Feds probe Jacksonville, FL process blast

Transcription

Feds probe Jacksonville, FL process blast
RUNAWAY
By ANTON RIECHER
P.O. BOX 9161, COLLEGE STATION, TX 77842
PRSRT STD
US POSTAGE
PAID
Permit #204
Bollingbrook, IL
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
PLUS:
• IFW posts program for
February conference
• Delaware refinery fire
blamed on corrosion
• Federal court orders
fire fighting foam recall
Volume 24, No. 6 November-December 2009
1
11/3/2009, 9:39 AM
2
INDUSTRIAL FIRE WORLD
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
2
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
IFW CONTENTS
DEPARTMENTS
6: COVER STORY
RUNA
WAY
RUNAW
4: Dave’s Notes
By David White
We must look to the past and have
a “what if” future perspective as we
report on potential disasters.
COVER SHOT: Jacksonville
Fire & Rescue Department
firefighters mount a foam
attack on the blazing
aftermath of a reactor
explosion involving six tons
of gasoline additive in
December 2007. Federal
investigators blamed the
explosion on a cooling
system failure.
Photo by Mark Treglio
8: Incident Log
30: Industry News
Federal investigators blame failure to recognize the runaway reaction
hazard in making a specific gasoline additive as a root cause of the T2
Laboratories explosion and fire in Jacksonville, FL, in December 2007.
13: Attack Strategy
An injured survivor using his cell
phone to plead for help forced
responders at T2 to act instantly.
18: History of Violence
Federal investigators cite four
runaway reactor accidents similar
to T2 in the last 11 years.
5: Point of Penetration
3M offers new fire barrier duct wrap
to meet ASTM E 2336 standard.
26: Means of Protection
Personal protective equipment
traces its origins back as far as
humanity’s will to survive.
20: Rust Never Sleeps
Fire officials blame a May 2009 fire
at a New Jersey-Delaware refinery on
pipe failure due to corrosion.
21: 2010 IFW Conference Program
Baton Rouge conference in February
covers diverse topics from spill
response & emerging fuels to EMS.
28: Fire Fighting Encounters
International Fog’s First Attack
piercing fog nozzle tested to
deliver carbon dioxide extinguisher.
30: U.S. Foam Recall Ordered
Product mislabeled with UL identifier
assigned to competing foam maker.
Technical Consultant
Louis N. Molino, Sr.
Hazmat Contributor
John S. Townsend, Ph.D.
EMS Contributor
Bill Kerney
Risk Contributor
John A. Frank
Publisher
David White
Editor
Anton Riecher
Marketing Manager
Lynn White
Associate Editor
Kendra Graf
Bookkeeper
Cyndie Norman
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2009
Volume 24
Number 6
31: Focus on Hazmat
By John S. Townsend
To be functional, a contingency
plan must be fleshed out with at
least ten essential elements.
34: Risk Assessment
By John Frank
Safety concerns are driving more
chiefs to consider defensive rather
than offensive fire operations.
35: EMS Corner
By Bill Kerney
Lathering your hands to the tune of
“Happy Birthday” is one way to
battle the outbreak of H1N1.
36: Industrial Service
Directory
38: Spotlight Ads
INDUSTRIAL FIRE
WORLD®
SINCE 1985
(ISSN 0749-890X)
P.O. Box 9161/540 Graham Rd.
College Station, TX 77842/45
(979)690-7559
FAX (979)690-7562
E-MAIL [email protected]
WEB SITE www.fireworld.com
Industrial Fire World, Nov.-Dec. 2009, Volume 24, No. 6. Industrial Fire World (ISSN 0749-890X) is published bimonthly by Industrial Fire World, Inc., P.O. Box 9161, College Station, Texas 77842. (979) 690-7559. Fax: (979) 6907562. E-mail: [email protected]. All rights reserved under International Convention. Copyright © 2009 by Industrial Fire World Inc., all rights reserved. Industrial Fire World is a registered trademark of David White Investments, Inc.,
College Station, Texas. The design and content are fully protected by copyright and must not be reproduced in any manner without written permission of the publisher. Bulk rate postage paid at Fulton, MO, and additional mailing offices.
Subscription rates: USA, one year $29.95, two years $49.95, and three years $59.95; Canada and foreign, add $20 per year postage. Single copies $6. Back issues available at $6 a copy plus postage. Payment must accompany orders
for single copies. All inquiries regarding subscription problems, change of address and payments, call (979) 690-7559. Please allow six to eight weeks for your first subscription copy to be shipped. Please state both old and new addresses
when requesting an address change and notify us at least six weeks in advance. (If possible enclose subscription address label.) Industrial Fire World is edited exclusively to be of value for people in the industrial fire protection field.
Subscriptions are reserved to those engaged in the area of industrial fire protection and related fields or service and supply companies’ personnel. Address advertising requests to Marketing Director, Industrial Fire World, P.O. Box 9161,
College Station, Texas 77842. (979) 690-7559. Advertising rates and requirements available on request. Editorial Information: Industrial Fire World welcomes correspondence dealing with industrial fire and safety issues, products, training
and other information that will advance the quality and effectiveness of industrial fire and safety management. We will consider for publication all submitted manuscripts and photographs. All material will be treated with care, although we
cannot be responsible for loss or damage. Submissions should be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. (Any payment for use of material will be made only upon publication.) Industrial Fire World assumes no responsibility
for the return of unsolicited manuscripts or photographs. Industrial Fire World reserves the right to refuse any editorial or advertising material submitted for publication. Information and recommendations contained in this publication have
been compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable and representative of the best current opinion on various topics. No warranty, guarantee, or representation is made by Industrial Fire World as to the absolute validity of sufficiency
of information contained within the publication. Industrial Fire World assumes no responsibility for statements made by contributors. Advertising in Industrial Fire World does not imply approval nor endorsement by Industrial Fire World.
Printed in the USA. CPC publication number 40801529. Postmaster: Send address changes to Industrial Fire World, P.O. Box 9161, College Station, Texas 77842. For subscription inquiries call: (979) 690-7559.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
3
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
3
DAVE’S NOTES
The more things change ...
By DAVID WHITE
O
n October 23, an explosion with the
force of a 2.9 magnitude earthquake
and the resulting fire destroyed 11
tanks at a 40-tank petroleum storage facility
near San Juan, Puerto Rico. Over the next
two days flames spread through at least six
more tanks containing jet fuel, bunker fuel
and gasoline in one of the largest fires ever
in the U.S. Caribbean island territory.
No deaths were reported but at least two
people were hurt.
Strangely enough, the date also marked
the 20th anniversary of Pasadena Chemical
Complex explosion and fire near Houston,
TX (See “Wrong Pasadena,” SeptemberOctober 2009). The initial blast registered
3.5 on the Richter scale. The conflagration
took 10 hours to bring under control. Some
23 workers were killed and 314 were injured.
Rather than blowing up a fuel storage
terminal in Puerto Rico, I would rather have
celebrated the Pasadena anniversary quietly.
Maybe not as quietly as the Houston news
media though. A quick survey of the for
newspapers web sites in Houston and
Pasadena, together with the web sites for all
the major Houston television stations,
revealed not one mention commemorating
the worst industrial disaster in U.S. history
in the past 60 years. Granted, the U.S. has a
lot on its plate right now — health care
reform, the economy, swine flu, Iraq,
Afghanistan and wayward airline pilots who
can not find Minneapolis.
Industrial Fire World is entering its 25th
year of service to our namesake. What have
we learned over the years? We must look to
the past and have a “what if” future
perspective as we report on potential
disasters. A few examples:
• Whiting, IN - 1955: An explosion in an
oil refinery hydroformer triggered an eight
day fire that spread through 67 storage
tanks. We learned that one tank boilover
can destroy a total refinery.
• Sunray, TX - 1956: A little known refinery
disaster that still ranks only three places
behind 9/11 in the record for firefighters killed.
You must address impinging fire on a
pressure vessel in the vapor space and the
dangers of pumping out liquids during the
fire.
• Philadelphia, PA - 1975: A refinery fire
that killed eight. The incident commander
must have the big picture of what is going
on in a fire and monitor the liquid levels in
the dike because overflowing dikes put
flammable liquid under personnel outside the
dike. Also, a covered floating roof tank can
boil over as much as two weeks after the
initial fire.
For the 50th anniversary of the Sunray
incident, the refinery joined with the
community to hold a dinner honoring the
relatives of the survivors. A special display
case for memorabilia related to the disaster
was dedicated the refinery’s new fire station.
In contrast, unfortunately, the Pasadena
anniversary, passed without a glimmer of
interest from the hometown press. Tiny
Sunray, population 1,950, seems to have a
longer memory as a community than
Pasadena, population 146,518.
We would have written the articles about
Whiting, Sunray and Pasadena regardless.
As poet and philosopher George Santayana
said, “Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it.” Sure, the
technology and procedures change. And,
yes, we also work to keep you updated on
the latest developments. But, more important,
the mind set that leads to industrial
catastrophe past and present too often
remains the same. Some moment of
carelessness or, worse, incompetence, begins
a cascade of events that in the end gets
someone killed. A decision based on false
economy, such as delaying fire training,
results in the loss of the entire facility.
I hope your focus in 2010 will be to learn
from the expertise of your peers who have
“battled the dragon” and from those
developing strategies and technology to
meet today’s emerging issues by joining us
for the 25th Industrial Fire World conference
C
in Baton Rouge.
www.fireworld.com
4
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
4
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
3M introduces new
fire barrier duct wrap
Point of
Penetration
By ANTON RIECHER
IFW Editor
T
o meet the most stringent standard being enforced
nationally for grease duct fire protection, 3M Company
introduced a lighter and less dense fire barrier duct wrap
in September to compete with traditional fire protection such as
gypsum wallboard shafts and other bulky wrap systems.
Jenny Hicks, marketing manager for Fire Protection Products
with 3M Building and Commercial Services Division, said that
3M Fire Barrier Duct Wrap 615+ was developed specifically to
meet the new ASTM E 2336 test standards referenced in the 2009
Edition of the International Mechanical Code.
“UL 1978 was the original test standard for grease duct
protection that was referenced in the building code,” Hicks said.
“However, part of the country was using a more rigorious test
standard known as ASTM E 2336.”
Testing agencies responsible for the model building codes
adopted by more jurisdictions opted to move to the tougher
ASTM E 2336 test standard. As a result, 3M replaced its previous
fire barrier duct wrap designated 15A with the new 3M Fire Barrier
Duct Wrap 615+ product.
The new standard requires that grease duct enclosure systems
resist combustion when exposed to 1,382 degrees F. Fire Barrier
Duct Wrap 615+ is a lightweight, thin-profile insulation product
that provides up to two hours of fire protection for grease and air
ventilation ducts by resisting maximum temperature of up to 2,192
degrees F.
3M Fire Barrier Duct Wrap 615+ installed around duct creates
a fire-resistive barrier that maintains the duct integrity and helps
prevent fire from rapidly spreading throughout a building. ASTM
E 2336 requires two layers of fire protection material are necessary
around grease ducts in jurisdiction that have adopted the 2009
IMC or the 2008 edition of NFPA 96.
“There are different ways to protect a grease duct,” Hicks
said. “You can use a gypsum rock wall around the grease duct or
you can use a prefabricated duct which provides another layer of
metal around the duct with additional insulation inside.”
The advantage of using duct wrap instead is zero clearance,
Hicks said.
“A gypsum wall is combustible,” she said. “If you chose to
protect a grease duct with it you have to have 18 inches of
clearance between them. If there are space constrains a zero
clearance product such as 3M Fire Barrier Duct Wrap 615+ is
very important.” The new 3M product weighs only six pound per
cubic foot, about two pcf lighter than previous wraps on the
market.
However, depending on insulation alone presents problems.
Fire Barrier Duct Wrap 615+ is only part of an overall 3M system
of duct wraps and sealants designed to better protect industrial
facilities.
“When a grease duct crosses a fire rated wall or floor, the
situation becomes more complicated,” Hicks said. “We call that a
point of through penetration.”
Using special chalks in conjunction with the duct wrap
prevents fire from passing through the point of penetration, she
said.
“We like to talk about the value of our whole system, not just
protecting the duct but protecting the points of through
penetration that ducts create,” Hicks said.
C
For further reference, the website is www.3m.com/firestop.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
5
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
5
Above, the explosion is captured by an
infrared camera more than four miles
away. The cooling towers to the right of
the blast are at a nearby power station.
On December 19, 2007, a process reactor containing
six tons of gasoline additive blew apart in
Jacksonville, FL, killing four employees and injuring
28 people. A federal report attributes the disaster to a
failure in the reactor’s cooling system. It also blames
failure to recognize the runaway reaction hazard
associated with the product being manufactured.
6
RUNAWAY
By ANTON RIECHER
IFW Editor
A
loud jet engine-like sound drew
startled attention from businesses
neighboring the T2 Laboratories
chemical plant one afternoon in December
2007. Eyewitnesses reported high pressure
venting from the top of a 2,450-gallon
batch reactor designed to produce a
specialized gasoline additive.
Within moments, the reactor violently
ruptured with a force equivalent to 1,420
pound of TNT.
“The incident at T2 Laboratories
included one of the most powerful
explosions that the CSB (U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board)
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
6
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
At left, the T2 Laboratories facilities are consumed
by flames after a December 2007 explosion. At right,
a four-inch diameter agitator shaft from the exploded
reactor imbedded in a sidewalk 350 feet away. Below, Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department Capt.
Kurt Wilson, left, confers with Lt. Todd Smith during
the fire. Wilson and Smith are the leading hazmat
instructors with the department. At bottom, a 2,000
pound portion of the three-inch thick reactor that damaged a building 400 feet from the explosion.
Photo Courtesy of Steve Gerbert
The company might have
has ever investigated, a blast • Firefighters search hot zone for blast survivor, Page 13
that was felt 15 miles away in • Feds cite four reactor runaways similar to T2, Page 18 survived if management recognized the runaway reaction
downtown Jacksonville (FL),”
hazard associated with their product, said
system was available.
said CSB chairman John Bresland.
Ordinarily, the CSB made specific safety CSB lead investigator Robert Hall.
Four T2 workers, including a company
“Had they understood this they might
co-owner were killed in the blast. Four recommendations regarding the process
other T2 employees and 28 workers at under investigation. Instead, this report have chosen to design and operate their
