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ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
ISITEP
D2.1.2- USAGE CANDIDATE SCENARIOS
Editor
Document Manager:
Etienne Lezaack
BFP
Programme:
Inter System Interoperability for Tetra-TetraPol Networks
Project Acronym:
ISITEP
Contract Number:
312484
Project Coordinator:
Selex ES
SP Leader:
BFP
Document ID N°:
ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141003_V1.0
Deliverable:
D 2.1.2
Version:
V 1.0
Date:
07/11/2014
Status:
Document
classification
Public
Approval Status
Prepared by:
Jerry Delaey (BFP), Etienne Lezaack (BFP)
Approved by:
(WP Leader)
Etienne Lezaack (BFP)
Approved by:
(SP Leader)
Etienne Lezaack (BFP)
Approved by:
(Coordinator)
Paolo Di Michele (SES)
Security Approval
Etienne LEZAACK (BFP)
(Advisory Board Coordinator)
Date: 07-11-2014
Approval status: Approved
Page 1/100
This document is produced under the EC contract 312484. It is the property of the ISITEP Parties and shall not be
distributed or reproduced without the formal approval of the ISITEP Steering Committee
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
CONTRIBUTING PARTNERS
Name
Company / Organization
Role / Title
Marianne Storrøsten
DNK
Contributor
Anita Galin
MSB
Contributor
Hans Borgonjen, Feiko Vermeulen
V&J
Contributor
Claudia Olivieri
SES
Contributor
Kirsten Aabye
MOT
Contributor
Jaakko Saijonmaa
CAS FI
Contributor
Michael Spyridakis
NETTECHN
Contributor
Marcel van der Lee, Bram
Verheesen
TNO
Contributor
Etienne Lezaack, Jerry Delaey, Dirk
Verhelst, Danny Smet, Harald
Meyer
BFP
Contributor / Editor
DISTRIBUTION LIST
Company / Organization
Role / Title
All Company Project
Managers
All involved companies
Members of the Steering
Committee
Elina MANOVA
EC DG REA
EC Programme Officer
Name
REVISION TABLE
Version
Date
V0.1
01/09/2014
All
All
Initial version, from D2.1.1
V0.2
03/10/2014
All
All
Intermediate version
V1.0
11/11/2014
All
All
Final version
Date: 07-11-2014
Modified Pages Modified Sections
Comments
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ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
Publishable extended abstract
This document describes the current legal and regulatory framework for direct cooperation between
the Public Safety Services (PPDR) of the European Nordic and the Benelux countries, as well as the
current state of the art of the related cross-border radio communications solutions, from both technical
and procedural viewpoints.
Besides, it defines a scenario template candidate for developing the ISITEP field exercises.
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CONTENTS
PUBLISHABLE EXTENDED ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................. 3
CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................................. 4
FIGURES ................................................................................................................................................................. 7
ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................................ 8
1.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 10
1.1
ISITEP AT A GLANCE ............................................................................................................................................ 10
1.2
GOALS OF THE DELIVERABLE 2.1.2 INSIDE THE WORK PACKAGE 2.1 .................................................................. 10
1.2.1
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 10
1.2.1
TASK 2.1.1 – CURRENT STATUS ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL STATE OF PLAY ............................................ 11
1.2.2
TASK 2.1.2 – SELECTION OF SCENARIO TYPE .................................................................................................... 11
1.3
RELATION WITH OTHER WORK PACKAGES ........................................................................................................... 12
2
REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION ......................... 13
2.1
SWEDEN-NORWEGIAN COOPERATION ................................................................................................................... 13
2.1.1
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 13
2.1.2
Agreements and declarations .......................................................................................................................... 13
2.1.3
Aims and Objectives........................................................................................................................................ 15
2.2
BELGIAN-NETHERLANDS-GERMAN COOPERATION .............................................................................................. 15
2.2.1
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 15
2.2.2
Framework for Belgian-Netherlands-German police cooperation ................................................................. 15
3 PPDR COOPERATION EXISTING SOLUTIONS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AT EUROPEAN
LEVEL ................................................................................................................................................................... 17
3.1
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 17
3.2
OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION SOLUTIONS ......................................................................................... 17
3.2.1
Loan of radio terminals .................................................................................................................................. 17
3.2.2
Mobile phones ................................................................................................................................................. 18
3.2.3
Gateways......................................................................................................................................................... 18
3.2.3.1 Interconnection at the analogue audio signal level ............................................................................................. 18
3.2.3.2 Interconnection at the digital voice and/or data signal level ............................................................................ 19
3.2.3.3 Radioscopy of the gateways in Europe .................................................................................................................. 19
3.2.4
“Semi-roaming” ............................................................................................................................................. 21
3.2.4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................ 21
3.2.4.2 Concept semi-roaming........................................................................................................................................................ 21
3.2.4.3 Identification numbers of the radios (ISSI) ........................................................................................................................ 23
3.2.4.4 Security .............................................................................................................................................................................. 23
3.2.4.5 Bi-national communication groups..................................................................................................................................... 24
3.2.4.6 Coupling of networks ......................................................................................................................................................... 25
3.2.4.7 Experiences: Eneco Tour and World Port Classic .............................................................................................................. 25
3.2.4.8 Modalities ........................................................................................................................................................................... 28
3.2.4.9 Extension of the current concept ........................................................................................................................................ 29
3.2.4.10 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................................ 30
3.2.5
Transportable base stations or networks ........................................................................................................ 30
3.2.6
Direct mode .................................................................................................................................................... 31
3.3
SWEDEN-NORWEGIAN, SWEDEN-FINLAND, SWEDEN-DENMARK COOPERATION ................................................ 32
3.3.1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 32
3.3.2
Cross boarder talk groups ............................................................................................................................. 32
3.3.3
Euro DMO ..................................................................................................................................................... 33
3.3.4
Loan of radio terminals ................................................................................................................................. 33
3.3.5
National talk groups in Norway for communication with neighbouring countries ......................................... 33
3.3.6
Norway-Sweden ISI under development ........................................................................................................ 34
3.4
BELGIAN-NETHERLANDS COOPERATION .............................................................................................................. 34
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3.4.1
3.4.2
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 34
G4WIF gateways............................................................................................................................................ 34
3.4.2.1. Implementation by the police forces .................................................................................................................................. 34
3.4.2.2 Implementation by the fire and ambulance services ........................................................................................................... 38
3.4.3
BIM gateways ................................................................................................................................................. 38
3.4.3.1
3.4.3.2
3.4.3.3
3.4.3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
4
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 38
Operational Procedures (simultaneous use of G4WIF and BIM) .................................................................................. 41
Tests and maintenance of staff skills ............................................................................................................................ 42
User feedback ............................................................................................................................................................... 42
GERMAN-NETHERLANDS COOPERATION .............................................................................................................. 42
GERMAN-BELGIAN-NETHERLANDS COOPERATION .............................................................................................. 43
FRENCH-BELGIAN COOPERATION ......................................................................................................................... 44
SURVEY OF CROSS-BORDER EVENTS .................................................................................................... 45
4.1
HISTORICAL EVENTS .............................................................................................................................................. 45
4.1.1
Event: Maundy Thursday cross border partying ........................................................................................... 45
4.1.2
The Hercules accident..................................................................................................................................... 46
4.2
PERIODICAL EVENTS: ANNUAL ENECO TOUR SPEED CYCLING RACE .................................................................. 50
5
ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL ISSUES AND RISKS FOR CURRENT COOPERATION ............................ 51
6 ASSESMENT OF UPCOMING TECHNOLOGY FOR COMMUNICATION INTEROPERABILITY ........ 52
6.1
UPCOMING TECHNOLOGY FOR PPDR VOICE AND SDS INTEROPERABILITY: NORWAY-SWEDEN ISI UNDER
DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................................................................................................... 52
6.1.1
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 52
6.1.2
CRITICAL ISSUES AND RISKS .............................................................................................................................. 53
6.1.3
SOME RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIRST DELIVERY FROM THE USER IN ISI PROJECT .............................. 54
6.1.4
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................................... 54
6.2
UPCOMING TECHNOLOGY FOR PPDR DATA COMMUNICATION INTEROPERABILITY .......................................... 54
6.2.1
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 54
6.2.2
Overview of relevant PPDR and standardisation organisations driving technologies decisions ................... 56
6.2.2.1 INVOLVED PPDR ORGANISATIONS ................................................................................................................... 56
6.2.2.1.1
6.2.2.1.2
6.2.2.1.3
6.2.2.2
The representatives of PPDR .............................................................................................................................. 56
Background of the LEWP-RCEG role ................................................................................................................. 56
Requirements ......................................................................................................................................................... 57
Standardisation Organisations (TCCA-CCBG + LTE standard + 3GPP) ..................................................... 57
6.2.2.2.1
6.2.2.2.2
LTE .......................................................................................................................................................................... 57
TCCA-CCBG .......................................................................................................................................................... 57
6.2.3
MOBILE BROADBAND DATA COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN EUROPEAN PUBLIC SAFETY .......... 60
6.2.3.1 Foreseen broadband applications .................................................................................................................. 60
6.2.3.2 Roadmap ......................................................................................................................................................... 60
6.2.3.3 Frequencies..................................................................................................................................................... 62
6.2.3.3.1
6.2.3.3.2
6.2.3.3.3
6.2.3.3.4
6.2.3.3.5
Current status of public safety mobile communication ..................................................................................... 62
The European frequency regulation.................................................................................................................... 62
The position of the European Commission. ....................................................................................................... 63
The EU Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (RSPP). ...................................................................................... 63
What should happen next?................................................................................................................................... 63
7 ASSESMENT OF SUPPORTING TOOLS FOR COMMUNICATION INTEROPERABILITY .................................................... 64
7.1
TETRA/TETRAPOL – DISPACHER TRAINING TOOL ............................................................................... 64
7.2
OPERATIONS TRAINING TOOL................................................................................................................................ 64
7.3
BUSINESS MODEL TOOL ........................................................................................................................................ 64
8 SCENARIOS ................................................................................................................................................................. 66
8.1
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 66
8.2
GOAL ...................................................................................................................................................................... 66
8.3
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................. 67
8.3.1
Categories of exercises ................................................................................................................................... 67
8.3.2
Groups and Functions .................................................................................................................................... 68
8.3.3
General principles .......................................................................................................................................... 69
8.4
DRAFT OF A SCENARIO ........................................................................................................................................... 71
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8.5
EXAMPLES .............................................................................................................................................................. 77
8.5.1
General example ............................................................................................................................................. 77
8.5.2
Specific Example: Hot pursuit Germany-Belgium-Netherlands ..................................................................... 80
8.6
ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................................................ 84
8.6.1
General information about the exercise.......................................................................................................... 84
8.6.2
Major Event List (MEL) – Scenario ................................................................................................................ 84
8.6.3
Checklist with the necessary logistical resources ........................................................................................... 84
8.6.4
Table with “to do’s” (practical conventions can be used as reference) ......................................................... 84
8.6.5
Follow-up table (coordinator and observer) .................................................................................................. 84
8.6.6
List of the evaluator ........................................................................................................................................ 84
8.6.7
List of the player ............................................................................................................................................. 84
8.6.8
List of the improvements ................................................................................................................................. 84
8.6.9
Practical conventions (structure) – Check-list ............................................................................................... 84
8.6.10 Practical conventions (transfer letter) ............................................................................................................ 84
9 ANNEXES .................................................................................................................................................................. 100
9.1
OPERATIONAL AGREEMENT ON THE USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CROSS-BORDER RADIO COMMUNICATION
MEANS IN THE “ZONE DE DEFENSE NORD” IN FRANCE, AND THE BORDER AREA WITH THIS ZONE IN BELGIUM (13-112013) 100
9.2
RADIO PROCEDURE FOR ISITEP DEMONSTRATIONS ......................................................................................... 100
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FIGURES
Figure 1: ISITEP framework .................................................................................................................................. 10
Figure 2: Existing gateway interconnections between the European countries .................................................... 20
Figure 3: Semi-roaming concept ........................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 4: Security measures .................................................................................................................................. 24
Figure 5: Stages of the Eneco Tour 2012.............................................................................................................. 26
Figure 6: G4WIF interface (CO B-NL / B-NL Coord) ............................................................................................. 36
Figure 7: extraction of the follow-up table ............................................................................................................. 37
Figure 8: G4WIF Interface (B-NL INRAP / ALERT B-NL) ..................................................................................... 37
Figure 9: B2B connection ...................................................................................................................................... 40
Figure 10: The ten (2 x 5) control rooms involved along the B/Nl border, and the nine (9) B/Nl pairs of control
rooms for the management of the (9) complementary talkgroups (green lines) ............................................ 41
Figure 11: KTS implementation via BIM-card ........................................................................................................ 42
Figure 12: Map....................................................................................................................................................... 45
Figure 13: Area where the wreckage was found ................................................................................................... 48
Figure 14: Photo of the area where the wreckage was found ............................................................................... 49
Figure 15: TCCA-CCBG structure ......................................................................................................................... 59
Figure 16: CCBG relation ...................................................................................................................................... 59
Figure 17: Step 1- Using existing networks for mission critical voice + a little bit data (with TEDS more) .......... 61
Figure 18: Step 2 - using commercial networks for mobile data + preparing the mission critical solution, resulting
in dedicated solutions around 2020................................................................................................................ 61
Figure 19: Step 3 - a mission critical voice group communication service „over‟ the LTE network is very uncertain
........................................................................................................................................................................ 62
Figure 20: Deming Circle (Plan - Do - Check - Act) .............................................................................................. 67
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ACRONYMS
AIM
Air Interface Migration
B2B
Back-to-Back
BDBOS
Bundesanstalt für den Digitalfunk der Behörden und Organisationen mit
Sicherheitsaufgaben
CBC
Cross-border Communication
CEPT
Conférence européenne des administrations des postes et
télécommunications
CoCo
Commercially Owned Commercially Operated
CPX
Commando Post eXercise
DGNA
Dynamic Group Number Assignment
DMO
Direct Mode Operations
ECC
Electronic Communications Committee
ETSI
European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EU
European Union
FTX
Field Training eXercise
G4WIF
Generic 4-Wire Interface
GSSI
Group Short Subscriber Identity
GoCo
Government Owned Commercially Operated
GoGo
Government Owned Government Operated
HLR
Home Location Register
IOP
Inter Operability Protocol
ISI
Inter System Interface
ISSI
Individual Short Subscriber Identity
ITU
International Telecommunication Union
ISITEP
Inter System Interfaces for TETRA-TETRAPOL Networks
JRCC
Joint Rescue Co-ordination Center
KTS
(Dutch abbreviation) Korte Termijn Schengen (Short term Schengen)
LEWP
Law Enforcement Working Party
LTE
Long Term Evolution
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MS
Mobile station / Radio Terminal
NORDEFCO
Nordic Defence Cooperation
PMR
Private Mobile Radio
PPDR
Public Protection and Disaster Relief
RCEG
Radio Communications Expert Group
RSPP
Radio Spectrum Policy Programme
SDA
Standards Development Organisation
SDS
Short Data Services
TCCA
TETRA and Critical Communications Association
TEDS
TETRA Enhanced Data Service
TG
Talk Group
TIP
TETRA Interoperability Profile
TMO
Trunked Mode Operations
TTX
Table Top eXercise
VLR
Visitor Location Register
WGFM
Working Group Frequency Management
WP
Work Package
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1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1 ISITEP at a glance
ISITEP (Inter System Interfaces for TETRA-TETRAPOL Networks) project will achieve operational
interoperability among European first responders addressing the regulative, organizational,
operational and technical level. ISITEP (Inter System Interfaces for TETRA-TETRAPOL Networks)
project will achieve operational interoperability among European first responders addressing the
regulative, organizational, operational and technical level.
The project will define public specifications of technical and procedural innovations, as well as novel
processes for safety applications.
Figure 1: ISITEP framework
The general objective is obtained jointly addressing four components that are coherently defined,
developed and integrated through a novel Framework which is constituted by:
1. A Mission-oriented Framework containing a standardized model of operational procedures and
associated functional radio model
2. A European Inter System Interface (ISI) cloud network integrating the PPDR national
infrastructures to allow roaming capability services within a secure framework.
3. Enhanced User Terminals: integrating TETRA/TETRAPOL technology into a novel terminal
architecture based on programmable devices (Tablet, Smartphones).
4. Interoperability enabling tools including tools for infrastructures dimensioning, training,
business model assessment and services for safety operations.
1.2 Goals of the deliverable 2.1.2 inside the work package 2.1
1.2.1 Introduction
Deliverable 2.1.2 is covering tasks 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of the work package 2.1.
Task 2.1.1 deals with the current status assessment of the general state of play related to the
international direct cooperation.
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The approach taken within the state of the art assessment is to particularly focus on the countries
were the demonstration will take place and from which government partners are consortium member
(No-Se, Be-De-Nl).
By means of the ISITEP survey it is also aimed to get state of the art information from the other
countries involved in SP7 demonstrations (Es-Pt and Ch-Fr) and other European countries.
As surveys are long processes they will be completed with D 2.1.3.
On the other hand, task 2.1.2 deals with the definition of a method and of the related templates for
elaborating the ISITEP scenarios (preparation, execution and evaluation phases). This task is
necessary before drawing up the SP7 demonstrations scenarios.
WP 2.1 encompasses a third task 2.1.3, which deals with the scenario definition consolidation. This
will be completed with D 2.1.3.
1.2.1 Task 2.1.1 – Current status assessment of the general state of play
Topics within this task are:
1. Analysis of the current expected regulatory and legal framework at European level and at
national, bilateral and trilateral national levels with particular focus on countries where
demonstration will take place (see point 2).
Note: the issue of the future expected regulatory and legal framework is addressed in WP 2.3
(D2.3.3).
2. Evaluation of existing PPDR cooperation solutions and operational procedures at European
level and at national, bilateral and trilateral national levels, with particular focus on countries
where demonstration will take place (see point 3)
3. Survey of cross-border events (see point 4).
4. Assessment of current technology for communication interoperability (see point 5).
5. Assessment of upcoming technology for communication interoperability (see point 6).
6. Assessment of supporting tools for communication interoperability (see point 7).
7. Assessment of critical issues and risks for current cooperation (see point 8).
1.2.2 Task 2.1.2 – Selection of scenario type
This task is developed in chapter 9. This is focused on:
1. Definition of scenarios prerequisites e.g. conformity of the developed scenarios with the
existing legislation, definition of the elements to be tested during the scenarios (operational
feasibility and technology) versus the elements that have to be fixed in the scenarios
(operational reactions…).
2. Definition of the role of the several teams accompanying the “actors” during the scenarios
playing (e.g. observers…)
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3. Definition of the degree of standardisation of the scenarios documents
1.3 Relation with other work packages
The outcome of WP 2.1 will be used to define requirements (WP 2.2 and 2.3), to assess the
infrastructure dimensioning (WP 6.1), the business model (WP 6.3) and it will be the source for
defining the specific demonstrations in SP7.
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2
REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CROSS-BORDER
COOPERATION
2.1 Sweden-Norwegian cooperation
2.1.1 Introduction
The Nordic countries share history, culture and values. There is a long tradition of cross-border
assistance in response to emergencies. The countries share similar risks and challenges as well as
the same threats inherent to climate change. Today, several agreements, networks and structures for
cross-sector and cross-border assistance exist in this region..
Issues of societal security and preparedness have topped the parliamentary agenda in the Nordic
countries for many years. Threats to societal security can have natural or human causes. Such
threats include climate change and its impacts on nature and our way of life, collapse of critical
infrastructure such as energy and water supply systems, organised crime, and terrorism. All of these
have one thing in common: they extend across national boundaries. Nordic cooperation may be
crucial. There is unique transparency in the Nordic countries surrounding civil protection and
preparedness planning before, during and after accident and crises.
2.1.2 Agreements and declarations
NORDRED agreement
The NORDRED agreement was entered into in 1989 and formed the first formal framework for cooperation on rescue services between the Nordic countries.
The Framework Agreement
Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on cooperation across territorial view to
the accident prevents or limits damage to people, property or the environment.
The governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, who are convinced of the need for
cooperation between the competent authorities of the Contracting States in order to facilitate the
necessary mutual assistance in emergencies in peacetime and to accelerate the deployment of
auxiliary personnel and equipment, which considers this agreement as a framework that is intended to
supplement other Nordic multilateral or bilateral agreements in the field, and who wish to further
enhance cooperation in the field, have agreed of 10 articles.
Article 6 of the Agreement provides for the obligations of States:
Provide information on legislation and organization of the emergency services in the different
countries,
Contribute to the development of cooperation in the field,
Keep direct dealings with each other on the practical implementation of the agreement, and
hold meetings where they are deemed appropriate
Haga declaration
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In recent years this tradition of practical and problem-focused cooperation across national borders to
ensure the safety and security of the countries‟ inhabitants has been strengthened through several
political initiatives.
Nordic Declaration at Haga in 2009 is one example. In this political statement, the ministers
responsible for societal security agreed to further develop emergency management cooperation within
specific areas. Several expert working groups were established and these are required to report
annually to the relevant political leaders. The Haga Declaration of 2009 aims at increasing the Nordic
countries co-operation to prevent, reduce and manage the consequences of major accidents and
disasters.
Haga Declaration II – A robust Nordic region without borders
Nordic cooperation is important. The strong community of values, such as Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden share are also reflected in the Nordic countries security policies.
On the basis of common interests and of geographical proximity, it is natural for the Nordic countries
to strive to meet today‟s security challenges, in our region, in Europe and globally in a spirit of
solidarity.
A new declaration, Haga II, were June 4, 2013 agreed by the Nordic ministers to be developed with
the common understanding that the Nordic cooperation should be further deepened, to withstand and
manage social crises.
The vision pursued by this work - a robust Nordic without Borders. A robust Nordic without Borders is
a society where the vulnerability decreases while the ability to deal with major emergencies and crises
and restore functionality is strengthened.
In order to focus the vision should be a priority in areas of cooperation that contributes to a Nordic
region without borders. It involves removing various barriers, reduce vulnerabilities especially those
with cross-border effects, raises the common ability to manage and restore as well as contributing to
greater cost and joint force in the EU, EEA countries and in international fora.
Solidarity clause
One expert group was assigned the task of exploring the prospects for Nordic research cooperation in
the field of societal security. The Norwegian chair formally presented the group‟s report to the Haga
ministers in November 2010. In December 2011 the ministers met again and decided to forward the
report on research cooperation to the heads of the national societal preparedness agencies.
And in 2011 the Nordic ministers responsible for societal security and preparedness shook hands
agreeing to stand by one other in crisis situations. This happened in a joint declaration of solidarity
which had already been called for in the Stoltenberg report from 2009. Finally there is collaborative
work in Nordefco, especially in materials procurement.
Treaty of Prüm
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Prüm (2005) also broader police and judicial cooperation, like
the creation of a network between existing national databases by granting participating countries
automated access to each other's data, is possible. The Contracting Parties intended to step up
cross-border cooperation in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal immigration.
Municipal boundary agreements
There are lots of municipal agreement cross border between Sweden and Norway. The Agreements
signed between the border municipalities based Framework Nordic.
Nordic Defense Cooperation - NORDEFCO
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The Nordic defence and foreign ministers also attended the meeting in Stockholm 2009, where they
explained the status of co-operation in defence and security policies between the countries. At the
ministerial meeting it was decided to merge the three parallel cooperation structures into one: and an
Memorandum of Understanding between the all five Nordic nations on the establishing of
NORDEFCO was signed 4 November 2009.
2.1.3 Aims and Objectives
The main aim and purpose of the Nordic defence Cooperation is to strengthen the participating
nations´ national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions. In
order to achieve this aim, the objectives of the Nordic Defence Cooperation include (but are not
limited to):
A comprehensive, enhanced and long-term approach to defence related issues
Identify and discuss defence related strategic and policy issues of common interest
Increase operational effect and quality of the armed forces
Strive for an optimum resource allocation and cost-efficiency in defence related areas
Develop interoperability and capability to act jointly
Develop cooperation in the area of multinational operations, defence related
More information on the site Nordred.com, international agreements
2.2 Belgian-Netherlands-German cooperation
2.2.1 Introduction
Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany have to deal with cross-border PPDR incidents daily. This
has been the case for decades. Regarding incidents where police forces are involved there is an
increase noticeable after the creation of Europe‟s borderless Schengen Area in 1995. The Schengen
Agreement proposed the gradual abolition of border checks at the common borders of the contracting
parties. The open borders have many positive effects but unfortunately there are also negative ones,
for example, the potential for cross-border crime. There are other treaties agreed that offer
opportunities to address these issues. Due to various factors (organizational, type of incidents,
different countries, etc.) , there is a wide variety of agreements and regulations on different levels and
subjects regarding cross-border PPDR cooperation.
2.2.2 Framework for Belgian-Netherlands-German police cooperation
The Treaty of Enschede
The Treaty of Enschede (2005) regulates border crossing police assistance between The Netherlands
and Germany. This treaty provides a legal basis for close cooperation and is designed to resolve
three main problems identified by joint police working groups. The three subjects are [1] the absence
of powers to undertake cross-border interventions in urgent situations, [2] problems that arose in
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relation to the policing of public order (large-scale public events) and [3] there were difficulties
regarding the swift exchange of information. This treaty contains besides articles on operational
cooperation, a number of specific provisions that relates to the improvement of judicial cooperation.
The Benelux Convention on police cooperation
The Benelux Convention on police cooperation (Treaty of Senningen – 2004) regulates border
crossing police cooperation between the Benelux-countries Belgium, The Netherlands and
Luxembourg. Even like the Treaty of Enschede this treaty provides a legal basis for close operational
cooperation and is designed to resolve the three main problems identified by joint police working
groups. Thereby is the declaration of The Netherlands, Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia (declaration
of Baarle-Nassau – 2002) concerning the improvement of cross border cooperation implemented.
Cross-border operations can take place throughout the country if there is a request preceded, for
example in case of a European football match in Amsterdam. Police operations in the border region is
permitted on the initiative of the police in case of an emergency situation in the context of the
maintenance of public order and security and when the police from the host state itself cannot be
present on time.
Treaty of Prüm
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Prüm (2005) also broader police and judicial cooperation, like
the creation of a network between existing national databases by granting participating countries
automated access to each other's data, is possible. The Contracting Parties intended to step up
cross-border cooperation in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal immigration. Besides
Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany several other European countries are party of this treaty.
