Between Nazism and Opportunism - UvA-DARE

Transcription

Between Nazism and Opportunism
Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS
Master Thesis Holocaust and Genocide Studies
University of Amsterdam
June 2014
Name: Sarah Weber
10418636
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate
Second Reader: Dr. Karel C. Berkhoff
2
Contents
Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................................................................5
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................................................7
1.
Introduction................................................................................................................................................................9
1.1.
Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS .....................................................................................................9
1.1.1.
Current State of Research ..................................................................................................................9
1.1.2.
Research Questions ........................................................................................................................... 15
1.1.3.
Source Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 16
1.1.4.
Approach and Structure .................................................................................................................. 18
1.2.
History of the Waffen-SS ...................................................................................................................... 20
1.2.1.
Establishment of the Waffen-SS ................................................................................................... 20
1.2.2.
Admission and Administration of Swiss Volunteers ........................................................... 24
1.3.
1.3.1.
“Swiss Renewal Movement” and Frontismus .............................................................................. 28
Nationale Front, 1933-1940 .......................................................................................................... 30
1.3.2.
Volksbund und SGAD (Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären
Demokratie, 1933-1944 ..................................................................................................................................... 31
2.
3.
Who were they? Background and Profile of the Swiss Volunteers ................................................... 34
2.1.
On Work Hunt........................................................................................................................................... 36
2.2.
National Socialists................................................................................................................................... 41
2.3.
Double Citizens ........................................................................................................................................ 48
Career Prospects .................................................................................................................................................... 52
3.1.
The Bureaucrat Dr. Franz Riedweg ................................................................................................. 54
3.2.
The Idealist Dr. Heinrich Büeler ....................................................................................................... 58
3.3.
The Military Man Heinrich Johann Hersche ................................................................................. 62
3.4.
The Nazi Johann Eugen Corrodi ........................................................................................................ 67
3.5.
The Instructor Alfred Nikles ............................................................................................................... 69
3.6.
The War Correspondent Benno Schaeppi..................................................................................... 71
3
4.
5.
Motivation and Ideological Commitment .................................................................................................... 75
4.1.
National Socialism and Anti-Semitism ........................................................................................... 77
4.2.
Anti-Bolshevism ...................................................................................................................................... 83
4.3.
Dream of a Greater Germanic Reich ................................................................................................ 86
4.4.
Opportunism ............................................................................................................................................. 90
Postwar Punishment of the Swiss Volunteers ........................................................................................... 95
5.1.
Main Legal Bases for the Verdicts .................................................................................................... 97
5.2.
Military Court Sentences ................................................................................................................... 102
5.3.
Treason Trial: Riedweg and Seventeen Co-Defendants ....................................................... 109
5.4.
The Swiss War Crime Trial: Stating an Example on Wipf Eugen...................................... 114
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................................... 120
Primary Sources ........................................................................................................................................................... 130
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................................... 143
Internet Sources ........................................................................................................................................................... 146
Appendix I ....................................................................................................................................................................... 149
Appendix II...................................................................................................................................................................... 150
Appendix III .................................................................................................................................................................... 152
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................................................... 153
4
Abbreviations
AfZ
BAR
BArch
BNSE
BRB
BTE
BSG
DSchV
EF
ES
ESAP
Grekos
GL
MStGB
NBS
NF
NJ
NS
NSDAP
RS-HA
RuSHA
SBA
SGAD
StGB
SS
SS-HA
VB
Archiv für Zeitgeschichte/ETH Zürich
Bundesarchiv Bern
Bundesarchiv Berlin
Bund Nationalsozialistischer Eidgenossen
Bundesratsbeschluss
Bund Treuer Eidgenossen nationalsozialistischer Weltanschaung
Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland
Datenschutzverordnung
Eidgenössische Front
Eidgenössische Sammlung
Eidgenössische Soziale Arbeiter Partei
Grenzpolizei Kommissariate
Germanische Leitstelle
Militärstrafgesetzbuch
Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz
Nationale Front
Nationale Jugend
National Sozialismus
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei
Reichs-Sicherheits-Hauptamt
Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt
Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft
Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer Autoritären Demokratie
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch
Schutzstaffel
SS-Hauptamt
Volksbund
5
6
List of Figures
Image Cover Page Photo of Swiss volunteers taken in Sennheim 1942
(BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2576, C.29/A116/42.1192)
Image 1 Portrait of Franz Riedweg
54
(Swiss.info Online:
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/culture/A_Swiss_in_the_service_of_the_SS.html?cid=2941
9904 [19.11.2013])
Image 2 Portrait of Heinrich Johann Hersche
62
(BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 131)
Image 3 Hersche as Cavalry Major in Bern
63
(BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.)
Image 4 Portrait of Johann Eugen Corrodi
67
(The Axis Powers Online:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=38&t=28101&start=0 [19.11.2013])
Image 5 Portrait of Alfred Nikles
69
(BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511)
Image 6 Portrait of Benno Schaeppi
71
(BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713)
Image 7 Wipf Eugen leaving the Court in 1948
114
(BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11)
7
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1. Introduction
“An meine Eltern. Sollte ich aus Russland nicht zurück kehren, meine Lieben, so nehmt dies als
letzten Gruss. Sorgt euch nicht, mein Tod sei umsonst gewesen oder verfrüht. Was sind wir als
Blätter am Baum – was tut es, wenn eins welkt oder fällt? Wenn nur der Baum wächst. Wenn das
Blatt ihm nur Wurzeln schlagen und blühen half. Denkt nicht, ich hätte das Schicksal
herausgefordert, ich hätte kühn oder aussergewöhnlich gehandelt. Ich tat nur, was alle tun. Dass
es nicht falsch war, nicht sinnlos, ist mein heiligster Glaube.“ 1
These words were expressed in a letter by a young Swiss volunteer to his parents
written from the Eastern Front. This young man had taken the decision to participate in
the war on the side of Germany and he must have felt sure that his sacrifice served a
greater interest. However, Germany lost the war and what was idealized before was
punished thereafter. So, his and many other volunteer’s story were forgotten and
suppressed, as Switzerland did not want to be associated with Nazi Germany in any way.
Hans-Rudolf Lehmann, a radio moderator, read his words for the public in a show
dedicated to the history of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS in 1977. Yet, the topic did
not attract attention, so it disappeared again from society and was only taken up
recently by academic research.
1.1. Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS
1.1.1. Current State of Research
The Holocaust and the Second World War is for the collective memory in Switzerland
not of much relevance. In continuation of a long-standing national self-image,
Switzerland saw itself after 1945 as a small neutral state, which because of its will to
resist and a clever policy managed not to be drawn into the war. The notion, that
Switzerland succeeded in preserving its institutional independence as a constitutional,
democratic and federal state in midst of the Nazi sphere seems to prevail. The Bergier
Brief des Schweizer Kriegsfreiwilligen Johannes Mettler an seine Eltern kurz vor seinem Tod, gelesen
durch Hans-Rudolf Lehman auf Ration DRS 1 in 1977, In: AfZ Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit.
1
9
report concluded in 2002 that today, Switzerland is faced with a past that has never
been incorporated into the prevailing view of history.2
Switzerland’s role in World War II has been the subject of an increasingly heated
debate since the 1970’s. Historians and publicists have published a whole series of
economic, social and political analysis of various aspects of the period from 1939-1945.
Nevertheless, in general, historical interest and enquiry in Switzerland on World War II
has concentrated much more on the war and the war economy than on the Holocaust.3
In late 1996, the debate on the gold transactions between the Swiss National Bank and
National Socialist Germany and the dormant assets of Jews in Swiss banks attracted
global attention. That is why the Swiss Parliament and the Federal Council decided to
investigate the accusations around the gold transactions. An Independent Commission
of Experts (ICE), under the direction of Jacques Bergier, was mandated to conduct a
historical investigation, bringing important, previously forgotten and suppressed issues
but also unknown aspects to light. The Bergier report, however, did not include or
mention Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS.
Research on Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS remains a research gap. So far there
is not much literature on the Swiss volunteers and the source basis remains
unorganized. A standard reference with reliable numbers and conclusions is still
missing. A Federal Assembly report to the Federal Convention in 1945, regarding
antidemocratic activities of Swiss citizens in the Reich, approached the matters of Swiss
volunteers. It recorded the numbers of Swiss in the Waffen-SS until the year 1944 as
following: 755 in the Waffen-SS, thereof 86 died in combat or missing, 52 dismissed, and
617 in the Wehrmacht.4
The German lawyer and historian Hans Werner Neulen published a standard
reference on international volunteers in the Waffen-SS and dedicated one chapter to the
Swiss volunteers. He estimated that a number of 1500 Swiss and Liechtensteiner passed
the Panoramaheim5 in total, whereby the majority arrived between summer and autumn
Bergier, J. (2002) (ed) “Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War. Final Report“. In:
Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War. Pendo Verlag: Zürich, pp. 10-25.
3 Ibid., pp. 40-45.
4 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über antidemokratische Tätigkeit von Schweizern
und Ausländern im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriegsgeschehen 1939-1945 (Motion Boerlin), 28. Dezember
1945, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945.
5 The Panoramaheim was a collection point for Swiss and Liechtenstein volunteers. Every Swiss man who
crossed the border was eventually picked up by the border control and questioned by the Gestapo. The
Gestapo in turn had orders to send the potential volunteers to the Panoramaheim, where they were either
2
10
1941. Neulen assessed that a number of 800 Swiss conscribed to Waffen-SS duty and 70
for the Wehrmacht, whereby an estimated number of 40 achieved the rank of an officer.
He furthermore estimated that 300 Swiss died in combat.6 The Swiss military
historian Vincenz Oertle published a voluminous source study on the Swiss volunteers
in the Waffen-SS in 1997 with the long title “Sollte ich aus Russland nicht zurückkehren.”
Schweizer Freiwillige an deutscher Seite 1939-1945. Eine Quellensuche.7 Oertle agreed on
Neulen’s numbers, stating that around 800 Swiss were serving in the Waffen SS-alone.
Yet, he claimed that the number of the Swiss expats joining the Wehrmacht were even
higher.8 More precise Oertle recorded the numbers from a SS-Hauptamt, SS-HA report in
1944 as following: 755 in the Waffen-SS, thereof 33 in leading position, 86 killed in
action and 52 dismissed.9
The Swiss historian Peter Mertens published an article on the Swiss volunteers in a
book about the history of Swiss as mercenary soldiers. According his research, there are
no exact numbers on the amount of Swiss volunteers within the Waffen-SS, since the
sources seem to be deficient and not clear enough in order to establish an exact picture.
Yet, he similarly estimated a number of 870 volunteers in the Waffen-SS, whereof 52 or
6.8% achieved the rank of an officer. Then again, this number only concerned Swiss men
who were living in Switzerland and left the country illegally and did not include men
with the Swiss citizenship living in Germany at that time. Furthermore, he estimated
another 1100 Swiss citizens in the Wehrmacht, whereas their degree of gratuitousness
was not clear, because of the matter of dual citizenship. The numbers did not include
Swiss who were working in civil departments or healthcare.10 Martin Gutmann from the
University of Lucerne estimated in his comparison of Danish, Swedish and Swiss WaffenSS volunteers a number of 1300 Swiss volunteers but remarked that these numbers are
hard to establish with certainty, since the estimates in various works and among the
conscribed to work service or Waffen-SS duty. The function of the Panoramaheim will be explained in
chapter 1.2.2. Organization and administration of the Swiss volunteers
6 Neulen H. W. (1985) An deutscher Seite. Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS.
Universitas: München, pp. 175f.
7 Oertle, V. (1997) Sollte Ich aus Russland nicht zurückkehren. Schweizer Freiwillige an deutscher Seite
1939-1945. Eine Quellensuche. Documenta Militaria Thesis Verlag: Zürich.
8 Ibid., pp. 12.
9 Ibid., pp. 557.
10 Mertens, P. (2006) „Schweizerische Freiwillige in der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 19381945.“ In: Fuhrer, H.R & Eyer, R. P. (Eds) Schweizer in Fremden Diensten. Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung:
Zürich, Pages 291-311, here pp. 295.
