AK2117-J3-18-AS6-001-jpeg - Historical Papers
Transcription
AK2117-J3-18-AS6-001-jpeg - Historical Papers
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R40.00 (RIO,00) (R20.00) ADDRESS AfUICA (excluding South Africa) - aurfaca matl editorial t n d lv ld u a l a .............................................R 10,00 O rg a n is a tio n s and l i b r a r i e s ..........n * ),0 0 TOR DETAILS OF REDUCED AND BULK OPtTR RATES, OCNTACT S^RS, P O BO* 03174, 2143 YEO VILLE, • SOUTH AFRICA. EM3/1E VOJ RECEIVE ALL SARS PUBLICATICNS. adoressi P O Oo* W 1 7 4 2143 Yeovil la SOUTH AFRICA WOnK IN PROGRESS 24 - October, 1902 Cover by Kevin Humphrey SUDSCRIDE The nature of Work In P r o g r e a a , which la to atlmulate debate end present cnntrovarslal views on a wide rang* of subjects, uniura* that the views expressed dn not necessarily reflect the oplnlona of members of the editorial collective. This Issue of Work In Progress edited end published by an editorial collective of 40 Jorlssen street, 2001 braamfonteln, end printed by sached, 54 slmmonds street, 2001 Johannesburg. STATE, REPRESSION AND REFORM consldaratlons Involved hare - and that la tha that period represented the transition rrta an ere growing political insecurity of the present of sporadic and uneven economic growth to one of government. repld end sustelned ecorne*le growth. Ikiderlylng this insecurity - end, therefore contributing to it - ere a number of major soclel, economic and political changes. |These Include ITTiOs had a number of economic ceuses but, In jl, addition to these, there cen be n o doubt that the The growing politicisation of the efrlcan population end the resurgence of militant political fVFn the last five years at least 2 310 people art known to have himn detelned under South Africa's No w these two fecors are not unreleted. South Afrlca'a s*»aky economic performence during the growth of popular resistance pleyed en Important pert aotlvlty among other oppressed racial groups in retarding economic growth, both directly through (expressed moat clearly in tha auccasaful anti- strlVe activity, stey-at-homes end other forme of BAIC cemoalgn)| eorker resistance end, Indirectly, through the affect >2. Tha growing militancy and orgenlaatlon of ^»lch social and political instability had on black workers| discouraging foreign end lorel Investment, la aa foilnest 3. fha continuing crisis In black education! However, the smeshlng of the flnpuler movement 1977 299 4. Tha failure of tha bantustan policy to eln any changed all thetf 1970 300 1979 113 1900 9Tto 1901 630 security lava. The m » h « r detained In aanh year (99) aerlous support, either emong black people in South first, because the defeet suffered by the Africa, or Internationally] Congress Movement eased the pressures on the South ( ISO) 3. African government to Introduce polltlcel democ ratic (a«9) South Afrlcai Tha escalation of the guerllle war against reforms In South Africa, apeclflcally eround the (figures In brackets Indicate the ntawbar detained 8. Smith Afrlca'a current economic decllnej alogan of one-man-one-vote, and gained the in tha bantustan*| 7. Tha atalemete over Namibia, encouraging even govei i— an t time to Implement Instead Its own tha first fijur* 'nclodai tha bantustan figure). Ona of tha most disturbing faaturaa of thaaa atatiatlca la that, despite much talk of reform In deeper armed incursions Into Angola which do nothing politically divisive end repressive solution In to remove tha likelihood of a 0SATO government tha form of tha bantusten policy. coming to power in that country; Internal opposition movement. It wes eesy for South Africa, there la aa yat no Indication of tha 5. rising trand in datantlona balng reversed. coupled elth a lack of coherence In government policy. In fact quita tha reverse! Tha dlssention el thin the government'a own rerfca While this llftt Implies that government la Without any major opportunists Ilka Metanxlma to begin to colleborate closely elth the government In tha hope thet thla tha flguraa actually point to a « marked lncraaaa In datantlona ovar tha last two being forced even deeper Into a crisis situation - yaara. and hence beccming Increasingly insecure - what an economic level the peth was cleared to allow suggest that thla horrifying trand way aall lncraaaa needs to be done is to enalyse the Inter- businessmen to reorganise their enterprises based even furthar In tha futura. relationship between these eight points. Moreover, racant political developments Ooth tha goverreient's Only If la clearly grasped can we eould bring n m w credibility to the bantustan Idea. Second, the affect of the defeet meant that at on the relstlvely sure knowledge that tha mass of acceptance of tha table Commission's proposals to thet Interrelationship tightan up and lntanalfy South Afrlca'a aacurity come to understend the full extent of the current and pliable. legislation, aa wall as ita fevoureble rasponsa crlala facing tha government, which the South Africen economy expanded enormously* tha labour force was now demoralised, disorganised The era of the 1900s wes thus one in During the mid 19T0s, for example. South Afrlca'a to tha Otayn Craw*!salon'a proposal a for furthar raatrlctlona on prass freedras, auggaat that tha H I 8 T P U G A L SACKnnOUND economic growth was the second festest In the futura alll bring alth It avan gras tar rapraaalon In order to do that adaquetely one needs first to Western world. and raatrlctlon of daaioc ratlc rights. go back ?0-odd yaera to tha time of Oharpevllle end encoureged a resurgence of foreign Investment Tha quastlon ahlch naada to ba posad iat ahyT The weakness of bleck labour the mess populer uprising shich wes led by the ANC which hed fled the country en masse In the Iimmediate Why la thara thla marked lncraaaa in tha raatrlctlona end, to a lssasr extant, tha PAC, beneuse that aftansath of Sttarpevl lie, Imposed on tha paopla of thia country? period la a eetershed in South Afrlca'a hlatory. movement defeeted, foreign cepltal flowed back Into I'm aura, many a n s M r a to thla quastlon, but 1 want Mot only was It around that time that the populer the country on en unprecedented scale, moving thla to iaolata shat I think la ona of tha major movement for democratic change was smashed, but also time not only into its tredltlonel haven of mining, Thara ara, Noe elth tha man a •A R e s t i t u t e s for unions, the n ee union m o v w e n t nonetheless continued to grow through the mldseventles. repression. the southern Afrlcen region as a whole. departure from e erller goverrmewit th|r*|ng and The end of c o l o n t a l l M In Ifcicemhtque end Angola, together fhen, In 1*?70, tensions a«*o*xj the bleck studen^ T This represented e significant fro* the political changes ehlch wore occurring In elth the collapse of IDI in Zimbabwe, not only therefore we need to esk ehy It occurred. A crucial point to lake eccount of here Is end sr.honl community reached breaking point, provided the guerilla movrment elth new end the growing technlcel sophistication an d monopoly culminating In the massive Downto revolt which sympethetlc bsses frrat ehlch to operate, but also character of Rrejth Afrlcen Industry. rsptdly assumed nationwide proportions. encouraged the f 1o w e r 1ng of bleck netlonelism el thin workers now occupying Increesirgly Important Again, the With bleck stats resorted to the trled-end-trusted method of (louth Africa. repression to q u e l 1 the revolt, end humlreds of its cempelgn egalnst Bouth Africa in Namibia. bleck children lpst their lives ehlls their Oespita the lncraasa of mllltery activity against the country, the extent of their power In Industry orfjsnl set Ions were banned. W W * 0 (and the Angolen g r r v e m w m t ), end despite hed grown ertoraousl y . the sttsmpt to undermine W A T O ’s Internal sippnrt these workers hed rejected the fonaal systai of Although the Initial c euse of the uprising eas a rejection of bentu At the same time, RWATO stepped up skilled and soml-*fcllled positions In more mochonlsnd end much larger fectorles throughout Once It became clear that education, there can b e little doubt that the thraflh lha ereatlan of tbs OTA, It eas nleer to enrks end l l s l s m riamalttees, many sublayers - political mnmentiM shll'H h ed begun elth HAttt In most observer* that South Africa could not eln tha particularly those In lerge corporetlons - began to negotlets with trade unions ss the mnst the late 15G0s h ed no e produr.ed en explosion of guerilla ear lo Namibia (though they did not seem anger against the eystam of epertheld as a ehole. likely to lose it elther)i W hile the student forces sought to rally their ever supplsnt GWAPO ss the most populsr political promote cc^munication end stebllity elth the black work force. nor could tha OTA representative mouthpiece of workwrs to try end parents end workers to their side, seeking to organlsatioo in the c m e t r y . develop e mess m n v s m n t for democratic reforms received further confirmation In the pest few days ertKjnd the slogan of black consciousness, the other as ths South African government hes made pleln its need to devel r*i new forms of control that were side of this coin aes the increasing mass rejection Strategy of withdrawing stoport frcai tha OTA). more cre^eitlble elth the conditions of modern (This point hes by blacks of the g overnment's bentustan solution. In other words, both l n t s m a l l y add in its The state thus found Itself in an unenvisble foreign p olicy the South African g n v e m m a n t eas position! faced elth a growing black political The ke y point here la that menagement was beginning to cnee to terms with the mechenloed production, forms of direct - end inevitably, racial - o|iprsas!on on the shr*> flnnr, seen to b e floundering and folloelng policies as eell as tha more pet erne 11st In approac h whldi shlch were not only bar* nipt but were ectuelly hed characterised small scale Industrial eerly 1900s, to smesh these forces through leeding to en escalation of various forms of production, eere no longer crvspetlble elth the repression shlle er.r.sl era ting the bentustan policy, hostllitlss against them. movement the state sought, as It hsd done in the requirements of modern mechonlsed factories ttoeever, though it aes relatively successful if) deploying hundreds end often thousands of black smsshlng the democratic forces of the bleck l * i o w ncrtrm workers In relatively fftlllsd positions. conscloueness movement, its oen bentustan policy However, there sas one sphere In shlch the government were noe be^ng seen by a section' of aes greeted eith mess rejection end the dsewind did attsmpt to promote certain reforms - end thet menegement - albeit reluctently - es the most for i n t e m e l democratic reforms reesserted itself. wis in labour, appropriate m e n s through ehlch c remain 1cat ton elth Faced with the state's intransigence on this issue, recommended the legalisation and registration of the work force could b e malntelnnd end. If possible many young blacks began to leave the country, trade unions for efrlcan workers - a unique develop throt^jh which conflict could be institutionalised m even everted. tlera the liehehn Cremlsslon thus fuelling the rar*s of the externally-besed ment in South Africa's history, guerllls movement and, suhswouwnt1y , leeding to concession represented a significant victory for a n escalation in armed conflict. afrlcan workers, It is equelly true that the ala of Nor ees this the only outcome of the state's intransigence! meny Wills this Trade uni Ikit If employers - particularly the lerger employers - eere rmw less sfreld of negntletlnft this reform ees to try end co-opt the leederehlp elth bleck eorkera and their unions, white workwrs of those blocks eho remained inslds South Africa of the bleck trade union movement end to b r e * the were much less sure of the elsdna of this e p p m a c h . ednptad en increasingly militant stance against power of the rar* end file on the shop floor. Out Sr^e, like Arrle Paulus of the Mine Workers* Iblai, the steta, fuelling e growing politlcisetlon among whet is Important here Is thet for the first time the bleck messes. the government sought to echleve Its elms lergely Indication thet the stete ees gredually elthdrewlr^j through co-opt Ion rether then solsly through the privileges ehlch had previnusly bean sffordnd Out these processes received tremendous support see the legalisation of black unions ss a claer Industrial reletlons In industry. On the other hand, th«si restrictions on union activity have fallad to .quail tha faars of thosa in tha white community, be edaltted to the President's Council. Undeniably, actually offer those groups thet the governmen t such a reform, If it were to be seriously Implemented, , hopes to eln over. would lndicete a further shift in government course offer both the coloured and Indian F o r m a l l y , the reforms do of* and a s p K l a l l y among «hlte workers, *#io faal that thirfclng - but It is fer from fundamentel. tha legel recognition of blank unions la a raclpa Coloured end lndlen cammunltlee have el ways bewn In system! e sort of pnllticei limbo end bringing tham into the three reclelly separate chambers that el 11 be for long-term political disaster In 8outh Africa. Tha government's lettpur .roform strategy thus The communities eccess to the new parilamentary they will have rwpresentetIon |n two of the P resident's Council Is not e fundamental creeted under the new system (the third will of flnda itaelf caught b etween conflicting pressures, devletlon fro* government policy. course.be occupied by whites). and unable for tha moment- to satisfy either side - opening the irtilte leager a bit to absorb whet the represented on the new President's Council which It Is simply They eill elso be government hopes will be useful elites in the will consist of 35 elected representetlves, of whom el thin which union organisation can coneolldate end. struggle egelnst the major threat to government ten eill be coloured, five lndlen, end expand. powwr - the africen penple. They will also be represented on the electoral ‘ yet providing the all-important political space It la impoaslbla that the future course of unionisation In this nnuntry ell I he asmnth nr In nther aorrte, these an-railart refnims era 2D shite. rnllega irtilrh eill alert the President (the snllaga vary fat- i-emnvsrt r*n* tha H»*4 nf h h I I M *-*1 fctangM all I fcHHslllt nf W which ara necassary If Booth Africa is to avoid an Indiana). end aa the recession Intensifies, these attitudes inevitable drift towards Increasing conflict and ceblnet end since there eill be no fixed raclel will spreed to employers in other porta of tha social Instability. Bo whwre does that leave the composition In that body, coloured end Indian country. government end PW Botha In pertlcular? parsons mmy well be msmhers of a futura South M V « A 11 M o r a l« • elmtr M u h ^ h I m # h» attltudea among employers In the e e s t e m Cape But It ts; equally Impossible thet after It leaves allII as, t>*\ fenlnuretf* a>«f Since the President eill eppolnt the the gains that have'been mad* so fer, the process him making tentetlve moves towards minor reforms - African government. of unionisation can now ba stoppad without dlra towards broadening the base of his laager - in cleerly is en advance on the eslstlng situation Thus, in formel terms, there costs for tha future of industry end for soclel the hope that this e l 11 eln hi m more aupport in terms of drawing coloureds end lndlens into the end economic atablity aa a rfralt. among the white opposition, the business community, nee decision-making machinery. coloured end Indian groups and, of course - end lmportently - the l n t e m a t l o n e l community. The important changee in the field of black labour hopes in this way to strwngthen his polltlcel base have not, however, been mirrored in the sphere of end eln support for his bid to Impose e bantustan- thet «^lte, coloured end lndlen chambers will play