made wide ranging recommendations to process differently,” he said.
nearby businesses were also injured.
The blast damaged other businesses better educate chemical engineers with
within one quarter mile of the facility. Four regard to chemical reactive hazard
damaged buildings were subsequently awareness, Bresland said.
condemned. Debris landed up to one mile
“We would have made different
away.
recommendations had the company still
A report issued by the CSB in September been in operation,” he said. “But the
2009 blamed the disaster on a runaway company was basically destroyed by the
exothermic reaction following a breakdown explosion. There wouldn’t be any point in
in the reactor’s cooling system. No making recommendations to the
emergency backup to the primary cooling company.”
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2009 7
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
7
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
Sept. Incident Log
Underlined items denote fatalities
Sept. 1 – Florence, AL: A machine that
makes landscaping mats caught fire at a
factory.
Sept. 1 – Joshua, TX: A fire near a gas
well site destroyed expensive support
equipment.
Sept. 1 – Macomb, IL: Firefighters dealt
with leaking anhydrous ammonia that
forced the evacuation of several homes
and businesses.
Sept. 1 – Malgobeck, Ingushetia: A trunk
gas pipeline exploded.
Sept. 1 – Nahariya, Israel: Toxic gas
leaking from a factory forced police to close
nearby roads.
Sept. 1 – North Sea, Denmark: An oil
platform shutdown when cracks were
found in an underwater oil storage tank.
Sept. 1 – Quezon City, Phillippines: Fire
destroyed a factory which produced
plywood.
Sept. 1 – Priest River, ID: Chlorine gas
leaking from a water treatment plant forced
the evacuation of the downtown area.
Sept. 1 – Ringwood, Australia: An
explosion rocked a recycling plant, injuring
a worker.
Sept. 2 – Cibolo, TX: A worker welding
was injured in an explosion and fire that
heavily damaged a warehouse.
Sept. 2 – Coosa, GA: A worker at a timber
processing plant suffered sulfuric acid
burns.
Sept. 2 – East Providence, RI: An
equipment fire broke out at a metals
recycling plant.
Sept. 2 – Flaxweiler, Luxemburg: Fire
erupted in a biogas plant.
Sept. 2 – Great Falls, MT: A fire at an oil
refinery triggered by a hydrogen explosion
was quickly extinguished.
Sept. 2 – Haridwar, India: Fire spread
through an electronics plant.
Sept. 2 – Jinlan, China: 18 people died
and 10 were injured in an explosion
involving a lacquer-curing agent being
unloaded from a truck.
Sept. 2 – Mangalore, India: Several fires
broke out in an electrical substation
supplying an effluent treatment plant at an
oil refinery.
Sept. 2 – Nampa, ID: A small fire broke
out at a meat packing plant.
Sept. 2 – Pointe-a-Pierre, Trinidad &
Tobago: A breakdown in a sulfur recover
unit at an oil refinery led to an evacuation.
Sept. 2 – Prawes, Thailand: A paint
factory worker was injured in a fire.
8
8
Billowing flames dwarf the woods adjoining the T2 Laboratories site.
METALATION
Prior to 2004, T2 Laboratories, Inc., a
small privately-owned corporation,
concentrated primarily on blending
solvents used in the printing industry.
Other than issues of inherent flammability,
these solvents remained non-reactive
when blended into solution as needed.
Manufacturing methylcyclopentadienyl
manganese tricarbonyl (MCMT), an
organomanganese compound used as an
octane-increasing gasoline additive, was
T2’s sole reactive chemical process, Hall
said. The additive was marketed under the
brand name Ecotane.
“It was much more hazardous than the
other processes they were performing at
this site,” he said.
Before 2001, T2 blended premanufactured MCMT to specified
concentrations for a third-party distributor.
That year, T2 moved from a downtown
warehouse to a site in a north Jacksonville
industrial area where construction began
on an MCMT process line.
“The seeds were planted the first day
they operated,” Hall said. “That ultimately
led to the explosion.”
Although both of T2’s owners – a
chemical engineer and a chemist – had prior
chemical industry experience, neither had
previously worked with reactive chemical
processes.
“The owners who developed the
process did not fundamentally understand
the hazard of the material they were dealing
with,” Hall said. “They did not understand
the runaway reaction potential that
existed.”
Utilizing a patent dating back to the
1950s, the owners developed a three-step
process for making MCMT within a single
process reactor. After running more than
100 test batches in a one-liter glass reactor,
T2 moved to the north Jacksonville site.
“My guess is that the laboratory testing
was more involved with improving the
process, making sure they were getting a
good quality material and good yields,”
Hall said.
T2 hired consulting engineers to assist
in the process design, control system
engineering and project management. Due
to limited funding, T2 purchased and
refurbished used equipment, including a
12-foot high, seven-foot diameter reactor
originally built in 1962.
Modifications to the reactor reduced
the maximum allowable working pressure
from 1,200 psig (pounds per square inch)
to 600 psig. A four-inch vent pipe
connecting to a rupture disk provided
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
8
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
overpressure protection for the reactor. T2
employees told the CSB that the rupture
disk was set at 400 psig.
“Had they done thermal hazard
evaluation testing, which is very specific
to the task, they could have properly
designed the reactor relief system,” Hall
said.
Three of the first 10 full scale MCMT
batches using the revamped reactor
resulted in unexpected exothermic
reactions, all during metalation, the first
step in the process. In each instance the
batch recipe was slightly different.
T2 did not repeat batch recipes to isolate
the problem. Instead, they changed
recipes in each of the first 10 batches, the
CSB report stated.
“Records we reviewed show that in some
early production batches there were
excursions that took the temperature
higher than the normal operating
temperature,” Hall said. “In each case the
plant was able to get the reaction back
under control, primarily through cooling.
In the first 10 batches there were three of
these events.”
T2 announced successful commercial
Incident Log
(Continued)
Sept. 2 – Ste-Therese, QC: Nearby
residents were evacuated when chemicals
leaked at a building materials plant.
Sept. 2 – Tampa, FL: Lightning that struck
nearby injured a worker operating a 130foot crane at a lime rock quarry.
Sept. 2 – West Point, GA: About 200
workers at a new auto plant were moved
after a city fire official raised a safety issue.
Sept. 3 – Chantenay District, France:
Fire broke out inside a grain silo.
Sept. 3 – Clairton, PA: A contract
employee doing maintenance in the gas
cleaning area of a steel plant coke works
died in an explosion.
Diagram Courtesy of CSB
Sept. 3 – Claypool, IN: An equipment fire
broke out at a plant that processes
soybean and biodiesel products.
operation to its stakeholders in 2004 after
Batch 11.
“They had these near misses but the
response was not to investigate the hazard
further, just begin making another batch,”
Hall said.
With Batch 42 in July 2005, T2 increased
Sept. 3 – Dhaka, Bangladesh: An
ammonia leak at a cold storage plant made
13 workers ill.
Sept. 3 – New Bedford, MA: Fire
threatened to spread throughout a printing
plant.
Sept. 3 – Rio Claro, Brazil: A fire in a
storage tank at an ethanol plant killed a
worker.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
9
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
9
Incident Log
(Continued)
Sept. 3 – Shan-dong Province, China:
An explosion in a chemical plant killed at
least 18 workers and injured 10 more.
Sept. 3 – Uzice, Serbia: 4 explosions
ripped through a munitions plant, killing 6
workers.
Sept. 3 – Warsaw, IN: An explosion
severely burned a worker at a plant making
orthopaedic surgical products.
Sept. 4 – Canton, PA: The second fire in
3 months broke out at a recycling plant.
Sept. 4 – Greymouth, New Zealand: A
subcontractor welding atop a storage tank
at a bitumen plant died in an explosion.
Sept. 4 – Hebbagodi, India: 2 workers
died when a vessel exploded at a chemical
plant.
Sept. 4 – Marifu, Japan: A lightning strike
knocked out power to an oil refinery, forcing
a two-day shutdown.
Sept. 4 – Markdale, ON: Welding work
was being done when fire broke out that
destroyed an ice cream plant.
Sept. 5 – Ampang district, Malaysia: Fire
spread through seven factories at an
industrial park, including an aluminum
manufacturing plant and a recycling center.
Sept. 5 – Bergkamen, Germany: A tank
of alkyl aluminium exploded at a
pharmaceutical plant.
Sept. 5 – Fehring, Austria: More than 50
gallons of diluted hydrochloric acid leaked
from a storage tank at a printed circuit
manufacturer.
Sept. 5 – Karachi, Pakistan: 4 firefighters
suffered burns battling a fire at a towel
factory.
Sept. 5 – Middleboro, KY: An ammonia
spill at a meat processing plant polluted a
downtown canal, killing fish.
Sept. 5 – Newman, GA: Fire destroyed a
plant making molded flexible products.
Sept. 5 – Philadelphia, PA: A food
processing plant was evacuated when
xylene fumes spread through the building.
Sept. 5 – Vanderbijlpark, South Africa:
A steel plant worker died in an explosion.
Sept. 6 – Allentown, PA: A plant making
industrial valves was damaged by a fire
that destroyed 2 nearby buildings.
Sept. 6 – Aston, PA: A foul odor emanating
from a chemical plant forced the evacuation
of an adjoining business.
Sept. 6 – Johor Baharu, Malaysia: Fire
destroyed a plastics manufacturing plant.
Sept. 6 – Manheim Twp., PA: Spilled
molten metal spread fire through an
aluminum plant.
10
10
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
Photo Courtesy of Mark Treglio
Firefighters move through the wreckage at T2 following their foam attack.
the batch size from four to six tons. No
records exist of additional chemical or
process analysis conducted as part of the
recipe change. A greater volume of
reactants increased the energy that the
reaction could produce, likely altering the
cooling and pressure relief requirements,
the CSB report stated.
Hall compared the management situation
to the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger
in January 1986.
“It’s a reoccurring theme in accident
investigation,” he said. “In the Challenger
accident you had the failure of the O-ring
that led to the explosion of the shuttle.
They had prior failures of the O-ring but
normalized it. There wasn’t an explosion,
so they did the same thing again.”
At T2, because operators were able to
cope with these unexpected temperatures
with applied cooling, the company
normalized the situation, continuing to do
the same thing rather than mounting an
investigation into what was happening,
Hall said.
At 7:30 a.m. on December 19, 2007,
production of T2’s 175th batch of MCMT
began. The process required both heating
and cooling. Hot oil circulated through
three-inch piping installed around the
inside of the reactor.
For cooling, water injected into a jacket
covering the lower three quarters of the
reactors was allowed to boil, the steam
venting through an open pipe connected
to the top of the jacket. The capacity of
the cooling system exceeded that of the
hot oil system by a margin of 10-to-1.
Each MCMT production step required
the process operator to add raw materials
and adjust heating, cooling and pressure
using a computerized process control
system. In the metalation reaction, the
process operator fed a mixture of
methylcyclopentadiene (MCPD) dimmer
and diethylene glycol dimethyl ether
(diglyme) into the reactor. An outside
operator then hand-loaded blocks of
sodium metal through a six-inch gate valve
on top of the reactor.
At about 11 a.m., the process operator
began heating the mixture, setting the
reactor pressure control at 50 psig (3.45
bar) and hot oil temperature control at 360
degrees Fahrenheit. The melted sodium
reacted with the MCPD to form sodium
methylcyclopentadine, hydrogen gas and
heat. The hydrogen gas vented to the
atmosphere through a pressure control
valve and one-inch vent line.
Once the mixture temperature reached
210 degrees, the process operator started
the agitator. The mixing and higher
temperature both increased the metalation
reaction rate. At 300 degrees, the operator
turned off the hot oil system as specified
by established procedure. Heat generated
by the metalation reaction continued to
raise the mixture temperature.
Once the process reached 360 degrees,
the operator initiated the control system
cooling program, which intermittently
10
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
Incident Log
(Continued)
Sept. 6 – Pu’unene, Hawaii: A fire at a
cement plant caused massive damage.
Sept. 6 – Richmond, RI: Fire in a mulch
pile created thick smoke at a sand and
gravel plant.
Sept. 7 – Catoosa, OK: Flames at a filter
plant warehouse sent three firefighters to
the hospital for heat-related injuries.
Sept. 7 – Dayton, OH: A hopper railcar
caught fire at an agricultural processing
plant.
Sept. 7 – Mexico City, Mexico: Fire
spread through paper stored at a printing
plant.
Sept. 7 – Tuttlingen, Germany: A factory
fire threatened to spread to a nearby
supermarket and gas station.
Flames at T2 Laboratories threatened tankers and tube trailers parked on site.
injected water into the jacket. Investigators
suspect that a single point failure in the
cooling system left the operator powerless
to control the increasing heat.
No emergency source of cooling existed.
“Had they recognized the hazard up
front and designed a cooling system that
was more robust and had more
redundancy, that could have prevented the
accident,” Hall said.
At 1:23 p.m., the process operator asked
an outside operator to contact the owners,
who were off site. Within minutes, the
owners returned. The owner/chemical
engineer reported to the control room to
assist while the owner/chemist searched
for the plant mechanic.
An outside operator en route to the
control room to investigate multiple
process alarms was met halfway by the
owner/chemical engineer who said he
thought there would be a fire. The owner/
chemical engineer motioned employees
away from the reactor before returning to
the control room.
At 1:33 p.m., the reactor’s relief system
could no longer control the rapidly
increasing temperature and pressure. The
three-inch thick reactor ruptured, its
contents exploding. Flames also spread
through the other flammable processes and
storage at the facility.
“It was just a matter of time with the
various batches that one got far enough
out on the parameter to cause an
explosion,” Hall said.
ANALYSIS
CSB investigators determined that
insufficient cooling was the only credible
cause for this incident, ruling out cross
contamination, wrong concentration of
raw materials, local concentration of
chemical within the reactor and application
of excessive heat.
“We likely had a cooling system
failure,” Hall said. “They were unable to
apply sufficient cooling, leading to the
result we had.”
Witness statements confirm that the
process operator reported a cooling
problem shortly before the explosion. The
cooling system lacked design redundancy,
making it susceptible to single point
failures.
Employees indicated that T2 did not
perform preventive maintenance on the
cooling system, replacing components
only after failure. On at least one prior
occasion, the reactor cooling drain valve
failed during operations and required
repair. Formation of mineral scale inside
the jacket could have interfered with heat
removal. Also, loose scale could have
blocked the inlet/drain pipe, causing it to
stick open.
CSB conducted laboratory tests based
on the T2 chemical recipe using a small
sample size to minimize potential hazards.
Two exothermic reactions were observed.
The first reaction occurred at about 350
degrees as desired. A second more
energetic reaction occurred when the
Sept. 7 – Xigu District, China: More than
100 people became sick from fumes leaking
from a chemical plant processing waste
oil.
Sept. 8 – Bolton, UK: Responders battled
an arson fire at a plastics manufacturing
plant.
Sept. 8 – Brockport, NY: A steel tank
being moved at a former plant site
ruptured, spilling 100 gallons of an unknown
liquid.
Sept. 8 – Broomfield, CO: Responders
allowed a fire in an unstable stack of trees
