Violent Islamism in Egypt from 1997 to 2012

Transcription

FFI-notat 2013/01703
Heidi Breen
FFI
Forsvarets
forskningsinstitutt
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
Heidi Breen
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)
3 June 2013
1275
Keywords
Jihadisme
Terrorisme
Islamisme
Egypt
Midtøsten
Approved by
Espen Berg-Knutsen
Project Manager
Espen Skjelland
Director
2
English summary
The Luxor massacre of 17 November 1997 that resulted in the death of 62 people marked the end
of a particularly violent period in the Islamist uprising in Egypt. Between 1992 and 1997 radical
Islamist groups staged attacks resulting in more than 1,000 deaths, extensive damage to the
economy and a series of brutal government crackdowns. However, from 1996 onwards, these
same groups began to revise their violent ideological program, questioning the rationale and
legitimacy of their previous attacks. For the next seven years Egypt had apparently successfully
rid itself of violent movements.
Then, beginning in 2004, Egypt was hit by a new wave of violent attacks, with Sinai now
emerging as a new area for political violence. Taba was bombed in 2004, Sharm el-Sheikh in
2005 and Dahab in 2006, the attacks killing more than 140 people. Before the Taba bombing
almost all violent incidents associated with Islamist extremism had taken place in mainland Egypt
and especially Upper Egypt. The attack in Taba was the first major terrorist incident on the Sinai
Peninsula, and this was also the first time that members of the Sinai Bedouin population were
involved as the perpetrators.
Human rights organizations described the investigation of the three Sinai attacks as “brutal”.
Several thousand arrests were reported, including the arrest of family members of alleged
perpetrators that were held as “hostages” by the police in order to force the wanted men to turn
themselves in. The harsh crackdown apparently exacerbated the already tense relationship
between the local Bedouin population and the Egyptian government represented by the police, the
military and indirectly, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) present in Sinai. The
Bedouins and Egyptian born Palestinians, who populate most of the Sinai Peninsula, have been
neglected for years. Efforts to build a tourist industry and other investment projects in the area
have mostly excluded the locals, as jobs and business opportunities have gone almost exclusively
to mainland Egyptians. The police and the military are also composed mostly of mainland
Egyptians, causing many locals to view the situation in Sinai as an occupation. When the
Egyptian revolution broke out, President Hosni Mubarak redirected most of the security forces in
Sinai to the mainland in an effort to quell the demonstrations there. In Sinai, several police
stations were attacked, causing many officers to abandon their posts and leaving the area lawless.
After 2011, the violence in Sinai increased drastically and Israel has continuously warned Egypt
about the precariousness of the situation. However, it was not until the border attack on 5 August
2012, resulting in the death of 16 Egyptian soldiers, that the Egyptian government significantly
intensified its efforts to deal with the situation in Sinai.
Although mainland Egypt, and especially Cairo, has witnessed several serious terrorist incidents
since the Luxor massacre in 1997, Sinai is more likely to be the site of future acts of terrorism in
Egypt.
3
Sammendrag
Massakren i Luxor 17 november 1997 der 62 personer ble drept, markerte slutten på en lengre
voldelig fase i islamistenes kamp mot Det egyptiske regimet. Mellom 1992 og 1997 gjennomførte
islamistiske grupper en rekke angrep som resulterte i flere enn tusen drepte, påførte den egyptiske
økonomien stor skade og førte til mange brutale antiterrortiltak. Fra 1996 og fremover begynte
imidlertid de samme gruppene å revurdere sine ideologiske ståsteder og stilte spørsmål ved
rasjonale bak, og legimititeten, til voldelig opprørskrig. I de neste sju årene som fulgte så det ut
som Egypt hadde maktet å fri seg selv fra voldelige bevegelser.
I begynnelsen av 2004 ble Egypt igjen rammet av en ny bølge politisk vold, men nå var det Sinai
som var arenaen for voldshandlingene. Badebyene Taba, Sharm el-Sheikh og Dahab ble utsatt for
terrorbomber i henholdsvis 2004, 2005 og 2006, en serie angrep som kostet mer enn 140
menneskeliv. Forut for Tabaangrepet hadde omtrent alle voldshendelser som involverte de
ekstreme Islamistene funnet sted på Fastlands-Egypt, spesielt i øvre Egypt. Taba-angrepene var
den første store terrorhendelsen på Sinahalvøya. Dessuten var for første gang enkeltpersoner fra
Sinais beduinbefolkning involvert som mistenkte gjerningspersoner.
Menneskerettsorganisasjoner har beskrevet myndighetenes respons på terroraksjonene i Sinai som
“brutal”. Det ble rapportert om flere tusen arrestasjoner; familiemedlemmer av mistenkte
gjerningsmenn ble hold som “gisler” av egyptisk politi i et forsøk på å tvinge de mistenkte til å
melde seg for myndighetene. Den harde undertrykkingen førte angivelig til en forverring i de
allerede spente forholdet mellom beduinbefolkningen og egyptiske myndigheter. Sistnevnte er
representert ved politi, sikkerhetsstyrker og indirekte ved observatørstyrken Multinational Force
and Observers (MFO) i Sinai. Egyptiske myndigheter har i mange år forsømt beduinbefolkningen
og de palestinske flyktningene som i stor grad er fødd og oppvokst i Sinai. Disse to gruppene
utgjør en stor del av Sinais befolkning. Bestrebelser på å bygge en turistindustri og andre
investeringsprosjekter i området har omtrent utelukkende kommet fastlandsegypterne til gode,
mens lokalbefolkningen er blitt ekskludert. Egyptisk politiet og sikkerhetsstyrker består også i
stor grad av fastlandsegyptere noe som har befestet oppfatningen om at situasjonen i Sinai er en
slags okkupasjon. Når den egyptiske revolusjonen brøt ut i januar 2011, overførte President Hosni
Mubarak storparten av sikkerhetsstyrkene i Sinai til sentrale Egypt i et forsøk på å slå ned
demonstrasjonene. I Sinai ble flere politistasjoner angrepet, noe som i sin tur førte til at mange
politioffiserer rømte fra post og oppgav alle forsøk på å opprettholde lov og orden. Etter 2011 har
volden på Sinaihalvøya økt dramatisk. Israelske myndigheter har kontinuerlig advart Egypt mot
det de ser som en prekær situasjon ved landets sørlige grenser. Egyptiske myndigheter tok
imidlertid først affære etter et blodig angrep ved en grensepost 5 august 2012 der 16 egyptiske
soldater ble drept. Hendelsen førte til en betydelig intensivering av bestrebelsene på å bringe
situasjonen i Sinai under kontroll.
Selv om Fastlands-Egypt, og spesielt Kairo har vært vitne til flere alvorlige terrorhendelser etter
Luxormassakren i 1997, er Sinai antakelig et mer sannsynlig åsted for fremtidige terrorangrep.
4
Contents 1
Introduction
9
1.1
The 1990s
9
2
Historical Overview
12
2.1
Ceasefire and De-Radicalization (1997–2003)
12
2.2
The Bombings in Sinai (2004–2006)
13
2.3
A Slow Increase in Islamist Violence (2007–2010)
20
2.4
After the Revolution (2011–2012)
23
3
Concluding Remarks
31
4
Chronology of Incidents from 1997 to 2012
32
Bibliography
51
Abbreviations
54
Appendix A Statistics
55
5
Map of Egypt 1
1
Source: http://geology.com/world/egypt-satellite-image.shtml.
6
Map of Sinai 2
2
Source: http://www.touregypt.net/sinai5.htm.
7
Preface
This study was written within the framework of FFI’s Terrorism Research Group (TERRA) and
its summer student program. Beginning in 1999 TERRA has produced academic knowledge for
the Norwegian Government regarding insurgent and terrorist groups that pursue transnational
militancy. The research project currently focuses on militant Islamist actors in Asia, the Middle
East and Europe as well as right-wing extremism and militancy in Europe and Russia. TERRA is
funded primarily by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and utilizes unclassified primary sources
to study the history, structure, ideology, and behavior of violent extremist groups. The TERRA
staff includes historians and political scientists possessing extensive area knowledge and language
skills. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) is recognized as one of the world’s
leading centers for the academic study of militant Islamism.
FFI terrorism research continuously looks into emerging armed conflicts and new terrorist threat
actors. Instability in the Middle East and North Africa in wake of the Arab Spring is one area of
particular interest. The current study offers an overview of militant Islamist activism in Egypt
since the mid-1990s, including an event chronology and a preliminary analysis of overall trends
and underlying causes.
8
1
Introduction
The present study explores the evolution of violent Islamism in Egypt from after the Luxor
massacre in November 1997 until August 2012. 3 Violent Islamism is defined here as Islamists
using violence to achieve political or religious goals. In this report I have identified six main
targets of this kind of violence: Israel, the Christian minority in Egypt, the government forces,
tourists, the Sufis and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) present in Sinai.
There have been numerous clashes throughout this period between Muslims and Christians, many
of them not relevant to this study. I have therefore only included those incidents that seemed to be
motivated by Islamist ideology. During the Arab Spring violence directed at authorities and
government forces has been widespread. Although radical Islamists were part of the revolution,
the main goals and slogans used during the demonstrations were not religious. Therefore I have
not included any of the violent incidents directly connected to the uprising.
Egypt experienced a wave of Islamist violence between the 1970s and the 1990s, and this period
has been the focus of a number of books, dissertations and articles. However, the following
decade remains understudied.
The report consists of four parts. The first part presents a brief historical background to the
situation in Egypt in the late 1990s and the main militant Islamist groups active in this decade.
The second part is a presentation of four different periods marked by an increase or a decrease in
Islamist violence. The first period, 1997 to 2003, is distinct in that Islamists who were active in
the previous decade declared a ceasefire and embarked on a process of ideological revision
through a series of dialogue meetings and publications. The next period is mostly known for three
bombing incidents of tourist locations in Sinai, resulting in the deaths of more than 140 people in
2004, 2005 and 2006. The third period, from 2007 to 2010, begins as a period with remarkably
few episodes of violent Islamism in 2007 and 2008. However, in 2009 and 2010, the violence
gradually increased, especially in Sinai. The last period, from 2011 to 2012, is obviously marked
by the revolution that affected the security situation in all of Egypt, and again, especially in Sinai.
The third part of this report is a chronology of violent incidents, starting with the Luxor massacre
in 1997, up to August 2012. The last section contains a bibliography of relevant literature.
1.1
The 1990s
The Muslim Brotherhood’s official renouncement of violence in the 1970s resulted in the creation
of several new radical groups not in agreement with this decision. The new groups were inspired
by Sayyid Qutb’s ideas and sought to overthrow the secular regime and establish an Islamic state
by means of violence. 4 There are a number of factors that led to the proliferation of radical groups
3
The sources for this study are mostly secondary literature, including academic articles, books, and reports.
The primary sources include a variety of newspaper articles in English and Arabic as well as postings on
jihadi web forums.
4
Since his execution in Egypt in 1966, Sayyid Qutb has remained a towering ideological figure in
contemporary militant Islamism. For an excellent biography, see John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins
of Radical Islamism. New York and London: Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2010.
9
in Egypt and across the Muslim world in the 1970s. Different scholars have identified and
stressed different factors, but central for most are: the reaction to modernization, Western
encroachment, tyrannical rule and corruption by the national elite, gross inequality, poverty, and
lack of economic development.5
One of the most radical and violent groups emerging in this period was the “Islamic Group” (in
Arabic: al-jama‘a al-islamiyya, JI). Pursuing its violent campaign in the 1990s, JI is said to be
responsible for the killing of hundreds of Egyptian policemen and soldiers, secular intellectuals,
Christian Copts, other civilians and dozens of tourists. The JI was formed mainly by students at
the Asyut University in Upper Egypt after the October war in 1973. Among the founders was
Karam Zuhdi. 6 The now imprisoned cleric Umar Abd al-Rahman was the spiritual leader of the
movement.
In its early days the group was primarily active on university campuses and was concerned with
how to conduct a “pure Islamic life”; the veiling of women, the segregation of classes by gender,
and so on. The group grew increasingly popular during the 1970s, and according to Gilles Kepel,
this was due mainly to their offer of an “Islamic solution” to the socio-economic problems in
Egypt. 7 They also found attentive audiences among disaffected students; the number of Egyptian
students more than doubled while the infrastructure remained the same. Many came from less
developed areas of Egypt and felt alienated by what they saw as a Westernization of society in
Cairo and other big cities. Another factor explaining the JI and other Islamist groups’ success was
the tacit support they received from the “Believing President” Anwar Sadat, who feared the leftist
opposition more than the Islamists. Initially, the Islamist groups were a minority in the Egyptian
student movement that was dominated by leftist Nasserists and Marxists. Sadat believed that in
supporting the Islamists he would be able to control the socialist opposition.
However, this “gentleman’s agreement” fell apart due to several factors. In 1973 Sadat
implemented an economic reform program entitled “Opening”, or al-infitah, designed to alleviate
the struggling Egyptian economy through the gradual introduction of free market principles. Alinfitah was generally considered flawed and Sadat was accused of abandoning the “solidarity with
the poor”. 8 In 1977, after the state announced that it was abolishing subsidies on basic foodstuffs,
this policy led to massive spontaneous riots involving hundreds of thousands of Egyptians. This
was also the year that Sadat went to Jerusalem to initiate peace talks with the Israelis.
The agreement between Sadat and the Islamists finally came to an end when a radical Islamist
group kidnapped and murdered a prominent cleric in 1977. The group called itself jama‘at almuslimin, but was known under the name al-takfir wa’l-hijra (TWH). Shukri Mustafa, a former
member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), founded the TWH. He pronounced takfir,
5
See work of scholars such as Gilles Kepel, Roel Meijer and Bjørn Olav Utvik.
Mohamed Bin-Ali and Rohan Gunaratna, “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32 (4) (April 2009), pp. 277-91; and Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization
of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist movements (London: Routledge, 2009).
7
Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp.81–84.
8
Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
2010), pp. 125–27.
6
10
“excommunication”, of all Muslims except his own disciples, declaring them apostates, and
implying that their killing would be permissible under Islamic law. Even though Egyptian
security forces soon crushed the group, it is said to have “left an enduring legacy taken up by
some Islamist radicals in subsequent years and decades”. 9
A third and important group that came to life in this period is the “Egyptian Islamic Jihad”
(jama‘at al-jihad bi-misr, EIJ), also called al-Jihad. The EIJ was formed in 1979 by Muhammad
Abd al-Salam Faraj, also a former MB member, disillusioned by its quietism and passivity. The
EIJ started as a small clandestine group based in Cairo, but soon it absorbed cadres and leaders of
a number of other clandestine cells, which had been established throughout the 1960s and
1970s. 10 Faraj was inspired by Qutb as well as the medieval Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya, a
revered figure among militant Salafists. Based on his interpretation of their teaching, Faraj
declared “jihad” on Sadat’s regime, even though Sadat called himself a Muslim. Faraj and Karam
Zuhdi were introduced in 1980 and a year later Sadat was assassinated during a military parade
commemorating the Egyptian military’s success in crossing the Suez Canal during the October
1973 war with Israel. Reportedly the EIJ and IJ cooperated in this attack, which was carried out
by an EIJ cell headed by a young lieutenant in the Egyptian army. 11 Faraj had hoped this would
lead to a “people’s revolution”. 12 However, following the assassination of Sadat, a massive
crackdown temporarily annihilated the Islamist extremist factions and dispersed their
sympathizers. 13
The assassination of the secularist author Farag Foda in 1992 by JI is usually seen as the
beginning of a new phase in the Islamist struggle in Egypt in the sense that it marked a significant
shift towards increased violence. A large number of attacks followed, including assaults and
bomb attacks against tourists between 1992 and 1997. During this period the EIJ was mostly
under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri. This period is often said to have reached its peak
with the Luxor massacre. On the 17 November 1997, a group of militants, presumably acting on
orders from al-Zawahiri or possibly from a senior JI commander, Mustafa Hamza, went on a
shooting spree in Luxor. 14 Armed with assault rifles they attacked groups of tourists in the
courtyard of the famous Temple of Hatshepsut. 68 people were killed in the massacre, including
58 foreign tourists. 15 Through these actions, the militant Islamists were able to strike a heavy
blow at the state, both financially and in terms of Egypt’s international image. At the time the
popular backlash against the militant Islamists was swift, and both the JI and the EIJ were quick
9
Katerina Dalacoura, Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), p.113.