political rights for blacke. llke structure on South Africa, la to deny efrlcans a dual rolo. any meaningful political rights In Booth Africa. ■letters shlch the President decrees ere of Interest In this lattar area we have heard much grand talk of ’power whoring*, Me But what real powwr will these formel changes POLITIC*. REFORM ectuelly confer? In terms of representetlon in the new chambers of peri lament it should be noted Thay will dwllberete partly on but as yat little of aubstanr.a thet one cen point to Yat even this tentative bid to broaden his power beae to their communities only - end in this sense the which suggests real change. has cost him a aifeeble amo«»nt of support emong the coloured end lndlen chambers will probably In fact, g o v e r n m e n t s reluctence to eccept the full findings of the extreme right wing, thrwatenlng to turn him into da Lange Commission on education, and lte e pariah among the Afrlkeoers. uncompromising rejection of the Buthelezl unsure precisely h ow fer to go, while bleck Commission Tlndlngs, coupled with its enthusiasm opposition against him continues to mount. for the findings of the Bteyn end t able Commissions, suggests the very reveraet a rejection of reform end a'tightening up of polltlcel repression. Yet, 80 he wavers, But what reel chence is there that the present emerge es no more than glorified versions of the present CHC and SAIC. However, where e matter is decreed by the President to be of mutual concern to ell three reciel groups (one wonders which matters won't have such relevence?), it will be debated In political reforms will succeed in widening govern ell three chembers and if there is dlsegrwexient ment's social base of aupport? among the chambers the awtter will bw rsferrwd to This is a question o n the other hand, we have the undenleble feet thet ehich should not be dismissed before it has been the President's Council. PW Botha finally threw down the gauntlat to his seriously considered, since the National Party ln-built majority elth ?0 elected mamhers es fer right wing end cast them out of the Netlonel at leest sewms to see these reforms es having a opposed to e combined strength of 13 for coloureds Perty. good chance of succeeding. end lndlens. Vet whet is the ostensible Issue over irtilch this split occurred? It is the terms over which so-celled coloured and Indian p eople should f Perhaps the piece to stert in answering this question Is to ask whet new powers these reforms Here the ahltee have an But will it not be possible for some of the whites In the Council, say those «*>o ere members of the PFP, to lir* up with the coloured CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AffFW lh« 10B1 genera I elect Ion revealed a rightward awing dlaquletlng to th» government, on* newspaper commentator auggested that It should dlaaolve the electorate and choose another. •uggeatIon was made In Jaat. At the time, the Whan the official propoaala for a new e o n a t H u t t o n wara releeaed thla year, however, it aeemed aa If It had been taken all to# literally. doubt that they are a fraud, Intendrd to postpone Co«m»lssion, which pondered It fur two year*, only In the democrat Isat Ion of South African society, but they atrategy of domination which haa been followed In South Africa aver elnre Union, constItuttonal they repreaent an tha Mounting popular ehallengee to the South composition of capital, have led tha dominant clasaea to seek new alllancea and pollclaa to promote their intereata, while clasaaa formerly allied to them atruggla for a return to old atrataglaa. Tha proceaa of reatructuring la already well underway In a number of area*, auch aa labour and education. Thla year, tha reatructurlng of tha political aystem began, aa attempt ta enlarge and ra-eaat class alllancea which IOHO, following the abnlltlon of the Senate, as form the dominant bloc in South Afrlean'aoclety, official, anil t l-rac la I advisory body on political and replacing lower-claae whites with aupport from aegmenta of the coloured and Indian conammltles. economic affalra. It la Tba proppaa 1a , aa framed by tha Conatltutlonal President chosen by wbltaa, a trl-cameral parliament Progr*sslv* federal Party, and by virtually all th* tnttlativ* la likely to auccsad, along with Its probable mov*m*nta with any Influanca among coloured* and Indiana. eonaequenees, and to weigh up tha Impllcatlona for A majority of Ita *14 members wera consequently whit# flemoeral tr political movement a, awppnrlera af |h* Natlanal Party, th* hope of atlmulatlng further throught and debate. After recapping the origina and highlights of th* constitutional to t*»a afrlcan majority. Liberal commentatora have pralaed tba propoaala aa a breach In tha political colour bar, and ana* fngllab-language newepapera bave Joined tbelr Afrikaans counterparta In campaigning vlgoroualy for tbalr acceptance. Crltlea bave focuaaed on tba aatremely cIrcumacrIbed nature of lb* •power-aharlng' propoaed and tba aicluaion of afrleane, along with inat1tutiona 1 laauea auch aa tha Preetdent'a propoaed powera. While auch an approach may be adequate for purpoaea of public propaganda. It la no euhatltute for The coloured and Indian minority waa comprised largely of figures plucked from obscurity, auch aa the Port Elltabeth social worker, and a few reliable whe*lhor**s from th* smong whites, and th* National Party'e reaponse. established coloured and Indian political machinery. The dlacussion of coloured and Indian polltlca which followa Other membera Included crypto-Nate fro* the New Republic augqeats that the new deal repreeenta a bid to capture Party, a renegade e«-Prog, a coloured trad* unionist from tha aupport of petty bourgeois leaders and thslr followers, th* conservative Trade Union Council of SA, and a right- and that It la likely to prove attractive to som# of them. wing political eclentlat with curious oversees The conclusion preaenta some of the tactical optiona In connection*, from its membership, it was difficult to escape the impression It had been set up to produce a Interested in aatabllahlng a genuinely democratic aociaty political and Intellectual figleaf to cover the NT'a In South Africa. political designs. CONTENTS Of Ttlg PffQTQSALB the timing of it* report. According to press accounts, The subservience of the council waa ahown even In T>f€ EXPLOSION of anger In South Afrlca'a black communltlsa ruling party that soma aort of political change was necessary. the council originally Intended bringing national conatltutlonal proposala out only In 1903 or 19«4, with at most a report on local government this year. Tha Initial response of SJ Vorster's government was an It promised to provide both In th* first half of 19S?, unwleIdly acheme, produced In igff, for three aeparat* only after being called eharpty to order by Chrte Heunla, parilamenta for colourada, whltea and Indiana, each with tha Mlnlatvr with r**ponsiblI Ity for eonatltuttonal tbalr own Prime Mlnlatar and cabinet, revision. Each would have had full leglalattve authority over their 'own* mattera, while a consultative council of cablneta would have operated undsr an aaecutive President to decide 'Joint' issues. This Impression waa confirmed when the propoaala of the Council's ConatI tut Inna I Committee were releaaed thla May. The main points included! - The creation of a single legislature to represent Rejection of this acheme, which would have left control of the non-reaerva araaa overwhelmingly In white hande, waa ao unanlmoua that the government waa forced Into a rethink. * Including a r«llsetl«m of out-to-pasture politicians, buelneesmon, and technocrat plsns, It considers the intenslficatlon or class struggle Including wbltaa, coloured! and Indiana, and th* continuing denial of any aay In tha can'-.ral government Recause It d e l u d e d afrlcan*. It waa boycotted by the white official opposition, th* Committee of tba President's Council and detailed by tba government, provide for a dominant executive an conaequently Important to aaseaa tha degree to which thla tha ruling party proposed a new eonat1tut Ion and under went a aevara split. Issue still further. tha President’s Council IPCI was ealabllahed In thla paper will attempt to address these laauea, In African atata, along with th* changing naeda and recomm end th* creation of a P resident’s Council, as envlaaged In John V orster’s plan, to consldef th* The Issue was handed to th* Schlsbusch whites, coloureds and Indiana, with afrlcan* still voteless. - Tranafsr of authority to an indirectly-elected executive Treaident, with power to appoint a Afrlkaana press (Charney, 1001(3-0). Ihus, even before the Coneervetlve Perty break-awiy, the National Party bad loat the support of a large proportion - If not the majority - of the groups which even among thoee who did Identify with the NP, fewer Party can no longer be certain of winning either a than one-third eald they did eo strongly. majority of the electorate or a majority of aeata in After the Coneervetlve Party broke off from the NP In February, oppoalng PW Botha*a acceptance of a parliamentary election. The fate of Dirk Mudge In Namibia who deetroyed hie boa* among whltee through *jt»ealthy power-aharing*, President's Council style, aa reforme without gaining popularity among blecke, la AfrIkaane-epeekl«g worker*, f a n w r a , and elvll servants, part of NP policy, the defeat lone bereme even more before their eyee. especially In the Traneveel end the O range Free State* menacing. political eettlement In Namibia, the government la likely Ana 1ye la of a poll taken by the Star newepoper-'ln electorate elumped from Ite M X three election to 44 X In two polle taken In April, 1002 eonetltuenclee ehowed that UNr eupport wae heavily concentrated among these group*. It aleo euggeeted that many NP vetera thought like MNP aupportere, but remained bound to their old perty home only by fraying emotional tlea (Charney, 1Q01|10, ’ 10 1. Netlonal Party eupport emong the white level In the 1001 (Rapport, 02.09.02) 8und*y tribune, 02.09.02). Rapport poll found the CP and W to loee another chunk of lta aupportere.) Nevertheleee, the Natlonallate still wleh to evold the logical alternetlve, an alliance with the leading the Netlonallate among Afrlkanere In the PTP. freneveal, to prejudlcee, eoclallead ever Ihe deeedea Thla conelualon wee dramatically confirmed A new eet of political alllencee le clearly celled for. The together to be (Indeed, If It egreee to a Much of their reluctence cen be attributed Into Craig C h a m e y enmmentedi In the Aanelatan district by-election In Auguet, The government'e timid move* toward* reform - along with lta hlnte of othere to' follow - have threatened the fragile proeperlty of thoee blue collar whltee end emallholdera. A freer labour aiarket and better black training would erode the Infleted wage* of the white labour arletocrecy. Many wage-earning whltee eee real wagee felling already. Ae Inflation aprlnta ahead white employere hold back on their Increaeee to pueh up bleck'o breadline wagee. 9"*al 1 fermere, threatened with being driven off the land, are worried about malia price lncreacea and government policies which Increaelngly favour the big fermere. where the combined right-wing vote wae comfortably accept the need for epeclflc eoclel end economic reforme aheed of the Nat Iona 11st'e ecore In a prevlouely which will give blecke etreteglc poeltlone In the economy, All theae groupa are bound together by the rigid racism often found among those directly In the path-of black advance. It le thue no email wonder thet mlnere and tleket-taker* and many othera who k"nw they owe their livelihood to tb# colour of their eklne are drawn by the W P ' e promise to go beck to Verwoertf. (Ibid, 0, 12) Among more affluent Afrlkanere, on the other hand, rock-solId Natlonallet eeat. In the wake of Qermlston district, hardly a Nat eeat In the Tranavaal could be coneldered ’safe'. The Coneervetlve eplit coat the •11 elaaeea of Afrtkaane-apeakere. Ivan though they the Afrlkener bourgeolele and polltlcel elite romelne • convinced thet giving them equivalent polltlcel responsibilities will leed to cheoe (Management, Important Oct 1002(311.* Of course, ouch prejudlcee could be elemente of eupport on the middle reeehee of the eoclal u n l e e m e d If they were perceived to clash with their ecale. holdere* There were major defections emong elemente of the petty bourgeolelet rural notablee, farmers (especially In the Tranavaal and free State mai>e regions), churchmen, lntellectuele, mid-ranktng civil eervente, etc. The CP eucceee In rallying the Intercuts. However, at present the verllgto NatienAIItto have emberked on e different etrategy to ehore up their perty'e eegglng fortunee. They prefer to try to •In beck a aubetentlal ahare of the Afrlkener forming petty bourgeole elemente tradlttonally eo lmportent and arorklng claee elemente, rether then converting to the NP In the north wae reflected In preee reporte PfP eupportera, in accord with a polltlcel and economic euggestlng It wae winning the etruggle for domlnence approach svhlch dlffera sharply from that of the Progs. In the Broederbond, the key network for Ideological While liberal thinking, like that of the Progreaelvee, alme at creetlng ■ polltlcel end economic eyetem patience wae wearing thin with the elow pace of reform. organleatton. O f profeeelonal, eupervleory, end mlddle-to-upper forming groupa aolldlfled the antl-NP trends among accommodating enough to co-opt aaplrant bourgeole management Afrlkanere In the 8tar poll, aome ?4\ thoee lower down the eoclel ecale. elemente from ell recee, thu* defusing the threat supported the PfP, against Juet W of their lower-claeo counterparta I Ibid, 101. Political changee were alao underway among In turn, lta success among theae opinion- Now, the NP etrongeet eupport comes from the urben by the Aflcen Netlonal Congreae, the verllgtee •re merely eeeklng to acquire eome block elllee for a fural bourgeoisie. civil wer egelnet the ANC. It le alao supported by eegmente Engl 1ah-apeakIng whltee, after the eld United Perty of the Intelllgentela, and the better-educeted, more dlelntegrated under the laehlng of the erlele. While posed Afrlkeene-epeaklng bourgeoisie and profeeelone, with the Compared to liberal atrotegy, the verllgto echeme Imp!lee much leee redletrlbutIon eecure pert of the urben petty bourgeolale, particularly and much more control (on both block end white oldeel. the better-off arere draw* to the PfP, the lower-cleoo In the private aector. Qlven theee Ideological differences, despite the material began to vote predomlnently Nationalist (Ibid, 101. •killed workforce, and lta fngliah workIng-claee convergencee. It le thue not too ourprlelng that a M* It aleo eppeared, however, that the w o r k l n g - d a e e supporter* though theee groups ere looking decidedly MP hee said that hie perty 'would only conelder a fickle. coalition with the Prog* oe a laet desperate meeeure fngliah vote waa 'up for grebe' on the right 1 40* of thla group had no regular party Identlfleatlon, and It aleo retelne part of the All thle adde up to one c o n c l u e l o m the Natlonel before bowing out* (Ibid). — — — I rnnwMin11 y (Star, 03.11.81). 