at a recycling center to burn itself out.
Sept. 8 – Calgary, AB: 2 workers using
extinguishers put out a fire in a commercial
oven at a furniture factory.
Sept. 8 – Doral, FL: High levels of carbon
monoxide generated by forklifts made 8
warehouse workers ill.
Sept. 8 – Frodsham, UK: More than 50
gallons of sodium silicate spilled from a
truck, closing a major roadway for hours.
Sept. 8 – Goor, Netherlands: At least 8
workers were affected by ammonia leaking
from a tank being disassembled at a plant
that processes butchery waste.
Sept. 8 – Huntington, WV: More than
50,000 pounds of aniline spilled while being
unloaded at a pigments plant, injuring a
worker.
Sept. 8 – Karratha, Australia: A worker
at an LNG plant was seriously injured while
unloading pipe from a vessel.
Sept. 8 – Lake City, FL: A tractor-trailer
carrying hazardous materials overturned
and caught fire.
Sept. 8 – Larymna, Greece: A metals plant
worker splattered with molten ore in late
August died from his injuries.
Sept. 8 – Manchester, UK: Fire swept
through inventory at a plastics factory.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
11
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
11
11
Incident Log
(Continued)
Sept. 8 – Melbourne, Australia: Fire
destroyed a carpet factory.
Sept. 8 – Shriopshire, UK: Fire broke out
at a tire recycling plant.
Sept. 8 – Wuxi City, China: More than
300 workers at a pipe manufacturing plant
were overcome by food poisoning.
Sept. 9 – Baton Rouge, LA: A leaking
flange caused a small fire at an oil refinery.
Sept. 9 – Bolton, UK: 2 vehicles parked in
an industrial park were set ablaze by
vandals.
Sept. 9 – Canal Fulton, OH: An orthopedic
surgeon helped rescue a meat processing
plant worker who caught his arm in a
grinder.
Sept. 9 – Caramut, Australia: Molten
sulfur spilled into a creek when a truck
overturned.
Sept. 9 – Cedar Rapids, IA: Sprinklers
suppressed a fire at a manufacturing plant
when an electrical transformer exploded.
Sept. 9 – Chiba, Japan: An oil leak at a
refinery led to a fire in the crude distillation
unit.
Sept. 9 – Colusa County, CA: Fire ignited
in a rice dryer at an agricultural processing
plant.
Sept. 9 – Dummerston, VT: The sprinkler
system in a paper plant warehouse held a
fire in check until responders could arrive.
Sept. 9 – Houthalen, Belgium: Nitric acid
vapor was released from a ventilation shaft
at a recording plant.
Sept. 9 – Lake Park, IA: Fire destroyed a
warehouse at an animal feed processing
plant.
Sept. 9 – Menomonee Falls, WI: A
machine designed to wash parts caught
fire and burned at a motorcycle
manufacturing plant.
Sept. 9 – Norit, TX: Welding work at a
carbon manufacturing plant triggered a fire.
Sept. 9 – Oldbury, UK: Flames spread
through a historic brewery.
Sept. 9 – Topsham, ME: Lack of water
hindered firefighters battling a metal
recycling plant fire.
Sept. 9 – Wem, UK: Heavy equipment was
used to separate waste material burning at
an industrial park.
Sept. 9 – West Heidelberg, Australia:
Nearly a ton of glass panes fell in a domino
effect, crushing a glass plant worker to
death.
Sept. 9 – Zaporizhia District, Ukraine: 3
people were injured in a fire that spread
through a car plant.
12
12
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
temperature exceeded 390 degrees.
Pressure from that second reaction
overwhelmed the reactor’s pressure relief
system designed for normal operating
conditions. The CSB report stated that it
was unlikely the T2 owners were aware
that reaction would occur.
“In a perfect world, T2 would have done
sophisticated testing that we did after the
accident,” Bresland said. “Then, based on
that, T2 would have designed the process
in such a way that, for example, there
would have been a backup cooling
system,” Bresland said.
The pressure and temperature rise
during the second exothermic reactions
was about 32,000 psig per minute (2,206
bar per minute) and 2340 degrees per
minute. This was sufficient to burst the
test cells.
It is unlikely that an overpressure relief
device of any size set at 400 psig could
have prevented the reactor failure during
the second exothermic reaction, the CSB
report stated. Had T2 set its four-inch
reactor rupture disk at 75 psig, rather than
the 400 psig used, the runaway reaction
likely would have been relieved during the
first exothermic reaction, precluding the
second.
“Had they done thermal hazard
evaluation testing, which is very specific
testing to the task, they could have
properly designed the relief system to
better protect the reactor,” Hall said.
All three steps of the MCMT process
involved toxicity, flammability or reactivity
hazards. A literature search by CSB found
little published information on the
production of MCMT other than the
patents and no published information
specific to its reactivity hazards.
That lack of process hazard information
made laboratory testing especially
important, the report stated. Initial testing
done by T2 did not observe extreme
exothermic behavior. Test temperatures
never exceeded 380 degrees. However, the
one-liter laboratory reactor did not
accurately indicate the amount of cooling
needed in the full-scale T2 reactor.
“The thermal hazard evaluation testing
that CSB performed is a specialized group
of tests that is done by a very small number
of companies across the U.S.,” Hall said.
“These tests look at the heat produced and
the reaction rate. We have used these tests
in a number of cases to replicate chemistry
that occurred in similar types of runaway
reaction accidents.”
The owner/chemical engineer held a
bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering
and was active in his university’s
engineering curriculum advisory board.
However, most baccalaureate chemical
engineering curricula in the U.S. do not
specifically address reactive hazard
recognition or management, a survey by
Texas A&M University’s Mary Kay
O’Connor Process Safety Center revealed.
Of the universities surveyed by the
center, only 11 percent required process
safety education in the core baccalaureate
curriculum. An additional 13 percent
offered an elective process safety course.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The CSB recommended that the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
and the Accreditation Board for
Engineering and Technology, Inc., work
together to add reactive hazard awareness
to baccalaureate chemical engineering
curricula requirements.
It also recommended that the AIChE
inform all student members about its
Process Safety Certificate Program,
encouraging participation.
A report on reactive hazard management
issued by the CSB in 2002 documented 167
serious reactive incidents in the U.S.
between January 1980 and June 2001 that
resulted in 108 deaths and hundreds of
injuries. At least 35 percent of those
incidents were due to runaway reactions
similar to the one at T2. Many of those
incidents were at small manufacturing sites
similar to T2, the report stated.
Four previous runaway reaction
incidents investigated by the CSB since
1998 resulted in 10 deaths and more than
200 injuries.
Only one other company in the U.S.
manufactures MCMT, Bresland said. That
company, a market leader in fuel and
lubricant additive research, development
and manufacturing, was the originator of
the MCMT patent.
“We don’t know what their process is
like but they have not had an incident so
we assume they are doing things the right
C
way,” he said.
12
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
Incident Log
RUNAWAY
(Continued)
Attack Strategy
Sept. 10 – Buffalo, NY: 7,000 gallons of
jet fuel spilled from an overturned tanker
truck onto one of the busiest roads in the
region.
Sept. 10 – Capitol Heights, MD:
Hazardous materials were involved in an
explosion and fire at a commercial
warehouse.
Firefighters search hot zone for injured T2 survivor
By ANTON RIECHER
IFW Editor
A
voice pleading on a cell phone
forced firefighters to risk entering
the blazing T2 Laboratories
complex soon after a reactor processing
six tons of gasoline additive blew apart,
said hazardous materials responder Kurt
Wilson.
“He said he was trapped by the fire,”
Wilson said. “We had people trying to find
him but they couldn’t.”
Only one option remained — mount a
quick attack with foam, not to extinguish
the fire but to open a window through the
flames to locate the badly injured worker,
said Wilson, a captain with the Jacksonville
(FL) Fire and Rescue Department’s
hazardous materials team.
Debris from the December 2007 reactive
chemical explosion at T2 Laboratories
landed up to a mile away, a U.S. Chemical
Safety Board report stated. Businesses
within a quarter mile radius were badly
damaged, including four buildings that
were ultimately condemned.
Sept. 10 – Carlyss, LA: Nearly 100 barrels
of crude oil leaked from an underground
storage line.
Four T2 personnel died. Four other T2
employees and 28 workers at nearby
businesses were also injured.
Responders arriving at a disaster scene
such as T2 usually depend on personnel
on site to gain a quick grasp of the hazards
involved, Wilson said.
“When we arrived 100 percent of the
workers were killed, trapped or en route to
the hospital,” he said.
Sept. 10 – Lavera, France: Four chemical
plant workers were overcome by a leak of
dichlorethane.
Sept. 10 – Logan County, WV: Flames
engulfed a five-story coal preparation plant.
Sept. 10 – Madison, WI: 30 tons of
cardboard burned in a recycling plant fire.
Sept. 10 – Mount Airy, NC: Fire spread
through the ductwork of a textile plant.
Sept. 10 – Sharjah, UAE: 8 warehouses
stocked with petrochemicals burned in an
industrial district.
COME TOGETHER
Covering 840 square miles, Jacksonville
is the largest city in land and water area in
the contiguous United States. The
Jacksonville Fire & Rescue Department
(JFRD) is the country’s 14th largest fire
department. A staff of 1,200 firefighters and
emergency medical personnel protects a
population of 850,000. Jacksonville, a major
transportation hub, is home to a wide
variety of industries.
“Jacksonville is an industrial city,”
Wilson said. “There is no way to keep up
with every process in use.”
The St. Johns River that splits the city
also divides the JFRD into two battalions.
Sept. 10 – South Gate, CA: A fire erupted
in an asphalt tank being dismantled at a
roofing company.
Sept. 10 – Springs, South Africa: An
explosion at a zinc refinery killed 3
contractors and injured 12 others.
Sept. 10 – St. Austell, UK: Fire broke out
in a bin at a chemical plant.
Sept. 11 – Barrancabermeja, Colombia:
Fire broke out at an oil refinery.
Sept. 11 – Gainsborough, UK: Fire broke
out in a storage silo at a plastics recycling
plant.
Sept. 11 – Jiyaguda, India: 2 people were
injured in a fire that gutted a plastic recycling
plant.
Firefighters apply alcohol-resistant foam against the burning solvents at T2.
Sept. 11 – Kingston, Jamaica: Nearly
300 tons of sulfuric acid spilled into the
sea near Kingston Harbor produced an
immediate fish kill.
Sept. 11 – Melksham, UK: A fuel spill at a
tire factory threatened to pollute the Avon
River.
Sept. 11 – Norwich, UK: 11 emergency
workers were treated after a factory fire.
Sept. 11 – Pudong, China: A worker died
from inhaling toxic fumes after an explosion
and fire in a waste oil pit at an oil refinery.
Sept. 12 – Jasper County, IL: Workers
quickly brought a fire at a power plant under
control.
Sept. 12 – Jefferson County, OH: A faulty
valve in the emissions control system at a
power plant allowed ammonia vapor to
leak.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
13
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
13
13
Incident Log
(Continued)
Sept. 12 – New Delhi, India: Flames
destroyed a multi-story candle plant.
Sept. 12 – Rio Grande City, TX: A 16-inch
gas pipeline ruptured but crews were able to
stop the supply and repair the line without
igniting it.
Sept. 12 – Studley, UK: Fire spread through
10 portable cabins at a factory site.
Sept. 13 – Barton, AL: An opossium short
circuited an electrical substation at a railcar
plant. Exhaust from emergency generators
then caught the roof of the building on fire.
Sept. 13 – Bindlacher Berg, Germany: A
massive fire broke out in rubber granules
stored at a factory.
Sept. 13 – Bucharest, Romania: Fire spread
through a combined tire and chemical plant.
Sept. 13 – Calgary, ON: An ammonia leak
broke out at a chicken processing plant.
Sept. 13 – Jaipur, India: 3 people died and 3
were injured in an explosion at a metal recycling
factory.
Sept. 13 – Robinson, IL: A small plane clipped
a power line, leading to a shut down at an oil
refinery.
Sept. 13 – Talara, Peru: An explosion and fire
in the heat exchanger area of an oil refinery
burned three workers.
Sept. 13 – Zhejiang, China: 3 people died
and 17 were injured after exposure to
hazardous waste at a chemical plant.
Sept. 14 – Calgary, AB: An ammonia leak at
a poultry plant shut down operations.
Sept. 14 – Cambridge, OH: Hydrogen sulfide
gas leaking from a gas well killed 1 worker and
injured 4.
Sept. 14 – Kilburn, Australia: An arrest for
arson was made after fire spread through
plastic bottles stored at a recycling plant.
Sept. 14 – Votanikos, Greece: Fire gutted an
ice cream factory.
Sept. 15 – Cedar Rapids, IA: A cutting torch
was in use when fire broke out on the roof of
an electronics plant.
Sept. 15 – Hunslet, UK: Butylacrylate was
discovered leaking from a railroad tanker
parked at an industrial facility.
Sept. 16 – Aschau, Germany: An explosion
rocked a chemical plant.
Sept. 16 – Bilecik, Turkey: More than 60 tons
of oil leaked from a pipeline damaged by an
explosion.
Sept. 16 – Clarines, Venezuela: Chlorine gas
that leaked from a wrecked tanker truck killed
9 people and injured 326.
Sept. 16 – Morrinsville, New Zealand:
Responders sprayed water on a leaking
container of liquid argon, causing it to ice over.
14
14
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
Battalion 1 is east and south of the river
while Battalion 2 is northwest. Nine district
chiefs administer the city’s 53 districts,
each with its own station and engine. JFRD
also has 12 ladder trucks and more than 30
ambulances, referred to as rescues.
Each battalion also has its own
hazardous materials team, Wilson said.
The Jacksonville Fire & Rescue
Department is home to the nation’s first
fire department-operated Hazardous
Materials Response Team, established in
1977. Station 21, located on Jacksonville’s
south side, serves Battalion 1, while Station
7, located in northwest Jacksonville, serves
Battalion 2.
“On the small stuff like gasoline spills
at car accidents we operate separately,”
he said. “On the big stuff, we come
together. T2 obviously qualified for that.”
On the afternoon of December 19, T2
Laboratories and JFRD Station 7
personnel found themselves working with
radically different recipes.
At T2 Laboratories, workers closely
monitored a batch of specialty gasoline
additive processing in a 12-foot high
reactor vessel. Since January 2004, the
refurbished batch reactor had been used
174 times to make the same additive.
Meanwhile, on the fifth floor of Wolfson
Children’s Hospital, the Station 7 hazmat
team prepared to serve ice cream to the
patients and staff in the cancer ward.
Organized by a retired firefighter, the
quarterly ice cream social had been a
tradition for the hazmat responders for
nearly four years.
At 1:33 p.m., the reactor vessel at T2
exploded. Light from the blast was so
intense that it blanked out video captured
by an infrared surveillance camera four
miles away for nearly 12 seconds. Then a
slow, steady mushroom cloud was seen
rising on a column of smoke that soon
dwarfed the 640-foot tall cooling towers
of a nearby power plant.
Neither the sound nor concussion
reached the children’s hospital 15 miles
away. A rush of confused traffic on the
hazmat team’s radios was the first
indication of trouble. First reports linked
the explosion to a transformer at the power
plant. Another report involved an airplane
crashing into the cooling towers.
Finally, an off duty district chief nearby
responded to the scene, tracing the blast
back to T2.
“He told the dispatcher, ‘This is going
to a second alarm real quickly,’” Wilson
said. “He said, ‘I’m at a chemical plant with
multiple BLEVEs (boiling liquid expanding
vapor explosion). I’ve got people injured.”
He also asked for a hazmat response.
Since T2 is in Batallion 2, Station 7
caught the call. The hazmat team, including
Lt. Todd Smith and Lt. Chris Woods, made