10
Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.
11
Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements.
12
Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam: pp.84–88.
13
Ibid.
14
Lawrence Wright, The looming tower: al-Qaeda and the road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007);
and “Bin Laden behind Luxor massacre?”, al-Ahram, 20–26 May 1999,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/430/eg21.htm.
15
Wright, The looming tower.
11
to deny any involvement in the massacre. Support for militant Islamism dropped drastically,
partly because a large proportion of Egyptians was dependent on tourism for their livelihood.16
2
Historical Overview
2.1
Ceasefire and De-Radicalization (1997–2003)
By the early 2000s most observers concluded that militant Islamism in Egypt had been largely
defeated. For example, a 2004 report published by the International Crisis Group on Islamism in
North Africa stated that: “The absence of serious violence since late 1997 strongly suggests that
the strategy of armed struggle (jihad) against the state has not only failed but has effectively been
abandoned.” 17
In the following, I will explore the EIJ’s and JI’s de-radicalization initiatives and the reasons for
the transformation.
The government had already in the 1990s started a campaign to dismantle the EIJ and JI. They
arrested members and sought to cut off the groups’ financial sources. Human rights organizations
have accused the Mubarak regime of using torture as part of the crackdown, and also of arresting
family members of Islamist leaders, keeping them as hostages and bargaining chips. 18 On the
other hand, the government seems to have realized that terrorism had to be fought with a broad
strategy that went beyond the use of brute force. It engaged al-Azhar clerics to openly discuss
“the right and peaceful” interpretation of Islam, both with the movement’s leaders directly, and in
public space more generally. 19 After the movement started to take the initiative to de-radicalize,
the Egyptian government also released many militants after years in prison, and improved the
prison conditions for those that were not released.20
Reportedly, and what is exceptional for the Egyptian case, is that the de-radicalization initiative
was not only a direct initiative of the government. In the years following the Luxor massacre key
members of both the JI and EIJ, underwent an ideological change. The groups’ leaders took steps
to renounce violence and apologized for previous attacks that had killed innocent civilians,
including tourists. The groups also started to work for a peaceful co-existence with the
government, signing a cease-fire agreement in 1999. The leaders of the EIJ and JI began to revise
their understanding of concepts such as jihad and takfir, perhaps mainly after realizing that their
attacks on tourists and other Muslims had led to a decline in support from the community at
large. 21
16
Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.
“Islamism in North Africa: Egypt's Opportunity,” (Cairo/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p.1.
18
“Egypt: Mass Arrests and Torture in Sinai,” Human Rights Watch 17, no. 3 (2005).
19
Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements; Bin-Ali and
Gunaratna, “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight.”
20
Bin-Ali and Gunaratna, “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight.”
21
Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements.
17
12
Karam Zuhdi explained that their previous practice of denouncing Muslims as “infidels” (kuffar)
had no Islamic legal base. 22 Accordingly, the JI and certain EIJ factions have also worked to
provide counter-arguments to al-Qaida’s violent ideology. A former EIJ leader and ideologue, Dr.
Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as ‘Abd al-Qadir bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and Dr. Fadl), was
perhaps the most important ideological voice in the revision initiative. In a new book titled
Document for Guiding Jihad in Egypt and the World, he, among other statements, said that jihad
against the leaders of Muslim countries is not acceptable, and that it is forbidden to harm
foreigners and tourists in Muslim countries. 23 These revisions caused reactions among other
members of the group, some of them claiming that the document was written under duress in
prison, perhaps in return for visiting privileges or a reduction of his prison term. Among those
criticizing Dr. Fadl was Ayman al-Zawahiri who, as the new leader of the EIJ had formalized a
relationship with al-Qaida by merging the two groups in June 2001. 24
2.2
The Bombings in Sinai (2004–2006)
In a 2007 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) titled “Egypt’s Sinai Question”, the
opening line states: “Terrorism returned to Egypt in 2004 after an absence of seven years with
successive attacks and the emergence of a heretofore unknown movement in Sinai.” 25
In this section I will first present the Sinai bombings and different views on who was behind the
attacks and possible motives. Then I will comment briefly on three incidents that occurred in
Cairo during April 2005 and that appear to be closely connected to the Sinai events.
This period is marked by three waves of attacks in Taba (2004), Sharm el-Sheikh (2005) and
Dahab (2006), causing more than 140 deaths in total. Prior to 2004, practically all of the major
terrorist incidents in Egypt involved people from the Upper Egypt region and most attacks
occurred in mainland Egypt. The Taba bombing was the first significant terrorist attack in Sinai.
Egypt’s most radical and well-known group, JI, was suspected, but soon after the Taba incident,
JI released a statement denouncing the attack saying “the bombings in Taba are the sort of
indiscriminate bombing that errs in the choice of its victims and in the determination of the
appropriate time and place”. 26
On 7 October 2004 a truck drove into the lobby of the Taba Hilton Hotel in Sinai and exploded,
killing 31 and wounding approximately 150 people. At a campsite used by Israelis called Ra’s alShitan, two more car-bombings occurred. Of all the 34 dead, 13 were from Israel, two from Italy,
22
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
“Egypt's Sinai Question,” (Cairo/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007).
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Egypt/61
_egypts_sinai_question.pdf (Accessed June 11, 2012).
26
23
13
one from Russia, and one from the United States. The remaining fatalities were believed to be
Egyptians. 27
On 23 July in 2005, a series of suicide bomb attacks hit the Egyptian resort city of Sharm elSheikh, causing 88 fatalities and wounding more than 200 people.28 The attacks stand as the
deadliest terrorist incident in the country’s modern history. The majority of those killed were
Egyptians, but Britons, Germans, Italians, Israelis and Americans, in addition to other
nationalities, were also among the casualties.29
On 24 April 2006 three bombs exploded in Dahab. 24 people were killed and more than 80
injured. It appears that bombs were detonated at two restaurants and a third at a supermarket. Again,
the majority
of the victims were Egyptians, while at least three foreigners were killed and 18
wounded. 30
The three attacks were similar in their method, in that they all used three bombs that targeted
civilians. Also, they all occurred on or around symbolic dates in Egyptian history. October 6 is the
anniversary of the Egyptian army’s crossing of the Suez Canal in the 1973. July 23
commemorates the 1952 revolution, while April 24 is the eve of the anniversary of Israel’s 1982
withdrawal from Sinai. The fact that the attacks occurred on or around Jewish holidays was also
highlighted, especially in Israeli newspapers. The Taba attack occurred during the Jewish Sukhot
festival, and the attack in Sharm al-Sheikh occurred one day before the Jewish fast day of
Tammuz, commemorating the breach of the walls of Jerusalem before the destruction of the
Second Temple. 31 The fast day falls on the 17th day of the Hebrew month of Tammuz and in 2005
that date was July 24. 32 Furthermore, the Dahab attack in 2006 coincided with Sham en-Nessim,
an Egyptian national holiday, and the Egyptian Coptic Easter celebration, which in 2006 fell on
April 23. 33
All of this suggested that one group with one agenda executed all the attacks. However, the
perpetrators and their motives remain a mystery. The ICG report stresses that what little information is available concerning perpetrators and their motivation should be treated with caution,
especially since most of the available information originates from the state-controlled press. 34
27
MJ Gohel and Sajjan M. Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks,” Asia-Pacific Foundation International Policy
Assessment Group (2006).
28
“Toll climbs in Egyptian attacks,”BBC News, July 23, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4709491.stm (Accessed November 1, 2012).
29
“Death toll from Egypt blasts rises to 59,” Xinhua, July 23, 2005,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-07/23/content_3256722.htm (Accessed August 08, 2012); “Egypt
terror suspects detained,” Breaking News, July 28, 2005,
http://www.breakingnews.ie/archives/2005/0728/world/cwkfmhideygb/ (Accessed August 28, 2012).
30
Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks.”
31
Ibid.
32
“July,” Jewish Calendar Sample, http://www.contactplus.com/products/webcal/samples2/wc200507.html
(Accessed August 8, 2012).
33
Chris Zambelis, “Sinai Bombings Mark Latest in Pattern of Symbolic Attacks in Egypt,” Terrorism
Focus 3, no. 17 (2006); “Egypt's Sinai Question.”
34
“Egypt's Sinai Question.”
14
Initially it was assumed that the tourists, especially Israeli tourists, were the main targets of the
terrorist attacks and therefore the attacks were partly attributed to al-Qaida. 35 Egyptian Islamist
and former EIJ associate, Hani al-Siba‘i, who currently runs a small London-based media centre
called Al-Maqrizi Studies Centre, said after the Sharm el-Sheikh bombings that the attack
probably was a reaction to al-Zawahiri’s audio-tape released on 4 March 2004, in which he called
for attacks on “Israel and the American crusaders”.36
Lucas Winter offered a theory of an al-Qaida-affiliated group being behind some of the attacks in
his article on The Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB). The AAB was a previously unknown group,
but was the first group to claim responsibility for the Taba attack and later also for the Sharm elSheikh attack. 37 Winter writes in his article that it is likely that Muhammad Khalil al-Hukaymah
(also known as Abu Jihad al-Massi) was the founder and mastermind of the AAB. He used to be a
mid-level activist in the JI in his hometown of Aswan, but fled the country after the crackdown in
the 1980s and eventually linked up with al-Qaida members in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 38 AlHukaymah had used the term Abdullah Azzam Brigades – Al Qaeda in the Land of Kinana
(Egypt) and the Levant when claiming the attacks in 2004 and 2005. The AAB also claimed that
they were behind the multiple attacks in Cairo in 2005. However, the AAB did not claim
responsibility for the Dahab attack in 2006. Winter describes the Dahab attack as “less
sophisticated than those of Taba or Sharm el-Sheikh”. 39 In early 2007 al-Hukaymah was
described as a “rising star” in the jihadi movement and was considered to be al-Qaida’s chief
propagandist from 2006 until he was killed in a US drone strike in North Waziristan in late 2008.
Once his group was officially sanctioned as an al-Qaida “franchise,” he stopped using the name
Abdullah Azzam Brigades, and only used al-Qaida in Egypt. Al-Hukaymah’s exact links to the
2004 and 2005 attacks in Egypt remain unclear according to Winter, while he stresses that “the
multiple claims of responsibility and the Egyptian government’s denial of outside involvement do
not alone warrant discrediting his group’s claim”. 40 Winter states that the attacks were likely
carried out by a network of cells working together, at least one of which had some link to alHukaymah and consequently to the AAB. 41
The 2007 ICG report supports the idea that the targets may have been Israeli tourists since the
locations where the attacks took place are considered favourite destinations for Israelis, even
35
Lucas Winter, “The Abdullah Azzam Brigades,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 11 (2011);
Stephen Ulph, “Clashes in Egypt with Sinai Bedouin Mujahideen,” Terrorism Focus 2, no. 18 (2005).
36
Muhammad al-Shafi'i, “Egyptian Islamists React to Sinai Bombings, Link Them to Al-Zawahiri's Tape”,
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 9, 2004,
http://www.aawsat.com/default.asp?myday=9&mymonth=10&myyear=2004&I2.x=16&I2.y=14 (Accessed
June 25, 2012).
37
Mark Willacy, “Police question dozens over Egypt bombings,” ABC Online, July 25, 2005,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-07-25/police-question-dozens-over-egypt-bombings/2065592 (Accessed
June 25, 2012).
38
Winter, “The Abdullah Azzam Brigades.”
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
15
though the majority of the victims of the three attacks combined were Egyptian nationals.42
Moreover, according to media reports on the initial investigation, no evidence was found that the
perpetrators received training in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Nor were there any clear indications of
logistical activities on behalf of the cell in Muslim communities in Europe, or of any outside
financing or direct ties to al-Qaida or its (then present) leader, Osama bin Laden. 43
The investigation reportedly pursued two major theories: first, that all three attacks were executed
as part of the same plan by one group, and secondly, that this group consisted of mostly Bedouins
and Egyptians of Palestinian origin that had developed links with radical Palestinian Islamist
organisations. 44
The Egyptian authorities announced that a group called “Monotheism and Jihad” (tawhid wa’ljihad, TWJ) was behind all the attacks. 45 TWJ members were mostly Bedouins and men of
Palestinian origin from North Sinai, specifically the al-Arish district. 46 This was reportedly the
first time Bedouins from Sinai were involved in acts of terrorism on Egyptian soil, and it marked
a sharp departure from past patterns of terrorism in Egypt. 47
According to the Egyptian security forces, the alleged mastermind behind the Taba attack was I.
S. Saleh, an Egyptian of Palestinian origin. He is said to have recruited Egyptians and Bedouins
who were then tasked to acquire the explosives to be used in the attacks. Egyptian officials said
that Saleh and one of his aides died in the Hilton blast, apparently because the timer had run out
too fast. The authorities also identified two other Egyptians as having played a role in the attack. 48
In September 2005 the three suicide bombers behind the attack in Sharm al-Sheikh were
reportedly identified. The identification came as a result of DNA tests as well as confessions from
29 individuals arrested in relation to the attacks. The men were said to belong to an unknown
Islamist Bedouin group. According to a Terrorism Focus article on the Sharm el-Sheikh incident,
the Egyptian police announced in September 2005 that they had shot and killed one of the
suspected perpetrators in an area about 60 km south of al-Arish. 49 Two more suspects were also
pronounced dead and a third was taken into custody. 50 Yet another man was convicted for
42
Daniel Williams, “Egypt Gets Tough in Sinai In Wake of Resort Attacks,” The Washington Post ,
October 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/01/AR2005100101293_pf.html (Accessed June 25, 2012).
44
45
“Egypt: Palestinians trained Sinai bombers,” United Press International, May 23, 2006,
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/05/23/Egypt-Palestinians-trained-Sinaibombers/UPI-74101148394586/ (Accessed June 27, 2012).
46
47
Joshua Gleis, “Trafficking and the Role of the Sinai Bedouin,” Terrorism Monitor, 5 (12) (June 2007),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4246 (Accessed 2 May
2013).
48
Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks,” p. 4.
49
Ulph, “Clashes in Egypt with Sinai Bedouin Mujahideen.”
50
Ibid.
43
16
involvement in the Sharm el-Sheikh bombings, but managed to escape from a Sinai prison in
2011. 51
The links to Palestinian militants were highlighted in some of the media reporting on the Sinai
attacks. For example, various media outlets reporting on an Interior Ministry Statement from
Egypt on 23 May 2006, claimed that a Palestinian had supplied money and mobile phones to
several of the perpetrators of the Sinai bombings, while another Palestinian had trained the
perpetrators in the use of explosives and firearms in the Gaza Strip. 52
After the Dahab attack, Hamas was criticized for aiding the perpetrators. The Hamas-led
Palestinian government denied any involvement by related groups such as Islamic Jihad. 53 The
Palestinian Authority argued that the only possible connection was between individuals and the
involvement was based solely on family and tribal ties. 54
In the days following the Dahab attack the Egyptian police intensified their operations to hunt
down and arrest members of the TWJ. Its leader, N. K. al-Mallahy, an Egyptian of Palestinian
origin, was killed on 9 May 2006, while one of his fellow fugitives surrendered. An important
reason why the investigation concluded that TWJ was responsible for the attacks was the
confessions obtained from alleged cell members captured by the police during the successive
waves of arrests after October 2004. Later, another individual considered to be number two in
TWJ was arrested. About 30 other alleged members were arrested in May and June 2006 in the
culmination of a long and particularly harsh investigation during which there had been several
instances of violent confrontations between the police and the public, especially in the al-Arish
region. During these months 15 people died in relation to the investigation and dozens were
arrested. 55
In his article on the AAB Winter presents a very different hypothesis of who was behind the Sinai
attacks. 56 During the early stages of the Egyptian revolution, Egyptian protesters overran the
offices of the recently deposed regime’s State Security Services. Even though many sensitive
documents had been destroyed or removed before the offices were stormed, some remained and
soon made their way into the public arena. It is of course very difficult to know which among
them are genuine. On 6 and 7 March 2011 the Kuwaiti newspaper al-jarida published the
51
Andrew McGregor, “Has Al-Qaeda Opened A New Chapter In The Sinai Peninsula?,” The Jamestown
Foundation, August 17, 2011,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38332 (Accessed July 22,
2012).