1 M#*t other Indian townships, lived through the heartbreak of earlier crackdowne, and to a rapidly Increaelng need for supervisory manpower in the yeare ahead, and the aoe*ewhat better educational and at least In thi Tranevaal, have similar 'kingpin* refuaed to be Intimidated by their eldere* feare. flguree, while In Natal, th« patty bourgeois Pefona 19f3, the Netal Indian Congreae waa rebofn, while Tarty ueed the Local Affaire Commltteea and the nominated coloured youth pertlclpated vigorously In the 1970 (compared to afrlcana) make them the moat obvious SAIC aa Ita power baae. uprisings In the Cape. c candldatee. A variety of Indlcatlone show that theae institution* In eoclal backgrounds enjoyed by coloureds and Indiana By the early 1970a, the capacity ofrthe system to Achieving the g o v e r n m e n t s objectlvea, furthermore, never really afforded their members a popular base in the contain popular dlacontent In the coloured and Indian does not require unanlmoue er even necaeaarlly majority Indian community. ceesnunltlea was aleo In decline. aupport among the coloured and Indian populatlona. Their Inability to moblllae more than 10% to ?0* of the population to vote In LAC and The moat Important etreem of patronage, housing, wae drying up, aa the tiny A recent review of aurvey data auggeata * make dlvlde-and-rule work, and encourage a flow of SAIC electlone In .recent yeare la Indicative of their limited aupport. The aupport of an Influential minority would be eofflclent to up. volunteera to Join the army, while the ahlfta in labour The burgeoning ehortagee of housing, achool facllltlea, and amenttlee aleo helped make many reeldente demand will appear more the coneequence of market forcea In favour of grouplnga working 'within the ayatem' (Peat Intensely angry. than af afflclal policy, Nslil, tflifMlfHMl Ita* that no more than theae small proport Iona are preeently A n |HH(| M HR RHS ft||al8«t| 8RM Repression alone c ould1not hold the fetflR Is »paak m il , fhHii«h tha fm rufcm The position waa slightly different In the coloured fhl o h H l s M l a 8f tfcf tplatfMi* a«d Indiana la not ont not only la It not necessary, it them, however, their rickety atructurea sufficed. la alao too eapenelve, given the limited reaourcea coloured comawnlty. available for redlstrlbutIon In terme of National areaa, where the coloured Labour Party haa occupied an especially among the young, aa the massive support for Parly thinking. leadera, It haa preaented Itself ee 'anti-apartheid*, the 1980 eohool and unlveralty boycotta ehowed. running In the tens of thousands, and equallelng and it haa enjoyed a significant measure of popularity. theae boycotta, coevnunlty organleatlone began to grow educational e*P«ndlturea, while coping with new demand, It won clear majorltlea of the vote In the Coloured rapidly In the Cape Town and Durban townahlps, pressing would preaent enormous costa, to aay nothing of attacking Persona PepreaentatIva clalme on local authorltlee and giving reeldenta an ether areaa of aoclal Inequality. awareneaa of their own power, of unlveraal call-up for coloured end Indian youth would ambivalent position. Deaptte Ita petty bourgeole Council electlone of 1089 and 1973, on turnoute of 49* and 46* respectively. Ita following their Impreaelve capacity Eliminating housing waiting llate Llkewlee, the Impoeltlon Intranalgent refusal to allow the Council to operate for popular eiobl 1 iaatIon was revealed In the 1981 anti- overetraln the training facllltlee and budget of a smoothly eventually led the government to abolish the SAIC campaign, which helped produce a 90* ateyesray in the military establishment already et Ita llmlta, to aay toothleee body, although the coup de grace came at a tls*e SAIC electlone. nothing of the loyalties of the young awn themselves. when other waye to Incorporate coloureda were already O n the part of the government, there haa been a (In Zimhab«e, the leiposltlon of a call-up for educeted blacke by the Mutorewa regime merely drove many of them under conelderatlon. However, at the local level, the Labour Party waa outmoded, and an atteeipt Instead to win eome degree of 81nce 1978, Into 7ANLA Instead: see Frederlkee, 198?i?33.) Nevertheless, the new processee will probably produce difficult to dlatlnguleh from Ita Indian counterparta, acquiescence from colourede and Indiana. eacept in Ita eomewhat greater political aklll and maee the authorltlee have been aware of the growing threat some difference* In political outcoeiea, which are likely support. poaed by the ANC, and they dread an alliance which to enable the government to bid for support among the In the coloured townehlpa, and It used their patronage would unite eoloureds and Indiana with revolutlonary better-off strata of the coloured and Indian .... unit lea. powere (elong with thoee of the Coloured PepreaentatIve afrlcsn natIona Ilata., Convereely, they are painfully There will ba a eerles of forums where blacks discuss Council) to eetablleh a power baee. aware of the limited defenelve manpower available from lssuek with whltee, euch aa the Joint coweeltteee and a population of 9 - m whites, and they aeek to augeient the President's Council, which will probably help blunt It took hold of the Management Co*** It tees In the proceee, it earned the same eort of criticism from within the community aa the PP had done. These etructuree of co-optation and control began to the ranka with 3-m coloureda and Indiana. (The draft call-up bill prepared by the Mlnlatry of Defence laat • some of the racist crudities traditionally associated with the National Party. Moreover, while the ultimate control will remain In white hands. Its eaerclae will break down aa the wounda of the 1950a and 1980a healed. be tee*pered by the need not to force the coloured and With time, the new communltlea began to develop a coloured men, but was shelved until they had bean aenaa of Identity, aa people grew uaed to the new granted 'political righte' of some sort.) reaidentlal patterns. ‘As these sentiments emerged, alao importent economic consideratIons« projections by collapse. so too did a new generation of young people, who had not the National Manpower Commission and other bodies point probably allow was U l u s t r s t e d by the r e c o w n d i t l o n There are Indian representatIves to quit, making the whole etructure The sort of depsrturee euch a set-up will the electlone and demonstrate that they do not enjoy powerfully, the new proposals could not function if supremacy, whether the aeata won are ultimately assumed conaent were merely orchestrated rather than fraaly •r nst. given on the part of co-opted elements. writ Thue there wilt Democrats alao need to consider w hether (here le In trying to wake the operation of the aystee. he InstItutlonel opportunities for the expression of Impossible, aa the Labour Party did with the CTC, and reaction to the new dlspenaatIon, Whether It might be helpful to have spokesmen In In the form of election* for the new parliament and poeelbly referendiime on the parliament with the le***unltlee against banning and new institutions themaelvee. detention which auch positions would imply. There will aleo necessarily sources Charney, C - 'Towards Rupture or Steals! An Analysis' of igni the 10R1 South Afrlcsn Oeneral fleet Ion' (unpublished paper, African Rtudlea Seminar, University of the Wltwatererand). Charney, C - 'The wooing of big business' ion? October. frederlkae, J - None but Ourselveai Masses va siedla In 100? the making of Zimbabwe (Ravan, Johannesburg). be a greater tolernnce of overt, peaceful political opposition to thoae participating In these Institutions, I participation In the new national political etructuree, aa complete elimination of the opposition would render building strong and effective Coweeunity organisations In them useless as devices for building support. the black communities remains an eeaentlal priority. This sttitude waa already reflected by the fact in Management, O'Meara, 0 - 'Muldergate and the polltlca of Af 1002 Nationalism', In WIP 22 (Supplement). Theee will be easentlal If the attempts at eowing division that the authorities permitted the » n t l - R M C campaign, despite ite open support for the freedom Charter, While At the eeme time, the new local authority echemee may *0*1* bannlnge and detentions followed tbe campaign, create new openings for gains by community organisations. merely allowing auch a campaign to take place would The blggeet problem of the new institutions will be their have been unthinkable a decade ego, and would probably ability to 'deliver the goods', which will alwaye be have led to major proaecutlons. reatrlcted by the need to limit the aacrlflcea asked However, doing eo In the context of the 8AIC election cempaign would have rendered of srhltes* the electlone an obvioue farce. authorltlee will probably be more susceptible to preseure Tbeae changes in the pnlltleal climate associated possibilities for struggle, which must be debated on the If a referendum la held on the new prcposale, It may be wiser to campelgn for • 'no' vote then to call for a boycott. 8ueh s ’ S A R S P U B L IC A T IO N S (including Work In Progrots) At the same time, however, the new local The Southern African Reseetch Service fSARSI keeps you le much with torrent political end economic hentk SARS puWlrslinni contain cn*e*ee» end ansiyiii af resettlement, henh»ilam, wroth Inf cists ectio*\ state ilretefies, trad* unions, ttilkes, political wish end detention. from community bodies, Since they will contain blacks with the Introduction of the new dispensation ereate new basis of tactics rather than prlnclplee. SOUTHERN AFRICAN R E S E A R C H SE R V I C E , themeelves. ,' • # ” Your suhtcrlptlon to SARS publications entitles you le sN 'editions of: • Work In Process • ThS Informetton fnWlatb s series • Information (hast* The consequence la that'co*w»unlty organlsat ions should be sble to esact a series of gains for their residents by keeping up the pressure on the new Institutions, while st the same time discrediting them campaign could put a spanner In the works. If the by continually revealing their limitations. proposals were rejected by one or both of the black can be pitched alwaye one etep furthen khan the authorities comwiunltlee concerned. are ready to go. A response to electlone for the new chamber must Their demands In this race for popularity, thoae like a runner chained to an Iron ballt the ball of white partlclpatee, and the alternatives which appear the «oet resistance. effective. ' participation, and a 'boycott ticket* which rune to atart of a new political era for both the dominant groupa demonstrate support but realgns If It wins sny aeata. and the democratic opposition In BA, In which (Such a boycott ticket waa uaed by the ANC in electlone opportunltlee for legal, peaceful political activity which for the Native Representative have been abeent for two decadee are likely to re-emerge. If only the discredited conservatlvea participate, The Implleatlone need to receive wide debate and a a boycott may be •'.he most useful way to demonetrate creative response. solidarity In opposition. dangere, but they will alao create new poeslbllltlea. (Or would a boycott ticket be more useful for lte disruptive ability?) If PFP-type groupa conteat the election. It may be wleer to conteet i R 7JM RIk.00 Rjo.o* For reduced rate* on bulk ordrrs and group dWtr lt»i*o*v and for rates outilde South Africa contact Theee Include an outright boycott, outright Council In the 1040a.) R A TES (or tooth African w bto h en (8 publication*) Individual*. Wade « D o n or subscriptions who chooae to participate 'within the system* will be be baaed on the confIguration of political forcee which SARS also beeps subscriber* Informed about other m » tlonel puMlcatlon* end new HtWt In the SARS dissertation serial The new lnetltutlone will pose new • ARf P O Rea tS1?4 >14] Yeosllte Booth Africa IMtpl 1/ Other struggles In urban blank cnmmunltles ravnlvml light the realignment of clans forces end Interests around rising rents, housing, bus fa<cs end education. • 1 th|n the ruling National party. Tha restructuring of capital, combined with B o t h Moss and O'Meara have emphasised the reconstitution of the Intensified class and popular struggles lad to class alliance that had formed the basis of NP pressures for changes ehich had become necessary rule since 19<18. to secure the domestic stebillty vital for gradually lost its position in that ruling alliance. economic growth. 'Reformists’ highlighted tha The ehlte wording cless has Its mmtoers heve decreased as ehlta workers hove need to ease restrictions on the mobility, training moved into supervisory positions. end employment of afrlcan labour, and to reorganise small egrIcultural Interests heve also lost nut In the procedures for collective bargaining, tha ruling group a s monopoly Interests begin to they also Under-capltelIsed, argued that It aes necessary to create tha condition* dominate the leadership pf the NP| for the development of a black petty bourgeoisie or Increasingly berimes a bourgeois political middle H a s t , RRfiy r e p r e s e n t ! ^ fspltellst Interest*. But tha raformist or m s true luring Initiatives the party Afrikaner business interests have pressed for of the Botha government do not only hove their c h a n g e s , especlelly through the mouthpiece of origins in the changing demands of capitalist the Haodelslostituut. production, coupled elth intensifying olass tendencies within the NP heve shaken the long- struggle end resistance. Btending class elllance *iich bound the party Another important factor Involves the rising dominance of tha military, end These reformist together, end heve resulted In the rupture this is tha area that can no* b e examined. ehlch led to tha format ion of the Conservative Party. THE RISE (F THE MILITARY IN SOUTH ATRICA After the debecle of the 1973 Angole The ear in Namibia has Intensified over the pest decade. Invasion, and the 1970 revolts, the reformist positions of There is presently en occupation force the leadership of the BA0T end powerful cepltallst of the order of 00 000 South African troops in 4 Namibia. Tha military has rapidly become over alliance. extended in its present form. Angolan Invasion highlighted the need for restructur Interests began to develop into an over-closer The protracted end ever-escalating guerilla eer in Namibia has The defeat of South African forces in the ing el thin the BARF itself. highlighted its essentially political oature. , It was reelIsed that psychological , wconranlc, politico), sociological, technological, diplomatic. Ideological, cultural, etc. Re ere today Involved in a war....The striving for specific aims...must he co-ordinated elth ell the moons evelleble to the state.® The co-ordination of this strategy seems to be undertaken b y the State Security Council ehlch eis established in 1977. on a uniried bests; It alms to co-ordinate action It functions to advise the government regent Ing the formulation of national pollry and strategy |n connection elth the security nf the Republic, the wanner In ehlih this pulley must he carried out, end a policy In n v h a t any particular threat against the serurlty pf the R e p uhl|c,,,, fhe aspects «f national security ehleh require attention are the following: - Political action - Ml 1itary/pora-ml11tary action - Economic action - Psychological action - Scientific and technological action - Religious-cultural action - Manpower services - Intelligence services - Security services - National supplies, reso'ircee and production - Transportation and distribution services - financial services - Community services g - Tele-ccmmunlcetlon services Tha shift in defence stretegy to include political and ideological strategies marks the beginning of the rapid militarisation of 8outh African society. Re can no w e xomlne srw*w of tha arees in which militarisation has occurred, for convenience sake, defence technology needed to b e Improved, end the In response, political end ideologlcel stretegies these have been brdten down into economic, political hiring of mllltery technicians from other countries simed et 'winning the h earts and minds of the and ideological levels of society. was stepped up. people' heve been sought by the military. With In 1977, the cell up for shite males wes tha increase In pnpuler resistance In South Africa, extended from one to two yeera to meet the BAOf's the R A W hes increasingly engaged in opanly growing personnel needs. political end ideologlcel activities. They heve In thla year, the MILITARISATION AT TIC POLITIC *. LEVEL In the eree of g o v ernment, the ceblnet end etete bureeucrecy heve been reorganised since PW Rotha - restructuring of Defence policy was expressed In a long-time minister of defence - tot* office as eanvessed for state policies eMr.h are 'militarily a ehite paper es e 'tote! strategy' to oomhet the prime minister. defensible', particularly since PW Botha took office 'total ear' against South Africa. the office of the prime minister, es prime minister. The openly political role of the m ilitary hes, however, brought it into conflict with other state apparatuses w h U h have tradltlonally adopted repressive strategies in periods of crisis. The restructuring of the economy end the struggles of the domlneted classes have brought to Tha process of ensuring end melntainlng the sovereignty of e state's authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from e purely mllltery to en lntegreted notional action. Tha resolution or e conflict In the times in shlch we now live demands Interdrpendent end co ordinated action in all fields - military, This hes concentrated power In St* ceblnet committees heve been entebl I *»hed ehlch ere responsible to neither periloment nor the NP caucus. Each is heeded by the prime minister or h i s nominee, covering the folloelng ereasi Internal affairs, social effelre, economic end financial affairs. These committees ere not only ctmiposed of * C a p rlv l s t r i p . Council called on all states tn stop supplyl»xj anas • South African f o r T M ere ell aged to be training to South Africa. 