11
statistics of the SS vary widely. He pointed out that there may have in fact been many
hundreds more than hitherto account for.11
The numbers of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS seems to be relatively small
compared to other countries. Yet, relativizing these absolute numbers it is evident that
there were less volunteers coming from France or Sweden, which was neutral as well
and that the Swiss numbers therefore were quite high. Mertens explained the high rate
with the cultural and linguistic proximity of Switzerland to Germany.12 Gutmann
similarly concluded that the influence of the geographical factor was decisive, since the
border between Switzerland and Germany was flat and densely populated which
facilitated the illegal crossing.13 Another reason according to him was the political
prosecution of right wing extremism in Switzerland in 1940, in which course many left
Switzerland to Germany.
Gutmann explained the lack of basic research on the topic with the fact that after
the war, Switzerland developed a myth of resistance which he described as
militarization of the popular memory. That memory highlighted the wartime experience
to the preparedness to repel a German attack. Therefore, the Swiss soldiers who had
guarded the borders became patriots and anti-Nazis, whilst the Waffen-SS volunteers
were considered unrepresentative of their society.14 Mertens stated that the subject of
Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS long was seen as a taboo issue in Switzerland and it
has attracted little interest in the writing of the historiography of Germanic volunteers
in Germany itself.15
Oertle was the first Swiss historian who researched the history of Swiss volunteers
in the Waffen-SS extensively. In his standard reference, he chose an anecdotal approach,
focusing on the motives of the broad group of Swiss men who joined the Waffen-SS, the
Wehrmacht and the “Organisation Todt”. His study intended to encompass the entire
history of the Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS, whereby his collection of source
material offered an insight into the topic in general. Since there was no research done on
that topic beforehand, his diligent work certainly laid the foundation for further
research. Yet, Oertle’s analysis remained limited on a descriptive approach that
Gutmann, M. (2013) „Debunking the Myth of the Volunteers: Transnational Volunteering in the Nazi
Waffen-SS Officer Corps during the Second World War,” In: Contemporary European History, 22(4), Pages
585-923, here pp. 590.
12 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 301.
13 Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 590.
14 Ibid., pp. 587.
11
12
unfortunately did not link the single stories of the volunteers together. Oertle’s aim was
to study the accounts objectively in order to contribute to a sophisticated perception of
Switzerland during the Second World War. Unfortunately, his study is exactly lacking
that objectivity. For instance, he excused the participation of Swiss soldiers with their
sense for duty and long the standing tradition of the mercenary army, rather than
ideological commitment. He did not assess his cases with the necessary thoughtfulness
and trivialized their participation. Statements like: “Zunächst spielt der natürliche Drang
des Schweizers mit, einmal ins Ausland zu gehen (…)“ only underline this judgment.16
Also, he did not treat the archive findings critically, since he accepted the volunteers’
excuses in the police interrogation protocols of not being politically engaged without
relativizing it. He stated that “Gestandene Soldaten mit Prinzipien und Lebenserfahrung
machten sich eben, ganz im Gegensatz zu den Verrätertypen, zwielichtige Figuren und der
grossen Zahl jugendlich-grüner Kriegsfreiwilliger, schon Gedanken über die Konsequenzen
(…)“17 His justifications for the Swiss volunteers could originate from his personal
background, coming from a family with far reaching military background. Also, one of
his ancestor was a volunteer in the Waffen-SS.
Oertle concluded that ideological commitment or the enthusiasm to join Hitler in
the fight against Stalin was not decisive. Overall, he stated that the Swiss Waffen-SS
volunteers were mostly looking for working possibilities or adventure. 18 The volunteers
rather left because of personal reasons, such as unsuccessful marriages, liabilities,
personal resentments against the Swiss army and government, as well as adventurism. 19
Mertens did not entirely agree with Oertle. Admittedly, he stated the range of motivation
was manifold but he assessed that Oertle underestimated the role of ideological
commitment. Mertens concluded that the motivation reached from National Socialist
and anti-Communist motives, private or professional problems, escape from federal
justice, war fever, or mere thirst for adventure and that in many cases, it was the
combination of these motivation sets that enabled participation.20
Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 52.
Ibid., pp. 325.
18 Oertle, V. ( 2010) Ein Appenzeller in der Waffen-SS. Heinrich Johann Herrsche von Appenzell, Major der
Schweizer Kavallerie und SS-Standartenführer, die Légion des Volontaires Français contre le bolchevisme
und die 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Divison der SS „Charlemagne“ (franz. Nr. 1). Druckerei Appenzeller
Volksfreund: Appenzell, pp. 10f.
19 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 12-20.
16
17
13
Oertle and Mertens’ research included all the Swiss volunteers and they did hardly
distinguish between higher ranking and lower ranking volunteers. Also, they did not put
their findings into perspective by including a comparative approach. That is why
Gutmann intended to offer a more nuanced assessment on the Germanic volunteers, by
comparing the Swiss volunteers with Swedish and Danish volunteers in combat
formations of the Waffen-SS. His main focus was not motivation per se, but he rather
intended to challenge the long standing scholarly interpretation that the volunteers
were of lower-class, social outsiders of criminal inclined or mentally unstable nature. He
concluded that the research of neutral volunteers can help to formulate a more nuanced
and demythologized history of the Waffen-SS. Switzerland was not occupied so there
was no forced conscription into the Waffen-SS. Therefore, classical, pragmatic
collaboration as motive can be ruled out as motif for joining. Also, recruitment and
propaganda differed, since National Socialist organizations were more and more
restricted and forbidden.21
Whilst the complexity of the Swiss volunteers as a collective received astonishingly
little attention from the academic world, there are three bibliographies published. Oertle
wrote a bibliography on the SS-Standartenführer Heinrich Johann Hersche, wherein he
concentrated more on the battle history of the “33. Waffen-Grenadier-Divison der SS
Charlemagne”.22 Another bibliography on one of the highest ranking Swiss volunteers
was published by Marco Wyss on the person of Franz Riedweg. Wyss’s book Un Suisse au
Service de la SS – Franz Riedweg 1907-2005, described his career by assessing his role
within the “Germanische Leitstelle” (Germanic Guidance Office), GL.23 The historian
François Wisard recounted in his book Un Major Biennois dans l’ordre Noir the biography
of Johann Eugen Corrodi, who was the highest ranking Swiss volunteer. 24 The two books
are pleasant to read and offer background information on the history of the Waffen-SS,
the organization of the Waffen-SS and the role of volunteers therein as well as on the NS
organizations in Switzerland. However, they do not address the motivation at large, nor
do they include lower ranking volunteers in their assessment. Yet, their references to
archive material certainly are invaluable for further research. Lastly, Linus Reichlin, a
Swiss journalist, published a book on the Swiss volunteers. The book Kriegsverbrecher
Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 585.
Oertle 2010, Appenzeller.
23 Wyss, M. (2010) Un Suisse au Service de la SS. Franz Riedweg (1907-2005). Éditions Alphil-Presses
Universitaires Suisses: Neuchâtel.
24 Wisard, F. (1999) Un Major Biennois dans l’ordre Noir. Walter von Känel: Saint-Imier.
21
22
14
Wipf Eugen. Schweizer in der Waffen-SS, in Deutschen Fabriken und hinter den
Schreibtischen des Dritten Reiches, cannot be considered academic research, since
neither footnotes nor detailed references to the archive documents are indicated.
However, the book is written in a narrative way and therefore certainly had the capacity
to the open up the topic to a wider public.25
1.1.2. Research Questions
No single assessment approached the question on motivation satisfyingly, by
incorporating higher ranking and lower ranking volunteers equally, as well as giving
ideological commitment the necessary attention. This thesis principal aim is to assess
the motivation of the Swiss volunteers to leave Switzerland illegally and to join in the
Waffen-SS. Motivation is defined as forces acting either on or within a person to initiate
behavior. The term refers to the activating properties of the process involved in
psychological motivation.26 Hence, motivation is a personal matter, influenced by the
own situation which in turn is characterized by the personal background. That said it
has to be clear that motivation is a multifaceted characteristic that is not equally
applicable for a whole group of men. In contrary, it has to be assessed individually and
by doing so, it is possible to work out similarities or divergences. Therefore, a
biographical approach was chosen. The thesis also focuses on the personal background,
socialization, socioeconomic factors as well as the Swiss volunteers’ admission and
careers within the Waffen-SS and the role of ideological commitment as a motivation.
Moreover, the post war punishment will receive consideration. However, this thesis
does not include the military history or military actions at the front. The following
research questions will be addressed:

Who were the Swiss volunteers and under what conditions were they
socialized? Where did they come from, how old where they when they left
Switzerland and what was their family situation and educational background?
Reichlin, L. (1994) Kriegsverbrecher Wipf, Eugen. Schweizer in der Waffen-SS, in deutschen Fabriken und
an den Schreibtischen des Dritten Reiches, Weltwoche ABC Verlag: Zürich.
26 Petri, L. H. (2008) „Definition Motivation“, In: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Online:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/394212/motivation [23.05.2014].
25
15

What careers and ranks did the higher ranking volunteers achieve? What were
their qualifications that enabled their careers and to what positions where they
assigned?

What different values of National Socialism were expressed by the ideological
committed volunteers?

How did the Swiss authorities judged on the returning volunteers and what
legal bases were applied in their conviction? Which courts were dealing with the
returnees and where there differences in their jurisdiction? Did the Swiss courts
impose severe punishment on the returnees and how did the society at large
perceive the Swiss volunteers?
1.1.3. Source Discussion
To acquire the source basis for this research, various archives were visited. For the most
part, the source basis was collected in the Bundesarchiv Bern (BAR). Since Switzerland
remained independent during the war, the national police and military intelligence was
able to keep records on the Swiss volunteers. These documents from the
“Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft”, SBA (Office of the Attorney General of
Switzerland), the “Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement” (Federal Justice and
Police Department) and the “Departement für Justiz und Polizeiwesen” (Departement
for Justice and Law Enforcement) delivered the foundation for my research. The
interrogation protocols from the various police stations or from the SBA contained
personal statements on their motivation to leave Switzerland. Mostly, in the following of
their prosecution after they returned to Switzerland, the volunteers had to write down
their curriculum vitae, which in turn gave information on their personal background.
Also, the SBA collected personal letters from the volunteers to their families and friends.
The higher ranking, committed volunteers generally already engaged in NS
organizations in Switzerland, whereby their mail and correspondence often were
monitored by the authorities.
Furthermore, a visit to the former US-Document Center in Berlin, which is now
renamed Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArch) was instructive. The personal files of the Swiss
volunteers gave insight on their date of admission, ranks and career advances within the
Waffen-SS. Also, Himmler issued the “Heiratsbefehl” in 1931, which ordered a screening
16
of the SS men and their fiancées by the the “Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt”, RuSHA.27 As
a result, the SS members had to apply for a permission to get married. Next to physical
examination, the applicant had to write curriculum vitae which had to prove their
“einwandfreie Weltanschauung” (proper ideology). In the case of the Swiss volunteers,
they mostly indicated why they left Switzerland, in order to prove their ideological
commitment. Luckily, most of the files were accessible. However, there are still files that
are not accessible and therefore could not be used for this research. Article 5 paragraph
2 of the “Bundesarchivgesetz” stated that personal archive files can only be viewed 30
years after that person has died.28 That is why Vincenz Oertle was not able to have
insight in all those files. Some of the files are still kept under lock and key. However, the
accessibility was already facilitated. Unfortunately, the volunteers can only be searched
by their full name and the volunteers are not classified by nationality. That complicates
the archive search considerably, since it requires previous knowledge about the
volunteers.
Lastly, further documents on three higher ranking Swiss volunteers were collected
in the “Archiv für Zeitgeschichte/ETH Zürich” (AfZ). The archive material on Franz
Riedweg, Benno Schaeppi, and Heinrich Büeler contained personal letters, newspaper
articles as well as court files. These documents were used to write their biographies and
assess their postwar punishment. Also, the archive offered extensive information on the
administration of the Swiss volunteers in the “Germanische Leitstelle” in the “SSHauptamt”, as well as the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart, which was the collection point for
the Swiss who were picked up at the border.