hasty apologies at the hospital and headed
for their emergency vehicles.
“We were downtown and T2
Laboratories is on the northside,” Woods
said. “It was probably a 15 to 20 minute
response easily.”
Station 7 arrived at T2 to find the fiveacre facility divided into three main bodies
of fire, he said. No water was being applied
out of concern for the water reactive nature
of chemicals known to be on site.
Reactors used to blend solvents were
venting to the atmosphere. However, the
reactor that was the source of the blast
was now scattered over a one mile radius.
Two large steel support columns
traveled about 1,000 feet in opposite
directions. A 2,000-pound section of the
three-inch thick reactor head damaged a
building 400 feet away. The four-inch
diameter agitator shaft from the reactor
imbedded itself in a sidewalk 350 feet from
the reactor.
Pressure fires were apparent throughout
the facility. BLEVEs involving trapped
product continued to take place.
“We had a couple of tractor trailers on
fire,” Woods said. “We had a stack of
conex shipping containers with fire and
smoke coming from them. We had flame
impingement on two MC-306 tankers. We
also had a tube trailer on fire with the
pressure release device going off.” Private
vehicles in the parking lot were also
burning.
Smoke from the fire carried an extremely
acrid odor, Woods said. Hazmat
responders broke out air monitoring
equipment and weather stations to track
wind direction. Firefighters donned full
bunker gear complete with self-contained
breathing apparatus.
EPCRA
No one was sure what various chemicals
14
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
Incident Log
(Continued)
Sept. 18 – Trostberg, Germany: Nitric
acid leaked from a ruptured pipe at a
chemical plant with firefighters using a
water curtain to control the fumes.
Sept. 19 – Cam Ranh, Vietnam: 3
workers at a fish sauce factory died of
suffocation when they entered a
fermenting vat.
Sept. 19 – Waharoa, New Zealand:
Sludge from a cheese factory leaked into
a nearby river.
Sept. 20 – Leverkusen, Germany:
Hydrofluoric acid leaked from containers
stored at a chemical facility.
Sept. 21 – Joinville, Brazil: A furnace
explosion rocked a foundry.
Damage to a trailer parked at a trucking company operating adajacent to T2.
were involved, the hazmat responders said.
Under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
annual reporting from facilities storing or
processing substances listed as extremely
hazardous was required. These facilities
must submit annual reports, known as Tier
II reports, to the State Emergency
Response Commission (SERC) and local
emergency planning committees (LEPCs),
listing the substances and quantities on
site.
Other than the gasoline additive
involved in the blast, T2 Laboratories, Inc.,
a small privately-owned corporation,
concentrated primarily on blending
solvents used in the printing industry.
Other than issues of inherent flammability,
these solvents remained non-reactive
when blended into solution as needed.
Manufacturing methylcyclopentadienyl
manganese tricarbonyl (MCMT, also
known as MMT), an organomanganese
compound used as an octane-increasing
gasoline additive, was T2’s sole reactive
chemical process. Of the chemicals on site
at T2, only MCMT was listed as an
extremely hazardous substance under
EPCRA.
“We pulled up T2’s web page and all we
got was MSDSs of what went into their
end product,” Wilson said. “It was like
looking at a bunch of LEGOs and trying to
figure out what it looked like when it was
put together.”
A U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board report issued in
September 2009 stated that T2 had not yet
filed its annual Tier II report for the 2007
reporting year. T2 failed to list MCMT on
its previous Tier II reports, despite
producing thousands of pounds per batch
and storing thousands more pounds prior
to shipment off site. The incomplete report
failed to warn responders that MCMT is
toxic by ingestion, inhalation and skin
absorption.
Smith said that only one of the workers
at T2 was in any shape to be interviewed
by responders after the blast. He talked
while being treated in the back of an
ambulance.
“He kept saying the name of the product
was MMT,” Smith said. “He never told the
full name. So we used Google to search
for MMT.” The NIOSH pocket guide
revealed that MMT was a Class IIIB
combustible liquid with a flash point at or
above 200 degrees Fahrenheit.
Also stored in large amounts on site was
water reactive sodium used to manufacture
MCMT. Based on the chemicals that T2
reported storing, JFRD conducted
hazardous materials response drills for
emergencies involving sodium metal since
it required specialized fire fighting
strategies.
“We keyed on these 50 pound bricks of
sodium more because of the Tier II
reporting,” Wilson said. “There were tons
of this stuff packed in 55-gallon drums with
mineral oil. We were looking at that more
Sept. 21 – Oravasaari, Finland:
Hydrogen peroxide spilled from an
overturned cargo vehicle.
Sept. 22 – Ringwood, Australia: A dust
explosion rocked a metal recycling plant
for the second time in a month.
Sept. 23 – Atyrau, Kazakhstan: A fire in
an oil refinery workshop killed a worker
and injured 2 others.
Sept. 23 – Gonfreville-l’Orcher, France:
An explosion in a polyethylene unit rocked
a chemical plant.
Sept. 23 – Hillsville, VA: A battery
explosion injured a worker at a carpet
weaving plant.
Sept. 23 – Korba, India: A chimney under
construction at a thermal power plant
collapsed, killing 14 workers.
Sept. 23 – Osceola County, FL: Lack of
water hindered firefighters battling a fire
that destroyed a biodiesel plant.
Sept. 23 – Saint John, NL: A paper mill
fire involving molten sulfur forced workers
to evacuate.
Sept. 23 – Voronezh, Russia: An
explosion at a pyrotechnic warehouse
killed a worker and injured 25.
Sept. 24 – Aichi, Japan: A desulfurization
unit caught fire at an oil refinery.
Sept. 24 – Dabrowa Chelminska,
Poland: More than 30 workers were
overcome by toxic fumes at a fish
processing plant.
Sept. 24 – Memphis, TN: A pressure
valve on a 9,000 gallon tank of liquid
oxygen ruptured at a chemical plant,
spewing flammable gas.
Sept. 24 – Richmond, CA: A gasoil
hydrotreater unit caught fire at a 245,271
barrel-per-day oil refinery.
Sept. 24 – Skikda, Algeria: Fire broke
out in a central air conditioning unit at an oil
refinery.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
15
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
15
15
Incident Log
(Continued)
Sept. 25 – Barrackpore, Trinidad &
Tobago: A lightning strike caused an
explosion at a crude oil facility.
Sept. 25 – Wilmington, CA: A fire at an oil
refinery lasted several hours.
Sept. 26 – Hohenbrunn, Germany: A
leaking drum of thionyl chloride at a
chemical plant reacted with water, causing
sulfur dioxide and hydrogen chloride
fumes.
Sept. 26 – Temagami, ON: A major
Canadian natural gas pipeline ruptured,
forcing a shut down.
Sept. 27 – Franklin, NH: A brief fire broke
out when material under a smelting pot
ignited at a valve foundry.
Sept. 27 – Hidd, Bahrain: A welder died
from burns when multiple gas cylinders
exploded at a shipbuilding yard.
Sept. 27 – Lewiston, ID: A small explosion
involving a shell rocked a munitions plant.
Sept. 28 – Albany, GA: 700 gallons of
hazmat tainted oil leaked from transformers
being scrapped.
Sept. 28 – Burnaugh, KY: 7 workers were
injured in an explosion at a metallurgical
plant.
Sept. 28 – Mansfield, LA: A contract
worker at a paper mill died when he fell into
a tank of heated water.
Sept. 28 – Preston, MN: A fire at a bio-fuel
plant caused minor damage.
Sept. 28 – Rio de Galinhas, Portugal:
Three people cleaning a wine vat died from
toxic fumes.
Sept. 28 – St. Louis, MO: Fire broke out
at an airplane parts manufacturing plant.
Sept. 29 – Apaxtla, Mexico: An equipment
explosion at a hydroelectric plant killed a
worker. Five others were overcome by
carbon monoxide fumes.
Sept. 29 – Berto Cirio, Brazil: An
explosion in a sawdust storage bin rocked
a local plant.
Sept. 29 – Garden City, GA: An explosion
injured 2 workers cutting up a steel tank at
a recycling plant.
Sept. 29 – South Bend, IN: Dust was
blamed for a fire that involved welding
equipment at a steel tubing plant.
Sept. 29 – Tilton, IL: A truck driver hauling
anhydrous trimethylamine was overcome
by fumes when he stopped to inspect his
vehicle for a suspected leak.
Sept. 29 – Winfred, SD: Fire broke out at
a wax plant, injuring a worker.
Sept. 30 – Baghdad, Iraq: 2 people died
in an explosion and fire at an oil refinery.C
16
16
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
than the end product.” Large quantities of
solvents were also stored on site.
While the main end product at T2
remained a mystery, many JFRD
responders were far too familiar with the
location. Under previous ownership, the
chemical manufacturing facility was the
site of a chemical explosion and fire in June
1998 that forced an area evacuation.
“The stuff they made back then was ten
times worse,” Wilson said. “They were
making pesticides. The owner met the first
arriving engine at the gate and said, ‘Don’t
enter — it’s not worth your life.’ He said,
‘Whatever it’s going to do, let it do.’”
Firefighters took the owner’s advice and
let the fire burn itself out.
It soon became clear that a full hazmat
response would be necessary, bringing
Station 21 to the scene as well, Wilson said.
FULL RESPONSE AT T2
“When we got there the incident
commander had basically declared the
fenced area of the property a hot zone,”
he said. “They basically handed it over to
us – ‘Here’s what we’ve got, so handle
it.’”
A better reconnaissance was needed.
Smith led a small group through the gates
and into the flames. Hose lines protected
the responders from the fire. Fortunately,
the nearly windless day allowed the smoke
to rise straight up, aiding visibility. Woods
armed himself with a 30-pound
extinguisher filled with Purple K. Another
responder sketched out the location of
tanks and buildings, in particular noting
the markings on the tanks.
The firefighters made a clockwise circuit
of the property, walking in a semi-crouch.
Around them, the explosions continued.
Fifty-five gallon drums of chemical would
suddenly launch themselves high into the
sky.
Of primary concern was the injured
survivor using his cell phone to
communicate with responders from
somewhere in the heart of the fire. He had
been one of three outside operators
ordered away from the overpressurized
reactor moments before the explosion.
“He said he was next to the office
surrounded by fire,” Wilson said. “We were
thinking he had to be trapped where all
this fire was coming from.”
After about 10 minutes, the
reconnaissance team backed out.
Firefighters now had a better concept of
the complex and the chemicals involved.
However, the injured operator was still
missing.
Firefighters formulated a rescue plan.
Using a quick foam attack, firefighters
hoped to open a path into the burning
facility long enough to reach the injured
worker. Jacksonville hazmat units are
equipped with 240 gpm foam nozzles and
eductors, Smith said.
Alcohol-resistant foam was used
because of the polar solvents involved.
To back up the JFRD supply, a crash truck
from the U.S. Naval Air Station Mayport
Fire Department was dispatched. The
Jacksonville International Airport Fire
Department responded as well.
“Initially, we drove the fire back to the
reactor site,” Woods said. “We got the
exposures under control first. We had two
foam lines established and used water and
foam to protect the MC-306 trailers. Once
those were under control, we went up the
center of the yard, turned around and came
back down the middle to get to the core of
what was burning.”
Aside from the 2½-inch hose lines, the
firefighters used Purple K extinguishers to
handle various pressure fires from
damaged flanges and ruptured gas lines.
Runoff from the hose lines mostly drained
into a large retention pond.
“When water got into a conex box
containing sodium, the pop always got
your attention,” Woods said. “Those 55gallon drums of dry sodium bounced off
the inside of the containers.”
Responders finally located the injured
operator but nowhere near where he was
thought to be, Wilson said.
“He was blown about 200 feet away from
the reactor out into the woods,” he said.
“Because he was losing blood he went into
shock. Although the fire was advancing
on him, he was not near the office as he
thought.”
The operator lost both legs due to the
explosion. Two fellow operators moving
away from the reactor were killed, cut in
half by the blast. A company co-owner and
a process engineer died in the control room
about 50 feet from the reactor.
A plant mechanic also suffered injuries
16
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
AFTERMATH
Three hours after the blast a company
representative was finally located who
could address the specific material.
“The wife of one of the co-owners was
Christmas shopping and showed up
because she heard there had been a
chemical plant explosion on the north side,”
Wilson said. “She was also one of the
plant’s chemical engineers. We started
getting some answers.”
SWS First Response, an environmental
services company, contracted to take
charge of remediation the following day.
JFRD turned responsibility for the site over
to the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, which
conducted an investigation to determine
the possibility of foul play.
“We maintained an incident command
presence for the next five days,” Wilson
said. “Our big chore was to get the
investigators and evidence technicians
trained and suited up in Level A.”
After the T2 explosion and fire, JFRD
decided to convert its entire stock of fire
fighting foam to an alcohol resistant brand,
he said. The only exception was an 8,000
gallon foam tanker containing AFFF.
Wilson often addresses the T2 accident
when asked to speak to process safety
engineering committees and other
industrial safety organizations.
“I ask everybody to give me a worst
case scenario,” he said. “Somebody will
say, ‘Well, this tank could blow up.’ That’s
not worse case, I tell them. Keep going. If
somebody says, ‘Everybody is dead,
trapped or gone and there is nobody on
scene to give me any information,’ that’s a
worse case scenario.”
The solution Wilson proposes is for
management to
compile all Tier II
When water got into a conex box
reports, MSDSs
containing sodium, the pop always got
and a site safety
your attention. Those 55-gallon drums
plan
to
be
bounced off the inside of the containers.
downloaded onto
a thumb drive.
JFRD Hazmat Team Lt. Chris Woods
That drive is then
placed in a rapid
entry or KNOX-BOX accessible to the fire can’t tell me what is in this particular
atmospheric tank or what is in those conex
department.
“Most places have ordinances stating boxes over there,” Wilson said. “I had two
that if your business is behind a locked tube trailers burning with no idea of the
gate you have to install a KNOX-BOX to product inside. It turned out to be carbon
which the fire department has a key,” monoxide, which can still be toxic.”
Today, T2 Laboratories exists only as a
Wilson said. “Most fire departments now
have laptops available on their vehicles.” web site that has never been taken down.
No proprietary information need be The remaining owner who survived a heart
included. The information on the drive can attack after the blast died only weeks
be password protected so that it is only before the final CSB report was issued.
“It’s kind of a sad story,” Wilson said.
available to the fire department, he said. It
“All the workers at T2 said they were
can also be regularly updated.
C
“The problem with CHEMTREC is they treated like family.”
in the explosion. A shipping container
shielded T2’s other co-owner from the
blast, but he suffered a non-fatal heart
attack during the incident.
With the dead and injured accounted
for, the operation at T2 turned into a fire
fight, Wilson said. In about 45 minutes,
firefighters knocked down the bulk of the
fire. As a final precaution, foam was
injected into the boilers to extinguish
internal fires.
“Fortunately, the fire went out quickly,”
Wilson said. “After that, it became a much
more manageable hazmat event.”
Above, aerial view of T2
Laboratories and neighboring businesses indicating the range of injury
and damage. At left,
firefighters search for survivors in the wreckage of
T2 Laboratories.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
17