Treaty of Bonn
There also exist bilateral treaties (Treaty of Bonn - 1988) related on mutual assistance in the event of
disasters (including serious accidents) between the three countries. These agreements were
established after a number of bottlenecks in the cooperation, including the use of radio
communication, were found to exist. One of the main elements of the agreement is procedural rules.
Regional agreements
Like mentioned before, treaties aren‟t the only sort of regulation regarding cross border PPDR
cooperation. There also exist many agreements between regions in the border areas. Many of these
are not public and are agreed between a limited numbers of organizations. There is a significant
difference between the cooperation between agencies when it comes to criminal matters or when it
comes to fire fighting and emergency assistance. That‟s because in case of criminal matters there are
fundamental rights and derived rights to take into account.
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3
PPDR COOPERATION EXISTING SOLUTIONS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
AT EUROPEAN LEVEL
3.1 Introduction
When we speak here about PPDR cooperation it is referred to the direct cooperation, or the
cooperation in real time, versus the information exchange off-line like the interconnection of criminal
or traffic data bases between countries.
The need for more international direct cooperation and the related need for international radio
communications have fostered the emergence of several solutions to overcome the lack of “roaming”
capability between the existing national PPDR radio networks.
3.2 Overview of European cooperation solutions
3.2.1 Loan of radio terminals
The traditional way to establish communications between countries is to exchange radio terminals
between countries.
The main advantage of this approach is that visitors can operate over the whole visited country.
On the other hand, the visitors lose their communication link with their own country, except if they
bear, besides the loaned terminal, a second terminal from their own network and if they don‟t have to
intervene beyond the coverage of their own national network.
This can be organised on two levels:
1. Bordering control rooms are equipped with a desk terminal coming from the country over the
border, allowing them to exchange information together or to monitor traffic from the opposite.
For so far the national radio coverage can reach the nearest control rooms over the border, is
this solution convenient: control room operators get accustomed with the foreign terminal MMI
and become acquainted with the agreed radio procedures (call signs, radio checks…).
2. Intervention teams are equipped with terminals from the country on which they have to
intervene.
This solution, apparently so easy to apply, practically only works when the concerned
services, on both sides of the border, regularly intervene over the border, together with teams
of the visited country, or alone, under control of the geographical competent control room.
Outside this favourable context, when an international incident occurs or when an international
operation is planned, loaning terminals is less evident than it appears: as such events are
unusual there exists mostly no procedure to regulate the exchanges.
Untrained officers have to discover terminals they likely don‟t know and to learn the
operational procedures to be applied, furthermore a specific logistical agreement has to be
concluded between the concerned countries.
Subsequently, countries often opt for sending a liaison officer to the visiting forces or for
organising mixed teams, so that everybody uses his own terminal following his own
procedures.
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3.2.2 Mobile phones
In case of international missions for which group calls are not essential, intervention teams will do with
mobile phones. This is mainly applicable for police investigation or surveillance teams.
Mobile phones have the main advantage that they can roam everywhere in Europe and nearly in the
whole world (terrestrial communications). If it is a matter of smart phones, they can also support
broadband data (professional) applications.
On the other hand, they are, in the practice, limited to point to point communications: national
operators having developed the group call feature are exceptions, and, anyway, the technical design
of the commercial cellular networks is not optimised for the multicast. The lack of some services like
the quick call setup time and the emergency calls is also, to a lesser extent, crippling.
3.2.3 Gateways
Gateways are technical interfaces that interconnect networks:
1. at the analogue audio signal level,
2. at the digital voice and/or data signal level.
The main advantage of this solution is that the first responders can use their own usual terminals to
perform group calls over the two or more interconnected countries.
However, there is no possibility to use your own terminal on another network abroad (no “roaming”
capability). Everybody has to remain under the coverage of its own national radio network.
3.2.3.1 Interconnection at the analogue audio signal level
In this case, you can only transmit voice.
There are two sub-cases, following the analogue audio signal from the network of a country A is
picked up:
1. on a standard radio terminal,
2. on a specific electronic card integrated in one of the radio network switches.
In the first sub-case it is spoken about “back-to-back” gateways or relays (B2B): two terminals are
connected, by wires, via an electronic interface. This interface realises basically the following: the
electric output signal (loudspeaker audio and PTT signalling) from the terminal of country A feeds the
micro audio and PTT electric inputs of a second terminal from country B.
So, if the B2B is placed in a zone where the radio coverage of networks A and B overlaps, the group
call received by terminal A will be transmitted by the terminal B, and conversely.
Some B2B models allow a remote control of the terminals, so that you can remotely select the talk
groups on both radios of the B2B, and so define new interconnected international talk groups.
The time delays management and the audio quality are tricky issues for this type of gateway.
Nevertheless, the low price, the possible self-production on a PPDR organisation level, the absence
of connection lines (B2B uses two air interfaces) and the flexibility for the B2B location choice make
this gateway type popular.
In the second sub-case, the electric audio signal from a talk group of the country A is directly supplied
by an electronic card of a network A switch to the terminal from country B. These gateways are
sometimes named following the commercial electronic card name (“BIM”, “G4WIF”…).
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Working from a network switch saves some time delay and improves the audio quality of the gateway.
This is clearly a more professional solution.
However, you have less flexibility for the gateway location: you need radio coverage from country B in
the vicinity of a switch from country A. This is not always possible.
3.2.3.2 Interconnection at the digital voice and/or data signal level
In this case, you can transmit voice, short data, IP data (over TETRA and/or TETRAPOL) and
signalling.
The digital audio, data and signalling streams from the network A are converted by computing
processing in digital audio, data and signalling steams compatible with the network B. This is typically
realised by line interconnecting a switch of country A with a switch of country B.
If the streams are ciphered, this technology implies a deciphering of the stream A before converting it
in a stream B, and eventually a ciphering of the stream B.
The benefits of this solution is that, thanks to the absence of A/D (analogue to digital) and D/A
conversions, the audio quality suffers no loss and, as mentioned above, next to the voice, data and
signalling (i.e. supplementary services) can be exchanged. This is the Rolls-Royce of the gateways.
However, these full digital, sophisticated gateways are also more expensive, and, therefore, scarcely
adopted for international communications between PPDR networks.
3.2.3.3 Radioscopy of the gateways in Europe
The gateway solution is the most widespread in Europe. This probably because its easiness to use:
no setup to deploy, no complicated operational or logistic coordination or procedures and, for the first
responders on the field, no specific equipment or radio procedure. First responders can keep using
their own terminals as usual, while having an extended possibility to reach colleagues abroad.
The introduction of the “roaming” between the existing PPDR networks would save all these
operational advantages, while solving the terminal migration issue.
As a radioscopy of the deployed gateways in Europe seemed a relevant indicator about the interest of
the PPDR services for the cross-border radio communication and hence about the effectiveness of
the European cooperation between these services, ISITEP started a survey inside the COMIX (Mixed
Committee, including the EU member states and the Schengen countries outside EU), in order to
know which PPDR services communicate – with insufficient operational capability – already today
together.
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Figure 2: Existing gateway interconnections between the European countries
We came from now to the results summarised in the figure above:
1. The bullet stuck on each country summarises its reply: “we have international connection”, “we
don‟t have international connection”, no answer yet.
2. The coloured short lines refer to gateways that have been mentioned by at least one country.
3. Black short lines mean that the concerned gateway(s) can be used by all the “blue light
agencies”. Gateway(s) dedicated to an agency type have a specific colour.
Although some countries didn‟t replied yet and some arising inconsistencies (e.g. Spain claimed to
have no interconnection with its neighbouring countries whilst Portugal and France mentioned
gateways on respectively police and multi-agencies levels), the map shows clearly a lot of
“interconnected terrestrial borders”.
By the way, the figure reminds vividly that TETRA and TETRAPOL, like the other cellular network
technologies, provide terrestrial radio communications. This means that PPDR international
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communication and cooperation on the sees requires other radio communication solutions, e.g.
international marine channels or satellites.
A more detailed analysis of the survey, and its suite about the existing operational procedures and
legislation, will be supplied with the deliverable D 2.1.3 (M 33).
3.2.4 “Semi-roaming”
3.2.4.1 Introduction
You can simulate the “roaming” between two countries using the same technology (TETRA or
TETRAPOL) by programming a common set of subscribers and talk groups in the both radio networks
data bases, combined with an interconnection of two talk groups via a gateway. Because it is a
„simulation‟ of the roaming; we speak about „semi-roaming‟.
Radio users wish similar facilities as they have with their mobile phones, but the evolution of the cell
phones has gone much faster than that of the radios. The strength of radio communication is the
possibility for group, individual en emergency calls and the localization and limited data-applications in
a separate and secure network.
The emergency and security services in Belgium are using a digital radio system based on the Tetra
standard. The network is called Astrid and was installed by Nokia.
In the Netherlands, we also have a radio network C2000 based on the Tetra standard but this one is
provided by Motorola.
The need to operate in a foreign network and the use of roaming was especially necessary during the
escort of bicycle races between the two countries.
In digital phone networks, roaming is a common practice. The networks operate with a HLR and a
VLR. The costs generated in the foreign network are transferred to the home network of the user. For
the moment, roaming doesn‟t exist in radio networks.
In the radio communications, there are several network operators and the technologies sometimes
don‟t match with each other. The operators are not so willing to share their networks with other
companies. On the other hand, the commercial return is too little to invest great sums of money in
new functionalities.
From the users‟ side, there is a need to continue in the foreign radio network with their own familiar
radio.
3.2.4.2 Concept semi-roaming
Roaming is a general term in wireless telecommunications, mobile phones and data connections
whereby a particular service is continued even when the user is no longer connected with his own
network in which he was initially registered. For users of mobile phones, the roaming is already
possible. Therefore they can communicate on other telephone networks without a subscription of a
local provider. For the radio communications, we currently have no roaming between the different
networks.
Roaming in the radio environment would mean that the radio user could proceed to a foreign network
with its own terminal (radio) and at least use the speech functionality. His radio would be recognized
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by the other radio network and so he has access to it. In the radio world, the roaming is still not yet
implemented as a result of a number of technical limitations.
For nearly 10 years (2005), Belgium and The Netherlands have been using semi-roaming. In semiroaming, we are going to work with identification numbers of the radios and talk groups that are
known in the two networks data bases.
Currently there is only an exchange of ISSI‟s and GSSI‟s between Be and Nl. The ISSI is the
identification number of the radio in the network, while the GSSI is the identification number of a talk
group in the network.
Semi-roaming has also a number of limitations:
Limitations in space: the use is only possible between the C2000 (NL) and the Astrid (BE)
network
Time restrictions: the semi-roaming is only used for scheduled operations for which the
duration is fixed in the operation order
Limitations in scope: the number of radios and communication groups is exhaustedly fixed and
predefined. In addition, the number of functionalities that can be used is also limited.
In the first phase of the use of semi-roaming, there was no security and the operators of the networks
considered it as a safety problem. The advantage for the users was that any radio could be
configured for the semi-roaming; the assignment of an identification number (ISSI) that was known in
both of the networks was sufficient to use the semi-roaming.
Figure 3: Semi-roaming concept
In order to meet the safety requirements of the operators, the use of free ISSI‟s was abolished. In
addition, some specific bi-national communication groups (CA-TOUR) were created and measures
were taken for authentication and encryption.
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3.2.4.3 Identification numbers of the radios (ISSI)
For the semi-roaming, we make use of free ISSI‟s that are known in both networks, C2000 (NL) and
Astrid (BE). These free ISSI‟s are divided in two blocks of 40 numbers. The first series is reserved for
the radios of the Netherlands and the 40 subsequent to those of Belgium.
The ISSI is a six-digit number starting from 192500 to 192580:
192500 – 192540: Dutch radios
192541 – 192580: Belgian radios
By assigning these specific ISSI‟s to the radios, it is possible to use them for semi-roaming. Because
there was a potential safety problem for the operators of both networks, they asked to submit those
radios to any security requirements that are also applicable on the equipment in the own network.
It is still possible to expand the number of identification numbers of the radios. For the current
requirements, 80 ISSI‟s were more than sufficient to meet the demands of the users.
3.2.4.4 Security
In the early years, semi-roaming did not meet any safety measures. Additional encryption was
introduced under pressure of the network operators. Another important step forward was the
introduction of authentication.
The use of un-encrypted ISSI‟s and GSSI‟s gave major security risks, even when the administrator of
the network introduced some limitations.
In the C2000 radio network it was found that unauthorized people had bought Tetra equipment on a
second-hand market (Marktplaats) and used these radios to listen to the unencrypted radio traffic.
These radios weren‟t covered by authentication so there was no possibility of technical control on the
admission to the network.
From the declaration of the suspects it seemed that public resources such as internet are sufficient to
get the necessary insight in the available fleet maps and how to build up the appropriate
communication groups.
With these knowledge is was possible to provide non C2000 equipment with communication groups
and to use these to conduct some calls from the country to the C2000 transmission tower. In this way
it was possible by the mean of scanning on another legitimate C2000 peripheral to listen to the
operational traffic. This peripheral was legitimately owned by the suspect. In addition, another non
C2000 peripheral was active in the network and has send 3 times a status code to the control room
and in this way disrupted the operational use of the network and the control room.
Through the Comptel tool the network operator daily controls if there are some non-authorised users
who are trying to log on to the network. That means that they use an ISSI number (unique number
that is recognised by the network) that is not reserved for the national police or a user organization of
C2000 within the un-encrypted range.
Weekly there are several such attempts. The use of the un-encrypted range was applied for the
Eneco Tour in Belgium and the Netherlands. A group of ISSI numbers was released in both countries
so that the escort was possible without problems of the network and encryption. Due to the safety
and security requirements, Belgium has recently decided to prohibit the use of un-encrypted radio
traffic on their network. In that way, the need to maintain the un-encrypted radio traffic in the C2000
network becomes superfluous.
The cross-border communication is therefore only allowed in encrypted mode. Encryption is currently
operational because since July 2013 the “Security Class 3” is also applicable on the Dutch network.
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On the Astrid network, the “Security Class 3” has been activated since 01-07-2011. Despite these
additional security measures, the representatives of the network operators were quite critical about
the use of the semi-roaming.
In addition to the encryption via the K-Key it was proposed to keep the semi-roaming only active
during the time of the planned action. This limit in time is an additional security measure to prevent
abuses.
In order to prevent further unauthorized use, it was decided to couple the K key and the TEI of the
radio to the free ISSI. This implies that the K keys have to be exchanged between the two networks.
From a security perspective, the operator A.S.T.R.I.D. considers this exchange as unsafe. Nobody of
the original network can guarantee that these keys aren‟t compromised. To minimize the security
risk, a rigid procedure has to be agreed between the two network operators. An encrypted mail is
used to exchange the data.
The network operators should be aware that at European level, the need of roaming gets bigger and
that means that the K keys have to be exchanged. The semi-roaming concept can be considered as
a test for the future.
By applying the authentication, the encryption, the limitation in time of the activation of the
identification numbers and clear agreements in both countries, the security prescriptions of the
operators were fulfilled.
Figure 4: Security measures
3.2.4.5 Bi-national communication groups
Bi-national talk groups were created to allow radio communication between Belgium and The
Netherlands. In the beginning there were only 6 CA-TOUR groups with a GSSI from 197500 till
197505. Nowadays the number of groups has been increased to 10 (197500 – 19709). The name CATOUR was deduced from the two implicated networks (C2000 and Astrid) and the foreseen use of
them (Enecotour).
The radios of the users have to be programmed with these communication groups. In addition we
need a coupling by means of a generic group between the two countries to allow the transfer from
one country to another.
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The combination of the tree conditions makes it possible to use the semi-roaming between the two
countries.
Maybe we could change the mnemonics of the communication groups so that there is an obvious link
with the semi-roaming but for the moment we decided to keep the names as they are.
Possible alternative names:
- SROAM BE-NL xx;
- BE-NL ROAM xx.
3.2.4.6 Coupling of networks
On the Belgian side, the necessary links with the operational talk groups are made by the operator
A.S.T.R.I.D.. The users must specify, at least five (5) working days before the operation, which links
should be made. Couplings are always made in combination with the use of free ISSI‟s and GSSI‟s. It
is the coupling between a generic talk group (GEN B-NL) and an international talk group (CA-TOUR)
that makes it possible to communicate between the two countries.
On the Dutch side, the necessary links are made by the service Operations from the “Landelijke
Eenheid” in Driebergen. Earlier it was one of the control rooms that made the link but sometimes
there was a problem because the operators in the control room weren‟t familiar with the procedure
and in that case the link couldn‟t be made. If the coupling is always made in the same place, the
operators are used to do this manipulation and they are familiar with the working arrangements and
the semi-roaming and so there is never a problem.
If the coupling is made we can easily move from one network to the other where the number of
GSSI‟s and ISSI‟s is the only limitation.
During the preparatory exercises, we have seen that one particular control room (Eindhoven) has the
technical ability to do the coupling with the bi-national communication groups (CA-TOUR). In general,
all the control rooms should be capable to execute this manipulation but that wasn‟t the case.
Another problem was that not all the bi-national talk groups (10) were available to do the coupling.
If the coordination of the coupling and the use of semi-roaming were guided from one central point,
the misunderstandings about the use should be limited.
3.2.4.7 Experiences: Eneco Tour and World Port Classic
The semi-roaming concept is used during two cycling races between Belgium and the Netherlands.
The first race in the year is the World Port Classic (WPC) which takes place between Antwerp and
Rotterdam. There are two stages: one day the bikers start in Antwerp and the other day they start in
Rotterdam.
The Eneco Tour is a second race with several stages (+/- 7) between Belgium and the Netherlands.
The Eneco Tour is part of the UCI World Tour (like the Tour the France and Giro Italia). The figure
below shows the area and the stages of the Eneco Tour in 2012.
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Figure 5: Stages of the Eneco Tour 2012
3.2.4.7.1 Operation and limitations
The Netherlands:
For the Dutch users in Belgium, the semi-roaming was not operational because there were problems
with the acceptance of the radios on the Astrid network. Even before the use of authentication there
was a problem with the Dutch radios because they use Motorola radios type M700 and M800 and the
first type isn‟t approved by the operator A.S.T.R.I.D.
Because the radio coverage of the C2000 network is sufficient in Belgium - the north site of the city of
Antwerp – they could still operate via a usual link with their own radio.
As the major part of the stage took place in the Netherlands, the annoyance was negligible.
Following tests with the Motorola M800 have given positive results. With this type of a Dutch radio we
could connect to the Astrid network and set up a communication.
Belgium:
For the Belgian users, the semi-roaming was operational. Both portable and mobile radios had no
problem to communicate under the C2000 network. However, we noted that it was difficult for the
users to change manually to the other network that‟s why we think that it is appropriate to provide a
technician who can guide the users with the manual migration to the other network.
In addition we should provide in each vehicle a brief procedure that clarifies the switching to another
network.
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The radios should also be fixed in a better way. Because the installation period was very short, we
used adhesive strips to install the radios. Due to the poor state of some roads, the radios are
exposed to shocks and vibrations what ultimately results in a number of technical problems.
That‟s why we have chosen for a decent installation of the radios in the future.
The second day, when the stage started in Rotterdam, a number of Belgian radios was searching for
the Astrid network. When we put the radios in the manual mode, the user can determine the network
but of course in that case it is assumed that he knows the necessary manipulations.
3.2.4.7.2 The opinion of the operators
From the operators‟ point of view, the behaviour of the radio in case of semi-roaming is difficult to
predict. The support during the operations and the research afterwards is particularly complicated.
This comment relates to the handsets of the foreign network and the radios of the home network. In
those cases, the operator can only offer a „best effort‟ service for the foreign and the own equipment.
3.2.4.7.3 Programming of the radios
The radios had to be programmed with the bi-national talk groups. The ISSI and the K key were
exchanged between the operators by means of an encrypted mail. This exchange was quite arduous.
Finally the activation of the radio in both networks has been carried out in time.
This year (2014) we made a technical analysis of the behaviour of the Dutch radios on the Astrid
network. In cooperation with SAIT (distributor of Motorola in Belgium) we have adjusted a few
parameters in the programming file. These adaptations were made according to the usual
programming of the Motorola radios on the Astrid network.
In Belgium 40 radios are put in a reserve in the central warehouse in Brussels and only these radios
are allowed for the semi-roaming. To be flexible, we use a variety of radios:
mobile radios:
o
15 x TMR880
o
7 x TMR880i
o
4 x CM9000
o
4 x CM5000
portable radios:
o
10 x THR880i
3.2.4.7.4 Control rooms and coupling of the networks
The Netherlands:
Already last year during the Eneco Tour, we noticed that only the control room of Eindhoven had
experience with the CA-TOUR talk groups. It was also the only control room that had the technical
possibility to activate a coupling between the two countries.
Belgium:
On the Belgian side, the coupling was carried out directly on the network level by the operator
A.S.T.R.I.D. The control rooms shouldn‟t take any action to create the link. The ASC (Astrid Service
Centre) needed only a message indicating the GSSI‟s, to realize the link. In addition, the message
mentioned also the duration of the coupling.
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3.2.4.8 Modalities
As mentioned before, there are some limitations in the practical use of this solution:
- Limitations in space:
Semi-roaming is only useful for radios used on the C2000 and Astrid network. Both networks are
based on the Tetra standard. By making use of ISSI‟s and GSSI‟s that are known in both networks,
one can use semi-roaming.
- Limitations in time:
The semi-roaming concept is only used for planned operations organized by one of the two countries.
Collaboration between users of both countries is necessary also beyond the border region. The
cooperation in each other‟s territories outside their own radio coverage is an important element; the
radio loses his connection with the home network but can switch to the foreign network.
The demand for the use of semi-roaming has to be done at least 5 working days before the operation.
This allows everybody to undertake preparations towards that end: the network operators provide the
needed links (ITSI – TEI – K key and coupling of talk groups) and the technicians can carry out the
necessary tests of the radios and the communication groups.
The installation of radios, used exclusively for the semi-roaming, in the vehicles requires the
necessary preparation and planning. Depending on the number of radios that has to be installed into
the vehicles a larger delay is maybe needed.
For safety measures, the link between the ITSI, TEI and K key is broken between two operations.
This means that the radios are only activated during 5 working days before and 2 days after the
planned action. Outside this period, the devices are put in the state „disable‟ into the two networks.
- Limitations of the scope:
For the semi-roaming, we make use of specific ISSI‟s (consisting of six digits) that are known in the
two networks: C2000 (NL) and Astrid (Be).
The radio types which are used should be validated in both networks. Non-validated radios are not
allowed for authentication in the networks.
It is always the same radios that are used for this functionality whereby the link ITSI number, TEI
number and K Key are unique and indivisible so that authentication is possible.
The radios are programmed with only the bi-national talk groups and the international DMO groups.
In Belgium we can also use the provincial routine groups of the traffic police (WPR Prov). This
doesn‟t apply to the radios of the Netherlands.
The Belgian radios are managed by the service DGS/DST/DTRC of the Federal Police and are
located in the central warehouse in Brussels (Uccle/Ukkel). The radios are at the disposal of all the
Belgian police forces in accordance with the appropriate procedures.
A list of these radios is available at the technical services of the operators in both countries.
To ensure the safety we make use of encryption in both networks. The semi-roaming must at least
meet the minimal security standards of both networks.
The semi-roaming concept is mainly focused on voice communication because that is the base of the
current radio networks. Additional features such as status messages, short data messages (SDS),
positioning, emergency calls,… are an added value but shouldn‟t be an obstacle for the use and the
further development of the semi-roaming concept.
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3.2.4.9 Extension of the current concept
As mentioned before, for the moment there are some limitations in space, time and scope. These
restrictions were introduced due to the lack of security at the start of the semi-roaming and partly due
to the limited applications of the concept.
For a lot of radio users the semi-roaming is a totally unknown application. Only the users in the
border region have some experience with the coupling of radio networks between neighbouring
countries.
The requests occur frequently at the occasion of border actions in consultation with operational
services at the other side of the border. Due to the semi-roaming there is interest in more cooperation
between the neighbouring countries. If we could take away some limitations of the current concept
the semi-roaming should be more accessible for the users.
3.2.4.9.1 Applications
The semi-roaming is used for planned operations organized by one of the two countries. The
cooperation of the two countries on each other‟s territories outside their own radio coverage is an
important element.
There are also some opportunities for exercises between the two countries in preparation of real
operations. The representatives of the users of the two countries are asked to think about more
applications of the semi-roaming. If we could take away some of the current limitations the semiroaming could also be used for non-scheduled operations.
3.2.4.9.2 Other neighbouring countries
Currently the semi-roaming is only possible between Belgium and the Netherlands. Of course, it
would be very nice to eliminate this restriction and to extend the concept to other (neighbouring)
countries.
It is important to choose free ISSI‟s or identification numbers that are not in use in both networks. A
good preliminary consultation is necessary to fix the conditions in which the semi-roaming can be
used. The talk groups that are used for this specific concept should be recognizable for the users.
The use of semi-roaming may not create a security risk for the network and the bi-national talk groups
may not obstruct the operation of the own radios. T he notification in advance of those responsible for
the use of semi-roaming is a prerequisite.
A protocol between the countries will establish the specific agreements.
3.2.4.9.3 Additional identification numbers
The number of free ISSI‟s between the two countries determines the extent of the operations that can
be supported. In the current concept we have two times 40 numbers available on both sides of the
border. So, only 80 terminals can be used at the same time for semi-roaming. If we could reserve
more numbers and provide them to specific services, we could stimulate the use. It is up to the
network operators of both countries to make more numbers available for this purpose.
3.2.4.9.4 Additional talk groups
As mentioned before, the talk groups that are used for semi-roaming should be easy recognizable.
The mnemonics of the current groups don‟t indicate the relationship with the semi-roaming concept.
We should use names that can be used when the concept is extended to other countries. Earlier in
the document we proposed to work with an abbreviation of semi-roaming (S-ROAM) complemented
with a reference to the two countries that work together (for example: S-ROAM BE-NL). Originally
there were only six (6) groups of the type CA-TOUR but nowadays, we have extended to ten (10).
3.2.4.9.5 No limitation in time
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For safety reason, the operators introduced a limitation in time. Outside the period that there is a
scheduled action, the ISSI‟s are disabled. This decision was made to protect both networks even
better. But because of the extra security through authentication and encryption, this additional
security is of minor importance.