In this thesis a total amount of seventeen Swiss volunteers was analyzed, whereof
ten were higher ranking and one was said to have committed war crimes. Twelve out of
seventeen were ideologically committed. In the assessment on motivation there is
always a risk of oversimplification, since it tends to freezes the motives of the
perpetrators. To find evidence on motives is problematic since it has to be relied on
interpretations. It has to be pointed out that it is of substantial importance to treat the
SS-Befehl-A-Nr.65 Verlobungs- und Heiratsbefehl durch den Reichsführer-SS, München 31. Dezember
1931, In: Schlüsseldokumente zur Deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Online:
http://www.1000dokumente.de/?c=dokument_de&dokument=0127_hei&object=context&l=de
[18.12.2013].
28 §5 Abs. 2 Bundesarchivgesetzes: „Archivgut des Bundes, das sich auf natürliche Personen bezieht, darf
erst 30 Jahre nach dem Tode der Betroffenen durch Dritte benutzt werden. Ist das Todesjahr nicht oder
nur mit unvertretbarem Aufwand festzustellen, endet die Schutzfrist 110 Jahre nach der Geburt des
Betroffenen.“
27
17
documents critically, because of the problematic involved in the objectivity of the
material. The personal statements have to be taken literally, however it has to be kept in
mind that those statements were given with the knowledge that their deeds where
crimes. Therefore the accused denied or downplayed the ideological commitment in
order to reject the accusation of treason and the interrogations by authorities created an
incentive to exonerate oneself. So, it is likely that the men were not completely honest
about the feelings and motivation they actually had. Judging on motivation and emotions
in retrospect leaves a lot of room for interpretation, since the memory on feelings is
influenced by a contemporary self understanding. This certainly altered the picture the
men had of themselves. So, the personal statements taken from interrogation protocols
are not sufficient to explain their motivation for collaboration. As a matter of fact, they
have to be complemented with additional statements originating from letters to friends
and family. These statements indicate more about the true nature of their motivation or
ideological commitment.
Records of the “Bundesstrafgericht” (Federal Criminal Court) could have given
more detailed insight. Unfortunately, these records were still under a blocking period
during Oertle’s research. The files would have been available for the research of this
thesis. However, its existence was only discovered later on in the research period and
therefore not consulted.
1.1.4. Approach and Structure
This thesis can be seen as a collection of individual cases attempting to create an overall
picture. However, the main focus is the assessment of the volunteers’ motivation to
leave Switzerland illegally and join the Waffen-SS. Special attention will be given to the
ideological committed volunteers, since previous research underestimated the role
thereof. National Socialism and Nazism have a unique usage of language and wording.
That is why the personal statements remain untranslated. The choice of words can
indicate a certain ideological commitment and give additional information on the
person.
Motivation is a personal matter an in order to understand the Swiss volunteers’
decision, it is important to introduce the individuals used this case study. Each of these
men was influenced by a different context. That is why chapter two assesses their
background, socioeconomic properties, family situation, as well as age by reference to a
18
biographical approach. In assessing the various backgrounds of the Swiss volunteers in
the interrogation protocols by the SBA or in letters, it turned out there were basically
two main motivation traits that served as guidelines in this chapter, namely work hunt
and National Socialism. Oertle and Neulen divided the volunteers’ motivation into
different groups according percentage. However, it is clear that a person did not only
belong to one category and that the division is an oversimplification, since they
possessed various aspects that overlapped. This chapter proves that the men possessed
additional motivational aspects from other categories used by Neulen and Oertle. Also,
Oertle and Neulen did not include dual citizens, because according to them, their
motivation was not clear. That is why two double citizens will be incorporated in the
study.
Chapter two shows that there are differences distinguishable between the group
National Socialist and the other ones. It seems that the ideological committed volunteers
were able to have a certain career within the Waffen-SS. That is why in chapter three a
special attention will be given to the career development of six Swiss volunteers. In this
chapter, I will argue that the possibility for these Swiss volunteers to gain a career
within the Waffen-SS was thanks to their ideological commitment to National Socialism
and their engagement in NS organizations in Switzerland. Another factor is that most of
them were already militarily educated in Switzerland. Additionally, their language
abilities, made them well respected and desired manpower. However, there were certain
types of careers and each man selected for this chapter represents a different career
type. Two of them were able to have a career within the bureaucracy of the GL, whilst
two others had an impressive career within the army. One person was engaged as an
instructor and leader of the Panoramaheim and the one other was involved in the
creation of propaganda material, as war correspondent.
Chapter two and three indicate that there was a difference between lower ranking
volunteers and higher ranking volunteers and that their motivation varied. However, the
assessment of the various career types in chapter three additionally indicates that
motivation also varied amongst the ideologically committed volunteers. That is why
chapter four further distinguishes ideological commitment as a motivation. Race
struggle and anti-Semitism are crucial aspects of German Nazism. Therefore, it will be
assessed if these matters were equally important for the Swiss volunteers.
Consequently, anti-bolshevism has to be included in the assessment as it was perceived
19
as National Socialism’s enemy ideology. Additionally, Hitler aspired a Greater Germanic
Reich in which all Germanic people would live together. Did that vision for a greater
Reich excite and influence the Swiss volunteers? Lastly, chapter three established that
the higher ranking volunteers were driven by opportunistic considerations. This is an
aspect that was not discussed by academic research so far. That is why special attention
will be given to that aspect of motivation.
The last chapter’s intention of this chapter is to assess how the Swiss authorities
judged on the returnees and on what legal base they convicted the volunteers. To
understand the sentences imposed on the volunteers, the different legal violations will
be addressed. As will be established, the Swiss volunteers were not all judged on the
same base or in the same court, since the authorities’ distinguished between the sole
violation of military law or criminal law. Therefore the various trials will be assessed.
The “common” Waffen-SS soldiers were mostly tried on the base of military law, whilst,
the higher ranking Swiss were tried separately in criminal trials for endangerment of the
Swiss neutrality and treason. Both trials will be elucidated with specific accounts from
the case studies. The question whether the Swiss authorities imposed severe
punishment is of crucial interest. Thus, it is necessary to put the findings into
perspective. Hence, in the conclusion a comparison will be drawn to the punishment
practice of other Germanic countries. Also, the criminal trials in Switzerland did not
address the question of war crimes or criminal activities of the volunteers in the WaffenSS. That is why one specific account of a potential Swiss war criminal will be given.
Chapter five furthermore intends to assess the post war perception of the returned
Swiss volunteers and how the society reacted on these men. This will be examined
through various newsletter articles.
1.2. History of the Waffen-SS
1.2.1. Establishment of the Waffen-SS
The Waffen-SS was an armed and specialized unit which emerged from the Allgemeine
SS. Bernd Wegner, a German historian and author of a standard reference on the SS,
stated that the Waffen-SS cannot be considered in isolation from the history of the SS as
a whole.29 The “Schutzstaffel” (Protection Squad) evolved within the National Socialist
Wegner, B. (1982) Hitlers Politische Soldaten. Die Waffen-SS, 1933-1945. Ferdinand Schöningh:
Paderborn, pp. 16.
29
20
movement in the Third Reich as one of the most powerful instruments of the leadership.
It was created in the early 1920s as a small unit to serve as a bodyguard for Hitler and
other important Nazi members.30 In 1927, it became highly centralized by the SS leader
Heinrich Himmler and from 1930 on, specialized divisions of the SS were formed.31
On December 14, 1934, Himmler ordered the consolidation of the “Politische
Bereitschaften” of the SS with the “SS-Leibesstandarte Adolf Hitler” into the “SSVerfügungstruppe”, which can be seen as the ancestor of the Waffen-SS.32 The “SSVerfügungstruppe” was to become a fully militarized formation, intended to serve as the
nucleus of an SS division.33 It now looked increasingly like an alternative army with a
program based on rigorous military training, physical fitness, and political
indoctrination. These values later became the corner stone of the Waffen-SS and
determined recruitment standards.34 In 1939, Himmler persuaded Hitler to establish a
new type of elite SS formation – the Waffen-SS. In fact, Hitler created a separate military
force alongside the regular state security organs, detached from the Wehrmacht and the
police that was allowed to use heavy weaponry.35
The mobilization for the Waffen-SS started in August 1939. In the beginning of the
war, the conception of the Waffen-SS was not based on the recruitment of new SS men
but on the consolidation of the various SS units and police battalions. Himmler’s idea
was to unite the various SS with different origin, equipment and standard of education
into an efficient military elite troop.36 In June 1940, the title Waffen-SS became official
and it applied to the “SS-Leibestandarte Adolf Hitler”, the “SS-Verfügungsdivision” and
the “SS-Totenkopfdivision”, which were responsible for the concentration camp guards,
the “SS-Polizeidivision”, the “SS-Junkerschulen” and all their replacement and training
units.37
Pollmar, N. & Allen, T. B. (1996) World War II. The Encyclopedia of the War Years 1941-1945”.
Randomhouse: New York, pp. 759.
31 Speer, A. (2002). “SS Schutzstaffel”. In: Benz, W. (ed) Lexikon des Holocaust. C.H. Beck: München, pp.
222f.
32 Dingel, F. (2007) „Waffen-SS“. In: Benz, W. & Graml, H. & Weiss, H. (eds) Enzyklopädie des National
Sozialismus. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag: München, pp. 862.
33 Stein, G.H. (1966) The Waffen SS. Hitler’s Elite Guard at War, 1933-1945. Cornell University Press: Ithaca,
New York, pp. 8.
34 Holmes, R. (2001) (ed) The Oxford Companion of Military History. Oxford University Press: New York pp.
867.
35 Ibid. pp. xxxi. Cf. Knopp, G. (2003) (ed) Die SS. Eine Warnung der Geschichte. Goldmann Verlag: München,
pp. 266.
36 Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 127.
37 Höhne H. (1967) Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS. Sigbert Mohn Verlag: Gütersloh,
pp. 407.
30
21
The members of the Waffen-SS joined on voluntary basis, but recruitment
standards were strict.38 The draft boards of the SS had to make sure that the racial
quality of the recruits remained guaranteed. Only tall, “racially excellent”, young
volunteers were accepted. They had to undergo extensive medical examination, whereas
the racial quality of the applicant was judged on a five-point scale.39 The scale reached
from “pure Nordic” to “presumption of non-European blood line influence” (Vermutung
aussereuropäischen Bluteinschlags).40 The restrictions on the physical standard were
even more rigorous. The applicants had to be younger than 23 years old, having a body
size of at least 1.74 meters and were not allowed to carry classes. Moreover, they had to
complete extensive athletic tests.41 A nine point scale was used to evaluate the physical
conditions. This scale was supplemented with additional exercises, judging the force,
endurance, nimbleness, velocity, and courage. Additionally, the recruits had to pass an
intelligence test, which however was not very demanding in content. Also, it was
important that the applicant was not married and that he did not have a criminal
record.42
The Waffen-SS man was not just a simple soldier, but rather a political soldier and
representative of the National Socialist world view.43 The SS ideology was rooted in the
racist ideal known in Hitler’s Germany as “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil). The SS was
seen as the living embodiment of the National Socialist doctrine of the superiority of
Nordic blood. So, the Waffen-SS was intended to be a fighting force, bound by ideological
oaths, whose fighters were selected from the best Aryan stock. However, according to
Stein, for the Waffen-SS soldier the racial struggle did not take the form it did for the SS
men who ran the extermination camps or who staffed the execution squads of the
Einsatzgruppen.44 Then again, Cüppers assessed in his analysis on the German
volunteers that the younger age groups of the Waffen-SS, who composed half of his
sample, were mostly accustomed to NS educational institutions and therefore used to
anti-Semitic propaganda, as well as the aggressive state measures against the Jews. He
Dingel 2007, Waffen SS, pp. 862.
Knopp 2003, Die SS, pp. 270.
40 Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 135f.
41 Knopp 2003, Die SS, pp. 270.
42 Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 135f.
43 Dingel 2007, Waffen SS, pp. 862.
44 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 122f, 125.
