A THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE AS PROCESSING

Psychology, Public Policy, and Law
2000, Vol. 6, No. 1, 168-179
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
1076-8971/00/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//1076-8971.6.1.168
A THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE AS PROCESSING
Implications for Society
Joseph F. Fagan III
Case Western Reserve University
Defining intelligence as processing allows one to predict intelligence from infancy,
discover causes of mental retardation, test the intelligence of people with disabilities, develop culture-fair tests of intelligence, and demonstrate that groups that differ
in IQ do not necessarily differ in intelligence. An early estimate of intellectual
disability allows a child to qualify quickly for remedial programs. Economic and
emotional benefits would ensue from discovering and eliminating the causes of a
small percentage of cases of mental retardation. The measurement of intelligence as
processing reveals intellectual strengths that may otherwise be masked by physical
or emotional disability or by cultural circumstances. Cultures may differ in the types
of knowledge their members have but not in how well they process. Cultures may
account for racial differences in IQ.
The purpose of this article is to consider the implications for society of
defining intelligence as processing. M y belief is that controversy surrounding the
term intelligence has arisen and continues because intelligence has historically
been defined as how much one knows rather than as how well one processes. IQ
scores, by convention, are based on how much one knows relative to one's age
peers. My theoretical position (Fagan, 1992; Fagan & Haiken-Vasen, 1997) is that
intelligence is processing and that processing can be measured by performance on
certain elementary cognitive tasks. An IQ score, on the other hand, depends not
only on processing ability but on what one has been taught. To state my theory
briefly, as information is processed, the mind changes. That change is called
knowledge. Knowledge is a state of mind. How well we process depends on our
genetic plan and on the good or ill that the world has physically inflicted on our
brain. Culture provides us with information. What we know depends on how well
we process and on what our culture teaches us.
Defining intelligence as processing frees intelligence from its historic definition as the score (IQ) on an intelligence test and makes intelligence an integral and
legitimate object of study across all areas of psychology and disciplines related to
psychology. Defining intelligence as processing has the additional practical advantage of providing a common metric with which to study intelligence across
species. Most important for our present purposes, defining intelligence as processing clarifies theoretical issues in the field of intelligence and, in so doing, may
change lives.
Preparation of this article was supported in part by Mental Retardation Training Grant HD
07176 from the National Institute on Child Health and Human Development. I am indebted to Nina
Engelhardt for gathering the data listed in Table 1.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Joseph F. Fagan III, Department
of Psychology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106. Electronic mail may be
sent to [email protected].
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INTELLIGENCE AS PROCESSING
169
Overview
In what follows, I show how the assumption that intelligence is processing
allows us to predict childhood IQ scores from infancy and how intelligence
defined as processing leads to the conclusion that Whites and Blacks, while
different in average IQ, are equally intelligent (Jenson, 1985). I point out some
practical implications for the definition of mental retardation and the search for
its causes that flow from the fact that intelligence is continuous over age. The
measurement of intelligence in special populations also is considered. I note how
the fact that Blacks and Whites are equally adept at processing provokes a search
for specific cultural causes of average IQ differences between groups (Jenson,
1985). I point out that defining intelligence as processing can make the hope for
culture-fair tests of intellectual functioning a reality. Finally, I mention some of
the additional policy implications that proceed from defining intelligence as
processing.
Predicting Later IQ F r o m Processing During Infancy
If intelligence is defined as processing and if processing can be measured
during infancy, than we should be able to predict how much a child will know at
a later age. A paradigm that I have found useful for the measurement of
processing is based on the fact that from birth, humans attend more to novel than
to previously exposed stimuli (Fagan, 1970, 1990). By definition, if a new target
can be differentiated from a previously exposed target, information processing has
taken place. Is the nature of intelligence continuous with age? Does a child who
was a good processor as an infant know more than an age peer who was a poor
processor during infancy? Yes. Measures of information processing taken during
infancy predict IQ scores obtained during childhood (see reviews by Fagan &
Detterman, 1992, and McCall & Carriger, 1993).
The fact that simple measures of information processing such as selective
attention to novelty can predict IQ scores has practical implications for our
definition of mental retardation and for the search for the causes of mental
retardation. A key priority of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development (NICHD) has been the development of methods to identify infants
at risk of becoming mentally retarded.