5 00 0 farmer nhodeslan auxllltarlea In tha Germeny, Italy and larael continued to si*iply d o one of two thinga through special programmea. South Africa elth arms. Flratly, It ittiapts to encourage a mllitarlatlc northern Transvaal. Denials of th|* Hava been However, the IK, USA, Franca, Anticipating an arms M tLlTAH IflA M O N AT AN ID C.H.0DICAL L tV IL At tha level of Ideology, ml 1itarlaetlon alma to weakened by tha racant entry of South African tralnad embargo, South Africa began to develop en erms ax Ohodealana Into Zimbabwe, and tha aubsequent lnduatry by manufacturing ammunition in 1961. the same time appearing aa a threet to the dominated engagement between thla group and Zimbabwean In 1964, eith the eselatance of prlvete lnduatry, classes. forces. the Armomenta Ooerd and the Armaments Development programmes I • consciousness emong the dominant clasaaa while at Thla takea place through the followlr^j Tha Laaotho Llbaratlon Army (LLA) la ellegedly end Production Corporation were established. supported an d ermed by South Africa. 1977, the Armaments Development end Production Act progremmes, veld schools)! undertaken aaaaaalnatlona and othar attacks lnalda combined both of these b odies into one - the The Civil Defence programmes: Laaotho. Armaments Corporation (AOMSCOO). The Increase use of armian in active roles or In It haa /• South African authorltlaa, Including the SAOF, repeatedly deny thane allegations, Tha admitted In . AHVSCOn conalata of nine natlnnaliaed • The schooling system (cedets, youth preparadneaa auppnrt o rgan1 sat Iona, manufacturing suhaldlarlas, and It dlstrlbutas Rraontfly, »h» ■ U t t a r ? Hi*. to '.In th. h.arta and Interventions In Angola end the Seychellea do not work to over 1 POO privete industrial contractors minds' of certain aactlona of the dominated add credence to theae denials. and strt)-contractors. clesses through Civil Action Programmes. In 1901 it eas reported ttat it eas the lergeat underteklng in South Africa, eith M I L 1 T W 1 S A T I 0 W AT THE ECCNCXIC LEVEL aaaeta of 01 200-m. Here, militarisation la reflected In figure of 0200-m. 1. Increasing expenditure on defence! 2. The expanding armaments lnduatry. In 1901 It employed 29 000 people, while 90 000 644-si In 1960, 0472-m In 1973, 01 699-m In 1976, end 02466-m In 1961. In the peat 10 yeera, there hee been en lncreaae of B&jji. This steedy lncreaae In Defence expenditure Tha school cadet system wes officially launched in 1976 and is co-ordinated by the SAOF and the six more were engaged in armaments production In the South Afrlca'a Defence budget hes rlaen as follows! These had risen from the 1974 prlvete aectora of lnduatry. During 1901 AfHinccn education departments. It aervea aa a forertww>er to national service, promoting an Interest In civil defence and aiming to 'stimulate in cadets produced ni 400-m eorth of defence equipment ehlch a loyalty to their cotxitry'. Included guided mlaailes, aircraft, ertillery, 9 armoured vehlclaa end computera. Tor the pest fee being started at coloured end Indian schools. It yeers, there have been peralatent reporta that South to 200 000. Africa haa exploded a nuclaer device.*** services such es housing, health aervlcea end februery 1902 the Ster reported that a US atudy the Civil Defence Act of 1977. educetion. had concluded that 6outh Africa certainly had programme Is to of theae aervlcea. Government apenda 0,5J]t of the Oroaa Domestic Product (OOP) on afrlcan housing, end 1 136)1 of COP on houting for all groupa. Dr Michael In the technological and economic cepaclty to produce nucleer weapons (Star, 09.02.6?).' South Africa, reported to be the world'e Sinclair, lecturer at tha Unlveralty of Wltweterarend, tenth lergeat arma producer (Ster, 31.03.62), ia ryuoted e a .saying that the eer in Namibia la alao produces many othar military products such aa coating 0 3 2 0 -m a yeer, end la Greeting e ’dearth napalm and la preparing to produce submarines. of funding for educetion, training end houalng In 1979, 400 compenlea railed to a significant at home' (np*l, 12.05.62). extant on defence contrecte. The srmements industry! manufenturwra, the gnlnlng of defence contracts Tor private It eea during Vnr Id War 7 that South Africa began meana securing a stable merket. eeger to gain e ahere of the arms *ar*et. Allied ear effort. enuld be avan more an in a period of rereaalnn. mi Ourlng the 19*10a and IWVla tha equipped primarily eith Britlah end Amerlcen ermements. The Civil Defence Programme eas Initiated by The ela of tha provide, by means of planning and provision of emergency measures, with a view to a n emergency situation, the 0SA end Its inhebltents elth the grnatest measure of protection end assistance end to curtail civilian disruption In the most effective manner. The local authorities beer the primary reaponalblllty for the implementation of the programme. They are expected to eatabllah an affective organisation that can producing arms, making ahalla and bomba for the B W With cadet training is anticipated that tha n a b e r of cadets eill rise has forced the stete to cut back on soclsl Thla reaulte In a further deterioration This Is especially so In arees of stratagic Importance. Cnmnenlea ere thua This go over to organised action elth a view to saving llvea, protecting property ant! maintaining the assent, lei aervlcea neceaaery for the survival of a civilised community. Industries, rnmmerclet undertakings, achoola, uolveraltlea etc ere elso expected to creete their In Auguat 1967, the UN Security I i the plight of local unionists d ates frws mld- others. Such intervention Is not surprising] an eggresslve pro-Imperial Ism, which of ita nature .'Involves intervention In the affairs of other countries to edvence Americen ruling cleas Interests.- ’ INTRODUCTION Tha recent visit of a n American trade union . delegation to 8oyth Africa coold hava Important Tha In this content, the words of IrVing Brown, .(the US term Is 'emerging') trede unions reached Its peek end* InternetInnelly, the International ,labour Organisation's 1900 programme of ectlon '/against apartheid ground slowly Into o p e r e t l w . ^ As the neely-formed Internetlonel Lebour ^Orgenlsetlon (ILO) committee etyilnst apartheid met •lor^j-stendlng Americen lebour leader who eill feeture ( in Zemble during May lest yeer, locel unionists 'egeln end egeln in the ertlcle below, ere worth freceived drefta of the A T L - C I O ’s own programme ■bearing In mlndl •,of action *ln support of black trade unions In ’Why', esks Orown, ’shouldn't rover! ant Inn ha srneptahls In paane time to try possibility of •ucaaalva American support for 1901, as, locally, the growth of Independent . for .ehlle the rhetoric of the Americen union leederahlp i Involves a rabid e n t l - e n m w m l a m , this translates Into ! raalfloat Inna for tha trade unlim movement, Tha current tidal wave of American concern for attempts to undermine soms unions *hlle supporting TRADE UNIONS: America steps in ,end p revent tha possibility of e a r f iftnuth Afrlaa', | The progremme Included the estehlIshment of certain unlona may hava the affect of placing a South Afrlcen unit In the Africen-Americen Lebour control f lnsly In the handa of leaderahlp rather The AFL-CIO delegation Centre (AALC) 'to co-ordlnete ell US labour e c t l v l t y Tilt September 7 - 1 6 a than rar* and file membership. As an organiser from a Cape Towo union put it, Although »e have agreed to meet the delegation, •a have misgivings about the role the Ikilted State* government plays in the AfricanAmerlcen Labour Centra. whistle-a top tour of loosl In support of trede union development* in South Africa) the programme also aimed for a. the creation of a speciel lebour fund' to flnence trada union activity herej the development nf other apeclflc prngre— wea In Its previous courses at Cornell University have hod a corrupting Influence on South African unionists. Their lavlah eey of throelng money eround Is not the eay ee believe In running e union. union ofricss by four offlclsls of the Americen South Africa and the US 'for asslstence In Tederetlon of Lebour-Congrass of Industrie! organlalng unions, collective b argaining, Organisations (AfL-CIO) - and the sudden flurry leadership and cadre training'. A Scendljiavlen trade union officlel ei§ even which proceeded It - has yet to be edequately of Interest In South African trade unionism more candid: explained. The Amerlcens ere trevelllng erwmrt offering money independently to trade union leeders. That eey of buying friends, goodwill end egenta must be directed to the upper atructure of the national unions as the goals are mainly p olitical. Despite occeslonal appearences on the South It is Obvious that the (Americen unlona)... don't consider trada union assistance from the point of view of giving e hand to the c rm w o n worker*a situation, but as part of US foreign policy. They d o n ’t give a damn about the common workers* altuatlon, aa you can easily see from their training programmes. They ere elways geared to trede u nion leadership training. flut If you never train the rank and file memhera h oe eill they defend their rlghta, especially against dishonest leederahlp.,,T The recipients were asked to c re-ont on the draft programme. In October, the full ILO edopted the May proposals for policing the entl-epertheld African labour stage - one of them the offer of progr a m m e , Including measures to enforce the *lerge s i a s ' for 'properly organised black trade polltlcel end economic Isoletion of South Africa. unions' by Irving Brown of the AFL-CIO's Afrlcan- A month before this decision, the ATL-CIO released Ae*erlcan L ebour Centre to TlJCSA shortly efter the details of Its own programme of ectlon, to be massive l£?J atrlKes - American union leaders heve greeted enthuslestlcelly In South Afrlce by only shown uncharacteristic reticence towards South Lucy M v u b e l o ’s National Ik^lon of Clothing Workers, African labour. and the el lied Garment Wo r k e r s ' Union. In the 1960s end 1970s their Involvement was Surprisingly, T U T S A ’s Arthur Grobbeleer, limited largely, to recruitment of a handful of previously one of the locel union leedere closest blank unionists to their Cornell IMIveralty to llfl unionists - MrtIA end r.llflA together ennounted (reining programmes - compared to the tens of for 1? of the ♦ 77 South African trainees at thousands of l.4tln American unionists and workers - Cornell - denounced the AfL-CIO plen ea In Africa end Latin America lnvolvea the creetlon end given trelnlng end flnenclal eld In the same period - ’presiasptlous', es locel trede unions bed not been exploitation of apllts between unions, the pleylng end e watching brief by US lebour atteche'a In consulted. off of union leaders against one another, end the South Africa. The hlatory of Americen trede union Intervention I * Journalists covering the September ’82 visit Justification fdr tht South African visit! an a US Marinas' sergeant-turned trade union leader, Invitation was 'a general one, expressed over many invitation to U S labour leeders to vlait thla n o a head *f the AALC | years by many unionists' fall equally flat. country, issued on b ehalf of CUBA by Jana Hlongeena, 'Chick' Chaikin and Frederick O'Neal* aarratary of tha titeel and Engineering Worker*' Union of South Africa. According to tha July aha spoke (in tha US)....of tha urgent needa that faca tha emerging black trade unionsi tha need for trained personnel, transportation for organising and recruiting purposes, funds for legal services and office equipment. tha esenutlva council only In February 1BB2 - Oie possible explanation for thla la hinted at operation elth tha International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). CUSA, a major recipient of ICFTU funds in for tha programme (Uahomo) h a d bean appointed mora The statement ees leced elth for \ha Afl-CIO prnoraswa and tha first South African member alnce the demise , t (For dataila of FOTATUSA*a formation, aee tha artlclaa ehieh folio* thla), Tha US unlona, not normally sensitive to the feelings of the ICFTU, had rejoined the International 1902, after an 11-year break (brought about by George Meeny'a accusation that tha ICFtU wae soft on communism and run by 'falriae'), and their South African programme enutd tharafora have to have included towards international participation. Tha d elegation arrived on August 7, consisting Irving Brown, former AALC chief, appointed two "•onths earlier to heed AFL-CIO'a international affaire directorate (ea auch ha la the Ufl unlona' Tha Amerlcena were claarly treading carefully around local union aensltlvltlee, But fltnen, in a latar, fac«-td-f*ftW lnt«rviww elth a smaller group, spoke aora openly ebout the AFL-CIO'a motives, foundation on which to build'. declered (efter en Initial hesitancy <rf»o he was tkiestloned on SACTU he being esfced ebout) thet BACTU's Congrasa Alliance paternel eld dlsappeered ea soon ea the delegation connections linked It to en ideology 'ehlch ea •at foot In South Africa (to be reaurrected only abhor', end ehlch cannot 'lead to free Independent occasionally by Brown, to the embarrassment of unions'. his colleagues, In prlveta interviews). B ACTU hes polltlcel links, but rethec that the Local In other words. It is not the feet thet American's don't Ilka tha sort of llr*s It has. Tha delegatlon'a hostlly to the ANC end lta ellled organisations was not hidden. to their own Incompetence. And local union sympathy was hardly unanlmoue. Trade Unlona in South Africa (FOFATUSA) in than a yaar pravlouely. organisation, trained leedershlp end e solid programme, would b e hard put to ed"lt In effact early this year became the ICFTU'a latest affiliate - Patrick O'Farrell, • of their etatementa - this at a time when e director It la our committment to see that this union leeders, even those sympathetic to the South Africa (reportedly H000 000 last yaar), U r * ma n elth the ICFTU)| 'At the present moment In history, we have m epped out our path. Not surprisingly, this aggressive promise of It refere to tha programme of action being carried out in co oft only come if w e 're wanted' eas the main thrust In helping black eorkera 'achieve a measure of earlier. 