38
39
22
concluded that the German Waffen-SS soldiers indeed were highly ideologically
motivated45
Given time and progression of the war, the Waffen-SS was increasingly
experiencing a lack of man power.46 Therefore, recruitment was more and more
disseminated to the occupied Germanic countries, applying an active style of
conscription. .47 In the early summer of 1940, the SS started a recruitment campaign in
the conquered Germanic countries which initiated the transformation of the Waffen-SS
into an international military organization.48 As a result, chief of the “SS-Hauptamt”, SSHA49 Gottlob Berger,50 founded the GL in March 1940. The GL was a department of the
“SS-Hauptamt”, SS-HA or also called “Ergänzungsamt”, which was one of twelve central
offices of the “Gesamt-SS”.51 The SS-HA was responsible for the recruitment and
acquisition of SS personnel and ideological training for both German SS and Germanic
SS.52 However, with the progression of the war, the tasks for the SS-HA grew
considerably, so that new offices were created in order to disburden the SS-HA. The goal
of the GL was to turn the Waffen-SS into a truly Germanic and European order, by
finding new recruits, first amongst the youthful generations of rural Germany, secondly
amongst the ethnic Germans and lastly among the Germanic countries.53 Finally, about
half of the Waffen-SS divisions were made up of foreign volunteers, meeting Himmler’s
Cüppers, M. (2005) Wegbereiter der Shoa. Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer SS und die
Judenvernichtung 1939-1945. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt, pp. 77.
46 Koehl, R. L. (1983) The Black Corps. The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS. The University of
Wisconsin Press: Wisconsin, pp. 193f.
47 Hein, B. (2011) „Himmlers Orden. Das Auslese- und Beitrittsverfahren der Allgemeinen SS.“ In:
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 59(2), Pages 263-280, here pp. 270, 276.
48 Gingerich, M. P. (2007) “Waffen SS Recruitment in the „Germanic Lands“, 1940-1941.” In: Historian,
59(4), Pages 815-830, here 6ff.
49 The SS-HA was also called “Ergänzungsstelle” and was the central command office of the SS until 1940.
It served as headquarter for the administration of staff. However, with progression of the war the duties
became too numerous. Therefore, it was split in twelve departments. Yet, it remained the central office for
administrative matters such as recruitment and promotions. Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15.1.1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281,
A.44.10.1.Uch.
50 Gottlob Berger was chief of the SS-HA since 1941 and was promoted general of the Waffen-SS in 1943.
Berger also functioned as personal representative of the Reichsführer-SS Himmler in the Ostministerium.
Berger’s career started early. He joined the NSDAP in 1922 and from 1930 on he was active in the SA.
After he left the SA in 1933 he joined the SS in 1936, starting immediately with the rank of an SSOberführer. Preradovich, N. (1985) Die Generäle der Waffen-SS. Kurt Vowinckel-Verlag: Berg am See, pp.
19f.
52 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15.1.1947, In:
BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
53 Koehl 1983, Black Corps, pp. 193f.
45
23
desire for an international organization composed of Nordic blood. The Germanic
countries were identified by special color insignia while others had national insignia.54
The Waffen-SS sought to work with indigenous and national socialist groups, in
order to incorporate the conquered lands into the Greater Germanic Reich.55 Thus, the
voluntary duty of foreign volunteers in the Waffen-SS can be seen as collaboration,
according to Neulen. He defined collaboration as cooperative work with the enemy,
whereas the actions of the volunteers were against the interests of the own country.
Neulen remarked that the collaborators were convinced that they were not acting
against their nation’s interest but in contrary that they served their country with good
intentions.56 He concluded that around 60% of the volunteers were members of National
Socialist parties in their own countries before joining the Waffen-SS. Only 38% were not
member before and only one person stated that adventurism or material considerations
played a role in his decision to join the Waffen-SS.57
The deterioration of the war situation on the eastern front and the high losses
there demanded a dissemination of recruitment even outside of the Germanic lands.
Therefore, the Waffen-SS was forced to create military formations from races that were
decidedly non Aryan and accept recruits without Nazi leanings or any understanding of
the SS mystique.58 As a consequence, the Waffen-SS was even allowed to draft recruits
under duress from 1943 on.59
1.2.2. Admission and Administration of Swiss Volunteers
The occupation of France in 1940 manifested the potential of a German supremacy in a
new European order. It was with this background that the Federal Council of
Switzerland, Marcel Pitet-Golaz,60 announced that the Swiss people might have to
become comfortable with the thought of certain assimilation with Germany. At the same
time, the first Swiss “Schwarzgänger” (illegal border crossers) arrived at the border.
Those first individuals did not precisely know what to expect in Germany and the
Pollmar & Allen 1996, Encyclopedia, pp. 870f.
Gingerich 2007, Recruitment, 6ff.
56 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 39.
57 Ibid., pp. 379-382.
58 Pollmar & Allen 1996, Encyclopedia, pp. 870f.
59 Hein 2011, Himmlers Orden, 270, 276.
60 Marcel Pilet-Golaz was a Swiss FDP (Free Democratic Party) politician and elected as Swiss Federal
Council in 1928 until 1944. Pilet-Golaz became well known in the World War II context, because he met
with a NSB delegation whilst he was Swiss Federal President in 1940. Favez, J. C. (2010) „Marcel PiletGolaz“, In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D4641.php
[28.08.2013].
54
55
24
“Grenzpolizei Kommisariate, Grekos left it to them, whether they wanted to apply for
work or join the Waffen-SS on a voluntary base.61 Thus, as early as 1940, there was
already a small number of Swiss volunteers serving in the Waffen-SS.62 Therefore,
Himmler commanded the SS-HA to verify the matters, as soon as the reports of Swiss
border crossers increased. Thereupon, the responsibility was transferred to the GL.63
GL Chief of office was Franz Riedweg, a Swiss SS-Obersturmführer, who will be
introduced in chapter three in this thesis. The main task of the GL was the recruitment of
additional man power within the Germanic countries and the deployment of a Germanic
“Sturmbanne”. It also encompassed the volunteers’ ideological training and it was
structured by education, political connections, as well as press and propaganda. Since
Switzerland was perceived as a Germanic country, its volunteers logically fell under the
responsibility of the GL. The “Referat Schweiz” (department Switzerland) was
responsible for the administration of the Swiss volunteers.64
The main task concerning Switzerland was to facilitate recruitment conditions and
prepare for a time when Switzerland would have been incorporated into the Reich.
However, since Switzerland was not occupied yet, a collection point had to be
established in Germany.65 The “Reichs-Sicherheits-Hauptamt”, RS-HA (Reich Security
Head Office) was mainly dealing with refugees, whereas the “Leitabschnitt” Stuttgart, as
part of the RS-HA was tasked with the supervision of the Swiss NS movement. Therefore,
the collection point for the Swiss border crossers was founded in Stuttgart in January
1941. Also, Stuttgart is in proximity of the Swiss and Liechtenstein’s border, and was
therefore easy reachable for the volunteers. The city of Stuttgart allocated a property on
the Panoramastrasse 11. Hence, the collection point was named “Panoramaheim”. As
soon as the Panoramaheim was prepared, the Grekos and the Gestapo had order to
transfer all the border crossers from Switzerland and Lichtenstein to the new collection
Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz,
März 1941-Mai 1945, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Panoramaheim, Nachlass Franz Riedweg, 4.
Germanische Leitstelle.
62 Williamson, G. (1994) The SS. Hitler’s Instrument of Terror. The full Story from Street fighters to the
Waffen-SS. Sidgwick & Jackson: London. pp. 108.
63 Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz,
Germanische Leistelle.
64 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar
1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
65 Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg an den SS-Oberabschnitt Süd-West betreffend der
Schweizerischen Auffangstelle, Berlin 1. April 1941, In: BArch NS 31/237.
61
25
point.66 Alfred Nikles, who will be introduced in chapter three of this thesis, was the first
Panoramaheim leader.67 The Panoramaheim was located in Stuttgart until 1943 and
thereafter transferred to Strasbourg. Because of heaving bombing it was once more
relocated to Bregenz until 1945.68
The Panoramaheim had the following purposes: on one hand it functioned as
collection point including acquisition of data, consulting of the volunteers in regard of a
possible accession into the Waffen-SS, representation of the Swiss in front of authorities
also after they left the home, and lastly support of ex- volunteers in regard of
applications for leave.69 The Swiss authorities assumed that the Panoramaheim
additionally functioned as espionage center, since all the newcomers were questioned
about their knowledge on military facilities in Switzerland, as well as their personal
political stance and opinion on the army in general.70
In case that the Swiss volunteers displayed leadership qualities, they were
transferred to the SS-Junkerschule Bad Tölz, where they received a special education for
leadership positions.71 The SS-Junkerschule Bad Tölz was only attended by Germanic
volunteers, who were holding the rank of an officer. The education lasted four months
and was more or less an infantry education with intense training on machine guns and
shells, as well as tactics. The course intended to retrain the foreigners to German
military standards and prepare them for ideological and political education of
volunteers.72 Ultimately, the trained officer corps originating from the special training
would have been installed as district leaders of their countries in the new Reich. This
was considered important for the future political tasks within these countries. So the GL
Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz,
67 Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg an den SS-Oberabschnitt Süd-West betreffend der
70 Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1.
Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511.
71 Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg betreffend Germanische Führerausbildung in Bad
Tölz, SS-Hauptamt, Amt IV an den Reichsführer—SS, Berlin 24. August 1942, In: BArch NS 31/375.
72 Abhörungsprotokoll von Kurt Brüderlin durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 8. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933.
66
26
already made plans for the administration of the Germanic lands after the war.73 The
plans also encompassed Switzerland, whereas an altering of the Swiss border was
intended. The canton Wallis for example would have been integrated to the “Gau
Savoyen” and just like in the Netherlands, a Reichskommissar would have been
appointed.74 Moreover, there were already lists available, annotating the desirables and
undesirables, Jews and unionists.75 The GL also already made plans for an establishment
of a “Germanische SS Schweiz”. These plans had the codename “Aktion S”.76
The Regulations for admission concerning the Swiss volunteers did not differ from
other Germanic countries. The conditions for admission were the same ones as for all
the SS members. However, there were two phases within the mustering process. The
first Swiss, who arrived between 1940 and 1941, still had the choice whether they
wanted to join the Waffen-SS on a voluntary base, or if they wanted to apply for work.
This, however, changed from 1942 on. As soon as the war on the Eastern Front did not
go in Germanys’ favor, it became more and more difficult to find new recruits. The Swiss
volunteers arriving in those years many times did not have the choice anymore but were
persuaded in the Panoramaheim to join the Waffen-SS.77 From 1943 on the numbers of
volunteers were declining whilst attempts of desertion were augmenting.78
The Swiss did not have an own division, probably because their number was too
small. Neulen assumed that another reason was that the Swiss neutrality was essential
to Germany and that therefore political provocations were avoided.79 In the first war
years, the Swiss were mainly allocated in the motorized infantry regiments “Der Führer”
and “Deutschland” as part of the “SS-Verfügungsdivision”. By the end of 1940, the “SSVerfügungsdivision” was renamed in “2. SS-Division Das Reich” and was mainly
appointed to the eastern front. In 1943, this division was transformed into a Panzer
grenadier division that became the elite formation of the Waffen-SS. Another division
composing a higher number of Swiss volunteers was the “6. SS -mountain division
Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg an den SS-Oberabschnitt Süd-West betreffend der
74 Zeitungsartikel, Die Germanische Leitstelle der SS. Die Urteilsverkündung des Bundesstrafgerichts, In:
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 2511, 12 Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
75 Zeitungsartikel, Das Panoramaheim. Eine Schweizerische SS Zentrale in Stuttgart, In: Stuttgarter
Zeitung, 31. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
76 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über antidemokratische Tätigkeit von Schweizern
und Ausländern im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriegsgeschehen 1939-1945 (Motion Boerlin), 28. Dezember
1945, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945.
77 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 144.
78 Zeitungsartikel, Das Panoramaheim, eine Schweizerische SS Zentrale in Stuttgart, In: Stuttgarter
Zeitung, 31 Dezember 1947, In BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
73
27
Nord”, mainly stationed in Finland. An estimated number of 290 Swiss men were
fighting in that division. Since the Swiss were highly experienced with mountain areas, it
is no surprise that they were chosen for that division.80
1.3. “Swiss Renewal Movement” and Frontismus
Peter Gilg and Erich Gruner, both Swiss historians and political scientists, claimed in
their essay, that the Swiss by nature do not tend to extremism, so that extreme left as
well as right wing movements admittedly do exist, however, are only temporarily of
influence and only affect limited layers of society. According to them, this is also true for
the time of Fascism and National Socialism in Switzerland.81
The emergence of nationalistic organizations in the prewar years in Switzerland is
generally called “Schweizerische Erneuerungsbewegung” (Swiss renewal movement),
since these groups aspired a restructuring of the political, economical and social
conditions in Switzerland and Europe.82 The movement is also named “Frontismus”,
because the word front, meaning border, appeared in most of these organization’s
names. Gilg and Gruner observed four common postulates: enforcement of
governmental authority, corporate structure of the economy, emphasis on nationalism
and the reinvigoration of the federalist principle.83 However, there was not one uniform
nationwide right extremist party but a variety of parties and movements; at points
collaborating at other points standing in concurrence with each other. 84 The
“Frontismus” in Switzerland was initially mostly an academic movement and in its first
stage rather insignificant.85 Hence, from 1933 onward, the “Schweizerische
Erneuerungsbewegung” was booming. The phenomenon of sudden intensification of this
movement in Switzerland is called “Frontenfrühling” (Front Spring).86
Walter Wolf, Swiss historian and author of a standard reference on Fascism in
Switzerland, named four motives for the emergence of the movement, namely a foreign
Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 302ff.