52
“Egypt: Palestinians trained bombers,” The Jerusalem Post, May 23, 2012,
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=22637 (Accessed July 10, 2012).
53
“Hamas denies involvement in Sinai bombings,” UPI.com, May 24, 2012,
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/05/24/Hamas-denies-involvement-in-Sinaibombings/UPI-69611148481269/ (Accessed 2 May 2013).
54
55
Ibid.
56
17
contents of what seemed to be a secret interior ministry report related to the Sinai events. 57 It
allegedly implied that Habib al-Adly, Egypt’s Minister of Interior at the time, and Gamal
Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak’s youngest son, had somehow planned the 2005 Sharm elSheikh attacks as revenge against businessman Hussein Salem. Gamal Mubarak had become
angry at Salem in January 2005 after his personal cut from the contract to export gas to Israel was
set at five per cent, rather than the ten per cent Gamal Mubarak wanted. According to the report, a
secret organization had been formed in 2000, led by Habib al-Adly, tasked with guarding the
Mubarak family’s economic and political interests. On 7 June 2005 members of this organization
recruited an Islamic group to attack Hussein Salem’s properties in Sharm el-Sheikh with three car
bombs. However, these allegations have not been corroborated.
Speculations about the motive or motives for the Sinai attacks continue to focus on grievances
linked to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and anger over Egypt’s internal policies in Sinai. Some
sources have suggested that there is reason to believe that the first attack was linked to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict (if not necessarily the work of a Palestinian faction).58 Some of the arrested
suspects also claimed to have been motivated by the war in Iraq. 59 According to media reports,
one of the perpetrators told the interrogators that the objective was “to kill Israelis and Americans
in revenge for Palestinian victims of the intifada. It was not the intention to harm other
Muslims.” 60 It is not surprising that arrested suspects denied that TWJ deliberately targeted
Egyptians. After all, they were tried in an Egyptian court. However, this leaves unexplained why
Egyptians were the majority of the victims in both the Sharm and Dahab attacks. A theory that
explains these two incidents to a certain extent (assuming the bombers intended to kill Egyptians),
stresses that the Sharm el-Sheikh and Dahab attacks were actually TWJ’s revenge for the
thousands of arrests after the Taba attack. One of the bombs that exploded in Sharm el-Sheikh
went off in the old town, which is mostly frequented by Egyptian tourists and all of the 17 victims
were Egyptians. This supports the notion that Egyptians were being deliberately targeted, unless
one assumes that the bomb exploded accidentally or prematurely. This appears to have been the
most prevalent theory in the Egyptian media. 61
Another theory presented in the ICG report is that the incidents, and the Sharm attack in
particular, was directed specifically at President Mubarak, “given the resort’s role as the main
venue for summit conferences and the president’s frequent personal use of it”.62 Furthermore, one
57
The German magazine Der Spiegel also ran a story about the documents, see “Dirty Document Trove:
Did Mubarak's Secret Service Order Terror Attacks?”, Spiegel Online International, March 9, 2011,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/dirty-document-trove-did-mubarak-s-secret-service-order-terrorattacks-a-749989.html (Accessed 14 June 2013).
58
59
Daniel Williams, “Red Sea Resort Attacks Show Threat of 'Decentralized' Terrorism” Bloomberg,
August 8, 2006,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aAkahHyWCDoA&refer=germany
(Accessed June 26, 2012).
60
“Egypt's Sinai Question,” p. 2.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
18
of the main establishments bombed in Dahab was the Al Capone Restaurant whose owner was a
prominent local supporter of the president’s election campaign in August-September 2005. 63
The Cairo Bombing
In addition to the Sinai bombings, three related incidents also occurred in Cairo in 2005. On
7 April 2005 a suicide bomber carried out an attack on Sharia al-Moski, near the popular Khan alKhalili market. Three foreign tourists, two from France and one from the United States were
killed, and 11 Egyptians and seven other overseas visitors were injured.64
Egyptian authorities had initially announced that the bomber acted alone, though they later
arrested three other men in connection to the bombing, including the perpetrator’s brother. The
Egyptian police was said to have identified the perpetrator. 65 One of the suspects taken in for
questioning died in police custody on 29 April.66
The next day, on 30 April 2005, two more terrorist incidents occurred in Cairo. The first one was
called The Sixth of October Bridge incident. Its main perpetrator, I. Y. Yassin, had reportedly
learned of the previous arrests, and was being sought by the police. As he was being pursued
along the Sixth of October Bridge, he apparently leapt from the bridge into the bus station below
with a nail bomb that he detonated as he fell. The bomber was killed and seven people were
injured including three Egyptians, two Israelis, an Italian and a Swede.67 Approximately two
hours later two fully veiled females in their twenties armed with guns opened fire on a tourist bus
in the neighbourhood known as Islamic Cairo. 68 Three people were reportedly injured. This was
the first terrorist attack in modern Egyptian history to be carried out by women. 69 The two women
were Yassin’s sister and wife. Egyptian security sources believe they shot at the bus in revenge
for Yassin’s death and then shot themselves. It remains unclear if they intended to commit suicide
or chose the tactic to avoid arrest by Egyptian police.70 The sources on the events are
contradictory: some reported that police fired on the women, killing one, while others held that
one woman shot the other, and then wounded herself, dying later in hospital.71
According to the Al-Ahram newspaper, security sources believe that I. Y. Yassin’s brother acted
as the driver. He first delivered his brother to Abdel-Moneim Riyad Square, then took the two
63
Ibid., pp. 2–3.
65
Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks,” p. 4; and “Cairo bombing claims third victim”, bbc.co.uk,
11 April 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4432485.stm (Accessed 2 May 2013). See also
Sherifa Zuhur, “A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt?,” Terrorism Monitor 3 (10) (May 2005),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=481 (Accessed 2 May 2013).
66
Ibid.
67
68
Zuhur, “A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt?.”
69
70
Farhana Ali, “Muslim Female Fighters: An Emerging Trend,” Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 21 (2005).
71
64
19
women to the site of the second attack. 72 According to an Arab News article, a scrap of paper
found in the purse of one of the women, read: “We will continue to sacrifice our lives to let others
live”. 73
The media has put the spotlight on the mass arrests following the terrorist incidents. More than
220 individuals were reportedly arrested in the extremists’ native villages, and in the Shoubra
neighbourhood of Cairo. 74 In Egypt the public questioned why so many were arrested, if, as the
authorities maintained, these April attacks were merely isolated acts of revenge by some family
members. 75
Not surprisingly, several militant Islamist groups published claims of responsibility for the Cairo
incidents. The Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) claimed that they were behind the attacks, and
that it was revenge for the arrests of thousands of people in Sinai after the Taba incident. 76
Another unknown group, “Holy Fighters of Egypt” (al-mujahidin fi-misr, MM), also claimed
responsibility. 77 Egyptian authorities were reported to have stated that the incidents were in some
way connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but they insisted the attacks were carried out by
an isolated cell and did not represent a revival of any major militant groups. 78 The JI condemned
the attack. 79
2.3
A Slow Increase in Islamist Violence (2007–2010)
The 2007–2010 period is marked by an increase in Islamist violence, especially against the Copts.
In 2009 a bomb exploded near a Church causing no casualties, while in 2010, six Copts were shot
and killed on their way home from Christmas mass. In Sinai the relationship between the local
population and the military, as well as the MFO, worsened. Foreign tourists and Israel were also
targeted. Tourists were abducted and rockets were launched towards Israel. In 2009 a synagogue
was attacked. The alleged perpetrator claimed the attack was motivated by the situation in the
occupied Palestinian territories. 80 However, the incident that received the most attention during
this period was a terrorist attack in Khan al-Khalili in 2009 that killed a French teenager.
72
Jailan Halawi, “Racing against time,” Al-Ahram, May 03, 2005,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/740/eg12.htm (Accessed July 25, 2012).
73
Summer Said, “226 Arrested After Cairo Attacks,” Arab News, May 2, 2012,
http://www.arabnews.com/node/266287 (Accessed July 25, 2012).
74
Ibid.
75
76
Peter Beaumont, “Veiled women in Cairo attacks,” The Guardian, May 1, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/may/01/peterbeaumont.theobserver (Accessed July 18, 2012);
77
Chris Heffelfinger, “Trends in Egyptian Salafi Activism,” (West Point: The Combating Terrorism
Center, 2007), p. 12.
78
Beaumont, “Veiled women in Cairo attacks”.
79
80
Abdel Monem Said Aly and Shai Feldman, “Testing the Resilience of Egyptian-Israeli Peace,” Middle
East Brief, no. 56 (2011).
20
In this section I will first present the Khan al-Khalil incident. Then I will focus on the security
situation in Sinai throughout this period.
On 22 February 2009, a bomb exploded in Khan al-Khalili, a popular tourist destination in Cairo.
The attack resulted in the death of a French teenager and the wounding of at least 20 other people
in the crowded Cairo market. 81 The Egyptian investigation reportedly showed that the perpetrators had placed a bomb under a stone bench outside the historic al-Hussein mosque. 82
There was no immediate claim of responsibility, but Egyptian authorities accused the Gaza-based
group “The Army of Islam” (jaysh al-islam, AI), of masterminding the bombing. 83 Seven
members of the group were arrested and one of them allegedly confessed that an AI cell was
behind the bombing. 84 The AI appears to have some ideological affinities with al-Qaida. During
the Gaza crisis, both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri called on Muslims to rise up and retaliate on
behalf of the Palestinians.85 However, Egyptian investigators and local observers ruled out the
involvement of al-Qaida or other radical Islamist groups such as IJ based on the simple technical
nature of the bomb. 86
One analyst wrote that “many Egyptian media sources and other observers suggest that the attack
was most likely executed by a small terrorist cell, possibly without ties to foreign terrorist
organizations, but nevertheless determined to act against the state on their own initiative by
striking out at the regime’s economic lifeline”.87 While it is difficult to determine the motive for
this attack, the timing is probably a good indicator of the perpetrators’ motives. The bombing
incident occurred shortly after Israel’s bombing and invasion of Gaza in late December 2008 and
early January 2009, an event that caused worldwide outrage and widespread violent
demonstrations in many countries. 88
81
Cynthia Johnston, “Egypt holds seven over tourist bazaar bomb attack,” Reuters Africa, May 23, 2009,
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE54M04Y20090523?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=
0 (Accessed June 20, 2012).
82
Chris Zambelis, “Does Cairo Bombing Mark a Return to Terrorist Violence in Egypt?,” Terrorism
Monitor 7 (5) (March 2009),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34696.
83
Samir Ghattas, “A new terror map,” Al-Ahram, August 30, 2012,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1112/eg1.htm (Accessed September 1, 2012).
84
“7 held over deadly Cairo blast; men had trained in Gaza”, Haaretz, May 24, 2009,
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/7-held-over-deadly-cairo-blast-men-had-trained-in-gaza1.276577 (Accessed July 16, 2012).
85
Zambelis, “Does Cairo Bombing Mark a Return to Terrorist Violence in Egypt?.”
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88
Jeffrey Fleishman, “Al Qaeda-linked militants behind church attack, Egypt says,” Los Angeles Times,
January 1, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/23/world/la-fgw-egypt-church-attack-20110124
21
The Security Situation in Sinai
The Egyptian government has traditionally neglected Sinai and its inhabitants. 89 Of the c. 300,000
people living in Sinai, around 70% are Bedouins, 10% are Palestinians, or of Palestinian origin,
10% are Egyptians from the mainland and 10% are “Bosnians”, descendants of Bosnians arriving
in Sinai during the Ottoman period. North Sinai is one of Egypt’s poorest governorates, and water
is a crucial problem, as in all of Sinai.90 Even though there have been attempts to industrialise as
well as efforts to make Sinai into a more attractive tourist destination, the Bedouins have been
excluded from these projects. Non-Bedouins from mainland Egypt took most of the jobs created
by the new industries. 91 The Bedouins and Palestinians are normally not conscribed to the army,
and they have few possibilities to obtain land. Around 100,000 do not even enjoy Egyptian
citizenship. Additionally, the police in Sinai mostly consist of people from mainland Egypt and
consequently many Bedouins say they feel the presence of the military and the police is an
occupation (similar to the Israeli occupation between 1967 and 1982). The authorities’ declared
intention to “Egyptianise” the region, “not only in economic and demographic terms but also,
symbolically, in cultural and identity terms” has not helped to alleviate this situation. 92 Not
surprisingly, the Bedouins complain they are being treated unequally when it comes to jobs,
health, education and housing. 93
A variety of both militant as well as criminal networks are believed to be active in Sinai, though
the nature and scope of their activities are uncertain. Israeli sources claim that Hamas, Islamic
Jihad and other Palestinian “terrorist organisations”, run various clandestine activities in the
Sinai, especially in the Rafah and the al-Arish areas, dating back to the early 1990s. 94 After Israel
withdrew from Gaza in 2005, the volume of illegal trade and arms smuggling rose to new heights,
escalating further after Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, and Egypt and Israel closed their
borders. 95
The increased tensions between Egyptian authorities and the local Bedouin population have
occasionally led to violent confrontations. In November 2008, Bedouins in Sinai abducted 25
policemen and briefly held them captive. The kidnapping was reportedly in response to the killing
of three Bedouins during an earlier demonstration. 96 A man called S. A. Lafi and six other
perpetrators, all members of the Tarabin tribe, were jailed in 2008 for being behind this incident,
89
Ibid.
91
Ehud Yaari, “Sinai: A New Front,” (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Notes No. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sinai-a-new-front
92
“Egypt's Sinai Question,” p. 19.
93
Ibid.
94
Yaari, “Sinai: A New Front.”
95
“In Egypt's chaotic Sinai, militants grow stronger,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, August 9, 2012,
http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=30632 (Accessed August 10, 2012).
96
“Egyptian Bedouins kidnap 25 policemen in Sinai,” Al-Arabiya News, November 11, 2008,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/11/11/59942.html (Accessed July 16, 2012).
90
22
but managed to escape while being transferred from one prison in Ismailia to another in alArish. 97 As the police tried to recapture Lafi, a gun battle ensued and a policeman was killed.98
In June 2010, an Egyptian pipeline that supplies gas to Israel and Jordan was destroyed. 99 The
perpetrators were believed to be a group of Bedouins, consisting of at least a dozen armed
fugitives, who have clashed with police since its leader, Lafi, escaped from a prison. 100 The attack
was reportedly in retaliation for several arrests of female Bedouins some days earlier.101
In April and August the same year, rockets were fired from Sinai toward Eilat and Aqaba. No one
was injured in the first attack. 102 In the second attack two rockets fell in Aqaba in front of the
Intercontinental Hotel, killing a Jordanian taxi driver.103 Initially, Egypt denied that its territory
was being used for launching attacks.104 However, they later admitted that seven rockets had been
fired from the Taba region, accusing Hamas (with Iranian instigation) of involvement.105
No group claimed responsibility for the attacks. Israeli sources claimed that a squad from
Hamas’s military wing, the ‘Izz al-din al-qassam brigades, was behind the two rocket attacks.
However, Hamas denied any involvement. 106
2.4
After the Revolution (2011–2012)
On 25 January 2011, the Egyptian uprising began and for 18 days protesters demonstrated against
Hosni Mubarak’s 29 years of authoritarian rule. On the 11 February the president was forced to
resign, leaving the Egyptian military in power. The country is now undergoing a historic political
transition to democracy and it experienced its first democratic election in 2012. An opinion poll
97
“Sinai tribesmen sentenced in absentia to life in prison for attacking police convoy,” Egypt Independent,
September 13, 2010, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/sinai-tribesmen-sentenced-absentia-lifeprison-attacking-police-convoy (Accessed August 6, 2012).
98
Lina Attalah, “The Sinai riddle: Security or development?,” Egypt Independent, August 19, 2010,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/sinai-riddle-security-or-development (Accessed August 6, 2012).