Therefore, end-users are currently studying with both operators to allow the bi-national terminals to
have access to there own network talk groups. If the goal is reached, both countries will have 40
polyvalent terminals. These radio terminals could be partly put in reserve, partly disseminated on the
field, among the services that regularly cross the border, for usual business.
Among the PPDR services which currently regularly cross the border, ambulances (mobile
emergency unit) are probably the most concerned. Therefore, the extension of the semi-roaming
concept will also mean an extension to other public safety services.
3.2.4.10 Conclusion
Semi-roaming is a workaround that allows the user to migrate from his home network to a foreign
network with his own familiar radio. Due to the semi-roaming he can by means of a specific talk
group communicate with the operational services of another country.
From an operational point of view there are a lot of advantages but of course there are a lot of
preparatory actions and some restrictions that impede the practical application.
The exchange of radios between the operational services of several countries also creates some
difficulties. For the operational units it is important to work with means with which they are familiar
enough.
Semi-roaming is an important step towards the final roaming. With the experiences we gain, we are
better equipped to work out the global concept of roaming. However, the need for using common
ISSI and GSSI ranges is basically the major invincible limitation of the semi-roaming.
3.2.5 Transportable base stations or networks
Some countries have acquired transportable base stations or networks to overcome the absence of
coverage (“black zones”) on their territory.
A transportable base station remains integrated in the national radio network, so that a link is needed
with the home network infrastructure (via lines, terrestrial electro-magnetic waves, satellite).
A transportable network, on the other hand, is a standalone solution. You don‟t need to have special
terminals to work on it: if you program your terminals including the network code(s) of your
transportable network(s), your terminal will be able to use your transportable network(s). Moreover, if
you set up a B2B between your network infrastructure and your transportable network, you will
perform “semi-roaming” for the concerned talk group.
A transportable base station with a satellite link is clearly the most operational solution.
Of course, these units can be involved abroad in order to create a compatible communication area for
visiting intervention teams.
Moreover, if you combine such deployed units with gateways, international communication between
visitors and visited teams will be established.
Practically, because of the deployment process and the costs of an effective preparedness, these
solutions are only used in case of planned operations or in case of long lasting incident or disaster
response (beyond 24 hours).
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The solution consisting in definitively implementing base stations over the national border is a static
application of the transportable base stations solution.
3.2.6 Direct mode
The direct mode (DMO) is the possibility that have both TETRA and TETRAPOL terminals to be used
as walkie-talkies (simplex), besides their usual use in relation with an infrastructure (TMO).
For so far you are using terminals of the same technology, TETRA or TETRAPOL, you can easily
establish a communication between terminals coming from different countries.
However, when a user is transmitting from his terminal, he will be received only by the users:
1. that have selected the DMO on their terminals (terminals are not able to listen to both DMO
terminals and infrastructure),
2. that have selected the same frequency and talk group,
3. that are inside a radius from 500 m to 3 km (depending on the propagation conditions) around
the transmitter.
Therefore, DMO is applicable only when users are spread in a limited area.
In order to enable the solution, most of the European TETRA countries definitively adopted, in May
2009 (see the “PSRG” meeting in Lisbon), a list of 10 DMO talk groups, named “EURO 1” till “EURO
10” to be programmed in all their PPDR terminals. This programming is still ongoing for the time
being.
The commonly adopted procedure is simple: EURO DMO groups are for national or international use
and are multi-disciplinary. Visiting teams have to ask the visited country for using a EURO group. In
case of emergency, EURO 1 may be used without any reservation.
Unfortunately, when you are a visitor, you have to cope with the lack of standardised procedure for
reserving a EURO group. In Belgium, there exists one contact point (phone number and e-mail
address) to this purpose, so that, if needed, several DMO groups can be temporarily granted to the
same agency, but most of the countries were not able to assign a SPOC in charge of the EURO
groups reservation, probably because of the multi-agency character of the EURO DMO groups and
their localised usage.
Several countries decided either to grant each EURO group to a first responder organisation and,
moreover, to assign a local coordinator of this organisation per region. Nordic countries have adopted
a common distribution of the EURO DMO groups between PPDR agencies (see point 3.3.3).
On the TETRAPOL side, manufacturers developed DMO relays using a well known principle of the
analogue PMR (semi-duplex).
When you use such DMO relays, your terminal in direct mode has to be programmed so that it
transmits and receives on two different frequencies. The signal transmitted by a terminal on the
frequency 1 is received by the DMO relay, which immediately re-transmits it on a frequency 2, so that
it is received by the other terminals in direct mode.
If your DMO relay is placed on a high spot or if you place the DMO relay antennas on a mast, you can
dramatically increase the area where DMO terminals can communicate together.
DMO relays are sometimes named “tactical bubble”. Tactical bubble can be utilized similarly to
transportable base stations and networks except that an automatic and transparent roaming is not
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possible: users have to select the DMO on their terminal to migrate from their infrastructure to the
tactical bubble, and, conversely, they have to select the TMO to come back on their infrastructure.
3.3 Sweden-Norwegian, Sweden-Finland, Sweden-Denmark cooperation
3.3.1 Introduction
Up until today cross s border cooperation is supported by different communications systems:
Commercial Fixed line telephone
Commercial Mobile telephone
Exchange of analogue or digital (TETRA & TETERPOL) radio terminal between Public Safety
forces in two countries.
Gateways between two countries analogue or digital public safety radio networks.
This has limited the regions under which the user can communicate and thus given limited support for
effective cooperation cross border
After introduction of TETRA in Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark gateways have been
introduced interconnecting the TETRA networks. This means public safety force can communicate
cross border as long as they have coverage from their home network. Groups have been prepared in
all the Scandinavian countries to support TETRA cross border communication as follow
The matrix below shows the existing solution for cooperation between neighbouring countries.
Cross
boarder
talk group
Finland
Norway
Denmak
FinSwe 1
NorSwe 1
Öresund ledning
FinSwe 2
NorSwe 2
Öresund KST-LKC
Öresund räddn
Öresund Sjukv
Euro DMO
Yes
Yes
Loan of
radio
terminals
Yes,
Yes,
local basis
local basis
Yes
3.3.2 Cross boarder talk groups
Back to Back Gateway links agreed talk groups together of two networks. The agreed talk groups only
works within own networks covering area.
Norwegian and Swedish agencies have tested this gateway. The experience is that quality of speech
is not satisfying.
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3.3.3 Euro DMO
There are talk groups for international cooperation, called Euro DMO. These ten DMO channels can
be used when out of coverage from the networks. Euro DMO may be used by public safety
organizations. The use of these talk groups are agreed mutually between operators and actors in the
Nordic countries, shown below.
EURO 1
Approach/common collaboration
EURO 2
Border control
EURO 3
Fire/Rescue/Health
EURO 4
Police
EURO 5
Customs
EURO 6
Common collaboration
EURO 7
Health/Fire/Rescue
EURO 8
Police
EURO 9
Armed Forces
EURO 10
Euro DMO talk groups are reserved for conversations between users from organizations from various
European countries. The talk groups are programmed in the mobile stations.
3.3.4 Loan of radio terminals
User groups who work together cross boarder sometimes loan radio terminals between organizations
and countries.
Norwegian and Swedish police fire/rescue and ambulances regularly loan radio terminals when they
cross the border to work together. This is arranged on a local basis.
3.3.5 National talk groups in Norway for communication with neighbouring countries
A plan of common communications rules and a top level fleetmap for all PPDR users of Nødnett were
developed at the start of Nødnett in 2010. Experience using and operating Nødnett has led to
changes and a new communication plan will come into practice Dec. 1 2013. International talk groups
are included in the new version of the Nødnett fleetmap.
Nordic talk groups are planned for group communication between emergency network users in
Norway and users of the networks in Sweden and Finland. Four talk groups are established for
communication with Sweden (NOR SWE) and two talk groups for communication with Finland (FIN
NOR). Access to these international talk groups is limited to PPDR users. International common talk
groups are owned and managed by the Norwegian police.
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The Norwegian police have in addition planned national police talk groups for collaboration with the
Swedish and the Finnish police. There at 9 talk groups for communication with the Swedish police
(NOR-SWE-POL1 to NOR-SWE-POL9) and one talk group for communication with the Finnish police
(POLIISI) to be used in the northern part of Norway at the border to Finland.
3.3.6 Norway-Sweden ISI under development
Please, see section 6.1.
3.4 Belgian-Netherlands cooperation
3.4.1 Introduction
Belgian and Netherlands emergency services use different national PPDR systems. In Belgium the
Astrid-TETRA system is used (main supplier: originally NOKIA, now Cassidian/Airbus) whereas in
The Netherlands the C2000-TETRA system is used (main supplier: Motorola).
In a first phase, links were made with the control rooms in the border region to have the possibility of
working together under the coverage of their own network.
The disadvantage is that the own coverage across the border was quite limited. The cross-border
communication was made possible by means of a number of technical developments:
a coupling of the different control rooms at both sides of the common border by means of a
G4WIF connection
a possibility to couple the communication groups by means of a back-to-back case, a B2B
connection
Through these two types of connections, we can link in both countries our own familiar
communication group.
3.4.2 G4WIF gateways
3.4.2.1. Implementation by the police forces
With this connection, all the control rooms of the police forces in both countries are involved in the
communication. Even the control room of Driebergen (NL) situated in the centre of the Netherlands,
can intervene on this connection.
G4WIF is a “wired interface” between the two radio networks. This connection is made in a Belgian
control room (technical room) by means of a G4WIF interface in a Belgian ASTRID DXT1 to which a
Dutch C2000 radio is connected which “looks” to a Dutch C2000 base station (see section 3.2.3.1).
1
DXT: Digital Exchange for Tetra. This is the name of a radio switch of a Cassidian/Airbus network.
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Belgian and Dutch police forces have two G4WIF connections in use since the end of 2006. The
G4WIF interfaces are both situated in the control room of Hasselt (Belgium).
There is no specific technical limitation related to a G4WIF gateway. In particular, there is no need of
a transfer to another control room in case of a displacement of the incident as it is requested for BIM
gateways (see point 3.4.3).
Functionally, because of this flexibility, each of both G4WIF gateways has been used to interconnect
specific groups that can be controlled, if needed, by each of the bordering control rooms.
3.4.2.1.1 Coordination talk group CO B-NL / B-NL Coord
The G4WIF connection “CO B-NL” is used as a coordination channel through which the control rooms
of both countries can communicate.
The coordination group is used as:
-
first contact between the control rooms that want to get in touch with each other
-
a pre-warning for operational disasters such as big disturbance of public order in the
border area
-
announcement of a hot-pursuit, armed robberies, … in the border area
-
blocking traffic after road accident, etc
This connection is also used to make certain arrangements about the couplings of communication
groups that have to be made.
This network has primarily a large informative role and will only be used for communication in extreme
conditions in the operational sphere. An initiating phone call is possible in case of extreme
emergency.
This connection is permanently monitored (7/7d – 24/24 hrs) by all the control rooms in the border
region (Be: Brugge – Gent – Antwerpen – Hasselt – Liège + Brussel, Nl: Middelburg – Tilburg –
Eindhoven – Venlo – Maastricht + Driebergen). If a collaboration of different police forces is
announced by this way, every control room is directly informed of the action.
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Figure 6: G4WIF interface (CO B-NL / B-NL Coord)
These connections are tested on a daily base in accordance with a protocol that was established
between the two countries. During the IMKO2 these tests are discussed and some proposals for
improvements are made.
The quality of the connection is also verified during the tests. We hereby make a distinction between:
-
No connection or
Connection, whereby the quality is fixed in a range from 1 to 5 / 5
The results of the tests are monitored in a follow-up table.
2
IMKO: InterMeldKamer Overleg
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Figure 7: extraction of the follow-up table
3.4.2.1.2 INRAP NL-B / ALERT B-NL
The ALERT B-NL is the second connection through a G4WIF interface with the same possibility to
engage all the control rooms in and beyond the border region in a joint operation between the two
countries. The ALERT B-NL is used for sudden and unplanned actions in the border region (for
example a chase). The use of this connection is announced by means of the CO B-NL. There is only
one such operational link for the whole Belgian-Dutch border.
Figure 8: G4WIF Interface (B-NL INRAP / ALERT B-NL)
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Practical example of a sudden and unplanned action:
There was hold-up in the centre of Turnhout (Be) and the perpetrators escaped via the E34 towards
Eersel. A team of the police of Turnhout and the traffic police were chasing the vehicle.
By means of the coordination network (Co B-NL) the control rooms on both sides of the border have
informed each other and they have made a coupling of the appropriate communication groups.
Meanwhile, a team from the Dutch police was ready to block the vehicle at the exit of Eersel (Nl).
Due to this coupling of the radio networks, the teams of both countries could communicate with each
other and exchange the necessary information so that the vehicle could be intercepted at the height of
Eersel.
3.4.2.2 Implementation by the fire and ambulance services
In 2009, fire and ambulance agencies tested a common B2B gateway next to a G4WIF gateway in a
bi-national fire service exercise, and preferred the G4WIF solution because of its best intelligibility3.
Each agency subsequently implemented two G4WIF gateways, one physically located in the control
room of Hasselt, and the second in the control room of Bruges.
At the Belgian side, the two interconnected talk groups are pre-programmed in the terminals of the
Astrid users. These have to select them on their terminals.
At The Netherlands side, the two interconnected talk groups are remotely and temporarily sent, via
DGNA, to the terminals of the C2000 users by the control rooms in charge of the concerned teams on
the field.
In the coming months, fire and ambulance services should implement each of them, one G4WIF
gateway, creating a coordination group, on the same border section as the Belgian and Dutch police.
Bordering fire brigades could so coordinate together, the same for the bordering emergency control
rooms and emergency services of the bordering hospitals.
3.4.3 BIM gateways
3.4.3.1 Introduction
BIM relays are conceptually similar to G4WIF relays, but in this case, it is a Belgian ASTRID radio that
is interconnected by a cable to a so-called BIM card (a generic Motorola Dimetra solution to connect
Dimetra to another network) of a C2000 switch, situated in the technical room of a Dutch control
room, from which it “looks” to a Belgian ASTRID base station.
BIM cards have a specific technical limitation: there is only one dispatching centre, this depending on
the switch on which the BIM card is integrated, that can send calls in the coupled talk group from a
console (control centre workstation). On the other hand, sending calls from any radio terminal and
receiving calls from any radio terminal or any console remain possible.
This technical limitation does not seem too serious, but this is probably the reason why Dutch endusers consider that when two talk groups have been coupled via a BIM card in a border region, if the
area where a common talk group is needed extends to a next Dutch control room, a second coupling
3
Verslag Grensoverschrijdende rampenbestrijding (15 jan 2010), Raadgevende Interparlementaire Beneluxraad
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is activated by this next Dutch control room. So, on the Dutch side, in place of having one “large”
group coupled with one “large” Belgian group, you have two “small” groups coupled with one “large”
Belgian group.
It is said in the Dutch police that each control centre is responsible for its own “regie”.
In order to limit the disturbances related to this principle, it has been decided that BIM gateways
should be used to form international talk groups which area should remain limited. Therefore, it has
also been decided to use G4WIF gateways to form both the CO B-NL and the ALERT B-Nl groups.
Consequently, BIM relays are currently used to temporarily couple two classical existing groups, one
Belgian and one Dutch ones, in order to perform a specific, time limited, operation.
In order to facilitate the coupling of those two ordinary existing groups, two specific groups have been
created by BIM relay: the so-called GEN B-NL / KTS4 groups. So, when, because of a temporarily
operational need, a classical Belgian talk group has to be coupled to a classical Dutch talk group, in
place of being compelled to change the group selection on the terminal connected to the BIM card,
the Belgian control room operator combines the classical Belgian talk group with the GEN B-NL talk
group, while the Dutch control room operator patches the classical Dutch talk group with the KTS talk
group.
Combining and patching are in fact two synonyms. It consists in making, from two talks groups, one
unique functional group. This can be done remotely from a control room console, very easily, by
some computer mouse clicks.
From each control room in the Netherlands, there are one or more BIM relays for interconnecting
Belgian groups. Each BIM relay is functionally managed by 2 well-defined control rooms. On one
side, of course, the concerned Dutch control room, and on the other side, one near Belgian control
room. The nine (9) existing functional control rooms “duos” are represented by the green line on the
figure 10 below.
Hereafter you will find an overview of all B2B connections with the Netherlands:
-
GEN B-NL 1 : between Brugge (BE) and Middelburg (NL)
-
GEN B-NL 2 : between Gent (BE) and Middelburg (NL)
-
GEN B-NL 3 : between Antwerpen (BE) and Middelburg (NL)
-
GEN B-NL 4 : between Antwerpen (BE) and Tilburg (NL)
-
GEN B-NL 5 : between Antwerpen (BE) and Eindhoven (NL)
-
GEN B-NL 6 : between Hasselt (BE) and Eindhoven (NL)
-
GEN B-NL 7 : between Hasselt (BE) and Venlo (NL)
-
GEN B-NL 8 : between Hasselt (BE) and Maastricht (NL)
-
GEN B-NL 9 : between Luik (BE) and Maastricht (NL)
These connections are used for scheduled operations between both countries, or, if the G4WIF
connection is used for another purpose, these connections can also be used for unplanned or urgent
actions.
4
KTS: Korte Termijn Schengen
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When two existing ordinary groups are coupled, the units will be directly able to communicate with
each other (every unit being limited by its own national radio network coverage) and, if needed, with
their own control rooms.
Figure 9: B2B connection
Application:
Border control in the context of the project „Drugs and alcohol in the traffic‟ on both sides of the
border, each in a certain direction and with mixed deployments.
There is a need of communication between the teams in the deployment as they worked on one radio
network.
At the Belgian side; the teams have selected a national support group that was in advance reserved
by their control room (SP NAT xx). In the Netherlands, the intervention teams have asked a
communication group to their control room (BYST xx).
After a call on the coordination group (CO B-NL) between the two control rooms, the foreseen
coupling is made on the agreed time of the operation (KTS xx-xx/GEN B-NL xx).
From now on, the teams on the field can communicate by means of their own, familiar and coupled
communication groups.
After the operation, the decoupling of the communication groups is announced on the coordination
group and the control rooms deactivate the coupling.
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Figure 10: The ten (2 x 5) control rooms involved along the B/Nl border, and the nine (9) B/Nl pairs of
control rooms for the management of the (9) complementary talkgroups (green lines)
3.4.3.2 Operational Procedures (simultaneous use of G4WIF and BIM)
1. The involved control rooms ensure that the tal kgroup CO B-NL (and B-NL Coord) is listened
24 hours a day.
2. The first radio contact between the control rooms that want to get in contact with others
partners must ALWAYS take place via the talk group CO B-NL (or B-NL Coord). During this
first radio contact, it‟s recommended to shortly and officially mention the reason why the
contact must take place. This contact must be established as soon as possible if there is a real
possibility that the border is to be crossed.
3. If the control rooms have to speak down to the unit level, the operator/supervisor (coach) in
duty ensures the good working of the complementary talk group (Generic talk group in
Belgium coupled with a KTS talk group in the Netherlands) by calling the other control room.
Each operator/supervisor (coach) in duty on both side of the border then combines the
concerned complementary talk group with the proper usual national project talk group,
following the LOCAL operative agreements.
4. The control room in which territory the incident occurs, is the leader and all the units must
follow the given orders, taking into account the procedures relative to border crossing. The
other control room stays listening to and is able to give some indications if necessary.
5. If available, the radio communication gets logged and recorded.
6. At the end of the incident, the operator/supervisor (coach) of the involved control rooms get in
contact via the combined talk groups and take together the decision to break up the link
between these talk groups.
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3.4.3.3 Tests and maintenance of staff skills
In order to teach the necessary skills to the staff and to maintain them, the responsible of the control
room will get contact at specific times with the control room beyond the border and he will establish
links between the two systems to the level of the units on the field.
3.4.3.4 User feedback
User feedback from the Ghent dispatch centre shows that cross-border co-operation and
communication run smoothly for deliberately planned operations such as mixed patrols or checkpoints. For these types of operations a planning process is executed including coordination meetings.
For unplanned situations, such as hot-pursuits, the interpretation of the regulations is sometimes not
clear which delays the decision making process.
Figure 11: KTS implementation via BIM-card
3.5 German-Netherlands cooperation
Until recently, have Germany and the Netherlands been using B2B cases, with one C2000 radio and
one analogue German radio, along their border.
The connections were initiated by the control rooms from both countries. In case of an unexpected
cross-border operation start, the dispatching officer makes a phone call to ask the other concerned
dispatching officer to open their terminal on the concerned network. When an event gets more
complex, liaison officers are sent to the leading control room to ensure the communication with its
own country.
Currently Germany is building their digital BOSNET Tetra network; therefore Germany and the
Netherlands are in the process of establishing a connection between BOSNET and C2000 via a new,
more sophisticated B2B system, situated in Nordhorn (De, Lower Saxony).
The new B2B system, named “IDECS” by the manufacturer, the company Selectric, will be used for
enabling until four (4) temporary group couplings. The initiative is multi-disciplinary: police, fire
brigades, rescue (ambulances) services are involved. Each organisation will manage its own B2B,
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but a multi-disciplinary gateway is foreseen. The inauguration of the new interconnection system is
foreseen in January 2015. Discussions around the related functional radio model are in progress, still
only on the police side.
3.6 German-Belgian-Netherlands cooperation
For the Maastricht-Aachen area a connection was created in 2008 in Maastricht (Nl), whereby it is
possible to connect the 3 countries together (ASTRID, C2000 and the Tetra network of Aachen (De))
This solution comprises a Belgian radio and a German radio located in Maastricht “looking” towards
respectively a Belgian and a German base station. Both are connected by cable to the C2000
network infrastructure via an analogue gateway (BIM card).
The triple connection is used to form a police coordination talk group, between the control rooms of
Maastricht (Nl), Hasselt (Be), Liège (Be) and Aachen (De). This region is named the “Euregio”,
therefore the coordination group is also named CO EUREGIO. The Euregio is the region where the
Three-Country pilot of 2003 took place.
With the implementation of the German federal BOSNET network, it has been decided to dismantle
the old Tetra network of Aachen. At this occasion, the three countries also decided to modernise the
interconnection between their radio networks (Astrid, C2000, BOSNET). In Germany, this kind of
process is managed by the federated states, the North Rhine Westphalia in this case.
So, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium are currently negotiating to implement a new three-way
B2B system, also an “IDECS” one, in Aachen. This is indeed a place where there is a police head
quarter, and, especially, where the 3 networks overlap. The interconnected terminals, coming from
the three countries, are so all able to directly pick up their own network coverage.
The project is to establish three (3) temporary, three-county groups couplings (1 for an international
police alert group, 1 for fire brigades or ambulances and 1 for multi-disciplinary use), next to 1 threecountry police coordination group (in replacement of the existing one), and, possibly, next to 1 threecountry fire brigade and rescue (ambulance) merged coordination group. Until five three-way
simultaneous group connections will be possible.
It is important to note that the end-user workgroup that implements the “IDECS” in Aachen also
implements the “IDECS” in Nordhorn.
In June 2014, the sub work group police decided that the future three-country police coordination
group would not only cover the border section corresponding to the Euregio, but also the common
section of border between Germany and the Netherlands until the North see. It has also been
decided that the new name of the future Be-De-Nl police coordination group would be CO-EUCOM-P,
in replacement of the current CO EUREGIO.
In fact, with this new philosophy, you have a unique border section encompassing the De-Nl border
next to the Euregio border. When radio interconnections are only needed between De and Nl, the binational IDECS B2B system of Nordhorn will do. On the other hand, if Belgium or if the three
countries are involved, the tri-national IDECS B2B system of Aachen will be involved.
The experience will confirm if it was a good idea to define a so long section of border between the 3
countries.
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3.7 French-Belgian cooperation
The border between France and Belgium has been divided in two sections. On both sections it is
intended to implement a common talk group to allow the functionally relevant police control rooms to
exchange live information.
The first section which corresponds in France with the so called “Zone de Défense Nord” (ZDN) is
fully operational since November 2013 and the signature of related agreement by the local authorities
(see annex 1).
The technical setup is simple: the common cross-border coordination radio group between Belgium
and France/ZDN relies on one back-to-back gateway. There are however two little particularities: the
gateway combines radio groups from both technologies TETRA and TETRAPOL, and, seeing the
French police services utilize two independent TETRAPOL infrastructures (the network “Rubis” for the
Gendarmerie and the network “Acropol” for the Police Nationale), linking the Belgian police with the
French police requires the interconnection of 3 terminals.
The functionality is also straightforward: if information items coming to a cross-border control room
have interest, in real time, for the neighbours (e.g. traffic jam on a motorway with possible impact over
the border, chase with gunfire…) the dispatcher has the possibility to notify his counterparts by
pressing the PTT of his console.
Although the setup and the functionality are particularly simple: one radio group gathering a set of
control room operators in a same coordination network, the novelty of the process, the regular but not
all-day use of the radio procedure and its international character make that the operational agreement
is particularly detailed.
Negotiations are going forward with the second border section, the so called “Zone de Défense Est”
(ZDE). This border section also encompasses the border between France and the Great Duchy of
Luxemburg. The future coordination radio group will therefore interconnect four networks: Astrid,
Rubis, Acropol and the soon coming Renita (Lu) radio network.
Next to the two abovementioned international police coordination networks, there will probably be
temporary interconnection possibilities with the Gendarmerie of the ZDE. The other involved French
parties have rejected so far any direct connection between police teams on the field.
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4
SURVEY OF CROSS-BORDER EVENTS
4.1 Historical events
4.1.1 Event: Maundy Thursday cross border partying
Maundy Thursday is a big day of partying in and between the two border towns, Strømstad in Sweden
and Halden in Norway. The distance between the two towns are 32 km and young Norwegians fill the
streets of Strømstad every year on this day. In Norway Maundy Thursday is a holiday and stores are
closed. In Sweden this is an ordinary business day.
Figure 12: Map
Hordes of young people in cars roam the streets in Strømstad during the day and go back to Halden
at night. And they consume large amounts of alcohol. Through the years this partying became such a
nuisance that Strømstad decided to close Systembolaget (monopoly wine and liquor store) on this
day. Still, it is a day for partying.
Several people become severely drunk, street fighting, drunk driving, nuisance, accidents and missing
IDs are some of the problems the police and ambulances are called to assist to.
As this is a yearly event, there is close cooperation between Norwegian and Swedish police, hospitals
and ambulances cooperate and plan for this day.