'We'll announcement In May last yaar, it atated frer*lyt •fernng, paIerne 11 at In m l * sent to South African unionlata almost a year at least a gesture attitudes to the 'proposed' progremmet In the AFL-CIO's initial South African trade unionlam, and advocated a a demonstreble untruth, in tha light of tha draft conf ederetton tp January, mission, Intended to feel out South African union tha delegation. rafarancas tcT tha tanuous, Incipient nature of tha ATL-CIO p rogramme of action had been put befora to point out that their trip was a fact-finding for nothing alsa, for tha decidedly muted tones of approach succeeds'. Tha same edition alao carrtaa an announcement that of the ICFTU-funded Federation of Free African fCi\ four US d elegatee eere, however, at peine Thwlr first prass conference eas notable, if adltlon of ’South. African Labour Nees', later in the name erticler and AFL-CIO executive members Asked by a Journalist whether they did not thlt* they were Bight wing and conservative group (South Afrlcen Ignoring one of the strongest fectore in tha Confederetlon of Lebour end TICSA) eere eery of equetlon, namely the ANC, e delegation m m h e r the progremme's emphaals on black unions| responded thet he did not thlr* the ANC ees en while among othere, attltudaa to the visit ranged generally - from the cool to the outrlghtly hostile. Even before their arrival, BAAWU and MACWUSA had laportent fector. Brown spoke edmlrlngly of Buthelefl as the 'leadar of the biggest llberetion movement here* indicated their hostility to the visit, while (in the George Weeny H uman Bights Award citation, FOSATU hed publlcelly doubted the need for en greet patne are taken to wmpHesIse thet many of 'ex t a m e 1 body'. A Cepe Town unionist, prohebly •peaking for many of the independent unions, seld flatly! 'We alll meet the delwgatlon...ea mill Irfcethe'e 'paid up membership of upwerds of M O ntIO' tnclud.* (■!»'* tr.i*. unlonlata'). When e front page story in the Sunday Trlbteia certainly not egree to any Involvement In their linked the AFL-CIO d elagatlon to the CIA, en orog r a w m e ' . outraged Brown - for one of the first times - Chaikin, enswerlng questions et their first, CerJton Hotel, preas conference, did"not help I! mattere by e m i t t i n g , then asked who had Invited the delegetlon, that ha didn't know. An attempted rescue by O'Ferrell, to the 'effect thet the i 'vehamently* denied such links. Mi s usual response fo such el legations 1* thet 'I w w l d n ' l tell you If I was CIA*. In a response to the Tribune story run a weak leter. Brown demonstrated e rather eketchy knowledge • European representative of FTUC. B r o w n ’a mandate Involved breaklng up cnmmunlat- oppoae $he World federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) with Brown In aettlng up FCFATUBA, their r e la tlo n a h lp ehich Included both corammlat and non-co«*»un|et was eell established by 19f*3. Brown recently told Bouth African .Journallata lad unions In Europe - and it la claimed that this unions. lad to Hia Initial Involvement elth tha C IA (formed plan gave the AR. an Important atnke In the that Mnhomo 'haa very good prectlcal experience in 1947). splitting of WTTU, and the foundation of the of the problems in developing e trade teilon ICFTU. because of the links he had elth FGTATU3A'. At about thia time, tha F rench Confederation of W F T U opposition to Amerlca'a Marahall In the mid-1950s, the ICFTU aet up a special Labour (COT) eaa landing a massive atrike In Parlai Whether thla lmpllea that Mnhnmo eea Involved In •HIla dock workere In Mediterranean porta were S o l i d a r i t y fund' to assist elth the netting up of forming FOFATUOA, or only eatabllehed llr*a once rafuaing to unload Amur lean goods. trede unions In third world countrlea - end b y 1939 h e left Bouth Africa In 1900, la not clear. Irving Brown held the post of ICFTU - United Nations by 1961 Mahtwo was d efinitely representing FOFATUBA liaison officer. In Arrtca, aa eltnessed at tha Casablanca conference. Thomaa Bradan, haad of tha CIA*a European cparationa frcw 19*30 to 193d, takaa up tha atoryt This placed him in en ldeel Into thla nrlala atappad I ovaatnne and hla Irving ftr*s*.i..tt aaa my Irian to give fltS 0 0 0 to Irving Brown. Ik# needed It to pay orr bin strong-arm aqunda in Mndltarranann porta, ao that American auppllaa could ba unloaded against tha opposition of Communist dock eorkers. p n a l M o n to Intervene In International trade union Brown'a Intarvantlon In European labour eant oppoaltlon. But Whether Grown art (tally fumted the nraatlnn of rOFAtUBA or not, II la ««sk ImprMhsbls that this sffslrs vis his relationship elth the nnwemalgemated AFL-CIO, the ICFTU and the aolldarlty could have taken place elthouk hla knowledge mnl fund. active epprovel. The AFL-CIO atarted their flrat trede union Broen'a paasage to the top waa not without programma independent of ICFTU In 1961. In 1933 the Swedlah trade unlona further than tha financing of thugs to coerce union complained that hla entl-communiam eaa 'phoblo', membera Into eervlng American Intareata. Thla waa the Amerlcen Inatituta for Free Lebour Development and by 1939 Brltiah auaplclona over U3 Intentlona (AIFLO), aet up to Intervene in Let In America a f t e r actively Involved In financing a apllt from tha in Africa centred around Brown. Caatro'a winning of Cuhen COT, and aaaiated In orgnntalng an anti-communiet Don Thomson, author of 'Share eere you, brother7* American concern. aaya thet in 1959 Brown waa S c a m p e r i n g off to ATL-CIO pledge to the ICFTU not to etart Africa representing the ICFTU and AFL-CIO end Independent progremmas. He waa union g r o u p , Force Ouvrlere. According to Braden, Brown and Loveatona appealed to the CI A for funde to finance apllt. thia 'Thus began the secret funding of trade Oesplta thla, At the same time, the AFL-CIO kept total c o n t r o l pledging aolldarlty fund cash without It even of the ICFTU'a L a tin American regional elng, CniT. being dlacussed by the ICFTU'. AFL-CIO bosa Meeny Broen'a actlvltlwa In Africa during thla u n i o n s ', aaya Bradan. Yeara later ATL-CIO president George lleeny boasted that the apllt between tha CAT and period remain ahrouded In secrecy I hoeever* one area of hla operations la eorth speculation. Force Ouvrlere eaa engineered by American In 1959, an attempt eaa made to apllt or weaken the interestst South African Congress of Trade Unions (BACTU), vHlcb . **e financed this apllt - we paid formed part of tha ANC-led Congress Alliance. for it', ha aald in 1964. Victor Beuther, who ran the CI O office in atate power ceuaed AIF10 eaa set up despite an An oppoaltlon trade union federetlon - FOFATUBA - waa eaa, according to Don Thcweon, ao confident about US control (of GBIT) th a t he offered to place a Briton In tha hi e rarchy.. .provided Irving O m e n wea g iv e n overall responsibl1Ity for Africa.... The deal wea flatly refused. many eurplcltma about Brown. There were too Three yeera later Mnany eaa to get hla my', Europe before ita amalgamation eitb tha AFL, formed, and the apllt between BACTU and FOTATUSA and Brown tor* control of American lebour lntereete admitted that pert of hie Jert> waa to keep a watoh tended to reproduce the ANC-PAC apllt. In Africa. on Brown*a Europwen activitlea. B rown m s lie noted that receiving 'incredibly large funds from FOFATUBA waa aatabllabed with FJ3 0 00 from the ICFTU - probably from the aolldarlty fund. In Thia occurred irfien, In 1964, the AFL-CIO aat up ita aecond independent p m g r e * " * , the AfrloenAmericen Lebour Centre (AALC). Bromi waa Ita f l r a t ao^e UB governmant aource to get European trede later yeera, varioua ICFTU affllletee end office director, e poaltlon he held until 1973. unions In hla pocket*. bearera claimed ignorance of thla grant, and there ber.eme president. By 1949, Western unions - Including the ATL were maetlr^j in London to form a nee International labour body, the I n t e m e t l o n a l Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). from Inception, ICFTU wea strongly entl-communlat, having been set up to lleeny la a etrong possibility thet it come from funds As Don Thomson points out, Brown was spreading in Africa. A 0 1 rarre conflict of Interests than developed, and was allowed to contln»»a.... Brown, in a d d 1t1on to running the Independent African progre«"e, waa still holding down the poaltlon' of Director of the ICFTU'a New Yor* office. The timing seems righti Brown was In Africa in 1939, the yeer of FOTATUGA'e creation. And «*ille there la no hard evidence that Mahrwo waa Involved 1963. In 1973, after tha m v M e re-oppesred s year later os tha PAC « of strike* In Ourban, ha promised TUCSA funding for 'properly representative oh the short-lived ANC-PAC United organised block trade unions*. front, at about ths same tlms SS hs sttrmptrd to eln At tits time, sn recognition as ths representative for the AALC publication commented thet Unless rssponslbls block leadership Is e ncoursged....tbs next series of strikes could bs dlssstsrous. If government does not permit blscks to form end run responsible trsds unions, Industrial chaos end tbs rssutttng explosion may in tbs snd destroy the very fsbrlc or Bouth African society. federation of free African Trade Unions of South Africa (rOTATUBA). This sttampt eas made st ths founding confsrsnce of the All-Afrlcsn Trsde Ikilon federation lo Casahlanes - and failed aftar objections from BACTU. Unfs/ed, Mahomo promptly Joined the Rhodesian In 1970, Brown Invited conservstlvs TUCSA unionists to ths AT L-CIO conference, where they TUC dslsgstlon. strongly opposed -0 nail for Aaiarlcen dlslnvsstment Mahomo's sntry Into ths lshour field - he had no In Dmilh Africa, nod renngnltlnn of RADflli Vnoeo Ilr*s allh ffFAfllflA ehllii Inal tie flnuth Afrlrs Mora recently ( 1 W 0 ) , Brnen urged tha ICftU to recognlss Chlsf Gatshs Buthslerl es a 'potentially end It is not clear eho asked him to represent fOfATUBA st the conference. A possible explanation for Mahomo'9 sudden declslvs' force In Bouth Afrlcen politics, sddlng that ha bad often championed the Chief's csusa. Mis sppsorsncs st Csssblsncs marked seltch from culture to lshour cams from AfL-CIO's InternatIona1 sffalrs director Irving Brown, on In psst statements, Brown has laid stress on the importance or rssponslbls trsds unionism his recent visit to Bouth Afrlco. snd lesdsrshtp. Mahomo's sppolntment to the Gaberone post, Brown Mis history must raise a question neferlng to whether h is recent visit to Bouth Africa Is to told Journalists that 'Mo slso had good practical sncoursgs unions responsible to rank end file experience of the problems In developing trede membership, or to#the Interests of American unions becsuse of tha links he ha d elth fOFATUSA'. Given Irving Brown's likely participation In foreign policy rtnd its vsrlous vehicles. the formation of fOfATUBA (see the section In this The Director: Nana Mahomo Nelson 'Nans' Mahomo, 52 year-old dlrector-deslgnsts of the Afrlcan-Amsrlcsn Labour Centre's Gaheronebased Southern African Programme, is eell suited to tha Job. Lika tha organisation ho represents, his .credential* ere d\4>lous, his motives qusstlonebla, and his styls of operetIon st vsrlsncs eith bis supposed allegiances. A Bouth African by birth, Mshevwo moved through the ANC Youth Lssgue into tha PAC to bscoms its secretory for culture, before leevlng Bouth Africa on P AC instructions, 24 hours befors Shsrpsvllle. publication on Broen snd the AALC), end ths closs .llr*s bsteesn Broen snd Mahre*o svldent by 19B3, jit requires no greet stretch of ths Imagination ^to see Mahomo as s backroom link In ths formstlon AALC'S NCLBON 'NANA* MAICMO - a C IA men? iof fOfATUBA. ’ Ths Broen-Mahomo nexus eas firmly estsbllshed b y 1963, ebon Brown helped M ahomo airlift PAC refugees from B e c huane1and and, later that year, ,financed the sstsbllshmsnt of a training ramp In the Congo - noe Zaire - under the Jolot command ■of Mahomo and Maiden Roberto, leter to head the F N L A In Angola. . Mshomo tot* ths post without euthorlsatlon froe the PAC leedershlp snd, ehen the camp dlslntsgrsted Into faction fighting, left for London ehere he to<* over the PAC's regional office. Both Gordon Winter - in the American edition of 'Inslds B0B8' - and Miks Ikisndana, current PAC representstlvs In London, describe Mahpato es 'a full CIA operative' by this tlms. Mahomo soon fsll out elth P AC chairman Potlako Labello, lsrgsly over unauthorised activities snd unexplained use of funds - among thess the ecceptsncs snd unexplained uss of funds from ths AfL-CIO. Identified as a CIA operetlva by B Barney Dessl (formsr leeder of the coloured erm of the Congress Alliance, who Joined PAC In exile), end a 1 reedy in bsd odour elth PAC leadership, Mahoaio PIIJM BA'S TWO TRACK POLICY ralda on both SWAPO end Angolan forces, es well willing to g«eirentee the preserve 11 on of private IT SfE*9 c l m r that BA la still pursuing ihat baa es maintaining 'the Trenskel' option inside ownership In Namibia. been callad a 'two track policy' - that In, of 'Namibia. Times interviee elth N u j m , keeping all options open for aa long as possible, of playing along elth tha settlement negotiations failure or the Geneva conference on the rect that n o agende waa drawn up berorehand - as far es maximum, while at tha seme tlma building up tha O TA as a do facto SWAPO eas concerned, the purpose or ao-called 'Plm* government, on tha one hand, end on tha other, (pre-lmplementetlan) telks wes to d lacuaa the launching maaslve ralda into Angola in an attempt lmplementetlon or Reaolutlon 435 of the UN plen, to elpa out tha military aIng or tha party moat wherees ror BA the aim was to prove the UN's likely to eln a democratic election - 6WAP0. Impartiality. Probably tha most Important reason ehy SA has ± continued to he perty to the diplomatic negotiation* In terms or Resolution 4 3 5 or th# iff plan however, there ere n o a priori guarantees es to the . ruture .constitution - this la lert to the elected conatltuent essembly to decide. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES Since the rellure or the Geneve talka, tha Western Flva (and the U3 in perticuler) haa sought to ensure that economic, constitutional and other guerenteea. the perrect loophole to bring up Issues which eould BA, which must thererore be clinched irfiile Reagan the Iff should heve known, they said, that SA did hea used the bait of Improved Geroeb 11.11.01.) Resolution 4.19 and any other m a t t e r s ', geve SA sabotage the negotiations. The US Nee York (ehich wes to heve been discussed at Geneve), Frontline lenders said artarwarda ia that the Reag a n administration eill almost The Western Five and Intended to keep Nnmlbla el thin the framework of capitalism, ar e written Into tha settlement proposela. not Intend atgning a c e e s e M r e or ecceptlng reletlona in o rder to get 8A to give certain 10.01.01} ‘that the phrase 'to d lecuss the ImplmwentatIon or certainly negotiate the moat revourable deal ror ia in orrice. In Ballsbury quoted in RDM, Leaders of the F rontline states blamed the but spinning them out to a (Examples ere t Thla was alao specifically In response to SA'* .Resolution 435, end (the convenors) therefore Stetement during secret telks elth the 113 in *»rll carnaltmenta, in what haa been deacrlbed aa a 'carrota 'deliberately walked into e trep, giving SA en 1901 (the content* or ^ I c h were lweked a Tee eeeke f inatead of sticks' policy. international pletrorm to make propagande ror tha later), that SA could not live elth a SWAPO victory internal parties'. that 'lert SWAPO elth unchecked power*. i- have been aeare that ehlle BA ha a appreciatively Moeever, even •Africanist*' close to the neagan arfculnlstration ' It la true thet the OTA was given a measure 'gobbled up' the Reagen Administrations 'carrota' it haa throughout the negotiations retained the > t •* The assumption Is, however, that SA would accept • or International exposure not previously enjoyed SWAPO government but only el thin the aevere by thet organisetion, but it wes SWAPO thet emerged conditions and restrelnt* Imposed by a neo- s h i n t y to 'Jump orr the train onto another track 4eith the most decisive Image end who created tha ehen it appears that the domestic political costa most internationally Tavoureble Impression. of a aattlement eill be too high', Nujoma had announced hla party'a willingness to Geneva (January, sign a c e e s e M r e , hi* entire delegation rose end ' ♦ IW moves In 7500 troops under Prem Chand ♦ to take over from the SADT end SAP end monitor ceaserire (provisional date 30 Merch)j (ttolen Kitchen, director African 6tudles Progre*wne, Georgetown University Centre for Strategic end International saluted a* ha decleredi Studies. united-, representing the oppressed people or Namibia!' Quoted RDM, 19,bl.02.) colonialist settlement. Arter 'My delegation la one, ♦ SA troops are scaled down rrom 2 0 000-1 500 over three months; eaa conciliatory end in marked contrast to.the BA'S TACTIC of atalling on the International , negntletlons firet became obvious during the aggressive etence taken by BA. negotiation* particularly in the pest ? years, has to take up SWAPO* s orrer of a n immedlet* ceeseflre 'led •ome observer* to believe thet the orgaolsatlon on the beala that the IW could not be en lmpertlel ^es abandoned ell eleaients or the progremme adopted At the time, it eea thought thet BA eaa atalling Tor time until ♦ the c ree 11on or e D e m | 11terlred Zona ( « / ) 50 km elde on either aide or the Angnlen end /emblen borders| In rect, the cnsprnml * log etend taken by SWAPO throughout Geneve C o h e r e n c e In Jenuery 1901, ehen SA reTuaed perty to the whole process. 