99
Abdel-Halim Salem, “Security source denied the bombing of the gas line leading to Israel,” Al-youm 7,
June 27, 2010, http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=246640 (Accessed August 2, 2012); “Sinai:
The international gas pipeline that transports gas to Jordan and Syria has been bombed”, Akhbar al-Arab,
June 28, 2010, http://www.akhbaralarab.net/index.php/regional/25948-2010-06-28-07-59-55 (Accessed
August 2, 2012).
100
“Egypt tightens security around pipeline for Israel-bound gas,” AFP, June 28, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j2aK0v_4IxpvzZ9I8kk2plHbtNAg (Accessed
August 8, 2012).
101
“Sinai: The international gas pipeline that transports gas to Jordan and Syria has been bombed”.
102
“'One killed' after rockets strike Jordan and Israel,” BBC News, August 1, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10807166 (Accessed June 28, 2012).
103
Isabel Kershner, “Rocket From Sinai Lands in Israel,” The New York Times, May 5, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/world/middleeast/rocket-from-sinai-lands-near-eilat-israel.html?_r=1
104
“'One killed' after rockets strike Jordan and Israel”.
105
“Hamas operatives were responsible for the two rocket attacks on Eilat and Aqaba,” The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, August 15, 2010, http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/en/article/18048 (Accessed September 2, 2012).
106
Ibid.
23
sponsored by the US State Department in the spring of 2011 revealed that Egyptians in general
were more optimistic about the country’s situation than they had been before the revolution.107
However, the political transition has worsened Egypt’s social and economic problems. Crime has
risen and religious conservatism and sectarian tension has grown. 108
Initially it seemed that the revolution had a unifying effect on the relationship between Christians
and Muslims. However, in 2011 and 2012 alone there were nearly a dozen sectarian clashes
resulting in the deaths of over 70 Copts. The Sufis have also been targeted and around 20 Sufi
shrines have been attacked by Salafi extremists since the beginning of the revolution, both in
mainland Egypt as well as in Sinai.109
In this section, I first look at the security situation in Sinai after the revolution, and elaborate on
the groups that are active there. I then examine Islamists’ role in targeting Copts in mainland
Egypt.
The Situation in Sinai
Although mainland Egypt has experienced an increase in sectarian violence, it seems that Sinai
has re-emerged as a “security hotspot” after the revolution.110 Attacks on security forces in Sinai
have multiplied: there have been at least 35 violent incidents since early 2011, resulting in the
deaths of more than 50 policemen and soldiers.111 Although it seems the relationship between the
locals in Sinai and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) has improved since the last
period, in March 2012 Bedouins held MFO workers hostage in return for the release of tribesmen
convicted for the Sharm el-Sheikh bombing. 112
Since the ousting of President Mubarak, there have been as many as 15 bombings of pipelines
that supply Israel and Jordan with gas. These attacks are interesting in that they targeted both
Israeli and Egyptian authorities. The gas deal with Israel is generally viewed among Egyptians as
a symbol of the corrupt Mubarak regime. On 28 June 2012, the former oil minister under Hosni
Mubarak, Sameh Fahmi, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for corruption, which involved
selling of gas to Israel at far below market value.113 After several pipeline attacks, the deal was
revoked on 23 April 2012. Egyptian authorities claim that this was due to a commercial dispute
and did not reflect political tensions. However, observers say the dispute could threaten the
nation’s peace accord with Israel. Israeli opposition leader Shaul Mofaz called Egypt’s decision
107
Jeremy M Sharp, “Egypt in Transition,” (Congressional Research Service, 2011), p. 6,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/171381.pdf (Accessed July 19, 2012).
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.; Nicolas Pelham, “Sinai: The Buffer Erodes,” (London: Chatham House, 2012); Jonathan Brown,
“Salafis and Sufis in Egypt,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2011): p. 7.
110
Benedetta Berti, Zack Gold, “Security Vacuum in the Sinai”, The National Interest, 10 August 2012,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-security-vacuum-the-sinai-7317.
111
“In Egypt's chaotic Sinai, militants grow stronger”.
112
Pelham, “Sinai: The Buffer Erodes,” p. 15.
113
“Sinai deadly attack reopens peninsula security file,” Al-Arabiya, August 8, 2012,
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/08/231090.html (Accessed August 10, 2012).
24
“a new low in the relations between the countries and a clear violation of the peace treaty.”114 In
this way, the perpetrators of the attacks have succeeded in dealing a blow to both the IsraeliEgyptian relationship as well as Israel’s energy supply.
Rockets have also been fired at Israel and there have been several cross-border attacks. This, in
addition to the smuggling of goods and human trafficking across the border between Egypt, Israel
and Gaza, has further damaged the Egypt-Israel relationship. 115
Tourists have also been targeted. In 2012 alone there have been several kidnappings of tourists by
Bedouins demanding the release of relatives from prison. Most of the time the tourists are
released unharmed only hours after abduction.116
As of mid-August 2012, the government has not addressed the deterioration of security in Sinai.
However, following an attack on 5 August against Egyptian border guards resulting in the death
of 16 Egyptian soldiers, the Egyptian military intensified its campaign against militants in Sinai.
It announced “Operation Eagle”, a security operation initially designed to secure vital
establishments in Sinai and declared that the operation would not stop until “all terrorist and
criminal activity is quashed”. 117
Several factors, directly or indirectly connected to the Arab Spring, have contributed to making
Sinai a more conducive environment for armed militants. In the first months of the revolution
security personnel in Sinai were redirected to Cairo and other cities in an effort to control the
situation there, while Sinai was left neglected. Operations carried out in Sinai after the Arab
Spring revealed that new weapons have entered the area, particularly from Libya, which has
become an open arms market following the uprising that led to the fall of Muammar Qaddafi’s
regime. 118 The opening of the Gaza border from May to August 2012 may also have resulted in
increased cross-border contacts between militants in Sinai and Palestinian organizations such as
“Islamic Jihad”, “Army of Islam” and the “Popular Resistance Committees”.119 In a massive
series of prison breakouts in January 2011 many radical Islamists managed to escape. Among
them were people accused of involvement in the Sinai bombings in 2004–2006. Some of them
have returned to Sinai, and this may have affected the security situation there. According to
114
Edmund Sanders, “Egypt-Israel natural gas deal revoked for economic reasons,” Los Angeles Times,
April 4, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/23/world/la-fg-egypt-israel-oil-20120424 (Accessed
August 17, 2012).
115
116
Michael Herzog, “Sinai's Emergence as a Strategic Threat to Israel,” (The Washington Institute 2012),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sinais-emergence-as-a-strategic-threat-to-israel
(Accessed July 20, 2012); Gabe Kahn, “Two Americans Kidnapped in Sinai,” Arutz Sheva, May 31, 2012,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/156388 (Accessed August 1, 2012).
117
Ahmed Eleiba, Hatem Maher, and Sherif Tarek, “'Operation Eagle' will not stop until Sinai is terrorfree: Egypt's military,” Ahram Online, August 8, 2012,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/49956/Egypt/Politics-/Operation-Eagle-will-not-stop-untilSinai-is-terro.aspx (Accessed August 10, 2012).
118
“Sinai deadly attack reopens peninsula security file”.
119
Sharp, “Egypt in Transition.” Yaari, “Sinai: A New Front.”
25
Lebanese sources, a commando force composed of Hizbullah and Hamas fighters reportedly
stormed the Wadi Natron prison in Sinai. Their task was to free several thousand prisoners, and
especially Hizbullah activists, who were detained on charges of planning terrorist operations in
Sinai in 2011. 120 Eight Hamas members also escaped from Abu Zaabal. Among those who
returned to Gaza was a key figure in the flourishing cross-border smuggling business, as well as a
leading activist who had served three years of a 10-year sentence after being arrested in the Sinai
Desert, accused of planning a suicide bombing in Israel. 121
Attacks by Militant Groups in Sinai
On 29 July 2011, Bedouins and police clashed in the city of al-Arish, killing three civilians and
three security officers as well as wounding 19 others.122 The attack followed a demonstration by
Islamists who are said to have demanded the implementation of Sharia law. 123 The group
consisted of around 150 people carrying black flags proclaiming: “There is no God but God”.
They tried to storm the police station and they also destroyed a statue of former president Anwar
Sadat. Eyewitnesses claim that the attackers were not locals. 124 Security forces claim that of the
15 arrested, at least eight were Palestinians.125
After the attack, on the 2 August pamphlets entitled “Statement from al-Qaida in the Sinai
Peninsula” were circulated. 126 The statement called for the creation of “an Islamic emirate”
(principality) in the Sinai, implementing sharia law, shelving the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty,
halting discrimination against the Sinai’s Bedouin tribes and demanding Egyptian military
intervention in support of the Hamas regime in Gaza. A video of the group announcing the
presence of al-Qaida in Sinai surfaced soon after the attack and repeated the demands. 127 The alQaida Central leadership in Pakistan has not yet acknowledged this group as an official branch of
the movement. 128 Egyptian authorities continue to deny that any of the militants are linked to al-
120
Chana Ya'ar, “Sinai Terrorists Bomb Gas Pipeline a 10th Time,” Arutz Sheva, Deceber 18, 2011,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150817 (Accessed July 19, 2012).
121
Yousry el Badry, “Written in Sinai sand: 'We won't allow gas to be exported to Israel',” Egypt
Independent, November 11, 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/written-sinai-sand-we-wontallow-gas-be-exported-israel (Accessed August 2, 2012); Ya'ar, “Sinai Terrorists Bomb Gas Pipeline a 10th
Time”; Linda Gradstein, “Escaped Would-Be Bomber Is Home in Gaza,” Aol News, February 3, 2011,
http://www.aolnews.com/2011/02/03/out-of-egypt-escaped-would-be-bomber-hassan-wishah-is-home-in-g/
122
McGregor, “Has Al-Qaeda Opened A New Chapter In The Sinai Peninsula?”; Martin Barillas,
“Militants Attack Sinai Gas Pipeline Supplying Israel and Jordan,” The Cutting Edge News, June 30, 2011,
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=52494&pageid=&pagename= (Accessed June 25,
2012).
123
Matt Pearce, “Boston congregation prays for pastor's release in Egypt,” Los Angeles Times, July 15,
2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-boston-reverend-egypt20120715,0,6309872.story (Accessed July 15, 2012).
124
Barillas, “Militants Attack Sinai Gas Pipeline Supplying Israel and Jordan”.
125
Ibid.
126
McGregor, “Has Al-Qaeda Opened A New Chapter In The Sinai Peninsula?”.
127
Bruce Riedel, “Al-Qaeda Grows in Sinai,” The National Interest, February 2, 2012,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/al-qaeda-grows-sinai-6486 (Accessed July 20, 2012).
128
McGregor, “Has Al-Qaeda Opened A New Chapter In The Sinai Peninsula?”.
26
Qaida, but stress that the groups seem to share similar ideologies with those of al-Qaida, and that
they receive backing from extremists in Gaza. 129
Regardless of the group’s affiliations, a man named M. E. Hameed, also known as M. al-Teehi,
was reported to be involved in several of the recent terrorist attacks. In addition to being one of
the perpetrators in the attack on 29 July 2011, he was also accused of being involved in planning
a cross-border attack that occurred on the 18 August 2011, killing eight Israelis.130 Others believe
that the Palestinian “Popular Resistance Committees” (PRC) used the tunnels underneath the
Egyptian-Gaza border to stage that attack. 131 The PRC denied any involvement and according to
Israeli media, the Eilat attacks were carried out by a group of Egyptians operating out of Sinai. 132
Al-Teehi is believed to be the leader of a new group established after the revolution called altakfir wa’l-hijra (TKWH), and sometimes referred to as al-takfir wa’l-jihad (TKWJ). 133 (This
group probably has no connection to the al-takfir wa’l-hijra group operating in mainland Egypt in
the 1980s and 1990s.) The TKWH movement is said to follow al-Qaida intellectually and
demands an end to any foreign military and tourist presence in the Sinai Peninsula.134 Israeli
media claims that al-Teehi has been arrested, accused of involvement in the pipeline attacks, but
whether this is the case and al-Teehi’s actual involvement remains unclear.135 On 21 November
2011 an Egyptian police officer was killed during a clash with TKWH, when attempting to arrest
two senior members of the group. 136
In December 2011 the gas line was blown up for the tenth time that year.137A group calling itself
“Supporters of Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula” (ansar al-jihad fi jazirat sina’, AJSP) claimed
responsibility in an Internet message, where it also professed its loyalty to the teachings of “the
martyr Osama bin Laden.” 138 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s new leader, has praised the
129
Pearce, “Boston congregation prays for pastor's release in Egypt”.
131
Aly and Feldman, “Testing the Resilience of Egyptian-Israeli Peace.”; Kershner, "Rocket From Sinai
Lands in Israel”.
132
“Egypt Detains Islamist Leader In Sinai”, Eurasia Review, November 13, 2011,
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13112011-egypt-detains-islamist-leader-in-sinai-accused-of-eilat-attacks/
(Accessed July 19, 2012).
133
Both Ahram Online, BBC News and The Daily Star use the name al-takfir wa-l-hijra while al-Jazeera
uses the name al-takfir wa-l-jihad.
134
“Egypt Detains Islamist Leader In Sinai”.
135
Chana Ya'ar, “Egypt Arrests Islamist in Gas Pipeline Bombing,” Arutz Sheva, November 13, 2011,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/149691#.TsAUsz3hdGU (Accessed August 1, 2012).
136
“Egypt police officer killed in Sinai shooting,” The Daily Star, November 21, 2011,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2011/Nov-21/154750-egypt-police-officer-killed-in-sinaishooting.ashx#axzz213Rjj3sG (Accessed July 19, 2012); Barillas, “Militants Attack Sinai Gas Pipeline
Supplying Israel and Jordan”.
137
Chana Ya'ar, “Sinai Terrorists Bomb Gas Pipeline a 10th Time,” Arutz Sheva, December 18, 2011,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150817 (Accessed July 19, 2012).
138
“Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant,” Al-Masy Al-Youm, January 26, 2012,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/clashes-between-army-and-saboteurs-sinai-gas-plant (Accessed
June 25, 2012). See also “New statement from Anṣār al-Jihād in the Sinai Peninsula: “Your Brothers
Pledge Bay’at to the Amīr Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī””, Jihadology.net, 25 January 2012,
http://jihadology.net/2012/01/23/new-statement-from-an%E1%B9%A3ar-al-jihad-in-the-sinai-peninsulayour-brothers-pledge-bayat-to-the-amir-dr-ayman-al-%E1%BA%93awahiri/ (Accessed May 25, 2013).
130
27
pipeline bombings. On 5 February 2012 the pipeline was attacked for the twelfth time since the
ousting of Mubarak. 139 This attack was also claimed by AJSP, saying it was in retaliation for the
death of the group’s leader, al-Teehi, who was reported to have died while being tortured on 3
February 2012. 140
Another group claiming to be behind the pipeline sabotage attacks announced its existence during
the summer of 2011, calling itself Al-Qaida in the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP). Many have
speculated that AQSP and AJSP are actually the same group or in some way connected. 141
On 18 June 2012, an Israeli construction worker was killed on the Egyptian-Israeli border. 142 A
team of IDF soldiers quickly responded, killing two alleged terrorists and causing others to
flee. 143 A group calling itself “The Advisory Council for the Mujahidin in Jerusalem” (majlis alshura lil-mujahidin fi’l-quds, MSC) claimed responsibility for the ambush.144 The perpetrators
included an Egyptian and a Saudi national.145 The MSC had reportedly posted a video online on
27 June 2012 showing members of the group wearing military outfits and choosing their target:
an Israeli security patrol and a border town. 146 The perpetrators reportedly sought to avenge
“Muslims’ blood” and were said to have dedicated their attack to al-Qaida’s new leader Ayman
al-Zawahiri. 147
On 22 July 2012 the pipeline was blown up for the fifteenth time. 148 The attack was the first to
take place after newly elected President Muhammad Morsi assumed office on 30 June 2012, and
the first after Egypt terminated the gas deal with Israel. The incident illustrates that despite the
termination of the gas deal, the pipeline still seems to be in use.149 A Jihadi group calling themselves “The Supporters of The Holy City of Jerusalem” (ansar bayt al-maqdis, ABM) reportedly
139
“Blast hits Egypt gas pipeline,” Al-Jazeera, June 22, 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/20127226391171889.html (Accessed August 9, 2012).