Supported, in part, by various grants from NICHD, a screening device has
been developed that has proven to be valid in predicting later mental retardation
from infancy (e.g., Fagan & Shepherd, 1992). The screening device, known as the
Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence, is based on the infant' s attention to novelty. The
rationale behind the Fagan test is based on the definition of intelligence as
processing. If intelligence is processing, than mental retardation is a deficit in
processing. If a person begins life as a poor processor, that person would be
expected to know less (i.e., have a low IQ score) later in life. A technical summary
of the Fagan test along with data confirming the sensitivity of the test for the
identification of mental retardation later in life is given in Fagan and Detterman
(1992).
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Finding the Causes of Mental Retardation
A number of implications for society arise from the fact that it is now possible
to predict which infants are likely to be intellectually delayed later in life. Perhaps
the most salient implication is that the lead time for the prospective study of the
causes of mental retardation has been greatly reduced. With conventional IQ tests,
3 to 6 years must typically pass before retardation in the 50-70 IQ range can be
diagnosed--an IQ range encompassing almost 90% of retarded children. The
development of an intelligence test for infants that is based on the definition of
intelligence as processing has meant that the lead time on prospective studies of
the causes of mild mental retardation can be cut to less than a year. Investigators
have been quick to take advantage of a test of intelligence that is based on
processing, to search for the causes of mental retardation (Fagan, 1992). The
Fagan test is now in use in over 200 research centers around the world. Some are
using the Fagan test to study the effect that exposure to various chemical agents,
such as PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), alcohol, cocaine, lead, and mercury
have on intellectual development. Others are concerned with the role of nutrition,
iron supplements, and fatty acids on early intelligence. The intellectual sequelae
of thyroid deficiency, maternal HIV infection, intraventricular hemorrhage, bronchopulmonary dysplasia, failure to thrive, intrauterine growth retardation, very
preterm birth, genetic anomalies, various neurological abnormalities, and the
effects of early surgical procedures also are being assessed.
I hope that researchers using tests of processing may discover the etiology of
certain cases of mental retardation (e.g., by identifying teratogens). Capitalizing
on such identification, legislators will, presumably, institute programs to prevent
specific causes of retardation. Obviously, any legislation to prevent identified
causes of mental retardation must accommodate conflicting social and economic
interests. Even a very limited success, however, in discovering the causes of
mental retardation and eliminating those causes would be of enormous social
benefit. To put that benefit into perspective, consider the fact that we currently
invest about $14 million a year to screen infants for phenylketonuria (PKU), a
highly worthwhile endeavor, which no one would question. However, finding and
eliminating the causes of just 1% of mild-to-moderate retardation would save
more children from intellectual deficit each year than are now saved by screening
and treatment for PKU. Economically, as Baumeister, Bacharach, and Baumeister
(1997) have pointed out, the savings to society of preventing even a small
percentage of the cases of mental retardation each year can be measured in
billions of dollars. Added to the monetary savings is the personal value to children
and parents, a value that cannot be measured in dollars but is a great sum in
emotional currency. In effect, the cost to society of supporting research aimed at
discovering the causes of poor processing is trivial compared with the benefits to
be gained.
Measuring Intelligence in Special Populations
The assumption that intelligence is processing also allows us to estimate the
intelligence of individuals who cannot be given standard IQ or developmental
tests for reasons unrelated to intellectual functioning per se. Difficulties in test
compliance may be due, among other things, to anxiety, to culturally imposed
INTELLIGENCE AS PROCESSING
171
limits on language comprehension, or to motor disabilities. Thus, extraneous
influences, which may vary with the requirements of IQ tests, may limit the
conclusions one can come to as to a person with a disability's intellectual
functioning. Such limitations can be overcome by defining intelligence as processing. The measurement of processing by means of selective attention to
novelty, for example, does not require a verbal response, requires only the ability
to make eye movements, makes no demands that would provoke anxiety, has no
instructions to be followed, and allows the tester observing the person's eye
movements to verify that compliance has occurred. Under such test conditions, I
have found that special populations, such as autistic children, adults with acquired
neurological impairment, or depressed or demented older people--although not as
proficient in selective attention as normal controls--are, nonetheless, able to
devote selective attention to novelty, thus yielding measurable individual differences in processing (Fagan & Haiken-Vasen, 1997). Findings have been similar
for females diagnosed with Rett syndrome, a neurological disorder characterized
by severe or profound retardation, lack of functional hand use, and an inability to
follow instructions (von Tetzchner et al., 1996).