1901) eere a* rollows: . During preaa interviews, the tone or GWAPO spokesmen GENEVA , Tha main points or tha if* plan presented at Reagan j 4n ' ♦ A rour month election cempalgn, followed by UN supervised elections (provlslonel 1 y October). Transitional admlnlstretlon u nder the (N*a Ahtlseerli 1970 ^ilch implied the overthroe or ^epltellem. ♦ Total elthdrewal or SA troops elthin one week or the election result| Whereas SWAPO then committed itaair to the aim tor* office e week or eo later, but alnce then of ■ 'classlese, non-exploitative society* In events heve made It clear that BA haa round one ehich 'all the m a jor meens of production end exchange excuse a rter the other to delay the aattlement would be owned by the p e o p l e * , GWAPO leadership process, while at the seme time launching repeated ha* in the last Tee year* repeetedly declared ltseir i ♦ Releese or political prisoner* errf dlaermlng of remelnlng armed groupsj 4 The constituent essemhly draws up a constitution. » •' ' pnqe J 1 Military presence. of Namibia was being drewn up by foreigners. It th e issue of an electoral System threatened to deadlock Is the prerngetive of the Namibian pnnple to do talks, elth BWAPO fevnurlng a syBtam of dlraqt this', said one spokesman. r eprasentatlnn end BA Insisting nn e conblrwitlon At a Commonenalth summit ON 19 September 1901, It wws ennnunced that both In Melbourne In October, various countrlas BA end the frontline States had eijrret to the 'Western Nigeria) supported BWAPO's line epslnst tampering assembly, Five Pence Plon*. elth the IW plan, Including the attempt to link drafted proposals ehlch Included a ml«ed direct and The ke y points were that BA •nd GWAPO would, before elections, npree to a (notably of elected end eppnlnted mnmbers of a constituent a Battlement with the presence of Cub a n s In Angola. binding constitutional frambwork safeguarding The roeson y BWAPO Aqnln pandering to BA, Western Group proportional system, making provision for ail objected to guaranteeing , parties to bo rnpresented In a constituent assembly, individual rights (these would be entrenched In' the rights of minorities, said Timothy Mlshongwa via a 'national list' system, ehlle 50 % of the seats the constitution and only amended b y a two thlrda (BWAPO rep, Europe and Scandinavia) wns thet the would be filled by directly elected representatives. Majority)j GWAPO constitution -During tha transitional period, Angola was to for all Namibian cltlfens - as individuals, not proposals' put forward the Idea of 'one man - tea guarantee that Cuban fnrnas would nn* nrnss south as groups', v h Ib s of a 'red-line' In Angola, or undertake any military said. actlvltlesi Then, a week later, 's« that a'11 ba nn m inor IM a s 1, ha (BOM, 19.01.B?) wider UN supervision) -Th* lf| contingent would ba composed of on Idlers The Implementation of this plan was scheduled to start In January 190?, elth indwpendence by While tha plan eas claimed to ba ', where path vntar would hava tan vnlas - one constituency and the other on the basis of a local constituency. Members elected from either system deal proposed s 'Bill of Bights' Instead of minority guarentees. but the plen now el so included the use would hava equal status In tha constituent assembly of UB and would drew up the constitution a fter Independence. surveillance technology to monitor GWAPO bases in Angola and Zaira. largely frrw tha east. 'revised constitutional to b e counted on the level of e single national B y tb«r end of September, the W n s t e m packapa -GWAPO units In Angola would be restricted to base January , 1903. 'guarantees equal protection GWAPO was said to This scheme was seen es a variation of the have conceded to BA's demand that 1 30 0 BA troops 'appointment' Bystem end rejected by GWAPO as 'non- remain in Nnmlbla during elections (confined to democratlo'. beses), as eell as that the GAP end civil serveots a compromise by proposing ■ 'one m e n - one vote' Efforts by the Western group to reech based on Oennlutinn 4.13 (to meet BWAPO and frontline remain at their posts during e transitional period, system, but elth each vota counting telce, were also demands),It eas evidence rather of collaboration and by mid-November BA, GWATO end the frontline rejected as being too complicated. between tha Ufl end BA - during tha secret discussions States were reported to have agreed to t h e ' 1907 the seven m onth pre-election period was also not In Prstorla (April),- Crocker had aaldt p a c k a g e '. enough time to drew up e constituency system. ...we believe BTO <139 is a basis for transition to independence for Namibia, but not for * a full settlfwnent. We elsh to meet BA government concerns, while taking account of vlees wi the other sldf. We cannot scrap <135 without great difficulty. We elsh to supplement rather than discard i t . The OTA, at this stage showing the strains of This Issue seems to hove been set aside during internal divisions, muttsred unhappily about the negotiations this year, In order to try and 'Insufficlent c o nst1tut1o n e 1 guaraoteesi end claiming that their objections were being Ignored, Apart from this, resolve other problems (the Cuban Issue tnklng ' prominence), but latest reports seam to indicate continued to assart the possibility of a n 'internal that a system of 'one man - one vote* might ba solution*. accepted, but 'the issue of constituency or However, during meetings between PW and 439 AND MINcniTY OUAflANTEEB Plk Botha and tha Internal parties, tha latter eere proportional voting wnuld bw laft to the Administrator AS TAP as BWAPO was concerned, 4 33 waa 'non- told that 'Phase 1* of the negntletlrms ees virtually General to decide'. (Star, ?9.07.B?) negotlabia* as tha basis for a settlement, and 'wrapped up*, and that Phase 2 (transition) was now representatives of both l n t a m a l and external elngs being, discussed. found themselves herd-pressed to accept a plan ehlah possibility of rlghtwlng pressurws disrupting the PW Botha also dismissed the THE flBBT few mnnth* of 1 W 'put the cert before the hnr*e'(TJnngnrero in Battlement prone** «* 'the prlra of holding on tn tha Ufl to meke a deal elth Angola concerning the Windhoek), or 'tied the fiends of Namibians long GWA eas too g r e e t ' . Cubans., In Jamiary, C rocker met Angnlen government THE ELECTORAL BYBTPI recognition by the UB of tha Angolan g o verrewnt'. before Independence In the exercise of dasestlo and foreign policy* (Raroeb In N ee York). BWAPO THE CUBAN IOBOE see concerted efforts by representatives to Paris 'to explore the issue of was 'absolutely eerlous In \tn seerch Tor paace NEGOTIATIONS on Phase 1 - In Namibia* but could not accept that 'the future eera far from complete however. the const I tutlone1 proposals In Denember 1901 ' The US eas prlvetely offering to open en Embesey in Luanda - but a rwconcl11st Inn elth UNITA eould also page 33 non southern end even central Angola, and that a full- no more 'einnabla* than eas America's ear egalnat (Allster Bperks in Boweten, acala ear la being waged In thla region. tha guerillas In Vietnam. and .destroy raids, of which there eere at leest to a According Europeen Economic Community (EEC) fact-rindlng BA'a intention seems more to keep 8WAT0'e military forces as fer north 10.09.01.) The seerch15 in lha first 6 months of 1901, caused BWAPO to change mission, tha BACJT aaa Involved In nearly 7 000 from the Namibian bnrdwr as possible (in order, lta tectica - troops were segmented Into much emeller operationa lnalda Angola during 1901 and haa maintained perhaps, to limit the Influence BWAPO guerillas units end elthdrewn further from the border. a conatant Military pranenca In, and affactlva control may have on any election process), elth a longer |n turn resulted in SA forces penetrating deeper into Thla of, larga parte of tha Cunana province (Reported In term atrategy of destsbllslng Angola so that the Angola, air attacfcs oecnme m o r e frequent, end tha tha London Obaarver and duoted 00M, 3.0?.0?). MPLA government la forced into e compromise sltuetlon pattern of esceletlon eas set. Apart frcm tha atatad ai m of destroying BWAPO's military elth regard to UN1TA end the Cubans. baaaa In Angola, B A ’s objective seems to hava been In August 1901, Angola Installed a defensive In this military policy BA enjoys the scarcely much gr e a t e r ! repeated attacks In tha southern and radar system end grnund-to-elr missiles. Celled support of the UB eho refused to Join In W central provinces, end on both BWAPO e nd Angolan BA than embarked on e m ajor expedition to d estroy the condemnation of BA after the 'Protea* Invasion, Installations in ehat became the biggest military army positions, Indinata that tha Intention has bean (lha fact that the Incursions give Angola reason assault Into Angola since the 1975 ear - the so-called to create a *no m a n ’a land' or bufrer-tone where not Just to maintain the Cuben presence but to 'Operation Protea'. only BA end I W T A troops would be free to operate. lncreese their numbers, la outweighed by tha operations In the C unene province during July had Furthermore, tha general d e s t e b l U x a t i o n of the greater dependence on co-operation elth e e s t e m left 114 dead, SA tanks er*d motorised lnfentry region ensures thet the Angolen situation be llrfced investors ehich BA aggression ensures.) columns were reported to be 200 k m Inside Angole, to a settlement In Namibia, la that Angola, weakened heading for Lubango. by constant b a l i n g raids and a deteriorating OPERATION PnOTEA economic situation, la forced to negotlete both the repeated ground end eir attacka in southern Angola has been to curb BWAPO'a mllltery strength by continually disrupting their lines of reinforcemen t end eupply, and by bribing both civilian (refugee) 1901, *• and by the end of August, SA0T sprftesmen announced In July that BA forces were going on the offensive: thet more than «50 5 WAP0 end FAPLA members bed been 'Our purpose Is to end the war end bring peace... killed. the best eay to do this Is to folloe the enemy and figure given was 1 000 dead. destroy hla |o his base, from now on we ehall keep (H O M , 31.00.81.) this up until OWAPO's mllltery strength is broken. JLubango aee beloe), mllltery observers sprite of a 'ahift' in BWAPO eas 'wlnnable' IMOCAMEOES V C U N E N E PROV (tha Econcfsiat, Sunday Tribune, 30.0B.B1). Tchibemba BA, it eas said, had revised the assumption that an International political eolutlon would have Cahama to be negotiated (since It might result in a BWAPO victory shich* 'left BWAPO unchecked'), and was going all out for tha 'military aolutlon'. angongo However, it la tha eriter'a belief that BA military intelligence NGIVA la aware of the fact that (a) BWAPO'a ranks are replenished Juet es soon es they are depleted) (b) that they era deploying increasingly sophisticated weapons and tactlca, end that in this sense the wnr is' (00M, 15.09.81.) weeks, it became cleer thet BA had been attacking After tha maaetve lnveslon by ground end air forces in August-September 1901 (Operetlon 'Protea* - Teo weeks later, the As repnrta filtered out over the ne*t fee end military oempa. BA strategy In terms of the belief that a ear against Within days, <100 k m north of tha Namibia/Angola border (see HAP), was Major-General Charles Lloyd's announcement early Neverthelesf, tha main Intention of BA's (Star Pfl.00.B1.) BAAF Jets had bombed towns as fer north es Tchlmbembe, THE prelude to the massive strlks In August, eithdraeal of tha Cubans and a deel elth IJNITA. One month a fter mllltery S W A /N A M IB IA pogtf C « l lad penetrating the Tsumeh district (see MAT), BWAPO losses Include Angolan non-combatants fly early wiped out tha entire Infiltrating force. o r Namibian rafugeas, but tba Defence Foret claims M a y , 5 civilians, to heve kill e d 3 B M guerllles had bsen killed In verlous cleshes elth Intelligence reports el so led tha S W the eecurlty forces, but ebout HO Insurgents wwre the etteck eould be lnltleted from tba tagolsn half of B W A P O ’s force* (according to tha previously still being hunted In the rugged and bush-covered coastal to*wi of Mrcamedss. mentioned eetlmate). mountains neer Utavl. fact launched enre than SOO k m further to the BWAPO Insurgents In tba past 3 years (RDM 19.04.01), ehlch would be nearly Cither BWAPO's strength In 11 SA0F personnal and 33 of the members at Cambena - but thay thought they had Mn a n w h l ]«, poatwre offerlr^j to believe The operation was In nurtiers le vastly underrated, or the deeth toll le rewerds for Information leedlng to the cepture or The force then split Into two groups, one of «hlch eneggerated (or both), sinea BWAPO a ction during deeth of the guerillas Indicated that for tba was encountered at Ca«bena es they movad south-west the past two yeers hardly lndlcatae that it la a security forces the U f a of a SWAP 0 Insurgent was towards the Kaokaveld. spent force, or even draatlcally wwakenad. worth lass than soma of his equipment: R2 000 was of some of SWAPO's best soldiers' movad undetected SWAPO'8 ranks are continually supplemented by offered for the former, ehlle the capture of e SAM into O vamboland (report from the Bter, 2A.04.82). During this seme period, three guerillas refugees fra* Namibia - particularly slnr.s compulsory military service eas Introduced In the territory in August* 1900, Causing a virtual exodus of youths, who wsrs at one stege said to b e crossing the b order at the rate of 100 p er eeek (lntervlee elth BWAPO ' Tba second group 'consisting captured In the T a a w h district during a previous ’ *ds IWIfl (T"? (•*•* •••) " ^aul* Is Bss|rt1i ilsc M lay m»att. later rtbret Ueali Iniola ! SWIF9 (atari 10 »*♦*) I tatar •( ) H u l l M r s aplil a *m1e KAVANOO Ineuralon were convicted under tbe Terror!