140
Pearce, “Boston congregation prays for pastor's release in Egypt”; “Jihad group says Sinai blast response
to leader's death”, Ma`an News Agency, February 5, 2011
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=457878 (Accessed July 19, 2012).
141
Said Shehata, “Al-Qaeda in Egypt?,” Ahram Online, July 8, 2012,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/4/0/47143/Opinion/AlQaeda-in-Egypt.aspx (Accessed July 30,
2012).
142
Ahmed Eleiba, “'Operation Eagle' Will Not Stop until Sinai Is Terror-Free: Egypt's Military,” Ahram
Online, August 8, 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/49956/Egypt/Politics-/OperationEagle-will-not-stop-until-Sinai-is-terro.aspx (Accessed August 8, 2012).
143
Ryan Jones, “Israel-Egypt border continues to heat up,” Israel Today Magazine, June 18, 2012,
http://www.israeltoday.co.il/NewsItem/tabid/178/nid/23261/language/en-US/Default.aspx (Accessed June
22, 2012).
144
Eleiba, “'Operation Eagle' Will Not Stop until Sinai Is Terror-Free: Egypt's Military”.
145
Herzog, “Sinai's Emergence as a Strategic Threat to Israel.”
146
Eleiba, Maher, and Tarek, “'Operation Eagle' will not stop until Sinai is terror-free: Egypt's military”.
147
Ibid.
148
“The pipeline between Egypt and Israel is been blown up for the fifteenths time,” BBC Arabic, July 22,
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2012/07/120721_egypt_gas_supply_15.shtml (Accessed
July 23, 2012).
149
“Sinai deadly attack reopens peninsula security file”.
28
claimed responsibility for this attack in an online video. 150 This group also claim to be an alQaida branch. A video allegedly released by the group features a speech by the organisation’s
commander, where he claims to:
“Protect state resources and the rights of the poor. (…) We struck a mortal blow to the
economy of the Zionist entity (…) This blow caused billions in losses that are expressed
in a rise in electricity prices, a rise in the prices of all goods and a reduction of the
Zionists’ military budget”.151
Yet another militant outfit claiming to run activities in Sinai is “The Supporters of Truth” (ansar
al-haqq, AH), which released a video online featuring gunmen wearing ski masks and training
with weapons in the Sinai desert. Another video by the group showed the men patrolling the
streets of a northern Sinai town, waving assault rifles and grenade launchers.152 Similarly, a group
calling itself “The Soldiers of Islamic Law” (jund al-shari‘a, JS) announced in a Web statement
in August 2012 that it would wage jihad against “the current tyrant of Egypt (...) until they implement God’s Shariah in the land”. 153 JS made several demands, among them the establishment of
Islamic law throughout Egypt, beginning in the Sinai, and the withdrawal of US peacekeepers
from Sinai. They also demanded the release of “Muslim sisters from the monasteries of the
Crusaders” (see below). 154
Al-Qaida’s Role in Sectarian Violence
Over the past 15 years there has reportedly been an increase in violence against Copts and their
communal and private property. 155 Most of this type of violence in Egypt has been related to
conflicts over interreligious marriage and conversion as well as laws restricting the building and
reconstruction of churches. 156
The most deadly attacks on Copts in Egypt occurred on 1 January 2011. The target was a Coptic
Orthodox Church called the Church of the Two Saints in Alexandria, and the bomb blast killed 23
and injured 96 people. 157
150
Eleiba, Maher, and Tarek, “'Operation Eagle' will not stop until Sinai is terror-free: Egypt's military”.
Elad Benari, “Al-Qaeda Claims Responsibility for Egypt Pipeline Attacks,” Arutz Sheva, July 26, 2012,
152
153
Ibid.
154
Bill Roggio, “New jihadist group emerges in the Egyptian Sinai,” The Long War Journal, August 1,
2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/08/new_jihadist_group_emerges_in.php
155
Saba Mahmood, “Sectarian conflict and family law in contemporary Egypt,” American Ethnologist 39,
no. 1 (2012).
156
Ibid., p. 1.
157
“Egypt church blast death toll rises to 23,” Reuters, January 4, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/04/us-egypt-church-idUSTRE7010M020110104 (Accessed
January 11, 2013); “Egypt bomb kills 21 at Alexandria Coptic church,” BBC News, January 1, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12101748 (Accessed January 11, 2013).
151
29
The Egyptian government announced that it had “conclusive evidence” that an al-Qaeda-linked
Palestinian militant group, “Army of Islam” (jaysh al-islam, AI), had orchestrated the New
Year’s Day bombing. Interior Minister Habib Adly indicated that the AI had recruited Egyptians
in planning the bombing. 158 However, the AI denied any involvement in the deadly attack. 159 A
spokesman for the group said: “The Army of Islam has no relation, whether close or distant, to
the attack on the Coptic church in Alexandria, Egypt”. 160
In July 2010, Kamilia Shehata Zakhir, the wife of a Coptic priest, disappeared from her home in
Deir Mawas in the Minya Governorate in Upper Egypt. Her husband said Muslims had abducted
her and forced her to convert and marry a Muslim man. Copts took to the streets and demanded
that the state find Kamilia and return her. A few days later the Egyptian police located her and
brought her back to her family. The Coptic Church announced that Kamilia had not converted to
Islam but had left her home because of marital problems. Subsequently, various Muslim groups
started a public campaign that accused the Church of kidnapping Kamilia and demanding they
give her back. A number of attacks were launched on Coptic churches, and many within the
Coptic community linked the bomb attack on the church in Alexandria to the protests surrounding
the Kamilia controversy. 161
An Israeli study claims that al-Qaida has a role in the Muslim-Christian tension in Egypt, a claim
that is disputed. It argues that “the first sign of Al-Qaida’s new strategic plan” is to be found in a
video of Osama bin Laden discussing unrelated themes. 162 Bin Laden did not mention Kamilia,
but after his speech a text appears encouraging Muslims to save Kamilia and “burn their churches
and slaughter their priests”. 163 Other threats were posted on Jihadi webpages, and in December
2010 a list appeared that named all the churches that had been threatened with destruction. The
Church of the Two Saints was on this list. 164
According to SITE, a US-based organisation monitoring jihadi websites, the attack was carried
out exactly two months after al-Qaida’s Iraqi branch, “Islamic State of Iraq”, had attacked a
church in Baghdad, threatening additional attacks against Christians, not only in Iraq, but also in
Egypt, portraying itself as the defender of Kamilia. 165 SITE also points out that Shumukh al158
Fleishman, “Al Qaeda-linked militants behind church attack, Egypt says”.
“Palestinian group denies role in church attack on New Year's Day”, France 24, January 24, 2011,
http://www.france24.com/en/20110123-palestinian-army-islam-denies-responsibility-new-year-churchbombing-alexandria-adly-egypt (Accessed July 18, 2012).
160
Ibid.
161
Mahmood, “Sectarian conflict and family law in contemporary Egypt,” p. 55.
162
“Al-Qaeda and Its Role in Fomenting Religious Strife in the Arab World: The Kamilia Shehata Affair,”
(Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Jihadi Website Monitoring Group, 2011),
http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=10HEyTnFY6Y%3d&tabid=320 (Accessed August 2,
2012).
163
Ibid.
164
Ibid.
165
“Egyptian Church Bombing Follows Years of Instigation from Al-Qaeda against Copts”, (Hampden
Lane: Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE), 2011),
http://news.siteintelgroup.com/component/content/article/292-egyptian-church-bombing-follows-years-ofinstigation-from-al-qaeda-against-copts (Accessed August 15, 2012).
159
30
Islam, a top-tier jihadi web forum, hosted a discussion on how to avenge the allegedly kidnapped
and forcibly converted “sister Kamilia”. Some of its participants reportedly suggested the
kidnapping or the killing of a priest, while others suggested the poisoning of food products
destined for Copts.
3
Concluding Remarks
Violent Islamism in Egypt between 1997 and 2012 has on average caused fewer casualties per
year compared to the situation in the mid-1990s. Although several of the attacks during this
period have been dramatic in terms of fatalities, both the number of attacks as well as the total
number of mortalities has dropped significantly in comparison to the fifteen years prior to 1997.
The period between November 1997 and October 2004 is characterised by a virtual absence of
violent Islamist attacks, leading scholars to believe that armed struggle against the state had
effectively been abandoned as a strategy by militant Egyptian Islamists. However, the Taba attack
marked the beginning of a new wave of Islamist violence in Egypt, this time with a change of
location, namely Sinai. Most of the attacks, and also the most lethal ones, occurred in Sinai,
making it the new “hotspot” for terrorism.
Owing to the wave of violence the Egyptian state conducted a brutal crackdown in the Sinai area,
resulting in the imprisonment of thousands of people. Human Rights organisations reported on
the extensive use of torture. The government campaign apparently resulted in a short-term
reduction in Islamist violence, and there were no significant violent incidents in 2007, and less
than five attacks each year until 2010, according to my figures (see Chapter 4).
The deadly terrorist attack at the Alexandrian church in January 2011 coincided roughly with the
outbreak of the Egyptian revolution, but it also marked the beginning of a new wave of terrorism,
again in Sinai, culminating with the cross-border attack resulting in the deaths of 16 Egyptian
solders.
Notably, most of the different groups that have claimed responsibility for attacks during this
period appear to have originated in Sinai. They all seem to be new groups, apparently consisting
of small units or cells, with far less organization and structure than the main militant groups
active in the 1990s. There has also been a change in tactics in the sense that the current
perpetrators appear for the most part to use explosives and in some cases suicide bombers, while
armed attacks and assassinations using pistols and machine guns were prevalent in the 1990s.
A number of theories exist concerning motives for the attacks and about whom the perpetrators
were, both regarding the violence in Sinai and the rest of Egypt. The socio-economic and political
grievances of the Bedouin populations and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are clearly key
background factors, as are the heavy-handed police tactics resulting in deaths in custody from
torture. As for the more specific motives, the actual organisations involved, their ideologies, and
the involvement of transnational networks, available data does not permit a more detailed
31
analysis. Unfortunately, a primary characteristic for this period is essentially the uncertainty and
the dearth of verifiable facts about these matters.
4
Chronology of Incidents from 1997 to 2012
2 January 2000
In the al-Kosheh village in Upper Egypt, 21 people were killed in sectarian rioting, the
worst of its kind in recent Egyptian history. This was the result of three days of MuslimChristian street fighting. When it was over 20 Christians, including four children and one Muslim,
had been killed. More than 40 people were injured in the incident and about 260 shops, houses
and kiosks were also deliberately burnt or damaged.
Of the 96 suspects accused of participating in the communal violence, only four were found
guilty. One person was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for possessing an illegal weapon,
while the other three were sentenced to two years imprisonment for setting alight a truck-trailer.
No one was convicted of murder. This incident was related to the killing of two Copts in the same
town on 14 August 1998. 166
7 October 2004
Three bombs exploded in Taba. A truck drove into the lobby of the Taba Hilton Hotel and
exploded killing 31 and wounding around 150 people. Ten floors of the hotel collapsed following
the blast. At a campsite used by Israelis called Ra’s al-Shitan there were two more car-bombings.
The site is located some 50 kilometres south of Taba, near Nuweiba. First a car parked in front of
a restaurant at the Moon Island Resort exploded, killing two Israelis and one Bedouin, and
wounding 12 others. Another blast happened moments later, targeting the Baddiyah Camp, but
did not harm anyone. Apparently the bomber had been scared off from entering the campground
by a guard. Of the 34 dead, 13 were from Israel, two from Italy, one from Russia, and one from
the United States. The rest of the dead were believed to be Egyptian. These incidents happened
during the Jewish Sukhot holyday. 167
The Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was the first group to claim responsibility for the Taba
attack, its statement coming two days after the attack. Also claiming responsibility was the
“World Islamic Group” (al-jama‘a a-islamiyya al-‘alamiyya, JIA). A third group claiming the
166
Mahmood, “Sectarian conflict and family law in contemporary Egypt.”; Caryle Murphy, Passion for
Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: The Egyptian Experience (New York: Scribner, 2002); Yustina
Saleh, “Law, the Rule of Law, and Religious Minorities in Egypt,” Middle East Review of International
Affairs 8, no. 4 (2004); Barbara G. Baker, “Egypt's Prosecutor Appeals El-Kosheh Murder Acquittals,”
International News, May 14, 2001 http://www.atour.com/news/international/20010514e.html (Accessed
June 27, 2012).
167
“Israeli General Believes Global Islamic Group Responsible for Sinai Terror Attacks”, (2004); “Death
toll rises in Egypt blasts,” BBC News, October 9, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3728436.stm (Accessed July 10, 2012); Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab
Terrorist Attacks.”; Penny Spiller, "Taba attacks shatter Sinai tourism,” BBC News, October 11, 2004,
32
attack was “Monotheism and Jihad” (tawhid wa’l-jihad, TWJ). Later, the Egyptian investigation
reportedly concluded that this particular group was the perpetrator. On 2 July 2005 Egypt’s
Supreme Emergency State Court commenced the trial of three suspects, all supposedly TWJ
members. Two of them were in police custody, while the third was tried in absentia. All of them
were convicted. 168
29 March 2005
An Egyptian man stabbed and wounded two Hungarian tourists in Cairo. The victims
sustained minor injuries and were treated at a local hospital. The Hungarian pair was stabbed after
kissing in a public market, Khan al-Khalili, near a historic mosque. The perpetrator stated that the
attack was revenge for Western policies towards Iraqis and Palestinians. The police described him
as “mentally unstable” and “depressed”.169
7 April 2005
A suicide bomber set off his explosive device near the Khan al-Khalili market. Three foreign
tourists (two from France and one from the United States) were killed, and 11 Egyptians and
seven tourists were injured. There are conflicting media reports on the identity of the perpetrators.
One of the arrested suspects, A. S. Yusuf, died in police custody on 29 April, some three weeks
later, and his death motivated further attacks (see below). The AAB and MM both took credit for
this attack. 170
30 April 2005
Two terrorist attacks in Cairo. On 30 April 2005, I. Y. Yassin, a male relative of A. S. Yusif,
who reportedly died from torture in police custody on 29 April 2005 (see above), leapt from the
Sixth of October Bridge into the bus station below with a nail bomb which detonated as he fell.
The bomber was killed and seven people were injured, including three Egyptians, two Israelis, an
Italian and a Swede. Even though the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior reported that Yassin
jumped from the bridge and subsequently detonated a bomb, some eyewitnesses described a
heavy object falling from the bridge onto a man walking near them, who was decapitated by the
explosion. 171
Approximately two hours later, two fully veiled females in their twenties armed with guns opened
fire on a tourist bus in the neighbourhood known as Islamic Cairo. Three people were reportedly
168
Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks.”; “Jamaa Al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya (World Islamist
Group),” Global Terrorism Database, 2012,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20235 (accessed August 8, 2012); Pierre
Tristam, “Egypt's Patriot Acts,” Candide’s Notebooks, April 18, 2007,
http://pierretristam.com/Bobst/07/bn041807.htm (Accessed August 23, 2012).
169
Ely Karmon, “Egypt as a New Front of al-Qaeda” International Institute of Counter-Terrorism (2006);
“Kissing tourists stabbed in Cairo”, BBC News, March 29, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4391361.stm (Accessed August 13, 2012).
170
Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks.”; Zuhur, “A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt?.”; Winter, “The
Abdullah Azzam Brigades.”
171
Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks.”; Zuhur, “A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt?.”
33
injured and both perpetrators died. The perpetrators were identified as Yassin’s sister and wife.
Egyptian security sources believe they shot at the bus in revenge for Yassin’s death. 172
The AAB claimed the attack was in revenge for the arrests of thousands of people in Sinai after
the Taba incident. Another group, the MM also claimed responsibility. Neither claim has been
verified. 173
23 July 2005
A series of suicide bomb attacks in Sharm el-Sheikh killed 88 people and wounded over 200.
The attacks took place in the early morning hours and there were three explosions. One was near
the bazaar (the “Old Market”) in downtown Sharm el-Sheikh. The second was at the Ghazala
Gardens Hotel, at Naama Bay, where a car bomber plunged his vehicle into the front of the hotel.