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
17
I
n today’s economic environment, a
company’s attempt to fast-track
production from scaled down test
models or to increase production
without completely accounting for
potential hazards can lead to costly,
sometimes deadly results.
A report issued by the U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(CSB) on the December 2007 explosion
and fire at T2 Laboratories, Inc., cites
four similar runaway reaction incidents
investigated by the CSB since 1998
resulting in 10 deaths and more than
200 injuries.
Paterson, NJ – April 8, 1998
An explosion and fire at a chemical
plant in Paterson, NJ, occurred during
the production of a dye used to tint
petroleum fuel products. The explosion
and fire were the consequence of a
runaway reaction, which overpressurized a 2,000-gallon chemical
vessel and released flammable material
that ignited. Nine employees were
injured. The incident caused the
hospitalization of two employees, the
release of chemicals into the community
and damage to the plant.
The investigation team determined
that the product reaction accelerated
beyond the heat-removal capability of
the reactor. The resulting high
temperature led to a secondary runaway
decomposition reaction causing an
explosion, which blew the hatch off the
reactor and allowed the release of the
reactor contents. The initial runaway
reaction was most likely caused by
excessive reactor heating and delayed
use of the cooling water system. The
reactor’s cooling system could not
control the exothermic reaction and had
no emergency shutdown or quenching
function.
The CSB investigation found that the
company had not adequately evaluated
or controlled the hazards of the dye
production process. Neither a
preliminary assessment conducted in
1990 nor a subsequent hazard analysis
five years later considered the
possibility of a runaway chemical
reaction—one of the most common
reactive hazards. As a result, the reactor
18
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
was not provided with sufficient cooling
capacity or adequate emergency
shutdown or venting systems. The
company’s analyses never considered
possible scenarios—such as excessive
heat input or inadequate cooling—that
could trigger a runaway reaction.
Allentown, PA – February 19, 1999
A process vessel containing several
hundred pounds of hydroxylamine
exploded at a
production
facility near
Allentown, PA.
Employees were
producing the
facility’s first
full-sized batch
of hydroxylamine (HA). After
the distillation
process of an
HA and potassium sulfate solution was
stopped, the HA in the process tank and
associated piping explosively
decomposed, most likely due to high
concentration and temperature. The
explosion killed four employees and a
manager of an adjacent business. Two
employees survived the blast with
moderate-to-serious injuries. Four
people in nearby buildings were injured.
The explosion also caused significant
damage to other buildings in the light
industrial use business complex where
the facility was located and shattered
windows in several nearby homes.
The company developed the HA
production process through laboratoryscale experimentation in 1997, then
constructed a 10-gallon pilot plant. In
July 1998, the company set up a full
production facility in a multi-tenant
building. The production parameters
that the company designed for the
reaction involved a high concentration
of HA, which could result in exothermic
decomposition forming explosive
crystals. Despite available MSDS,
information regarding the fire and
explosion hazards of such high
concentrations was not consulted.
The CSB found that the company had
not systematically evaluated the
reactive hazards of the process during
18
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
production development phases,
determined the magnitude of the hazard,
nor identified control measures. An
adequate reactive chemical hazard
evaluation and process hazard analysis
(PHA) would have helped the company
quantify, evaluate, and mitigate the
hazards of HA production. Such analyses
might have even caused management to
question whether its planned process
presented substantial or unacceptable
risks to employees and to the community.
recipe in the full production batch. A
comprehensive process design and hazard
review of the scale-up was not performed,
and the company did not appreciate the
significant difference in heat removal
capacity of the 4,000-gallon reactor
compared to the 30-gallon reactor.
The CSB concluded that this incident
could have been avoided had the company
thoroughly investigated the hazards of the
process and properly designed the
emergency vent system to contain a
potential release of the toxic vapor.
added all of the additional monomer
needed into the initial charge to the reactor.
This more than doubled the rate of energy
release in the reactor, exceeding the cooling
capacity of the reactor condenser and
causing a runaway reaction. The reactor
pressure increased rapidly. Solvent vapors
vented from the reactor’s manway, forming
a flammable cloud inside the building. The
vapors found an ignition source and
exploded.
The CSB investigation found that
although the company combined
monomers and reaction initiators in the
presence of flammable solvent to produce
polymer products, it failed to identify the
hazards associated with this type of
chemistry. Additionally, process safety
information was poorly documented,
product recipes were changed without
systematic review and automatic
safeguards to prevent or mitigate the
effects of runaway reaction were not in
place.
When performing reactive chemistry,
companies must be aware of the hazards
involved and take action to minimize
potential consequences of all identified
hazards. These examples illustrate the
terrible dangers when this is not done. C
Dalton, GA – April 12, 2004
A runaway reaction over-pressurized a
Morganton, NC – January 31, 2006
chemical reactor at a chemical
A runaway chemical reaction and
manufacturing plant, releasing toxic allyl subsequent vapor cloud explosion and
alcohol vapor into the community. The fires killed one worker, injured 14 (two
resulting toxic cloud sent 154 people to a seriously), damaged structures in the
local hospital, forced the evacuation of nearby community, and destroyed an
nearby residents, and killed vegetation and industrial facility in Morganton, NC. This
aquatic life near the plant.
facility manufactured a variety of powder
The plant was producing its first batch coating and paint additives by
of triallyl cyanurate (TAC) in a batch polymerizing acrylic monomers in a 1,500reactor as part of a tolling arrangement with gallon reactor.
a third-party company. The CSB
The company had received an order for
investigation found that the company had slightly more of an additive than the normal
not thoroughly researched the reactive size recipe would produce. Plant managers
hazards of the process before scaling up scaled up the recipe to produce the
from laboratory tests to full production.
required larger amount of polymer and
Although literature
on the hazards of TAC
manufacturing was
readily available, the
company’s literature
search focused on
patent restrictions
rather than the reactive
chemistry hazards of the
process. Although the
company had tested the
reaction at the bench
scale, these tests were
designed to maximize
yield and minimize
production cost and did
not indicate that the
process included an
additional highly exothermic decomposition
reaction which would
require additional cooling. The company tested three batches in a 30gallon reactor but then
Photo Courtesy of Mark Treglio
used a different batch A burning reactor for blending solvents vents to the atmosphere after the T2 Labs explosion.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
19
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
19
F
Photo courtesy of Claymont (DE) Fire Company
Firefighters push into the blazing Marcus Hook refinery.
Pipe failure cited in refinery fire
25th IFW Emergency Responder
Conference & Exposition
Safety & Security Track
Who: Safety, security and HSSE
managers
Rescue Courses:
• Fall Protection
• Annual Confined Space
What to Expect:
• Incidents Leading to Change
• CFATS
• Review of NFPA Security Standards
• How National Crime Affects Industry
Group rate – Send 5 people for $1,000
(a $2,000 value)
Register at
www.fireworld.com
20
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
ire officials blame a May 2009 fire that destroyed part of
Sunoco’s Marcus Hook refinery on a rusty 10-inch pipe
that ruptured and caused a catastrophic natural gas leak.
Separate investigations by the company and the Delaware
State Fire Marshal determined that pipe failure caused the fire in
the refinery’s ethylene unit.
“The Delaware State Fire Marshal’s investigation indicates –
and our own internal investigation agrees – that a pipe failure
resulted in the release of combustible ethylene unit feed gas,
which caught fire,” said Thomas Golembeski, Sunoco’s
spokesperson.
The pipe failure was caused by external corrosion on the
bottom of the pipe, Golembeski said. The evidence shows that
localized corrosion stemmed from moisture trapped between the
pipe and a loose steel sleeve on which the pipe rested.
The corrosion, which occurred over many years, was limited
to the space between the sleeve and the pipe. The rest of the pipe
showed no indication of corrosion.
“Extensive metallurgical testing and analysis of the damaged
section of pipe confirms corrosion as the cause of the failure,”
Golembeski said.
As a result of these findings, Sunoco has voluntarily begun
taking the following corrective actions:
• Sharing the lessons learned across all of Sunoco’s refineries
and chemical plants.
• Launched a short-term effort at all facilities to examine piping
systems and identify locations of possible concern so they can
be addressed immediately.
• Begun a process to revise standard inspection practices to
make them even more thorough and rigorous. New inspection
practices will go beyond the industry standard that Sunoco
currently follows.
• Implementing a special emphasis program for high-risk
systems to be sure similar structures with similar conditions do
not exist at any Sunoco facilities.
• Initiated a third party review of the revised mechanical
integrity and inspection practices to identify other areas for
improvement.
“Sunoco has long been an active member of community
organizations in Claymont, Marcus Hook and Linwood,”
Golembeski said. “We work hard to maintain positive and
productive relationships with our neighbors, local elected officials,
and the community of emergency first responders.”
Sunoco participated in a local emergency planning committee
devoted to improving communication and cooperation among
agencies responding to events straddling the PennsylvaniaDelaware border. Together with other area companies, Sunoco
sponsored a new emergency packet for New Castle County
residents that contains evacuation routes and procedures.
In October 1946, seven Marcus Hook refinery workers died
and nearby 200 were injured when fire swept through a recently
opened aviation gasoline cracking plant. Nine explosion rocked
the facility as firefighters labored to control the blaze.
Sunoco announced in July 2009 that it will permanently close
the ethylene complex, citing low market demand for ethylene,
C
ethylene oxide and cyclohexane.
20
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
Register Now at www.fireworld.com
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
21
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
21
2010 Conference & Expo • February 22 - 26 • Baton Rouge, LA
WORKSHOP TRACTS
KEY
MONDAY
8:00-5:00
Industrial Medical Services
Annual Confined
Space Rescue
Course (Part I)
LNG Symposium
Fall Protection
Rescue
Course
Marine Fire Fighting
Preparing the Next Generation
Ferrara Dinner
& Tour
6:00-8:00
Safety & Security
Spill Response & Emerging Fuels
Twenty-five years ago, Industrial Fire World held its first
conference to bring together the outstanding leaders in our field
and share hard-won knowledge gained from first-hand
experience. In recent years, IFW has shifted its focus to
accredited training and certification in keeping with new
requirements placed on industry. This year in Baton Rouge, IFW
focuses again on passing leadership skills to a new generation of
classroom trained responders moving into positions previously
held by firefighters who tested their skills against the real thing at
its angriest time and again. Bring your key leaders to participate
in the workshop tract that addresses their area of responsibility.
TUESDAY
7:30-9:00
Breakfast
8:00-11:30
General Session
11:00-6:00
Exhibits Open
11:30-1:00
Lunch in Exhibit Hall
David White
1:00-2:00
Industrial Medical
Services
Challenges &
Differences
LNG
Events
2:00-3:00
Industrial Burns
from
Head to Toe
Sandia
Lab
3:00-4:00
Ongoing
Training
4:00-5:00
5:00-6:00
22
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
Marine
Fire Fighting
for
Land-based
Firefighters
Decision Making
& Situation
Awareness
Changes in
Safety &
Security
Real
Hazmat
Incidents
Panel:
The Future of
Industrial
Brigades
CFATS
Importance of
Available
Resources
Gasoline
Terminals
Under CFATS
Clearing
Environmental
Impact
The
Magic of
LNG
Reception
22
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
WEDNESDAY
7:30-9:00
Breakfast in Exhibit Hall
7:30-3:30
Exhibits Open
8:00-9:00
What’s New in
Emergency
Medical
Response
9:00-10:00
Medical
Emergencies
10:00-11:00
Securing &
11:00-12:00 Using Med. EMS
Panel:
Ownership
&
Legal Aspects
Panel:
Fire
Fighting
Aspects
UK Fire Rescue
Service’s
Changing Roles
Impact on Ind.
Complying to
Changing Codes
& Standards
Marine
Fire Fighting
for
Land-Based
Firefighters
1:00-2:00
2:00-3:00
Biodiesel
Lunch (Staggered) in Exhibit Hall
Immobilization
Helicopter AwareLanding ness
Rescue
Course
3:00-4:00
Panel:
Implications of
Buncefield
(1:00-2:30)
Panel:
Fire Fighting
Tug Aspects
OPA 90
Roundtable
Discussion: The
Role of Chief
(2:30-5:00)
Roundtable
START
Triage
4:00-5:00
5:30-8:00
Ethanol
&
Methanol
(9:30-11:00)
Knowing the
Players:
Available
Resources
Maintaining Fire
Protection in
Tough Economic
Times
Around the World
11:30-1:00
Real
Hazmat
Incident
(8:00-9:30)
How National
Crime
Affects
Industry
Security
Technology &
Emergency
Mangement
Fuels
Emerging
onto
Highways
Cost Effective,
Total Protective
Concepts
Demonstrations & Southland Fire Sponsored Dinner at LSU FETI
THURSDAY
8:00-Noon
Maritime
Rescue on
USS Kidd
Noon-5:00
Annual
Confined Space
Rescue Course
(Part II)
Make Hotel Reservations
Before January 21, 2010
for Industrial Fire World’s
$109 Room Rate
www.crowneplaza.com
1-877-270-1393
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER
2009
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
23
11/3/2009, 9:40 AM
23
23
2010 Conference & Expo
Registration Form
Date:
///
//
/
Complete and Fax to
979.690.7562 or Register
On-Line at www.fireworld.com
Month
Day
Year
Exhibitor
Exhibitor
Speaker
Speaker
General Admission:
$$300 Before Nov. 30
$$400 After Nov. 30
$$200 Each for Group of 5 or
More
Last Name Company Business Title Mailing Address
City State Zip -
PH# FX# Email Address Which Workshop Do You Plan To
Attend?
Attendee
Attendee
First Name
Select payment option:
Pay at Conference Check-in
Cash or Check (Enclosed)
P.O. #
Credit Card # Expiration Date
PIN Name on Credit Card Industrial Medical Services
LNG Symposium
Marine Fire Fighting
Preparing the Next Generation
Safety & Security
Spill Response & Emerging
Fuels
Mail to:
540 Graham Road
P.O. Box 9161
College Station, Texas
77845/77842
or Fax to:
FX#: 979.690.7562
or Register at:
www.fireworld.com
Billing address is the same as mailing address
Zip -
Billing Address
City
State
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
25
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
25
Modern personal protective
gear traces its origins back as
far as humanity’s will to survive
P
Means
of
Protection
By Ben Mauti and Leslie Mitchell
MSA
26
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
rotective helmets have been used for millennia. About 24
BC, Roman emperor Augustus established a municipal
fire fighting company that employed a hand-to-hand
bucket delivery system. Lacking personal protective
gear, early firefighters battled flames from the
perimeter. Firefighting protective gear in the
United States, worn as far back as the colonial
