private counterparts.
Nonetheless, if the larger public institution hires
mostly teaching faculty — individuals who do not
perform significant amounts of competitive research
— then the increased faculty size will enhance
research competitiveness less than the increase in
faculty numbers might suggest.
While public institutions support larger undergraduate student bodies and have larger complements of personnel than their private counterparts,
this added size does not necessarily enhance their
ability to capture large research portfolios or to
enhance the quality of their students. Although the
best public research competitors have substantial
undergraduate enrollments (the five top public
university performers in federal research have
enrollments in the 15,000 to 30,000 range), the
four private universities in the same range all have
less than 12,000 in undergraduate enrollment.
Again, we believe that this speaks to the underlying
financial models. Public university enrollments
may help to generate the revenue that allows them
to compete for research faculty, but private universities may not gain much benefit from larger undergraduate enrollments.
Unlike public universities, whose undergraduate
enrollments respond to public policies and funding
priorities, private universities may set their enrollments to meet programmatic needs. Private universities need enough students to populate the academic
programs that they offer. An institution with a small
number of academic specialties may require a smaller
undergraduate student body than an institution with
many specialties. Elite private universities often
subsidize the tuition of their students from internal
funds (using endowment earnings as well as various
forms of federal and state financial aid) in order
to compete successfully for the best students.
Consequently, for private universities, increasing the
size of the undergraduate student body may not
produce a financial benefit but may instead increase
their costs.
For these reasons, it is likely that private institutions have a self-limiting enrollment structure scaled
to match the academic complexity of the institution
as well as its investment in competing for high-
quality students. As a result, the benefit that a larger
enrollment brings to the private university’s research
competitiveness is relatively limited. This may help
to explain the narrower range of enrollment sizes for
private universities compared to the wider range
observed in comparable public institutions.
An additional perspective on the issue of enrollment size involves the relationships between
graduate student enrollment and federal research.
Some graduate student enrollment, especially of
those in the pursuit of Ph.D.s, reflects the size and
capacity of research programs, but other graduate
students are in various forms of terminal master’s
degree programs that have much less of a relationship to the university’s research agenda. Universities
with larger undergraduate enrollment gain an opportunity to support a larger
number of graduate students
For public universities,
as teaching assistants. The
plot of graduate student
increasing undergraduate
headcount and federal
enrollment may help to
research for the major
research universities with
generate the revenue that
over $20 million in federal
research is instructive.
allows them to compete
Among both private and
for research faculty. For
public institutions, approximately the same relationship
privates, more students
exists between the number
of graduate students and
may not provide a
the size of the institution’s
federal research expenditures.
financial benefit but
The difference in the
instead increase costs
median size of the graduate
student populations of
due to tuition subsidies.
private and public universities is somewhat less than
the difference observed for undergraduate student
enrollment but it is still substantial. The scatterplot
of undergraduate and graduate enrollment illustrates
that while both private and public universities
demonstrate a relationship between undergraduate
and graduate enrollment, the relationship is substantially higher for public universities, as we would
expect given the role of graduate students in the
teaching mission of large public institutions.
Page 27
Graduate Enrollment and Federal Research:
16,000
14,000
Private (N=43)
Public (N=86)
1999 Graduate Enrollment
12,000
Public R2=0.32
10,000
Private R2=0.33
8,000
6,000
Public median: 5,600
4,000
Private median: 3,280
2,000
0
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
$300,000 $350,000
$800,000
Undergraduate vs. Graduate Enrollment:
40,000
1999 Undergraduate Enrollment
35,000
Private (N=43)
Public R2=0.57
Public (N=86)
30,000
25,000
20,000
Private R2=0.37
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1999 Graduate Enrollment
Page 28
Enrollment and Medical Schools
While enrollment, both undergraduate and graduate, helps us to understand some of the competitive
elements in the construction of a successful research
university, we do not have a measure for the most
important element: the number of active research
faculty. Unfortunately, no methodology currently
exists to capture this number accurately. While
all universities report various faculty counts to
national agencies and in response to a variety of
surveys, the methodologies used to produce these
numbers vary significantly by institution, as
described in a paper published on TheCenter website.
The result is that comparisons based on faculty
counts are unreliable, mostly because the data from
the institutions are not comparable. Further complicating the use of faculty counts is the wide range
of faculty functions in universities of different types.
Some institutions have many individuals classified
as faculty in instructional and service activities,
while other institutions have most of their faculty
in research functions.
If we could identify the full-time equivalent
research faculty on a standard basis across institutions, our hypothesis predicts that this number
would be an excellent predictor of institutional
research success, as it often is in comparing the
research success of individual guilds. Reliable data
on research faculty would also permit an analysis
of comparative faculty productivity by institution,
a task not possible with currently available
faculty data.
Medical Schools and Federal Research:
Medical schools offer another point of comparison
between institutions. A common perception holds
that institutions with medical schools have an
advantage in a research competition where significant sums go to biomedical and life science projects.
Indeed, only eight institutions out of the top 50
in federal research succeed at this level without a
medical school. The importance of life science
research for many high-performing universities
(which is visible in the data table of Institutional
Characteristics for Institutions with Over $20 million in Federal Research) reinforces the belief in the
importance of a medical school in the competition
for federal research dollars.
Although medical schools frequently have highquality research faculty who compete successfully
for federal grants and contracts, the data do not
demonstrate that the existence of a medical school
alone guarantees a nationally competitive research
university faculty. Universities with and without
medical schools appear at all levels of research
competition. Although only one institution
without a medical school competes among the
top ten institutions in federal research, many institutions without medical schools
compete successfully in each
Comparisons based
subsequent group of ten
among the top 130 instituon faculty counts are
tions (excluding stand-alone
medical schools) ranked by
unreliable, mostly
federal research.
because the data from
The primary functions
of medical schools,
the institutions are not
which include preparing
future physicians and
comparable.
participating in the clinical
enterprise, do not necessarily
require high levels of federally funded basic research.
Universities without medical schools often have
significant investments in biomedical research
in departments of biology, microbiology, bioengineering, and similar disciplines, and they often
compete effectively against the medical school
research faculty at other institutions.
The key contribution that a medical school
makes to a research university is the generation
of surplus revenue that can subsidize the development of high-quality biomedical and life science
research. Most, but not all, medical schools prove
capable of generating such surpluses and have
the commitment to invest such funds into
research. Nonetheless, universities with and
without medical schools perform at comparable
levels of research competitiveness.
The chart included here shows the top 130
research universities divided into groups of ten
based upon federal research, with each cluster
divided by those institutions with medical schools
and those without. In this chart, we removed the
institutions that are stand-alone medical schools,
Page 29
as our discussion here focuses on comprehensive
research universities that include medical schools.
Universities with and without medical schools
appear in all clusters of federal research within the
top 130 universities represented by this chart. Of
the 80 universities with medical schools, 14 institutions do not have sufficient federal research activity
to rank among the top 130 institutions included in
this chart.
Universities with and without
Medical Schools
by 1999 Federal Research Rank
Medical
No Medical
10
9
Number of Institutions
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
111–120
101–110
81–90
91–100
71–80
61–70
51–60
41–50
31–40
21–30
11–20
1–10
0
121–130
1
Universities Grouped by National Rank
When a medical school generates a surplus and
invests that in support of research, its presence as
part of the university will make a major contribution
to its research competitiveness. The existence of a
medical school with the capacity to support research,
then, contributes to the university’s research competitiveness. A medical school alone does not guarantee
competitiveness.
ance of a university in terms of its federal research
comes from the success of its faculty in competing
for these funds. While this is obvious, it bears
emphasis that this competition is fierce.
Success rates for proposals submitted to the NSF
and NIH vary, but in recent years, over all projects,
about 30% of the proposals submitted received
funding. The resulting expenditures by universities
from federal funds reflect the aggregate success of
the institution in acquiring and supporting research
faculty who compete successfully for these funds.
Universities increase or decrease in their research
performance based primarily on this competition.
Change in Rank Order: Many observers focus
on the ranking of research universities, including
the authors of this report. However, overemphasis
on rank order as the primary reflection of competitiveness can obscure some important distinctions.
Ranking, by virtue of its evenly spaced series from
number one on down, gives the impression that
ranking also reflects an even distribution of performance. That is certainly not the case here.
In fact, the performance gap between universities
at the top of the ranking scale is much greater than
the difference separating universities farther down
the scale. As the following figure illustrates, the
distance that separates universities (median, low,
and high) within groups of ten decreases rapidly
as rank declines.
Gap between Adjacent
Ranked Universities
by 1999 Federal Research Rank
$30,000
Change in Competitive Performance
on Federal Research
Competition in university research implies gains
and losses. University faculty offer more quality
research proposals than the various federal agencies
can support. Primarily through the process of peer
review, although sometimes through the direct
appropriation of federal dollars to individual research
projects or institutions without peer review (this
process is called earmarking), some faculty projects
receive funding while others do not. The perform-
Page 30
Gap between Institutions (x $1,000)
Highest Gap
$25,000
Median Gap
*
Lowest Gap
$20,000
$15,000
$14,165
$10,000
$5,194
$5,000
$3,970
$0
$781
1–10
11–20
21–30
31–40
$1,145
41–50
$628
51–100
Universities Grouped by National Rank
* The gap between Johns Hopkins and the
second-ranked institution ($402 million) is
atypical and therefore excluded from this analysis.
Change in Federal Research
For example, the median gap between each of
the universities ranked 1–10 is about $14.2 million,
while the median gap for ranks 11–20 is less than
two-thirds of that at $5.2 million. Thus, to improve
in rank, holding all other elements constant, a
university in the top ten might need to increase
its federal expenditures by roughly 6% while a
university in the 11–20 range would only need to
increase by about 2%.
In practice, not all elements are constant, since a
change in the rank of any particular university is a
function of its position relative not to the median
of its group but to the performance of institutions
immediately above and below. The variation in
the gap between institutions of similar research
performance is large, and the amount of change
required to move up one rank varies substantially
by institution.
Improvement or decline in rank also depends on
the behavior of other universities. If the institution
one position higher declines in performance, the university below may improve its rank without having
improved its performance at all. A university that
improves its performance may nonetheless decline in
rank because the institution below it made a greater
improvement and the institution above it improved
by the same amount.
The figures included here clarify these relationships. We looked at all universities with $20 million
or more in federal research over a period of ten years
(1990–1999). We divided them into two groups:
those whose federal research increased in constant
1998 dollars, and those whose federal research
declined. We then tracked the change in rank for
each group and arranged them by the size of their
1999 federal research expenditures.
Of those who gained in expenditures, some also
improved their rank, but many did not. The amount
of rank change over the ten-year period increases as
the amount of federal research decreases, illustrating
the impact of the smaller gap between universities at
lower ranks.
The second chart shows the rank change for
institutions that experienced a decline in federal
research during the ten-year period. All of those in
the higher ranks declined significantly in research
volume and declined somewhat in rank with the
exception of Johns Hopkins. Although Hopkins lost
$29.8 million in constant dollars over the ten years,
it easily maintained its top position in the ranking.
The ranking of universities helps to illustrate the
general characteristics of research competitiveness,
but change in rank is less helpful as an indicator
of individual university performance over time. A
better indicator is the actual change in federal
research expenditures, expressed in constant 1998
dollars, which gives a useful comparative context
for assessing institutional performance.
An absolute decline in constant-dollar federal
research expenditures is a relatively clear event for
this decade, since there was an increase in the total
federal dollars available. An absolute increase,
Over $20 Million Universities with a
Decrease in Federal Research:
Change in National Rank, 1990–99
Over $20 Million Universities with an
Increase in Federal Research:
Change in National Rank, 1990–99
$800,000
$350,000
$350,000
Declined
in Rank
$300,000
$400,000
Improved in Rank
$250,000
$200,000
$150,000
$100,000
Declined
in Rank
Improved
in Rank
$300,000
$250,000
$200,000
$150,000
$100,000
$50,000
$50,000
$0
-25
0
25
50
75
100
Net Change in National Rank
$0
-50
-25
0
Net Change in National Rank
Page 31
Growth in Federal Research, 1990–99
(in Constant 1998 Dollars)
Federal Research in Constant 1998 Dollars (in billions)
16
Total Federal Research
grew by 25.3% between
1990 and 1999.
14
12
Over $20 Million Public
Universities had an overall
growth rate of 27.1%.
10
8
6
Over $20 Million Private
Universities had an overall
growth rate of 18.3%.
4
2
All universities with less than $20 million grew by 49.8%.
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
however, offers two possible interpretations. In
the first case, an institution might increase its
research expenditures, but at a rate less than the
rate of increase for all research university federal
expenditures. In this decade, the overall increase
was 25.3%. In a relative sense, this may reflect a
decline in an institution’s share of federal research,
as it has not grown at the same rate as the pool
of funds.
In the second case, an institution might increase
its constant-dollar research expenditures at a rate in
Change in Federal Research, 1990–99:
Increase Greater than 25.3% (N=82)
Increase Less than 25.3% (N=46)
Decrease in Research (N=26)
Number of
Universities
with Increase
24
16
8
Number of
Universities
with Decrease
58
30
18
Private
Public
(N=48)
(N=106)
Page 32
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
excess of the increase of the pool, thus also
increasing its share. The table below displays
those universities with over $20 million that
experienced each of these three cases over the
past ten years.
Private and Public University Shares of
Federal Research: The shifts in market share
offer some additional insight. The past decade
has seen the emergence of a number of public
universities competing successfully for federal
research dollars. As a result, the distribution of
market share in federal research expenditures has
shifted over the period of 1990–1999.
Private universities with over $20 million in
federal research lost 2.2% market share during the
decade. This was the only category of universities
amount our four research groups that lost market
share. Because the total amount of federal dollars
grew during those ten years, the private institutions
in this category gained $896 million, but because
the total federal expenditures grew at a faster rate,
they actually lost market share.
Public research universities with over $1 million
gained 1.97%, with most of the gain occurring in
Market Share, 1990–99:
By Research Group and Control
Over $20M
$5–$20M
$1–$5M
Under $1M
(N=154)
(N=97)
(N=128)
(N=238)
1.0%
0.84%
0.74%
0.5%
0.39%
0.13%
0.08%
0.02%
0.00%
-0.5%
Private
Public
-1.0%
-1.5%
-2.0%
-2.20%
-2.5%
the $20 million and $5–$20 million categories.
Private universities with less than $20 million
gained 0.23% market share in the decade.
A final reflection on the private-public distribution of federal research compares private and public
university research expenditures. The graph includes
two lines plotted on the same scale: one for the top
100 private universities and the other for top 100
public universities, both arranged in order of their
Top 100 Private vs. Top 100 Public Institutions:
1999 Federal Research
$800,000
$350,000
Percentage Change
0.0%
federal research expenditures. The purpose of this
graph is to show the relative competitiveness of
private and public research universities in acquiring
federal research support. For the first 12 private
and the first 12 public universities, the private
universities have a higher level of federal research.
After than, this pattern reverses, and from rank
13 on down, public universities have greater federal
research expenditures than private universities.