The third explosion happened in a taxi rank also in Naama Bay. A bomb in a suitcase exploded in
the taxi rank next to the Ocean Bay Hotel. The majority of those killed were Egyptians, but also
several tourists, among them Britons, Germans, Italians, Turks, Czechs, Israelis, Americans and
Kuwaitis. The bombing coincided with Egypt’s Revolution Day, which commemorates Nasser’s
1952 overthrow of King Farouk.
Egyptian authorities claim that TWJ was responsible. The AAB was the first to claim
responsibility for the attacks. The MM also claimed it was the group responsible for the bombs at
Sharm el-Sheikh. 174
14 August 2005
Two bombs hit an MFO bus. Two roadside bombs hit a passing bus belonging to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in North Sinai on the border with Gaza, slightly injuring
two Canadian peacekeepers.
The MM claimed responsibility in an online statement saying: “Here are the lions of jihad striking
the Sinai Peninsula once again despite the precautions which the infidel security forces have
taken”. The statement claimed that the attack left three Israelis and two Canadians dead, figures
that were neither confirmed nor reported by any other source. 175
172
Ali, “Muslim Female Fighters: An Emerging Trend.”; Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks.”
Beaumont, “Veiled women in Cairo attacks”; Zuhur, “A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt?.”
174
Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks.”; “Toll climbs in Egyptian attacks”; “Death toll from Egypt
blasts rises to 59”; “Egypt terror suspects detained”; “Egypt: Palestinians trained Sinai bombers”; Willacy,
“Police question dozens over Egypt bombings”; Ulph, “Clashes in Egypt with Sinai Bedouin Mujahideen.”
175
“Egypt's Sinai Question.”; Ulph, “Clashes in Egypt with Sinai Bedouin Mujahideen.”; Jailan Halawi, “A
warning shot?,” Al-Ahram, August 25, 2005, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/756/eg3.htm (Accessed
July 18, 2012).
173
34
19 August 2005
Rockets fired from Sinai. Three 107mm Katyusha rockets were fired at two US warships in the
port of Aqaba, Jordan, not far from Taba. Of the three rockets one landed in a warehouse on a
dock owned by the Jordanian army killing a soldier, a second near a military hospital, and the
third in Eilat, Israel.
The AAB claimed responsibility for the attacks, but so did al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) a few days
later. One of the perpetrators was captured while attempting to flee. His testimony, along with
physical evidence, traced the rockets and the coordination of the attack back to Iraq, where the
remaining team members had returned to safety. 176
21 October 2005
Four people killed in clashes between Muslims and Copts. Militants attacked churches in the
Moharrem Bek area of Alexandria. This occurred after a protest condemning the distribution of a
DVD whose content was deemed offensive to Islam. St George’s Church in Alexandria was
attacked because of the leaking of the DVD, which reportedly featured a play performed inside
the church and which allegedly insulted the Prophet Mohammed. Police forces tried to stop the
demonstrators who were hurling stones at the church, police and passers-by, resulting in some
injuries. 177
14 April 2006
One man killed when a person attacked several churches. Some sources say several men
attacked worshipers in three Coptic churches in Alexandria. The perpetrator(s) killed an 80-yearold man and wounded at least six other people. A fourth attack was foiled and three attackers
were arrested. However, hours after the attack, the Egyptian government, which is sensitive to
sectarian attacks, described the attacks as the work of a single madman. The governor of
Alexandria, General Abdel Sallam Mahgoub, told state-run television that a mentally unstable
25-year-old carrying two knives had carried out the attacks in all three churches. The Interior
Ministry later issued a statement identifying the perpetrator.178
24 April 2006
Three bombs exploded in Dahab. The attack was most likely a suicide attack, 24 people were
killed, 18 Egyptians and 6 tourists. More than 80 were wounded. It appears that two of the bombs
were detonated at two restaurants and a third at a supermarket. The three explosions happened at
around 7.15 pm local time. Among those killed were a German boy and two unidentified
foreigners.
176
Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks.”; Pakinam Amer, “Chronology: Egypt's sectarian
violence,” Egypt Independent, January 12, 2010, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/chronologyegypts-sectarian-violence (Accessed June 29, 2012); “Egypt: Police Disperse Muslims Protesting
Controversial Play in Alexandria Church,” Dialogue: World News Connection, October 21, 2005
178
Abeer Allam, “3 Coptic churches in Egypt attacked,” The New York Times, April 14, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/14/world/africa/14iht-egypt.html?_r=1 (Accessed July 16, 2012).
177
35
Those wounded included 20 foreigners, among them three Britons, two Italians, two Germans,
two Frenchmen, three Danes, a South Korean, a Lebanese, a Palestinian, an American, an Israeli,
and an Australian.
The 24 April is the eve of the anniversary of Israel’s 1982 withdrawal from Sinai and also
coincides with the Egyptian national holiday of Sham en-Nessim. In 2006, the Egyptian Copts
celebrated Easter on 23 April. Egyptian authorities blamed the TWJ.179
26 April 2006
The MFO were attacked near their base in the town of al-Gora. Al-Gora is located
approximately 15 miles west of Gaza. There were no international casualties in the twin suicide
attacks. The first attacker ran in front of a passing vehicle carrying two MFO personnel: one
Norwegian and one New Zealander, in addition to two Egyptian police officers. The second
attacker rode a bicycle - some sources said it was a motorcycle - and detonated a bomb he was
carrying after Egyptian police rushed to the scene following the initial attack. In both instances,
only the bombers were killed. 180
19 September 2008
Tourists abducted in Upper Egypt. 11 European tourists and eight Egyptians were abducted in
an Egyptian desert area in southern Egypt. Masked gunmen seized five Germans, five Italians,
one Romanian and eight Egyptians from a desert safari tour near Egypt’s southwestern borders
with Sudan and Libya. The kidnappers then rushed their captives southward into harsh desert
terrain in Sudan and demanded a multi-million-dollar ransom.
According to Egyptian officials, all 19 hostages were freed unharmed in a rescue operation in
which several of the kidnappers were killed. The news reporting regarding the circumstances of
the hostages’ release is conflicting. 181 Egyptian authorities insisted the perpetrators were
“bandits”, not “terrorists”. 182
11 November 2008
Police abducted by Bedouins in Sinai. Armed Bedouins in Sinai abducted 25 policemen and
briefly held them captive, releasing them the same day. The Bedouins stopped a vehicle full of
police reinforcements heading to a police post near the Israeli border. This happened a day after
street protests. The protests broke out overnight after police fired on a Bedouin vehicle that
179
Karmon, “Egypt as a New Front of al-Qaeda”; Gohel and Gohel, “Dahab Terrorist Attacks.”; Zambelis,
“Sinai Bombings Mark Latest in Pattern of Symbolic Attacks in Egypt.”; “Egypt's Sinai Question.”;
180
“Egypt's Sinai Question.”; Zambelis, “Sinai Bombings Mark Latest in Pattern of Symbolic Attacks in
Egypt.”
181
Kahn, “Two Americans Kidnapped in Sinai”; “Global K&R Watch,” ASI Global, 2008,
http://www.asiglobalresponse.com/downloads/newsletter/newsletterAug-Sep.pdf (Accessed July 27, 2012);
and “11 tourists go free after raid in the Sahara”, Los Angeles Times, 30 September 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/30/world/fg-tourists30 (Accessed 3 May 2013).
182
“Tourists kidnapped in Egypt”, The National, 22 September 2008,
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/tourists-kidnapped-in-egypt (Accessed 3 May 2013).
36
ignored orders to stop, killing one man and wounding another. Seven people were hurt in the
unrest, including an officer. Other sources said this kidnapping was in response to the killing of
three Bedouins during an earlier demonstration. An Egyptian named S. A. Lafi was jailed in
2008, suspected of having masterminded this incident. 183
22 February 2009
Bomb exploded in Khan al-Khalili. The bomb killed a 17-year-old French girl and wounded 13
French tourists, three Saudi Arabians and four Egyptians. The German Foreign Ministry later
reported that one German national had been injured. The bomb exploded under a bench in the
square, and it was later reported that security forces had defused a second bomb.
The Egyptian authorities accused the “Army of Islam” (jaish al-islam, AI) of masterminding the
bombing. The group is supposedly led by two wanted Egyptians and is suspected of having ties to
al-Qaida. Later, Egyptian investigators and local observers appeared to rule out the involvement
of al-Qaida or other international radical Islamist groups, based on the simple nature of the bomb.
Many Egyptian media sources and other observers also suggested that the attack was probably
executed by a small terrorist cell, possibly without ties to foreign terrorist organizations.184
10 May 2009
A bomb exploded outside St Mary’s Church. This is a Coptic church located in the Zeitoun
area northeast of Cairo. No one was injured although the device damaged a car. A second bomb
was found and detonated by police in the same area. Shady Wagih, a witness at the scene, told
Reuters that the first blast occurred at about 9 p.m. (1800 GMT), damaging the car and prompting
police to set up a security cordon. The second blast occurred later after the police cleared the area.
No group has claimed responsibility for the incident. 185
6 January 2010
Perpetrators shot at Copts standing outside a church in Naga Hammadi City. Three shooters
opened fire at a gathering outside a Coptic church. They killed six Copts leaving the church after
a Coptic Christmas mass. The perpetrators also killed one off-duty Muslim police officer. Eleven
people were wounded (nine Copts, two Muslims).
183
“Egyptian Bedouins kidnap 25 policemen in Sinai”; “Sinai tribesmen sentenced in absentia to life in
prison for attacking police convoy”.
184
Johnston, “Egypt holds seven over tourist bazaar bomb attack"; “Clashes between the army and
saboteurs at Sinai gas plant,” Egypt Independent, January 26, 2012,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/clashes-between-army-and-saboteurs-sinai-gas-plant (Accessed
June 25, 2012); Fleishman, “Al Qaeda-linked militants behind church attack, Egypt says”; “7 held over
deadly Cairo blast; men had trained in Gaza”; Zambelis, “Does Cairo Bombing Mark a Return to Terrorist
Violence in Egypt?.”
185
“Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”; Aaron J. Leichman, “Small Bomb
Explodes Near Revered Church in Egypt,” World, May 11, 2009,
http://www.christianpost.com/news/small-bomb-explodes-near-revered-church-in-egypt-38579/ (Accessed
June 26, 2012); Edmund Blair, “Bomb explodes in Cairo, no one hurt,” Reuters, May 11, 2009,
http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFBLA10007520090511 (Accessed July 16, 2012).
37
Two days after the attack, the police arrested several suspects. One year later, in January 2011,
the Egyptian State Security Court sentenced one of them to death.186
21 February 2010
Cairo’s main downtown Jewish synagogue attacked. A man threw a suitcase containing a
makeshift bomb at Cairo’s main downtown Jewish synagogue on Adly Street early on Sunday
morning. There were no deaths, injuries or damage. The authorities arrested the 49-year-old man
shortly after the incident. He is believed to have had connections to an extremist group that
burned down videotape shops in 1984. The attempted attack on the synagogue was reportedly
motivated by the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories.187
22 April 2010
Rockets were fired from Sinai towards Eilat and Aqaba from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. No
one was injured and the source of the firing was never established. Before dawn, three 122mm
Grad rockets were launched; one rocket exploded in Aqaba in Jordan, destroying an empty
refrigerator warehouse. The other two rockets fell into the Red Sea.
No group claimed responsibility. According to Israeli media reporting, a squad of Hamas’
military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB), was behind the attacks. Hamas denied
responsibility. 188
27 June 2010
Unknown perpetrators allegedly bombed the pipeline between Egypt and Jordan. The
Arabic newspaper Al-Youm Al-Saba‘a reported that security sources denied that the gas-line
leading to Israel in the area of Hven, 30 kilometres south of al-Arish, had been bombed. However, the article said that witnesses confirmed that a number of unidentified men blew up the gasline, and that police cars, civil defence vehicles and gas company personnel rushed to the scene
and brought it under control. Another online newspaper Akhbar Al-‘Arab reported that the
Egyptian-Jordanian pipeline had been bombed, not that between Israel and Egypt. The paper
presumed the attacks were in retaliation for several arrests of female Bedouins some days
earlier. 189
186
“Attack on Egyptian Coptics kills six,” CNN World, January 6, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-0106/world/egypt.shootings_1_coptic-christians-drive-by-shooting-christmas-eve?_s=PM:WORLD
(Accessed June 21, 2012); “International Religious Freedom Report,” (U.S. Departement of State, 2009);
Fleishman, “Al Qaeda-linked militants behind church attack, Egypt says”.
187
“Bomb hurled at main synagogue in Cairo; no casualties”, Haaretz, February 21, 2010,
http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/2.209/bomb-hurled-at-main-synagogue-in-cairo-no-casualties1.263696 (Accessed July 16, 2012); Aly and Feldman, “Testing the Resilience of Egyptian-Israeli Peace.”
188
“'One killed' after rockets strike Jordan and Israel”; “Two rockets land in Eilat area”, The Jerusalem
Post, April 22, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=173675 (Accessed June 28, 2012);
“Hamas operatives were responsible for the two rocket attacks on Eilat and Aqaba”.
189
Salem, “Security source denied the bombing of the gas line leading to Israel”; “Sinai: The international
gas pipeline that transports gas to Jordan and Syria has been bombed”.
38
2 August 2010
Rockets fired from Sinai killed one man. Six (or more) 122mm Grad rockets were fired at
Israel from the Sinai Peninsula toward Eilat. Two rockets fell in Aqaba in front of the Intercontinental Hotel killing a Jordanian taxi driver. Three people (some sources say five) were
injured. Three rockets fell on the city of Eilat (one in a drainage pool in the northern part of the
city). Israeli media and police reported that some of the rockets fell into the Red Sea and others
into open spaces near Eilat. Initially, Egypt authorities denied that its territory was used to launch
the apparent attack. However, they later admitted that seven rockets had been fired simultaneously from the Taba region, accusing Hamas of responsibility.
No group claimed responsibility. As was the case of the rocket attack in April, Izz al-Din alQassam Brigades was accused of being behind this attack, while Hamas again denied
responsibility. 190
1 January 2011
A bomb exploded in a church in Alexandria. The church is called the “Church of the Two
Saints”. The bomb killed 23 and injured 96 people. A preliminary investigation said the bomber
wore a backpack into the church and detonated it as worshipers emerged from New Year’s mass.
No group claimed responsibility. The attack was widely condemned by Muslim leaders in Egypt.
The Egyptian government blamed AI for recruiting Egyptians to plan the bombing. AI denied any
involvement in the attack. 191
11 January 2011
An off-duty policeman shot Christians in Upper Egypt. An unidentified gunman boarded a
northbound train in Upper Egypt and opened fire on passengers, killing one 71-year-old Christian
man and injuring five others. Allegedly the attacker had checked passengers for the green cross
traditionally tattooed on the wrists of Coptic Christians in Egypt. After identifying several Copts,
the perpetrator killed one of them and injured five others. 192
5 February 2011
The pipeline between Egypt and Israel was bombed for the first time since the revolution.
Saboteurs blew up the natural pipeline that runs through Egypt’s northern Sinai disrupting gas
export to Israel and Jordan. However, according to the head of Egyptian Natural Gas Company,
190
Kershner, “Rocket From Sinai Lands in Israel”; “Hamas operatives were responsible for the two rocket
attacks on Eilat and Aqaba”; “'One killed' after rockets strike Jordan and Israel”.
191
Dalacoura, Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East; “International Religious Freedom
Report,” (U.S. Department of State, 2011); “Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”;
“Palestinian group denies role in church attack on New Year's Day”; Fleishman, “Al Qaeda-linked militants
behind church attack, Egypt says”.
192
“71-year-old Coptic Christian shot dead on train in Upper Egypt,” Egypt Independent, January 11, 2011,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/71-year-old-coptic-christian-shot-dead-train-upper-egypt
(Accessed June 28, 2012); Fleishman, “Al Qaeda-linked militants behind church attack, Egypt says”.