Gilg, P. & Gruner, E. (1966) „Nationale Erneuerungsbewegung in der Schweiz 1925-1940.“ In:
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 14(1), Pages 1-25, here 1.
82Arber, C. (2003) “Frontismus und Nationalsozialismus in der Stadt Bern. Viel Lärm, aber wenig Erfolg.“
In: Berner Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Heimatkunde, 65(1), Pages 1-57, here 3.
83 Gilg/Gruner 1966, Erneuerungsbewegung, pp. 3.
84 Arber 2003, Frontismus, pp. 6.
85 Zöberlein, K.L. (1970) Die Anfänge des deutsch schweizerischen Frontismus. Die Entwicklung der
politischen Vereinigungen NEUE FRONT und NATIONALE FRONT bis zu ihrem Zusammenschluss im Frühjahr
1933. Verlag Anton Hein: Meisenheim am Glan, pp. 9
86 Glaus, B. (1969) Die Nationale Front. Eine Schweizer faschistische Bewegung 1930-1940. Benziger Verlag:
Zürich, pp. 96.
80
81
28
political, a domestic political, an economical and a psychological dimension.87 1. The
happenings in Germany in the year 1933 and Hitler becoming Chancellor had its impact
on the development. The Swiss politics with its readiness to compromise appeared lax in
comparison to the impressive dynamic, discipline and order in Italy and Germany. The
turnaround in Germany seemed electrifying and had its impact on the already existing
“Kampfgemeinschaften” (action groups) and fronts, so that new formations were
dashing forward like mushrooms from the ground.88 2. The domestic policy was
characterized by opposition between the left and right wing of the political spectrum.
There was a constant struggle between bourgeoisie and socialism.89 3. The economical
crisis in the thirties, the altered social structure of society, and the events in Germany
were main factors that underlined the growth of the movement. The economical crisis
resulted in a weakening of the banking system, and export economy, as well as more
unemployment, which in turn created an atmosphere of mental protectionism, fear of
foreign infiltration and a general doubt on the system. Therefore, the conservative
bourgeoisie was able to gain influence with their party stances, by holding the
Bolshevism to account. It was mainly the younger generation of Switzerland that
assembled in either independent or party-relied organizations to unite their common
values of anti modernism and anti-bolshevism.90 4. The Frontists were primarily
recruiting from the younger generations, men between twenty and forty. The younger
generation was frustrated that the politicians who decided over the country’s fate were
mostly old. They demanded more opportunities for political participation, since they felt
that they did more for the country than the older generations, as they were working and
serving in the army. To put it in Wolf’s words: this younger generation was rebelling
against the “supremacy of the senile indolence”.91
The landscape of the right wing organizations in Switzerland was very fragmented,
as there were a lot of different groups with own organizations. Ideologically however,
they were similar. In order to gain more political influence it was necessary to create a
Wolf, W. (1969) Faschismus in der Schweiz. Die Geschichte der Frontenbewegung in der deutschen
Schweiz 1930-1945. Flamberg Verlag: Zürich, pp. 16.
88 Rüthemann, W. (1979) Volksbund und SGAD. Nationalsozialistische Schweizerische Arbeiter Partei,
Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der
politischen Erneuerungsbewegung in der Schweiz 1933-1944. Juris Druck + Verlag: Zürich, pp. 5
89 Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 18.
90 Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 96-98.
91 Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 21f.
87
29
bigger movement. That is why some groups had the desire to unite under one major
party.
1.3.1. Nationale Front, 1933-1940
The party “Nationale Front”, henceforth NF was created in 1933, by consolidation of two
smaller organizations; the “Neue Front” (New Front) and a previous “Nationale Front”.
Both organizations were based on nationalistic principles and anti-Semitic ideals. The
party was first called “Kampfbund Neue und Nationale Front” (Battle League New and
National Front), which was more an interim solution and therefore renamed Nationale
Front in the spring of 1933. National Socialism, anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism
remained the corner stone of the party program. The party grew enormously in its
previous stage after the consolidation.92 However, the growth stagnated between 1935
until 1938, with little exceptions of rare growth moments. The war furthermore
influenced the disbanding, so that the party dissolved in 1940. Hence, it was replaced by
the “Eidgenössische Sammlung”, ES (Confederate Collection) which in turn was
forbidden by the Swiss authorities in 1943.93
The party relied ideologically on the German NSDAP. From 1936 onward, they
identified openly with the National Socialistic world view of Nazi Germany. Yet, the
party proclaimed a separate path for Switzerland. Beat Glaus, a Swiss historian and
author of a standard work on the NF described their ideology as a “fascistic world view
in a distinct Swiss form”.94 Furthermore, the party had a military stance in its style of
organization and behavior. The NF believed in a racial superiority of the Aryan race and
blamed the Jews for the economical crisis. The party depicted itself as savior in the
apocalyptical struggle against Jewish world conspiracy and proclaimed their
messianism.95 The intention was to fight against bolshevism and the class struggle,
which according the movement threatened the national economy.96
In contrast to the German National Socialism, the Swiss NF emphasized the
Christian believes and values. Additionally, the party popularized the confederate
Zöberlein 1970, Anfänge, pp. 241f, 246.
Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 107f.
94 Ibid. pp. 201.
95 Ibid. pp. 203ff.
96 Tobler, R. (1933) “Wesen und Ziele der Nationalen Bewegung.” In: Schriften der Nationalen Front.
Sonderdruck aus Schweizer Monatsheften, 4(6), Pages 1-38, here pp. 10.
92
93
30
history of Switzerland, working with pictures and tales of the Rütli oath,97 to define
Swiss identity and redefine the heroic and unique conception of Swiss history. 98
However, their most important message was that Germany will win the war in any case.
Insisting on an “organic solution”, the party expected that Switzerland would receive a
special position in the new Reich, in which they could help refashion Europe in an
independent, federalist manner.99 The party was not only relying on the German NSDAP
considering ideology and visions but were fashioning themselves in the same style. They
were using a battle cry “Harrus” whilst simultaneously lifting the right arm in Nazi
fashion.100 Also, the use of national socialistic terminologies was common. The party
leaders of a certain regional branches for instance were also called Gauleiter.
The NF had an own newspaper “Eiserner Besen” (iron broom), later renamed in
“die Front”, in which the political and ideological ideals were proclaimed for propaganda
means. The newspaper was published for the first time in November 1931. Initially, the
newspaper was published every two weeks, soon however on a weekly base. In the first
three years of its existence, the edition increased from 4.000 pieces to 25.000.
Propaganda tools formed the content of the newspaper and their way of writing was
characterized by fascist terminology. According to Glaus, the newspaper was clearly
comparable with the German national socialist newspaper “Stürmer”.101
1.3.2. Volksbund und SGAD (Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer
autoritären Demokratie, 1933-1944
The “Volksbund,” henceforth VB, was a dissociation of the organization Nationale Front.
The VB was detached from the NF, because of ideological differences.102 It distanced
itself from the NF as of differences in perception in the Jewish and Freemason matters,
but also as of a disagreement on the participation of political elections, since the VB did
not want to participate in it. Another reason was the contention between the NF leader
The Rütli oath is a legendary oath of the old Swiss Confederacy, taken on the Rütli meadow above the
Lake Lucerne. It took place in 1291 when the leaders of the three regions Uri, Schwyz and Niedwalden
united under the term Eidgenossen against the German landlords. Kaiser, P. (2009) “Befreiungstradition”,
In: Historisches Lexikon Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D17474.php [23.08.2013].
98 Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 203ff.
99 Meyer, A. (2010) Anpassung oder Widerstand. Die Schweiz zur Zeit des deutschen Nationalsozialismus.
Verlag Huber: Frauenfeld, Stuttgart, Wien, pp.155f
100 Feldmann, M. (1933) Nationale Bewegungen der Schweiz. Eine Vorläufige Übersicht. Verbandsdruckerei
A.-G.: Bern, pp. 42.
101 Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 82-85.
102 Ibid., pp. 108.
97
31
Dr. Alfred Zander and Ernst Leonhardt, who became the charismatic and most driving
leader of the VB. The content of the fight was about letters, which were published in a
newsletter that tried to prove the illegal connection of NF members to National
Socialistic branches in Germany. NF leader Zander decided that the NF should remain
independent from the German movement. Leonhardt did not agree with this stance, so
he distanced himself from the NF and created an own organization, the VB. Furthermore,
the NF was more academically oriented and organized whilst the VB tended to rely on
the social class of farmers and therefore did not approve of the intellectual stance of the
party. As a result, the VB attracted people who were unemployed, as they had a special
program for their support.103 The most influential reason, however, was the difference
in perception on the Jewish matter. The NF wanted to distinguish between “Swiss Jews”
and Jews from the East, by implementing a numerus clausus for occupations where
mainly Jews were working. The “Swiss Jews” would have benefited from this and
Leonhardt suspected that the NF tried to get power and influence from the wealthy and
well assimilated “Swiss Jews”.104
In 1938, the VB was officially banned and forbidden. As a reaction, Leonhardt
founded three other organizations, among them the “Schweizerische Gesellschaft der
Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie” (Swiss association of friends of an authoritarian
democracy), henceforth SGAD. The new organization used the same political vocabulary
as the VB and can be seen as a concealed continuation of the forbidden VB. In its statute,
it indicated the three following purposes: gathering of all friends of an authoritarian
democracy, enlightenment of the people through word und writing on the political,
economical and cultural advantages of an authoritarian democracy, as well as
preparation and implementation of an initiative for a complete revision of the federal
constitution. The SGAD aimed for an NS Führer state according the German model.105
The association was mainly producing propaganda material with the purpose of a
preparation for a National Socialist turn in Switzerland. The propaganda material
contained publications against the Jewish world conspiracy, Marxists and Freemasons
and furthermore displayed Hitler speeches.106 Switzerland was in a difficult position
regarding the foreign affairs, surrounded by the axis powers, never sure when Germany
would challenge their neutrality. With the annexation of Austria, and after the German
Rüthemann 1979, Volksbund, pp. 14-19, 23.
Ibid., pp. 23f.
105 Ibid., pp. 200-203.
106 Ibid., pp. 224.
103
104
32
invasion of Norway, and the capitulation of the Netherlands and France, the propaganda
activities of the SGAB reached its peak. The SGAD was sure that Germany would win the
war and was therefore fighting for an annexation of Switzerland into the German Reich,
in order to keep a privileged position. Leonhardt stated that the Swiss nationalists
wanted to avow themselves to the German folk and Hitler as its Führer. So, the mission
was to incorporate Switzerland completely and implicitly into the German Reich.107
By the end of 1941 Leonhardt aimed for the creation of a Swiss volunteer corps of
the Swiss Army that should support the fight on the eastern front against the Soviet
Union. The plan was to set up a Swiss corps with the help of Franz Riedweg. However,
after the initial dismissal of the idea by the German authorities, there was a change of
mind in august 1941. Gottlob Berger was enthusiastic about the idea. In fact he stated
that he did not wish active propaganda, but that he would support the idea and its
implementation. Leonhard started recruitment with the aid of illegal propaganda
literature from Germany and was planning to join himself. Whilst Leonhardt had an
independent unit in mind, Riedweg wanted to incorporate the legion into the Waffen-SS.