Norwegian and Swedish police cooperate to manage the traffic. Arrested Norwegians are taken care
of and transported to Halden police station.
Injured persons must be transported to the nearest hospital emergency unit to Strømstad, which is in
Fredrikstad in Norway, 50 km away. The nearest emergency unit in Sweden is in Gøteborg, 165 km
away.
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4.1.2 The Hercules accident
Introduction
Lots of actors participated in the search and rescue for a missing Hercules aircraft. This rescue
mission was a very fruitful cooperative search and rescue work with several countries involved, both
on land and in the air. This cooperation has, contributed to locate the aircraft.
This scenario describes situation of a missing Hercules Aircraft. JRCC, Joint Rescue Co-ordination
Center in Gothenburg, Sweden have the command for the search and rescue mission of the missing
Aircraft
The aircraft involved was a Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules as 5630 (USAF serial no: 105630, c/n: 382-5630), a four-engine turboprop military transport aircraft. It was the last of four such
planes acquired by the Norwegian military between 2008 and 2010 and was named "Siv".
Accident
The plane left Evenes Airport at 13:40 and was scheduled to arrive at Kiruna Airport at 14:30. The
aircraft was participating in the "Cold Response" military exercise, which also involved forces from
Germany, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. The
aircraft appeared to have flown straight onto the edge of the western wall of Kebnekaise, Sweden's
highest mountain. According to a police spokesperson, the aircraft probably exploded after crashing,
setting off an avalanche. Human remains were found in the avalanche area.]
The radar plots show the aircraft maintained a straight course over the last 50 km of the flight until
impact, in line with the planned route. The plots did not indicate tactical low-level flying, although that
was an optional plan for part of the route if weather conditions allowed. Just prior to the crash,
Swedish air traffic controllers at Kiruna cleared the Hercules to descend to 7,000 feet (2,134 meters).
This altitude is just 20 meters above the height of the top of the Kebnekaise Mountain. The altitudes
for the continuous radar plots remain in the possession of the accident investigation board and have
not been released.
Timeline
13:40 The Norwegian Hercules plane takes off from Evenes in northern Norway, destination
Kiruna, Sweden
The aircraft arrived from Evenes (Narvik, Norway) 13.40 with destination Kiruna (Sweden).
Kiruna airport tower had the last radio contact 14.43
Information to JRCC of a missing aircraft. The Hercules arrived from Evenes and the last radio
contact at the tower in Kiruna there it should lands for 30 minutes ago.
14:43 Radio contact with the plane.
14:5x The Kiruna Airport control tower had radio contact with the plane shortly before the last
radar observation. The exact time and details or transcripts of this conversation have yet to be
published.
14:56 Last radar observation of the aircraft just west of the 6950 feet high Kebnekaise
Mountain peaks, by civilian radar (Kiruna, distance 75 kilometers (47 mi)) at 7200 feet. Military
radar at Sørreisa (distance 130 kilometers (81 mi)) registered last altitude at 7600 feet at
about the same time.
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The resources that is joining the rescue:
2 Danish Merlin-helicopter
1 Swedish rescue helicopter, Lifeguard 906
1 Swedish police helicopter 945
1 aircraft Orion, and a Aircraft Coordinator
1 Hercules from USA
2 Norwegian F16-plan
2 Swedish Jas-39 at standby
There is also land based resource that can be directed to the area if the flying units find something.
2012-03-15 21:20
Stabs rewie at JRCC
2 Norwegian Seaking and 2 Danish Merlin Helicopters is standing for fuel in Kiruna.
In the air is:
- US Hercules
- Norwegian Orion
US AWACS
On the ground are several mountains rescue teams and military teams with staff. All witness
statements are verified and helicopters will search out at likely places.
Earlier task about emergency signal has not given some results
There has come task about 3 different places there the searching aircraft has indicated warm
signature and a position from a patrol. The next step will be to look at those positions closer.
2012-03-15 23:16
Stabs rewie
The Norwegian Seaking helicopters are landing at Kiruna and the two Danish Merlin helicopters went
back to Evenes Norge, the weather is to bad to fly in. AWACS is landing for fill in fuel and staff shift.
The plan for the night is to search round Kebnekaise area; it will be a task for the ground patrols.
Norwegian aircraft Seaking Orion, continue search under the night and will be the search platform and
communication link for all ground patrols. Even ground patrols from Fire and rescue service, rescue
teams and military staff is searching round the mountain area of Kebnekaise.
.
2012-03-16 04:17
Kl 06:00 the helicopters try to fly in to the Kebnekaise area. The weather forecast is not looking good
Kebnekaise. It can be difficult to reach Kebnekaise area.
2012-03-16 06:54
The weather in the area is problematic, low clouds and poor visibility. That gives limited possibilities
for flying research
2012-03-16 06:59
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23 snowmobile bound persons is engaged in the searching
2012-03-16 10:29
Stabs rewire
There is avalanche danger in the area 4. s Two avalanche experts from Norway is coming.
From
the
United
Kingdom
arrive
a
radar
/
connection
platform
"Hawkeye".
Maritime Administration is working to get another rescue helicopter and crew.
Rescue Service has about 30 people looking at the ground. They have stamina to on Sunday there
are also lots of resources in readiness on land, which can be used when we get clearer indications.
2012-03-17 09:00.
The search area has now produced results. A military team is looking at the ground at Robots glacier
has now found wreckage scattered over a larger area on the west side of the north / southern peak of
the mountain. The position shown on the map should not be taken literally, because the objects are
spread over a larger area.
Figure 13: Area where the wreckage was found
At 09.00 a.m the State Search and rescue will be closed and handed over to the Police Authority in
Norrbotten in charge of the Mountain Rescue Service. The focus for the Police is to search for and
document the findings and make further technical investigation.
A close collaboration between JRCC and the police in Norrbotten will continue. For example, the flight
units will continue to operate in the area, but now with the command from the police. The coordination
will to be done by JRCC under a transitional period.
Questions about the work until now still can be answered by JRCC, while issues relating to the
ongoing rescue efforts will be answered by the police press function.
2012-03-15 19:01
Danish rescue helicopters have noticed low signal from Kebnekaise Mountain and will investigate it.
2012-03-15 19:29
Norwegian F16 has notices warm points in Tarfala terrain; it is not possible to say what it is. It can be
mountain hikers, animals or the crew.
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.
Figure 14: Photo of the area where the wreckage was found
Aftermath
Following the accident, a search effort led by Swedish rescue service was launched, but was
hampered by snow, wind and cloud cover, impeding helicopter reconnaissance. Around 4 pm Central
European Time on 16 March, a Norwegian P-3 Orion aircraft participating in the search spotted an
orange or red object on the ground in the Kebnekaise Mountain range. Danish helicopters attempted
to locate and identify the object, but due to the weather conditions, the search was called off before
any finds were made. Later thousands of pieces of wreckage and debris were located at the site
identified by the Orion aircraft. Some of the parts showed burn marks and smelled of kerosene.
Footage recorded by the Orion plane showed what appeared to be soot and ashes spread over the
side of the mountain. Through the use of search dogs, human remains were discovered and
relocated for DNA testing, and subsequently on March the search for survivors was called off since it
was believed that all five people on board had been killed and the aircraft destroyed. Efforts were
refocused on an accident investigation.
The ongoing investigation is headed by the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority with participation
of the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board. The aircraft is considered to have been completely
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destroyed by the impact and the following explosion, and on 22 March work began on moving debris
from the temporary investigative base in Nikkaluokta near the crash site to an aircraft hangar at
Kiruna Airport, but efforts were still being hampered by adverse weather and the discovery of further
cracks in the glacier on which the debris is located. In August 2012 both the cockpit voice recorder
and the flight data recorder were found and flown to the United Kingdom where experts at the Air
Accidents Investigation Branch are aiding local authorities in salvaging data from the two recorders [23]
as Sweden does not have the expertise to handle flight recorders as damaged as the ones found in
the wreckage. By 3 October 2012 NRK reported that data from the flight recorders had been
successfully downloaded, and preliminary results have indicated that the terrain warning system was
set for landing, so no warning was given before impact.
More information is available in the Report C-130J-30 Super Hercules accident of the Swedish
Accident Investigation Authority.
4.2 Periodical events: annual Eneco Tour speed cycling race
See chapter “semi-roaming”, point 3.2.4.7.
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5
ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL ISSUES AND RISKS FOR CURRENT COOPERATION
Interoperability and cross border cooperation for PPDR have up until today been substantially limited
by the communication limitations that exist between the European countries.
In most countries public safety has had communication solutions with no interconnection neither with
other public safety organisations in their own country or with public safety agencies in neighbouring or
other European countries.
The introduction of TETRA and TETRAPOL about 10 to 15 years back increased substantially the
possibility to talk cross agency internally in a country but still cross border communication for the
public safety forces was missing.
Up to today a few alternatives for cross border communication exist, see point 3. However, all these
solutions required that the public safety end users had to use other radios or systems than what they
normally used in their daily work if the border has to be crossed.
One example of cross-border cooperation between Norwegian and Swedish police has been limited
to the use of fixed line telephone and mobile phones. This makes coordination and support difficult for
a team from one country enter into the other country. Today we have a lot of criminals followed by
police that move cross border.
Due to the quick and unpredictable movement over the county boarder it is often not possible to alert
the neighbouring country before the followers have been in the other country for several hours. If the
Police followers have time they alert their control room before they leave their home country and ask
them to inform the visiting countries Police control room, but so far it has not been possible for the
visiting country to follow the foreign movement and thus support them. The visiting team have to
contact the local police by mobile phone if they can to inform them and ask for support.
This kind of police operation cross border will be much better supported with TETRA ISI and efficient
cooperation will hopefully be the result. The Police in the Scandinavian country look very much
forward to introduction of ISI as well as the other public safety organisations.
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6
ASSESMENT OF UPCOMING TECHNOLOGY FOR COMMUNICATION
INTEROPERABILITY
6.1 Upcoming technology for PPDR voice and SDS interoperability: Norway-Sweden
ISI under development
6.1.1 Introduction
DNK and MSB have agreed to develop Norway-Sweden ISI cross border communication between the
national TETRA networks.
Cross border communication between Norway and Sweden is aligned with features from ISI phase 1,
2, and 3 (cf. TETRA + Critical Communications Association TF10-56-22r1, 30 March 2010).
The cross border communication solution is based on a set of features commonly available from the
two TETRA vendors. The contract for the technical solution and delivery plan was signed by the the
four parties Motorola, Cassidian, MSB and DNK at September 28, 2012. Motorola, Cassidian, MSB
and DNK worked together and with the PPDR communities to specify the technical solutions prior to
the final contract.
Each system has been optimised differently to meet national needs and optimisation has been driven
by user needs and available options. When visiting one cannot expect to have all of the functionality
in the home network available and other functionalities will work a differently.
The following principles of cross border communications between Norway and Sweden have been
worked out:
Each network will create pre-agreed local talkgroups for international use – International
Talkgroups.
These talkgroups can be linked together to form a ”linked group” that covers both countries.
Visiting terminals must be pre-approved.
o
The operator of the visited SwMI has approved the type of visiting MS for operation on
his network
o
The visiting MS fulfils the agreed requirements for CBC between Norway and Sweden
o
The visiting MS has been IOP certified
Visiting terminals must be pre-provisioned
o
Blocks of permitted subscribers should be provisionable in each SwMI for every
connected SwMI. TR 101 448, 5.1
Any terminal that migrates must support Air Interface Migration (AIM) signalling.
Systems and terminals must have the agreed international groups programmed.
A visitor can only select international groups.
o
Patching to other groups within the respective networks is possible.
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The cross border technical solution is planned delivered to DNK and MSB Q1/Q2 2015 for final testing
and deployment in the live networks.
In the meantime DNK and MSB work closely with the end users to prepare for effective cross border
communication.
All the experience from this development and preparations and early use in the user communities will
be available to our European partners in ISITEP.
6.1.2 Critical issues and risks
From Norwegian and Swedish ISI project the technical development and delivery line seems to be the
biggest threat for the project plan.
ISI does not support “Store and Forward”. The system supplier, Cassidian, has proposed a solution
whereby “Store and Forward” is converted to normal SDS when Rakelmobil (equipment used for
communicating in Rakel) is connected to Nødnett (the Norwegian Public Safety Network). The
message is not saved and the “delivery guarantee” on the message is removed.
SDS is used frequently by certain Swedish users. SDS is frequently combined with voice calls.
Others, however, do not use SDS very frequently. Swedish fire-and-rescue services receive alarms
via SDS if they are outside the home station. This means that for the fire-and-rescue service the
absence of SDS may be critical. Notwithstanding this, an ordinary SDS is better than a non-existent
SDS.
Status (individually addressed) is not supported by ISI. Sweden uses this, however, which causes
problems with communications for all user organisations since status transfer is used frequently.
Unless a technical solution is found, Swedish users must make a voice call home to their own
emergency service centre, which is a move towards everyday methods.
GPS position fix is transmitted as an ordinary SDS to the server address (ITSI) which is configured in
MS and in a migrated state. It is not possible to send location info to the positioning server in both
one‟s own network and the visited network through migration.
From a work environment and security viewpoint, this is an important issue. For certain organisations
it is an absolute requirement to be able to locate both Swedish units in Nødnett and Norwegian units
in Rakel.
Emergency calls in the TETRA network are configured in many different ways. A unified structure is
lacking, both internationally and nationally. Moreover, internally within certain user groups there are
different methods of sending emergency alarms. Regardless of which form or method is used, there is
most often a common denominator. This is the fact that the method is hard-programmed in the alarm
button of the mobile stations. This means that the function, regardless of which network the user is
logged on to, must be the same in all situations. Furthermore, there should be an investigation into
how great the differences are between the various methods. The Swedish police use a method
whereby the emergency alarm occurs in response to a group conference. This makes things easier
since all police mobiles are coded in the same way. The emergency medical (ambulance) services of
the different county councils (landsting) have chosen different solutions. Some have agreements with
the local police whereby they send their emergency alarms to the county police communications
centre (LKC). Others send their emergency alarms to SOS Alarm. The fire-and-rescue services also
have different methods. These may involve receiving calls made to SOS Alarm, but emergency
alarms for dedicated talk groups or selected talk groups are also common. Other fire-and-rescue
services have chosen to configure an emergency alarm in their Rakel mobile phones.
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Common to all these, however, is the requirement that the emergency alarm functions in essentially
the same manner in the migrated state as it does in the home network.
6.1.3 Some recommendation from the first delivery from the user in ISI project
Work out guidelines and instructions for input methods in dedicated and international link talk
groups.
Create procedures for tracking requests at the communications centre of the network to which
home mobiles have migrated.
The group proposes that the project adopt Cassidian‟s solution whereby SDS with Store-andForward is converted into an ordinary SDS.
Procedures should be created for the emergency service centre to verbally check that the
SDS alarm has reached the addressee, if no alarm acknowledgement comes back.
Developing ISI so that individually addressed status is supported. Alternatively, the emergency
service centres in Sweden must develop a way to transmit and receive group-addressed status.
For calls to another Rakel mobile phone, ITSI is used in the migrated state or via ISI (countryto-country). Rakel mobile phones often use MSISDN. This requires reprogramming in the
Rakel mobile phone book, since when this occurs ITSI must be entered instead of ISSI or
MSISDN. It is therefore essential that the mobile station suppliers are involved at an early
stage in order to ensure that it is possible to enter 14 keys in the phone book.
More information is available in document “Nor-Swe ISI project, Delivery 1 Sweden User”.
6.1.4 Conclusion
For Scandinavian countries cross border cooperation for public safety have been on the agenda for
several years. All involved organisations are looking forward to an effective cross border
communication solution and our opinion is that TETRA ISI and ISTEP shall provide these tools for
voice communication.
This view is anchored all through the countries authority levels form Parliament to the individual end
user. We can see this in the support from all levels in our work in this project.
6.2 Upcoming technology for PPDR data communication interoperability
6.2.1 Introduction
Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR) responders provide us with indispensable police, fire
and other emergency services. Each individual in our society has growing expectations of, and the
right to, timely assistance from emergency services. In turn, the society expects that governments will
use the necessary resources to aid those in emergency need. The provision of emergency services
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extends beyond the social contract and invokes a moral obligation to protect life, welfare, and
property.
The Public Protection and Disaster Relief sector is a niche sector in the global world. The sector also
has some unique requirements to the technology they need. It is important to achieving maximised
cross-regional harmonisation in such a vital niche market, not only in order to realise cost-effective
radio terminal equipment but also to allow for seamless inter-regional interoperability between Public
Safety and other governmental agencies.
The requirements of the global professional communications community for Mission Critical voice and
data services are currently satisfied – except concerning the international cooperation – by a range of
voice-centric Private Mobile Radio (PMR) technologies including TETRA, TETRAPOL, P25, and
GSM-R. These are all narrowband digital systems and offer excellent voice services but limited data
capability. TEDS, part of TETRA Release 2, is currently being deployed in Northern Europe and will
provide wideband data services.
Mission Critical Users are characterised by those that work in groups and therefore need to
communicate in groups using specific and unique functionality. The communications systems that
they use have been specifically designed and optimised to meet this fundamental means of working.
Cellular phone technology has been developed for person to person communications and, as such, is
unsuitable for Mission Critical Communications. Imagine, for example, a football stadium with a lost
child, communicating a description to several hundred staff by phoning each one would be a hugely
inefficient process. Sending a single voice message to all staff simultaneously and efficiently using a
PMR system could be accomplished in seconds.
What is mission critical communication?
Mission critical communication is supplied by special communications systems where the reliability,
availability, stability and security of mobile communication are vital to ensure continuous availability of
functions critical for society. Typical users of mission critical communication are law enforcement and
emergency services for public protection and disaster relief (PPDR) operations. Mission critical
communications include communication hardware, software, as well as radio frequency band
(spectrum) capacity to transmit and share information between field units and command centres.
Why mobile data communication for PPDR?
The huge advances in mobile communication technologies are changing the way in which citizens
communicate with each other. The growth of Smartphones and Tablet PCs make information
available whenever and wherever they need it. These technologies provide the opportunity for PPDR
users to react faster and more efficiently than ever before. It is well proven that fast and informed
response to emergencies saves lives and the citizens of Europe would expect that first responders
would have the tools to do their job effectively.
Why own dedicated networks for PPDR?
1. Commercial communication infrastructures (such as mobile phone networks) are at their weakest,
precisely at those moments when the police and emergency services need full reliable
communication the most. In the event of a large-scale incident, commercial networks quickly
become over-loaded, as a result of which communication is disrupted or even becomes impossible.
However, it is precisely at such moments that the police and emergency services must be able to
communicate in full force.
2. Geographical coverage of the commercial networks is limited: operators will only cover the area
where they will have business. Natural and man-made disasters can occur anywhere and
nationwide coverage for PPDR is therefore essential.
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3. Commercial networks are not equipped everywhere with back-up batteries or generators, so that
communication is also not guaranteed in the event of a large-scale power failure.
4. Commercial networks are not built to include the resilience and availability that is necessary where
lives are at risk. There are many instances where commercial networks go down for hours at a
time. This might be embarrassing for a commercial operator but it is totally unacceptable for
mission critical users. The recent outage of the Blackberry network for three days is an unfortunate
but clear example.
5. Security is another weak point. Police and emergency services need systems that cannot be
eavesdropped and that are adequately protected against sabotage.
The PPDR sector definitely requires its own facilities for mission-critical applications. However, less
critical applications (such as administrative applications) can be handled via a commercial
infrastructure. Most countries are already choosing for this hybrid, cost-effective approach: missioncritical communication on a dedicated network (GoGo, GoCo or CoCo)5, other communication on
commercial networks.
6.2.2 Overview of relevant PPDR and standardisation organisations driving
technologies decisions
6.2.2.1 Involved PPDR Organisations
In the recent Public Safety Mobile Broadband data communication there are some relevant parties
involved, like the Radio workgroup from the Law Enforcement Working Party.
6.2.2.1.1
The representatives of PPDR
The Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP) is the advisory body on security and justice of
the Council of the European Union. LEWP is composed of the police/justice and representatives of all
Member States (Mixed Committee joined by EU- and EFTA Members).
Around 2010 there was established within the LEWP the Radio Communication Expert Group
(RCEG), a group of experts that works specifically on communication and has received a mandate
from all involved EU ministers. The RCEG is composed of radio experts from all Member States.
The LEWP-RCEG Forerunner group has the task to come with an advice how to solve the growing
need for (mission critical) mobile data communication; there are 2 subtasks: harmonisation of the
technical solution + harmonised frequency band.
6.2.2.1.2
Background of the LEWP-RCEG role
The representatives of the public protection and disaster relief sector have issued two major
statements:
 Council – COMIX recommendation (June 2009): contains the request for a long-term solution
for mobile high speed data by means of a harmonised technical solution and a harmonised
frequency band. The current PPDR networks and the commercial infrastructures are not
sufficient for this. Specifically:
- request to CEPT and ECC for extra frequencies below 1GHz,
5
GoGo = Government Owned Government Operated
GoCo = Government Owned Commercially Operated
CoCo = Commercially Owned Commercially Operated
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- request to ETSI, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, to work on a
European standard for high speed data communication for PPDR.
LEWP Frequency statement (November 2010): further elaborates the previous
recommendation and contains more details about the bandwidths which the sector needs and
where in the radio spectrum they can be found, as can also be found in this document.
There has been „following-up letters by the several presidencies (Sweden, Cyprus, Ireland).
6.2.2.1.3
Requirements
The LEWP-RCEG has developed a set of requirements that must be met by a technology for high
speed data for the PPDR sector. The roaming capability is one of the most obvious requirements.
This is the LEWP-RCEG document on the "Public Safety mobile data user requirements", in the
format of a matrix.
The document is based on existing studies done by France, Germany, Belgium, Finland, UK and The
Netherlands + existing work by ETSI TC-TETRA.
It contains the different type of (future) mobile data applications in different categories (Location
services, office applications, uploading + downloading information, database enquiries, multi-media
applications etc) and several characteristics per application (number of users, „mission critical level‟,
needed quality etc).
The document is unanimously approved by all countries in the LEWP-RCEG meeting June 2011. The
RCEG consist of all EU member states, meaning that all EU member states support it, and therefore it
offers an official overview in technological terms of the needs on behalf of all Member States. The
matrix is already used in the frequency discussion in CEPT-FM-PT49 and in the discussions with
ETSI about how to „translate‟ the functional requirements into technical solutions for (high speed) data
communication for PPDR.
6.2.2.2 Standardisation Organisations (TCCA-CCBG + LTE standard + 3GPP)
6.2.2.2.1
LTE
As a working assumption the PPDR community has made the choice for the LTE (4G) technology.
Instead of developing an own PPDR Broadband standard (like done 15 years ago with TETRA for
mission critical voice group communication), it is much more logic to adapt the worldwide adopted
LTE standard.
There are nevertheless some functionalities which are needed for professional users (like PPDR) but
are not in the LTE standard: examples are Group communication, DMO (Direct Mode Operation:
direct portable-portable communication without using the infrastructure), AGA (Air-Ground-Air
communication, e.g. helicopters), redundancy + security.
The LTE standard is discussed and decided in 3GPP.
The American PPDR organisations have (as a start) 7 Billion dollar to realise a PPDR Broadband
network and have already 2x10MHz frequency allocated for that. They were also therefore in the
„driving seat‟ to get the specific PPDR requirements into the LTE standard by participating in 3GPP.
6.2.2.2.2
TCCA-CCBG
In Europe the Tetra users were joined in the Tetra Association. Since 2012 this has been transformed
to the TETRA and Critical Communications Association (TCCA) to give it a broader scope with also
mission critical Broadband included. Also non-Tetra countries (like France with Tetrapol technology)
are now part of the TCCA membership.
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The Critical Communications Group (CCBG) is a sub-group of the TCCA, especially focusing on
mission critical mobile broadband.
Its primary purpose is to drive the development of standards for Mission Critical Mobile Broadband.
- The creation or adoption of open standards by recognised Standards Development Organisations
(SDOs)
- The establishment of open and competitive markets through equipment and system interoperability
- Lobbying for and pursuit of dedicated, harmonised spectrum
The CCBG has 3 subgroups:
WG-UR User & Operator Requirements
Responsible to develop, deliver and justify user and operator requirements statements in support of
critical mobile broadband capabilities and spectrum requirements.
Meanwhile the group has produced an „umbrella requirement overview‟, based on all kinds of URS‟s
(User Requirement Specifications) from LEWP, Canada + US PPDR, UIC, Utilities etc.
WG-SA Systems Architecture
Responsible to prepare, progress and validate use cases, services requirements and architecture
specifications between industry and user representatives in order to drive Standards Development
Organisation (SDO – e.g. 3GPP, ETSI, etc.) activities in agreement with those SDOs and for the
specific needs of Critical Communications.
WG-SC Strategic Case
Responsible to develop, deliver and justify the Strategic Case document, including consideration and
description of implementation options, for critical mobile broadband capabilities.
The CCBG is very active in the 3GPP / LTE standardisation process.
There were use cases made to support the work started by PPDR US on Group communication +
DMO.
The CCBG also took the initiative to coordinate the different PPDR participation in 3GPP: US,
Canada, Australia, UK HO, German MoI and CCBG are now joining their efforts to have a more
coherent approach to 3GPP, with therefore more success.
Below the complex scheme:
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Figure 15: TCCA-CCBG structure
Figure 16: CCBG relation
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6.2.3 Mobile Broadband data communication developments within European Public
Safety
6.2.3.1 Foreseen broadband applications
The function of future European broadband (BB) PPDR system is to provide, based upon the
commonly agreed user requirements between CEPT and PPDR organisations e.g. LEWP, the ability
to enable PPDR organisations to efficiently access and share accurate and timely data information at
which and in the longer term also the inclusion of voice is envisioned. The roaming capability is, of
course, part of the solution.
Below are some of the most important PPDR Broadband mission critical applications and services
that have been identified by the PPDR users:





high resolution video communications from wireless clip-on cameras to a vehicle mounted
laptop computer, used during traffic stops or responses to other incidents.
video surveillance of security entry points such as airports with automatic detection based on
reference images, hazardous material or other relevant parameters.
remote monitoring of patients. The remote real time video view of the patient can demand up
to 1 Mbit/s. This demand for capacity can easily be envisioned during the rescue operation
following a major disaster. This may equate to a net capacity of over 100 Mbit/s.
high resolution real time video from, and remote monitoring of, fire fighters in a burning
building.
the ability to transmit building plans to the rescue forces
6.2.3.2 Roadmap
The TCCA has made a Roadmap to show the phasing from the existing mission critical voice
networks to mission critical Broadband.