This pattern indicates that the top private
universities continue to succeed in maintaining
their preeminence as competitive research
performers. However, the number of private
universities that can compete with their public
counterparts falls off after rank 12. Although we
have not yet analyzed this pattern in detail, we
expect that tax-based funding provides the revenue
supporting many public universities’ investments
in research-competitive faculty and facilities.
Private universities often find it more difficult
to generate the revenue required to compete for
faculty and to provide the necessary research support. As a result, while many private universities
remain competitive, they find themselves at a
Private
Public
$300,000
$250,000
Rank 12
$200,000
$150,000
$100,000
$50,000
$20 Million
$0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Control Rank
Page 33
disadvantage compared to their public competitors
on one side and their better-endowed private competitors on the other.
Patterns of Improvement and Decline in
Federal Research Expenditures: Although we
can summarize the aggregate behavior of research
university competitiveness over time, as measured
by federal research expenditures, the patterns of
change for individual universities pose a different
challenge. Some institutions demonstrate predictable
patterns, with a steady increase or decrease in their
expenditures. For others, the data change substantially over the ten-year period, rising many millions
in one year and falling an equal or greater amount in
subsequent years.
These larger changes reflect many circumstances
that are particular to each university. Institutions
can receive grants that include capital expenditures.
As the university spends these one-time dollars,
the reported federal expenditures for that year
will spike upward, only to fall back to a normal
level in subsequent years. Institutions can gain
or lose large grants, producing major fluctuations
in their expenditure patterns. Sometimes,
universities improve their methods of data
reporting to the federal government, producing a
one-time increase in the reported revenue.
Whatever the case, an explanation for the
particular history of any university’s research
competitiveness requires a specific and detailed
understanding of that institution’s research
activities in comparison to similarly competitive
counterparts. The explanations for a rise or fall
in reported results will vary significantly from
institution to institution.
An illustration of the complexity of a university’s
research performance as reflected by federal expenditures is visible in the graphs of ten universities
displayed in the two figures below. The first figure
graphs the ten-year performance of five universities
(1 private, 4 public) that showed the greatest percentage improvement in their research performance
(excluding stand-alone medical institutions). The
second figure graphs a comparable group of five
universities (3 private, 2 public) that declined the
most in research performance during the same ten-
Research Universities with the
Largest Percentage Increase
in Federal Research: 1990–1999
Federal Research in Constant 1998 Dollars (x $1,000)
$100,000
$80,000
$60,000
$40,000
$20,000
$0
1990
1991
Page 34
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
year period. The institutions all fall within a group
reporting expenditures in the $20–$90 million
range in 1999. The graphs display expenditures
in constant 1998 dollars.
Some of these institutions report a steady
rise or fall in expenditures; others show major
changes from one year to the next. To understand
the competitive circumstances of the federal
research marketplace that these data reflect, each
institution would need to review its ten-year
data and compare this performance history with
its near competitors.
For all of the similarity in their organizational
models, American research universities have
many different strategies for success. No single
pattern explains the success or difficulty encountered by universities in competing for federal
research and outstanding students. Our understanding of research university behavior indicates that
the most important element is the creation of
revenue to subsidize the acquisition of high-quality
scarce faculty and student talent and support for
the research enterprise. At the same time, each
university has an internal strategy for the
effective investment of its revenue. Many
characteristics determine a university’s ability
to compete for the scarce elements that make a
research institution. No single characteristic
appears to explain competitive achievement,
but instead, the right combination of elements
matched with an institution’s resources and
opportunities is what appears to drive the most
successful institutions.
To maintain or improve their competitiveness
in these marketplaces, universities almost certainly
need to understand the relationship between their
investments in research and student support and
the results that they achieve. Some universities
may be wealthy enough to avoid the discipline of
measuring results, but most institutions are not.
Our goal in this publication is to provide useful
data that present institutions within their competitive context as a tool for measuring and improving
research university performance.
Research Universities with the
Largest Percentage Decrease
in Federal Research: 1990–1999
Federal Research in Constant 1998 Dollars (x $1,000)
$100,000
$80,000
$60,000
$40,000
$20,000
$0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Page 35
1999
Page 36
Data Tables
Part I
The Top American
Research Universities
TheCenter determines the Top American Research
Universities by their rank on nine different measures: Total Research, Federal Research, Endowment
Assets, Annual Giving, National Academy
Members, Faculty Awards, Doctorates Granted,
Postdoctoral Appointees, and Median SAT Scores.
(The Source Notes section of this study provides
detailed information on each of the nine indicators.)
The tables group research institutions according to
how many times they rank in the top 25 on each of
these nine measures. The top category includes those
universities that rank in the top 25 on all nine indicators. The bottom category includes universities
with only one of the nine measures ranked in the top
25. Within these groups, institutions are then sorted
by how many times they rank between 26 and 50 on
the nine performance variables, with ties listed
alphabetically. A similar methodology produces a
second set of institutions — those ranked 26
through 50 on the same nine measures.
For the purpose of this study, TheCenter includes
only those institutions that had at least $20 million
in federal research expenditures in FY 1999. This
is the same dollar cutoff used in our last report.
The first two tables list each institution with
the most current data available for each measure
and its corresponding national rank (i.e., rank
among all institutions regardless of whether they
are privately or publicly controlled). The third and
fourth tables provide the same nine data measures
but with the groupings determined by the control
rank (i.e., rank among all private or all public
institutions). Institutions ranking in the top 25
on at least one measure are included in the tables
with the (1–25) identifier, while those ranking
26 through 50 are found in the tables labeled with
the (26–50) header.
• The Top American Research
Universities (1–25) identifies the 50 institutions (26 private, 24 public) that rank in the top 25
nationally on at least one of the nine measures.
• The Top American Research
Universities (26–50) identifies the 37 institutions (9 private, 28 public) that rank 26 through 50
nationally on at least one of the nine measures.
• The Top Private Research
Universities (1–25) identifies the 36 private
institutions that rank in the top 25 among all private universities on at least one of the nine measures.
• The Top Public Research
Universities (1–25) identifies the 46 public
institutions that rank in the top 25 among all public
universities on at least one of the nine measures.
• The Top Private and Public
Research Universities (26–50) identifies the
12 private and 31 public institutions that rank 26
through 50 among their private or public counterparts on at least one of the nine measures.
Many research universities rank highly both
nationally and among their public or private peers
and therefore appear in more than one table. For
example, of the 36 private institutions in the Top
Private Research Universities (1–25) table, 27
universities also appear in the Top American
Research Universities (1–25) table.
Data found in these tables may not always
match the figures published by the original source.
TheCenter makes adjustments, when necessary, to
ensure that the data reflect the activity at a single
campus rather than that of a multiple campus institution or state university system. When data are
missing from the original source, TheCenter may substitute another figure if available. A full discussion
of this subject, and the various adjustments or substitutions made to the original data, is in the Data
Notes section of this report.
TheCenter presents these tables, along with last
year’s top universities, in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets on its website [http://thecenter.ufl.edu].
Page 37
TheCenter
University
Organization,
Governance,
and
Competitiveness
John V. Lombardi
Diane D. Craig
Denise S. Gater
The Top American Research Universities
August 2002
An Annual Report from
The Lombardi Program on Measuring University Performance
Contents
University Governance and Organization ....................................................................................................3
Definitions........................................................................................................................................3
Quality Engines ................................................................................................................................5
University Administrative Shell ........................................................................................................5
Governance Prototypes ....................................................................................................................6
Political Context ..............................................................................................................................9
Purpose and Functions of Governance ............................................................................................12
Imperative of Statewide Governance ..............................................................................................15
Relationship of Governance to Research University Competitiveness ......................................................16
Cost, Complexity, Regulation, and Money ....................................................................................18
Endowment-Equivalent ..................................................................................................................20
Some References on University Organization and Finance ......................................................................25
Appendix: Endowment-Equivalent Data and Calculations ......................................................................29
Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of Mr. Lewis M. Schott, whose
generous contribution established the Lombardi Program on Measuring University
Perfomance.
Page 1
University Governance
and Organization
Research universities live in complex contexts,
compete in many different marketplaces, and perform
a bewildering array of highly sophisticated services for
many diverse constituencies. Although research universities focus their efforts primarily on the key dimensions of teaching and research, they engage in a wide
range of additional activities derived from the expertise
and resources accumulated in support of teaching and
research. With the dramatic expansion of higher education, and particularly public higher education, in the
post World War II years and then again in the 1960s,
institutions became much more complex and the
organization of their governance became an evermore
popular topic, especially among political leadership in
the various states. Public university governance and
organization, a topic for scholarly interest since the
pre-war years of the 1930s, became a major concern in
most states throughout the last half of the twentieth
century and continues to preoccupy institutions, their
governance boards, and their political supporters into
the early years of this century.
Definitions
In the discussion of university governance and
organization, as is often the case with other universityrelated topics, we immediately encounter a series of
ambiguous terms. American universities have a remarkably imprecise vocabulary to describe their activities.
Take the word “university.” While everyone agrees this
refers to an institution of post-secondary education, the
range of such institutions that use this term is large.
Small private and public institutions with modest to
almost invisible graduate programs and a narrow range
of disciplines as well as major research universities with
extensive graduate and professional programs and an
extended array of disciplines all carry the same name:
University.
Further complicating the nomenclature, we have
the terms “school” and “college.” Sometimes context
makes the definition clear: “The engineering college
prospered.” In other situations, context is ambiguous:
“My daughter visited five colleges before deciding on
Stanford.” We do not know from this statement
whether the daughter visited Oberlin, Pomona, Smith,
Amherst, and Stanford or visited Michigan, Berkeley,
Minnesota, Illinois, and Stanford before choosing
Stanford. “College,” like “university,” refers not only to
institutions large and small – all of which offer undergraduate degrees from the AA to the BA or BS but also
to subdivisions of the university like journalism or
business. “School” is equally ambiguous. While
almost no one, in formal contexts, refers to a college or
university as a “school,” students frequently use the
word “school” to refer to their university. “What do
you think of the school so far?” the junior will ask the
freshman at a university event. “We have great school
spirit among the students,” says another. In this context, clearly “school” is equivalent to the institution –
whether university or college – even though in organizational terms universities use the name “college” or
“school” for academic subdivisions.
The academic meaning of these terms also varies
from institution to institution. Some have only schools
(medicine, engineering, music) such as Johns Hopkins.
Some have only colleges of medicine, engineering, or
fine arts. In some institutions,
the school distinction is reserved
for the non-arts and sciences
American universities
units, and arts and sciences units
carry the title of college (Indiana
have a remarkably
University Bloomington).
Finally, in some institutions a
imprecise vocabulary to
college is a larger academic
administrative unit under which
describe their activities.
schools may exist (a college of
fine arts with its school of music
and school of art).
Equal variety attends the designation of campus
officers above the level of dean. Presidents, chancellors, provosts, executive vice presidents, deputy chancellors, and other titles serve purposes of significance
to local participants in the institutional culture. In
some institutional settings the president presides over
the system and chancellors preside over the individual
institutions; in others the chancellor serves the system
as chief executive and the presidents serve the universities. Most private universities have presidents as
chief executive officers, but some have chancellors.
Second-order administrators take the title from their
superiors; so vice presidents serve presidents, and vice
chancellors serve chancellors. When institutions and
their systems become complex, universities identify
intermediaries in their hierarchies and titles such as
provost or deputy chancellor or executive vice president appear with responsibilities greater than a vice
president or vice chancellor but less than a president
or chancellor.
Page 2
The title of provost confuses those outside the academic environment, and most provosts carry the additional title of vice president for academic affairs. If the
message that the title “provost” makes a vice president
first among vice presidents is insufficient, some acquire
the additional honorific of senior vice president for
academic affairs to add weight to the title of provost.
In some places, where the administrative functions of
finance and business operations hold great institutional
significance, such an officer may also be a senior vice
president, although whether that trumps a provost or
executive vice president is mostly a function of institutional tradition.
A “campus” is an important concept in most universities. The campus defines geography, a location
that in some original sense represented the institution.
When colleges and universities were small and selfcontained, the notion of college and campus coincided. With the advent of large single institutions,
remote branch locations, and multiple-institution university systems, the precision of the concept of campus
coinciding with university blurred. Many large universities have separate campuses in the same city, sometimes physically connected sometimes not. University
at Buffalo, for example, has two campuses separated by
three miles. Even when the physical space of the university is contiguous, such as the University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor, people speak of the medical
campus, the north campus, the south campus, and the
central campus. The archetypical small college
remains, however, embedded in our imaginations.
Many observers still use the term “campus” to refer to
a university that may have two or more distinguishable
physical locations where it delivers its programs.
If the definitions used for single institutions are
difficult, imagine the naming challenge for systems,
groupings of institutions in the complex governance
organizations discussed here. Although, for various
political and administrative reasons, systems of institutions choose different naming conventions, we treat all
of them as systems. Sometimes, as is the case of the
University of California and other similarly constituted
systems, the rhetorical language implies one university
existing in many different locations. This concept has
some validity related to the formal authority of the system, but in practice individual campus-based institutions within the system function in ways that mimic
single campus research universities. The key participants for research universities – faculty and students –
live and work primarily in one place and their academic lives and accomplishments revolve around mostly
place-bound resources and activities.
Page 3
In research university contexts, the campus location also identifies the universe of individuals who participate in decisions about the quality of research and
the content of the teaching program. Recruitment of
faculty and students and promotion and tenure decisions about faculty usually reflect primarily place-specific criteria, even when the system is styled as a single
university with multiple campuses. Students and faculty make choices related to campus location, not system designation. In California or Massachusetts, a
student or faculty member affiliates with Berkeley or
UMass Amherst, not with the University of California
or the University of Massachusetts writ large, even
though systems have their own characteristics that may
enhance or detract from the desirability of campuses.
Some university systems seek to present themselves as a
single university with multiple locations as a way to
show the system’s assets as a single large resource rather
than as the disaggregated and less impressive subtotals
of the individual campuses. Some systems also promote the notion of a single university for statewide
political purposes or in marketing their programs
internationally.
Another distinction involves the branch campus.
While university systems may coordinate or govern
multiple university campuses with relatively
autonomous academic decision-making authority,
many individual institutions (standing alone or within
systems) also have branch campuses. Branch campuses
generally depend heavily on the parent campus for academic direction, usually do not have autonomous academic personnel decision-making authority for promotion and tenure, and often provide only a subset of the
full curriculum offered by the parent.
In our work here and for the purposes of understanding research universities, we use the term “university” to apply to a single campus-based institution that
has substantially independent academic decision-making authority and admits students primarily with reference to local standards. These campuses hire, promote, and tenure faculty through processes that substantially rely on locally referenced campus standards
and usually have tenure defined by specific campus
location. We use the term “system” to apply to governance organizations of many types that collect these
university campuses into organizational and managerial constructs of greater or lesser complexity and integration. Systems rarely combine campus-based
research institutions into a single functioning university entity although a few systems share some academic
units across several institutions.
Definitions
For our purposes, we use the terms “institution”
and “university” interchangeably to refer to the campusbased research universities that have been the focus of
these annual reports on The Top American Research
Universities, and we refer to the larger organizations that
in the public sector govern groups of universities (however named or organized as described below) as “systems.” For example, the University of California is formally one university with multiple campuses. But for
the purposes of our discussion, we see the University of
California as a system that governs multiple campusbased research universities such as UCLA or Berkeley.