In some cases, the measurement of intelligence as processing has shown that
intelligence is not impaired despite otherwise debilitating circumstances. Drotar et
al. (1997), for example, have shown that HIV-infected infants, despite lower
levels of sensorimotor development, are capable of age-appropriate visual information processing. Droter.~ Mortimer, Shepherd, and Fagan (1989), using tests of
selective attention to novelty, have demonstrated normal intellectual functioning
on the part of an infant with quadriplegia, despite the infant's severe physical
disability and a life spent in the hospital. The child was eventually placed in a
nursing home for physically impaired children who are intellectually intact.
Professionals who treat people from special populations constantly seek more
valid and efficient tests of intelligence, for screening, to monitor the course of
intellectual decline, and to evaluate treatment. The number of people who can
profit from tests of intelligence based on processing is quite sizable. In addition
to the populations already mentioned are people who complain of age-associated
memory impairment, patients with various neurological disorders, individuals
with mental disorders, people with speech, hearing, or language impairment, those
with developmental disorders, and those who evidence cultural bias (a loose term
covering the economically disadvantaged and cultural minorities from different
language backgrounds). Table 1 lists the approximate number of people who
might profit from tests of intelligence that are based on processing.
All of the 64 million people listed in Table 1 are accessible to health care
professionals. The first 44 million listed are being seen on some regular basis. The
remaining 20 million, listed under cultural bias, are about 7% of the U.S.
population and are seen in public schools, community health agencies, jobretraining programs, and major urban hospitals. The numbers listed in Table 1 are
gross estimates on the basis of the size of the U.S. population and what data I
could find on the prevalence of individuals in each category. The point of
constructing Table 1 is not to be exact, but simply to indicate that the number of
people in need of an alternative to conventional IQ tests of intelligence is sizable.
In brief, defining intelligence as processing allows the measurement of
intelligence in individuals for whom the administration of IQ tests would be
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FAGAN
Table 1
Special Populations Who Cannot Comply With the
Requirements of Standard IQ Testing
Population
Age-associated memory impairment
Neurological disorders
Stroke
Trauma
Movement disorders
Dementias
Neuromuscular disorders
Mental disorders
Schizophrenia
Major depression
Bipolar disorders
Language comprehensionproduction disorders
Developmental disorders
Cultural bias
Total
Number
20,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
500,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
5,000,000
20,000,000
64,000,000
inappropriate. The measurement of processing in special populations can provide
baseline and outcome measures in assessing the effectiveness of therapies aimed
at the remediation of certain disorders characterized by intellectual dysfunction
(e.g., Alzheimer's disease). For particular individuals, the measurement of processing can also reveal an intellectual strength that might otherwise be masked by
physical disability.
Racial Differences in IQ but Not in Intelligence
Let us now consider how the definition of intelligence as processing can aid
in answering the question of what causes differences in IQ among groups of
people. Theoretically, the answer depends on whether group differences in processing accompany group differences in IQ. I would assume that in the absence
of processing differences among groups, differences in IQ are most likely due to
cultural influences.
We are also aided in understanding group differences in IQ by noting those
that must be due to culture. Schooling effects are a clear instance of group
differences in IQ that must be due to the presence of differences in the culture's
provision of information. A comprehensive review of the extent to which various
factors associated with schooling have their effects on IQ is provided in Ceci
(1991). I focus on studies of children who were born just before or just after an
arbitrary cutoff date for school entry. The fact that one was born before or after
an arbitrary date obviously has nothing to do with either one's genetic plan or with
the physical effects of the environment on the brain (i.e., with factors that
influence processing). But being born before or after a particular date may have
a great deal to do with whether a child is in the fourth or the fifth grade by the age
10 and, consequently, with how much that child has been taught by the age of 10.
Cahan and Cohen (1989) conducted the archival study of the effects of cutoff
INTELLIGENCE AS PROCESSING
173
dates for school entry on intelligence test scores. They administered portions of 12
different standard IQ tests to over 11,000 fourth, fifth, and sixth graders attending
the state-administered elementary schools in Jerusalem in 1987. The results were
unambiguous. Schooling affected raw intelligence test scores on all 12 tests,
including the Raven Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1975). I
mention the Raven test because it is highly g loaded (Jensen, 1993a) and, by
implication, has been thought not to be subject to cultural influence. Cahan and
Cohen (1989) have concluded that schooling is the major reason that intelligence
test scores increase with age.