The Roadmap shows that for mission critical voice the existing Tetra networks are needed for at least
another 10-15 year; it is not to be expected that real mission critical voice group communication can
be realized „over‟ a LTE network in the coming period.
Therefore most countries will continue operating their Tetra network, start (or have already started
Broadband applications via commercial networks (because there is, with exception from using TEDS,
no alternative at the moment).
The period from 2012-2020 is used for preparing a mission critical Broadband solution: getting a
harmonised frequency band + getting the specific PPDR requirements via 3GPP into the LTE
standard.
That means that realising dedicated mission critical broadband solutions are expected around 2020.
When the LTE technology + standard are so much further developed that the network can also cover
mission critical voice is unclear: the Roadmap gives an indication around 2025-2030.
But, in that case the LTE network should have the same coverage as the Tetra networks to avoid
losing mission critical voice capability; the question is if this will happen, so maybe the Tetra networks
will be needed even longer.
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In any case the Roadmap proves that an interoperability solution for the existing networks is needed
for a long period to be used.
Figure 17: Step 1- Using existing networks for mission critical voice + a little bit data (with TEDS
more)
Figure 18: Step 2 - using commercial networks for mobile data + preparing the mission critical
solution, resulting in dedicated solutions around 2020
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Figure 19: Step 3 - a mission critical voice group communication service „over‟ the LTE network is
very uncertain
6.2.3.3 Frequencies
6.2.3.3.1
Current status of public safety mobile communication
Traditionally, emergency services throughout Europe use a part of 380-400 MHz spectrum for voice
communications. This frequency band allows today for effective mission critical voice
communications, whilst the needs for mission critical broadband data communication cannot be
covered until such time that a suitable amount of radio frequency spectrum has been identified under
harmonised conditions in Europe.
Emergency services have an increasing demand for access to mobile broadband data services for
their PPDR operations. The establishment of mission critical mobile broadband data services
requires a frequency band located below 1 GHz. An opportunity is opening at 700 MHz.
This band is today inter alia used by terrestrial broadcasting services, but is expected to be reallocated to mobile service at the World Radiocommunications Conference in Nov. 2015 (WRC-15).
The PPDR community, through the EU Council‟s Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP) has
worked jointly with the spectrum regulator community (CEPT-ECC) and concluded in an ECC Report
that a minimum of 2 x 10 MHz spectrum is required for mobile Broadband data services, with
additional spectrum required to implement voice services, Air Ground Air, Direct Mode Operation and
ad hoc networks.
6.2.3.3.2
The European frequency regulation.
The organisation which is working specifically on PPDR Broadband is Projectteam 49 from CEPT-FM.
The CEPT (European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations), and more
specifically the ECC (Electronic Communications Committee), issues the official recommendations
and decisions. This body represents the frequency administrations of the Member States.
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Practical work is done in WGFM (Working Group Frequency Management) and its Project Teams.
CEPT- FM-PT49 has the sole focus on high speed broadband for PPDR and has finished his Report
A (now known as ECC 199) with the conclusion that for the PPDR Broadband terrestrial networks a
minimum of 2x10 MHz is needed (this is without frequencies for AGA, DMO, adhoc networks and
voice over a Broadband network).
CEPT-FM-PT49 is now working on Report B which has to give an advice where the frequencies shall
be allocated; at the moment there are 2 options : 400 + 700 MHz, where the PPDR community have
stated that they prefer 700MHz because of being part of the “LTE ECO system” with the advantages
of more + cheaper terminals, roaming to commercial networks etc.
6.2.3.3.3
The position of the European Commission.
The European Commission organised several high level workshops in Brussels, with the main
conclusions:
It was found that the need of the PPDR sector for mobile high speed data solutions via a dedicated
solution (or a mix in a hybrid solution from dedicated capabilities combined with using commercial
networks) is legitimate, as is the request for harmonised frequencies and a harmonised technology.
Meanwhile the EC has asked for a study on the (in)possibilities for using commercial networks for
mission critical PPDR Broadband.
6.2.3.3.4
The EU Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (RSPP).
The European Commission, Parliament and Telecom Council are currently working on a multi-annual
Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (RSPP) that also includes clauses for PPDR spectrum. Currently
the wording proposed by the RSPG (radio Spectrum Policy Group) negotiated between the
Parliament, Commission and the Council of Ministers gives clear guidance for the need for additional
harmonised spectrum for PPDR and calls for joint action of the EC and the Member States to ensure
sufficient spectrum for public safety.
RSPG recognised that Spectrum needs for broadband PPDR services differ for each member state.
National solutions are depending on national political decision including economics, relevant
refarming issues, network mutualisation, etc. RSPG also recognised that a decision on deployment of
broadband PPDR networks is an national matter.
PS: it should be noted that RSPP Article 8.3 states: “The Commission shall, in cooperation with the
Member States seek to ensure that sufficient spectrum is made available under harmonised
conditions to support the development of safety services and the free circulation of related devices as
well as the development of innovative interoperable solutions for public safety and protection, civil
protection and disaster relief.”
6.2.3.3.5
What should happen next?
Discussions are currently taking place within and between Member States on the future use of 700
MHz frequencies and future Broadband PPDR services, with the aim of presenting a coordinated
position of all EU and CEPT Member States at the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-15)
in November 2015, organised by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU-R).
The organisations responsible for PPDR are convinced that their needs for mission critical broadband
services can only be met by dedicated harmonised spectrum.
Those needs have been documented within CEPT who have concluded that there is a need for a
minimum of 2 x 10 MHz of spectrum for mobile broadband data services with additional spectrum
required when implementing voice services, Air Ground Air, Direct Mode Operation and ad hoc
networks.
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7
ASSESMENT OF SUPPORTING TOOLS FOR COMMUNICATION
INTEROPERABILITY
7.1 TETRA/TETRAPOL – DISPACHER TRAINING TOOL
Training for TETRA/TETRAPOL system operation for both terminals and dispatchers are usually
provided by the manufacturers or by companies providing special training for the use of terminals
and/or dispatchers. The training is based on standard methods like class room presentations, elearning centres and product operation manuals and documentation. . In more detail, the company
TETRASIM provides TETRA training systems, both terminal and dispatcher simulators. The terminal
simulators provide full one-to-one functionality with the real terminals, including voice and data.
Everything from network changes to emergency calls is simulated. Interactive manuals for the radios
and short guides to their functionality are also included. Various terminals are currently supported
from different manufacturers (EDS, SEPURA and MOTOROLA).More advanced methods especially
for self-training are only commercially available for TETRA by the company TETRASIM which
provides a TETRA training system with terminal simulators that provide one-to-one functionality with
the real terminals.
Within ISITEP project a training tool that will emulate both TETRA and TETRAPOL terminal
functionalities and operations will be developed. Furthermore, the enhanced terminal features and
capabilities for the ISI operations will also be incorporated in order to provide a training tool that will
be customized to the needs of the developed ISI solution.
7.2 Operations training tool
For operations in crisis and emergency situations, there are several companies which provide training
to organizations such as ETC, SIMfx. Their products aim to train commanders and disaster
management teams at all levels, from on-scene operations to off-scene coordination and planning in
multiple scenarios as well as for different operations like fire fighting, Hazardous Materials Incidents,
Airport Rescue, Emergency Management.
Within ISITEP the training tool for operations that will be developed, will take into account the specific
needs, organizational structures and nature of operations of the parties participating in the
demonstrations of the ISI solution. It will be focused on educating different PPDR forces on the
procedures and operational scenarios that foreign PPDR forces exploit and will target on the
improvement of cross-border collaboration in transnational events. Furthermore, the training tool will
have dynamic characteristics in the sense that the database that will be developed will be constantly
updated, including different type of scenarios, user groups, level of co-operation, severity of incidents
and other parameters.
7.3 Business Model Tool
Regarding the TETRA/TETRAPOL business models available today, these are mainly focused on the
roll-out of various networks across Europe. On top of this, there are few surveys performed in a local
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level by various PPDR forces in Europe, focusing on the international operations that are being
performed within certain periods of time and collecting statistics on the type of operations, number of
operations and other services provided, as well as investigating the level of satisfaction of involved
end-users in the use of international radio communications. However, a business model that takes
into account various input from a significant number of European end-users and is focused on the
establishment of an interoperability solution that allows for the interconnection of various
TETRA/TETRAPOL national networks is not yet available.
ISITEP project will develop a European Business model for implementing the roaming between PPDR
forces in European countries and promoting the cross border collaboration between them.
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8
SCENARIOS
8.1 Introduction
One of the main objectives of ISITEP is to test the theoretical schemes and projects, especially
concerning the use of a uniform and standardized international communication in real operations or
events.
Therefore, it‟s a basic need to practice some scenarios with and by the end-users in real time
environment. Before we can organize some scenarios, it‟s advisable to have a draft in which all items
are published. The draft is not only for the exercise itself, but it is also a checklist for the team in
charge of the exercise.
Further it can be used to compare the different (inter)national laws (see chapter 2: Regulatory and
Legal Frameworks for Cross-Border Cooperation) and the own national procedures (medical, disaster
management, riot control,...). These rules and procedures must be known by the responsible when
there is a cross-border action, even when it‟s only an exercise.
If we want to prepare the different actors, who are involved in the implementation of the scenarios, in
an adequate and professional way, we should pay sufficient attention to the awareness, information
and training.
8.2 Goal
The organization of an exercise and the execution of captured scenarios offer many opportunities:
●
●
●
●
●
●
the participants and the organizers become aware of the operational and technical problems
participants from different services and countries, with their own organizational culture, get to
know each other better and learn to work better together
the evaluation of certain elements:
- the effectiveness of the elaborated plans and procedures
- the surplus value of certain resources / tools (action cards, data links, …)
- the mono- and multi-disciplinary approach of the intervention, taking into account:
▪ the commanding structure,
▪ the communication and communication links,
▪ the alerting cycle,
▪ the coordination
the knowledge of the participants is expanded and updated, skills, knowhow and behavior on
the field
the participants learn to deal with unforeseen circumstances
the participants and the organizers can evaluate the practical feasibility of the theoretical
models and can make adjustments where necessary
For ISITEP is the main goal: the testing of the international radio-communication on all (operational
and technical) levels (cooperation, operational, control rooms, dispatchers, end-users).
Therefore, the scenarios should not be too complex and kept simple otherwise there‟s a great chance
that the main goal (= practical test of the communication lines) will be put off to other objectives. Of
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course, there will be a link with other goals but the organizer must always keep in mind what the main
objective is.
The essence of a realistic and well-organized exercise is to check if the theoretical concept agrees
with the practical use and if necessary to make some adjustments and improvements to the
theoretical model. This is a simple application of the PDCA (Plan – Do – Check – Act) management
model.
Figure 20: Deming Circle (Plan - Do - Check - Act)
8.3 Concepts and definitions
A lot of concepts and definitions are used during the organization of an exercise. Sometimes these
terms are interpreted in a different way. The aim is to define in this document a number of terms so
that misunderstandings could be avoided.
8.3.1 Categories of exercises
There exist 3 main categories:
Table top exercise – TTX
Simulation exercise in room based on information messages
and incidents where the emphasis is put on the use of
procedures and structures and the mutual communication.
The approach of the different incidents is discussed in group
after the exercise. Includes the possibility of participation of
the control rooms and the commanders/personnel at all
levels.
Command post exercise – CPX
A (field) exercise where the emphasis is put on the
command structures (Command, Staff and Communications)
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and where the operation of a CP-Ops (Command Post Operations) and / or the CC (Coordination Committee) is
tested. It is preferred that the usual transmission means are
used. There are limited actions of commanding vehicles
actually implemented on the field.
Field training exercise - FTX
Realistic exercise where the emphasis is on the deployment
in the field and in which all or parts of the services are
involved and in which they use their material in a real
condition.
Operational procedures and technical aspects are even important in the framework of ISITEP, but the
goal is not to test the operational initiative or reactions of the involved players. The basic requirement
is that the scenario is simple and fixed, although this has the consequence that the scenario is less
realistic. There is, especially in the beginning, no space or time for unforeseen inputs or inappropriate
reactions from a player as in a real situation, except when it is foreseen in the scenario. Every step or
development in the timeframe of the scenario should be prepared and briefed in advance.
Regarding the methodology, it is strongly recommended to follow a step-by-step approach. This
means that before realizing the full ISITEP demo, you should start with a purely theoretical exercise
(mono disciplinary TTX), followed by a mono disciplinary static CPX, then a mono disciplinary
dynamic (i.e. including teams movements) CPX, to evolve ultimately to an integrated multidisciplinary
FTX exercise.
Even when you reached the FTX manner of playing scenarios, it is still recommended to start the FTX
execution by reading the scenario around the table with people which will be lined up on the field to
be sure that everybody has understood what the scenario requires from him.
8.3.2 Groups and Functions
Groups and functions involved in the preparation, the execution and the evaluation of the exercise.
Safety Advisory
Group
Group that has the overall responsibility for the organization of
exercises in the context of the emergency and intervention plans.
They gather the information on the emergency and intervention plans.
They pronounce them on and they translate the lists of improvements
in an action plan that determines the actions to be taken, the
responsible persons and the delays of execution.
Steering Committee
Consists of at least one representative from each discipline, if
necessary assisted by some experts (depending on the scenario and /
or location).
The Steering Committee is responsible for organizing, directing and
evaluating the exercise. Therefore, the Steering Committee
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establishes and introduces an organization chart which contents all
the tasks and persons who will take part in the demo.
Dir Ex
Person who is responsible for the general organization and the
progress of the exercise.
Coordinator
Person selected within the Steering Committee or person who gets a
mandate from the Steering Committee to:
Observer
1. let fulfill the rules of the exercise
2. give information and start up events so that the actors can
react in an appropriate way
3. intervene in the course of the exercise, if this is necessary
4. ensure the safety of the participants
Person who was invited to observe (without evaluating) the conduct of
the exercise, gives also advice to the coordinator
Dir Ex Tech
Person who is responsible for the technical implementation and the
technical progress of the exercise.
DirEval
Person who has the final responsibility for the general evaluation of
the exercise
Evaluator
Person, authorized by the steering committee, who follows the
execution of the exercise without taking part. He has a document to
evaluate if the actions are in accordance with the stated objectives.
Different evaluators are indicated by aspect
Actor
Person who actively participates in the exercise (member of the police
force, fire brigade, medical team,...)
Player
Person who plays the role of a direct or indirect involved individual in
the exercise (dead, wounded, offender, victim, witness, ...)
8.3.3 General principles
To test the international communications, there are a number of aspects that are important:
●
●
●
Radio Procedure. Because several services from different countries are involved, it is
important to use a common and understandable language. The most obvious tool for this is
the NATO procedure 6. A compendium of the NATO procedure in joined in annex 2. For the
participants that are not familiar with that procedure, a brief preliminary training has to be
provided.
Communication lines. It is not only intended to test the coordination network between the
different (national and international) control rooms but especially to verify the function of the
operational networks towards the teams on the field and between the teams on the field.
Technical implementation. Obviously, if we want to test the communication lines, it is essential
to know which facilities are set in place and what are the additional requirements that are
needed to set up the desired communications. It is also indispensable to have a view on the
exploitation of the existing network (GoCo – GoGo – CoCo) or of the ad-hoc network, because
6
“ACP 125F Allied Communications Publication, Communication Instructions,Radio Telephone procedures”,
sept 2001 - Unclassified, NATO
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it determines which (external) organizations should eventually be involved in the organization
of the exercise and which legal issues have to be taken into account.
In general; next question has to be answered: “Who has to communicate with whom and how?“
In the organization of exercises we shall primarily be focused on communications with the neighboring
countries because that is the most likely situation. However, there are occasions where
communications with teams and/or services from not-neighboring countries are necessarily or
possible. An analysis of these communication lines is also indispensable and these connections
should eventually be realized.
In addition to organize the exercises, adequate attention should also be paid to the evaluation.
This is the last but certainly not the easiest step. It is essential that each exercise is completed by a
good evaluation. Based on the performed analysis, the existing procedures, structures and
techniques have to be modified, supplemented or improved. The completed evaluation should be
followed by an action plan.
An exercise is also an opportunity to share some experiences.
The lessons learned from this exercise are not only useful for the leadership and the actors that took
part in the event, but also for those who will have to manage a similar event and for those who think
about to organize such an exercise.
To share these lessons with others, there will be a central point where, by theme and by type of
exercise, following topics are centralized:
●
●
●
●
The preparatory documents (follow-up table, evaluation forms,…)
the scenario of the exercises
the best practices withhold from the global evaluation
an objective and neutral presentation of the final evaluation
Due to the fact that we work in an international context, it is sure that there is a problem of legality:
what is perfectly legal in one country is not necessarily legal in the neighboring country. Hence, a
review has to be done of the (inter)national rules of law in the broadest sense, both from the legal and
operational point of view. The greatest common divisor must be filtered out of all procedures and
serve as a foundation for the exercise. In practice, it is usually a country and his neighboring countries
that play a role in the filtering of the laws and procedures.
When using 'unknown' or new resources it is indispensable to give a preliminary training to the actors
including, among other things, the new procedures/methods. But even when we make use of existing
means, it is interesting to foresee in a refurbishment course. This can also be required for the used
procedures and the legal principles.
Besides the preliminary training, actors‟ actions will be supported by the step-by-step methodology
which will be led by the Dir Ex, starting with the most simple to go to the most complex (see point
8.3.1). During the exercise execution, the Dir Ex and the different coordinators will be on the field so
that they can react rapidly in case of trouble to, if necessary, suspend the exercise, and, after
recovery, to restart the scenario thread.
When organizing a classic exercise we normally focus on the operational aspect. Due to the finality of
the exercises in the context of ISITEP, it is desirable to work with a dual structure in which one pillar is
focused on the operational aspect and the second pillar is focused on the technical side
(communication lines and technical infrastructure). Besides, we also have to consider the logistic and
administrative support.
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The location is important for the preparation of the scenarios: depending on the scenario, the most
suitable location is chosen or otherwise, the location will determine the type of scenario. The location
will probably play a crucial role with regard to the (inter)national regulations that are applicable (for
example: Schengen, accords of Prüm, bilateral agreements, mono- and multi-disciplinary protocols,
…).
The geographical aspects (tunnels, waterways, buildings, railroads,…) will have an impact on the
available technical resources and possibilities and will maybe create additional requirements (mobile
base stations, repeaters, gateways,…).
It is also important that the organizer has the disposal of the most recent plans of the location and that
he or she performs a preliminary reconnaissance.
Discretion remains necessary.
Once the information about the organization of the exercise becomes known, the curiosity of potential
participants will be stimulated. The official communication must be limited to the minimum necessary
information. It is desirable to preserve the discretion as much as possible so the exercise can remain
realistic and effective.
8.4 Draft of a scenario
The draft of a scenario is a checklist-based document, a template, which deals with all the aspects of
the organization of a certain event or exercise. The aspects concern the scenario itself but also the
practical arrangements.
The draft encompasses a timeline (point 8.4) and annexes (point 8.6).
It‟s based on the study of several evaluations of international PPDR exercises and on the principles
explained in the “Practical and methodological guide for the organization of an emergency exercise”.7
This guide speaks about an operational timeline but we think that it is necessary to combine it with a
technical timeline, due to the main goal of the ISITEP-project. In the following paragraphs we‟ll take a
closer look at those timelines.
The „operational‟ timeline includes 4 phases with a total of twenty steps.
In addition to the „operational‟ timeline we have to consider also a „technical‟ timeline as already
mentioned.
Depending on the technical possibilities and needs, it is necessary to implement some technical
means on the field. Maybe these resources have to be developed, purchased and installed. At the
same time it is inherent to execute a number of technical tests on the field. A test of the various
communication lines is essential a brief time before the real execution of the scenario. In the planning
we have to foresee the necessary time for some technical adjustments.
“Praktische en methodologische gids voor de organisatie van een rampoefening”, HCP Didier Sorgeloos, dec 2009,
Federale Politie DGA/DAO (intern)
7
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Phase 1: Preparation
Time
Number
Operational
Who
D-5
months
1
Safety
Advisory
Board
What
-
-
D-5
months
2
Steering
committee
-
D-5
months
3
Steering
committee
-
Decision to carry out an exercise
Determine the scale of the exercise (type,
duration, participants, budget, theme, place,
...)
Determine the general and specific objectives
Determine, in general terms, the policy of the
communication to the outside world
Establish a steering committee
Organize the first meeting
Fix the working structure
o Director of the exercise (Dir Ex)
o Scenario
o Communication (towards the locals and
the media)
o Logistics and technical support
o Evaluation
Complement the overall objectives with the
specific goals
Choose the theme (if it is not imposed)
Edit a scenario and work it out
Determine the requirements (personnel,
equipment, security, insurance,...)
Start with the execution of the “to do’s”
Technical
Who
What
Safety
Advisory
Board
-
Steering
Committee
-
-
-
Dir Ex Tech
-
+
specialists
-
-
-
In this case the goal of the exercise is the test of
the communication lines.
The Safety Advisory Board has to be aware of
the technical possibilities and limitations.
Establish a subgroup that will deal with the
technical aspects of the exercise. By this, we
mean the technical aspects of the separate
communication lines.
Designate a Dir Ex Tech
When the scenario is defined, the disciplines
involved are known and the communication lines
can be fixed.
During the elaboration of the scenario: check if
the required communication lines can be
achieved with the existing material. If not: seek
for alternative solutions.
If additional material should be employed, start
as soon as possible the appropriate procedures
(purchase, rent,…)
Get in touch with the foreign technical services
o use of international ISSI’s,
o Base stations
o Frequencies
o Coupling of networks / communication
groups
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
D-4
4
months
Steering
committee
-
D-4
5
months
D-10
Steering
committee
-
6
weeks
Steering
committee
-
D-28
7
Steering
committee
-
D-21
8
Public
administration
-
D-14
9
Steering
committee
-
Report to the Safety Advisory Board
(presentation of the activities, proposals
(video), encountered problems, details of the
external communication, decisions to be
made (costs, resources,…)
Continuing the work depending on the final
mandate
Describe the complete scenario in detail
(Major Event List or MEL)
Prepare a table with the actions expected by
discipline and by coordination structure
Establish and constitute an evaluation
committee
Allocate the tasks during the progress of the
exercise
Edit the follow-up table for the coordinator
and the observers
Establish the sheets for the players, the
evaluators,…
Edit the conventions for the exercise, the
communication strategy and the purpose of
the evaluation
Provide them for approval to the public
administration
Transmit the approved training conventions
to the participants
Make the participantsofficial aware of the
general information and the contents of the
exercise
Planning the different briefings that have to
be given before the start of the exercise
Briefing of the coordinators, operators,
Dir Ex Tech
-
-
Dir Ex Tech
-
Dir Ex Tech
+
Specialists
Dir Ex Tech
+
-
-
o …
Contacts with the own and the foreign network
administrators
Set up a list with the technical contact persons
Draw up a detailed list of technical “to do’s” and
their deadlines.
Report to the Steering Committee:
o Presentation of the technical possibilities
o Encountered technical problems
o Decisions to be made (costs, resources,…)
Continuing the work depending on the decision
of the Safety Advisory Board and the Steering
Committee
Verify is there is a synergy between the MEL and
the proposed communication lines
Complete the table of the actions with the
different communication lines
Establish an constitute a technical evaluation
committee
Edit the sheets for the technical evaluators
Installation and testing of material
Edit the technical conventions for the exercise.
Provide them for approval to the Steering
Committee and the Safety Advisory Board.
Practical tests of the communication lines.
Specialists
-
Dir Ex Tech
-
In case of the use of unfamiliar resources:
organizing a number of initiation courses
Dir Ex Tech
-
Planning the different briefings that have to be
given before the start of the exercise
Briefing of the coordinators, operators, evaluators
-
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
D-7
10
Safety
Advisory
Board
-
evaluators, ,…
Follow-up of the end result of the “to do’s”
External communications (media, local
population, …)
Dir Ex Tech
+
-
Follow-up of the technical “to-do’s”
-
Give a state of affairs to the various national
network operators
Installation and test of additional material
-
Specialists
+
Steering
Committee
Phase 2: The day of the exercise
Time
Number
Operational
Who
D or
11
D-1
Steering
committee
-
D
12
Steering
committee
D
13
Steering
committee
D
14
Steering
committee
-
-
Technical
What
Who
Transporting, testing and starting to
distribute the material used during the
exercise
Building up the scenery
Dir Ex Tech
Organize a meeting point for the
participants
Manage the logistics (supplies, tools,…)
Reception of the concerned persons
(everyone except the actors) at the
meeting point
Briefing of the players, the observers,…
Making-up and fitting the players
Inform the Dir Ex that everything is ready
to start the exercise
Dir Ex Tech
-
Dir Ex Tech
-
+
What
-
Specialists
Dir Ex Tech
-
Final test of the communication lines and the
planned material.
Installation and test of additional (secondary)
material
Organize a meeting point for the participants
(eventually the same place as the operational
meeting point)
Reception of the concerned persons at the meeting
point
Briefing of the participants
Fitting the players
Inform the Dir Ex that everything is ready to start
the exercise.