39
the explosion was caused by a leakage and not by a bomb. Subsequent news reports suggested
that the incident was caused by an attack. 193
20 March 2011
Extremist Salafis cut of a Coptic man’s ear. In Qena, Upper Egypt, extremist Salafis, including
an off-duty policeman, accused a Copt of renting an apartment to a prostitute. They allegedly
punished him by cutting off one of his ears, mutilating his other ear, and slashing his neck. The
attackers claimed to have carried out “the punishment” as required by Islamic law.194
28 March 2011
Salafi extremists killed one Copt. One person was killed and eight injured when a group of
Salafi extremists attacked a liquor store that was owned by a Copt in Kasr al-Bassil in Lower
Egypt. They also destroyed other shops and demanded that all coffee shops in the neighbourhood
be closed. 195
30 March 2011
Salafi militants razed Sufi shrines. In the governorate of al-Qalyubiya in the Delta area north of
Cairo, two Salafi extremists were arrested after a group razed five local shrines. Fighting broke
out between the people of the town who gathered to protect the tombs and the militants.
Immediately after this attack, the Alexandrian Salafi leader Abd Al-Minam Shahhat told
newspapers that such criminal acts were completely impermissible for Salafis.196
27 April 2011
Pipeline bombing. An explosion at the pipeline near al-Sabil village in the al-Arish region halted
natural gas supplies to Israel and Jordan. According to the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources unidentified saboteurs blew up a monitoring room of the pipeline.197
193
“Probe finds Sinai pipeline blast was caused by bomb”, Haaretz, February 7, 2011,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/probe-finds-sinai-pipeline-blast-was-caused-by-bomb1.341844 (Accessed June 25, 2012); Avi & Ravid Issacharoff, Barak, “Egypt holds gas supply to Israel and
Jordan after pipeline explosion” Haaretz, February 5, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacydefense/egypt-holds-gas-supply-to-israel-and-jordan-after-pipeline-explosion-1.341368 (Accessed June 25,
2012); Sam Kiley, “Egypt Gas Terminal Blast 'Caused By Leak',” Sky News, February 5, 2011,
http://news.sky.com/story/835633/egypt-gas-terminal-blast-caused-by-leak (Accessed June 26, 2012);
“Blast at Egypt gas pipeline,” Sify News, February 5, 2011, http://www.sify.com/news/blast-at-egypt-gaspipeline-news-international-lcfsomghedi.html (Accessed June 26, 2012).
194
Paul Marshall, “Egypt's Other Extremists,” (Hudson: Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom,
2011), http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7987 (Accessed June 24,
2012).
195
Ibid.
196
Irfan al-Alawi, “Egyptian extremism sees Salafis attacking Sufi mosques,” The Guardian, April 11,
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/apr/11/salafis-attack-sufi-mosques (Accessed
June 27, 2012); Brown, “Salafis and Sufis in Egypt.”
197
Ola Galal, Nayla Razzouk, and Alaa Shahine, “Blast Hits Egypt-Israel Gas Pipeline, Forcing Supply
Halt, Ministry Says,” Bloomberg, April 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-27/blast-hitsegypt-israel-gas-pipeline-forcing-supply-halt-ministry-says.html (Accessed June 25, 2012).
40
11 May 2011
A church was set on fire in Imbaba and 12 Copts were killed. A group of what was described
as Islamic ultraconservatives set a church on fire in the working-class district of Imbaba in Cairo.
This resulted in clashes between Muslims and Christians leaving 12 (some sources say 18) dead.
A Christian woman who was said to have had an affair with a Muslim man allegedly triggered
those riots. When she disappeared, the man is said to have spread rumours that a Christian clergy
had snatched her and was holding her prisoner in a local church because she converted to Islam.
By the end of the night, the Muslim crowd had burnt and ransacked two churches in the
neighbourhood. 198
14–15 May 2011
The shrine of Sheikh Zuwayed was bombed. In Sinai, the shrine of Sheikh Zuwayed in the
town of the same name was destroyed by a bomb planted by militant Salafis opposed to the Sufi
rituals carried out there. The explosion damaged the shrine’s dome and its four walls. A security
source said that the assailants put an explosive device inside the shrine and detonated it remotely.
There were no injuries as a result of the explosion.199
4 July 2011
Pipeline bombing. The explosion at the pipeline near Nagah in Sinai halted gas supplies to Israel
and Jordan. According to an official armed men with machine guns forced guards at the station to
leave before planting explosive charges there.200
12 July 2011
Pipeline attack. A large explosion hit Sinai’s main gas pipeline, cutting off supplies to both
Israel and Jordan. Masked gunmen entered a pipeline distribution station near the city of al-Arish.
The saboteurs reportedly ordered security guards to leave before blowing up the terminal, causing
10-metre-high flames to leap into the air.201
198
Mahmood, “Sectarian conflict and family law in contemporary Egypt.”; Michael Maggie, “Egypt:
Coptic Christians See Sectarian Violence” HUFF Post World, October 10, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/10/egypt-coptic-christians_n_1004320.html (Accessed June 22,
2012); Sam Kiley, “Egypt Gas Terminal Blast 'Caused By Leak',” Sky News, February 5, 2011,
http://news.sky.com/story/835633/egypt-gas-terminal-blast-caused-by-leak (Accessed August 21, 2012).
199
“Sufi mausoleum attacked for third time in North Sinai,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, May 14, 2012,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/sufi-mausoleum-attacked-third-time-north-sinai (Accessed June
25, 2012); McGregor, “Has Al-Qaeda Opened A New Chapter In The Sinai Peninsula?”; Tamim Elyan, “In
Sinai, militant Islam flourishes quietly,” Daily News Egypt, April 2, 2012,
http://thedailynewsegypt.com/2012/04/02/in-sinai-militant-islam-flourishes-quietly/ (Accessed August 2,
2012); “Al-Qaeda and Its Role in Fomenting Religious Strife in the Arab World: The Kamilia Shehata
Affair.”
200
“One police officer killed and one wounded in a clash with suspects of the pipeline blowups in Sinai,”
BBC Arabic, November 21, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/11/111117_sinai_gas_policeman_killed.shtml?print=1
201
Jack Shenker, “Egyptian pipeline hit by fourth explosive attack since January,” The Guardian, June 12,
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/12/egypt-pipeline-explosion-fourth-attack (Accessed
August 2, 2012).
41
29 July 2011
Bedouins and police clashed at al-Arish. Tribesmen in Land Cruisers or on motorcycles
attacked a police station in al-Arish killing three civilians and two security officers as well as
wounding 19 others. Later it was also confirmed that a military officer and a police captain were
killed. The attack took place shortly after a demonstration by a group of Islamists who demanded
the implementation of Sharia law. The gunmen, riding four-wheelers and motorcycles, peppered
the police station with bullets, and security forces returned fire. Eyewitnesses claim that the
attackers were not locals. Security forces arrested 15 suspects, ten of them Palestinians. One of
the defendants is said to have died while being tortured on 3 February 2012.202
30 July 2011
Explosion at the pipeline between Egypt and Israel. The attack occurred at Sheikh Zuwayed
near al-Arish. Gunmen used rocket-propelled grenades to attack the cooling system on the pipeline. According to the Egyptian National Gas Company (Gasco), the pipeline was attacked for the
third time in a month, and the fifth time this year. The pipeline was still out of operation
following an earlier attack on 12 July. Israeli sources indicate that private security forces working
for Israel’s East Mediterranean Gas Company beat off a second attack on the pipeline in the early
hours of 30 July. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the explosion. 203
August 2011
A rocket-propelled grenade reportedly hit the Sheikh Zuwayed Mausoleum. The exact date
for this attack was not given in the available news reporting. 204
18 August 2011
Eight Israelis were killed near the Red Sea port of Eilat in a cross-border attack. The
attackers killed eight Israelis including two soldiers and wounded 31 others. Gunmen and
bombers ambushed a bus and several vehicles on a road just north of Eilat. Israeli forces killed
five of the perpetrators, and Egyptian soldiers reportedly killed two more. However, Egyptian
security officials said that five Egyptians – an officer and four soldiers – were killed when an
Israeli aircraft fired at people suspected of being militants who fled into a crowd of security
personnel on the Egyptian side of the border.
According to various news reports the Popular Resistance Committees, a well-known Palestinian
militant group, had used the tunnels underneath the Egyptian-Gaza border to stage the attack.
However, the Popular Resistance Committees denied any involvement. 205
202
McGregor, “Has Al-Qaeda Opened A New Chapter In The Sinai Peninsula?”; Barillas, “Militants
Attack Sinai Gas Pipeline Supplying Israel and Jordan”; Pearce, “Boston congregation prays for pastor's
release in Egypt”.
203
Sharp, “Egypt in Transition.”; McGregor, “Has Al-Qaeda Opened A New Chapter In The Sinai
Peninsula?”; Barillas, “Militants Attack Sinai Gas Pipeline Supplying Israel and Jordan”.
204
“Sufi mausoleum attacked for third time in North Sinai”.
205
Herzog, “Sinai's Emergence as a Strategic Threat to Israel.”; “Clashes between the army and saboteurs
at Sinai gas plant”; Kershner, “Rocket From Sinai Lands in Israel”; Sharp, "Egypt in Transition.”; Aly and
Feldman, “Testing the Resilience of Egyptian-Israeli Peace.”
42
19 August 2011
Three Egyptian security personnel killed at the Egyptian-Israeli border. The incident
reportedly occurred as an Israeli plane began chasing suspected militant infiltrators along the
border between Taba and Eilat. Three Egyptians, a border guard officer and two Central Security
Force members were caught in the line of fire. In addition, three Egyptian security personnel were
injured by gunfire. The Israeli attack reportedly came in response to a cross-border incident the
day before. 206
27 September 2011
The gas pipeline in Sinai was sabotaged. The incident involved a carload of gunmen who
placed an explosive device at a pumping station. According to Egyptian authorities, local Bedouin
Islamists were behind the attack. 207
9 October 2011
25 people were killed in riots, most of them Copts. After a Muslim mob burned down a church
on 30 September, Copts started to demonstrate which resulted in riots between Muslims,
Christians, and the police. According to Egypt’s Ministry of Health, the official death toll was 25,
with 272 injured. Video showed military vehicles ploughing through crowds of people
demonstrating. Many people were said to have been crushed to death by armoured personnel
carriers. 208
21 November 2011
An Egyptian police officer was killed in clashes with Islamist group in Sinai and another
officer was injured. Police officers in the north Sinai town of al-Arish were preparing to arrest
individuals suspected of belonging to the Islamist group al-takfir wa-l-hijra (TWH), sometimes
called al-takfir wa-l-jihad (TKWJ), suspected of involvement in the pipeline attacks, when they
came under gunfire. The suspects managed to escape the scene.209
206
Elad Benari, “Three Egyptians Dead as Israel Chases Terrorists Along Border,” Arutz Sheva, August 19,
2011, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/146963 (Accessed August 1, 2012).
207
Dan Murphy, “Egypt gas pipeline attack raises questions about Sinai security,” The Christian Science
Monitor, September 27, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0927/Egypt-gaspipeline-attack-raises-questions-about-Sinai-security (Accessed June 25, 2012); Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu,
“Egypt’s Pre-Election Terror: 8th Attack on Gas to Israel,” Arutz ShevaI, November 27, 2011,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150129#.TtLZrGO5MRY (Accessed July 19, 2012).
208
Maggie, “Egypt: Coptic Christians See Sectarian Violence”; “Egypt violence,” The Guardian, October
10, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/2011/oct/10/egypt-violence-live-updates
209
“One police officer killed and one wounded in a clash with suspects of the pipeline blowups in Sinai”,
BBC Arabic, November 21, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/11/111117_sinai_gas_policeman_killed.shtml?print=1
43
26 November 2011
Masked terrorists attacked the Sinai-Israeli gas pipeline. This happened shortly after Egyptian
intelligence officials warned of the risk of pre-election terror attacks. The attack came only a few
days after supplies were restored following an attack two weeks earlier. The explosion did not
disrupt the flow of gas because the pipeline was undergoing routine maintenance work, so there
was no gas in the pipe at the time of the explosion.210
28 November 2011
A twin explosion hit Egypt’s gas pipeline to Jordan and Israel. The incident occurred just
hours ahead of the country’s first free election since President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in
February 2011. According to witnesses, the two explosions happened about 100 meters apart,
west of al-Arish in Sinai. 211
18 December 2011
Pipeline bombing. Masked attackers tried to blow up gas pipelines in Sinai. The attempt
seems to have been less successful compared to previous attacks. Egyptian officials said it did not
appear to have caused any significant leakage from the pipeline, although, at the time of writing,
tests had not yet been completed. A group calling itself “Supporters of Holy Struggle in the Sinai
Peninsula” (ansar al-jihad fi jazirat sina’, AJSP) said it was responsible for this attack. In an
Internet message, the group said it was loyal to the teachings of “the martyr Osama bin Laden”.212
28 January 2012
A Bedouin in Sinai shot a French tourist. The police say the attack was random as part of an
on-going drug feud. According to the Egyptian Independent, the 42-year-old Frenchman
Alexander Crister suffered multiple gunshot wounds after a man fired randomly at a group of
tourists. The suspected Bedouin perpetrator was killed and three policemen sustained injuries. 213
31 January 2012
25 Chinese workers were kidnapped and taken hostage by Bedouin tribesmen. The Bedouins
demanded that authorities free five fellow tribesmen from prison. The Chinese were being held in
a tent in Lehfen, where protesters had been blocking the highway to the northeast of Sinai for
three days. The kidnappers said their jailed tribesmen were arrested between 2004 and 2006 as
210
Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, “Egypt’s Pre-Election Terror: 8th Attack on Gas to Israel,” Arutz Sheva, October
27, 2011, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150129#.TtLZrGO5MRY (Accessed July
4, 2012).
211
“Egypt gas pipeline explosion,” The Guardian, November 18, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/nov/28/egypt-gas-pipeline-explosion-video (Accessed July
10, 2012); “Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”; “Terrorists Blow Up Sinai Pipeline
Again,” CBN News, November 28, 2011,
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/insideisrael/2011/November/Terrorists-Blow-Up-Sinai-Pipeline-Again/
212
“Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”; Ya'ar, “Sinai Terrorists Bomb Gas Pipeline
a 10th Time”.
213
Gabe Kahn, “French Tourist Gunned Down in Sinai,” Arutz Sheva, January 28, 2012,
44
part of an investigation into bombings in Sinai. According to the Bedouins, the ruling Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces has repeatedly promised to release the Bedouins. On 1 February
2012 the group was freed. An assistant to the Chinese Ambassador in Cairo said they were all
well and had not sustained any injuries. An official, who did not want to be named, said the
kidnappers had been promised that their relatives would be re-tried. 214
3 February 2012
Two US tourists and their Egyptian guide were kidnapped while travelling in Sinai.
Reportedly the two US females abducted were part of a tourist group travelling from St.
Catherine’s Monastery when a car with armed masked men stopped the bus. The perpetrators
were allegedly Bedouins who first robbed the tourists of all their money and then took two female
tourists as hostages and fled the scene. The abduction was an attempt to demand a ransom as well
as the release of family members from prison. The hostages were released unharmed shortly
afterwards. 215
5 February 2012
Bombing of the pipeline between Egypt and Israel. Egyptian authorities said the attack took
place west of al-Arish. The bombing forced a shutdown of the pipeline. AJSP claimed
responsibility saying it was in retaliation for the death in Egyptian custody of the group’s leader,
Muhammad Eid Musleh Hamad, also known as Muhammad Tihi, the day before. He is reported
to have died in his prison cell in Cairo. He was captured by Egyptian security forces on 13
November 2011 and accused of masterminding the series of pipeline bombings. 216
9 February 2012
The Azazma Bedouin tribe kidnapped 18 Egyptian border guards. The guards belonged to
the Central Security Forces (CSF). The kidnapping was in retaliation for the CSF killing of one of
the tribe’s members who was trying to sneak into Israel. The kidnappers detained the guards
somewhere in the desert near the border.217
214
“Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”; “Egypt security HQ in Sinai hit by
militants,” BBC News, September 16, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19616644
(Accessed September 19, 2012); “Egyptian Bedouins kidnap Chinese workers in Sinai,” Al-Arabiya,
January 31, 2012, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/31/191733.html (Accessed July 12, 2012);
“Kidnapped Chinese workers freed in Egypt's Sinai region,” BBC News, February 1, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16828127 (Accessed July 9, 2012).