The goal of these reports, of course, is to understand the
competitive success of individual research universities,
and in this report we look at the complex organizational
models within which they operate.
Quality Engines
As we discussed in our previous publication (The
Top American Research Universities, 2001), research
In the academic core, the faculty
guilds control teaching and research quality
the work of the faculty. A third sustains the research of
the faculty and their many collaborators, while a fourth
translates those research accomplishments into patents,
licenses, and other assets of value to the nation and the
world. The core of this engine, which we described
more fully in last year’s report, is composed of departments or programs that resemble guilds – defined as
organized collections of individual experts joined by
their shared commitment to a particular methodological
and subject approach to knowledge and driven by a
national and international system of common standards
and criteria for quality. These guilds – whether familiar
ones like history, English, chemistry, psychology, philosophy, physics, and mathematics or newer ones like neuroscience or biomedical engineering – control faculty
identification, selection, promotion, and tenure.
Through this process, the guilds function as self-perpetuating communities whose quality depends on the rigor
of the standards they apply to those who would become
permanent members.
The guilds and their work are at the
nucleus of a broader university environment…
an environment that is enriched with student
services, general support and enterprises
complementary to research and teaching
universities function as quality engines. They accumulate resources of all kinds to support the highest possible levels of faculty and student quality. Faculty and
students, pursuing their individual goals within the
context of the university’s academic programs and
guilds, develop their skills and use them to create additional value either in the form of enhanced capabilities
as graduates (at all levels from undergraduate through
professional school to the PhD) or of contributions to
new knowledge through research.
In achieving these aims, the quality engine of the
American research university operates multiple separate
domains, nonetheless connected within the boundaries
of the campus-based institution itself. One domain
drives the teaching enterprise at the undergraduate level;
another connects graduate and professional studies to
University Administrative Shell
Although the guilds hold the keys to the effectiveness of the American research university’s quality
engine, they rarely exist independently of the support
and management provided by the university shell.
The shell, also described more fully in last year’s report,
serves as the organizational construct that acquires
money and other resources needed by the guilds. It
provides the administrative infrastructure that supports
the guilds and their work, creates the connective mechanisms that link the guilds for the purposes of undergraduate education and other joint enterprises, and
protects the guilds and their members from external
pressures that might impair their effectiveness.
The public sees the shell as the administration of
the university with its boards and administrative offi-
Page 4
An active administrative “shell” positions the
institution as a whole, builds resources and helps to
attract faculty, students and benefactors
cers and its hierarchically represented organizational
structure. The guilds know that this hierarchy belongs
primarily to the shell and does not define the authority
structure of quality engine’s academic core. While
shell agents can manage money and resources, they do
not directly control the content or quality of the institution’s academic work, which belongs to and is primarily supervised and managed by the faculty. The faculty, in turn, define academic standards in cooperation
and collaboration with colleagues in similar guilds
throughout the nation.
Nonetheless, the work within the shell is essential to
the success of the quality engine’s guilds. Everything the
guilds seek in the pursuit of quality requires support:
faculty, students, libraries, laboratories, computers,
buildings, travel, research assistance, and the like. All of
these elements need money. The defining function of
the shell is to acquire the maximum resources possible
in support of the guilds’ missions of teaching and
research. Teaching and research do not directly command a sufficient share of resources in the open marketplace to pay the full cost of their production, and shell
agents work endlessly to identify additional sources of
funding. This involves development or fund-raising),
political lobbying for additional state and federal support, encouragement of grant and contract application
and awards to expand the research base, development of
commercial or quasi-commercial businesses derived
from the university’s intellectual property, and the efficient and effective operation of the institution and its
various affiliated enterprises.
Our interest, we must emphasize, focuses on only
one segment of the American higher education mar-
Page 5
ketplace: major research universities defined as institutions with at least $20 million of federally funded
research expenditures per year. This group of about
160 institutions controls over 90% of all the federally
funded research expenditures reported by the 600
institutions that share this support. They compete
fiercely for the funds that make this research possible;
for the services of the most productive, creative, and
innovative research faculty; and for the resources to
recruit the best undergraduate, graduate, and professional students into their midst. This competition
drives the behavior of America’s research universities,
and our work over the past few years has attempted to
understand this competition. We have described the
characteristics, and we present various indicators of
institutional success in the competition. We have
explored the impact of size and medical schools on the
competition, for example, and we have looked closely
at the mechanisms by which these quality engines support and improve quality.
As we continue to explore this competitive behavior,
the wide range of organizational and governance structures
within which American research universities function
intrigues us. We examined the extensive literature on the
organization and governance of public and private universities and reviewed the many forms of governance to discover how the organizational structures of institutional
governance influence research university competition.
Governance Prototypes
The variety of organizational structures that govern
American research universities ranges from a simple
model that places a university campus in a single, notfor-profit corporation responsible to a self-perpetuating
board of trustees to the ornate configurations of state
university systems with their overlapping boards of
regents and trustees, their higher education coordinating commissions, and their multiple subsidiary foundations and other enterprises. Despite this range of governance, research university quality engines – with their
immediate shell and core academic guilds – compete
with each other in almost identical ways. Governance
structures take on forms that adapt to the challenges of
external environments rather than respond primarily to
the needs of the academic guilds they govern. Among
private institutions, governance models change little
over the period of a century or more. For many public
institutions, however, governance mechanisms that link
the institution to the state that sponsors and owns
them often change – sometimes dramatically.
In our review of organizational models, we identified a number of prototypes, drawing on the extensive
literature on this topic, which we review briefly below.
These models represent a simplification of the detailed
formal, organizational structure of institutions and systems as reflected in their documents, and our own
involvement with a number of institutions clearly indicates that behavior and the balance of authority and
responsibility can vary considerably from what the documents imply. Our prototypes represent a stylized version of the 19 different structures identified by the
Education Commission of the States, in part because
we look at organization from the perspective of the
research university rather than from the perspective of
the state or corporation that governs the institutions.
Universities generally fall into three main groups
containing a number of sub-categories:
• The first group includes those universities that
have a single governing board for a campusbased research institution with direct authority
and responsibility for the operation and management of the institution. Some institutions in this
group, primarily private, have self-perpetuating
governing boards with complete authority and
responsibility for all aspects of the university’s
operation. Others, primarily public, have mostly
politically appointed governing boards with an
obligation to report to legislatures, governors, or
statewide boards or commissions that may limit
the institutional board’s authority and responsibility in various ways.
• The second group includes multiple campusbased public institutions governed by a common
statewide board. In this group, the campus-based
institutions may report to the statewide board
directly or through a system executive.
• The third group of public institutions has a local
governing board for the campus institution, and
this local board has a subset of powers derived
from or delegated by a statewide board. The dis-
A competitive university must continually fuel its
quality engine with people, capacity and resources
Page 6
tribution of authority and responsibility between
the statewide board and the local board, and
between state-level executives and campus-level
executives, varies widely. These relationships
tend to change with some frequency in response
to challenges, opportunities, personal ambitions of
individual actors, and legislative and executive
branch preferences.
When a university has a single board for a single
campus, the relationships of authority and responsibility
appear much more clearly than in the other types discussed here. Particularly in private institutions, the single-institution board has authority and responsibility for
everything the university does, and it delegates responsibility and authority to various university officers, usually
through the president or chancellor for the actual operation of the institution. These boards usually have complete fiduciary responsibility for the institution and exercise close supervision over financial and budget matters.
At the same time, these boards differ substantially in the
delegation of authority within the university. In some
instances, they expect the president or chancellor to
retain most of the
authority and responsiin the central
The majority of public research bility
administration. In
other cases, they expect
universities operate within the campus chief executive to delegate that
systems where several largely authority and responsibility to vice presidents,
independently administered deans, and other university officers, while
university campuses share retaining the supervisory role of ensuring
the same board or multiple effective operation and
managing and promotboards and commissions. ing institution-wide
objectives such as fundraising.
Very few public universities have this kind of clear
relationship between the governing board and institutional management. Even when a public university
has one board for a single campus institution, the
politically selected board usually shares responsibility
and authority, especially in financial and budgetary
matters, with state-level bureaucracies, either in the
form of higher education commissions or boards of
education. Often, these higher-level organizations
serve not as governing entities in relationship to the
university’s board but as legislative or executive branch
extensions to deal with fiscal policy and coordinate
Page 7
issues related to the state’s support of higher education.
While it is not always possible to make clear distinctions, many state-level organizations perform both
functions and some are more intrusive than others in
the operation of the university’s board.
Public and private research universities with one
governing board for a single institution may also have
branch campuses. Although the dividing line that separates multi-campus institutions from single-campus
institutions with branch campuses is none too clear,
we think the distinction is worth making. When a
university has branches that simply extend the university’s activities into other geographic locations, and the
activities in these locations do not have independent
academic personnel or curricular authority, then we
consider them branch campuses and include the institution within the single-institution, single-board category. Historically, some single-campus, single-board
institutions created branch campuses that later on
acquired sufficient academic size and complexity to
warrant more or less independence in their academic
governance and operations. Usually in these cases, the
defining distinction involves local campus control over
promotion and tenure and often includes independent
accreditation. In such instances, the single-campus,
single-board institution becomes a multi-campus, single-board institution.
The majority of public research universities operate within systems where several largely independently
administered university campuses share the same board
or multiple boards and commissions. Although the
variety of structures and arrangements is impressive,
most of these reflect two formative processes:
• Consolidated systems usually emerge through the
growth of branch campuses of a single university
into a multiple-campus university system. Often
distinguishable from multi-campus, single-board
types, these consolidated systems have a systemlevel CEO and individual university CEOs but a
governing board only for the system.
• Coordinated systems result from a process that
collects previously independent institutions into
a structure governed by a single board. Typically,
each institution has its own CEO, and these
institutions do not manage multiple campuses.
Often the coordinating board will oversee all
state institutions of higher education including
community and other two-year colleges.
Although the origin of each of these types is of
some interest, the levels of coordination and control
exercised over the research institutions vary greatly
within each of these types and the distribution of
authority and responsibility changes over time. In
both types, research campuses generally function in
similar ways, as we discuss below.
These multi-university systems themselves often
belong to other governance structures, either reporting
to a board of education or involved with coordinating
agencies of every imaginable type. The powers and
authority of these commissions and boards of education that exist outside the direct governance boards for
the universities range from direct supervisory authority
through coordinating authority to advisory functions.
The following diagram illustrates the distribution
of a group of universities defined by the criteria used
for this publication’s Top American Research
Universities. Note that all private universities fall into
the first group of institutions with a single board for a
single university. We divided the governance structures that apply to public research universities into
three major categories (recognizing that this is a simplification of the full complexity of state system structures). The first group includes research universities
that have single governing boards for each research
university. Most of the universities in this group are in
systems that have some form of statewide coordination, and some of the universities included here have
branch campuses or medical branch campuses.
The second group of universities has local boards
for each university with powers derived from a single
governing board. Most of the local boards have the
authority to identify a campus chief executive and recommend the appointment to the governing board.
These institutions usually have some form of statewide
coordinating board or commission.
The third and largest group of public universities
reports to a single governing board along with other
research universities. They have no local boards,
although the systems of which they are a part usually
work with a statewide coordinating board or commission. This group is large – in part because of the number of University of California institutions that qualify
in the top category of research universities.
This focus on public research universities should
not obscure the fundamental distinction between public
and private governance. In private universities, the single board not only focuses exclusively on the success of
an individual university but also usually sees its role as
supporting rather than controlling the institution.
Public university boards, politically appointed or elected
in most cases, usually serve to regulate the university on
behalf of public constituencies. This fundamental difference in orientation and focus is the primary difference between public and private university governance.
Political Context
Every state university, however it appears in a governance system taxonomy, is subject to the policy control of the state legislature and often to the policy
objectives of the state’s executive branch. Legislatures
can and do provide direct guidance on academic matters to state institutions, often overriding the presumed
authority of institutional boards. Depending on the
traditions and legal
basis of the university’s
Private university boards see
charter (whether
included within the
their role as supporting their
state’s constitution or
created by legislative
institutions; public university
act), the form of this
intervention may vary,
but the state’s strength
boards usually serve to
in higher education
issues comes in large
regulate their universities on
measure from the
power to appropriate
behalf of public constituencies.
funds. When legal
and administrative traditions place the university directly in the legislative
process, this authority over academic matters can
appear in explicit legislation specifying program content, graduation standards, and even detailed curricular
matters.
When legal traditions place the university outside of the direct legislative process, because the university is an artifact of the state constitution and not
a creature of the legislature, the authority over academic issues may appear indirectly. The legislature
can withhold appropriations until the university
implements a desired goal or appropriates dollars
restricted to a specific purpose or guided by a legislatively approved master plan. The multiple coordinating agencies that characterize many state higher
education governance structures also serve to extend
the legislature or governor’s influence over the operation of university programs.
These considerations about legislative and executive branch intervention apply to all of the governing
structures discussed here. Even private universities
find themselves engaged in this conversation. Many
states have coordinating commissions or other
bureaucratic entities whose mandate includes some
responsibility for rationalizing the educational delivery process of higher education, including not only
public but also private, not-for-profit, and for-profit
institutions. Laws in many states require all higher
education institutions to receive permission from the
Page 8
Governance Structures
Private and Public Institutions with More Than $20 Million in Federal Research
Single Governing Board – Single Research University
University may have branch campuses. Most Public universities have state-wide coordinating boards.
Private universities may have a formal or informal relationship with a state-wide coordinating agency.
Boston University
Brandeis University
Brown University
California Institute of Technology
Carnegie Mellon University
Case Western Reserve University
Charles R. Drew University of
Medicine and Science
Columbia University
Cornell University
Dartmouth University
Duke University
Emory University
George Washington University
Georgetown University
Harvard University
Howard University
Johns Hopkins University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Michigan State University
New Jersey Institute of Technology
New York University
Northeastern University
Ohio State University - Columbus
Princeton University
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Rice University
Rockefeller University
Rush University
Rutgers the State University of NJ New Brunswick
Saint Louis University - St. Louis
Stanford University
Syracuse University
Tufts University
Tulane University
University of Alaska - Fairbanks
University of Chicago
University of Cincinnati - Cincinnati
University of Dayton
University of Delaware
University of Kentucky
University of Miami
University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
University of Notre Dame
University of Pennsylvania
University of Rochester
University of Southern California
University of Vermont
University of Virginia
University of Washington - Seattle
Vanderbilt University
Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University
Wake Forest University
Washington State University - Pullman
Washington University
Wayne State University
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Yale University
Yeshiva University
Single Governing Board – Multiple Institutions with Local Trustee Boards
Local Boards have delegated powers or legislatively defined powers.
Most local boards recommend institution CEO. Most have state-wide coordinating boards.
Auburn University - Auburn
Clemson University
Florida A&M University
Florida State University
North Carolina State University
Pennsylvania State University University Park
University at Albany
University at Buffalo
University at Stony Brook
University of Florida
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
University of Pittsburgh - Pittsburgh
University South Carolina - Columbia
University of South Florida
University of Utah
Utah State University
Single Governing Board – Multiple Institutions with No Local Board
Most have state-wide coordinating boards.