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
Phase 3: The exercise
Time
Number
Operational
Who
D
15
Dir Ex
and
coordinators
-
Technical
What
Who
Start the exercise
Ensure the overall control
If necessary, suspend the progress of the
exercise
End the exercise
Dir Ex Tech
What
-
Start the exercise
Ensure the overall technical control
If necessary and in consultation with the Dir Ex,
suspend the progress of the exercise
In consultation with the Dir Ex, end the exercise
Phase 4: The evaluation of the exercise
Time
Number
Operational
Who
D
16
Coordination
structures,
disciplines
and
services
What
-
Hold immediately a debriefing
Provide the broad lines of the debriefings
to the Dir Eval before the fixed deadline
Fix the dates for the next evaluations and
debriefings
Technical
Who
Dir Ex Tech
Coordination
structures,
disciplines
and services
What
-
-
D+3
17
weeks
D+3
Disciplines
and services
18
Dir Eval
-
Direx
-
weeks
D+4
weeks
-
19
Hold later on a debriefing within the fixed
deadline
Deliver the contents of the debriefings to
the Dir Eval before the fixed deadline
Edit an evaluation report based on the
checklists of the evaluators
Provide this report to the Dir Ex
Create an overall evaluation based on the
evaluation of the Dir Eval, the comments
of the Steering Committee, the discussions
with the actors and the reports of the two
Dir Ex Tech
Disciplines
and services
-
Hotwash debriefing
Collect the material
Restore the site and the material in its original
condition (frequencies, network, decoupling of
communication groups,…)
Provide the broad lines of the debriefings to the Dir
Eval
Fix the dates for the next evaluations and
debriefings
Hold a debriefing within the fixed deadline
Deliver the contents of the debriefing to the Dir
Eval before the fixed deadline
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
-
-
D+3
months
20
Security
Advisory
Board
-
types of debriefings of the coordination
structures and the disciplines
Make a report containing an overall
assessment of the actions, completed with
the lists of improvements and if necessary,
recommendations regarding the
organization of the exercise
Present this report to the Safety Advisory
Board, expanded with the main actors of
the exercise and the members of the
Steering Committee
To pronounce them on and to translate the
lists of improvements in an action plan
that determines the actions to be taken, the
responsible persons and the delays of
execution
Security
Advisory
Board
-
-
In the context of ISITEP:
o Which communication line is technically
realized and meets the operational needs ?
o Which communication line is technically
realized but needs some adjustments ?
o Which communication line is not realized ?
o Are there additional technical needs ?
It is difficult to determine at this stage the
responsibility and the execution time for the
technical realization of the various operational
needs.
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
8.5 Examples
8.5.1 General example
Draft concerning the Management of the Public Order and Safety (MPOS) ~ An Example of a Riot
Control Exercise
Riot Control Exercise in Place X (military area) on xx/xx/20xx
Leader:
CP [name]
[Unit] [Phone number] [e-mail]
1. Objectives
a. The following exercise is one of the objectives of the ISITEP-project and has as
primary objective: the follow-up of the international physical radio connections and
radio procedures when there is a need to a international cooperation of police-units.
Especially when there is a planned manifestation.
b. Every police-unit will do the same exercise.
c. The different national procedures will be evaluated afterwards.
d. Each country has one command and one platoon, the Belgian water cannon is at the
disposal of every country. They have to follow their own national rules concerning
tactics, arrests, use of special means…
e. The analysis (e.g. procedures, tactics,…) will be the base of a future integrated
exercise.
2. Script
a. Content: A peaceful manifestation ends with a confrontation with some others which
throw small objects. Objective: restore the public safety, arrest of the „throwers‟ and
escort of the peaceful manifestation towards a safe place
b. Fixed scenario
i. Start Manif
ii. Movement Manif
iii. Confrontation
iv. Arrests
v. Restore
vi. Escort
vii. End Manif
c. If necessary the Belgian water cannon offers supply to the other countries. A liaison
officer will drive along.
d. No use of teargas in any form.
3. Agreements with other partners
a. Owner: Ministry of Defence
i. SPOC: CP xx
ii. Locations, free to use: see map in attachment
iii. Costs: by Belgian Federal Police
iv. No special clothing required, only the usual uniforms will do
v. No use of the internal radio network, only the police radios shall be used, each
country supports his one (mobile) solution
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vi. Monitoring of the script is supported by the mobile TBS of the Federal Belgian
Police.
vii. A guide (soldier) is foreseen during the day, RV is 08u00 at the entrance.
viii. Parking places are in the accommodations (follow the signs)
b. Government / Administration
i. Contact: CP xx
ii. City xx:ok
iii. Min of Defence: ok
iv. DAO/DirCo/Local Police (Belgian police): ok
v. Invitations
vi. CIC / Emergency rooms: ok
vii. Press: ok
viii. Traffic Control: ok
4. Overview Participants/units
a. Belgium
i. SPOC: xx
ii. List in attachment
1. persons: ok
2. vehicles: ok
b. Germany
i. SPOC: xx
1. persons: ok
2. vehicles: ok
c. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
i. SPOC: yy
1. persons: ok
2. vehicles: ok
d. The Netherlands
i. SPOC
1. persons: ok
2. vehicles: ok
e. Observers
i. SPOC
1. persons: ok
2. vehicles: ok
iii. Clothing: ok
5. Exercise
a. Main objective
i. Comparison of the approach of a same event by the different police units. Also
to test the international radio standards, TMO and DMO, the combining of it and
to get an overview of the national radio procedures.
ii. Each country will install an own CpOps that will be visited by the observers to
make an inventory. (eg practical housing, use of call sings, radio scheme,
connections, technical,…)
b. Content
i. A peaceful manifestation faces some individuals who throw some small objects.
The individuals must be arrested and the peaceful manifestation will be
escorted to a safe place.
ii. 15 individuals with special clothing and some small wooden objects.
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iii. No use of teargas in any form.
iv. Support of the Belgian water cannon is possible, a liaison will take place in the
vehicle.
c. Start exercise
i. Xx/xx/20xx at 09:00
ii. After consultation with other partners
iii. Only by leader
d. Timetable (incl. the names of the leaders)
Start – End
Mission
Responsible
Place
Remarks
08:00-08:15
Reception
X
Guardhouse
Parking places
08:15-08:30
Greeting
Y
Canteen
Coffee
08:30-09:00
Briefings
X
Room 1: B/Nl
Y
Room 2: D/L
Translations
maps / orders
Z
Room
Observers
09:00-09:15
09:00-11:45
Exercises
Y + staff
All areas
11:45-13:00
Break + diner
All
Canteen
13:00-14:45
Exercises
Y + staff
All areas
14:45-15:15
Debriefings
participants
X
Room 1: B/Nl
Y
Room 2: D/L
Z
Room
Observers
Y + staff
Canteen
15:15-15:30
Thanks
/
3:
Contact
partners
ext
Contact
DAO,
Local Police
3:
Good-byes
15:30-…
Debriefing staff
Y + staff
owner
+ Room 1
e. Location
i. Military Area AREA 51, address, map: see attachment
ii. Zone I-V
f. Debriefings
i. Specific debriefing: see timetable
ii. General debriefing Dxx + 14/xx/20xx at the Federal Police CIC, address, map
6. Preparations and practical arrangements
a. Script
i. Responsible
ii. Escort/guides
iii. See attachment
b. Participants
i. Listings should mailed by national SPOCs
ii. When moving on Belgian territory: only blue lights, no sound
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iii. First Place: Military Area, Guardhouse
iv. No special clothing demand, only regular/standard clothing is sufficient
c. Leaders & entourage
i. Special recognizable clothing will be offered by leader
ii. First place: guardhouse
iii. Plastic-coated contact list will be provided
d. Observers
i. Special recognizable clothing will be offered by leader
ii. First place: guardhouse
iii. Plastic-coated contac tlist will be provided
e. Detailed maps and photos: see attachment
i. Global view
ii. Location of the actors
iii. Movements
f. Background actors/ extras
i. Recruited from the Police Academy
ii. List of names and tasks: see attachment
iii. Location on map: see attachment
g. Media simulation
i. No simulation
h. Catering
i. See timetable
ii. Coffee, diner, coffee
7. Safety rules
a. Code words
i. Strike: when the actor is sick or can‟t act anymore, given by actor him-/herself
ii. Lock-out: end of exercise for a specific actor (e.g. when he‟s „arrested‟), given
by leader
iii. No play – end: no exercise, real circumstances, asap contact with leader/cpops
b. List of SPOCs
i. See attachment
8.5.2 Specific Example: Hot pursuit Germany-Belgium-Netherlands
Introduction
This scenario describes the situation of an armed robbery. The scenario is used to describe the cross
border (The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany) radio communication between police forces. Cross
border communication can mean the connection of police forces with their own control room while
they are active across the border. It can also mean the communication between the police forces of
The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium including one of more control rooms.
Start incident
On one day the Dutch police receives an robbery alarm from a warehouse. The police control room
orders police surveillance cars nearby the warehouse to take a look at the warehouse and the
situation. [1]
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The situation
The warehouse belongs to a security company securing
high value cargo and is situated in a Dutch village called
Wijlre. The distance between Wijlre and Maastricht (NL)
and between Aachen (DE) is approximately 20 kilometer
and the distance to Liege (BE) is 40 kilometers. Both
borders are even closer.
Communication
The Dutch police communicates with the C2000 radio
system. In the police vehicles they have a mobile radio (mobilofoon) available as well as a portable
radio (portofoon) for communication outside the vehicle.
Two police surveillance cars respond to the robbery alarm and start moving to the warehouse in
Wijlre. While they are driving to the crime scene they receive more information via the radio from the
centralist of the police control room. [2] An eye witness told the police control room that he saw 3
persons coming out of the warehouse carrying firearms, step into a black Audi and leave in the
direction of the N278. The police control room also received a telephone call from the security
department of the warehouse. They told the police that the robbers left the building and stole a large
amount of money. They even gave a detailed subscription of the robbers getaway car. One of the
police surveillance cars noticed the getaway car while they are driving on the N278. They
communicate their position to the police control room. [3] The getaway car is going in the direction of
the Netherland-Germany border. A high speed police pursuit follows.
5 minutes from start incident
The Dutch police estimate that they will not be able to catch the robbers before they arrive at the
border. Therefore they contact the police control room and ask to inform the German police. [4,5]
Legislation
The Dutch police can continue the pursuit on German territory when they fulfill the requirements laid
down in the Schengen Implementation Convention. In case the robbers must be caught in the act of
committing the offence, the offence must be listed in article 41.4 of the Schengen Implementation
Convention. The situation is urgent, the pursuing officers shall, not later than when they cross the
border, contact the competent German authorities and the German police is unable to reach the
scene in time to take over the pursuit.
Legislation
Article
41
Schengen
Implementation
Convention 14 June 1985
(SUO)
Regulates
Cross border
powers
Countries
pursuit, NL, DE, BE
12
Addition to article 41 NL, DE
SUO
(cross
border
pursuit)
Benelux Convention on 18
Police Cooperation
Addition to article 41 NL, BE
SUO
(cross
border
pursuit)
Treaty of Enschede
2 March 2005
8 June 2004
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There is reason to think that the robbers will try to leave the N278 and change their course to the
Dutch-Belgium border or even maybe via Germany to the German-Belgium border. The getaway car
has Belgium number plates and the car is a few days ago registered as stolen in the area of Liege.
For this reason the Dutch police also wants to inform the Belgium police. They ask the Dutch police
control room to do so. [6]
10 minutes from start incident
The robbers and the Dutch police surveillance cars arrive and pass the Dutch-German border. They
inform the police control room about it. [7] The Dutch police have a high priority to stop the pursuit
quickly because of the dangerous situations during the chase. Given the seriousness of the offences
there is a big incentive to catch the robbers. Because of this situation they want to communicate with
their German colleagues for making an jointly operational approach. [8]
Five kilometers beyond the border the German police placed a roadblock to stop the robbers. The
robbers are forced to stop the getaway car and the Dutch police officers are able to arrest the three
robbers. Both the Dutch and German police officers give the information about their position and the
arrest of the robbers by radio to their Police control room. [9,10] The Dutch police control room also
informs the Belgium police control room in Liege that the robbers are caught and that the Belgium can
give up their stand-by position. [11]
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Nr
Time
(from start
incident)
Communicatio
n between
Communication about
1
0-5 min
PSC-NL/PCRNL
The
robbery
information
Relevant
technical
requirements
Relevant legal
requirements
C2000
National
2
0-5 min
PSC-NL/PCRNL
Detailed information about suspects
and car
Mobile radio
C2000
National
3
0-5 min
PSC-NL/PCRNL
Position PSC and position suspects
Mobile radio
C2000
National
4
5-10 min
PSC-NL/PCRNL
Position
PSC
and
suspects, Mobile radio
movement to border NL/DE
C2000
National
5
5-10 min
PCRNL/PCR-DE
The robbery, incident information,
information about suspects and
possible crossing border pursuit
Telephone
-
Schengen
6
5-10 min
PCRNL/PCR-BE
The robbery, incident information, Telephone
information about suspects and
possible crossing border pursuit
-
Schengen/Ben
elux
7
10-15 min
PSC-NL/PCRNL
Position
PSC
and
crossing border NL/DE
C2000
National
8
10-15 min
PSC-NL/PSCDE
Position suspects, making an jointly Mobile radio
operational approach
C2000/??
Schengen
9
15-20 min
PSC-NL/PCRNL
Position PSC and suspects, arrest Mobile radio
of the robbers
C2000
National
10
15-20 min
PSCDE/PCR-DE
Position PSC and suspects, arrest Mobile radio
of the robbers
??
National
11
15-20 min
PCRNL/PCR-BE
The arrest of the robbers, no longer
stand-by position needed
-
Schengen/Ben
elux
and
Communication
device
incident Mobile radio
suspects, Mobile radio
Telephone
PSC=Police Surveillance Car / PCR=Police Control Room / NL=The Netherlands / DE=Germany / BE=Belgium
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
8.6 Annexes
8.6.1 General information about the exercise
8.6.2 Major Event List (MEL) – Scenario
8.6.3 Checklist with the necessary logistical resources
8.6.4 Table with “to do’s” (practical conventions can be used as reference)
8.6.5 Follow-up table (coordinator and observer)
8.6.6 List of the evaluator
8.6.7 List of the player
8.6.8 List of the improvements
8.6.9 Practical conventions (structure) – Check-list
8.6.10 Practical conventions (transfer letter)
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8.6.1. General information about the exercise
Scenario name:
Scenario
number:
Scenario outline:
Author(s):
Key
actors
Participants:
Status:
Owner:
/
(…)
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8.6.2. Major Event List (MEL) - Scenario
ajor Event List (MEL)
“Name”
Exercise:
Number:
Date:
A
Nbr
B
Hour
C
Event
D
E
F
G
From
For
Carrier
Content of the message
H
By
First phase - ...
Field
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
CP-Ops
CC
I
J
Expected actions
Control
Remarks
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
Second phase - ...
Field
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
CP-Ops
CC
Third phase - ...
Field
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
CP-Ops
CC
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
Fourth phase - ...
Field
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
CP-Ops
CC
LEGEND
LEGEND:
A
Chronological order of the action
B
Timing of the action
C
Nature of the action
D
Information delivered by ...
E
Who has received the information ?
F
In which way has he received the information (phone call, envelope, radio message, direct testimony, ...)
G
The content of the information
H
Reaction (in keywords) that is expected by the receiver of the information at the level of … (field, discipline, CP-Ops – CC)
I
(If required), indicating the discipline / person who evaluates the reaction that was given
J
Various information (reference to the annexes, ≠ choice depending on the reaction that was given to the key actions)
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
8.6.3. Checklist with the necessary logistical resources
General organization
Bus (transport of persons)
Gifts
Heat gun
Transit certificates
Medical exercise equipment
Photos
Plans / sketches
Indication of the meeting point
Drinks / refreshments
Catering
Tents
…
Scenery
Wreck / training tank
Breakdown lorry
Smoke pot
Debris
Manikin
Bomblets
…
Tarpaulins
Hooter
Fences, screens
Road signs
Colored ribbons
…
Badges
Blankets
Showers
Toilets
Dressing rooms
Make-up
Appropriate clothing
…
Photo cameras
Video cameras
Audio recorders
Batteries
GPS
Radio
Specific vests for the evaluators
Equipment for taking notes (notebook, tablet,…)
…
Operation file
Ear sets
Radio
…
Security
Players
Evaluators
Observers
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8.6.4. Table with “to do’s”
What
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
…
By whom
For whom
Timing
Status
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
8.6.5. Follow-up Table (coordinator and observer)
Ref
MEL
Hour
+
Actual
Hour
Main event
By
whom
/ where
(…)
Expected
actions
Controller
Status
Consequences if:
1. Realized
2. Not realized
Remarks
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
8.6.6. List of the evaluator (structure) – Front
Exercise:
“Name”
Nbr:
Date:
Ref MEL
Evaluator:
Actions
Yes / No8
Timing
Remarks
Hour +
(…)
8
Yes / No :Some actionsrequireonlya simpleevaluation (realized or not) – for otheractions,the boxwillbegrayed out and the appropriate comments will be made in the
section “Remarks”.
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
8.6.6. List of the evaluator (structure) – Back
Floor plan
Data of your contact persons
W: Starting point
Y: target location in the case of a suspension
X: location towards you have to move
Z: target location after the end of the exercise
Instructions
o Discretion in relation to the actors:
o Schedule
o Significance of the pinafore:
o Demarcation ribbon (- colour):
o In case of a risk or premature termination of the exercise: attitude:
o In case of a REAL problem:
o (…)
o Delivery of the current list:
ID: ISITEP_D2.1.2_20141107_V1.0
8.6.7. List of the player (structure) - Front
Exercise:
Date:
“Name”
Identity (real)
Identity (character - role)
Sheet Nbr:
Name:
First name:
Place and date of birth:
Address:
Phone:
Nationality:
Language:
(…)
Situation:
- Your character (…)
- You have to (…)
Remark(s) – extraction from the MEL:
- You have to know that (…)
Specific instructions:
-
You have to say / do (…)
You don‟t have to say / do (…)
Attitude to strike
-
During the exercise: (…)
At the end of the exercise: (…)
Timing:
-
Arrival at (specified location): H+ (…)
Departure: H+ (…) or when you (…)
Date: 07-11-2014
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8.6.7. List of the player (structure) - Back
Data of your contact persons
Floor plan
W: Starting point
Y: target location in the case of a suspension
X: location towards you have to move
Z: target location after the end of the exercise
General instructions
o
o
o
o
o
Significance of the pinafore:
Demarcation ribbon (+ colour):
In case of a risk or premature termination
of the exercise: attitude:
In case of a REAL problem:
Don‟t leave the exercise prematurely !
o
(…)
Date: 07-11-2014
In case of problems :
=>address you to the responsible (+ colour
pinafore)
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8.6.8. List of improvements
1) To be completed by the management of the exercise:
Observations
Recommandation
Date
Signature of Dir Ex
2) To be validated and to be completed by the safety advisory board:
Validation
 YES
 NO – reason
Actions to be taken
To be carried out by
Implementation period
Budgetary implications
Date
Signature of the president
3) to be completed by the official responsible for the emergency planning:
 YES
Satisfied
 NO – reason
Date
Signature of the official
Date: 07-11-2014
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8.6.9. Practical conventions (structure) – Check-list
Table of contents
1. General framework
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Mandate
General objectives
Exercise
1.3.1 Name
1.3.2 Period
1.3.3 Type
1.3.4 Topic (optional)
Organization
1.4.1 Management of the Exercise
- Steering Committee
- Controllers and operators
1.4.2 Evaluation of the exercise
- Evaluators
1.4.3 Observers (optional)
1.4.4 Participants (Disciplines / Services)
- With use of resources
- Without use of resources
1.4.5 Non-participating (Disciplines / Services)
1.4.6 Non-participating but simulated (Disciplines / Services) (optional)
Communication Policy
- Local population
- Media
- Curious people
2. Progress of the exercise
2.1
Scenario
2.2
Timing
2.3
Location(s) of the exercise
2.4
Agreements
2.4.1 Use of the (written and oral) messages
2.4.2 (...)
2.4.3 Identification of the non-actors
2.5
Start of exercise
Date: 07-11-2014
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2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3.
3.1
2.5.1 Modalities (announcement signal)
2.5.2 Arrangement of the locations
2.5.3 Positioning of the actors: place, date and time
Interruption of exercise
2.6.1 Modalities of interruption and restart (code word / signal and communication scheme)
2.6.2 Redirection of the actions
2.6.3 Real incident
2.6.4 Real intervention
End of the exercise
2.7.1 Modalities (code word / signal and communication scheme)
2.7.2 Action of the participants (immediate debriefing)
2.7.3 Restore the locations in their former state
Resources and communication scheme
Measures taken in relation to the (real) press
3.3
3.4
General information
Recommandations for the participants
3.1.1 Conduct
- motivation
- respect for the infrastructure
3.1.2 Restrictions of the access and of the actions
Logistics
3.2.1 Transportation / parking
3.2.2 Clothing
3.2.3 Equipment
3.2.4 Supplies
Security
Insurance
4.
4.1
4.2
4.3
Specific information per service
Specific objectives (optional)
Used resources (personnel and materiel)
Additional explanations (optional)
5.
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
Annexes
Glossary and abbreviations
List with useful data (personnel and locations)
Cartography and photos
Models of specific transmission documents for the exercise
Models of transit certificate
…
3.2
Date: 07-11-2014
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8.6.10 Practical conventions (transfer letter)
conventions (transfer letter)
Practical conventions (transfer letter)
Heading
Place, date
To the recipients of the emergency and
intervention plan of the province / town /municipality
SUBJECT: Emergency and intervention plan province / town / municipality ……. Exercise “Name”
Dear Sir, Madam,
I wish to inform you that, pursuant to (article … of a legal text, regulation, resolution,….), an
exercise designed to test our Emergency and Intervention Plan will take place in (location) on
(date) from (starting time) to (end time).
This test will consist of a field exercise in which all or a portion of the different emergency services
will be involved.
Enclosed you will find the clauses in connection with this exercise. May I ask you to make your
staff aware of the content? These clauses are very strictly applied.
If you would like to have additional information, you are free to address your questions to the
director of the exercise (Dir Ex) or to the representative of your discipline who is member of the
Steering Committee.
Yours Faithfully,
The Governor / Mayor,
Date: 07-11-2014
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9
ANNEXES
9.1 Operational agreement on the use and management of cross-border radio
communication means in the “Zone de Défense Nord” in France, and the border area
with this zone in Belgium (13-11-2013)
9.2 Radio procedure for ISITEP demonstrations
Date: 07-11-2014
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FRENCH-BELGIAN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION ON POLICE AND CUSTOMS
ISSUES
RADIO COMMUNICATION OPERATIONAL WORKING GROUP
OPERATIONAL AGREEMENT
ON THE USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CROSS-BORDER RADIO COMMUNICATION
MEANS
IN
THE ‘ZONE DE DÉFENSE NORD’ IN FRANCE,
AND
THE BORDER AREA WITH THIS ZONE IN BELGIUM
*
*
*
Operational Agreement BF – Border dispatch centres – date of the version: 13 November 2013
The purpose of this Agreement is to establish a procedure for the use of radio interoperability means
by the dispatch centres of the police services of the Belgian provinces of West Flanders and
Hainaut and the French departments of Nord and Aisne.
1.
Legal framework
The Tournai Agreement of 5 March 2001 on cross-border police and customs cooperation
established a Strategic Committee and an Operational Working Group. This working group
is made up of a ‘radio communication’ sub-group whose task is to interconnect the three
existing radio networks.
2.
Goal
This Agreement aims to improve, facilitate, exchange and optimise fast communication of
information between police dispatch centres in the border area so as to increase efficiency
and safety in the context of the fight against cross-border crime, through the use of the
DSEC interoperability radio communication system (‘DESC suitcase’) made available by
the ‘Région de gendarmerie’ of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais departments and installed at the
premises of the ‘CCPD1 Tournai’.
The DESC suitcase allows the border police dispatch centres listed in section 3 below to
communicate directly with each other using radiotelephony. So it makes it possible to
combine the ASTRID (Integrated Belgian Police), RUBIS (French Gendarmerie) and
ACROPOL (French National Police) networks into a single talk group designated and
established for this purpose.
3.
Services concerned
3.1.
Services common to both countries:
the ‘CCPD1 Tournai’, in Tournai
3.2.
In Belgium:
3.2.1.
At the level of the Federal Police:
3.2.1.1.
the ‘CIC2 WVL’, located in the province of West-Vlaanderen (West Flanders), city of
Brugge (Bruges),
3.2.1.2.
the ‘CIC2 HAI’, located in the province of HAINAUT, city of Mons.
3.2.2. At the level of local police zones (‘zones de police locale’), the autonomous dispatch centres
of the following police zones:
3.2.2.1.
In the Flemish Region (Dutch-speaking):
3.2.2.1.1. the WESTKUST police zone,
- which is responsible for the municipalities of De Panne, Koksijde and Nieuwpoort,
-
and has its headquarters in Koksijde (Coxyde);
3.2.2.1.2. the ARRO IEPER police zone,
- which is responsible for the municipalities of Heuvelland, Ieper, LangemarkPoelkappelle, Mesen, Moorslede, Poperinge, Staden, Vleteren, Wervik and
Zonnebeke,
- and has its headquarters in Ieper (Ypres);
3.2.2.1.3. the GRENSLEIE police zone,
- which is responsible for the municipalities of Ledegem, Menen and Wevelgem,
- and has its headquarters in Menen (Menin);
3.2.2.2.
In the Walloon Region:
3.2.2.2.1. the MOUSCRON police zone,
- which is responsible for the municipality of Mouscron,
- and has its headquarters in Mouscron;
3.2.2.2.2. the TOURNAISIS police zone,
- which is responsible for the municipalities of Antoing, Brunehaut, Rumes and
Tournai,
- and has its headquarters in Tournai;
3.2.2.2.3. the BORAINE police zone,
- which is responsible for the municipalities of Boussu, Colfontaine, Frameries,
Quaregnon and Saint-Ghislain,
- and has its headquarters in Saint-Ghislain.
3.3.
In France:
3.3.1.
Aisne):
At the level of the ‘Région zonale de gendarmerie’ Nord (‘Groupements’ Nord and
3.3.1.1.
the CORG3 of the ‘Groupement’ Nord,
3.3.1.2.
the CORG3 of the ‘Groupement’ Aisne.
3.3.2.
At the level of the ‘Direction départementale de la sécurité publique’ (DDSP) of the Nord
department:
the ‘CIC4 LILLE’, which is the dispatch centre of the DDSP of the Nord department.
At the level of the ‘Direction zonale de la police aux frontières’ (DZPAF):
3.3.3
the CIC4 of the DZPAF, in Lille.
3.2.4. At the level of the ‘Direction zonale’ of the CRS:
-
the CIC4 of the DZCRS, located in Lezennes, for matters relating to motorways.
4.
Scope of the Agreement – Purposes for which the common talk group may be used
The use of the common talk group within the context of information provision is motivated
by the events mentioned in the ‘Tournai Agreement’.
A limitative list of events giving rise to the use of the common talk group is contained in the
Annex to this Agreement.
This Annex may be changed following periodical assessments.
The ‘Last Update’ date should be mentioned on it.
5.
Rules for the use of radio communication means
5.1.
Communications monitoring
5.1.1
The interoperability suitcase installed at the premises of the ‘CCPD1 TOURNAI’ is
activated on a permanent basis.