He demanded a margin of 150 to 200 volunteers for the creation of an own Swiss unit.108
The SGAB leadership, however, did not mention that the Swiss volunteer corps would be
incorporated into the Waffen-SS. With the slogan: “Schweizer Freiwillige! An die
Ostfront!” they were putting the emphasis on the fight against the red terror and not on
the annexation into the German Reich. In January 1942, Leonhardt informed Riedweg
that the minimum amount of 150 volunteers was achieved. Berger answered that the
Reichsführer-SS Himmler agreed on incorporating a Swiss unit into the Waffen-SS. Yet,
the arising critics in Switzerland from other front organizations derailed the plan. Thus,
the volunteers were asked to register independently. At the end, only twenty or thirty
out of 150 men were estimated to have joined the Waffen-SS.109
Ibid., pp. 236-240.
Ibid., pp. 258-261.
109 Ibid., pp. 262f.
107
108
33
2. Who were they? Background and
Profile of the Swiss Volunteers
One is left to wonder, why some Swiss men left the safe haven of Switzerland and joined
the Waffen-SS, whilst many foreigners and refugees tried to get into the country but
where rejected. Switzerland was not drawn into the Second World War and it conserved
its neutrality successfully. Thus, the theorem of a threatened identity and pragmatic
collaboration as a motif for joining does not succeed to explain participation in the Swiss
case. Nevertheless, there had been a transition in Switzerland already in the interwar
years that altered the daily life of many Swiss citizens. As pointed out in the
introduction, discussing the uprising of the renewal movement, the economic situation
had changed drastically and the Great Depression had left its marks on the Swiss
economy so that unemployment kept on rising. The outbreak of the Second World War
only worsened the situation. Furthermore, the political landscape changed and the NS
rhetoric and ideals found their way into Swiss right extreme parties. Especially young
people were caught up in the fever of the transition; in their view an exciting time with
changes ahead. Moreover, the German war success in the first years reinforced the fear
of a German occupation of Switzerland, which may have influenced the perception on
Nazi Germany in general.110
The Swiss military historian Oertle evaluated 240 Swiss volunteers in his basic
research and pictured them as following. “They were workers, employees, craftsmen,
tradesmen, teachers, academics and military men.” In short, they were representing the
Swiss population and resembled much more ordinary men than convinced Nazis.
Moreover, he described the Swiss volunteers as mavericks, separatists and underdogs in
comparison with the other Germanic volunteers.111 This, however, is a typical Swiss
perception, always emphasizing Switzerland’s special status, which does not offer a
sufficient explanation. Oertle divided their motivation into different profile groups
according percentage: namely National Socialists (38%), job searchers (18%), criminals
(10%), anti-Communists (9%), men who were having problems with parents, friends or
the wife (9%), aviation and motor enthusiast (5%), adventurers and soldiership (5%)
escapers from a penitentiary (4%) and finally young men with problems with their
110
111
Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 16.
Oertle 2010, Appenzeller, pp. 9.
34
teachers(2%).112 Mertens advocated the opinion that there certainly was not a uniform
motive for the Swiss volunteers, but rather a bundle of individual reasons. Then again he
similarly divided the motivation into a national socialist worldview or an anticommunist attitude, private and vocational problems, escape from prosecution,
enthusiasm for the war, as well as adventurism.113
Oertle’s classification extended a study committed by Neulen who divided the
Swiss volunteers into three groups: political activists, adventurers and criminals
whereas he further particularized the group political activists in 40% anti-communist,
60% National Socialist and 70% “grossgermanisch”.114 The term “grossgermanisch”
referred to the desire to establish a Greater Germanic Reich on the basis of a federalist
structure. Also, Neulen concluded that there were only few criminals accepted in the
Waffen-SS, since they were rejected and immediately sent back.115 Oertle applied more
subgroups, whilst Neulen assessed the term political activity more detailed. With this
division of motivation into percentage, Neulen and Oertle both created a sort of profile
groups for the Swiss volunteers. However, the allocation of motivation into different
groups according percentage is an oversimplified bias that does not succeed to give a
satisfactory answer to the question of motivation. As will be shown in this assessment, a
person was not only driven by one motivation type, but possessed various aspects that
overlapped. Since Oertle’s and Neulen’s division in profile groups were problematic, this
chapter attempts to prove that the research on motivation requires more flexibility.
The personal background of those young men and their stories mattered and took
influence on their decision to leave Switzerland. Therefore, as Semelin had proposed, the
historical enquiry of describing how in order to understand why was applied.116 We
have to understand in what conditions they lived, what their values were, how they
were socialized and what circumstances influenced their life at that point, in order to
understand why the border crossing became attractive to them. A decision is always a
personal matter. Hence, it is necessary to introduce the individuals in this case study.
That is why this chapter attempts to assess the background of the Swiss volunteers and
to create an outline on common characteristics and personal details. Who were they and
Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 53-61.
Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 304.
114 Neulen 1985, deutsche Seite, pp. 175ff.
115 Ibid., pp. 176.
116 Semelin, J. (2007) Purify and Destroy. The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. Columbia University
Press: New York, pp. 182.
112
113
35
under what conditions were they socialized? Where did they come from, how old were
they when they left Switzerland and what was their family situation and educational
background? In order to answer the question of their derivation and socialization, a
biographical approach was applied, focusing on the socioeconomic properties, family
situation, as well as age.
In this chapter, the biographies of ten men were evaluated and recounted. The
lower ranking Swiss volunteers seem to have left Switzerland out of economical
considerations and were influenced and partly persuaded to join the Waffen-SS after
they arrived in the Panoramaheim. Then again, Mertens assessed that economical
considerations were only a secondary motive, since the salary in the German forces was
not especially high.117 Therefore, the first paragraph assesses three men on a work hunt.
The second paragraph focuses on five National Socialists. Oertle and Neulen both stated
that there were double citizens in the Waffen-SS but they did not include them in the
study, because their motivation could not be assessed. This argumentation is not
convincing so additionally, two accounts of double citizens will be incorporated in this
analysis.
2.1. On Work Hunt
The Swiss economy was left in a vulnerable position after the Wall Street crash of 1929.
The resulting protective duties and the ban of imports in other countries led to the crash
of the Swiss export economy in 1930. This crisis had an impact on the unemployment
rate in Switzerland. As early as 1928, the Swiss agriculture was already suffering and
now the commercial middle class felt the crisis as well.118 By 1936, 125.000 people were
unemployed in Switzerland which corresponded to 4.8% of the population.119 These
numbers were still in range compared to other European countries. However, the Swiss
citizens were influenced by the thought and reality of the Swiss crisis.120 Moreover,
rumors circulated that life in Germany would be much better, that there was enough
work for everybody and that the Germans were still drinking real coffee. The rumors
sometimes resembled tales of a land of Cockaigne.121
Rüthemann 1979, Volksbund, pp 3f.
119 Degen, B (2013) „Arbeitslose und Arbeitslosenquote 1929-2000.“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz.
Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D13924.php [28.05.2014].
120 Rüthemann 1979, Volksbund, pp 3f.
117
118
36
The desire to find work and living a prosperous life was especially strong for
young men. Otto Alfons Aichle, (15. May 1923, St. Gallen) had crossed the border to
Germany illegally several times; the first time in November 1941, at the age of eighteen.
He was recruited for the Waffen-SS immediately after he had crossed the border.122 In
the interrogation by the SBA, Aichle stated that he was arrested by the Gestapo
immediately after the border crossing and that he was interrogated about military
information on Switzerland. He explained the Gestapo that he knew nothing in these
matters and that he simply was looking for working possibilities. The Gestapo sent him
to Stuttgart to the Panoramaheim, where he was persuaded to join the Waffen-SS.123
Hence, in December 1941 he was enlisted in the casern of Stralsund. Once there, forced
to go through the hard training, Aichle quickly realized that the Waffen-SS was not what
he had imagined how his life in Germany would be like. As a consequence, he deserted
two months later in February 1942. He was immediately imprisoned after he made his
way back to Switzerland.124
In the interrogation by the SBA, Aichle described himself as a simple person, just
on the search for work and being caught up in the web of circumstances. However, he
had a criminal background and was arrested in Switzerland for theft several times.125
Thus, even if he was mainly on work hunt, he also tried to escape his unfavorable
personal circumstances, with the desire to start all over again. The archive documents
did not contain further information on his family background or profession. However,
his conviction to find work in Germany went so far, that he even returned immediately
after the war. Aichle crossed the Swiss border once more in February 1946. He tried to
find work in the American, British and Russian sector and profited from the chaos of the
time by receiving different identification papers in every sector. He managed to find
work in Bremen in a mine and later on as a lumberjack. He stayed in Germany until
March 1947.126
Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942, In:
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192.
123 Abhörungsprotokoll von Otto Alfons Aichle durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundessanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 4. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192.
124 Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942, In:
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192.
125 Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942, In:
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192.
126 Abhörungsprotokoll von Otto Alfons Aichle durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundessanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 4. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192.
122
37
Aichle could also belong to the profile group of criminals. Then again, the desire to
find work was more decisive. Aichle was very young when he crossed the border and did
not have a clear idea of what would await him once he arrived in Germany. He was quite
naïve and realized his mistake soon after joining the Waffen-SS. It can be assumed that
his financial background in Switzerland was so bad, that the alternative Germany
became more and more attractive. Alfons Straub (3. August 1921, St. Gallen) also left to
Germany with the intention to find work. His background, however, varied from the
previous one. Straub was a Swiss citizen but his grandfather was of German origin.
Straub worked in a garage and had problems with his work colleagues because of his
pro-German attitude. He therefore left Switzerland illegally in June 1942, at the age of
twenty-one. He traveled with his friend August Kobelt, and soon after crossing the
border, they were picked up by the Gestapo and sent to the Panoramaheim. Straub
joined the Waffen-SS but his friend Kobelt refused and returned to Switzerland shortly
thereafter. Yet, before Straub joined the Waffen-SS, he initially worked for the company
Meissner & Wurst in Stuttgart.127
A police report indicated that Straub was not saying the truth entirely, considering
his motivation to leave Switzerland illegally. Straub’s former chief informed the
authorities, that Straub did not have troubles because of his pro-German attitude, but
because he was not reliable. He described Straub as “minderwertiges Subjekt” (inferior
person) who had problems to find his place in society. This term related to the racial
theory and expressed that a person possessed negative hereditary factors. Also, the
Swiss army dismissed him from the obligatory military service in September 1940,
because he did not fulfill the requirements.128 So, Straub was clearly having problems to
get a grip on his life and he was perceived as an undesirable citizen. What aggravated his
situation was the fact, that his parents had died early in his life and that he therefore was
under custodial care. The only family left was a brother, living in Zürich, who was said of
having a pro-German attitude as well.129 It can be assumed that Straub grew up with the
awareness of the pride of the German nation and with that a certain sense of belonging
and responsibility, which in turn was an influential factor to leave. However, that alone
Bericht der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando
des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 18. August 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A 116/42.629.
128 Bericht der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando
des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 18. August 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A 116/42.629.
129 Abschrift der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando
des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 6. Juni 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A 116/42.629.
127
38
was certainly not reason enough for him to leave and risk his life in a war. The problems
at work and the unfavorable position in Swiss society, as well as dismissal from the army
were reinforcing factors in his desire to find a good job in Germany.
One of the work hunters in this sample was accustomed to the NS worldview. Josef
Jakob Breitenmoser (17. April 1922, St. Gallen) was born in a big family as the youngest
of six children. Since his parents did not possess over the necessary financial
background, Breitenmoser was not in the position to enjoy further education after his
official school years. Typically for the lower classes, he had to start working right away,
in order to support his family financially. He was working in different companies,
amongst others in a company for agricultural machinery and furthermore as chauffeur
and laborer. In 1940, Breitenmoser moved to Zürich to live with his older brother.
Breitenmoser only had a meager regular income in Zürich, which contributed to a
feeling of dissatisfaction. As a result, he became dissolute and choleric. In the following,
he was arrested by the police because of theft and illegal possession of a weapon. So like
Aichle, Breitenmoser could be allocated to the category of criminals. Also, he joined the
ES in the beginning of 1941, which again brought him into conflict with the authorities.