As one might expect, schooling effects owing to cutoff dates have also been
found for other tests of knowledge such as reading and mathematics (Morrison,
Griffith, & Alberts, 1997). Schooling effects, however, have also been found for
tasks that one would usually consider to be elementary cognitive tasks and
unlikely to be subject to cultural influences. Cognitive tasks influenced by
schooling include phonetic segmentation (Bentin, Hammer, & Cahan, 1991;
Morrison, Smith, & Dow-Ehrensberger, 1995), short-term recall (Ferreira &
Morrison, 1994; Varnhagen, Morrison, & Everall, 1994; Morrison et al., 1995),
and mental arithmetic (Bisanz, Morrison, & Dunn, 1995). Tasks that appear to be
tests of processing are subject to schooling effects. Hence, the definition of
processing must be derived from a theoretical understanding of the task in
question and not simply assumed on the basis of the superficial characteristics of
the task. I return to the discussion of cultural influences on what appear to be
elementary cognitive tasks as I discuss racial differences in IQ. For the moment,
however, bear in mind that schooling effects provide a clear example of the
influence of a cultural factor on what are conventionally designated as tests of
intelligence, achievement, and basic cognitive functioning. Schooling effects must
reflect the influence of the culture on what one knows. Thus, tasks affected by
schooling must be, to some degree, culturally influenced.
Racial differences in IQ are a prime example of the application of the
procedural guideline that I suggest for the determination of group differences in
IQ. Differences in average IQ between Blacks and Whites on the order of about
1 standard deviation (about 15 IQ points) are well documented (Jensen, 1985) and
are present as early as 3 years of age (Fagan & Monfie, 1988; Peoples, Fagan, &
Drotar, 1995). I make no attempt here to trace the history of the arguments that
have been made for the causes of racial differences in IQ. The interested reader
may consult the historical discussions contained in Block and Dworkin (1976) or
the references cited by Neisser et al. (1996). Suffice it to say that there are those
who lean toward a genetic explanation and those who favor a cultural explanation
of Black-White differences in IQ.
I accept the evidence for IQ differences between Blacks and Whites at face
value. Theoretically, I ask if the presence of racial differences in IQ is accompanied by differences between Blacks and Whites on measures of the spontaneous
processing of information. If so, the search for the causes of Black-White
differences in IQ should be directed toward genetic or physical environmental
factors. If not, the search should concentrate on cultural influences.
As I noted in my discussion of schooling effects on IQ, performance on some
elementary cognitive tasks may be culturally influenced. Thus, one must be
cautious in attributing racial differences in IQ to processing differences on the
174
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basis of any or all cognitive tasks. A case in point is the study reported by Jensen
(1993b) of 585 White and 235 Black schoolchildren whose reaction times were
measured on what appeared to be simple information-processing tasks. Jensen
used four tasks, which varied in the time taken for successful solution. The easiest
task was a simple reaction time task in which the time taken to lift one's finger
from a home key on presentation of a signal from a single source was measured.
A slightly more demanding task measured the same reaction times when the
signal to respond came from any one of eight sources. In a more complex
discrimination task, reaction time was measured when three signals (out of eight)
were activated at once and the child had to decide which of the three was located
at the greatest distance from the other two before reacting. The most demanding
task was the measurement of reaction times over a series of mental arithmetic
problems involving addition, subtraction, or multiplication of single-digit
numbers.
Jensen's results (taken from the data given by Jensen, 1993b, in his Appendices A and B) indicated that mean reaction times for Blacks and Whites did not
vary on the two simple tasks but did differ on the two more demanding tasks. As
noted in the summary of schooling effects, age of school entry alters performance
on tests of short-term memory and the speed of solution of mental arithmetic
problems. Thus, the present theory suggests that the pattern of Jensen's (1993b)
results may actually indicate the influence of a cultural factor on the performance
differences of Blacks and Whites. The suggestion of the present theory as the
reason for Jensen's results could easily be checked by using Jensen's four reaction
time tasks in a study of children (of the same race and the same age) whose
birthdates fall just before or just after an arbitrary cutoff date for school entry. If
children of the same age who varied in schooling did not differ on Jensen's simple
tasks but did differ on Jensen's more demanding tasks, it would mark the more
demanding tasks (but not the simple tasks) as subject to cultural influences. The
cultural factors affecting Black-White differences, of course, may not be the same
as those influencing schooling effects.