Arizona State University - Tempe
Colorado State University
Georgia Institute of Technology
Indiana University - Bloomington
Indiana University - Purdue University
Indianapolis
Iowa State University
Kansas State University
Louisiana State University - Baton Rouge
Mississippi State University
Montana State University - Bozeman
New Mexico State University - Las Cruces
Oklahoma State University - Stillwater
Oregon State University
Purdue University - West Lafayette
Temple University
Texas A&M University
University of Alabama - Birmingham
University of Alabama - Huntsville
Page 9
University of Arizona
University of California - Berkeley
University of California - Davis
University of California - Irvine
University of California - Los Angeles
University of California - San Diego
University of California - Santa Barbara
University of California - Santa Cruz
University of Colorado - Boulder
University of Connecticut - Storrs
University of Georgia
University of Hawaii - Manoa
University of Houston - University Park
University of Idaho
University of Illinois - Chicago
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign
University of Iowa
University of Kansas - Lawrence
University of Maryland - College Park
University of Massachusetts - Amherst
University of of Minnesota Twin Cities
University of Missouri - Columbia
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
University of Nevada - Reno
University of New Hampshire Durham
University of of New Mexico Albuquerque
University of Oklahoma - Norman
University of Oregon
University of Puerto Rico - Mayaguez
University of Rhode Island - Kingston
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
University of Texas - Austin
University of Wisconsin - Madison
West Virginia University
Political Context
state before offering educational services. States have
tuition support programs that give modest but significant financial grants to private institutions for
enrolled in-state students. The provision of this
funding carries with it the opportunity for the state
to assert some influence over the academic behavior
of private institutions. This influence is less directive
and less comprehensive than the relationship between
the state and its public institutions, but nonetheless
makes the state’s higher education policy goals relevant to private institutions.
Politics is a source of most public university existence. The state, on behalf of the people, creates the
institutions, provides significant portions of revenue,
and regulates institutional behavior. State systems of
governance and coordination act as agents of the
state’s political authority and regulate, direct, and
control universities in response to the political
process. This power flows clearly and directly from
public ownership of the state university, and the
trustees (regents, board of education members) have
an obligation to manage the institutions on behalf of
the people as directed by state officials.
Some of this may seem obvious, but it deserves
emphasis because it is in this role that public university
or university system trustees differ most significantly
from their private university counterparts. The private
university board owns the university directly and
answers to the public primarily in terms of its fiduciary
responsibility. The private university board focuses
almost exclusively on the effort to fund and enhance
university performance as defined by the board and the
institution. It works on behalf of the institution, not
on behalf of outside political constituencies. While the
private board may take social needs, public obligations,
and alumni and citizen concerns into consideration, it
does not have a formal and direct obligation to direct
the university to meet these concerns. The private
board aligns its efforts with the interests of the institution it supervises. Indeed, one of the primary considerations for membership on a private university board is a
commitment to the university’s mission, frequently
expressed through substantial philanthropy. This difference in perspective explains why public university
presidents, chancellors, chief financial officers, and
other top executives often feel as if they have arrived in
heaven when they move from managing a public institution to managing a private institution.
The political imperatives for public university governance appear clearly to many political and bureaucratic leaders within the various states, and the members of these boards gain their posts usually by political
means. Nonetheless, universities themselves are politi-
cal entities that can and do act independently in their
own self-interest. Public universities have alumni and
local and regional support groups. They serve many
constituencies of high
political value in their
states. Public research
Public universities themselves
universities have multiple
sources of revenue in addiare political entities that can
tion to state dollars, and
most universities of any
and do act independently in
distinction provide the
state with services funded
their self-interest through
from these non-state
resources. Whether in
teaching, research, ecoalumni and local and
nomic development, or
various forms of service,
regional support groups.
the research university
generates a substantial
proportion of the revenue it spends. As a result, states
simply cannot dispose of universities as political imperatives of the moment might indicate.
If a proposed political change appears dangerous to the
university, the institution will mobilize its forces to
resist that change even when its politically appointed
governance system may not concur. Often the university is remarkably successful in defeating the substance,
if not necessarily the form, of political intervention.
In this political context, the governance system
finds itself in a conflict. While in theory the trustees,
boards, or other direct governance organizations serve
the state and are responsible to the state for the operation of the universities, they also often assume the values and aspirations of the research institutions they
regulate. A public board enhances its identification
with the institution’s objectives when it supervises only
one institution. Political agenda are more significant
when the board supervises multiple institutions. The
governor may appoint the trustees, for example, but if
the governor’s agenda appears to threaten the universities’ aspirations, and if the universities and their alumni can make this case persuasively, these politically
appointed boards may resist the changes identified as
essential by the legislature, governor, or state bureaucracy. In this intermediary role, the trustees or other
public governance systems may find themselves sometimes on the side of enforcing the expectations of
elected and appointed state officials and, at other
times, on the side of resisting these expectations. On
occasion, the governance system’s lack of responsiveness to the state political agenda will lead to a reorganization of higher education in order to impose the
state’s will more effectively.
Page 10
This kind of reorganization falls into two categories. States can impose a higher level of control on
existing institutional governance structures by creating
higher education coordinating, budgetary, or policy
commissions, or by redistributing power and authority among the various levels of the state higher education governance system. These
a filtering bureaucraWhen coordinating interpose
cy responsible to legislatures or
governors that reduces the
mechanisms for aligning effectiveness of institutions and
their governing boards in takpublic universities with ing institutional agenda directly to the political process.
current political objectives Coordinating commissions vary
in their effectiveness depending
fail, states often change on the powers awarded them
by the legislature or governor
on their ability to impose
the organization of the and
their determinations over the
of the governing
higher education system. aspirations
boards of the individual institutions or groups of institutions in the state. If the legislature and governor permit the institutional or system boards to carry their
agenda directly to the political process and fail to
assert the authority of the coordinating board, commission, or agency, then the coordinating unit will
become just another bureaucratic but mostly ineffective voice in the crowd.
When coordinating commissions and other mechanisms for aligning the institutions with a state’s current
political objectives fail to perform adequately, states may
change the organization of the state higher education
system either completely or substantially. They can consolidate institutions into a single system or multiple systems with direct controlling bureaucracies headed by
politically appointed chief executives or boards. They
can impose a high-level board with the authority to control the lower-level governance boards for the individual
institutions or groups of institutions, and they can put
particular educational objectives into law.
While these changes sometimes respond to perceived or real problems of effectiveness and efficiency
in the higher education system, at other times they
respond to the needs of the political actors who seek
innovation and change as part of a wider state agenda.
Of particular interest in this conversation is the role of
technocratic elites at various levels of the public higher
education system in most states. The technocrats
often staff legislative committees concerned with the
funding and operation of higher education, serve in
the governor’s or other executive branch offices that
Page 11
deal with educational budget issues, and serve on the
staffs of coordinating commissions.
Such individuals have considerable expertise about
university funding, curricular trends, student access,
and other matters essential to the successful delivery of
higher education to the people of the state. Often
they have strong personal opinions about how universities should operate. Although they are not part of
the direct institutional governance through its administrative shell, they nonetheless have significant influence because they control the details of the political
processes at different levels above the quality engine
and often become key actors in determining and
implementing state policies that affect public research
universities. The technocrats sometimes support the
aspirations of research universities, but often their values lead them to prefer to support large-scale generic
undergraduate education. The effort of managing this
particular set of technocratic actors constitutes one of
the important tasks of the staff of individual university
shell organizations.
In every state – whatever the formal organization
of higher education governance – the political culture
and, in particular, the location of power within state
government determine how the system functions. If
power is concentrated in the hands of the governor,
then the governor will drive state higher education policy and funding. If power resides in the hands of longterm legislative leadership, then legislators will drive
higher education. If state government shares or disperses power widely within its agencies and term limits
diminish the power of legislative leadership, then technocratic staff and multiple-party negotiations may
characterize higher education governance. No formal
statement of organizational structure adequately captures public higher education governance without a
parallel understanding of how the formal structure
relates to the actual distribution of political power
within state government.
Purpose and Functions of Governance
Practically every state develops a strategic vision
for its higher education system, whether expressed in
the form of a master plan or a mission statement. The
relevance of these strategic perspectives to state funding and system organization varies greatly, and many
strategic plans remain as statements of intent rather
than directives for action. A much more commonly
pursued goal of statewide coordination of higher education is to restrain costs and reduce program duplication to a minimum. Captivated by the organizational
notions current in American business, where consoli-
dation, efficiency, and economies of scale appear ascendant, state legislators and governors hope to achieve
similar results by imposing large-scale organizational
models on the rapidly proliferating campuses dependent on state funding. While each state develops a pattern for distributing authority and responsibility for
higher education to the various components of its
higher education governance system, some common
elements appear in every state.
Money underlies much of this conversation.
States recognize the rapidly increasing cost of higher
education resulting from the growing percentage of
their population attending college after World War II,
and especially after 1960, accompanied by an increase
in the complexity and sophistication of public higher
education institutions. Much of the coordination and
governance effort focuses on controlling and managing
costs. Legislators, for example, often find it difficult to
evaluate competing requests from the many institutions in their states. Legislative and executive leadership seeks mechanisms to insulate legislators from
decisions on the relative merit of budget requests from
individual institutions.
The higher education coordinating structure
appears attractive in many states because it promises an
expert-driven structure for evaluating institutional legislative budget requests. While in many cases legislators reduce, expand, or otherwise change the consolidated budget requests received from the coordinating
agencies or governance systems, they nonetheless start
from a unified presentation. Most importantly, this
arrangement provides a mechanism that insulates legislators from the bad news of denying budget requests
and leaves them free to add good things to the higher
education budget for their constituencies if funding
and political forces make this possible. The appointed
higher education governance and coordination system
delivers most of the bad news, and the elected legislators deliver most of the good news.
In some states, this works well; in others, the governance system can become an antagonist of the legislature and executive branch, asking for much more
than the state can afford and then blaming the legislature or the governor when funds fail to materialize.
When this behavior grows too intense, states reorganize or restructure the governance system.
In the drive for efficiency and effectiveness, and
again drawing on corporate models, states use the
higher education governance system to achieve some
measure of what they call accountability.
Accountability is a term of art in higher education,
especially public higher education. From the state’s
point of view, accountability is a process for measuring
the effectiveness of higher education institutions principally in terms of their ability to produce functional
graduates at low cost. While disguised by a wide range
of subjective qualitative rhetoric, the driver of accountability is efficiency. State actors outside higher education, and many within, believe colleges and universities
have little interest in effectiveness or efficiency.
Universities have few standardized measures of efficiency and no equivalent to business-like profit statements
or return on investment calculations. The accountability process presumes to imitate these business indicators with some academic equivalent.
Statewide governance systems, individual institutions, and independent state agencies all develop measures of accountability. Legislators and governors hope
these will provide reasonable guidance for standards of
institutional effectiveness and for public investment
decisions about higher education needs. The results of
the accountability movement have not realized the high
hopes of many, but most statewide governance systems
have some form of accountability program nonetheless.
Another key regulatory purpose is mission differentiation and program approval. Institutional mission
differentiation appears in the formal master plans
approved by most states or through historically determined or cooperative
mission assignments as
No organizational structure
apply in other states.
Many states, such as
adequately explains public
Florida, illustrate the
difficulty of instituhigher education governance
tion-specific mission
differentiation even
within single-board,
without a parallel
multiple-university
environments.
understanding of the actual
Although that state’s
board of regents
distribution of political power
attempted to specify
particular missions for
within state government.
its individual institutions at the time of
their creation, over the
years the power of local politics overwhelmed board
policies as local constituencies mobilized to support
mission expansion. Recent reorganization of higher
education in Florida created the opportunity for community colleges to break the four-year degree barrier, a
formerly substantial dividing marker for higher education mission differentiation.
Page 12
Almost every state controls program approval to
restrain local-campus constituency enthusiasm for
duplicating prestige programs that exist elsewhere in
the state. Medical schools, engineering programs, art
and music programs, professional schools in law, medicine, public health, and veterinary medicine, architecture schools – these and many other specialties come at
a high price although they bring prestige. Statewide
program review and approval attempts to determine
whether the state actually needs an additional program
or advanced degrees or whether an existing program
could meet the demand. States vary widely in their
ability to contain program expansion and proliferation,
as the creation of expensive prestige programs or
advanced degrees is often a token of political effectiveness for the local legislative delegation.
States especially worry about high-cost programs
such as medical schools. Although system organizations
do not always prevent the
proliferation of medical
some systems treat
States vary widely in their schools,
the medical enterprise as a
separately adminability to contain program distinct,
istered entity. In such
places, the medical enterproliferation, as the creation prise becomes a separate
campus, geographically
of expensive prestige programs apart from either the flagship institution or other
is often a token of local major campuses.
Sometimes the medical
political effectiveness. campus reports to the flagship campus, even if it is
not closely connected to it
in any organic way; at other times the system treats the
medical campus as a stand-alone institution reporting
directly to the system executive and board. These
arrangements respond to legislative and institutional history that create opportunities in locations separate from
the main campus, or they may serve to resolve conflicts
of authority and responsibility by creating a separate
relationship for the medical campus. Whatever the origin, the separate campus for a medical center changes
the dynamics of relationships between the medical
research program and the research activities on the system’s research campuses. When the medical center is
part of a research campus, it has a much greater impact
on the research activities of other faculty in related and
allied disciplines.
State systems usually address a variety of academic
standards issues. Admissions processes and transferability of credit among institutions within the state
usually appear on the system agenda. Admissions
Page 13
issues reflect the implementation of the state’s student
access imperative of affording an opportunity for higher education to the widest possible state audience.
Sometimes admission issues include limits on out-ofstate students or establishment of minimum standards
of entry, even when the admissions process itself is a
local, institution-by-institution concern. Elsewhere,
university systems operate common admissions
processes for every institution, using standard forms
and data, and standard criteria. In those systems, students usually have the option of selecting their preferred campus; the better their admission credentials,
the better their chance of admission to the campus of
their choice. State systems also specify other common
characteristics of the admissions process, most recently
in terms of the acceptability of affirmative action programs but also including special financial aid grants
and exceptions for student-athletes, musicians, artists,
alumni children, or donor relatives.
Statewide requirements about the transferability of
credit from one state institution to another (community college to college or university, and between colleges
and universities within the state) also reflect the state’s
commitment to institutional mission differentiation. If
different colleges have different missions and different
programs, students will often take some part of a program at institutions in one place and the specialized
courses at another institution that has the mission to
provide the special program, major, or degree. For this
to work efficiently, student academic credits earned at
one state college or university must transfer to every
other in the state. Much effort in many states is devoted to ensuring this transferability, from transfer requirements to common course numbering systems that guarantee the course equivalency at all state higher education institutions. Because institutions vary in the quality of their student bodies and faculty, and in the range
and extent of their academic resources, colleges and
their faculty often resist these standardizing efforts.
Sometimes they succeed; most often they do not.
Almost all states have a sharp distinction between
community colleges that provide the first two years of
the traditional four-year degree and colleges or universities that provide all four years as well as advanced
degrees. However, linkage between the community
college and the four-year institution varies from explicit formal linkages such as those in Florida to less comprehensive or restrictive transfer rules and agreements
that apply in other states.