In a police interrogation, Breitenmoser stated that these conflicts heightened the
tensions with his parents. Consequently, he left to Germany in order to escape the
problems and find work in the Reich. He was convinced that he would be forced to
develop a respectable lifestyle, for which he lacked the will in Switzerland.130
Breitenmoser stated in the interrogation by the police that his main motivation to
leave Switzerland was to find work. He left Switzerland in April 1942, at the age of
twenty. He crossed the Swiss border in company of a friend, who was also a member of
the ES. After the border crossing, the two young men were picked up by German border
guards and sent to Stuttgart, after they stated that they were on a job hunt. The head of
the Panoramaheim tried to persuade Breitenmoser and his friend to join the Waffen-SS.
However, he refused and started working in a beverage manufactory in Stuttgart
instead. In the following he was consistently influenced by propaganda material and
persuaded to join the Waffen-SS, which he eventually did in October 1942.
131
In fact,
Breitenmoser’s family background and financial situation contributed to the motivation
to leave Switzerland. Even if he also featured characteristics from other profile groups
Polizeiliche Einvernahme des Josef Breitenmoser, St. Gallen 7. August 1950, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214
2701, C.29/A116/43.124.
131 Polizeiliche Einvernahme des Josef Breitenmoser, St. Gallen 7. August 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214
2701, C.29/A116/43.124.
130
39
like National Socialist and criminal, his desire to find work in the Reich was the most
important factor. After crossing the border, he preferred to work instead of joining the
Waffen-SS. Only the ongoing interference made him join eventually. Like Aichle and
Straub, Breitenmoser too arrived in Germany in the second period of recruitment. Men
like Breitenmoser were intensely persuaded by the Panoramaheim leaders to conscribe.
However, it has to be kept in mind that Breitenmoser most likely downplayed his
motivation and exaggerated the circumstances in retrospect.
Breitenmoser was clearly influenced by the National Socialist ideology, as he
hoped for better times in Switzerland under a national socialistic rule.132 In a letter to
his friend Otto, he fulminated against the Jews in Switzerland and stated that he was
proud to be transferred to Serbia where he would be able to fight the Eastern hordes.133
His friend Otto furthermore confirmed in a police interrogation that Breitenmoser
apparently was praising Hitler as a leader and he was convinced that he would earn
more money once Hitler would be in power in Switzerland.134 Hence, it can be concluded
that Breitenmoser did not leave Switzerland because of ideological commitment, as
earning money was the decisive desire. However, it certainly was a contributing factor
to join the Waffen-SS. Also, he had problems with the Swiss police because of theft and
illegal possession of a weapon. In the police interrogation Breitenmoser stated that he
was hoping to be able change his life and become a respectable person. 135 So, the
prospect of wearing a uniform and become a soldier, representing the proud Aryan,
must have excited Breitenmoser.
The overall category “work hunt” connected the individual stories and
motivational patterns of the volunteers in this sample. Apparently, other factors such as
unstable life conditions, problems at home or with the police, as well as sympathy for
Germany or National Socialism, and linked to that, the desire to start a new life were
further important driving factors. It is striking that all three men grew up in St. Gallen.
This could only be a coincidence and of course the quantity of three in a case study is
statistically not significant for the whole group. However, we can note that the Eastern
Polizeiliche Einvernahme von Josef Breitenmoser, Will 8. Juli 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701,
C.29/A116/43.124.
133 Brief von Josef Breitenmoser an seinen Freund Otto, Ort unbekannt 18. August 1943, In: BAR E4320 B
1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124.
134 Polizeiliche Einvernahme von Otto Ehrenzeller über Josef Breitenmoser, Ort unbekannt 27. Mai 1941,
In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124.
2701, C.29/A116/43.124.
132
40
part of Switzerland might have been more open to the renewal movement than other
parts. Also, St. Gallen is at the border of Switzerland, so it could be that the early refugee
influx was influential. However, Wolf stated that the renewal movement was not
influential in St. Gallen. He explained that with the rural structure of the canton, since
the conservative rural population opposed the ideas for a reorganization of society.136
Also, Oertle assessed that in total only 7% of the Swiss volunteers originated from St.
Gallen.137
2.2. National Socialists
In the interwar years, the conservative bourgeoisie of Switzerland was able to gain
influence with their National Socialist party stances. It was mainly the younger
generation of Switzerland that congregated in either independent or NSDAP related
organizations to unite their common values of anti modernism and anti-bolshevism.138
On party assemblies they heard heroic speeches about Nazi Germany and the inciting
words may have motivated the young men to join the Waffen-SS. As will be shown in this
paragraph, there were various types of “Swiss Nazis”. It can be noted that for the
National Socialist volunteers the decision to leave Switzerland was mostly the same as to
join the Waffen-SS, as they left with that exact intention.
Othmar Maag (17. July 1917, Zürich) was a Swiss Nazi par excellence, combining
ideological commitment with soldiership and a strong sense for nationalism. He was
truly committed and already actively engaged as a party leader in NS organizations
before he left to Germany. Also, he had a strong sense for anti-Semitism. In various
letters to his parent he expressed his obsession with the Jewish conspiracy, as will be
shown in chapter four. Additionally, he was convinced that the Jews, as well as the
Communists had infiltrated the Swiss government and politics. Maag joined the WaffenSS in April 1942, at the age of twenty five. He was immediately appointed SS-Untersturmführer and served in the cavalry. Since he was of German origin, Maag
received the German citizenship in 1943.139 In 1944 he was promoted to SSObersturmführer.140
Wolf, Faschismus, pp. 121.
Oertle, Russland, pp. 565.
138 Glaus 1969, Front, pp. 96-98.
139 The Führer’s edict of May 19, 1943 said that all foreigners of German origin acquired the German
citizenship by joining the Waffen-SS, Wehrmacht or the Organisation Todt. Reichsgesetzblatt, Teil 1, Nr.
53, Führererlass, Berlin 25. Mai 1943. Online:
136
137
41
Maag was born in Winterthur in a middle class family. His father was an official in
the “Schweizerische Bankverein” and his mother was German. The family Maag had
spent most of their holidays in Germany and Othmar had good memories of those years.
As a child, he was in possession of the German citizenship but did not renew the
passport after it expired in 1936. After finishing his official school years, Maag decided
to study at the commercial school and graduated in 1937. As every Swiss man, he
attended the military training and absolved it in an infantry unit. After the official
military training, Maag decided to attend the sergeant school and thereafter the officer
candidate school, so he kept on working for the Swiss Army.141
In a letter to his friend Fritz, Maag stated that he was a downright nationalist and a
convinced militarist.142 He had joined the cadet corps with twelve and in his
interrogation by the SBA, he stated without hesitation that he was a fanatic soldier. 143 In
addition, from correspondence with his family and friends it became apparent that the
family Maag was clearly anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevist. Thus, it can be assumed that
Anti-Semitism indeed played a strong role in Maag’s life.144 Furthermore, Maag was
already politically active from an early stage. With sixteen, he was member of the
“Nationale Jugend”, NJ (national youth organization) of which he became the
“Ortsgruppenführer” (local group leader) and a year later “Bezirksführer” (district
leader). In 1936, he joined the NF and in 1940, he affiliated to the NBS (Nationale
Bewegung Schweiz) where he also held the function of an “Ortsgruppenführer”.145
In 1941, he founded the ”Sportschule Maag” (sport school) in Zürich, which served
as an organization for Swiss Nazis. The sport school copied the Nazi youth organizations
in the sense that they attempted to represent the racial ideal Aryan. They organized
sport events, hikes and gatherings in which they exchanged their political ideas. The
Swiss authorities later labeled the Sportschule Maag as a recruitment site for potential
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dns/RGBl_1943_I_315_EF_Erwerb_deutscher_Staatsangehoerigkeit_Einstellu
ng_deutsche_Wehrmacht_Waffen-SS_deutsche_Polizei_Organistation_Todt.pdf [7.12.2013]
140 Personalakte Othmar Maag, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 287 A)
287 – A Maag, Fritz – Madecker.
141 Lebenslauf von Othmar Maag aus der Untersuchungshaft, Zürich 10. Juni 1941, In: BAR E4320 B
1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
142 Brief von Othmar Maag an seinen Freund Fritz, Winterthur 21. August 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78
916, C.2-5358.
143 Abhörungsprotokoll von Othmar Maag durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Aarau 13. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
144 Brief von Othmar Maag an einen Verwandten in Deutschland, Name unbekannt, Schweinfurt 11.
145 Antrag für die Eheschliessung, Lebenslauf von Othmar Maag an das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt,
Berlin 30. Dezember 1943, In: BArch RS D 5229/243.
42
Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS and as an attempt to establish a Swiss Waffen-SS.146
Maag was arrested in the summer of 1941, because of his political activities. He was held
in custody for three months and after his release, he decided to leave Switzerland in
September 1941.147
Dr. Kurt Brüderlin (12. June 1914, Bern) was another Swiss Nazi, who conscribed
to the Waffen-SS. Dr. Brüderlin was a committed National Socialist and a military man.
He furthermore was an intellectual who espoused for the propagation of the NS world
view and the affiliation of Switzerland to the German Reich. Brüderlin was politically
active in Switzerland since 1933 and functioned as an “Ortsgruppenführer” of the “Bund
Nationalsozialistischer Eidgenossen”, BNSE (association of National Socialist Swiss
confederates) and later the NBS in Bern. Additionally, he was engaging in the ES as
trainings manager and maintained contact with important members of the Swiss
renewal movement.148 Dr. Brüderlin can be labeled Nazi, since he called himself
accordingly.149 He left Switzerland in March 1943, at the age of twenty-eight and joined
the Waffen-SS right away where he was promoted to SS-Obersturmführer. His
conscription was determined for the whole war time.150 After completing his education
in the Junkerschule Bad Tölz, he was promoted to SS-Hauptsturmführer and sent to the
Eastern front thereafter.151 He kept on being politically active in Germany and joined the
“Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland”, BSG (association of Swiss in Greater
Germany) and engaged actively in propaganda matters.152 In 1944, he was relocated to
Finland, where he was in charge of a unit. He was taken prisoner by the Soviets in
October 1944 and was extradited to Switzerland a year thereafter.153
Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement an den Regierungsrat des Kantons Zürich, Bern 31. Juli
1944, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
147 Antrag für die Eheschliessung, Lebenslauf von Othmar Maag an das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt,
Berlin 30. Dezember 1943, In: BArch RS D 5229/243.
148 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an die Eidgenössische Polizeiabteilung z.H. von Herrn Dr. Hohl,
Bern 3. Juli 1944, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933.
149 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an den Chef des Eidgenössischen
Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 9. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933.
150 Einvernahme von Kurt Brüderlin aus der Haft vorgeführt, Protokoll an das Polizeikommando des
Kantons Baselland z. H. der Militärbehörden und der Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 5. September 1946, In:
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
151 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an die Eidgenössische Polizeiabteilung z.H. des Herrn Dr. Hohl,
Kantons Baselland z.H. der Militärbehörden und der Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 5. September 1946, In:
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
146
43
His brother in law, Prof. Keller154, described Dr. Brüderlin in an interview with the
federal war industry and employment office as an incommunicative, unsocial and
unhappy man and confirmed that Brüderlin had joined the NF out of ideological
commitment.155 Brüderlin furthermore had absolved his military training in Switzerland
and achieved the rank of a senior lieutenant.156 There is not much information on his
family background in the archive documents. What is known is that he graduated at
university with a doctoral degree in economy and political science. However, the topic of
is PhD is not known either.157
The two men described so far can be labeled Swiss Nazis. However, there were
other political activists with a different background and mindset. Paul Diebold (25. April
1908, Thurgovia) for example was working as a primary school teacher prior to his
departure to Germany. Diebold was arrested for sexual harassment of some of his
female underage students in 1938 and was sentenced to four months in prison. He
always denied that he was guilty; but his wife as a result got a divorce. To cap it all, he
was excluded from the Swiss army and lost his rank as a lieutenant. From that moment
on, Diebold’s life changed drastically. He was struggling to find a job and his ex-wife
complicated it even further by imposing a financial burden on him, since he had to pay a
monthly rent to her and their child. His financial situation worsened so badly, that there
were days without food. In his curriculum vitae he stated that he was about to end his
life when he once more got arrested, this time on suspicion for espionage because of his
involvement in NS organizations. The police however was not able to find proof for the
suspicion and released him out of custody shortly thereafter.158
Diebold was able to find a job in a factory where he worked as laborer.