era, was at best rudimentary until about 1730
when the first firefighting “stovepipe” helmet
appeared courtesy of NYPD firefighter
Jacobus Turck. 1825 produced Italian
scientist Giovanni Aldini’s heat
protection mask. Goggles were worn to
complement London Fire Brigade
Superintendent James Braidwood’s 1863
SCBA, an invention comprised of a lined sac,
rubber hoses, bellows, and mouthpiece. As
primitive as such gear seems today, it’s unlikely
that we’d be where we are without building upon
its foundation.
Leather, Aluminum, Kevlar, and…FOAM?
Firefighting helmets of the familiar leather variety have been
around for about 170 years. Mass production of fire helmets
swayed temporarily to aluminum shells until their heat and
electrical conduction properties became obvious. Leather returned
as the manufacturing mainstay for its water resistance and ability
to offset the blow of falling objects.
Leather helmets remained the standard until the 1970s with
incorporation of moldable heat- and impact-resistant synthetics
and composites such as fiberglass, polyaralyte, and Kevlar. The
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), an international
nonprofit group established in 1896 dedicated to developing fire
hazard consensus codes and standards, issued the Standard on
Structural Fire Fighter’s Helmets in 1979. This standard resulted
in design consideration of impact force and acceleration, heat,
flame, and electrical current resistance, and other factors.
In Europe, CGF Gallet, a French manufacturer of firefighting
and military protective headgear, launched the original F1 Helmet
in 1985. This design in its fifth generation is still widely used
today by firefighters in 80 countries. Gallet’s F2 Wildlands Helmet
became available in 1987 for wild fire and technical rescue
applications and is popular in Europe, Asia, and South America.
Henry T. Gratacap began production of leather fire helmets in
1836. In 1869 Cairns & Brother Inc. bought Gratacap’s factory,
and by 1955 produced helmets made of leather, aluminum, and
plastics. Plastic composites of the day used phenolic impregnated
26
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
fabric and polyester impregnated fiberglass. The flint flex helmet
also appeared during this era, a more fracture-resistant and
moldable plastic.
Cairns & Brother was the first manufacturer to incorporate
full thermal/impact caps within fire helmet shells. Foam impact
caps were initially designed for impact energy absorption but
were found to effectively absorb thermal energy as well. Fire
helmets with integral impact caps are significantly cooler for users
to wear than are those without.
An additional benefit of certain impact cap designs is the ability
to disengage from the helmet shell should a firefighter become
lodged within a tight space by a helmet brim. The helmet shell is
left behind while the user escapes with impact cap intact.
An additional unexpected benefit can be derived from the fire
helmet eagle ornament. The brass eagle was created about 1825
and became a fire helmet tradition. Eagles serve both ornamental
figures and lettered front identification pieces. Some eagle styles
are manufactured as solid pieces, while others crush easily and
absorb some impact energy, protecting the user and helping to
lessen firefighter head and neck injuries.
Firefighter eye protection; a quick history
More innovation and history can be documented on this
subject than most might think. It’s a given that firefighters protect
their precious eyesight while on the job. Did anyone think
otherwise? Yes, as it turns out. Protective eyewear for firefighters
received minimal attention until firefighter Lester Bourke sustained
a facial injury in the early 1960s.
Lester Bourke, firefighter with FDNY Engine Company 231 in
Brooklyn and part-time inventor, sustained a severe blow to his
forehead while working the hose line. Although he recovered
from his injury, the accident raised his awareness as to firefighters’
eye injury vulnerability.
Lester initially tried army goggles as eye shields only to
experience constant fogging. Subsequent tinkering and
experimentation using spare parts, notably fire engine
speedometer cables and clock springs, allowed him to create
lenses that could move up and down on the fire helmet. It took
time, but within a few years his invention was complete. Cairns
and Brother began selling his Bourke Safety Eye Shields in 1966;
Lester Bourke received a patent in 1968. This flip-down style eye
shield’s appearance, initially resisted by firefighters, became a
tradition through the years, only to be surpassed by new and
innovated technology made possible through modern materials,
design, and manufacturing.
Firefighters’ eye protection design must consist of an impact/
heat resistance balance. All externally-mounted eye shields worn
with fire helmets share the same drawbacks: their lenses are
subject to dirt, grit, and other flying debris, as well as damage
from heat, sparks, and liquids. Firefighting faceshields and
goggles, also externally-mounted, are subject to the same although
faceshields offer tint and material options (generally plastics)
not offered with older model eye shields. Goggles provide a close,
tight fit with flexibility as well as anti-fog properties.
Time passed and firefighting gear took the high-tech route
through incorporation of lightweight, heat-resistant synthetic
materials. Moldable compounds such as polycarbonate and
polyaralyte allow for production of smaller, lower-profile
components. A truly retractable visor became a reality for Gallet.
This internally-mounted faceshield preserves a goggle’s close fit
and a traditional faceshield’s tint options and anti-fog properties.
Retract-ability offers between-use protection from abrasive debris,
dirt and mud, heat and sparks. By nature, it’s unlikely that
integrated visors are lost or left behind.
It’s only in recent years that integrated, retractable visors are
available across the pond in North America following polyaralyte
faceshields in 1983 and non-corroding faceshield hardware in
1984. Most visor choices are NFPA-compliant and meet ANSI
Z87.1+. Locking hard detent mechanisms offer easy adjustability
and eliminate slippage; optically-correct lenses eliminate
peripheral distortion.
Most firefighters in the U.S. prefer traditionally-shaped helmets
with wide brims and custom fronts, constructed of leather or
synthetic materials. An added benefit that became quickly
apparent in the United States is firefighters’ ability to clearly read
retractable visor users’ helmet identification fronts, as those fronts
are not blocked by goggles or faceshields resting in the “up”
position.
We’ve thankfully come a long way in a relatively short time
period due to human ingenuity and resourcefulness and no doubt
will continue to do so. Regulations, codes, and standards help to
guide protective firefighting gear innovation to offset and
minimize the risks of this hazardous but crucial occupation. C
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
27
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
27
Photos by Anton Riecher
International Fog CEO Eugene Ivy uses a First Attack nozzle to extinguish a helicopter prop with carbon dioxide.
International Fog demonstrates First Attack nozzle using CO2
Fire Fighting I
Encounters
of
the
28
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
28
3rd
Kind
By ANTON RIECHER
IFW Editor
nternational Fog Inc.’s First Attack piercing fog nozzle proved
effective in applying three chief fire fighting elements — water,
foam and carbon dioxide — in special demonstrations
conducted in October at Louisiana State University’s Fire and
Emergency Training Institute (LSU FETI).
Shell Oil is considering the use of the First Attack nozzle on
off-shore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, said Eugene Ivy,
president of IFI.
“Shell would like to put one if not two of the First Attack
nozzles on their big wheeled unit CO2 extinguishers for fighting
helicopter fires,” Ivy said.
Beginning in late September, use of the First Attack nozzle
became part of Shell personnel training at FETI prior to assignment
to offshore platforms.
“Once we get the LSU instructors trained, all the Shell people
coming through will learn to apply First Attack to aircraft rescue
fire fighting,” Ivy said.
Designed to give firefighters immediate access into a structure,
Ivy initially designed a nozzle with a stainless steel piercing tip
that also creates a pattern of fine water droplets. This system
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
At left, Eugene Ivy discusses First Attack’s advantages.
creates a stream that looks like a mist or fog, which absorbs and
extinguishes the fire in a decreased amount of time when
compared to other systems.
“Over several conversations, Shell indicated that they were
interested in the nozzle if it could handle CO2,” Ivy said. “Honestly,
I had to tell them I never had to use anything but water and foam
for any type fire we’ve been up against. But I said I would put it
on my priority list to find out.”
Steve Summers, an aviation logistics consultant for Shell,
attended the demonstrations at FETI. While piercing nozzles that
use CO2 are relatively common in Europe where Shell is based,
finding them in the United States is much harder, Summers said.
Because FETI handles all helicopter landing officer training
for Shell off-shore platforms, training FETI instructors on use of
the First Attack nozzle is important, Summers said.
“We figured that whatever they train with here would be the
optimum thing to use off shore,” he said.
At FETI, Ivy demonstrated the First Attack on an industrial
training prop using water and foam. The demonstration then
moved to FETI’s helicopter training prop using CO2 under
pressure. Chris Lacombe with Burner Fire Control said the
demonstration was impressive, quickly extinguishing the fire.
“Eugene is working on a system to restrict the amount of CO2
flowing through the nozzle to make it easier to handle under
pressure,” Lacombe said.
Preliminary testing on the First Attack was conducted at the
IFI facility in Portland, OR. Ivy then made use of a full sized livefire helicopter “prop” at the Washington State Fire Training
Academy near North Bend, WA. A flow test using the First Attack
nozzle and a 100 pound CO2 cylinder proved successful in
Washington, Ivy said.
“The short version is that it worked extremely well,” Ivy said.
“We got 50 seconds of useful CO2 time out of the cylinder.” The
fire itself was extinguished in only a few seconds.
According to Ivy, each helicopter pad on an off shore platform
comes with at least four fire fighting stations surrounding it.
Each wheeled unit on the Shell platform would come equipped
with one or two First Attack nozzles.
Gene Caskey, chief of aircraft rescue and fire fighting at the
At right, First Attack creates a pattern of fine droplets.
Shreveport, LA, Regional Airport, also attended the FETI
demonstration. Caskey said he had worked closely with Ivy in
the past to adapt First Attack technology to his department.
“We needed a nozzle built with Ivy’s patented rotator assembly
for a piercing nozzle to fit on the end of a Snozzle,” Caskey said.
“We were looking for better conversion to steam through the use
a finer water droplett pattern. I designed the nozzle, sent the
plans to Eugene and he built it. Right now we are the only ones
using it this way.”
For a video report on International Fog’s testing at FETI, visit
C
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2CNGvxCthQ.
Marine Fire Fighting Track
Who: Industrial and municipal firefighters,
ship captains, crew members & port
authority
What to Expect:
• Marine Fire Fighting for Land-Based
Firefighters (sponsored by
MERE)
• Off-Shore Marine Fire Fighting
(sponsored by LSU FETI)
• OPA 90
• Maritime Rescue on USS Kidd
(sponsored by Roco Rescue)
Group rate – Send 5 people for
$1,000 (a $2,000 value)
Register at
www.fireworld.com
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
29
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
29
INDUSTRY NEWS
U.S. Foam recall ordered by federal court
Judge grants injunction to Chemguard based on misuse of UL identifier
A
federal district judge granted an injunction in favor of
Chemguard, Inc. of Mansfield, TX, against a Longview,
TX-based foam manufacturer, ordering a recall of fire
fighting foam using an Underwriters Laboratories’ control number
assigned to Chemguard.
United States District Court Judge Reid O’Connor of the
Northern District of Texas entered the order in September granting
Chemguard’s request for an injunction with respect to U.S. Foam
Technologies’ (USF) use of Chemguard’s UL identifier.
The Court directed U.S. Foam to issue a general recall to all
customers “specifically identifying what product(s) may have
been mislabeled as Chemguard product(s), directing them to avoid
using mislabeled product, and to return that product to USF.”
U.S. Foam must also place a notice in an industry wide
publication to inform customers as to how those products can be
identified and provide instructions on the return of the product.
Roger Bower, president of Chemguard, said that the company
is pleased with the court’s action and looks forward to “the
correction of this problem with product on which firefighters
across the country rely upon.”
In issuing his ruling, Judge Connor noted that “many
Preparing the Next
Generation Track
Who: Current and future industrial and
municipal fire chiefs and emergency
response managers
What to Expect:
• Maintaining Fire Protection in Tough
Economic Times
• Panel Discussion
• Complying to Changing Codes &
Standards
• Knowing the Players: Available
Resources
• Managing Leadership Change
• Panel: Implications of Buncefield
• Roundtable Discussion
(a $2,000 value)
Register at
www.fireworld.com
30
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
consumers require [UL certification] as part of their bid
specifications.” Connor noted that Chemguard learned on May
14, 2009, that U.S. Foam was selling fire fighting foam using
Chemguard’s UL identifier. He observed that “both Chemguard
and USF agree this was improper.”
He also noted that Chemguard purchased UL and military
specification foam from USF and “According to Chemguard,
USF’s military specification foam did not perform as required by
military specifications. . . . Other foam Chemguard purchased
from USF revealed, according to Chemguard tests, that it did not
perform according to UL or other relevant standards.”
In issuing his ruling, Judge Connor stated: “USF admits it has
falsely designated USF products with Chemguard’s labels.” After
considering U.S. Foam’s arguments, the Court concluded: “The
Court is persuaded that USF’s use of Chemguard labels have
either actually deceived and confused potential customers, and
a presumption exists that it has done so. Therefore, Chemguard
has established a likelihood of success on the merits of its
substantive claim based on USF’s false use of Chemguard’s
labels.”
The recall does not pertain to Chemguard-labeled products.C
Nevada fire academy consults
on new training center in India
W
ith ongoing consulting assistance from the University
of Nevada, Reno Fire Science Academy
(FSA)Worldwide, the Institute of Fire Safety and
Disaster Management Studies (IFSDMS) in Gujarat, India, has
broken ground on its new training facility, expected to provide
professional instruction in fire fighting and disaster management
for emergency responders in India and the region.
“The Fire Science Academy has assisted by sharing our
knowledge and experience in the conceptual design and operation
of an exceptional training facility that, in the case of IFSDMS,
can serve the needs of India’s communities,” said Mitchell
Baclawski, assistant director of FSA’s worldwide division. “We
began a consultation partnership with IFSDMS in 2008 and have
worked to promote the Indian institute’s development of a handson emergency response training facility, which is designed to be
as comprehensive as our own academy in Nevada.”
Construction began in March 2009. Buildings for
administration, education and hostel accommodations have been
completed. Full-scale training props, key to the realistic handson training that will be offered at the facility, are also due to be
built this year. A rescue tower prop and smoke chamber prop are
under construction, and remaining training structures will be built