Whatever the governance model, systems all focus
on generating revenue. In public university contexts,
the governance systems of boards and commissions
focus primarily on the funding that comes through the
political process at the state level. Systems may share
this function with people and organizations located at
the individual campuses, but they generally assume the
primary responsibility to deal with the state on issues
of budget and finance. Depending on allocation of
authority and responsibility to campuses, system officers also may control or participate in private fundraising, commercialization of intellectual property, and
operation of revenue-generating enterprises such as distance education or economic development programs.
In these activities, however, the system usually serves as
the agent for campus-based, faculty-created content.
In fund-raising, for example, few donors give to a
system of higher education. Most give to a campus,
and even more specifically to an individual school, college, or program. Systems can provide a range of support to campus fund-raising that enhances the ability
of colleges, departments, and campuses to attract gifts.
The most effective support comes from matching programs that usually appear as system-wide, state-funded
efforts. The details of these programs vary, including
direct dollar-for-dollar matches at ratios of 1 to 1 or,
more commonly, some proportion of the gift dollar
matched by state funds. Other programs exist where
the system uses state funds to match the anticipated
income from the endowment gift but does not transfer
state dollars into the endowment.
Systems also supply other less visible, but often
important, support. They can delegate authority and
responsibility for fund-raising to campuses, increasing
the effectiveness of fund-raising activities, or they can
authorize the creation of campus-based foundations that
give donors a clear sense of confidence that their gifts
will stay at the campus and serve designated purposes.
Some state systems deposit foundation money in state
accounts, but most give the campus foundation the
authority and responsibility for managing the endowment. Statewide systems generally support campusbased capital campaigns and encourage their success.
In their role as revenue generators, systems often
serve to combine campus resources when a revenue
opportunity appears that does not fall fully within
the mission of a single campus. In such a role, the
system can encourage or force campuses to cooperate,
combine resources, and deliver services. Sometimes
campuses defend a local self-interest and decline to
cooperate in statewide multi-campus activities. The
system can exercise its authority to force cooperation
and collaboration. The system can also serve as a
supervising entity for large-scale research programs
that fall outside the direct mission of the campus,
require separate funding, or need state funding that
the system can guarantee. Independent national
research laboratories, for example, often exist outside
the direct control of a campus reporting to a systemlevel governance entity, although drawing on the
intellectual strength of the campus’ guilds for their
work and their academic prestige.
Imperative of Statewide Governance
The needs of the state, expressed in political
terms through the actions of legislatures, elected executive branch officials, and permanent state bureaucracies, result in an intervention in the affairs of the
public research university, delivered through the
intermediary of the university’s governance system.
If efficiency and effectiveness become an issue, states
create or mandate accountability programs loaded
with good intentions but
usually without significant
Public university systems,
effect. If access becomes an
issue, states determine the
rather than individual
distribution of students to
institutions, offer incentives
campuses, assume primary
to expand existing institutions, create new ones, and
responsibility for dealing
evaluate competing plans for
providing access. If cost
with the state on budget
becomes a significant issue –
and it always does, states can
and finance.
use the governance system to
shorten the time to degree,
reduce the expense of research faculty, limit the personnel costs of teaching, and expand the lowest cost
options for undergraduate education. If economic
development becomes a priority, states can review
technology transfer programs, encourage the licensing
of technology to in-state corporations, and expect
increased engagement of university people in local or
statewide economic development.
These imperatives, expressed in as many forms and
with as many variations as there are states, often lead
to frustration as research universities fail to respond to
the perhaps unrealistic expectations of the political and
bureaucratic leadership. While this sometimes
prompts specific legislative intervention in the academic process, more often it produces reorganization and
reconfiguration of the higher education system with
stronger hierarchical structure. This enthusiasm for
changing the organization usually responds to a belief
that public higher education fails to meet political
objectives because of a failure of central control, direction, and authority.
Page 14
Relationship of Governance to Research
University Competitiveness
In the conversation about governance, the proponents of particular organizational models or reorganization schemes usually assert that one or another
structure is clearly superior for quality higher education. While it is relatively easy to find dysfunctional
behavior in complex public higher education systems
attempting to coordinate and manage highly diverse
institutions with multiple and differing missions, it is
much more difficult to find ideal types adaptable to
the many different state environments. What works
in California does not translate to New York. What
proves successful in Indiana does not have a future in
Florida. What appears successful in Michigan has no
currency in Louisiana. Each of these models is a
political not an educational artifact, and it responds
to the local political concerns of the state it serves.
The multiple variations on the basic organizational
models described above
that appear in different
It is difficult to find ideal types states at different times
provide eloquent testiof public higher education mony to the locally
adaptive character of
systems. Each is a political public university system
organization.
artifact designed to respond to
The impact of
statewide governance
the local concerns of its state. structures on the functioning of individual
institutions varies. For
those institutions primarily focused on the production
of undergraduates for immediate employment after
graduation, the form, organization, and supervision of
statewide governance boards and local institutional
boards have a significant impact on university behavior.
For research universities, however, the impact of these
governance mechanisms is much less. The undergraduate-producing institution often has a much higher percentage of its budget derived from state-controlled
resources than the research university. The faculty, staff,
and students of these primarily undergraduate colleges
and universities serve a predominantly regional or, at
most, statewide constituency.
Research universities, however, focus on competitiveness with their national peers and produce graduates for
a national marketplace. As a result, changes in statewide
governance often have a much greater impact on predominantly undergraduate institutions than they do on
research universities, even within the same system.
Page 15
Research campuses in complex governance systems
often have the best students, the best faculty, and the
most extensive facilities of any higher education institution in the state. Compared to their teaching-focused
counterparts, they have more alumni support, provide
more service to the state, and have more prestige. Their
financial requirements are high because they tend to
have high-cost programs, professional schools, and other
facilities that are critically important for the success of
many state economic development initiatives. When a
state applies accountability mechanisms in an attempt to
measure and reward effectiveness, research universities
usually meet or exceed the targets set for all state universities. They have the best students, residential campuses, strong student services programs, and with these
advantages, they usually meet graduation, retention, and
enrollment targets. They have many unique programs
and can always demonstrate unique contributions to the
state. Their research strength leads to significant economic return to the state from employment, economic
development programs, spin-off industries, and technical assistance to state agencies and private enterprise. A
research university with a research-oriented medical
school and affiliated hospital can always demonstrate a
major contribution to the state’s health care, especially
for indigent and uninsured patients.
All of this makes statewide governance an important issue – but not a controlling factor – for public
research universities. Indeed, in many cases, much of
the statewide governance activity – of vital interest to
those who work in the university’s shell organizations –
has little direct impact on faculty work. Although salary
issues, arguments about faculty rights, union rules, credit transfer regulations, curricular controls, and program
approvals may depend on the statewide governance system for answers, the issues themselves and the state’s
responses to them do not appear to depend much on
the form of governance.
If we look at all the universities with more than $20
million in federal expenditures in 1999, and arrange
them by type of governance, we can see that they fall
into two obvious groups. The private universities all
have single boards, and the advantage of their organization derives primarily, we believe, from the private
board’s role in support of the institution.
The second group includes all public universities.
Within each of the three general types identified here,
we find highly competitive institutions as well as those
with less success. Of those with a single board for a
single institution, just under half have at least one of
our measures in the top 25 among public universities.
Relationship of Governance to Competitiveness
Public Research Institutions by Governance Type
and Number of Measures in the Top 25
Just over half have no measure in the top 25. Of those
with a single board governing multiple institutions and
the institutions with a local board, half have at least
one measure in the top 25 and half have no measure in
the top 25. Finally, of those with a single governing
board over multiple institutions and no local board,
again, half have at least one measure in the top 25 and
half do not.
These data indicate that highly competitive public
universities and those significantly less competitive
work within all types of governance systems.
Governance structure, in our view, is not a critical
dimension of public research university success.
This conclusion requires a tight focus. Public university systems have many functions and serve many
purposes in the political life of states. Systems often
take on lives of their own, maximize advantages that
they find significant for their executives, board members, and other personnel, and project themselves into
local and national political and academic space to
enhance their importance. From our perspective on
and experience with the competitive success of research
universities, however, the particular organization of a
university system is much less important than other
characteristics of the environment in which the
research campus exists. Delegated authority for most
academic and administrative decision to the campus,
strong support for quality and productivity, and effective research administration all contribute to the success of highly competitive institutions. The same system at some times may support and at other times
inhibit the aspirations of the research campus. These
different outcomes depend not on the structure of the
organization but on the quality and perspectives of the
people who direct the system. If those people share
the aspirations of the research university, they can help
it succeed. If they seek other goals, usually related to
local or state political agenda or personal career
advancement, they may see the national perspective of
the research university as an obstacle to their local
ambitions and inhibit the institution’s research success.
Other characteristics than organizational form
make more of a difference. Universities whose states
provide more money have a relative advantage in the
competition for quality than those whose states provide less. Money matters for the support of research
and the acquisition of quality students in all universities. While the complexity and variety of institutional
arrangements make strong statements about the causes
of research university success rather speculative, we
nonetheless think that the following represent reasonable starting points for discussion. As our model suggests and as the relationship between financial support
and performance discussed below appears to indicate,
public and private research universities with strong
financial support do well – no matter what organizational model governs them. It is difficult to know
whether states with clear mission differentiation for
their institutions or systems such as California and
North Carolina succeed because of the differentiation
or whether the clarity in missions is the result of long
state traditions that govern investment in high-quality
universities. Nonetheless, public research universities
in states with clear mission differentiation separating
research-intensive and teaching-intensive institutions
generally appear to compete more successfully than in
Page 16
those in states where differentiation is ambiguous.
Following our hypothesis that money matters, we
would expect public research universities in states that
enjoy a long tradition of investment in and appreciation for national quality in research and students to
compete better because of their stronger financial support than similar institutions in states that focus primarily on undergraduate
Universities whose states access and degree generation.
From the perspective of
provide more money have a system officers, however, the
view of university success
relative advantage in the may well appear differently
than it does from the
competition for quality. research campus. The university system is a super shell
entity removed from the
teaching and research work of academic life. Some
university systems acquire derived assets such as distance education enterprises, continuing education, and
economic development, but, even so, they depend on
the work of the faculty guilds in the core of each of the
system campuses for their legitimacy and success.
Given the remarkable diversity of organization and
structure, the stability and familiarity of the internal
organization of the research university – what we call
the academic core – is remarkable. Whatever the
structure of the administrative shell and whatever the
higher-level organization of systems or statewide governance, every research university, at the level of the
guilds where the teaching and research work is done
and where the curriculum is defined and delivered,
appears similar and functions in almost identical ways.
Indeed, from the perspective of the academic core of
the university, most of the conversation that occupies
the attention of political actors at the university shell
and governance system, and the legislative and executive branches, appears almost irrelevant. In the end,
what matters for the faculty and students is the teaching and research of the academic guilds, activities regulated by a range of accrediting agencies for teaching,
degrees, and research in many professional fields, and
by national guild-based peer review for research publication and grants. If a state transforms its entire higher education organization, reconstitutes individual
universities into systems with a single board and a single chief executive on behalf of the system, the faculty
and students on each campus will continue as before
and do almost exactly the same things in the same
ways and using the same standards. If the new system
provides more money, they will do better perhaps. If
the coordination changes transfer requirements and
Page 17
similar student-related conditions, some segments of
the institution may see an impact but, for the most
part, the academic core in public research universities
functions in the same way, whatever the statewide
organization.
Not so in the institution’s administrative shell,
where changes in system organization have a profound
effect on the balance of power, authority, opportunity,
career possibilities, and administrative functions. With
consolidation into systems, individual shell officials
from presidents or chancellors to registrars, from
financial affairs officers to police departments, all find
themselves dealing with new relationships. In some
cases, they acquire new authority if the change decentralizes functions; in other cases, they lose authority if
the change centralizes functions. In either case, the
jobs of the shell participants change with the governance structure. For this reason, debates over system
changes often engage shell actors directly and they
become major participants in the controversies that
always surround major political restructuring of state
university governance.
While forms of organization vary within state systems, the actual architecture of the system appears to
us much less important than the distribution of
authority and responsibility throughout the system.
In reviewing the details of delegated authority for a
number of highly competitive institutions within complex systems, the pattern of delegating substantially all
academic and administrative authority to the campus
is evident. The implications of an organizational
change depend on the details of the resulting arrangements and delegations of authority, and the impact of
any change will vary depending on the capabilities and
needs of each campus. The success of any particular
university system also depends as much on the quality
of the governing organization’s leadership as it does on
the precise organization. A governance structure with
strong and effective leadership can help the research
university succeed; the same structure with weak leadership can inhibit success.
Cost, Complexity, Regulation, and Money
Our principal concern in these reports is to
understand the competition that defines the American
research university. We have identified some of the
measurable areas of competition for the scarce
resources that define research university success, and
we have looked at some of the characteristics of universities that influence this competition. We have
found that the size of an institution helps explain at
least some part of the competitive research success of
Cost, Complexity, Regulation, and Money
public, but not private, universities, and we have seen
that the presence of a research-intensive medical faculty is a significant asset in this competition, even if the
mere existence of a medical school is not. We have
noted that public research universities dominate the
competition for federal research dollars, although
some private universities continue to compete exceptionally well.
The examination of the differences between public
and private research institutions led us to reconsider
our original notion that we could approach the analysis of competition among research universities by looking at public and private universities separately. The
competitive model we found shows public and private
research universities competing in remarkably similar
ways for students and faculty, federal grants and contracts, and private resources. As a result, after the first
year, we redesigned our Top American Research
Universities to present public and private universities
together, although we continue to offer separate presentations to maintain consistency with the first report
and to support our colleagues who found the data useful when displayed by institutional control.
In this review of institutional organization, in
which we anticipated identifying some other elements
distinguishing public from private institutions, we
have two tentative conclusions.
• First, the impact of large-scale organizational structures in the public sector does not appear to have a
major effect on the competition for research or for
high-quality students in major research universities. While differences surely exist between public
and private undergraduate programs, most public
research universities find ways to compete for the
best students and to deliver excellent undergraduate results in every organizational model we
reviewed. However, the success of public universities in the student competition is somewhat
obscured by the wide range in student quality in
most of the large, high-quality public institutions.
The students recruited into public university honors programs, for example, have SAT scores and
other quality indicators equivalent to those of the
highly competitive private universities.
• Second, these often elaborate and hierarchical
public organizational structures within which
public research universities function clearly create inefficiencies, duplicate work, and generate
high administrative costs compared to the relatively lean and flat structures that govern private
institutions.
Why then, do public universities perform so well in
the competition for the scarce resources that define
research university success? The answer is not all that
complicated. It is the money. Understanding university money is complicated by the accounting standards
followed by public and private universities (which use
different standards) and by the organizational differences among public universities
(which define expenses and
The contribution of
income in different organizations or at different levels of the
state tax dollars to
state bureaucracy). Nonetheless,
it is our belief that the contribupublic research universition of state tax dollars to public
research universities more than
compensates for the added cost
ties more than compenand inefficiency that are a consequence of complicated public
sates for the added cost
governance structures.