In my own program, I have obtained IQ scores for 299 preschoolers at 3 years
of age, who, as infants, were tested for attention to novelty. Attention to novelty
is a processing task that does not vary for children of various school ages and is
applicable from birth to senescence (Fagan & Haiken-Vasen, 1997). Of the 299,
35 children were Black, and 264 were White. All came from middle-class,
suburban homes. Their parents, as a group, did not differ in level of education. In
addition, I participated in a multisite, national study of 70 high-risk infants (34
White and 36 Black) from predominantly lower-class families, who were tested
for visual attention to novelty as infants and for IQ on the Bayley Scales of Infant
Development (Bayley, 1969) at 2 years of age (Fagan & Shepherd, 1992). Finally,
as part of a dissertation by Haiken-Vasen (1995), we tested 96 schoolchildren (64
Black and 32 White), with a mean age of about 9 years (SD = 2.6), who were
attending church-affiliated schools. The schoolchildren were tested for both visual
attention to novelty and, on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn & Dunn,
1981), for IQ. The specific procedures for testing the visual novelty preferences
of older children and adults are given in Fagan and Haiken-Vasen (1997). With
the exception of briefer study times, however, testing of attention to visual novelty
175
INTELLIGENCE AS PROCESSING
is the same for children as for infants, (i.e., there are no instructions as to what to
attend to and processing is spontaneous).
Table 2 lists the average visual novelty preference scores and the average IQ
scores for each of the three age groupings (2, 3, and 9 years). Weighted mean
averages are listed for the 3-year-olds.
The data in Table 2 are quite clear. For each sample, White children were
significantly different from Black children in IQ. In no case, however, do Whites
and Blacks differ significantly in spontaneous processing.
On the basis of the assumptions that intelligence is processing and that IQ
scores are a measure of knowledge, my interpretation of the results is that Black
people are as intelligent as White people but that some Blacks do not know what
some Whites know. My interpretation does not assume that one culture is superior
or inferior to another but only that people from different cultures may differ in
what they believe their children should be taught. One social policy implication
of such an interpretation is that if we wish to understand the differences in the
knowledge tapped on IQ tests that produces differences in performance between
Blacks and Whites, we must discover the cultural practices that influence the
teaching of particular kinds of knowledge.
According to my theory, the study of culture is the study of what interacts
with processing to produce knowledge in a particular domain. Paradoxically, it is
only by examining culture that the conventional definition of intelligence as IQ
remains relevant. Is it important to understand culture as well as the processing
determinant of IQ? Yes, for two reasons. First, IQ scores predict important life
achievements, and the cultural factor is a significant source of variance in such
prediction. Second, differences among groups in IQ may well involve the cultural
factor. As noted, Black people and White people differ in IQ but do not appear to
differ in spontaneous processing. The implication is that the source of BlackWhite differences in IQ is to be sought in the culture.
I suggest five guidelines for studying the influence of culture in the determi-
Table 2
Novelty Preference and IQ Scores for Black and
White Children at 2, 3, and 9 Years of Age
Novelty preference
IQ
Age
'White
Black
White
Black
years
M
SD
n
years
M
SD
n
9 years
M
SD
n
.61
.07
34
103.7
26.2
84.7
18.2
.60
.09
107.5
11.3
93.5
13.1
.58
.06
106.5
10.5
99.2
14.0
36
.60
.07
264
35
.58
.05
32
.59
.07
64
176
FAGAN
nation of IQ. The first guideline is that the measurement of the culture should
always be accompanied by the measurement of processing. Hart and Risley
(1995), for example, have conducted a landmark longitudinal study of frequency
of verbal stimulation and resulting vocabulary development of children from 1 to
3 years of age. The amount of exposure to language was positively correlated with
vocabulary development and IQ scores of the children at 3 years. Unfortunately,
because no measure of the children's processing of information was included in
the design of the Hart and Risley (1995) investigation, there is no way to estimate
the relative contributions of processing and the culture to the children's ultimate
vocabulary knowledge or IQ. The lesson for future naturalistic or experimental
observations of children's experience is to include measures of processing in
one' s design, so that the differential effects of processing and cultural direction on
knowledge can be assessed.