after the end of India’s monsoon season.
C
30
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
Feds release 2008 PA oleum overflow report
T
he Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released a final report in
October on the uncontrolled oleum release from Petrolia,
PA, chemical plant which forced the evacuation of three
surrounding towns in October 2008. CSB encouraged companies
that handle hazardous chemicals to follow proper managementof-change procedures, monitor deviations from written operating
procedures, and implement appropriate safeguards to mitigate
human errors.
The accident that took place on Saturday, October 11, 2008,
forced over two thousand residents of Petrolia, Bruin, and
Fairview, to evacuate or to shelter-in-place for approximately eight
hours. Oleum, also known as fuming sulfuric acid, was released
when a tank transfer operation was left unattended during weekend
operations and an oleum storage tank overflowed. The oleum
formed a toxic sulfur trioxide gas, which mixed with moisture in
the air to form a dense, corrosive, sulfuric acid cloud that
threatened the neighboring towns.
CSB Chairman John Bresland said, “The managers of
companies that handle highly hazardous substances, such as
oleum, need to exercise special care that appropriate process
safeguards are in place. In this accident, the CSB found that for
many years, operators had been using an auxiliary pump power
supply that lacked safety interlocks to prevent tank overfilling.”
Located approximately 50 miles northeast of Pittsburgh, the
facility produces resorcinol, a chemical used for making tires and
other products. The CSB report noted that three operators were
involved in bulk liquid loading and unloading work from Monday
to Friday. However, to maintain operations on a continuous,
seven-day-per-week schedule, an operator would regularly
perform work on weekends, transferring oleum from pressure
vessels to storage tanks used to supply the resorcinol
manufacturing process.
The CSB investigation determined that the normal power
supply for the three oleum transfer pumps was equipped with a
safety interlock, which would automatically shut off the flow of
oleum when the receiving tank was full, preventing a dangerous
overflow. However, the oleum storage building also had an
auxiliary or “emergency” power supply that had been installed in
the late 1970s.
It was originally intended as a temporary way to keep the
pumps functioning during interruptions of the normal power
supply but eventually the emergency power supply became a
permanent fixture. Facility management never installed interlocks
for the emergency power and written operating procedures did
not address how or when the emergency power supply should
be used.
C
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
31
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
31
FOCUS ON HAZMAT
Putting meat on the bones
E
ver since the dawn of civilization, man has been
confronted with the certainty that, at some unpredictable
time and place, some sort of unexpected catastrophic
event will overtake him. Once this certainty was conceptualized
the next step was to consider what action was to be taken if ...
thus emergency planning was born.
A contingency plan is like a skeleton: to be a functional
organism it must be equipped with muscle, skin, organ systems
and a network of nerves. Otherwise it is just a pile of bones that
hang uselessly in a dark closet. To be functional, there must be
meat on the bones.
The “meat” on the bones of any emergency contingency plan
must consist of at least ten essential elements:
— Definition of objective: What sort of emergency are we
planning for? Severe weather? Fire? Flood? Process failure? Power
outage? Transportation emergency? Terrorism or industrial
sabotage? We need to define it and plan for as many different
scenarios as possible.
— Evaluation: What will be the likely consequences of an
incident of this type? What would be the “worst case” scenario?
— Determination of required resources: What will we need to
deal with this situation? Are these resources available? If so,
Spill Response &
Emerging Fuels Track
Who: Industrial and municipal hazmat
teams
What to Expect:
• Real hazmat incidents
• Importance of Available Resources
• Cleanup: Environmental impact
• Ethanol & Methanol
• Fuel Technology: CNG, LPG, LNG,
Hydrogen, Electric & Hybrid
Vehicles
• Fire Fighting Technologies for
Emerging Fuels
(a $2,000 value)
Register at
www.fireworld.com
32
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
By DR. JOHN S. TOWNSEND
where are they located? If not, what shall we do to obtain them?
Who is responsible for obtaining additional supplies and
resources?
— Staffing: Who will be in charge of the response effort?
Where will these people assemble? Will there be someone tasked
in advance to start up the fire water pumps or activate the standby
power plant?
— Communications: How will the alarm be propagated and
who is responsible for doing it? Will the notification be confined
to the plant proper or will nearby communities need to be alerted?
Will it be necessary to evacuate nearby residents? How will this
be accomplished and by whom?
— Off site assistance: Who will be responsible for notifying
mutual aid groups and, if needed, civilian fire departments, medical
facilities and local law enforcement? Who will conduct an
evacuation if one becomes necessary?
— Financial responsibility: Will there be someone with the
authority to write checks or issue purchase orders immediately
for urgently required materials such as foam concentrate and
where will these materials be obtained?
— Liaison with local government: in the event that an
evacuation is called for, who is responsible for notifying local
authorities and securing their cooperation?
— Record keeping: Who is responsible for keeping a log of
events as well as the financial obligations incurred while
responding to the incident? The log especially is most important
as it will document the actions of the company, the government
and third parties when, months, or even years, after the event,
litigation occurs, as it will almost certainly do.
— Safety: Who will be responsible for the safety of the
responders and for implementing the protocols for emergency
medical treatment?
There may be more elements than these but this list covers the
salient points.
In actuality, a complete Emergency Response Protocol (ERP)
will consist of a master plan and a number of incident specific
sub-plans. Thus the XYZ facility will have a master emergency
plan that will outline the chain of command, set out the basics of
the plant’s response organization and protocols. A series of subplans will account for fire, severe weather, power outage, off-site
transportation incident or other scenarios. When an incident
occurs, the master plan will be activated along with appropriate
sub-plan(s).
These sub-plans will be facility specific; for example the severe
weather sub-plan for a plant located in northern Michigan would
likely pertain to a winter storm. They will also be product or
process specific. The response protocol appropriate for chlorine,
for example, will be vastly different from one designed for gasoline
or sulfuric acid. The best place to find the proper “fit” for a plan
32
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
is within the group that will have to ultimately activate and deploy
in the event of an incident. In the case of manufacturers, who
would be expected to know more about a product and the ways
to safely handle it than the people who actually make it?
To be functional, an ERP must be constantly updated. There is
a saying among emergency planners that any plan will be out of
date ten minutes after the last page comes out of the copier. In a
large organization, this is not entirely fallacious. People change
positions, employees come and go, e-mail addresses, telephone
numbers and radio call-signs change frequently, and in a very
large installation, such changes may occur on a daily basis.
No ERP, no matter how
elaborate, has ever saved a life or
prevented an injury or averted a
single incidence of property
damage. Plans do not protect
anything; they only empower
people to do so. A plan is nothing
more or less than a theoretical
framework for organizing response
capabilities and resources a
specific problem.
To be effective, any plan must be known to those who are
affected by it and these parties must take ownership in the plan.
Far too many ERP’s are created, bound in blue leather with gold
lettering and promptly filed away in some remote archive to be
forgotten.
Any job description that involves participation in an emergency
response protocol, either in the private sector or within
government, should have this participation spelled out in detail
and it should be one of the first things that a newly hired
employee receives as part of his initial orientation; the new-hire
should know exactly what would be expected of him/her in the
event of an emergency. As soon as the new employee comes
aboard the ERP should be updated to show his/her new position,
name, contact number(s) and his responsibility within the
emergency response organization.
To facilitate this, particularly in a large plant site, it is quite
convenient to have the ERP on a computer attached to a Local
Area Network (LAN). Changes, additions or deletions can be
made from a central location (the personnel office, for instance,
or the emergency response manager’s headquarters) and show
up on all computers within the network. An alternate method is
to have a notice sent out by e-mail and occasionally to have the
whole plan reviewed and re-distributed on computer disks. Such
notices and disks should carry some sort of receipt to
acknowledge that they have actually been received by those for
whom they were intended — thus ensuring that those persons
can be held accountable for the information contained in the
notices.
Whatever method is employed the ERP must be kept current.
Nothing can “throw a wrench in the works” quicker than to place
an urgent call to the fire chief only to hear that, “he retired last
week,” “He is on vacation” or “That telephone number has been
changed.” Anything and everything that happens in and around
a facility affects the ERP; if the fuel delivery truck is down for
repairs, the fire chief needs to know it now, not when he is pumping
full bore at a four-alarm barn burner and his fuel gauges are
approaching “empty.”
ERPs and ERP Updates are like fire bells; they do nothing if
there is nobody around to heed them and to act accordingly.
Those affected by an ERP must understand its purpose and their
part in it.
Those involved or affected by an ERP must understand that
an emergency is just that, an emergency, and “business as usual”
goes out the window. Administrators, be they local government,
or corporate, must be familiar with the ERP and instruct their
employees that when “the big bell
rings” they are authorized to
immediately do whatever is
necessary or requested. We can
sort out the details and address
the finger-pointing later.
It has often been said that
frequently activated ERPs are the
most effective. People in Tornado
Alley know very well what it
means when the sirens start
sounding so they act accordingly. They know the emergency is
real; it is not a game or a drill that can be ignored. Indeed, ignoring
an alarm as “just a drill” has been the means by which an incident
has escalated into a full blown disaster on more than one occasion.
People who experience emergencies understand the need for
preparedness.
The obvious way to foster understanding and appreciation
for the importance of ERP is to have frequent drills, simulations
and exercises. Most of these will involve only a segment of the
entire emergency response community. Announced drills involve
the entire emergency response organization simulations. These
are, or at least should be, about as close to the “real thing” as it
is possible to get without causing undue interruption of normal
activities.
The best possible scenario for simulations is one for which
the probability is high in the particular venue. Such simulations
should occur on an unannounced basis just as real emergencies
do. The alarm should be sounded and the ERP actuated. The
objective here is to see what actually happens when the bell
rings. Do the people know what to do and will they do it without
hesitation? In order to determine this, the simulation should be
scheduled with as few people actually aware of it as possible. It
should not be scheduled to occur at the most opportune or
convenient time; real emergencies never do. Is the boss out of
town or the fire chief at a seminar? Fine, let us see how our back
up plan works. If we need to make adjustments or modifications,
now is the time to find out about it. Is it raining or snowing? We
can see how well our response team functions in adverse weather.
Finally, do not neglect the assessment phase of the simulation.
There will be errors and miscalculations to be sure. Determining
what these are is the reason for running the simulation in the first
place. The critique session(s) should be thorough, perhaps held
the day after the simulation when everyone has had a chance for
rest. It should be all inclusive and not be rushed.
C
Far too many ERP’s are
created, bound in blue leather
with gold lettering and promptly
filed away in some remote
archive to be forgotten.
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
33
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
RISK ASSESSMENT
Intervene or leave it alone
By JOHN FRANK, P.E., CFPS/XL GAPS
A
t recent loss prevention meetings in both the United
States and the United Kingdom the issue of public fire
department (brigade) intervention at industrial properties
was raised. There is growing awareness that a public fire
department may not perform offensive1 operations at industrial
properties if everyone has made it out of the building and has
been accounted for. There have been numerous reports of chief
officers who stated something to the effect of “if everyone is out,
we are not going in” meaning they will assume a defensive2
posture. This is driven by safety concerns, a new emphasis on
fire service risk management, and actual firefighter injuries and
fatalities.
While there are certainly circumstances where the risk to
firefighters is too great to conduct offensive operations, when
properly designed and functioning fire protection systems are
installed, the incident commander may decide that offensive
operations to save property could be undertaken.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1500 Standard
on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program
States in A.8.3.2:
“When considering risk management, fire departments should
LNG Symposium Track
Who: Industrial, municipal, private, public
and governmental management and
personnel working in or near LNG
facilities.
What to Expect:
Tuesday, February 23,
The Magic of LNG by Peter Micciche
(Open to the Public Based on
Availability)
Wednesday, February 24
Panel discussion addressing
ownership, legalities and fire fighting
$1,000 (a $2,000 value)
Register at
www.fireworld.com
34
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
consider the following Rules of Engagement after evaluating
the survival profile of any victims in the involved compartment:
(1) We will risk our lives a lot, in a calculated manner, to
save SAVABLE LIVES.
(2) We will risk our lives a LITTLE, in a calculated manner, to
save SAVABLE property.
(3) We WILL NOT risk our lives at all for a building or lives
that are already lost.”
From my perspective, the first and third items are relatively
obvious. It is the second item that seems to generate the most
discussion as to what is savable. A primary purpose of this series
of articles, since inception, has been to help facility managers
and fire departments to analyze their risks during thorough prefire planning.
The basic message to facility operators is to make every effort
to invite the fire department to conduct a technical pre-plan. This
way they will know what to expect and whether or not the
situations they will likely face involve savable property (as in a
fire well controlled by sprinklers) or if the building will likely be
lost — which might be the case where sprinkler systems are not
properly engineered for the hazards present. The key is that this
should be a technical tour, not a “gee whiz” tour where the fire