In our data, we include two
and inefficiency that are
items of institutional resources:
endowment assets and annual
a consequence of comgiving. These two items provide
an indicator of how well univerplicated public goversities (and their related foundations) compete in the private
nance systems.
marketplace for gifts in support
of student and research quality.
In these data we easily see that private universities often
have significantly higher totals than their public counterparts. In 2001, among the research universities in
our study (those with more than $20 million in federal
research expenditures), the private institutions’ median
endowment at $1.1 billion is four times greater than the
public universities’ endowment of $250 million. Their
annual giving shows a median of $94.8 million for privates and $45.0 million for publics. However, because
institutional resources are so critical to the ability of
research universities to compete, we are not satisfied
with these indicators.
Resources represent a complicated notion for universities. In this conversation, we draw on the work
of the Williams Center directed by Gordon Winston
and the useful article by Bradburd and Mann published in 1993, both cited below. We have explored
the possibility of identifying all the assets and obligations of an institution and then, by various means,
translating these assets less obligations into an index
of institutional wealth. This is not easy to do, as the
papers of the Williams Center and the Bradburd and
Mann article show – not only due to accounting rules
that do not allow clear distinctions but also because
Page 18
publics present their financials by
fund group while private universities do not. In the case of private
practices do not lend universities, current accounting
rules permit capture of the entire
themselves to a clear enterprise; with public universities, only the operating budget is
understanding of the as easily accessed. The
Governmental Accounting
institution’s total Standards Board (GASB) has
established a new reporting model
resources. that will require all universities,
both public and private, to report
on an entity-wide basis in their financial statements
by fiscal year 2002.
In addition, public universities have many different methods of holding and managing assets.
Buildings and grounds, debt, retirement accounts, and
similar elements of a public university’s total assets
appear in different places for different institutions and
systems. In some states, plant belongs to the state and
is accounted for as a part of the state’s assets.
Retirement fund balances and large obligations such as
worker’s compensation or liability and property insurance can belong to the state and not the university.
Debt may be located at a university campus, consolidated for many universities at a system office, or held
by the state itself. The variety and significance of these
different methods of managing public money for universities are exceptional. In addition, universities, public and private, hold other kinds of assets in different
ways. Medical practice plans, hospital assets and
budgets, athletic association funds, private endowment
balances and income, and similar sources of funds can
appear inside the university’s accounting system or
within other entities. Although, in theory, detailed
work with state and institutional accounts might permit a resolution of some of these problems, as a practical matter we do not believe we have the tools yet to
construct a clear, institution-to-institution comparison
of total assets.
Accounting rules and
Endowment-Equivalent
Nonetheless, money matters. In exploring the
trade-off between complexity and money that is part
of the explanation for public research university success in the competition with private universities, we
developed a rough sketch of the comparative endowment and endowment-equivalent resources available to
public and private research universities. To do this, we
drew our inspiration from a notion originally proposed
by Bradburd and Mann (1993). Looking only at
Page 19
research universities, we start with their 1999 endowment assets at market value. Then, we take their
annual giving for 1999 and convert this to an endowment-equivalent.
By endowment-equivalent, we mean the amount
of endowment that would be required to generate this
annual giving income stream. We assume an endowment payout of 4.5%, which represents the generally
accepted and widely used 5% spending formula calculated upon a moving three-year (or 12-quarter) average. We derived this estimate from the methodology
used by Moody’s Investors Service for evaluating the
creditworthiness of colleges and universities.
Thus, to get the endowment-equivalent of the
annual giving stream, we take annual giving and divide
it by 0.045. Using the same methodology, we convert
the state appropriation into an endowment-equivalent.
This is obviously a much more important element for
public than for private universities, but many private
institutions have state subsidies of various kinds.
The final income stream we identify is gross
tuition and fees. Although tuition is widely discounted through institutional financial aid, our interest is in
the potential endowment-equivalent resources available
to the university, and so for this purpose we use the
gross tuition and fees. We also convert this income
stream into an endowment-equivalent.
To get the total endowment-equivalent for private
and public universities we add these items:
• regular endowment
• annual giving endowment-equivalent
• state appropriation endowment-equivalent
• tuition and fees endowment-equivalent
These calculations do not provide a total for all
university assets that generate income or value for the
university. Accounting rules and practices for universities, as we have mentioned before, do not lend themselves to a clear understanding of the institution’s total
resources. Especially for public universities, many elements of the university’s total resources may not even
appear on the university’s financial statements. For
example, in some states, the state pays debt service and
carries this expenditure on the state’s accounts, not the
universities’. As a result, the university has the use of
more resources than appear on its statements because
the institutional financial reports understate the institution’s income by the amount of debt service paid on
its behalf by the state. Not all resources held in private
foundations on behalf of the institution or in various
auxiliaries that support the institution appear in uni-
versity reports. When universities are part of complex
systems as described previously, the distribution of the
costs and benefits of the system may not appear in
ways easily attributable to the university benefited or
charged.
All of this recommends significant caution when
using the data we develop and present here. The purpose of the exercise is to assess in a general way the relative economic strength of public and private research
universities, not to present a comprehensive and complete analysis of institutional assets and liabilities, or to
compare individual institutions. Our interest in a general comparison of public and private institutions is to
show how public universities, by virtue of the constant
support provided by their state governments from tax
revenues, often have comparable financial resources to
invest in quality, compared to private universities with
apparently large endowments. This is a conservative
approach because most of the errors that come from
the inability to deal with capital expenses reduce the
apparent resources of the public universities. That is,
they have more to work with than we have captured
here. If we can show that the public institutions
appear to have as much or more in financial resources
than many of their private counterparts, we are likely
underestimating the public institution’s advantage.
Differences in scale among universities suggest
another adjustment. Some of the apparent financial
strength of the public institution may be deceptive
because it reflects the cost of large-scale undergraduate
instruction. This is an important function of public
universities. It is not, however, one of the competitive
issues for research universities who compete for student quality and faculty research productivity. To
adjust for this factor of scale, we also present the data
after deducting the endowment-equivalent supporting
basic instruction. We use $7,000 as the basic cost for
an undergraduate FTE, $8,750 for a graduate FTE,
and $20,000 for a professional school FTE. The
undergraduate baseline cost comes from the NACUBO
Cost of College Study (2002), using the 10th percentile
for four-year public universities and estimating graduate
education at 1.25 times the baseline cost of undergraduate instruction. The estimate for the baseline cost of a
professional student FTE is more tentative than the others used here. Some professional programs in medicine
and veterinary medicine have very high costs; we estimate others, such as law, at much lower cost. Our estimate of $20,000 is our best approximation of a baseline
cost for professional school FTEs.
The following graphs plot the total endowmentequivalent for private and public universities in rank
order. As we showed in previous publications, about
twice as many public institutions meet the minimum
of $20 million in federal research expenditures as private universities. This reflects the investment of state
revenue in public universities that has allowed them to
build sufficient capacity to compete successfully
against their private counterparts. The graph helps us
understand the basis for the emergence of the researchintensive public universities. In terms of total endowment-equivalent, before adjusting for the factor of
enrollment, the graph shows that public universities
rank with private universities in terms of the resources
measured here at every level. This result, however,
likely overstates the impact of
public university resources from
Public funding of public
state appropriations for large
undergraduate enrollments.
institutions more than
If we then adjust downward
the total endowment-equivalent
compensates for the
to account for the extra income
public universities get as a result
higher endowments of
of their larger enrollments funded with state dollars and tuition
and fees, the pattern changes
private universities.
slightly. While public universities remain competitive in every
category with their private counterparts, the private
institutions in the top 20 outnumber the publics.
Indeed, a disproportionately smaller number in the last
two groups balances the disproportionately larger number of private universities in this top group.
Insofar as success in the competition for quality
requires substantial resources, the data reflect the
public institution’s ability to acquire the necessary
funds. Public funding of public institutions more
than compensates for the higher endowments of private universities.
Although this adjusted total compensates for different levels of student enrollment between public and
private universities, it also compensates for different
levels of enrollment within the two control groups.
This has the effect of changing the order of private and
public universities between their total endowmentequivalent rank and their enrollment-adjusted total
endowment-equivalent rank. These changes are not
particularly significant, however, as the r-square
between the rankings on the adjusted vs. the nonadjusted total endowment-equivalent is 0.95 regardless
of ownership. In other words, the rank order for both
publics and privates changes very little with the adjustment for size.
Page 20
Total Endowment-Equivalent
Universities with More Than $20 Million in Federal Research in Rank Order
While these calculations do not give us a full picture of the total resources available to public and private institutions, they suggest that public universities
have substantial revenues equivalent to or exceeding
those of their private counterparts for investment in
support of those elements of quality they identify as
most important. Some of this revenue, as discussed in
detail in the Williams Center papers, supports subsidies for educational quality expressed both in the form
of tuition discounting and added enhancements to the
quality (and expense) of undergraduate education.
The other investments support the added costs of
high-quality research. As we discussed in more detail
in the The Top American Research Universities (2001),
academic research requires extensive support from university funds because grants, contracts, and other
forms of external support do not pay the full cost of
the research produced. This additional support, like
the subsidies and enhancements for high-quality
undergraduate education, comes primarily from
endowment income or, in our model, from the total
endowment-equivalent income generated by public
and private institutions.
Given the substantial resources available to public
institutions, as identified in this discussion, it is not
surprising to find so many public universities competing successfully against private universities both for
high-quality students and for research grants and contracts. Only in the top category do more private universities have enrollment-adjusted total endowmentequivalent resources than public institutions. More
Page 21
detailed research may provide us with a clearer indication of this public university strength in the competition for academic quality, but our example here probably underestimates the public institution’s competitive
advantage in supporting the competition for institutional quality among research universities.
We have reviewed a few of the benefits that some,
but not all, public institutions enjoy that do not always
appear in public university accounts. In addition, we
should note that these benefits can also include statefunded retirement systems, debt financing held by the
state on behalf of the university, provision of sovereign
immunity to faculty physicians that dramatically reduce
the cost of malpractice insurance, state scholarships paid
directly to students attending public universities, and
similar benefits that correspond to the details of state
arrangements with their public institutions. While these
benefits vary greatly from public institution to public
institution, all of them enhance the resources that public
universities have in their competition with each other
and with their private counterparts for high-quality students and research.
We have not yet fully explored the close relationship between institutional resources and the competition for federal research funding, but it appears likely
that the substantial funds available to private and public universities as reflected in their adjusted total
endowment-equivalents provide a source for strong
support in this competition. We use the adjusted figure to estimate the potential institutional resources
available to the university for supporting all forms of
Total Endowment-Equivalent Adjusted for Student FTE Enrollment
Universities with More Than $20 Million in Federal Research in Rank Order
quality competition, including research, once it has
covered its basic teaching costs. The plot of public and
private university adjusted total endowment-equivalent
against federal research expenditures shows a strong
linear relationship.
In this case, the adjusted total endowment appears
to explain about 60% of the variance in federal
research performance for both public and private institutions. Of course, these highly competitive institutions use their disposable income to support the acquisition of quality students and other university priorities. Nonetheless, we believe this relationship reflected
in the r-square of about 0.60 indicates that the substantial resources reflected in these data explain a significant part of the success of the top research universities in the competition for federal research dollars. In
this calculation, we do not include John Hopkins and
Harvard because they are extreme outliers on federal
research and total endowment-equivalent, respectively.
Their inclusion in this analysis distorts the results and
reduces the private institution r-square to 0.27.
Another way to view this relationship is to look at
the relationship of federal research to adjusted total
endowment-equivalent. We calculated the amount of
federal research expenditures per $1,000 in adjusted
total endowment-equivalent for each of the 288 institutions in our sample. We then grouped the institutions into four bands based on their level of federal
research in 1999. Within each band, we calculated the
median amount of federal research expenditures per
$1,000 for private and public universities separately.
In the group of universities with more than $20
million in federal research expenditures, public and
private institutions not only have similar expenditures
per $1,000 but also appear to have significantly more
adjusted total endowment-equivalent resources relative
to their research volume than do their less researchintensive counterparts. As we showed in last year’s
report, this group of institutions at the very highest
level of performance is in a category of its own. The
federal research expenditures per $1,000 for private
universities, in particular, demonstrate the substantial
differences between this group of top competitive
research universities and the other private institutions.
Adjusted Total Endowment-Equivalent and Federal Research
Universities with More Than $20 Million in Federal Research
(excluding Harvard and Johns Hopkins)
Page 22
Federal Research per $1000
Adjusted Total Endowment-Equivalent
Median of Research Group by Control
Mean Adjusted Total Endowment-Equivalent
by Performance Score and Control
Universities Over $20 Million in Federal Research
Page 23
The more than $20 million private institutions’
median federal research expenditures per adjusted total
endowment-equivalent is nearly four times as large as that
of their closest competitive group (those with between $5
and $20 million). In contrast, the top public universities’
median federal research expenditures per $1,000 is less
than two times as great as the second band of publics.
Instead, the big break point for public institutions occurs
at the bottom of the scale, where the median federal
research expenditure per $1,000 of the $1 to $5 million
publics is nearly eight times as large as the median for
those public universities with less than $1 million in federal research expenditures. These relationships do not tell
us how universities spend their money, but they give a
sense of the resources available to institutions at the different levels of research intensity. A detailed set of case
studies would allow us to understand the different ways
universities allocate their funds in support of research,
instruction, and other university priorities.
We also categorized the research universities in our
over-$20-million group by their performance scores in
The Top American Research University’s taxonomy (2001).
This view of the data helps us understand how the
resources identified here relate to the total success of the
top research universities in all the areas included in our
reports. We assigned a score of 1 for every measure the
institution had ranked in the top 25 by control (public
and private ranked separately) and a score of 0.5 for every
measure the institution had ranked from 26 to 50.
Universities can range from a high score of 9 (all top 25
rankings) to a low of zero (no rankings in the top 50).
The chart included here clearly shows that the universities
in the group with the highest performance on our measures also enjoyed, by far, the highest mean adjusted total
endowment-equivalents. Reinforcing our earlier examination by rank order, in nearly every performance category,
public universities have higher mean adjusted endowment-equivalents than their private counterparts.
In short, money matters. Public universities probably have as much of it to spend subsidizing the cost of
high quality as private universities do, and most public
institutions have stronger resource bases of total endowment-equivalent than their private counterparts. Public
institutions with high total endowment-equivalents and
high performance in the quality elements defined by our
reports exist under every governance type. For all universities, public or private, money matters, but public universities benefit greatly by their organization as state-supported entities. Within public universities as a group, the
amount of money available to support quality is likely to
be much more important than the specific details of state
governance organization.
Some References on
University Organization and Finance
The search for an effective and stable organizational model for state systems of higher education has a
long history. The simple cataloging of the various state
models alone accounts for a significant amount of
effort, mostly sponsored by organizations focused on
higher education such as the Carnegie Foundation, the
Association of Governing Boards, and the Education
Commission of the States. One of the earliest efforts
to address the issue of higher education organization is
in Robert J. Leonard’s The Coordination of State
Institutions for Higher Education Through Supplemental
Curricular Boards (Berkeley: University of California,
1923), which, although narrow in scope because it
focuses on only three states, nonetheless raises many of
the issues that continue to drive organizational change
today. More comprehensive early treatments came a
decade later, in 1933 and 1934, when The Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching helped
sponsor Fred J. Kelly and John H. McNeely’s The State
and Higher Education: Phases of Their Relationship
(New York, 1933, in cooperation with The US Office
of Education) and Edward C. Elliott and M.M.