** Act In the Windhoek Q u o r m m Court. Leedlng evidence in altlgetlon of their sentences, Prof John Ougerd Defence Secretary, Peter Nenyemhe, Star, 28.01.01). called for Prlsonar rtf tar ststus for BWAPO combatants, Tha aama source estimated the number of Nemlblen arguing that In the eye* of the InternetIof*l r e f u s e s In Angola at 30 000, but the figure la comftunl ty BA*a presence In Nsmlbla aes ^llegel, noe held to b a cloaer to 70 000. and that the act lobs 0T flWAPO guerllles wes tharefore Although thla would Include a greet number of women and children. reg^nled In a leas snrdpue Light by a lerge segmant It can reliably ba guesssd that several thousand of tha Neatlblan popt/1 e H o n , as ewll es Internetlonally • of these refugees are b eing trained as 8WAP0 fighters. (htW Id.ffi.O?), It le enrth noting that this argument it alKller' to that presented by H enman Tolvo Je BWAPO 1N9U1 PENCE Tolvd «h*n ha cceetucted his own defence during the INFILTRATION by BWAPO guerillas beck Into Namibia Pra*orle treason t*iel In 19n0| Tolvo ees howsver and lncldenta of aabotage continued through 1901, sentenced to 20 years Imprisonment. wbsrees Jason despite tha eacaletlon of BA raids Into Angola ehlch Bagarlus, Tbanphllvs Jason and Lucius Malombo were o stensibly to prevent thla activity. were given 9 , 9 end 11 yeer*. Tha main sabotage attacks were those et Oshakatl (in f a b r u a r y , 1901) and Okolongo (May) In Ovembolend, as well |D»Unt« r«ff• HO) BAOT ATfKKITJEfl ea et tba R uecene complea, wbare e morter etteck on the power pylons In November resulted In week- OtfllRG the e W l y m onths of 1981, when Generals ► rom R s m T BsT ly Ball Malen fend Lloyd Were still talking of a 'political' long power cuts throughout Namlble. Infiltration by groups of BWAPO guerllles Into the shite Terming areas also Increased, particularly In tha Tsumab-Grootfonteln eras (the so-called 'Terror Triangle'). In April this year. In tha most concerted thrust ever made, en elite squad of about 100 Insurgents crossed the operational area's 'red line' and m ovad undetected Into e e s t e m Ovamboland. Tba g roup than split Into small bands, ona group moving east of Tslnsabls, another eest, and the third rather than e 'military' solution, It was announced ground-to-air missile would fetch ns 000 (ROM 00.05.82),* By 12 June, 190? no Incidents had been reported for "•ore than teo weeks end It was believed that that th« BA0F was backing Its military c*»eretlons elth a progrsmma of 'civic action', ^ o s e purpose was to 'win over the hearts and minds of local Insurgents eho bad escaped tbe dragnat had found Inhabitants end creete e positive ettltude to th* their way back to tha border regions. BA0F*. In April the 6AHF claimed that they bed knoen of BWAPO*s plsns to leunch a major offensive - hence 'Operation Super' during March In ehlch tba BAAT a n d 32 Batall Ion were reported to have killod 200 SWAP0 As the war sltoatlnn has Intensified, hoeever, widespread allegations of security force brutelltlas against civilians In tha border regions lndlcete that tha method has been partly one of Intlmldatlnn and force, necent visits by clergyswn constitution' meka provision for 1? governments in breakaway in six months (the Labour Party, undmr excuse' to delay negotiations wMli* BA looks for ■ the territory, elth the OTA-controlled Ministers Ministers Council member, Joey Julius, split in Nevertbeles*, th* Cuban Issue remains an 'ideal way to sidestep the Implement fitIon or UN Resolution Council at the top (but still subordinate to Pretoria August). 439, vie by Hutting to esteblleh ■ 'more effective' end the BA eppolnted Admlnl atrator-Oenet-el , at present out of the OTA, teklng elth hi m the lest remnents Interim government In the territory based on e system Oanla Hough), end eleven 'ethnic' administrations, or of Ovemho support for the A1llence. of eppolnted 'ethnic' representatives. The Implication In Februery this year Kalangula walked He also took elth him his German edvlsor, lerner Neef, causing 'second-tierAuthorlties', ehlch are autonomous in Mudga to accusa tha West German government (end of this scenerlo is that even If the Ci*»en issue is certeln areas - notably haalth and education. resolved, end BA troops era In the long run withdrawn eas Introduced by Oerrlt Vlljnen, then Attorney- senior SAOF officials) of assisting Kalangula in from Namibia, such e elthdraeal would not have to General, as a comprtwlse between the NP end the OTA, tha breakaway (ROM P6.03.BP). Include a commitment to Internationally supervised but because the NP eon the «*ilte administrative formed hl a own perty, elections nor would it Imply en end to the wer. elections It hes had the erfect of entrenching for Bnclal Justice' (COA), hut he has nevertheless apertheld In certain spheres. retained hla National Assemhly seat as eell as n, i n ltn N ^ L . W V t H n i : W f - r a U U m tm i lht loonowy *GR This means that not In May, 198?, Kalangula 'Christian Democ ratic Action chairmanship pf the sernnd-tler Dvemho authority. only Is Mstge a 'Prime Minister without poeer', DURING 19R1, moves to Install the 0! A as a da facto sines the second-tier authorities heve powers government In Namibia Increased dramatically. cannot be tampered elth by the Ministers Council, of the Ministers Council end the National Assembly| February it eas announced, after talks between but his chences of consolldatlng his power basa several axamplas of non-elected Ministers heve even PW Botha, members of the BA cabinet and the BWA are slim while political groups in the territory further diminished the credibility of these Ministers Council, thet the latter eas to take full see the ethnic system of government as an extension control of executive functions in Namlble. of BA's homelands/apartheid system. In By Thus, attempts this raises the question of the cowposltlon instituticxis. • Be n AFrika is one such example - having lost tha R aheboth election in 1979 to Hans Olargaard ha has nevertheless steyed on es e member August, ell executive powers except control of to increese support for the so-called 'Interim constitutional, security end foreign effelrs (but goverrwwent', by wooing groups outside the National of the Ministers Council end his perty es membsrs including control of the civil service), had been Assembly hove proved to be e dismal failure. Groups i such as BtANU, GWATO-D, the Federal Perty, the Christie lost the election for the Damara transferred to the Council of Ministers (referred 81mllerly, Engelherd representative euthorlty to Justus Gnroeb's Demare as the 'Cabinet'), end SPA was said to be on the Namibian Independence Perty end the •brir* of self-rule* (ROM PB.OB.Bl). have consistently refused to be part of a system Council, but Chrlstla remains a member of the Ministers composed elong ethnic lines, calling i t f*repugnant *, Council and his party member Moeever, a crucial ecr'ponent of this strategy Mbandaru Council of tha National Assembly. was that the OTA-domlnated 'interim government', whilst other groups argue that the 1970 election as it has come to be called, broaden Its bests of (in which they refused to take part and which brought support. the OTA to power) eere never Intended for en interim This section elll look briefly et events ehlch have led to the steady disintegration of the OTA, government, but merely for a constituent essembly. eepeclelly in the last two years, as well es the Furthermore, they argue, their entry Into the National lncreeslng division between the ehlte parties In Asse«4>ly would delay tha Implementation of tha IW the territory. plan (ROM 03.0P.B1). These developments heva forced the Many partlas are themselves BA government, in its determination to find an losing support (never mind 'lending' it to the OTA) ' l n t e m e l ' solution for the territory, to consider as eell es running out of funds, efter nearly four an alternative to the OTA-led National Assembly, yeers of negotlstlons eithout a ssttlement. At the time of erltlng, allegations by Mudga are that tha plan involves replacing senior OT A members of government elth representetives from the secondtier ('ethnic') edmlnlstrations (Btar 0R.09.B?). DAMARA COUNCIL Tha Damara Council Itself has significant support among the estlmatad 90 0 00 Damara-speakIng people the t h l F f f - largest grouping In the territory - end sines it swept to power in Damaraland against the OTA-allgnad BWAPDIF , the O TA has made several unsucessful attempts to etn its support. the National Assembly and Ministers Council (ROM Groups el thin the OTA heva meanwhile become AG8, end by the Kalangula, who Initially aligned himself with the Ovambo-based 'Netlonel Democratic Party' more end more dlssetisfled, particularly elth the provisions of Instead, Garneb has recently celled for the dissolution of 09.03.B?). M L A N G U L A SPLIT of the National Assambly. end of last yaar after the OT A breakaway, also hoped for e unity move between the NOP and Oamara Council, but Garoeb hes remained eloof from any attempts at Incorporation, AO B there were signs that the rift between O T A President even breaking away (in Mnrcb) from a loosa alliance THE 1ERMS of Proclametion (AO) B of the 'interim Kelengula and Mudga would lead to tha second OTA elth the NNf . Garoeh has recently steted his perty's at* wel 1 as a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, of 1901 the cattle population was 170 000, from exacerbated by one pf the 'worst draught* In living ?30 000 a year «4»lle the ntaxher of r\hae|i and A a m o r y ', have contributed further to the country's gnats declined frew G-m to <150 00 0 (flOM 23.11.01). colootallst regime in Namibia, which would entail B«"»r*l Instability. Oi the whole most (white) cattle farmera have been by-passing a tfl election end Insteed propping up ccwoensated for their losnas by tha high price paid ethnic leaders who would be openly revourable to BA It 1* Ironical that flva yeers ego, observers noted that while an 1ndepandent In conclusion, recent events Indicate that BA Is presently considering weys or maintaining a nao- Namibia would not ba without problems, the fact for beef, but siA>slstence farmers have been the worst Interests. that the territory wee 'mineral rich* would et least hit, with starvation deaths being recorded In Kookotand run, BA p roves incapable or susteinlng such a system tide the economy over a trane111one 1 period. ■Here tha drm^jht has decimated three quarters of In the race or mass npposltlon, and R»AP0 ccrnws to tha livestock population (ibid). P o w * r In Its place, Now even the territory's mineral wwelth In In question: In a recent addrsns In Windhoek, Douglas Moffe Tha fishing Industry - nrra a substantial (chelrmen Chamber of Mlnen) dlnputed that Namibia wen contributor to export e e m l n g s - hes also declined 'mineral r i c h ’, saying that 0 0% of the mining Industry's dlnmelly, elth output hair whet It was six years rnntrlbutlnn to the OOP wen from three mines - COM, ago (four nut of eight, factories In Walvl* flay have !staneb Corporation Ltd, and Hons lng - ami the former closed In the last three yearn). two were 'very old properties' (W Observer 10.00.0?) decline has less to do with environmental factors (suggesting perhaps that they were already 'milked'?). It might be edded that Mosnli«f'a contribution In this case the and mnre to d o with grand and over-rxploltat Ionj tha fact that the pilchards resources have been would be e lot greater If It were not exempt Tram completely destroyed end other fishing reserves taxation - according to reports, flossing Uranium seriously depleted, is largely due to the desire on Ltd made CTvJ-m profit In 1901 (CiVl,/|-" In 1900), not a cent of which goes to the M a t e Treasury In Windhoek until the 'company's capital investment Is redenmed' (ibid). The mine produces srme 5 00 0 tons of uranium 'the struggle for control of Namibia's future will by no meens be over. tha Bouth Arrlcan soldier has left Nemlhlan soil' (Otwtcao Innas 'Monopoly Capital and Booth Arrlcan Imperialism In Namibia', Chapter V or Thasls "Monopoly Capital and Impnrlellsm In Southern Africa: The flole of tha Anglo American Group"). Sue Cull loan the part of a hendful of company-nwners to realise (and possibly before the territory became Independent). S O U T H E R N AFfllCAN R E S E A R C H SER V I C E Thus, the outlook for an Independent Namibia-Is far from optimistic. said to egtjel that of Onudl Arabia (ll Rudolph In the territory would have to be subsldlsod from outside Africa Insight Vol 11 no 1 1901 p19), but whether sources by majority shareholders n io Tlnto /Inc el 11 be prepared (originally expected to be the first 7 yeera of In 1977 it was estimated that SA R S PUBLICATIONS Occluding Work In Proyreit) about fl170-*» per annum nvar 1970/9-19A5/R to renngotlete their mineral contract with e future Independence), and an additional fll ,JM»l\\inn would government in Namibia, remains to be seen. have to be found. This figure Is nnw substantially Th# K authain A fr k a a nataareh Satvle* (S A f lS I l e n you In touch w ith tu rra n t el aad aconcwnic fiandt S A H S publication* contain r iw u x j a and a n a lyih of fatatitaawnt, hanhM lan«, w o rk ing c la n action, »tata itiata«<a«. t»*da union*, t it Ik at, potltlcat tila h and da tan t Ion Your wilacrlptloa to SAnS publication* antltlai you to aN trillion* of’ present both flossing and COM claim that their higher. contribution - together worth R10U m - Is by wey of that between 30-40% or skilled whltas will probably • W w l In h # » t n 'wages and salaries, supplies end services' (W Observer leave the country - although the UN Institute for • lnlo>m ailon ihaatt 14.00.0?). Namibia In Lusaka has for several years been training However, it Is the eecond most Important feature of the economy-cismserr.lal agriculture- which Is Thet struggle will Still need to be rought long arter 'immndiete profits when the Industry was at its peak oxide per annum and Its uranium anerqy potential Is At Out even ir, as Is likely In the long Other crucial factors include the expectatlpn refugees with the aim of producing an essentlel core • Tha Information Publication ilfkl S A H S alio kaapa tu b trtlb a ti Info tm a d about oth** occa ilonal publication* and n t w tlttai la tha S A R S dhiartatloa of public service administ r a t o r s • ate. in a state of real crisis, directly effecting one Above all, the country's economic dependence nn third of the economically active population, the 3 000 HA (to the extent of WTjt or the budget) In a rector commercial fanners (mainly aHltes) and noma 100 OHO which membership nT n W C C Is unlikely to c h a n g e . subsistence formers. According to W o U g n n g Thomas (et SA Institute Terming output, which Is made up of 5(7jt beef, 30jt kerekul pelts end wool , ""d 1!7jL Intenwitlonal Arralrn C o h e r e n c e (?3.01.fl?) while mutton end p m * , declinwd 37jl between 1970 end 1900 Namibia would race similar problems to Zimbabwe, er*d Is likely to drop further. 'Its dependence on BA The reduction or livestock herds has been 'dramatic': at the end tends t.o put It. morn In t»m class or flotswana lo relation to HA'. I R A T E S lo r S outh African n ihtcrlha rt IS puhtlcatlond Individual*, If ada u n lo m . awm m w nhy wrsaahatlen* fl 7 *0 P n n o t iiih trrlp lln n t A 19.00 le d llu lto e * and llbtarla* a 70 00 f o r raducad rata* o n hulk o>da«i and f r m p distribution, and for rata* o utild a S outh Africa, contact SARS P .O B o x 03174 1103 YaovlHa S outh Africa r > M r v A t t o n suqqnsted by the llnfinhn C n m w l M l o n / not shls to prsvnnt mlnsrs frtmi rsturnlng hnms Tl*e policy of th« Industry to reduce dependence s»mn they wsntad to. on Torsion workers, together elth Increased 14 months to 6 snd B month psrlods. vlolsncs snd unrsst on ths mines during ths Be-engagement Gusrsntss Bystem was Introduced! 1970s, Isd to the Introduction of structursl guaranteed a miner that if ha raturnad to tha mlns In methods or snrlel end physical co n t r o l . ^ chengaa in ths Industry. within s spaclflo parlod, ha would ha given hack report essentially suggested pnllcles leeding to his Job, togsthar with s bonus payment. the stabilisation or ths workforce on ths minss, Sthnlc conflict', It Is svldsnt from othsr analyses Contracts wars roducsd from Ths Vslid that many of ths dlsturbsncss were s result or wags demands and the transitions from old hesvy manual this This production methods, with ths accompanying adjustment Decreasing ths psrcsntsgs of forslpn workers system led to an Increase In the proportion of ret Iona 11 sing or engns, end g iving Ths policy of lncrssslng ths supply of lor.sl man returning to the mines sftsr s contrsct period workers s Bouth African lshour sss f o m u l s t m f sftsr ths hed snded. 