215
Jan Christer Pedersen, “American tourists kidnapped in Egypt,” NRK, February 3, 2012,
http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.7981680 (Accessed August 6, 2012); “Clashes between the army and
saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”.
216
The Guardian, “Egypt gas pipeline explosion,” The Guardian, November 18, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/nov/28/egypt-gas-pipeline-explosion-video (Accessed July
18, 2012); “Blast hits Egypt gas pipeline”; “Jihad group says Sinai blast response to leader's death”.
217
“Egyptian military officers 'kidnapped'”, Ma`an News Agency, February 9, 2012,
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=459199 (Accessed July 10, 2012); Benari, “Al-Qaeda
Claims Responsibility for Egypt Pipeline Attacks”.
45
10 February 2012
Three Korean tourists and their Egyptian guide were kidnapped. This happened on the road
between Dahab and St Catherine’s in Sinai while the tourists were travelling on a bus. They were
released unharmed shortly afterwards.218
11–12 February 2012
A police station at Nakhl (between Taba and Suez) was attacked by Bedouins. The attack
took place during the night.219
5 March 2012
Pipeline bombing. The incident was reported to be the thirteenth of its kind since the ousting of
President Mubarak. The explosion reportedly forced a closedown as the pipeline had to be
emptied of gas after the attack. 220
15 March 2012
Bedouins held MFO workers hostage. Around 300 Bedouin armed with automatic rifles
surrounded an MFO base holding hundreds of Colombian and Uruguayan troops hostage for
nearly a week, preventing troops from leaving and provisions from entering. Their aim was to
pressure the Egyptian authorities to release five tribesmen facing possible death sentences or life
in prison for their alleged role in the 2005 bombings of Sharm el-Sheikh. 221
18 March 2012
Bedouin kidnapped two Brazilian women near St Catherine’s Monastery. Bedouin tribesmen
also kidnapped their Egyptian tour guide and a policeman. They were abducted from a bus
returning from the historic monastery of Saint Catherine when the tribesmen seized them. They
were all released unharmed within hours.222
23 March 2012
A Czech tour guide was kidnapped at gunpoint in Nuweiba. She was released unharmed
within hours. 223
218
“Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”; “Egypt security HQ in Sinai hit by
militants”.
219
“Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”.
220
“Blast hits Egypt gas pipeline”.
221
Andrew McGregor, “Thirtieth Anniversary of Sinai’s Liberation Marked by Libyan Arms, Bedouin
Militancy and a Growing Rift with Israel,” Terrorism Monitor 10, no. 10 (2012).
222
“Bedouin abduct 2 Brazilian tourists in Egypt Sinai,” BikyaMasr, March 18, 2012,
http://www.bikyamasr.com/62574/breaking-news-bedouin-abduct-2-brazilian-tourists-in-egypt-sinai/
(Accessed July 12, 2012); “Clashes between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”.
223
46
4–5 April 2012
Rockets were fired from Sinai. Three 122mm Grads were fired into a residential construction
site in Eilat. There were no casualties. The rocket attack came just before the Passover holiday,
traditionally one of the busiest seasons in Eilat, which is popular with Israeli and foreign
tourists. 224
9 April 2012
The pipeline between Egypt and Israel was bombed. The explosion reportedly occurred at the
entrance to al-Arish. 225
15 April 2012
Two Egyptian soldiers were killed and two others were wounded. The perpetrators were said
to be militant Salafis in Sinai. Egyptian security officials said that they were planning to dispatch
more forces to the region in response. 226
5 May 2012
Bedouins began using rocket-propelled grenades in attacks on Egyptian security forces in
Sinai. Bedouin fighters attacked a military checkpoint in northern Sinai and two soldiers were
injured. The sources said the Bedouins targeted the Abu Tawila checkpoint in Sheik Zuwayed
near the Sinai border with the Gaza Strip, the first attack on a military facility. 227
7 May 2012
Ten Fijian peacekeepers with the MFO were kidnapped. Bedouins in North Sinai abducted
the peacekeepers to demand that Egypt release members of their Bedouin tribe who were
imprisoned. They were held hostage for two days. 228
224
Herzog, “Sinai's Emergence as a Strategic Threat to Israel.”; Kershner, “Rocket From Sinai Lands in
Israel”.
225
Gabe Kahn, “Sinai Pipeline Attack #14,” Arutz Sheva, April 9, 2012,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/154634 (Accessed June 25, 2012).
226
Chana Ya'ar, “Sinai Terrorism Heats Up, Kills 2 Egyptian Soldiers,” Arutz Sheva, May 15, 2012,
227
Ernesto Londoño, “In Egypt’s Sinai, violence poses new challenge for peacekeepers,” The Washington
Post, August 18, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-egypts-sinai-violence-posesnew-challenge-for-peacekeepers/2012/08/17/03cd70f2-e882-11e1-9739-eef99c5fb285_story.html
228
Chana Ya'ar, “10 UN Peacekeepers Kidnapped in Sinai,” Arutz Sheva, May 8, 2012,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/155554 (Accessed August 1, 2012); “Clashes
between the army and saboteurs at Sinai gas plant”; Ernesto Londoño, “In Egypt’s Sinai, violence poses
new challenge for peacekeepers,” The Washington Post, August 18, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-egypts-sinai-violence-poses-new-challenge-forpeacekeepers/2012/08/17/03cd70f2-e882-11e1-9739-eef99c5fb285_story.html (Accessed August 18,
2012).
47
30 May 2012
Members of a local tribe kidnapped two American tourists. Intermediaries for the tribes
approached journalists and issued a call for the release of an alleged drug dealer, amongst other
demands. According to reports, gunmen stopped the tourists as they were travelling from the
resort of Dahab, near Israel. This kidnapping differs from previous kidnappings in that it occurred
on the resort-laden coastal strip. The two American tourists were released after less than 24 hours
in captivity. 229
14 June 2012
Unidentified men bombed the Sheikh Zuwayed Mausoleum. The mausoleum is located near
the Egyptian city of Rafah on the border with Israel. The blast completely destroyed the
mausoleum, which had already been severely damaged in two previous attacks. 230
15 June 2012
Bus passengers were held-up and kidnapped near Suez. A Singaporean national was
kidnapped after armed men near Suez held-up the bus he was travelling on. He was released with
minor injuries eight hours later. Other passengers on the bus were robbed. 231
16 June 2012
At least two rockets were fired deep into southern Israel. The rockets caused no damage or
casualties. It was not clear whether they were launched from Gaza or Sinai. The missiles landed
near the Negev town of Mitzpe Ramon and the Uvda Airfield, where Israel is considering the
construction of a new international airport. Both sites had never previously been targeted by
rocket fire. While the motive for the attacks was unclear, Israeli officials accused the Muslim
Brotherhood and Hamas government in Gaza of complicity. 232
18 June 2012
One construction worker was killed on the Egyptian-Israeli border. A group of at least three
militants crossed from Sinai into southern Israel and attacked a group of construction workers
who were building a portion of the new border fence. One construction worker was killed and
another seriously wounded in the attack. The IDF launched a counterattack, killing two militants
and causing the others to flee.
A group calling itself the “The Advisory Council for the Mujahidin in Jerusalem” (majlis alshura lil-mujahidin fi’l-quds, MSC) claimed responsibility for the ambush. The perpetrators
included an Egyptian and a Saudi Arabian. Israeli officials said soldiers killed both attackers. The
229
“Americans kidnapped in Egypt's Sinai released”, Now Lebanon, May 31, 2012,
http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=403584 (Accessed June 22, 2012).
230
“Sufi mausoleum attacked for third time in North Sinai”.
231
232
Eleiba, “'Operation Eagle' Will Not Stop until Sinai Is Terror-Free: Egypt's Military”; Jones, “IsraelEgypt border continues to heat up”; Chana Ya'ar, “Sinai Terrorism Heats Up, Kills 2 Egyptian Soldiers,”
Arutz Sheva, May 15, 2012, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/154751 (Accessed
August 6, 2012); Herzog, “Sinai's Emergence as a Strategic Threat to Israel.”
48
MSC reportedly posted a video online on 27 June, showing members of the group wearing
military outfits and choosing their target: an Israeli security patrol and a border town. 233
13 July 2012
Two American tourists were abducted in Sinai. Two American tourists and their Egyptian tour
guide were abducted in broad daylight when their tour bus carrying dozens of tourists, was
stopped on a major road linking Cairo to St. Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai. After three days in
captivity the hostages were freed.
The perpetrator was reportedly a 32-year-old truck driver of the Bedouin Tarbeen tribe. He
demanded the release from prison of his 62-year-old uncle. He claimed that his uncle had been
unjustly arrested on his way to the northern coastal city of Alexandria after refusing to pay a
nearly $100 bribe to the police. Egyptian authorities stated that his uncle had been caught with
half a ton of drugs. None of the stories could be verified. 234
19 July 2012
Two Egyptian soldiers were shot dead in north Sinai. They were on patrol in the town of
Sheikh Zuwayed when two unidentified Bedouin tribesmen shot at them while riding a motorbike
with their faces covered. The military had sent tanks and soldiers into the region in 2011 to quell
Islamist militants, after receiving permission from Israel. The attack came after Islamist militants
distributed pamphlets calling on the army to leave the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula.235
22 July 2012
Bombing of the pipeline between Egypt and Israel. The attack, which took place east of alArish, was the first of its kind to take place after President Mohamed Morsi assumed office on 30
June 2012, and the first after Egypt terminated its gas deal with Israel. The incident apparently
suggested that despite the termination of the gas deal with Israel three months previously,
pipelines still seemed to be in use. No injuries were reported and fire trucks and security
233
Eleiba, “'Operation Eagle' Will Not Stop until Sinai Is Terror-Free: Egypt's Military”; Ibrahim Barzak,
“Shadowy al-Qaida-linked group claims Israel attack,” Yahoo News, June 20, 2012,
http://news.yahoo.com/shadowy-al-qaida-linked-group-claims-israel-attack-133303853.html (Accessed
June 20, 2012); Aaron Y Zelin, “Terror from Sinai: Global Jihadist Groups on Israel's Doorstep”
(Washington D. C.: The Washington Institute, Policy Notes, 2012); Jones, “Israel-Egypt border continues
to heat up”; Herzog, “Sinai's Emergence as a Strategic Threat to Israel.”
234
Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, “Terrorists Fire on IDF Bus from Egypt; No Injuries,” Arutz Sheva, July 22, 2012,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/158114 (Accessed August 1, 2012); Matt Pearce,
“Boston congregation prays for pastor's release in Egypt,” Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2012,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-boston-reverend-egypt20120715,0,6309872.story (Accessed July 16, 2012); Elad Benari, “Two U.S. Tourists Freed by Captors in
Sinai," Arutz Sheva, 17.07. 2012.
235
Tamim Elyan, “Two Egyptian soldiers shot dead in Sinai-sources,” Reuters, July 19, 20212,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/news/international/Two_Egyptian_soldiers_shot_dead_in_Sinaisources.html?cid=33141936 (Accessed July 19, 2012); “Suspected Sinai Islamists kill two Egyptian
soldiers,” Ahram Online, July 19, 2012,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/48185/Egypt/Politics-/Suspected-Sinai-Islamists-kill-twoEgyptian-soldie.aspx (Accessed July 30, 2012).
49
personnel were on the scene to control a resulting fire. A Jihadi group calling itself “Supporters of
Jerusalem” (ansar bayt al-maqdis, ABM) claimed responsibility in an online video for the gas
pipeline blasts. 236
22 July 2012
Terrorists fired on an IDF bus from Egypt carrying soldiers at the border near Eilat. There
were no injuries, but the bus was damaged. This attack occurred several hours after an explosion
on the Egyptian-Israeli gas pipeline. The two incidents are not necessarily connected. 237
5 August 2012
16 Egyptian soldiers and officers killed in Sinai; seven injured. Armed Bedouins attacked two
security checkpoints of the Egyptian army. The attack happened at the Karem Abu Salem
crossing in north Sinai - on the border between Egypt and Israel. According to witnesses, the
gunmen stormed the border and managed to steal armoured cars from the Egyptian military.
Some of the gunmen loaded up the vehicles with ammunition and weapons from the checkpoint.
The gunmen then barrelled into Israel in the stolen vehicles; one vehicle exploded at the border
and the other was struck by Israel’s Air Force. It was later reported that six of the attackers had
been killed at the border and that 10 people were believed to have carried out the attack. The
Palestinian extremist group “Army of Islam” (jaish al-islam, AI) was reported to be behind the
attack. 238
15 August 2012
Rockets were fired from Sinai at Eilat. An unknown organization calling itself the Salafi Sinai
Front (SSF) issued a statement on 16 August in which it claimed responsibility for this attack as
well as the repeated attacks on the gas pipeline. ABM also claimed responsibility for the attack. 239
236
“The pipeline between Egypt and Israel is been blown up for the fifteenths time”; “Sinai deadly attack
reopens peninsula security file”.
237
Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, “Terrorists Fire on IDF Bus from Egypt; No Injuries,” Arutz Sheva, July 22, 2012,
238
“About 15 Egyptian policemen were killed when gunmen attacked a police station in northern Sinai near
the border between Egypt and Israel on Sunday,” NRK, August 6, 2012,
http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.8270510 (Accessed August 6, 2012); “Egypt vows strong response to
Sinai attack,” Al-Jazeera, August 6, 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/20128523429347102.html (Accessed August 6, 2012);
"In Egypt's chaotic Sinai, militants grow stronger”.
239
Elad Benari, “Unknown Terror Group Claims it Fired Rockets on Eilat,” Arutz Sheva, August 16, 2012,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/158964 (Accessed August 22, 2012); Elad Benari,
“Al-Qaeda Affiliate: We Fired Grads on Eilat,” Arutz Sheva, August 17, 2012,
50
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Terrorism Focus, 3, no. 17 (2006).
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53
Abbreviations
AAB
ABM
AH
AI
AJSP
AQI
AQSP
EIJ
IQB
JI
JIA
JS
MFO
MM
MSC
PRC
SSF
TKWH
TKWJ
TWJ
Abdallah Azzam Brigades
ansar bayt al-maqdis (“Supporters of Jerusalem”, ABM)
ansar al-haqq (“Supporters of the Truth”)
jaysh al-islam (“Army of Islam”)
ansar al-jihad fi jazirat sina’ (“Supporters of Jihad in the Sinai
Peninsula”)
al-Qaida in Iraq
al-Qaida in the Sinai Peninsula
jama‘at al-jihad bi-misr (“Egyptian Islamic Jihad”)
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
al-jama‘a al-islamiyya (“The Islamic Group”)
al-jama‘a al-islamiyya al-‘alamiyya (“World Islamic Group”)
jund al-shari‘a (“Soldiers of Islamic Law”)
Multinational Force and Observers
al-mujahidin fi-misr (“Holy Fighters in Egypt”)
majlis al-shura lil-mujahidin fi’l-quds (“The Advisory Council for the
Mujahidin in Jerusalem”)
Popular Resistance Committees
Salafi Sinai Front
al-takfir wa’l-hijra (“Excommunication and Emigration”)
al-takfir wa’l-jihad (“Excommunication and Holy Struggle”)
tawhid wa’l-jihad (“Monotheism and Holy Struggle”)
54
Appendix A
Statistics
30
25
Cairo
20
Alexandria
Delta
15
LowerEgypt
UpperEgypt
10
Sinai
5
0
1997‐2003
2004‐2006
2007‐2010
2011
2012
Figure A.1 Place of attack
18
16
14
Bomb
12
Abduction
10
Rocket
8
Shooting
6
Riots
Stabbing
4
2
0
1997‐2003
2004‐2006
2007‐2010
Figure A.2 Type of attack
55
2011‐2012
25
20
15
Cairo
10
Delta
Alex
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt
5
Unknown
Stabbing
Riots
Shooting
Rocket
Abduction
Bomb
0
Sinai
Figure A.3 Type and place of attack
25
20
Christians
15
Israel
Sufi
Tourists
10
MFO
Government Forces
5
0
1997-2003
2004-2006
Figure A.4 Target of Islamist violence
2007-2010
56
2011-2012

Violent Islamism in Egypt from 1997 to 2012

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