Chambers’ Charters and Basic Laws of Selected
American Universities and Colleges (New York, 1934, in
cooperation with Purdue University). The State and
Higher Education offered a comprehensive review of
college and university organization in 10 selected states
with charts outlining the composition of boards and
their functions and relationships along with other
information on the missions of institutions including a
chapter on “The Trend toward Unified Control.”
Charters and Basic Laws gives a succinct summary of
the charters and powers of 51 universities, over half of
which are private. All of the themes that inform subsequent studies of this topic of university organization
appear in these pre-World War II publications – further evidence of the persistence of the dilemmas faced
by public university organizations and the difficulty of
arriving at satisfactory organizational paradigms.
Over the years, a significant literature on these
topics emerged, responding in part to the endless
changes and modifications in university governance
and the characteristics of state university organization.
For an interesting account of the process by which
“colleges” became “universities,” see Christopher C.
Morphew’s article, “‘A Rose by Any Other Name’:
Which Colleges Became Universities,” The Review of
Higher Education (25:2, 2002) 207-223. The renewed
interest in the topic of organization of state systems
that marked the 1960s is visible in a comprehensive
review of State Boards Responsible for Higher Education
by S.V. Martorana and Ernest V. Hollis (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, 1960). This state-by-state analysis with organizational diagrams and a variety of other analytical
and descriptive information outlines the functions,
powers, and responsibilities of the various units within
these organizations. A slightly later view revisits these
questions in a series of essays edited by W. John
Minter, Campus and Capitol: Higher Education and the
State (Boulder, Colorado: Western Interstate
Commission for Higher Education, 1966). Of particular interest for our purposes are three essays on state
higher education coordination and the excellent annotated bibliographies that accompany them: Samuel B.
Gould, “The University and State Government,” pp.
2-15; Daniel G. Aldrich, Jr., “Maintaining
Institutional Identity and Autonomy in Coordinated
Systems,” pp. 16-24; Lyman A. Glenny, “Politics and
Current Patterns in Coordinating Higher Education,”
pp. 26-46; and the annotated bibliographies on pp.
121-147.
The 1971 report on The Multicampus University:
A Study of Academic Governance sponsored by The
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education by
Eugene C. Lee and Frank M. Bowen (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1971) provides another effective update
on the evolution of university systems and once again
illustrates the continuity of issues and the contextual
nature of university organization. The authors offer
this conclusion that sounds as current to us today as it
must have in 1971 (pp.421-422):
“The organization of higher education will not
determine the place or the future of the university in
society. Whether a state has a single-board system or
single-campus institutions; whether it has a strong
coordinating agency or a multicampus system...; or
whether it has some combination of these—none of
these factors will in and of itself solve the problems of
higher education in the 1970s. [. . .] None of the alternative patterns of organization is better or worse in
abstract. They take shape and can be evaluated only in
terms of the environment within which they are set.
Particular sets of political and social circumstances may
dictate a pattern of organization which could not survive in a different context.”
Page 24
Indeed, the same authors have this to say in their
introduction to an excellent volume of essays published
in 1999 (Gerald H. Gaither, ed., The Multicampus
System: Perspectives on Practice and Prospects, Sterling,
Virginia: Stylus Publishing, 1999, p. x):
“The world is a different place than it was thirty
years ago. But have multicampus systems changed as
much as the world around them? Plus ça change, plus
c’est la même chose. As significant as are the changes
discussed in the essays, much remains the same.”
Robert O. Berdahl, in “A View from the Bridge:
Higher Education at the Macro-Management Level,”
The Review of Higher Education (2000, 24:1) 103-112,
a review of Gaither (ed.), The Multicampus System
(1999), and in Richard Richardson, Kathy Bracco,
Patrick Callan, and Joni Finney, Designing State Higher
Education Systems for a New Century (Phoenix, AZ:
American Council on Education/Oryx Press, 1999),
offers an insightful view of these issues, drawing on the
perspective of 30 years of involvement in this conversation as reflected in his earlier much-cited work
Statewide Coordination of Higher Education
(Washington, DC: American Council on Education,
1971).
Reflecting the continuity of issues and concerns
that define the organizational efforts of states on behalf
of public higher education as viewed from the mid
1980s, John D. Millett’s Conflict in Higher Education:
State Government Coordination Versus Institutional
Independence (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984) provides a useful historical view and an in-depth analysis
of 25 states categorized by the author’s typology of
higher education governance systems. In the late
1990s, D. Bruce Johnstone revisited this discussion
based on his many contributions to our understanding
of system operations and university finance in an
excellent essay on “Management and Leadership
Challenges of Multicampus Systems,” in the Gaither
volume mentioned above.
In 1995 Richard Novak compiled an annotated
bibliography that provides a good overview of the literature in Statewide Governance, Coordination, and
Trusteeship in Public Higher Education: An Annotated
Bibliography (Washington, DC: Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges [AGB],
1995). Indeed, the AGB’s commitment to this topic is
understandably keen, and the association has sponsored a number of publications that explore the controversies and conversation about the best way to
organize and manage public universities. For examples
of this literature, see the collection of articles from the
AGB-sponsored magazine Trusteeship that appears in
Page 25
Trusteeship Portfolios, Governance of Public Higher
Education (Washington, DC: AGB, 1999), many of
which speak to either organizational issues directly or
to the difficulties of managing universities within existing organizational models. This follows on the AGB’s
publication Bridging the Gap: Between State
Government and Public Higher Education (Washington,
DC: AGB, 1998), a call to action on various issues of
governance that touches on questions of organization
and the distribution of responsibility and authority.
Another useful study appeared in 1998 sponsored
by The National Center for Public Policy and Higher
Education (Richard C. Richardson, Jr., et al., Higher
Education Governance: Balancing Institutional and
Market Influences (San Jose, California, November
1998) that used a seven-state analysis to illustrate a
new analytic model. In rejecting the classic definitions
of state organization (consolidated governing boards,
coordinating governing boards, and planning boards),
the authors wrote “...these three designations, despite
their earlier usefulness, are now insufficient for examining the relationships between public policy and state
systems that overarch individual institutions”(p. 5).
They propose instead a taxonomy using segmented,
unified, and federal as the appropriate descriptors and
focus on the policy issues that states address when they
decide on governance structure, educational mission,
institutional capacity, and work processes.
Among the agencies concerned with these issues,
exceptionally detailed and current information on public higher education organization appears through the
work of the Education Commission of the States [ECS].
In addition to the useful paper by Aims C. McGinness,
“Governance and Coordination: Definitions and
Distinctions” (Denver: ECS Policy Brief, December
2001, accessed 2002 at [http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/31/62/3162.htm]), that reinforces the categorization of governing systems used by many observers and
draws on the work of Clark Kerr and Marian Gade in
The Guardians: Boards of Trustees of American Colleges
and Universities: What Do They Do and How Well Do
They Do It? (Washington, D.C.: AGB, 1989), the AGB
publishes a comprehensive database on postsecondary
governance structures on its web site. The data available
there includes “A report containing all information
available in the Postsecondary Governance Structures
Database for a single state,” “Information on individual
topics from all 50 states, where available,” and the
opportunity to “Select one or more states and specific
comparative information to be displayed in a single online report” ECS Tools & Resources: Postsecondary
Governance Structures Database (Denver: ECS, accessed
2002 at [http: //www.ecs.org/ clearing-
References
house/31/02/3102.htm]). Aims C. McGinness also has
an interesting presentation of organizational diagrams in
“Models of Postsecondary Education Coordination and
Governance in the States” (Denver: ECS, accessed 2002
at [http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/
34/23/3423.htm]). J. Fredericks Volkwein demonstrates that “Changes in Quality among Public
Universities” is more a function of their resources than a
function of their state’s regulatory system in his article in
the Journal of Higher Education (60:2, 1989, 136-151)
Finally, for those interested in the long history and
evolution of university organization, The Academic
Corporation: A History of College and University
Governing Boards by Edwin D. Duryea (New York:
Falmer Press, 2000) offers a review that begins with
“Medieval Origins.” This book primarily addresses the
powers and legal status of universities private and public and has a thorough discussion of the various significant court cases relevant to this concern. The author
looked at the founding documents of 26 private institutions and those of the public universities in 22
states. In addition, there is a very useful bibliography
of relevant court cases.
These represent but a sampling of the extensive literature on university governance. While our focus
here is on organization, the materials on other topics
related to decision making, faculty governance, and
other such issues is even more extensive.
The topic of university money, in all its forms, has
a large and fascinating academic literature.
Economists, education researchers, and many others
have explored the topic of university finance from
many different directions. Because of the many difficulties of using university-supplied economic data,
most of the studies deal with subsets of the academic
finance universe. For a quick introduction to the
problems of identifying university costs, the report
Explaining College Costs: NACUBO’s Methodology For
Identifying The Costs of Delivering Undergraduate
Education (Washington, DC: National Association of
College and University Business Officers, 2002
accessed on-line July 2002 at [http://www.nacubo.org/
public_policy/cost_of_college/final_report.pdf ]) provides a good discussion on accounting issues and difficulties of estimating the costs of undergraduate education. It also provides some estimates of cost ranges
using its methodology that proved helpful in our work
here. Our calculations on endowment payout follow
the methodology in Moody’s Investors Service,
“Moody’s Introduces New Concepts to Measure
Operating Performance and Leverage” (Special
Comment Report, No. 41612) (New York, 1999).
Exceptionally creative work on the issue of
instructional costs, pricing, and tuition discounting
have come from the Williams Center project mentioned various times in the text. The papers produced
on these topics appear on the The Williams Project on
the Economics of Higher Education web site at
[http://www.williams.edu/Mellon/project.html] and
accessed in July 2002. Of particular interest is the
paper on “Saving, Wealth, Performance, and Revenues
in US Colleges and Universities” by Gordon C.
Winston, Jared C. Carbone, and Laurie C. Hurshman
(Williamstown, MA: The Williams Project, 2001),
although the entire series of papers on the site are
required reading for those interested in the operation
of college and university finance. For our purposes in
this paper, we have drawn heavily on the framework
developed by Winston and colleagues for understanding the institutional competition for high-quality students and applied a similar approach to our understanding of research university competition for
research faculty and their grants and contracts. In
both cases, the university subsidizes the competition.
For students, the mechanism involves tuition discounting and high-cost undergraduate programs and service;
for research, the mechanism involves market-competitive salaries and benefits for scarce research-competent
faculty and subsidies for the unreimbursed cost of their
national research competition for grants, contracts,
foundation support, and publication success. Also
helpful in formulating this paper is the article mentioned above by Ralph M. Bradburd and Duncan P.
Mann, “Wealth in Higher Education Institutions,”
Journal of Higher Education (64,1993; 472-493) and
available on-line through JSTOR.
Of considerable utility in this conversation is
Irwin Feller’s article on “The Determinants of
Research Competitiveness Among Universities” in
Albert H. Teich, ed., Competitiveness in Academic
Research (Washington, DC: American Association for
the Advancement of Science, 1996, pp. 35-72), where
he clearly outlines the importance of institutional and
other subsidies that pay for the costs of this competition. Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie in Academic
Capitalism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1997) offer a strong discussion of the impact of externally driven research competition on the internal academic structure and behavior of universities. The
focus on faculty incentives and competition also has a
long tradition. See, for example, the following two
articles that illustrate the clear relationship between
research and reward at the individual faculty level.
James F. Ragan, Jr., John T. Warren, and Bernt
Bratsberg focus on the microcosm of the economics
Page 26
department in their “How Similar are Pay Structures
in `Similar’ Departments of Economics?” Economics of
Education Review (18:1999, 347-360) and demonstrate
that high- quality research publication returns high
rewards to faculty to compete successfully, further supporting the impact of national guild quality assessment
on individual campus faculty and the rewards provided
for their research work. James S. Fairweather’s “Myths
and Realities of Academic Labor Markets,” in The
Economics of Education Review (14:1995, 179-192),
looks at the whole of the faculty marketplace and finds
that while there is some segmentation of the market by
institution type, every institution seeks out researchcapable faculty and the price for research talent is
nationally determined.
The topic of university revenue and expenditures
and institutional finance is an endlessly fascinating and
frustrating topic. See, for an example, Daniel T.
Layzell’s Budgeting for Higher Education at the State
Level: Enigma, Paradox, and Ritual (Washington, DC:
George Washington University, 1990), D. Kent
Halstead’s Higher Education Revenues and Expenditures:
A Study of Institutional Costs (Washington, DC:
Research Associates of Washington, 1991), and especially the more recent review of the state of the conversation in D. Bruce Johnstone, “Patterns of Finance:
Revolution, Evolution, or More of the Same?” The
Review of Higher Education. (21:1998, 245-255)
Page 27
accessed on-line July 2002 at [http://www.press.jhu.edu/
journals/review_of_higher_education/v021/21.3johnstone.html]. The articles in Patrick M. Callan, et al.,
eds. Public and Private Financing of Higher Education:
Shaping Public Policy for the Future (Phoenix: Oryx
Press, 1997) speak to the complex array of financial
resources supporting higher education and make some
predictions about the future. An interesting accounting
and risk analysis perspective on private university
resources is in Ronald E. Salluzzo, Frederic J. Prager, et
al., Ratio Analysis in Higher Education. Measuring Past
Performance to Chart Future Direction (4th ed., n.p.,
KPMG, LLP and Prager, McCarthy Sealy, LLC,
1999).
Finally, the federal government provides data on
institution resources in Financial Statistics of
Institutions of Higher Education; Current Funds,
Revenues and Expenditures (Washington, DC: National
Center for Educational Statistics, various dates), but
these data are not easily used for the purposes of the
kind of discussion presented here. Based on the
IPEDS data collection system, the data collection and
reporting system create some problems of interpretation, completeness, and consistency that render their
usefulness for some purposes problematical.
TheCenter staff is developing a discussion paper that
will address these technical concerns, scheduled for
publication in late Fall 2002.
References
Appendix: Endowment-Equivalent
Data and Calculations
Calculations
The following table lists each of the research universities used in our calculation and analysis of endowment-equivalent resources (see Cost, Complexity,
Regulation, and Money, pp. 20-22). These 119 institutions (39 private and 80 public) include those with
more than $20 million in federal research expenditures
in fiscal year 1999, and exclude stand-alone medical
schools and any institutions that did not have all five
key elements for this study—student enrollment,
endowment assets, annual giving, state appropriations,
and tuition and fees.
The Total Endowment-Equivalent is the sum of
these four variables, with the latter three converted to a
comparable endowment-equivalent (i.e., assuming a
4.5% payout rate, we divide each figure by .045):
Endowment Assets Market Value is obtained
from the 1999 NACUBO Endowment Study, with
adjustments made for single-campus institutions that
report as a system or multi-campus university (see
Data Notes for further details on adjustments, p. 163).
Annual Giving data are obtained from the Council
for Aid to Education’s 1999 Voluntary Support of
Education Survey, with adjustments if necessary.
