The Boston Bombing: An Interagency Response
Transcription
The Boston Bombing: An Interagency Response
The Boston Marathon Bombing and the WMD-CST Response Major Matthew Woolums Commander, 1st WMD-CST 10/11/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 1 Mission • Conduct WMD/CBRN monitoring, hazard detection, identification, assessment, consequence projection, and response measure advice • Coordinate with civil authorities in order to enhance security and public safety at the start and finish line areas for the Boston Marathon • Provide civil authorities with rapid identification, assessment, and advice regarding mitigation of any hazards discovered • Provide hazard modeling and communications interoperability if required 10/11/2013 2 Concept of Operations Split Operation 10/11/2013 3 Background • 0400-0600: CST deployed to begin missions at start and finish • 1200: Starting line mission complete, personnel released • Capabilities remaining at finish line: – – – – – – – 10/11/2013 Command Element Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Mobile Lab (13th CST RI) Physician Assistant 3 Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (JHATs) with Boston Fire HAZMAT FBI HMRT co-located Remote sensors deployed 4 Boston AO Pre-Incident 10/11/2013 5 Tactical Unit Locations at 1450 JHAT Personnel ICP 10/11/2013 6 CST Actions Following Bombings • At ~1450 two IEDs detonated within 10 seconds of one another – Ops lost comms with all downrange personnel (JHATs) – Ops lost communications with all remote sensors – Command moved to finish line for accountability Both blasts on Boylston Street 10/11/2013 Spectators reacting to the IED 7 CST Actions Following Bombings • JHAT personnel immediately move to blast sites to conduct hazard monitoring and provide first aid as necessary • Negative for both chemical/radiological hazards • Sufficient medical care provided by medical tent staff 10/11/2013 8 Onsite Situation Responders treating victims CST ADVON arriving link-up with BPD CST ADVON arriving on-scene 10/11/2013 CST ADVON and Survey aerial 9 CST Actions Following Bombings • Reports via radio a potential 3rd device located by EOD • Out of concern for victim responders CST began IED sweep CST personnel conducting IED sweep under grandstands 10/11/2013 10 CST Actions Following Bombings • Once all victims evacuated, CST personnel departed the blast site and began follow-on support actions to the ICP (TAG, FBI, ATF, follow-on NG forces) Maj Gen L. Scott Rice, Adjutant General, surveying damage 10/11/2013 11 Lessons Learned • Training will never perfectly emulate the way events play out in reality—be creative in scenario development – Imagine the Boston Bombing as an RDD and war game the challenges of such a scenario • Expect equipment failure, build redundancy, regularly train with your back-up gear – Cell phones outages, satellite obstructions 10/11/2013 12 Lessons Learned • Have a plan to communicate team health & welfare to families – Push info--families will continuously seek it either way – Have a plan to communicate bad news • Consider behavioral health impact on the unit and the impact at home – Immediately reach out to support resources: mental health/chaplain. 10/11/2013 13 Lessons Learned • Build relationships with interagency partners and train with them… …a familiar face goes a long way in a disaster!!! 10/11/2013 14 Questions? 10/11/2013 15