'rixed' larger waoe Increase. It also s«jqgested the rederinltlon or snms Job Ths proportion of thnse amployses cstegorlsed Malael government stoppsd sll further recruitment The cstegorles. of labour for ths Bouth African mines in 1975. as 'speclels', holding ths Vslld na-angaqament This or.currsd sftsr 72 contract worksrs were Csrttflcsts, racrulted from Lesotho, incrsnned UN inNlRATICINi killed In nn nlrcrssh on thslr r s t u m to Mslssl. from 31* In 1970, to B O * In 1979, to 7fVjl in ths Tha Cham b er of Minas* p o licy Ths sodlog of Porttiguese ruls In Mnceetolque, sod first four months of 1900.^ In 1901, the Chamber announced that It hed formuleted wins unrsst dnmlnsted by tssotho eorfcers ovsr ths Ths industry expressed thsss chsngss In ths 7 following soy In 1900i e policy regarding the unionisation or blscks on dsfsrrsd psy clsuss - which forcsO Lssotho miners to d sfsr 6 0 % of thslr m onthly wages to ths Lssotho Mining |n Routh Africa Is Increasingly H a m m i n g an sttrsctlvs csrsar for black workers, not only becsuss wngas have Increased six fold In the .Isst ssven years, hut hecauss of Improved living conditions end carssr oppnrtunltins. Mora and mnra or ths worfcforrs nos returns to Ihe Industry Tor additions! contracts snd their level or expertlss Incressss as well. National Ranfc^- led ths Industry to r.hangn its labour rscruitment policy. Thsss chsngss aimed st preventing furthsr vulnerabl 11 ty thro«*gh rnllsnr.s on forslgn mlnewnrkers, snd Involved a n Increase In ths supply of Routh Afrlcsn migrants. This was also necsssary due to ths shortsgss of undsrgrouod lshour requlrements which sTtsr ths withdrswai of Malawian eorkers stood at 22%. In 1973, only 20% of african miners wars South African. By 1974, WTjC wars recruited in Routh Africa, snd only <1071 wsrs forslgn. In ordsr to attract Routh Afrlcsn workers, ths C homhar of Mines was forcsd to Increase wagns. the mines. Industrial Beletlons Quarterly, nevlew, ths B antu Labour Act aftar a thrsst thst Routh African noal exports to ths URA would ba prohlbltsd frr*» sntsrlng ths country in tsrms of Amarlcsn laglslatlnn. This I n g l s l a M o n prohlbltsd tha Importatloo of goods producsd uoder conditions of indentured lshour. Ths Routh Afrlcsn Act which msds It a criminal offanca for a mlnsr to break contrsct wss thsrsfora rapsslsd. This compsllsd ths mining industry to rsdur.s contrsct parlnds as thsy wars 1901) are that s The Chamber of Minas will not negntlsts elth unregistered trede unions; S Unions registered for workers In ths mining Industry will be subject to further recognition criterle sst by ths Chamber; Effects of resistance e Extensive unrest on ths mines during ths 1970s lodustry. depsrtmentel Committee of Inquiry Into ths Riots in ths Mlnss'. This spplles to new end existing unions seeking to represent blacks; Of ths 41 principal gold mines in Routh ATrlca, 22 were directly srrsctsd by unrsst s p r o M t s fslllng by B35-m in ths ssms psriod. or occupations who are elreedy represented by anothsr recognised union; a they are 'reglsterahla'. living conditions snd convsnlsncss, provision of be denied scr.ess to mlnrworkersj It also recommended a change a There will be no extent Ion or the 'closed shop' to s ny new unions; on work sections.^ Despite th« feet thst ths report sttrlbuted Unions reglaterebls end unreqlsterehle trtui refuse to register el 11 marrlsd quartern, and a revision of ths industrial unrest mainly to ths 'quality of lira' snd 'lnter- Unions seeking to racrult mineworkers sill be lnvestigeted by the D*amher to determine trfiether Ths Committee recommended Imprnvements in from housing on an ethnic basis to s system bsnad The Chember or Mines el 11 reTuss to recognlss s union ehlch seeks to represent workers In classss Ths 4B 119 kllogrsms in 1974 to 44 532 in 1976, elth rslstlons processes. Unions el 11 heve to p rove 30jt represeotlvlty of s certain class of emplnyee throughout the led to s major enquiry entitled tha 'Inter- unrsst csused gold production to si ids frcm In ths mid-1970s, gnvsrrmient wos forcsd to rnpasl Ths essential Teatures of this policy (as reported In ths Anglo-American CorporatIon's i during ths p sriod January 1972 to June 1976. Reduction of ths contrsct psriod POL I C Y , PROCTDUOEB ANO ATTITUD ES s Cherk-orr reel II ties should not be grented to unreglstereble trsds unions but only to those unions which have submitted proof or their Otnpers carry blsating cartIf1cates, and are Till a la en essential pnsltlon In l.ha prncaes of furthering the elms of comm»mlsm. Hut In en industry wharw OHfL is foreign lahnur who do not want to become Involved In lnr.nl politics this eill make the unlnn's task more difficult*. mining.** Other Interviews revealed erase scepticism on responsible for tha breaking nf ore In tha straws. R topers aarn placa wages, and ara often employed under contract. the part of monegemnntt stme felt that mlnewnrkers mining assistant', be creeted. After training, auch workers wnulrt be Issued with blasting certlflcatee nnly for the mine for which they were Issued. This propose I has been blocked by the Mine Workers' Union. Surveyors gunge tha progress nf etopers, ami would not be as 'nmonahle tn imlimtaatlnn os fectnry report on tha arna covered to a hlghar authority. eorkers - this could ba because of the rural origins repeal of this legislation, It appeers thet there According tn the JCI spokesperson, white minora of a large proportion of mlnaworkers end tha fact will be no slgnlfIcent changes In this section of fear that black aurvayora will not Maintain that they are migr a n t s . ..coming for only 13 months.* the Act In the near future. accurate records. Because of white mlnewnrker resistance to the This, they claim, eill affect According to Llebeoberg, It Is the wages nf atopers, aho era paid plece-retee. S E C T 1 W 1? Of TIC MINES ANQ WintO ACT White mtoers' fear that the employer will exploit the altuatlnn by emplnylng blacks at one quarter of the pay paid to white miners; This Act reswilna a major bona of contention for piAMorn w o company A n n u n r o TowAnoq w u x ibation the entire Industry. Interviews »1th Chamber nfftrials and representatives white enrkers as 'scheduled persons* by granting The Act essentially prnter.ta from the mining houses revealed thet Much attention only them a certificate of competency, nr bleating was being paid to tha moves being made by unionists, certificate. elth management quick to pnlnt nut that they were of the mine gang, essentially controlling mnjnr quite 'open* to unlnnlaatlon. aspects of the production process from which blacks The following ere extracts from ire* of the Interviews I are excluded. Employerk In the m ining Industry have not attempted to reterd the development of unions for our labour force - our general philosophy and policy la that It la not tha employers' function to establish trada unlnna for black workers - It Is obviously also not our policy to retard the development of unions for our lahnur fnrca. - LlebeiJi^rg, tha Chae#»er*s Induatrlsl Halations Qfflcar. ' This enables a miner to be In charge Because of a shortage of miners holding e 'blasting certificate', there has been cetegory of work to black mtneenrkers. The Act wes reviewed by the Wlehahn Commission (part ft nf its r e p n r t ) In 1901. Ihe Commission recommended that tha definition of confirmed that the Black Minaworkers’ Union had been Hnwever, the government irfilte paper stated thet given access to one of the mines, while It was In principle In favour of the fie went on to say We know that the unlona here ere going to be political - it is the only way In which you can show your clout. Many of the union leaders ara arrested not for union activity but for wbs shown In the dispute this year (May 190?), increase, while the Chamber offered only *7)1. The stete eas forced tn intervene in the dispute, pushing the Chamher tn raise its offer to 1?jt. 11 We want to man the mines with the best people Irrespective nf race which means we have to train more people and we need the right to train them and put them in these Jobs a right shlch we don't freely have now - a right tn utilise human resnurr.ee Irrespective of race end sex. 'scheduled person' ba replaced by a nondlscrlmlnetory definition of 'competent person'. I myself have bed 19 years experience of blecljr trade unions before I came hare. I heve no fear of unions and nor does the ctwpany as long aa the thing Is organised. We do not Insist on recngnltlon (sic) at thla atage If people went to talk to us we will telk to them. This when the Council of Mlolng Unions demanded a 19% Llebeoberg, commenting on this Issue, seidt pressure to open up this Industrial natations Offlcsr Horton o f ‘Hand Wines •a ere quite happy about It - we will know who we are talking to - at the m c m n t we do not. We have extensive coevnlttee systems but they are not negnttatlng bodies at all. The committee system Is only an upward communication system and cannnt be considered anything else. Ikiionisation Is a natural development. This may be e tempting Idea for managesient as white miners demand higher and hlghar wages. This will only take place through e gradual process of negotlstlon. We would like to do this without losing the existing employers who have served us well over many years. recommendation, this would only take place at an j approprlete time end in an appropriate manner. CONTRADICTIONS AOiniNQ rnOM STABILISATION POLICIES It left It to the discretion of the employer and Job satisfaction employee organisations to negotiate this within l e reasonable time. No legislative amendment was The Increased percentage of miners returning to the mines has led to demands for advancement, proposed on this subject, and government aald and to higher expectetIons. this would not happen before 'e l t e m a t l v e Chamber of Mines' research department, this Is 1 safeguard measures (for Elites) hart been effected'. Thwre was discussion around the granting of According to the placing pressure on management to open up Jobs held by whites. At the sa«*a time, there Is en ! blasting licences to afrlcen mlneworkers in ettampt to Introduce new bonus schemes to alleviete ' BophuthaTswana during thie problem. 1900. In proposals drawn up by an 'lnter-stete' committee of South African and BophuthaTswanan officials, It was suggested Indigenous recruitment that e new category of worker, the 'licenced According to analysts close to the industry, the to often b e the r i m t to take t*» grl*y»rr*s, they However, according tn Van dor Watt could we l 1 be wery receptive to unlnnlsatIon. It eea too big for one union to handle, and they The they felt that problematic. However, he clelmed that workers had themselves been demendlng union recognition fact that legislation prevents sccnmmodetlon In attempted to find a group of uniona to move Into through strike action. married quarters to only 3)t of tha workforce, tha Industry. In principle to reglstretlnn. The union Is not opposed (el though encordlng to noma sources there In an At the present time, only Chllllsn lint ha of eppeel to ttnve thla extended), suggests that It the Dleck Mine Work era' Union Is working closely National iktlnn of Mlneworkera. an afflllete of la unlikely that menagnment alll be ahla to elth FMfCWU, end has bnen given an office by the the C'Ninr.ll of Unions In Bnuth Afrlce (CIISA). co-opt a battar-off, mor# skilled group. Boilermakers' Thla tactic haa baan ettempted In other araaa of Booth Africa. Whatever minera may gain In tha long tana thro^jh tha procaaa of unlnnlsatIon, unions alll 'Initially ba forcad to confront low wngaa, badly daflrwd Job eetegorlaatlon, management prnr.aduraa auch aa aa Iact Ion ami grading of Society. At an August 1001 conference, e decision ass The FMTCWU represents mainly skilled coloured taken to begin unionising mlneworkers end security workers end hea a recognition aqreament with the workers. Chamber of Mlnea: was aet up, under secretary general Cyril thla allows them to organise The Netlonal Union of Mlneworfcers the seml-skllled categories of handymen, painters Hamapo'ta. end drlvera, ahlch Includes afrlcan workers. Chemher, end was reluctant to comment, eoy further. V e n d e r Wett claims that the recognition CUSA Is presently negotiating elth the According In Perlshae Carney, general secretary egreemant waa finallaed nn|y because tha union of CUBA, they decided to nrqenlse mine workers blade mlnera, black H a t i n g and unfair threetenad to take the nhamtier to the Industrial becauaa of apprnarhes from m Inara themselvea. dlamlaaala. Court. In addition to this, unionisation Due to thla, Individual mining may altar formal and informal mechenlsms of control, hounea put pressure on the Chamber to recognise aa wall aa m e n agement'a tactlca of foatarlng the union, end to negntlete conditions for lta athnlc divisions. Ueorgina Ja ffaa The Ikmlclpal and General Workers' U n i o n . Ifrtlon president Oatsby Mazes I - who succeeded APTENOIX Joseph Mnvl after his death - announced at their Tha Fedaratad Mining, Explosives and Chnmlcal Wor*era Union (rMTHWU), and tha Black Mina Workera' U n i o n . Auguat 190? AOM that they intended to Incorporate mine workers Into the union. Ibis Is pert of a general plan to recruit migrant workers. Tha FMFCWU wns astabIIshad in 1975 aa an Thla union was previously known as tha of falmot of tha Ooilenaokera* Society, a TUCS a I Black Municipality Workers' Union, the name being afflllata. Boclaty waa forcad changed In August 190? to eccomodste other mlgrent Tha Onllarmnkara' to traoafar thalr colourad membership to tha F U X W U in 1975 to gain raglatratlon. Ika van dar w orkers. The feet thla union haa br»g<»n to recruit on Watt, aacratary of both r MTCWU and nollarmakara' the mines was confirmed by e management Society, said that t»*e formation of FMECWU was representative In mid-September. undartakan with tha lntantton of the union amalgamating jlth Onl 1e r m akera' raglatratlon. once It had gained Hoeever, thla we* not legally Black Allied Mina and Tunnel Workers' U n i o n . Oleck Allied Wnr*ere' Union * of memhera tekea place melnly in Natel, eIt hough (B A W ll). necrultlng elth De Beer'a, and according to Van dar Watt they claim acme memberahlp on aome of the Tranaveel represent (511% of the total eorkforce In the mines. Induatry. With thla auccaaa at Da Baer'a, tha union began discussions to move Into gold mining. 1. for an analysis of compounds as structures of domination, nee Dunbar Moodle'a 'The rules ere here to protect tlwjse In power only'. Iftpubl Ished semi nor paper, African Bttalles Institute, IVilverslty of W1twatersrsnd. Gee also MrNamara, .IK. 'Orothera and work ms t e a ! home friend networka In the aoclal life of bleck migrant eorkere ln»e gold mine hostel', In P Mayer, Black villages In en Industrial a ocletyi e n t h r o n i n g leal pamper, t Ives on lebour migration In South A f r i c a . IN ford, 1!»W. Ron alao Prerson, P, 'the social structure of e South African gold mine hostel', BA (honoura dlaaertetlon, Unlveralty of W1tweterarand. 2. .Johnstone, fA. Claaa, rnce end gold! a study oF cl a ss relations and reclal discrimination In South A f r i c a . Ihls Includes e datallad analysis of this point. See el so e forthcoming b w * by Innas, 0, A n g lo American and the rise of m p d s m South AfrlcaT" llelnemann, 1903. 3. Hyman, B. St r i k e s , fontene/ColIIns, 1977, p 61. 4. Bee Cooper, C, 'The mlneworkers' strike', In Booth African Labour B u l l e t i n , 5(j), 1979. 5. Bee Klrkaood, M, 'The mlneworkers' atruggle', in South African Labour P u llet In, l(fl), 1975, p ?9. Thla union, formed in 1900, la affiliated to the poaalble, end the uniona remain aeperete. Both unione have a recognition egreemant NOTES President B Khumalo seld thet the Chamber's ettltude towards recognition procedures was 6. Tor further Information, see Murrey, C, 'Stabilisation and unemployment', In South African Lebour B u l letio, 6(4), 1900, p 50. 7. Mining Survey, Number T, 1900. Collection Number: AK2117 DELMAS TREASON TRIAL 1985 - 1989 PUBLISHER: Publisher:-Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:-Johannesburg ©2012 LEGAL NOTICES: Copyright Notice: All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. 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