State Appropriations data are from the IPEDS
1999 Finance Survey (Form F-1, Line A043, for public universities; Form F-2, Line A041, for privates).
Gross Tuition and Fees data are from the IPEDS
1999 Finance Survey (Form F-1, Line C2d, for public
universities; Form F-2, Line A01_1 and AA08, for
privates).
The Adjustment for Student Enrollment is based
on Fall 1999 Student Headcount data reported in
IPEDS Fall Enrollment Study (Form EF-1). We use
the conventional formula for converting to an FTE
Headcount—three part-time students equal one fulltime student. We then multiply the FTE headcount
by the following estimated baseline costs of education
per level:
$7,000 per undergraduate FTE headcount
$8,750 per graduate FTE headcount
$20,000 per professional FTE headcount
The Adjusted Total Endowment-Equivalent is
equal to the Total Endowment-Equivalent minus the
Adjustment for Student Enrollment.
Page 28
Endowment-Equivalent Components and Size Adjustment for Selected Over $20 Million Universities*
Control
Private
Public
Private
Private
Public
Public
Private
Private
Private
Public
Public
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Public
Public
Public
Private
Public
Private
Private
Public
Public
Private
Public
Private
Private
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Private
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Private
Private
Public
Private
Institution
(In descending order of Adjusted
Total Endowment-Equivalent)
Harvard University
University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
Stanford University
University of Pennsylvania
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
University of California - Los Angeles
Columbia University
Yale University
New York University
University of California - Berkeley
University of Wisconsin - Madison
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
University of Southern California
Cornell University
Princeton University
Emory University
Duke University
Texas A&M University
Ohio State University - Columbus
University of Washington - Seattle
Northwestern University
University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
Boston University
Johns Hopkins University
Pennsylvania State University - University Park
University of Chicago
Michigan State University
Washington University in St. Louis
Vanderbilt University
University of California - Davis
University of Georgia
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign
Purdue University - West Lafayette
North Carolina State University
University of Virginia
University of Arizona
University of California - San Diego
University of Notre Dame
University of Texas - Austin
University of Maryland - College Park
University of Pittsburgh - Pittsburgh
Indiana University - Bloomington
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Georgia Institute of Technology
University of Kentucky
Dartmouth College
University of Miami
University of Iowa
George Washington University
Page 29
1999
Endowment
Assets
Market Value
1999
EndowmentEquivalent
Annual Giving
1999
EndowmentEquivalent
State
Appropriation
1999
EndowmentEquivalent
Tuition & Fees
1999
Total
EndowmentEquivalent
Adjustment for
1999 Student
Enrollment
1999
Adjusted Total
EndowmentEquivalent
14,255,996
2,424,588
6,005,211
3,281,342
1,509,769
1,103,038
3,636,621
7,197,900
1,035,900
1,654,557
909,834
4,287,701
1,589,833
2,869,103
6,469,200
4,475,755
1,678,728
3,596,759
1,086,350
745,217
2,634,850
925,746
652,161
1,520,793
601,813
633,748
2,762,686
265,238
3,761,686
1,831,766
300,828
334,534
522,607
1,222,411
275,532
1,398,068
272,950
200,552
1,984,256
1,355,016
314,183
854,840
400,000
429,991
948,600
327,644
1,710,585
428,571
476,800
673,589
10,037,156
3,775,844
7,102,000
6,001,356
3,599,244
4,626,756
6,321,933
4,987,622
2,845,422
4,094,022
5,452,933
4,631,933
4,817,422
7,585,756
3,535,111
5,197,778
7,355,378
2,746,222
3,409,711
4,683,222
3,212,222
3,295,778
1,630,556
4,599,400
3,008,644
2,492,467
2,681,400
2,314,133
2,541,489
4,292,956
1,182,867
945,200
2,344,000
1,821,422
1,666,644
2,937,422
1,707,533
2,549,689
2,522,822
2,954,222
1,117,978
1,457,200
1,771,533
3,444,444
1,837,822
1,167,556
2,375,400
1,905,244
1,811,378
978,200
7,330,982
817,600
11,804,626
11,094,156
82,267
121,956
8,775,800
8,106,423
3,946,789
8,372,507
8,534,762
6,361,022
8,497,156
310,444
10,920,000
4,849,373
7,625,572
7,714,800
8,938,384
6,652,621
5,579,954
7,454,916
3,032,980
6,979,589
5,195,489
5,676,625
6,071,824
3,515,667
4,535,531
4,109,991
4,182,134
6,189,243
354,363
5,709,796
-
11,018,356
10,187,931
6,429,622
10,423,533
5,192,034
5,100,067
8,986,467
5,042,556
16,566,289
5,199,800
5,398,922
6,074,244
11,713,222
1,692,052
3,336,511
4,750,111
5,613,733
4,218,896
6,610,183
5,141,178
8,092,400
2,453,333
12,928,870
5,953,444
2,813,356
7,432,956
6,026,163
5,268,334
4,559,444
4,482,680
2,969,578
2,545,197
4,315,938
4,766,477
1,765,839
3,633,056
3,352,310
2,462,267
4,502,689
4,906,188
3,998,828
5,176,468
5,219,659
1,609,964
1,493,082
2,220,823
3,048,549
5,893,579
2,732,211
7,088,455
35,311,507
23,719,345
19,536,833
20,523,831
22,105,674
21,924,016
19,027,288
17,228,078
20,569,567
19,724,179
19,868,112
14,993,879
18,120,477
16,093,700
13,340,822
14,423,644
14,647,839
18,934,384
19,641,006
16,930,639
13,939,472
15,172,013
15,211,586
12,384,082
17,343,813
15,408,544
11,470,249
15,473,278
10,862,619
10,607,402
12,168,072
12,763,314
13,835,166
13,390,265
11,162,932
11,001,526
12,312,382
10,407,996
9,009,767
14,892,052
11,502,814
11,004,175
11,926,723
9,594,390
8,461,639
9,905,265
7,134,534
8,581,757
10,730,184
8,740,244
4,225,829
6,550,455
2,771,492
3,935,464
6,317,631
6,381,320
3,833,199
2,234,412
5,956,817
5,179,608
6,554,848
1,784,828
4,911,713
3,687,918
1,058,444
2,146,384
2,386,840
6,816,145
7,656,874
5,667,350
2,925,031
4,214,823
4,688,758
2,222,115
7,257,706
6,104,893
2,182,466
6,459,180
2,112,252
1,945,782
4,190,435
4,914,913
6,146,249
5,991,567
3,800,595
3,677,228
5,093,684
3,250,481
1,871,367
7,825,047
4,648,564
4,194,428
5,521,501
3,224,713
2,173,877
3,625,435
933,974
2,562,533
4,798,362
3,124,712
31,085,679
17,168,890
16,765,341
16,588,367
15,788,043
15,542,696
15,194,089
14,993,666
14,612,750
14,544,571
13,313,265
13,209,051
13,208,765
12,405,782
12,282,379
12,277,260
12,260,999
12,118,238
11,984,132
11,263,289
11,014,441
10,957,189
10,522,828
10,161,967
10,086,107
9,303,652
9,287,782
9,014,098
8,750,367
8,661,620
7,977,637
7,848,401
7,688,917
7,398,698
7,362,337
7,324,297
7,218,698
7,157,516
7,138,400
7,067,005
6,854,250
6,809,747
6,405,222
6,369,678
6,287,762
6,279,830
6,200,561
6,019,224
5,931,823
5,615,533
Appendix
Endowment-Equivalent Components and Size Adjustment for Selected Over $20 Million Universities* (cont.)
Control
(In descending order of Adjusted
Total Endowment-Equivalent)
1999
Endowment
Assets
Market Value
Public
Public
Public
Private
Private
Public
Private
Public
Public
Public
Private
Public
Private
Private
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Private
Private
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Private
Public
Public
Public
Private
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Private
Iowa State University
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Temple University
Brown University
Rice University
University of Utah
Syracuse University
University of Illinois - Chicago
University of Connecticut - Storrs
University of Cincinnati - Cincinnati
Georgetown University
California Institute of Technology
Case Western Reserve University
University of Missouri - Columbia
University of Delaware
Indiana University-Purdue University - Indianapolis
Arizona State University - Tempe
University of Massachusetts - Amherst
Wayne State University
University of California - Irvine
University of Rochester
Washington State University - Pullman
Northeastern University
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
Tufts University
Carnegie Mellon University
Tulane University
Clemson University
University of South Florida
University of South Carolina - Columbia
University of Alabama - Birmingham
University at Stony Brook
University of Kansas - Lawrence
Auburn University - Auburn
West Virginia University
University of Hawaii - Manoa
Wake Forest University
Louisiana State University - Baton Rouge
Oregon State University
Oklahoma State University - Stillwater
Saint Louis University - St. Louis
University of Colorado - Boulder
University of California - Santa Barbara
Texas Tech University
Virginia Commonwealth University
University of New Mexico - Albuquerque
Mississippi State University
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
266,348
340,244
141,527
1,181,514
2,936,622
269,430
641,466
106,154
100,019
898,976
684,193
438,002
1,333,229
1,434,200
350,319
777,349
350,000
183,440
60,579
146,275
100,276
1,119,027
421,402
396,205
151,240
464,107
719,320
548,305
214,566
202,784
253,775
204,680
22,383
613,338
233,049
254,576
247,471
146,459
857,938
176,925
241,973
156,074
907,822
195,585
100,276
197,532
200,793
193,377
160,399
516,238
Institution
1999
EndowmentEquivalent
Annual Giving
1999
EndowmentEquivalent
State
Appropriation
1999
EndowmentEquivalent
Tuition & Fees
1999
Total
EndowmentEquivalent
Adjustment for
1999 Student
Enrollment
1999
Adjusted Total
EndowmentEquivalent
1,099,778
1,586,067
986,333
1,668,667
1,741,378
2,789,867
748,511
781,333
523,356
905,889
1,823,956
372,422
3,068,689
1,674,267
897,133
891,267
1,594,400
1,035,778
428,178
760,444
1,078,778
1,073,800
916,444
628,178
947,289
1,167,889
906,978
1,337,778
740,311
437,644
1,120,822
846,556
257,400
1,438,600
842,467
624,178
1,211,111
298,911
1,047,978
855,556
910,178
779,733
670,267
1,152,733
431,889
1,344,178
611,267
562,356
585,000
810,356
5,834,442
4,512,065
3,544,156
1,667
4,015,022
49,720
5,867,337
4,737,372
3,839,337
5,749,837
117,556
4,114,272
1,996,371
4,091,212
5,717,422
4,462,400
5,143,921
3,929,422
32,156
3,806,648
4,885,746
116,111
26,733
3,614,423
5,944,343
3,560,904
3,694,341
4,478,928
2,735,259
3,733,182
3,948,834
4,724,683
3,874,512
35,156
4,622,370
2,575,223
3,642,316
1,658,484
3,516,889
2,945,039
3,264,124
4,084,286
3,000,404
19,622
2,282,133
3,431,155
5,017,133
3,804,467
1,362,911
1,602,733
6,573,796
2,406,764
2,460,946
3,259,991
5,084,778
2,224,756
752,400
3,209,244
3,024,866
4,034,428
2,319,584
3,804,333
3,055,356
2,329,759
2,405,822
3,494,844
2,248,787
6,349,546
2,280,498
4,280,619
3,776,335
4,261,622
1,925,353
1,468,667
2,591,833
1,313,618
1,695,649
2,426,281
2,114,228
2,114,047
1,999,718
1,508,100
2,557,988
2,278,580
1,749,047
1,355,365
3,373,534
4,047,063
2,028,800
2,024,881
2,040,229
1,221,062
1,287,907
2,503,622
9,482,700
9,869,531
9,689,149
6,656,314
6,040,911
8,677,052
8,013,493
9,161,588
7,821,692
8,904,193
7,592,926
8,785,017
5,154,318
6,435,267
8,386,590
7,699,415
8,355,196
10,740,973
8,006,512
8,380,400
7,514,298
5,719,827
7,393,281
7,373,929
8,264,773
6,028,726
5,402,633
6,174,438
6,494,653
8,053,439
7,527,334
6,059,194
6,454,360
7,213,478
6,922,925
6,941,635
8,182,983
5,827,982
4,499,060
7,933,431
5,476,420
5,933,488
4,951,623
7,053,865
6,077,854
6,511,630
6,116,413
6,061,080
5,033,710
3,849,838
3,893,219
4,287,326
4,286,664
1,301,883
707,455
3,366,438
2,797,378
4,073,425
2,771,511
3,891,731
2,660,972
3,872,596
332,033
1,681,988
3,653,738
2,968,426
3,628,765
6,029,743
3,503,666
3,963,536
3,115,880
1,348,488
3,094,051
3,080,704
4,011,225
1,923,293
1,311,896
2,097,321
2,480,236
4,069,261
3,552,428
2,234,229
2,792,290
3,660,577
3,401,334
3,502,438
4,805,880
2,460,014
1,202,247
4,827,557
2,414,946
2,879,380
1,951,319
4,077,690
3,128,705
3,670,800
3,294,524
3,317,046
2,291,251
1,118,000
5,589,481
5,582,205
5,402,485
5,354,431
5,333,456
5,310,614
5,216,115
5,088,163
5,050,181
5,012,462
4,931,954
4,912,421
4,822,285
4,753,279
4,732,852
4,730,989
4,726,431
4,711,231
4,502,846
4,416,864
4,398,419
4,371,339
4,299,230
4,293,225
4,253,548
4,105,433
4,090,737
4,077,117
4,014,417
3,984,177
3,974,906
3,824,965
3,662,070
3,552,901
3,521,592
3,439,197
3,377,103
3,367,968
3,296,813
3,105,874
3,061,474
3,054,107
3,000,304
2,976,175
2,949,149
2,840,830
2,821,889
2,744,033
2,742,459
2,731,838
Page 30
TheCenter Advisory Board
TheCenter Staff
Arthur M. Cohen
John V. Lombardi
Professor, Higher Education and Work
Director, ERIC Clearinghouse for Community Colleges
University of California, Los Angeles
Co-Editor, TheCenter
Chancellor, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Larry Goldstein
President, Campus Strategies
Fellow, SCT
Senior Fellow, NACUBO
Co-Editor, TheCenter
Provost, University at Buffalo
Gerardo M. Gonzalez
Research Director, TheCenter
University Dean for the School of Education
Indiana University
D. Bruce Johnstone
Professor, Department of Educational Leadership and Policy
Director, Learning Productivity Network
Director, International Comparative Higher Education
Finance and Accessibility Project
Roger Kaufman
Professor and Director, Office for Needs Assessment and
Planning
Associate Director, Learning Systems Institute
Gordon C. Winston
Orrin Sage Professor of Political Economy
Co-Director, Mellon Project
Williams College
Diane D. Craig
Lynne N. Collis
Administrative Services, TheCenter
Denise S. Gater
Research Associate, TheCenter
Associate Director, Office of Institutional Research
Ralph E. Horky
Courtesy Research Associate, TheCenter
Anney B. Doucette
Student Assistant, TheCenter
Page 31

GERENCIA ACADÉMICA, GOBERNANZA Y ADMINISTRACIÓN DE

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