The second guideline is that the exploration of the influence of culture on
knowledge should begin in the first few years of the child' s life. Empirically, we
know from the Hart and Risley (1995) investigation that large differences in sheer
exposure to important information take place during the first few years. Evidence
also has been presented in the present article that demonstrates that differences in
IQ between Blacks and Whites are present as early as 2 to 3 years of age. Thus,
any manipulation of the culture factor with the goal of preventing a low IQ score
should begin in the first few months and years of life.
The third guideline is fairly obvious. The samples from which we can learn
the most in the search for those aspects of the culture that determine IQ are groups
that differ in IQ but do not differ in spontaneous processing. Likely candidates are
children of the same age that differ in schooling due to arbitrary cutoff dates for
admission to school and children that differ in race.
The fourth guideline is to search for specific techniques that agents of the
culture use to direct a child's attention to information. Saffran, Aslin, and
Newport (1996), for example, have shown that infants at 8 months can segment
words from ongoing speech solely on the basis of the relation between neighboring speech sounds. But long before 8 months, mothers from various cultures speak
in a more informative manner to their infants than they do to adults by emphasizing particular sounds (Kuhl et al., 1997). Is it possible that individual differences in how mothers speak to their infants may influence the infant's subsequent
segmentation of words from ongoing speech, which, in turn, may alter the size or
composition of the child's vocabulary? Vocabulary knowledge, of course, plays a
prominent role in most estimates of IQ.
The fifth guideline is to be eclectic in the search for cultural influences on
knowledge. Theoretically, any variable that produces differences in knowledge
among groups who do not differ in processing is a cultural variable. It does not
matter whether the individuals being studied are humans or animals. It does not
matter if the knowledge in question is complex problem solving or the avoidance
of a shock. Any variance (aside from what is due to processing or error) that
determines human cognition or animal learning may play a part in determining the
cultural factor in IQ.
Although other examples of the search for the cultural sources of knowledge
may be given, the point is that social policy is determined not so much by data but
by the interpretation of data. The assumption that intelligence is processing leads
INTELLIGENCE AS PROCESSING
177
us to search the culture (rather than genetics) for the origins of racial differences
in IQ.
Culture-Fair Tests o f Intelligence Based on Processing
The definition of intelligence as processing may also accomplish a longsought-after goal: tests of intelligence that are applicable to any culture. Fagan et
al. (1991), for example, compared the performance of four culturally (and racially) diverse groups on the Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence. The Fagan test is
composed of 10 pairings of novel with previously seen items. The four groups did
not differ in their mean attention to novelty, nor was there any evidence of test
bias across the 10 items. In brief, tests of processing based on selective attention
to novelty, at least with infants, have proved to be culture-fair. Thus, defining
intelligence as processing may make culture-fair tests of intelligence a reality: a
hope that cannot be fulfilled as long as intelligence is defined as knowledge.
Additional Implications
In conclusion, some additional implications of defining intelligence as processing may be mentioned. In the area of education, the definition of intelligence
as processing can provide an early estimate of intellectual disability, thus allowing
a child to qualify as soon as possible for available programs. Multiple criteria for
inclusion in special programs are the norm. Hence, children who are good
processors but have other disabilities or live in culturally disadvantaged circumstances would not be disenfranchised from special programs by their high processing scores. Rather, throughout preschooling and during the school years,
placement in special education and the preparation of individual educational plans
can be accomplished by a consideration of both processing strengths and weaknesses in conjunction with measures of amount of knowledge. In medicine, tests
of processing can serve as short-term outcome measures to assess the utility and
the risk of medical procedures, particularly interventions undertaken with infants.
In the area of disability entitlement, tests of processing can indicate intellectual
ability as well as disability and might also provide a way to identify malingering.
Finally, culture-fair intelligence tests that are based on processing may provide an
objective means of selecting candidates for employment or for advanced education, thus fulfilling the spirit of affirmative action and equal opportunity programs.
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Received May 25, 1998
Revision received July 7, 1998
Accepted August 25, 1998 •