service marvels at the process but is given little understanding
of the technical design of the fire protection systems. It may be
necessary to engage a fire protection engineer to help explain the
technical basis for the fire protection design and what to expect
for various scenarios.
Likewise, the fire department should make every effort to
conduct these tours and to ask facility operators to host them.
In future articles, we will outline expectations for various
occupancies and situations. Emphasis will be placed on what
actions various NFPA standards anticipate that the fire department
will take. Recent loss experience indicates that sometimes there
is a disconnect between what the fire protection designers expect
the fire department to do and what they are actually able or willing
to do. It is essential that these gaps be closed before the incident
occurs.
Feel free to contact this author at [email protected] or
at (404) 431-2673.
C
1 Per NFPA 1500 3.3.69.4 Offensive Operations. Actions generally performed in
the interior of involved structures that involve a direct attack on a fire to directly
control and extinguish the fire.
2 Per NFPA 1500 3.3.69.1 Defensive Operations. Actions that are intended to
control a fire by limiting its spread to a defined area, avoiding the commitment of
personnel and equipment to dangerous areas.
John Frank, P.E., CFPS is with XL GAPS, a leading loss
prevention services provider and a member of the XL Capital
group. “XL Insurance” is the global brand used by member
insurers of the XL Capital Ltd (NYSE: XL) group of companies.
More information about XL Insurance and its products is
available at www.xlinsurance.com.
34
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
EMS Corner
Avoid being KOd by H1N1
By WILLIAM R. KERNEY, MA, EMTP (Ret.)/College of Southern Nevada
andemics being what they are, often prone to panic type standard germicidal
thinking and behavior, it is little surprise that swine flu cleaners (or 1:10
has been given so much attention. In the early outbreaks sodium hypochlorite
of the virus, it was not uncommon to see people in Mexico’s solution if allowed) will
major cities wearing protective masks. They even closed many of suffice, but special
the ports of call on both coasts causing the cruise industry to attention must be paid
cancel many cruises with Mexican destinations. In June of this to the common contact
year the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it officially surface areas. It is also
to
‘pandemic’ with the virus having spread to more than 70 countries. encouraged
There had also been cases reported in every one of the 50 United frequently wash hands
States. Then it seemed to back-off. There were fewer cases and in warm water and soap
deaths reported, the panic seemed to abate, the ports were re- and avoid touching
opened and hygiene campaigns seemed to take center stage. your mouth, nose and
Now the flu season has arrived and a renewed interest has emerged eyes. In the absence of
by the agencies responsible for the tracking, reporting and soap and water,
“waterless” hand
preventing of this very kind of outbreak.
H1N1 (Figure 1)
The CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) has sanitizers may be
only issued routine guidelines up until this point but states they substituted. These are alcohol based, gel in style products that
expect the cases of swine flu, now categorized as novel influenza should be used freely, fully wetting the hands and rubbed until
A or H1N1, to rise with regular flu during the flu season. Cases in dry. They are inexpensive for a large size container. Invest in one
the United States are ongoing with some having increased and use it.
Continued on Page 37
intensity.
H1N1 is transmitted just like normal flu through droplet
infectivity (sneezes and coughs) but is also transmitted via surface
(door handles, stair railings) contamination. Apparently studies
have shown that the H1N1 (fig. 1) can live on surfaces two-to25th IFW Emergency Responder Conference
eight hours after being deposited. In light of this, it is even more
& Exposition
important than ever to make sure shared work spaces are
Industrial Medical Services Track
decontaminated frequently. This includes counter surfaces,
Who: Nurses, Paramedics, EMTs
keyboards, telephones, and other common use shared items.
What to Expect:
Flu symptoms are numerous and people should be aware of
• Industrial Emergency Medical Services –
classic signs before they occur.: fever, cough, sore throat, runny
Challenges & Differences
or stuffy nose, body aches, headache, chills, fatigue and,
• Caring for Fire Victims: Burns & Breathing
sometimes, diarrhea and vomiting.
Emergencies
It is important to note that not everyone with flu will have a
• Medical Emergencies
fever and not all of the signs and symptoms may be present. The
• Ongoing Training for Your Emergency
Response Team
other issue that has arisen and is truly problematic for all the
• What’s New in CPR, First Aid & Emergency
human resource directors is the recommendation for all employees
Medical Response
who present illness of this type be sent home (or remain at home)
• Securing & Using Medical Services Around
for a week’s (seven day recommendation) convalescence and to
the World
remain at home for at least 24 hours past their last incidence of
• START Triage: Black Tagging Friends &
fever and without the use of any fever-reducing medications.
Coworkers
The CDC also does not recommend that persons seek medical
• Helicopter Landing
care unless absolutely necessary. Here is where the problem arises
• Awareness Rescue Course (sponsored by
for HR as many of these persons will not have doctors’ notes to
Roco Rescue)
present for their time off work. It is also not recommended that
(a $2,000 value)
they be required to have one as this creates an undue and,
according to the CDC, an unnecessary burden on the medical
Register at
community.
www.fireworld.com
Decontamination follows routine procedures and the use of
P
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
35
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
INDUSTRIAL SERVICE DIRECTORY
CAFS
FIRE FIGHTER TOOL CO.
5150 Franz Road
Katy, TX 77493
281/391-0588 • Fax 281/391-1593
COMPRESSED BREATHING AIR TESTING
ISO 9001: 2008 Certified
Meeting NFPA, CGA & OSHA Standards
www.dyneusa.com
(800) 632-2304
Email: [email protected]
CONSULTING/TRAINING
EMERGENCY
SERVICES TRAINING
600 Marina Drive
Beaumont, TX 77701
409/833-BEST • Fax 409/833-2376
FIRE & SAFETY SPECIALISTS INC.
P.O. Box 9161
College Station, TX 77842
979/690-7559 • Fax 979/690-7562
HAINES FIRE & RISK CONSULTING
609/294-3368 • www.hainesfire-risk.com
Fire Protection Consulting, Water Supplies,
Emergency Planning, Testing, Fire Investigation
INDUSTRIAL FIRE TRAINING CONSULTANTS
P.O. Box 17947 • Nashville, TN 37217-0947
615/793-5400 • [email protected]
www.iftcfire.com
LSU FIRE & EMERGENCY CONSULTANTS
6868 Nicholson Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70820
800/256-3473 • Fax 225/765-2416
http://feti.lsu.edu • [email protected]
WILLIAMS FIRE &
HAZARD CONTROL
P.O. Box 1359
Mauriceville, TX 77626
409/727-2347 • Fax 409/745-3021
FIRE APPARATUS
SUTPHEN CORPORATION
P.O. Box 0158
Amlin, OH 43002
800/848-5860
E-ONE
1601 SW 37th Ave.
Ocala, FL 34474
352/237-1122 • www.e-one.com
Ferrara Fire Apparatus, Inc.
Holden, Louisiana
Toll Free 800/443-9006
www.ferrarafire.com
36
36
ISDp36.pmd
ISO 9001: 2008 Certified
Meeting NFPA and IMO Standards
www.dyneusa.com
(800) 632-2304
HARD SUCTION HOSE
FIRE APPARATUS HARDWARE
HARRINGTON, INC.
2630 West 21st St.
Erie, PA 16506 • 800/553-0078
814/838-3957 • Fax 814/838-7339
TASK FORCE TIPS, INC.
Valparaiso, IN 46383 • 800/348-2686
[email protected] • www.tft.com
“An American Owned Company.”
FIRE FIGHTING & HAZARD CONTROL
WILLIAMS FIRE &
HAZARD CONTROL
P.O. Box 1359
409/727-2347 • Fax 409/745-3021
FOAM
Valparaiso, IN 46383 • 800/348-2686
HAZMAT EMERGENCY
RESPONSE EQUIPMENT
SKEDCO, INC.
10505 SW Manhasset Drive
Tualatin, OR 97062
503/691-7909 • Fax 503/691-7973
www.skedco.com
HOSE/HOSE COUPLINGS
WILLIAMS FIRE &
HAZARD CONTROL
P.O. Box 1359
409/727-2347 • Fax 409/745-3021
HOTELS
WILLIAMS FIRE &
HAZARD CONTROL
P.O. Box 1359
409/727-2347 • Fax 409/745-3021
FOAM EQUIPMENT
FOAMPRO-HYPRO
375 Fifth Ave. N.W.
New Brighton, MN 55112
651/766-6300 • 800/533-9511 • Fax 651/766-6614
EDUCATION & TRAINING
LAMAR INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
855 E. Lavaca, Beaumont, TX 77710
OSH, Fire & Homeland Security Training
409/880-8321 or 800/950-6989 • www.lit.edu
FIRE APPARATUS
FOAM TESTING
Valparaiso, IN 46383 • 800/348-2686
WILLIAMS FIRE &
HAZARD CONTROL
P.O. Box 1359
409/727-2347 • Fax 409/745-3021
www.fireworld.com
2355 IH-10 South — Beaumont, TX 77705
409/842-3600 • Fax 409/842-0023
e-mail: [email protected]
HOLIDAY INN BEAUMONT PLAZA
3950 I-10 S & Walden Rd.
Beaumont, TX 77705
409/842-5995 • Fax 409/842-7878
INCENTIVES/AWARDS/GIFTS
180 Franklin St.
Framingham, MA 01702
www.firecatalog.com • 1-800-729-1482
Gifts, badges, & accessories for firefighters
INDUSTRIAL
INDUSTRIAL FIRE
FIRE WORLD
WORLD
36
11/4/2009, 9:36 AM
LDH EQUIPMENT
HARRINGTON, INC
2630 West 21st St.
Erie, PA 16506 800/553-0078
814/838-3957 • Fax 814/838-7339
TURNOUT GEAR
SAFETY GEAR
GLOVE GUARD
Phone: 888-660-6133
Fax: 281-426-6135
Valparaiso, IN 46383 • 800/348-2686
MONITORS
Valparaiso, IN 46383 • 800/348-2686
WILLIAMS FIRE &
HAZARD CONTROL
P.O. Box 1359
409/727-2347 • Fax 409/745-3021
NOZZLES
Valparaiso, IN 46383 • 800/348-2686
WILLIAMS FIRE &
HAZARD CONTROL
P.O. Box 1359
409/727-2347 • Fax 409/745-3021
RESCUE EQUIPMENT- CONFINED SPACE
SKEDCO, INC.
10505 SW Manhasset Drive
P.O. Box 3390
Tualatin, OR 97062
800/770-7533 • Fax 503/639-4538
www.skedco.com
www.fireworld.com
2010
IFW Conference
February 22-26
Baton Rouge, LA
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
37
103 S. Main St.
Quakertown, PA 18951-1119
215/536-2991 • Fax 215/538-2164
[email protected] • www.quakersafety.com
H1N1
Continued from Page 35
So, what about total protection via a
vaccination program? Well, that is here
but there is not enough of the virus
vaccine to completely go around yet.
Target groups will be the first to receive
the initial dosages. It takes time, not
only to manufacture, but to isolate,
develop and of course, clinically test
any new vaccine. Are you in a target
group? Health care workers and
emergency workers are at the top of the
list because of the vast exposure to the
patient population. The young and
elderly come next and pregnant mothers
and those who care for dependant
children (child care workers) are also
slated to receive the vaccine. So have
your agency check with the local health
district, and see what the current
information about the vaccine is, get
your people inoculated and get the
protection necessary. Visit vaccine
sources at http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/
vaccination/statecontacts.htm. This is
a full state reference for contact points
for the vaccine. Your agency may even
become a provider for the vaccine as
this may help with its dissemination to
the general public. Use good public
relations tools. You can never have too
many of those.
In the mean time, wash your hands.
That has always been the forte for health
care workers and now is not the time to
back off. Lather soapy water for the time
it takes to sing “Happy Birthday.” Rinse
and dry with paper towels or air dry.
Remember to use a paper towel to open
the bathroom door.
C
Company dumped pesticide
wastes into public sewers
T
he president of a pesticide company
based in St. Joseph, Mo., was
sentenced in September in federal
court in Kansas City, Mo., for violations
of the Clean Water Act and hazardous
waste storage laws related to the
company’s pesticide production, the
Justice Department announced.
He was sentenced to serve six months
in prison, six months of home confinement
and was ordered to pay a $100,000 fine for
having disposed of pesticide waste water
down the sewers of the city of St. Joseph.
Sentencing for the company was delayed
by the court.
The company executive pleaded guilty
on Jan. 27, 2009, to a felony violation of
the Clean Water Act for disposing of the
pesticide waste. The company pleaded
guilty on the same day to the same
violation of the Clean Water Act as well as
a felony violation of the hazardous waste
storage laws.
The company maintained warehouses
at various locations in St. Joseph where it
stored wastes from its operations for years
without notifying the proper regulatory
agencies. Many of the stored wastes were
considered hazardous based upon their
ingredients or their characteristics. In
addition, employees under the company
president’s supervision disposed of waste
waters from the production of pesticides
down floor drains and into the city of St.
Joseph’s sewers for several years without
permit.
C
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
SPOTLIGHT ADS
March 2-4: Hazardous Materials On-Scene IC
March 9-12: Entry Level Industrial Firefighter
March 16-19: Advanced Exterior Industrial Firefighter
Mar. 29-April 1 : Incident Command Emergency
Response
Visit http://www.fireworld.com/training/training_cal.php
for the 2009-2010 FSA training calendar.
Feds issues record
$87 million penalty
T
Rescue Courses Track
Sponsored by Roco Rescue
• Maritime Rescue on USS Kidd
(Thursday, February 25)
• Fall Protection Rescue Course
(Monday, February 22)
• Annual Confined Space Rescue
Course (Monday, February 22 &
Thursday, February 25)
• Basic Awareness Rescue Course
(Wednesday, February 24)
$1,000 (a $2,000 value)
Register at
www.fireworld.com
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
38
he U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) announced in October it is
issuing $87,430,000 in proposed penalties to one of the
world’s largest energy companies for failure to correct potential
hazards faced by employees. The fine is the largest in OSHA’s
history. The prior largest total penalty, $21 million, was issued in
2005, also against the same company.
Safety violations at a Texas City, TX, refinery resulted in a
massive explosion — with 15 deaths and 170 people injured – in
March of 2005. The company entered into a settlement agreement
with OSHA in September of that year, under which the company
agreed to corrective actions to eliminate potential hazards similar
to those that caused the 2005 tragedy. The latest announcement
comes at the conclusion of a six-month inspection by OSHA,
designed to evaluate the extent to which the company has
complied with its obligations under the 2005 agreement and OSHA
standards.
When the company signed the OSHA settlement from the
March 2005 explosion, it agreed to take comprehensive action to
protect employees, said Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis. Instead
of living up to that commitment, the company has allowed
hundreds of potential hazards to continue unabated,” “Fifteen
people lost their lives as a result of the 2005 tragedy, and 170
others were injured. An $87 million fine won’t restore those lives,
but we can’t let this happen again. Workplace safety is more than
a slogan. It’s the law. The U.S. Department of Labor will not
tolerate the preventable exposure of workers to hazardous
conditions.”
For noncompliance with the terms of the settlement agreement,
the Texas City Refinery has been issued 270 “notifications of
failure to abate” with fines totaling $56.7 million. Each notification
represents a penalty of $7,000 times 30 days, the period that the
conditions have remained unabated.
OSHA also identified 439 new willful violations for failures to
follow industry-accepted controls on the pressure relief safety
systems and other process safety management violations with
C
penalties totaling $30.7 million.
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
39
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM
Nov-Dec09a.pmd
40
11/3/2009, 9:41 AM

Feds probe Jacksonville, FL process blast

Transcription

Similar documents

Crusader Chronicle S - St. James Lutheran Church

Sept 11 News - Imagination Crossing

5 Exhibits To See In NYC This September

the roadrunner reader - State Fair Community College

2014 – September - Cherryland Community Association

Midweek article - Senior Move Managers

Primera Iglesia Metodista Unida Celebrates 20th Anniversary!

feptemberVommunityXvents

TAILGATE MAG on AUGUST 22, 2014.qxd

Spanish Ministry - Emmanuel Pentecostal Church