5.1.2
The French ‘conférences’ and the Belgian talk group which have been combined and put
into operation to this end and the services concerned are the following:
5.1.3
As for the ASTRID network:
« CO B-F 1 », which is permanently monitored by the ‘CIC2 HAI’ (in Mons), the ‘CIC
WVL’ (West Flanders, Brugge) and the ‘CCPD1 TOURNAI’.
This talk group shall also be monitored by the dispatch centres of the autonomous police
zones mentioned in section 3.2.2. above.
5.1.4
As for the RUBIS network:
‘Conférence 198’, monitored by the ‘CORG3 59’, in Villeneuve d’Ascq, and by the ‘CORG3
02’, in Laon.
5.1.5
As for the ACROPOL network:
‘Conférence 111’, monitored by the ‘CIC4 DDSP59’ in Lille, the CIC4 of the DZPAF in Lille
and the ‘CIC4 autoroutier’ of the DZCRS Nord in Lezennes.
5.2.
Communications transmission
5.2.1. The working language of the common talk group is French.
5.2.2. The Belgian police zones mentioned in section 3.2.2.1. shall take the necessary measures to
make use of the French language whenever they use this common talk group, although this
is not compulsory. If needed, they shall seek support from their provincial CIC2 (‘CIC
WVL’), which shall use the appropriate internal processes if necessary.
However, French-speaking services are requested to speak slowly and clearly and to use
standard vocabulary whenever the message they transmit is also intended to Dutch-speaking
services (see section 3.2.2. above).
5.2.3. There is no obligation to follow specific radio procedures; if needed, the NATO alphabet
shall be used.
5.2.4. Any initial message shall always be preceded by a notice following the example below:
‘De X à TOUS (ou à Y, Z), message transfrontalier dans 30 secondes’.
This message does not require any acknowledgement of receipt (ACK), yet it should make it
possible for the dispatch centres concerned to take the necessary measures to receive the
expected message properly.
So the main message should be transmitted 30 seconds after the notice.
If they deal with the same issue, the following messages shall no longer be preceded by a
notice.
Except for cases when the transmitted message is directly and primarily addressed to another
dispatch centre, the receipt of the message shall only be confirmed (ACK) to the sender by
the following dispatch centres, in the order mentioned in section 5.3. below:
- for Belgium: ‘CIC2 WVL’ and ‘CIC2 HAI’,
- for France: ‘CORG3 59’ and ‘CIC4 DDSP 59’.
However these four dispatch centres shall make sure that their geographical partners have
also received the above-mentioned message.
5.2.5. Additional information:
5.2.5.1.
The common talk group may only be activated by one of the dispatch centres
mentioned in section 3; it shall in no way be activated by a field team.
5.2.5.2.
Field teams should be managed by their own dispatch centre using a distinct talk
group.
5.2.5.3.
It is strictly forbidden to combine the cross-border talk group (‘CO B-F 1’) with a
talk group specific to a zone or a service or with a district talk group.
5.3.
Call-signs used:
The call-signs used by the various partners are the following:
‘CCPD1 Tournai’ = CETOUR (should be pronounced as ‘SéTOUR’)
‘CIC2 WVL’, in Brugge (Bruges) = CIWES (should be pronounced as ‘CIWèS’)
‘CIC2 HAI’, in Mons = CINAU (should be pronounced as ‘SiNo’)
‘CORG3 59’, in Lille = ROMEO 220
‘CORG3 02’, in Laon = WHISKY 230
‘CIC4 DDSP59’, in Lille = TN 59 (should be pronounced as ‘TéHène’)
‘CIC4 DZPAF’ = TOURVILLE (should be pronounced as ‘TourVil’)
‘CIC4 DZCRS’ = RABOT (+ RABOT 5) (should be pronounced as ‘RaBo’)
‘ZP5 WESTKUST’, in Koksijde (Coxyde) = WESKUS (should be pronounced as
‘WèSKus’)
‘ZP5 ARRO IEPER’, in Ieper (Ypres) = ARIE (should be pronounced as ‘ARI’)
‘ZP5 GRENSLEIE’, in Menen (Menin) = GRENSLEIE (should be pronounced as
‘GRèNSLèïE’)
‘ZP5 MOUSCRON’, in Mouscron = DINA
‘ZP5 TOURNAISIS’, in Tournai = TOBRA
‘ZP5 BORAINE’, in Saint-Ghislain = BORA
5.4.
Miscellaneous:
5.4.1. Weekly testing of the system:
5.4.1.1 The aim of these tests is to make sure, in a non-directly operational context, that all
members (see section 5.3 above) are connected to the network and that this network is
technically and operationally functional.
5.4.1.2.1 The common talk group shall be tested once a week, on TUESDAYS, between
9 am and 11 am.
5.4.1.2.2 The tests shall be carried out by the four reference dispatch centres in four-month cycles,
irrespective of the year, according to the schedule below:
- January – May – September: ROMEO 220
- February – June – October: CINAU
- March – July – November: TN 59
- April – August – December: CIWES
5.4.1.3 Whenever such tests are carried out, ALL members of the common talk group shall confirm
(ACK) to the sender that they have received the test.
5.4.1.4 These tests are always to be carried out.
5.4.1.5 Way of carrying out of these tests: see Annex
5.4.2 Operational messages (outside the context of tests):
5.4.2.1 Messages to the whole network:
5.4.2.2 Rapid communication and reliable message reception are vital.
5.4.2.3 Procedure for sending an operational message: see Annex
5.4.2.4 Whenever a message is sent in an operational context by any of the dispatch centres
mentioned in section 5.3, only the four reference dispatch centres (see 5.2.4) shall confirm (ACK)
the receipt of the message.
It is the responsibility of these four dispatch centres to make sure that the other dispatch centres
which are part of their geographical remit have also received this message.
5.4.3
Coordinated missions (e.g. FIPA10) – whether (inter)national or limited to one local
geographical area, whether or not subject to an ‘OPT’ (‘ordre particulier de transmission’) –
shall always use other means of communication than the common group.
However these missions shall always be notified to the dispatch centres mentioned in section
3 by means of an information message sent by the dispatch centre on whose territory these
coordinated missions are to be carried out.
The end of the mission shall also be communicated.
5.4.4
For operational reasons, ‘conférence 111’, which is usually connected to the common talk
group, may be temporarily disconnected from the network in response to a request made by
the French DDSP to the CCPD1.
The body having made this request shall always inform all the members of the network of
this temporary disconnection and of the planned end date of this measure.
5.5 Equipment and maintenance in operational condition
An interoperability radio suitcase (the so-called ‘DESC’) has been installed at the premises
of the ‘CCPD1 Tournai’.
The maintenance in operational condition of this equipment is ensured by the Gendarmerie’s
specialists.
An emergency service is provided.
A second suitcase (GGD 59/SSIC), which has been installed at the premises of the
Gendarmerie in Villeneuve d’Ascq, is not operated and is used for maintenance.
The equipment needed for each network shall be provided by the recipient entities, which
undertake to replace defective equipment within the shortest possible period of time.
Under no circumstances the Gendarmerie shall be liable for any malfunction.
No fees may be requested from or by the Gendarmerie for the use of any frequency needed
to make the valise DESC work.
6.
CCPD1 Tournai
The information which border dispatch centres directly share via radio communications shall
also be transmitted to the CCPD1. In fact, the ‘CCPD1 Tournai’ is permanently listening, but
it does not participate in radio communications, except when it is clear that legal obligations
are breached.
7.
Heads and focal persons of official bodies
In order to make sure that the DESC suitcase is used and managed properly, each of the
signatory parties shall designate a focal person to report to the authorities.
In Belgium, these persons are the heads of the CIC2’s of the provinces of West-Vlaanderen
(West Flanders) and Hainaut and, once the talk group ‘CO B-F 1’ has been integrated into
the radio devices of the dispatch centres of the local police zones, the respective heads of
police corps (‘chefs de corps’).
In France, these persons are:
- at the level of the Gendarmerie: the commanding officers of the ‘Groupements’ Nord and
Aisne,
- at the level of the National Police: the ‘directeur départemental’ of the ‘Sécurité Publique’
of the Nord department.
8.
Support, arbitration and assessment Committee
8.1
A support and arbitration committee shall be set up to ensure that the common talk group is
properly used by the dispatch centres mentioned in section 3.
8.2
In the event of manifest and continuous non-compliance with the rules by one of the
partners, the above-mentioned Committee may deny access to (and use of) the talk group for
a specific period of time, which is technically feasible.
8.3.
An assessment committee made up of one representative of each of the dispatch centres
mentioned in section 3 shall be set up to assess the areas of use of the talk
group/’conférence’ as mentioned in section 4 as well as this operational Agreement.
8.4
Statistics on the use of the cross-border network may be provided by the telematic officer
of West-Vlaanderen.
The dispatch centres and their management may maintain other statistics, e.g. on the number
of calls received by the system, the reasons for these calls and the outcome of these calls.
A summary of these statistics may be presented at the annual meeting of the Strategic
Committee of the Tournai Agreement.
8.5
Depending on the issues, the following parties may also be involved in the support and
arbitration committee:
-
A representation from the ‘CCPD1 Tournai’;
-
For Belgium:
o the central service ‘CGOO6’ (‘Département Opérations’, on which the ‘CIC2
WVL’ and ‘CIC HAI’ structurally and hierarchically depend),
o the techniqual service ‘DTRC7’ (‘Département des Télécommunications’, on
which the ‘CIC2 WVL’ and ‘CIC HAI’ technically depend, but also, under certain
conditions, the concerned police zones),
o a representation (French-speaking and/or Dutch-speaking) of the ‘Directeurs
coordinateurs administratifs d’arrondissements’,
o a representation (French-speaking and/or Dutch-speaking) of the ‘CPPL’8;
-
For France:
o the technical services of the Gendarmerie,
o the technical services of DDSP.
9.
Application of the Agreement
The signatories of the Agreement undertake to respect and duly implement these
recommendations. Each of the parties may at any time revoke this Agreement.
This shall take effect from the date of signature.
Done at Lille on 19 November 2013,
Mr Didier PERROUDON
xxx
Inspecteur Général,
Directeur Départemental of the Sécurité
Publique of the Nord department
Mr Nicolas GERAUD
xxx
Général de division,
Commanding officer of the Région de
gendarmerie Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Zone de
défense et de sécurité Nord
Mr Daniel DUBOIS
xxx
Contrôleur Général,
Directeur Zonal
of the Compagnies Républicaines de sécurité
Nord
Mr Patricio MARTIN
xxx
Commissaire divisionnaire,
Directeur zonal
of the Police aux Frontières of the Zone
Nord
Mr Janvier DE WINTER
xxx
Commissaire divisionnaire
Belgian coordinator of the ‘CCPD1 Tournai’
Mr Philippe PATISSON
xxx
Commissaire divisionnaire
French coordinator of the ‘CCPD1 Tournai’
Mr Luc D’HOEST
xxx
Dirco9 of Kortrijk (Courtrai), on behalf of the
Directeurs coordonnateurs administratifs of
West-Vlaanderen (West Flanders)
Mr Eddy MAILLET
xxx
Dirco9 of Tournai,
on behalf of the directeurs coordonnateurs
administratifs of Hainaut
Mr Nicolas PAELINCK
xxx
Chef de corps of the ZP5 Westkust, on behalf
of the CCPL8 and the chefs de corps of the
Flemish Region
Jean-Michel JOSEPH
xxx
Chef de corps of the ZP5 Mouscron, on
behalf of the CCPL8 and the chefs de corps
of the Walloon Region
Mr David CAMERLYNCK
xxx
Directeur of the ‘CIC2 WVL’, province of
West-Vlaanderen (West Flanders)
Mr Claude JACQUARD
xxx
Directeur of the ‘CIC2 HAI’,
province of Hainaut
Glossary:
CCPD1:
‘Centre de Coopération Police-Douane’ [police and customs co-operation
centre]
CIC2:
‘Centre d'Information et de Communication’ [information and communication
centre] (Belgian Integrated Police)
CORG3:
‘Centre Opérationnel et de Renseignements de la Gendarmerie’ [operational
and intelligence centre of the Gendarmerie] (French Gendarmerie)
CIC4:
Centre d'Information et de Commandement [command and information
centre] (French police)
ZP5:
Zone de police [police zone] (Belgian Integrated Police)
CGOO6:
Direction de l’Information policière opérationnelle [directorate of
operational police information] (Belgian Integrated Police)
DTRC7:
Direction de la Télématique et des Radiocommunications [directorate of
telematics and radio communications] (Belgian Integrated Police)
CPPL8:
Commission Permanente de la Police Locale [standing committee of the
local police] (Belgian Integrated Police)
Dirco9:
Directeur Coordonateur Administratif [administrative coordinating director]
Annex to section 4 of the Operational agreement on the use and management of cross-border radio
communication means in the ‘Zone de défense nord’ in France,
and the border area with this zone in Belgium
Purposes for which the common talk group may be used:
During cross-border pursuits (the use of the common talk group is then compulsory)
Serious crimes offences requiring immediate police response and for which there are
investigation elements (e.g. license plate, even incomplete, and/or type of vehicle used,
description of the perpetrators, direction in which they fled, etc.), such as escapes,
abductions, violent thefts, etc.
Problems with illegal immigrants aboard lorries, reported by lorry drivers calling 112 –
101 – 17
Disasters such as explosions, fires or other catastrophes that occur near the border and
may have an impact on the other side of the border ; in this type of situation, each
dispatch centre manager must assess the urgency, the level of threat and the scope of the
event police services have to deal with
Planned cross-border operations, for coordination purposes between the dispatch centres
Public order events having an impact on both sides of the border (e.g. blockade of the
motorway by lorry drivers on the border)
Annex to section 5.4.1 of the Operational agreement on the use and management of cross-border
radio communication means in the ‘Zone de défense nord’ in France,
Way of carrying out the communication test (or ‘radio check’):
1.1 Warning message:
‘De XXX à TOUS: test de communication (or ‘radio check’) dans quelques instants’.
1.2 Call (about 30 seconds after the warning message):
‘De XXX à TOUS: test de communication (or ‘radio check’) maintenant.
‘CETOUR: radio check?
(wait for CETOUR’s answer and confirm the quality of the test)
(ditto for the other calls)
‘CIWES: radio check?
‘CINAU: radio check?
‘ROMEO 220: radio check?
‘WHISKY 230: radio check?
‘TN 59: radio check?
‘TOURVILLE: radio check?
‘RABOT: radio check?
‘+ RABOT 5: radio check?
‘WESKUS: radio check?
‘ARIE: radio check?
‘GRENSLEIE: radio check?
‘DINA: radio check?
‘TOBRA: radio check?
‘BORA: radio check?
1.3 End of the test:
‘De XXX à TOUS: fin de test maintenant.’
1.4 REMARK:
- If one of the members of the network does not answer when he is called, a second attempt
shall be made to contact him before moving on to the next member;
- If the member does not answer after this second attempt, the next member on the list shall be
called.
Members who do not answer after this second attempt shall be called again at the end of the
test.
If necessary, a second attempt shall then be made to call them.
- If no contact at all can be made, the head of the dispatch centre which has made the call shall
contact the defaulting dispatch centre later and by another channel in order to address the
problem.
Annex to section 5.4.2 of the Operational agreement on the use and management of cross-border
radio communication means in the ‘Zone de défense nord’ in France,
Procedure for sending an operational message:
1. Message to the whole network:
If possible, the message shall be sent in the following way:
a. ‘De XXX à TOUS, message transfrontalier dans 30 secondes’.
b. Thrity seconds later:
‘De XXX à TOUS, [content of the message]’
‘ACK: CIWES?
‘ACK: CINAU?
‘ACK: ROMEO 220?
‘ACK: TN 59?’
c. The following messages shall be formulated in a way that best guarantees their emission and
reception.
2. Message to an individual member:
2.1
Whenever an operational message is sent by any of the dispatch centres mentioned in
section 5.3 to a single member of the network, the receipt of the message shall be confirmed
(ACK) by this member only. The other dispatch centres should only listen ‘for information’
and have no obligation to react.
2.2
If possible, the message shall be sent in the following way:
a. ‘De XXX à YYY, message tranfrontalier individuel dans 30 secondes.’
b. Thirty seconds later:
‘De XXX à YYY, [content of the message]’
‘This message is also sent to the other dispatch centres for information only.’
‘ACK: YYY?’
c. The following messages shall be formulated in a way that best guarantees their emission and
reception.
Radio procedure for ISITEP demonstrations
Contents
Radio procedure for ISITEP demonstrations ............................................................................. 1
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 2
1.1.
Uniform procedure for ISITEP demos ....................................................................... 2
1.2
Objectives ................................................................................................................... 2
1.2.1
Simplicity ........................................................................................................... 2
1.2.2
Own language ..................................................................................................... 3
1.2.3
Mandatory common radio procedure ................................................................. 3
1.2.4
Standard: NATO procedure ............................................................................... 3
1.2.5
Radio discipline .................................................................................................. 3
1.2.6
Method of Speech............................................................................................... 4
2
Definitions .......................................................................................................................... 4
2.1
Radio user ................................................................................................................... 5
2.2
Radio-operator ............................................................................................................ 5
2.3
Radio network ............................................................................................................ 5
2.4
Net control station (NCS) ........................................................................................... 5
2.5
Chief of the network ................................................................................................... 5
2.6
Call sing...................................................................................................................... 5
3
The radio network .............................................................................................................. 5
3.1
Type of net ................................................................................................................. 5
3.1.1
Free net ............................................................................................................... 5
3.1.2
Directed net ........................................................................................................ 5
3.2
Working principles ..................................................................................................... 6
3.3
Call procedure ............................................................................................................ 6
3.3.1
Principle ............................................................................................................. 6
3.3.2
Types of calls ..................................................................................................... 6
4
The radio user ..................................................................................................................... 7
4.1
Attitude of the radio user ............................................................................................ 7
4.1.1
Conscious use of the radio resources ................................................................. 7
4.1.2
Discretion in radio communications .................................................................. 7
4.2
Obligations of the radio user ...................................................................................... 8
4.2.1
Three phases ....................................................................................................... 8
4.2.2
At the start of the service.................................................................................... 8
4.2.3
During the service .............................................................................................. 9
4.2.4
At the end of the service ................................................................................... 10
5
The use of prowords in the radio communication ............................................................ 11
5.1
General principle ...................................................................................................... 11
5.2
Procedure Words (Prowords) ................................................................................... 11
5.2.1
OVER ............................................................................................................... 13
5.2.2
OUT .................................................................................................................. 13
5.2.3
ROGER ............................................................................................................ 13
5.2.4
COME IN ......................................................................................................... 13
5.2.5
WAIT ............................................................................................................... 13
5.2.6
SAY AGAIN .................................................................................................... 14
5.2.7
I SAY AGAIN .................................................................................................. 14
5.2.8
CORRECTION ................................................................................................ 14
5.2.9
I SPELL ............................................................................................................ 14
5.2.10
BREAK ............................................................................................................ 14
5.2.11
GIVE ACK / ACK ........................................................................................... 15
5.2.12
SITREP (SITuation REPort) ............................................................................ 15
5.2.13
FLASH ............................................................................................................. 15
5.2.14
MAYDAY ........................................................................................................ 15
5.2.15
RELAY TO ...................................................................................................... 15
5.2.16
RELAY............................................................................................................. 16
5.2.17
WILCO ............................................................................................................. 16
6. Phonetic alphabet ............................................................................................................. 16
6.1.
Pronunciation of Letters. .......................................................................................... 16
6.2.
Phonetic alphabet ..................................................................................................... 17
6.3.
Pronunciation of Figures. ......................................................................................... 17
6.4.
Rules for mixed groups ............................................................................................ 18
6.5.
Punctuation ............................................................................................................... 20
9
Some helpful hints ............................................................................................................ 20
1.
Introduction
1.1. Uniform procedure for ISITEP demos
With several radio stations in one radio network, the exchange of messages is only possible if
we use a coordinated and structured method of communication. The rules to increase the
INTELLIGIBILITY, the SPEED, the SECURITY and the UNIFORMITY are fixed in the
radio procedure. The radio procedure applies to ALL the radio users.
The radio procedure forms a standard that regardless unit, mission or place of intervention
should be followed to make an integrated operation possible.
1.2
Objectives
The following objectives were aimed at the preparation of the radio procedure for the ISITEP
demos. Voice procedure is designed to provide the fastest and most accurate method of
speech transmission. All messages should be pre-planned, brief and straightforward. Ideally
messages should be written down: even brief notes reduce the risk of error. Messages should
be constructed clearly and logically in order not to confuse the recipient.
If the present radio procedures are positively tested by the ISITEP scenario players, their
adoption on European level by first responder services could be envisaged if this is validated
by the ISITEP advisory board and, subsequently, by the main European PPDR organizations
in charge of the direct cooperation.
1.2.1 Simplicity
The radio procedure must be simple to use and has to seem as natural as possible for the radio
users. It is therefore not appropriate to use a lot of codes that would go against the principle of
simplicity.
However it is necessary to determine a minimum of rules to obtain an optimal
communication. The procedure must be manageable in emergency situations where a quick,
short and clear communication is essential.
1.2.2 Own language
The procedure makes it possible to send messages in your own language but it needs to allow
the intelligibility between persons of a different language, especially in countries where
different languages are used. Normally, the conversation is conducted in the language of the
caller. During an intervention or assistance in a region where a foreign language is used, the
rules of collegiality and civility are applied.
It is prohibited to use any form of dialects.
Proper names (street, names of cities and villages, …) are NEVER translated.
1.2.3 Mandatory common radio procedure
The procedure should be identical and obligatory for all the units and the services involved in
the ISITEP demos, in the interest of the project objectives.
Additional internal needs for radio communication procedures can be arranged inside some
first respondent forces but that can‟t oblige the other units to follow those arrangements.
Any necessary additional appointments for mutual cooperation should be established and
communicated during a preliminary operational briefing
1.2.4 Standard: NATO procedure
The basic procedure for the ISITEP demos is based on the NATO procedure. That means that
in case of doubt or problems we fall back on the NATO procedure. She is also internationally
known as the standard for operational needs in an international context.
A first responder force doesn‟t need to invent some rules or codes that are already available in
the NATO procedure.
1.2.5 Radio discipline
Radio discipline is a fundamental ingredient of voice procedure without which a radio net
cannot function efficiently. In addition to reducing communications efficiency and accuracy,
inadequate radio discipline can result in a serious degradation of security standards.
It is the commander‟s responsibility to impose and maintain discipline on a radio net. A
commander may choose to exercise that responsibility through the control station. All radio
nets or links must have a designated control station. In the absence of instructions to the
contrary, the control station is that station serving the senior headquarters or location.
During difficult conditions, net efficiency can deteriorate even more rapidly if the control
station permits poor operating standards.
1.2.5.1
Rules for radio discipline
The following rules for radio discipline are mandatory on all radio nets. Every station must
adhere to the following.
Always:
(1) Use correct voice procedure.
(2) Maintain a constant listening radio watch unless specific instructions or permission has
been received to the contrary. This requires that at least one person be nominated to monitor
the radio regardless of the circumstances. All aspects of voice procedure are based on the
assumption that stations will respond to the call immediately.
(3) Ensure that the correct frequency (communication group) is in use.
(4) Answer calls in the correct order and without delay.
(5) Listen carefully before transmitting to ensure that the frequency (communication group) is
clear and, where possible allow for stations which cannot be heard.
(6) Release the pressel switch (PTT – Push to Talk) promptly.
(7) On releasing the pressel switch, ensure that the radio returns to the receive condition.
(8) Perform a radio check at regular intervals
(9) Report the entering and the leaving of the network
(10) Follow the guidelines of the chief of the network who manages the traffic on the network
Never:
(1) Violate radio silence.
(2) Compromise classified information by unauthorised plain language disclosure.
(3) Make unnecessary or unduly long transmissions.
(4) Engage in unofficial conversation or operator‟s chat.
(5) Speak faster than the station experiencing the worst reception conditions can be expected
to receive, thus avoiding needless repetition.
(6) Show loss of temper or resort to profane language.
Every radio user is responsible to keep the radio network as „clean‟ as possible. The radio
network is intended to send operational and relevant information in a pragmatical manner to
the correct recipients.
1.2.6 Method of Speech.
The key words to remember are Rhythm, Speed, Volume and Pitch (RSVP).
1.2.6.1
Rhythm.
Use short sentences divided into sensible phrases which maintain a natural rhythm; they
should not be spoken word by word. Where pauses occur, the pressel should be released to
minimize transmission time and permit stations to break in when necessary.
1.2.6.2
Speed.
Speak slightly slower than for normal conversation. Where a message is to be written down
by the recipients, or in difficult conditions, extra time should be allowed to compensate for the
receiving station experiencing the worst conditions. Speed of transmission is easily adjusted
by increasing or decreasing the length of pauses between phrases, as opposed to altering the
gaps between words; the latter will create an unnatural, halted style of speech, which is
difficult to understand.
1.2.6.3
Volume
The volume should be as for normal conversation. Shouting causes distortion.
1.2.6.4
Pitch
The voice should be pitched slightly higher than normal conversation to improve clarity.
2
Definitions
Within the radio procedure, we make a distinction between:
 Radio user – radio operator – chief of the network
 who are working in a radio network
 that is managed from a network control station
 and where we make use of call signs
2.1
Radio user
The radio user is a person who uses the available telecommunication means (= radios) to
communicate with other radio users.
2.2
Radio-operator
He occupies a central position in the communication network. He arranges and coordinates
the traffic of the communications on his network.
2.3
Radio network
A radio network is a set of radio transceivers (radio stations) that operate in the same
communication group (or talk group) or on the same frequency.
2.4
Net control station (NCS)
The net control station is the place where one manages the traffic on the network and where
they ensure the correct use of the radio procedure. The NCS is also responsible for
maintaining security on its net.
In general, the net control station is called the dispatching.
In exceptional situations or during operations on the field the net control station can be the
commanding post..
2.5
Chief of the network
This is a radio operator who is designated to manage and lead an entire radio network.
2.6
Call sing
Each radio user (individual, team, station) is defined by a call sign. In the first responder
organization a lot of call signs are pre-defined.
We can distinguish:
 Individual call signs: identifying stations (addressees) separately.
 Collective call signs: identifying a predetermined group of stations (addressees).
 Net call sign: identifying all stations on a given net.
3
The radio network
3.1
Type of net
We distinguish two types of radio networks namely:
3.1.1 Free net
In this type of net, the net control station authorizes member stations to transmit traffic to
other stations in the net without obtaining prior permission from the NCS. Free net operation
does not relieve the control station from the responsibility for maintaining circuit discipline.
3.1.2 Directed net
In this type of net, stations obtain permission from the NCS prior to communicating with
other stations in the net. Permission is not required for the transmission of FLASH messages,
which shall be sent direct. Transmissions on a directed net may also be accomplished in
accordance with predetermined schedules.
A net is deemed to be a free net unless otherwise ordered.
3.2
Working principles
The network control station leads all radio traffic on its network and between the users of the
network. Access to a particular network is obtained by the „IN NET‟ reporting and leaving the
network by the „OFF NET‟ reporting.
The proper functioning of the radio traffic on the network depends on:
- the users: through the correct application of the radio procedure they guarantee an
intelligible conversation between the users
- the means: they make it possible to enter in communication with each other
- the leading: a proper management of the radio traffic by the radio operator.
3.3
Call procedure
3.3.1 Principle
To set up a call to another radio user or the network control station, we start with the call sign
of the receiving station and we end with the call sign of the calling station.
Doing so, we first draw the attention of the recipient. Only when the recipient has answered,
the message can be sent.
3.3.2 Types of calls
The call of a message serves to identify the stations between which that particular message is
being transmitted.
3.3.2.1
Single call
Only one call sign (one user or station) precedes the proword THIS IS. This may be an
individual, collective or net call sign.
3.3.2.2
Multiple call
Two or more call signs precede the proword THIS IS. These may be individual and / or
collective or net call signs. The call signs are transmitted in alphanumeric order and the
recipients answer in the same order.
3.3.2.3
General call
All the users or stations on the network are called.
The sequence of answers is identical to that in a multiple call.
If a collective call sign is used and there are exempted addressees in the message, such
addressees can be exempted in the call by use of the proword EXEMPT followed by the call
sign of the stations exempted.
3.3.2.4
Form of the call
The call may take one of the following forms:
(1)
Full call:
ALFA ONE
- call sign of receiving station
THIS IS
ALFA
- call sign of transmitting station
(2)
Abbreviated call:
The call sign of the called station may be omitted when a call is part of an exchange of
transmissions between stations and no ambiguity will result.
THIS IS
ALFA
- call sing of transmitting station
For speed of working and when conditions are good, particularly on large nets, the receiving
station may omit the proword THIS IS when responding to a call or receipting for a
transmission.
When two stations are in continuous communication with each other on a net not shared by a
third station, the call may be omitted entirely, provided no confusion would result.
The call may contain:
 Individual call signs
 Collective call signs
 A combination of both individual and collective call signs.
 Net call signs
4
The radio user
4.1
Attitude of the radio user
4.1.1 Conscious use of the radio resources
The radio user should be aware of the importance of his telecommunication means for the
proper execution of his mission. They offer him the opportunity to interact with other radio
users and sometimes they are the only link with the colleagues and the network control
station.
The radio user has to use this means in a correct and logical manner.
Examples of use:
- identifications
- provide important operational information
- call for reinforcements
- the warning of other emergency services
- …
4.1.2 Discretion in radio communications
Through the telecommunication means, the first responder officer has access to confidential
and specific job related information. The professional secrecy must be strictly respected.
Due to its quick and easy use, the radio is a very efficient means of telecommunication.
The first responder officer has to take into account that other persons eventually can intercept
the messages.
Principles to be applied:
- Limit the important information that you sent to a strict minimum
- Consider the use of prearranged code words
- Agreed code words have to be changed regularly
- Limit the audio level of your radio equipment
- In the presence of third parties, use the „silent procedure‟ to safeguard the
confidentiality. Put the volume of the external loudspeaker to a minimum or put it off
and listen via the discrete speaker of your radio to the message. The network control
station can ask you to switch to the silent procedure if the nature of the message that
compels (example: controlled person is known as being dangerous)
4.2
Obligations of the radio user
4.2.1 Three phases
During the service of a radio user we can distinguish three phases in which his obligations
differ:
- at the START of the service
- DURING the service
- at the END of the service
4.2.2 At the start of the service
Each radio user should ask himself at the start of his service:
- With whom do I have to communicate ?
- What is my call sign ?
- Which communication group (frequency) do I have to use ?
- Do I have all the necessary accessories (antenna, batteries, …) ?
- Are my telecommunication means in good condition ?
- Is it possible to execute my service with the available communication means ?
4.2.2.1
‘IN NET’ reporting
From the moment that a first responder officer starts his service he should make an „in net‟
reporting. In that way, the dispatching knows that an additional team is present in the
network and that it should be managed.
The IN NET reporting consists of a small message to the network control station in which the
radio user identifies himself and reveals his mission. It is also a good opportunity to test the
functioning of his equipment.
Usually the call sign is sufficient because it refers to a certain mission.
If it concerns a special mission, it is still recommended to communicate this to the dispatching
(eventually without certain details).
4.2.2.2
Radio check
In spite of the subjective nature of such a test, the goal is to check if the radio is operational
usable.
When there is some doubt about the good functioning of the radio or when the radio
connexion is really bad, the radio check can also be repeated on initiative during the service.
To indicate the operational usefulness, a predefined scale is used: it uses a pre-agreed scale of
values in which the question of whether the material can be used operationally stands central:
5/5 Operational usable
The reception is very
good. The message is
received loud and clear
The reception is good.
The message was well
understood.
The reception is
mediocre. The message is
weak but was understood.
The telecommunication means
and/or connexion is
operational usable
and/or connexion is
operational usable
and/or connexion is
operational usable
2/5 Operational unusable
The reception is so bad
that it is difficult to
understand the message.
The reception is so bad
that there is no
communication possible
No communication
and / or connection is
operationally useless
Sometimes, another scale is used. The prowords listed below are for use when initiating and
answering queries concerning signal strength and readability:
(1)
Report of Signal Strength:
LOUD
GOOD
WEAK
VERY WEAK
FADING
(2)
Your signal is very strong
Your signal strength is good
Your signal strength is weak
Your signal strength is very weak
At times your signal strength fades to such an extent that continuous
reception cannot be relied upon.
Report of Readability:
CLEAR
READABLE
UNREADABLE
DISTORTED
WITH INTERFERENCE
INTERMITTENT
The quality of your transmission is excellent.
The quality of your transmission is satisfactory.
The quality of your transmission is so bad that I cannot read you.
Having trouble reading you due to interference.
Having trouble reading you due to interference.
Having trouble reading you because your signal is intermittent.
Example:
Network control station: ALFA
Teams: ALFA ONE – ALFA TWO
ALFA - THIS IS - ALFA ONE - OVER
ALFA ONE - THIS IS - ALFA - come in - OVER
ALFA - THIS IS - ALFA ONE – RADIO CHECK - OVER
ALFA ONE - THIS IS - ALFA - loud and clear - OVER
ALFA - THIS IS - ALFA ONE - also loud and clear - OVER
ALFA ONE - THIS IS – ALFA - OUT
4.2.3 During the service
Important principles:
 Stay reachable and findable
o portable radio








o mobile radio in the vehicle with one of the colleagues who is listening to
the radio messages
o (mobile) telephone (in the case that there is no radio coverage) –
communicate in this case the number to the dispatching
Try to retain as much as possible an optimum transmission and reception site.
Portable coverage inside buildings is not guaranteed and even outdoor it is
sometimes problematic.
Respect the radio procedure and discipline
Limit your conversations to operationally relevant messages. Other messages don‟t
belong on an operational network.
Keep your messages succinctly
When leaving your dispatching area, inform your dispatching and report yourself
to the dispatcher of the new area, identify yourself
Keep your status up to date. Give regularly (for example every half hour) a
SITREP to the network control station
When you leave your vehicle during the service, switch off the communication
means (if it is possible) to prevent abuse
If you remain in the vicinity of the vehicle, adjust the volume of the mobile radio
so that unauthorized persons can‟t overhear the messages. Close the windows.
Same principle with a portable radio: control your volume.
4.2.4 At the end of the service
4.2.4.1
‘OFF NET’ reporting
At the end of the service you have to make an off net reporting so that the network control
station (or dispatcher) knows that he doesn‟t manage you anymore.
The radio user sends a short message in which he reports his call sign and that he is leaving
the network.
Example:
ALFA - THIS IS - ALFA ONE - OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA – come in – OVER
ALFA - THIS IS - ALFA ONE – End of our service, thank you for the cooperation – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA – Good night, thank you – OUT
4.2.4.2
End of service
At the end of the service, switch off all your communication means to avoid battery problems,
to prevent abuse and to maintain the confidentiality of the messages.
Bring all portable radios back inside en place the radios and the batteries in the charger. Turn
the radios off before removing the batteries.
Any problems (radio, radio coverage, …) should be reported as soon as possible to the
responsible(s).
5
The use of prowords in the radio communication
5.1
General principle
Procedure Words (Prowords). To keep voice transmissions as brief and clear as possible
standard prowords are used in place of whole sentences. Prowords are easily pronounced and
recognised words or phrases used to convey a specific predetermined meaning.
5.2
Procedure Words (Prowords)
Proword
Explanation
Prosign/ OPSIG
ACKNOWLEDGE (ACK)
An instruction to the addressee that the
message must be acknowledged
The portion of the message to which I have
reference is all that follows……
The portion of the message to which I have
reference is all that precedes…………..
I hereby indicate the separation of the text
from other portions of the message
Stations are to close down when indicated.
Acknowledgments are required
Send your message
You are correct, or what you have
transmitted is correct.
An error has been made in this transmission.
Transmission will continue with the last
word correctly transmitted.
ZEV or QSL
An error has been made in this transmission
(or message indicated). The correct version
is……
C
That which follows is a corrected version in
answer to your request for verification
This transmission is in error, disregard it.
(This proword shall not be used to cancel
any message that has been completely
transmitted and receipted
Stations called are not to answer this call,
receipt for this message, or otherwise
transmit in connection with this
transmission. When this proword is
employed, the transmission shall be ended
with the proword OUT.
The station(s) immediately following is
(are) exempted from the collective call or
from collective address
C
ALL AFTER
ALL BEFORE
BREAK
CLOSE DOWN
COME IN
CORRECT
CORRECTION
DISREGARD THIS
TRANSMISSION – OUT
DO NOT ANSWER
EXEMPT
AA
AB
BT
ZKJ
C
EEEEEEEE
EEEEEEEE AR
F
XMT
FIGURES
FLASH
FROM
I SAY AGAIN
I SPELL
NEGATIVE
(NEGAT)
NOTHING HEARD
OUT
OVER
RADIO CHECK
READ BACK
RELAY (TO)
RELAY THROUGH
ROGER
SAY AGAIN
SILENCE (Repeated
three or more times)
SILENCE LIFTED
SITREP
SPEAK SLOWER
THIS IS
TIME
Numerals or numbers follow
Precedence FLASH
The originator of this message is indicated
by the address designator immediately
following
I am repeating transmission or portion
indicated
I shall spell the next word phonetically
No. Cancel message(s) sent by the Delayed
Executive Method. (NEGAT may be used
to cancel a single message or a group of
messages awaiting execution.)
To be used when no reply is received from a
call Station
This is the end of my transmission to you
and no answer is required or expected
This is the end of my transmission to you
and a response is necessary. Go ahead,
transmit
What is my signal strength and readability;
how do you hear me?
Repeat this entire transmission back to me
exactly as received
Transmit this message to all addressees (or
addressees immediately following this
proword).
The address component is mandatory when
this proword is used.
Relay your message through call
sign………
This is a method of receipt. I have received
your last transmission satisfactorily
Repeat all of your last transmission.
Followed by identification data means
“Repeat………… (portion indicated).”
Cease transmissions on this net
immediately. Silence will be maintained
until lifted. (Transmissions must be
authenticated by use of a self authenticated
system, codeword, etc.)
Silence is lifted. (Transmissions must be
authenticated by means of self
authentication system, codeword, etc.)
Situation Report
Your transmission is too fast. Reduce speed
of transmission.
This transmission is from the station whose
designator immediately follows.
That which immediately follows is the time
Z
FM
IMI
ZUG
ZGN
AR
K
G
T or ZOF
ZOK
R
IMI
HM HM HM
ZUG HM HM
HM
QRS
DE
QTR
WAIT
or datetime group of the message.
The addressees immediately following are
addressed
for action
The identity of the station with whom I am
attempting to establish communication is
unknown.
I must pause for a few seconds
WAIT – OUT
I must pause for longer than a few seconds.
WILCO
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR SIGNAL,
UNDERSTAND IT, AND WILL
COMPLY. To be used only by the
addressee. Since the meaning of
ROGER is included in that of WILCO, the
two prowords are never used together.
The word of the message to which I have
reference is that which follows…………..
The word of the message to which I have
reference is that which precedes…………..
Communication is difficult. Transmit each
phrase (or each code group) twice. (This
proword may be used as an order, request,
or as information.)
Your last transmission was incorrect. The
correct version is…….
TO
UNKNOWN
STATION
WORD AFTER
WORD BEFORE
WORDS TWICE
WRONG
TO
AA
AS
AS AR
WA
WB
QSZ
ZWF
5.2.1 OVER
This is the end of my conversation to you and an answer is required or expected.
5.2.2 OUT
This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is required or expected.
The network is free for other radio users.
In the case of a directed net, it is the net control station that gives the OUT.
5.2.3 ROGER
I have received your last transmission satisfactorily
5.2.4 COME IN
Typically used by the chief of the network to give permission to one of the radio users of his
network to send his message.
5.2.5 WAIT
The receiver station makes clear that it isn‟t available or can‟t give an answer immediately.
From the moment the receiving station is available again, it informs the calling station.
5.2.6 SAY AGAIN
When words are missed or are doubtful, repetitions are to be requested by stations before
receipting for the message. The proword SAY AGAIN, used alone or in conjunction with
ALL BEFORE, ALL AFTER, FROM, TO, WORD BEFORE, WORD AFTER, will be used
for this purpose..
5.2.7 I SAY AGAIN
In complying with requests for repetitions, the transmitting station will identify that portion
which is being repeated. The proword I SAY AGAIN can also be used when the calling
station wishes to emphasis a particular word or phrase from the message.
Example:
ALFA ONE - THIS IS – ALFA – OVER
ALFA – THIS IS ALFA ONE – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS ALFA – Go to the Victoria street number ten – OVER
ALFA – THIS IS ALFA ONE – SAY AGAIN ALL AFTER number – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS ALFA – I SAY AGAIN ALL AFTER number – ten – OVER
ALFA – THIS IS – ALFA ONE – ROGER – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS ALFA - OUT
5.2.8 CORRECTION
When a transmitting operator makes an error (word, figure, phrases), the proword
CORRECTION will be transmitted followed by the last word, group, proword, or phrase
correctly transmitted. Transmission then continues.
The proword CORRECTION can be used in conjunction with the addition ALL BEFORE,
ALL AFTER, FROM, TO, WORD BEFORE, WORD AFTER.
Example:
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA – OVER
ALFA – THIS IS – ALFA ONE – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA – Go to the Cavendish street number 10 – CORRECTION 20 – OVER
ALFA – THIS IS ALFA ONE – WILCO – OUT
5.2.9 I SPELL
Spelling is necessary when difficult radio conditions prevent the reception of an obscure
word, or of a word or group, which is unpronounceable. Such words or groups within the text
of plain language messages may be spelt using the phonetic alphabet; they are preceded by the
proword “I SPELL”. If the word is pronounceable and it is advantageous to do so, then it
should be spoken before and after the spelling to help identify the word.
Spelling is obligatory for proper names of persons, in the case of an identification and for
number plates.
5.2.10
BREAK
The proword BREAK indicates the separation of the text from other portions of the message
or the splitting of a word.
Example:
I SPELL “VAN HEES” – Victor – Alfa – November – BREAK – Hotel – Echo – Echo - Sierra
5.2.11
GIVE ACK / ACK
An instruction to the addressee that the message must be acknowledged. The calling station
wants to be sure that his message (mission, order) has been well understood by the team(s)
that must execute the command.
The received message is repeated briefly followed by the proword ACK.
Example:
ALFA ONE – THIS IS ALFA – Arrest the person in the building – GIVE ACK – OVER
ALFA – THIS IS ALFA ONE – We are going to arrest the person – ACK – OUT
5.2.12
SITREP (SITuation REPort)
Through a sitrep, one gives an accurate description of the situation in which they find
themselves or the situation that they encounter.
A sitrep can be asked by the network control station or the radio users can give it
spontaneously.
Example:
ALFA – THIS IS ALFA ONE – SITREP - We are at the crossing of the
Drummond street and the Cobourg street, everything is calm – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS ALFA – ROGER - OUT
5.2.13
FLASH
A station having a message of higher precedence than the transmission in progress may break
in and thus suspend that transmission. All other group members know that an urgent and
important message is going to follow an they give priority to that message. The precedence
spoken three times means: “Cease transmissions immediately”. Silence will be maintained
until the station breaking in has passed the message.”
Examples:
- as a witness of a traffic accident, you need an immediate intervention of another
emergency service
- during the identification of a person, you are threatened by a group of bystanders and
you urgently need reinforcements
5.2.14
MAYDAY
The proword MAYDAY is used as an emergency message when persons are in great danger
(peril of life) and when immediate assistance is required.
If it is possible, the caller has to mention his identity, the nature of his problem and his
location.
To be sure that the call would certainly be heard and understood, the proword MAYDAY
should be pronounced three times.
5.2.15
RELAY TO
Sometimes it is impossible for a radio user to send or to receive a message because the
distance that has to be covered is too great or the chosen location isn‟t ideal. In that case a
radio station in the vicinity acts as an intermediary station and retransmits the message.
Sometimes the network control station may order a radio user to act as an intermediate station
(= relay station) if the NCS can‟t reach directly the wanted recipient.
The proword RELAY TO followed by an address designator indicates that the station called is
to relay the message to the stations indicated. When more than one station is called, the call
sign of the station designated to perform the relay will precede the proword RELAY TO.
Example:
ALFA - THIS IS – ALFA ONE – send your message – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA – RELAY TO ALFA TWO – Go to Spring road number 10 - OVER
ALFA TWO – THIS IS – ALFA ONE – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA TWO – OVER
ALFA TWO – THIS IS – ALFA ONE - RELAY FROM ALFA – Go to Spring road number 10 – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA TWO – WILCO – OVER
ALFA TWO – THIS IS – ALFA ONE – OUT
ALFA – THIS IS – ALFA ONE – Relay to ALFA TWO executed – OVER
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA – ROGER - OUT
5.2.16
RELAY
The proword RELAY used alone indicates that the station called is to relay the message to all
addressees.
5.2.17
WILCO
The proword WILCO means: I have received your message, I understand it, and will comply.
To be used only by the addressee. Since the meaning of ROGER is included in that of
WILCO, the two prowords are never used together.
If the receiving station has not understood the message or can not perform the mission than
the station has to report this immediately to the calling station so that this station can look for
another recipient to execute the mission.
Example:
ALFA ONE – THIS IS – ALFA – Go to the Woodbridge road for a scuffle in the pub “The Flying
Dutchmen” – I SPELL – Tango – Hotel – Echo – BREAK – Foxtrot – Lima – Yankee – India –
November – Golf – BREAK – Delta – Uniform – Tango – Charlie – Hotel – Mike – Echo – November
– The Flying Dutchmen – OVER
ALFA - THIS IS - ALFA ONE – WILCO – OUT
6.
Phonetic alphabet
6.1. Pronunciation of Letters.
To help identify spoken letters of the alphabet a standard phonetic word alphabet is used.
Each letter of the alphabet is represented by a uniquely pronounced word to enable consistent
and accurate pronunciation.
6.2. Phonetic alphabet
The following alphabet table shows the phonetic word equivalent of each Letter as it is
written and then as it is spoken. The underlined portion of the spoken words indicates the
syllables that require emphasis
Letter
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
Phonetic
ALFA
BRAVO
CHARLIE
DELTA
ECHO
FOXTROT
GOLF
HOTEL
INDIA
JULIETT
KILO
LIMA
MIKE
Spoken as
AL-FAH
BRAH-VO
CHAR-LEE
DELL-TAH
ECK-OH
FOKS-TROT
GOLF
HOH-TELL
IN-DEE-AH
JEW-LEE-ETT
KEY-LOH
LEE-MAH
MIKE
Letter
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
Phonetic
NOVEMBER
OSCAR
PAPA
QUEBEC
ROMEO
SIERRA
TANGO
UNIFORM
VICTOR
WHISKEY
XRAY
YANKEE
ZULU
Spoken as
NO-VEM-BER
OSS-CAH
PAH-PAH
KEH-BECK
ROW-ME-OH
SEE-AIR-RAH
TANG-GO
YOU-NEE-FORM
VIK-TAH
WISS-KEY
ECKS-RAY
YANG-KEY
ZOO-LOO
Spelling is necessary when difficult radio conditions prevent the reception of an obscure
word, or of a word or group, which is unpronounceable.
Spelling is obligatory for proper names of persons, in the case of an identification, and for
number plates.
Such words or groups within the text of plain language messages may be spelt using the
phonetic alphabet; they are preceded by the proword “I SPELL”. If the word is pronounceable
and it is advantageous to do so, then it should be spoken before and after the spelling to help
identify the word.
Example 1.
Pronounceable word – UNNA: …”UNNA- I spell, Uniform November November Alfa”.
Example 2.
Unpronounceable word or group – UTFX: …”I spell, Uniform Tango Foxtrot Xray”.
Exceptions to this rule, when letters are always spoken phonetically wherever they appear,
and without the proword I SPELL are:
(1) Call signs and Net Identification Signs (NIS)
(2) Grid references (UTMs).
(3) Authentication.
(4) DTG zone suffix/SICs.
(5) Address groups.
(6) Encrypted text.
6.3. Pronunciation of Figures.
Whenever figures are spoken in single digits over radio they are pronounced as shown in the
following table. The underline portion of the spoken words indicates the letter or syllables
requiring emphasis.
Figure
Phonetic
Spoken as
Figure
Phonetic
Spoken as
0
1
2
3
4
Examples:
Figure
23
50
146
200
1009
1630 hours
2800
12000
ZERO
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
ZE-RO
WUN
TOO
TREE
FOW-ER
5
6
7
8
9
Satisfactory conditions
Twenty three
Fifty
One hundred and forty six
Two hundred
One thousand and nine
Sixteen thirty hours
Two thousand eight hundred
Twelve thousand
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN
EIGHT
NINE
FIFE
SIX
SEV-EN
AIT
NINE-ER
Difficult conditions
FIGURES two three
FIGURES five zero
FIGURES one four six
FIGURES two zero zero
FIGURES one zero zero nine
FIGURES one six three zero hours
FIGURES two eight zero zero
FIGURES one two zero zero zero
Exceptions to this rule, when figures are always spoken digit by digit whenever they appear,
and without the proword FIGURES are:
(1) Call signs
(2) Grid references.
(3) Authentication
(4) Formal message date time groups (DTGs).
Example
ALFA ONE - THIS IS - ALFA - OVER
ALFA - THIS IS – ALFA ONE - OVER
ALFA ONE - THIS IS - ALFA
Go immediately to the FINISTERRE street – I SPELL – Foxtrot – India – November – India – Sierra
– Tango – Echo – Romeo – Romeo – Echo street number twenty for a scuffle - OVER
ALFA - THIS IS – ALFA ONE
We are going ASAP to the FINISSTERRE street number twenty - OVER
ALFA ONE - THIS IS - ALFA - ROGER - OUT
6.4. Rules for mixed groups
The rules for sending mixed letter/figure groups incorporate the same principles that apply to
sending letters and figures separately. The same information may be sent in two different
ways depending on the circumstances.
Example 1. Satisfactory conditions:
Mixed group spoken as
ACP 125 ACP one two five
Example 2. Difficult conditions or a number plate
Mixed group spoken as
ACP 125 I SPELL ALFA CHARLIE PAPA FIGURES one two five
Example3:
ALFA - THIS IS – ALFA ONE - OVER
ALFA ONE - THIS IS - ALFA - OVER
ALFA - THIS IS – ALFA ONE
Control of a vehicle with number plate – I SPELL ) Bravo – Alfa - Uniform- FIGURES ONE –
FOUR - TWO - OVER
ALFA ONE - THIS IS – ALFA - Vehicle Unknown – OVER
ALFA - THIS IS – ALFA ONE - ROGER - OUT
6.5. Punctuation
Punctuation is not to be used unless it is necessary to the sense of a message, and should
rarely be required in radio messages where the originator makes his own transmission.
Punctuation can occur more often in written informal or formal messages. When the use of
punctuation is essential, it should be written and spoken as follows:
Punctuation
Full stop/period
Comma
Slant/Oblique
Hyphen
Left-hand bracket
Right-hand bracket
Colon
Semi-colon
Question Mark
Decimal point
9
Spoken as
Full stop
Comma
Slant
Hyphen
Brackets on
Brackets off
Colon
Semi-colon
Question mark
Day-See-Mal
Symbol or Abbreviation
. PD
, CMM
/
(
Paren
) Unparen
: CLN
; SMCLN
? Ques
. Point
Some helpful hints
Prepare yourself for what you are going to tell before sending. (During the transmission, you
do not need to search for words or information).
Ensure that the dispatching knows always who you are, where you are and what you are
doing. Give the dispatching the necessary information (SITREP). The dispatching is there to
help you, if you are not sure, ask it.
Never intervene operationally without warning the dispatching.
Do not speak as long as your correspondent has not ended his message.
Keep your messages short and clear, you are not alone on the network.
Do not make personal calls on the radio.
Avoid using proper names of your colleagues on the network.
Sometimes it is advisable to repeat the most important information of the received message.
This is an additional control for both the calling and the receiving station
Press and hold the PTT key and than start the communication (wait a moment until the
channel is reserved for your communication). If not, it is possible that the first part of the
message is lost.
Don‟t press the PTT key accidentally, otherwise the network is occupied and maybe your
colleague has at that specific moment an urgent message to transmit.
Make sure that your portable radio is not in a position in the vehicle that the PTT key is
inadvertently pressed.
Hold the microphone not too close and not too far to your mouth. Talk in the direction of the
microphone.
Don‟t speak too fast and articulate well because sometimes the recipient has to write down or
to process the message.
Speak civilized and controlled.
Answer if possible in the language of the calling party. It‟s a form of politeness.

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