Unfortunately, he lost his job quickly after his boss found out that Diebold was member
of the National Socialistic party “Nationale Gemeinschaft” in Schaffhausen.159 This was a
National Socialist party that belonged to the renewal movement in Switzerland. It
consisted of only 100 members. It had an antiliberal, anti-Semite and anti-Bolshevist
No indication of his full name in the archive document.
Bericht des Eidgenössischen Volkswirtschaftsdepartements der Kriegsindustrie und Arbeitsamt an den
Chef der Bundespolizei der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 26. August 1942, In: BAR 4320 B
1970/25 504, C.02-933.
156 Bericht von Dr. H. Matty, Advokat an die Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 6. Juni 1946, In: BAR 4320 B
1970/25 504, C.02-933.
157 Bericht der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Armeekommando, Abteilung
Sicherheitsdienst, Bern 4. Juli 1941, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933.
158 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618.
159 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Stuttgart 27 April 1942, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147
Dickten – Diekmeier.
154
155
44
stance and was banned by the Swiss authorities in 1943160 Diebold stated in his resume,
that he always had had a pro-German political bearing and that he was a committed
frontist.161 He believed in the new order but at the same time, he was convinced that
Switzerland would not be incorporated into the Reich and would be able to keep its
political neutrality.162
Diebold left Switzerland in March 1942, at the age of thirty-four.163 Since he was
excluded from military service in Switzerland, he did not think that he was acting
against existing Swiss laws. He had even asked for readmission into the Swiss army after
the mobilization in Switzerland, but his request was rejected. After he crossed the
border, he was taken into custody by the German border police and shortly thereafter
transferred to the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart where he joined the Waffen-SS. During his
stay in Stuttgart, he attended some meetings of the BSG, where he became even more
convinced that he had to fight bolshevism for a better future of mankind. Yet, he refused
to join the party, since he did not want to engage politically against his homeland. He
asked for permission only to be stationed as a soldier on the Eastern front. Diebold was
appointed SS-Obersturmführer according his previous rank of a lieutenant in the Swiss
army, promoted to SS-Hauptsturmführer thereafter and ordered to the front. Diebold
claimed in a later resume that he was not politically active but only served as a “simple”
soldier. He certainly downplayed the facts since his rank of an SS-Obersturmführer
indicated that he was ideologically committed. Also, he admitted in his resume that his
validations for the Waffen-SS on his character and military skills were always
outstanding.164
Diebold’s view was very naive. He was influenced by the “Nationale Gemeinschaft”
in Switzerland where he might have found replacement for his family. At that point,
Diebold had lost everything and was almost starving. It could be that there he found
support and affiliation for the first time in a long time. He left Switzerland already with a
certain ideological commitment. Diebold’s profile fits to three categories. He hoped to
find more work in Germany since he failed to find a job in Switzerland because of his
previous conviction. But he was also a criminal who suffered under repression of his
Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 110,207.
Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Stuttgart 27 April 1942, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147
163 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Stuttgart 27 April 1942, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147
160
161
45
previous deeds and lastly he was a convinced National Socialist who wanted to engage in
the fight against the Red Terror.
So, even if Diebold was a political activist, his unstable life conditions were
marking as well. The case of Hermann Huber (24. March 1909, St. Gallen) was similar.
He was born in a farmer’s family. His father provided for the family as farmer and
shoemaker, his mother was of German origin. After finishing his official school years,
Huber started an apprenticeship in his father’s business. Yet, he did not succeed in
finishing with a degree. His family was having severe financial problems and father
Huber left his family after his business went bankrupt. Hermann, only seventeen at that
time, stayed behind with his mother and was forced to accept different jobs as laborer,
all of them poorly paid, since he had no qualifications. So, he decided to open an own
shoemakers business. He did not experience much luck, as the owner of the building was
having financial problems as well. Huber felt like he could lose everything from one
moment to the other. As a result, he decided to close his business in September 1939.
Additionally, Huber got married in 1933, so his responsibilities had grown enormously.
He had two children with his wife for which he had to provide. Thus, Huber started
farming after closing his own business. Unfortunately, the situation worsened, since the
surrounding war took its influence on the Swiss economy.165
Huber always had a keen interest in politics. Before 1936, he visited gatherings
and speeches of all sorts of political groups. However, he found the renewal movement
organizations the most convincing ones, since he was having a nationalist and antiinternationalist stance.166 He joined the VB already in 1936 and enrolled to the SGAD
after its resolution. Huber was an active member, who was engaging in the distribution
of propaganda material for the SGAD in St. Gallen but he never had a leading position
within the movement. Due to the prosecution, as of his political activities, plus his
financial problems and difficulties to find work, he decided to leave to Germany.167
Huber finally crossed the Swiss border illegally in February 1942, at the age of thirtythree. Huber served in the Waffen-SS until the end of the war and was imprisoned as a
Abhörungsprotokoll von Hermann Huber durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Oberriet 26. Oktober 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333.
166 Abhörungsprotokoll von Hermann Huber durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Oberriet 26. Oktober 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333..
167 Zeitungsartikel, Nachzügler des Leonhardt-Prozesses, In: Vorwärts Nr. 129, Ort unbekannt 20. August
1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333.
165
46
POW thereafter.168 A newspaper article indicated that Huber returned to Switzerland
after the war and that he had to stand trial in the criminal court Basel.169 The sources
unfortunately did not give information on the sentence, or on the rank he held in the
Waffen-SS.
Huber’s background is that of an ordinary man, without a good education or a
fabulous career within the Swiss army and although he engaged in the National Socialist
movement in Switzerland, his financial situation was certainly also influential in his
decision making process. So, like Diebold, Huber cannot be labeled as true Nazi, even
when he was ideologically committed. His frustration not being able to provide for his
family with all the hard work could explain his fascination for National Socialism, since
this gave him perspective and a sense of belonging. Thus, he could also be assigned to
the category job search. However, his political activities showed that he was committed
to the National Socialist world view. In 1941, Huber requested rest and recreation of
military service and he applied for the renewal of his passport.170 It can be assumed that
he had planned to leave to Germany with the intention to join the Waffen-SS. A
newspaper report confirmed that Huber’s work situation forced him to leave
Switzerland and that he left to Germany with the intention to join the Wehrmacht but
that he had been assigned to the Waffen-SS instead.171
The fewest Swiss volunteers were solely ideologically committed. However, they
were clearly having a pro-German attitude, but that does not necessarily imply that they
were true Nazis. Dr. Ernst Schneider (20. May 1912, Bern) had a pro-German stance
because of his ancestry. Schneider was born in Bern but his family bloodline featured
German origin since the 16th century. Moreover, his brother was a SA-Oberführer and
his two sisters were both married to citizens of the German Reich (Reichsdeutsche). Dr.
Schneider attended his school education in Riga and studied twelve semesters Romance
philology, linguistic, indology, philosophy and art history at the University of Paris and
Munich, graduating in 1937 as doctor of philosophy. After his graduation, he continued
Anklageschrift von Herman Huber durch den Auditor Major Popp des Divisionsgerichts 7A, St. Gallen 5.
Juli 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333.
1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333.
170 Bericht des Polizeikommando St. Gallen an den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft,
St. Gallen, 10. Februar 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333.
1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333.
168
47
working as assistant in the department for Aryan culture and linguistic at the University
of Munich.172
Dr. Schneider joined the Waffen-SS in March 1941, at the age of 29, where he was
trained initially in the “2. and 3. SS Ersatz Battalion Deutschland”. Thereafter, he was
transferred to the SS Company “Das Reich” as SS-Schütze at the front in Russia in the
summer of 1941. At the front, he was wounded and brought to a field hospital. After his
recovery, he was serving as a translator in the regiment “Das Reich”. Next to his job as
translator, he was also involved with the ideological training of the Waffen-SS soldiers in
the regiment.173 Schneider was promoted to SS-Untersturmführer in April 1942 and
once more to SS-Obersturmführer in November 1944.174 Schneider was well respected
within the Waffen-SS and thanks to his language abilities he was able to be assigned to
organizational positions. He was a brilliant mind, speaking next to German and French
also Russian, Spanish and Italian and he intended to learn the Scandinavian languages.
175
Schneider stated that he never had been politically active and that he wanted to avoid
prosecution in Switzerland.176 This claim however was rather doubtful. His high rank in
the Waffen-SS, his involvement in the ideological training of the soldiers and his work in
the department for Aryan culture and linguistic at the University of Munich indicated
that he that he shared in the National Socialist world view. In spite of his National
Socialist stance, his pro-German attitude and his ideological commitment, he cannot be
labeled Nazi.
The men in this group were all around thirty years old when they left Switzerland.
Their family background however varied. It is interesting to note that the ideologically
committed volunteers all achieved higher ranks in the Waffen-SS. This feature will be
discussed in the next chapter, dealing with Swiss careerists in the Waffen-SS.
2.3. Double Citizens
Most of the Swiss volunteers in this case study engaged in NS organizations in
Switzerland prior to their departure to Germany. However, not all of them were
politically active. Others were simply on a work hunt because of an unstable financial
Lebenslauf Dr. Ernst Schneider, München 25. Mai 1943, In: BArch RS F 0491/7.
Lebenslauf Dr. Ernst Schneider, München 25. Mai 1943, In: BArch RS F 0491/7.
174 Dienstlaufbahn Dr. Ernst Schneider, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SS0
091 B9) 91 – B Schnabel, Erich – Schneider, Erich.
175 Lebenslauf Dr. Ernst Schneider, München 25. Mai 1943, In: BArch RS F 0491/7.
176 Lebenslauf Dr. Ernst Schneider, München 25. Mai 1943, In: BArch RS F 0491/7.
172
173
48
background. There were also men, who do not fit in those groups after all. Neulen would
probably assign them to the profile group of adventurism and soldiership. Guttmann
described them as stereotypical young, impressionable and adventurous types.177
Several volunteers where dual citizens, possessing the German and Swiss citizenship or
were having parents originating from Germany. However, neither Neulen nor Oertle
incorporated them into their profile categories. For those men, the war situation might
have caused a conflict of conscience, as they felt they had to take a side. The desire to
fight for their father country could have posed a substantial basis for their later decision
to join the Waffen SS.
Fritz Arnold’s (10. August 1919, Basel) father for example was a German citizen,
who escaped to Switzerland during the First World War. Arnold spent his whole youth
in Basel and was conscripted to the Swiss army in 1939. During his military service,
Arnold decided to leave Switzerland illegally. In his curriculum vitae for the Waffen-SS,
he stated that he left because of political and family reasons. As soon as he crossed the
border, he was picked up by immigration officers and had to spend 14 days in custody.
After his release, he went to his German relatives and worked as a brewer in
Schwenningen. On January 12, 1942, Arnold joined the Waffen-SS at the age of twenty
three.178 He started as SS-Rottenführer in November 1943 and was promoted to SSUnterscharführer in April 1944.179
Arnold most probably left Switzerland because of a conflict of conscience.
However, the sources do not indicate why Arnold finally decided to join the Waffen-SS. It
can be assumed that a certain excitement for militarism played a role as well. He left
Switzerland in the middle of his military education, which in turn indicated that he
might have wanted to apply the learnt skills to reality. Also, Arnold stated that he left
because of family reason. Maybe he blamed his father for escaping Germany during the
last war and therefore betrayed his country. Maybe, Arnold felt that it his responsibility
to make up for his father’s past wrong. Unfortunately, the archive documents do not
succeed to give a satisfying answer and it has to be relied on assumptions and
interpretations. However, it can be assumed that he was not ideologically committed,
since he was not active in NS organizations. Possibly he referred to the adverse climate
Guttmann 2013, Myth, pp. 591.
Lebenslauf aus der Personalakte von Fritz Arnold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch RS A
0116/593.
179 Dienstlaufbahn Fritz Arnold, Ort und Datum unbekannt In: BArch RS A0116/593.
177
178
49
for people with a German citizenship in Switzerland when he gave information on his
motivation by stating that he left because of political reasons.
Swiss volunteers with a German citizenship were not all born or raised in
Switzerland. Ernst Krauel (11. December 1907) was born in Hamburg but had the Swiss
citizenship, since his great grandfather immigrated to Switzerland in 1861. At the age of
fifteen, Krauel also moved to Switzerland and finished his official school years in
Lausanne. He returned to Hamburg in 1927, where he completed his high school
education. He started to sympathize with National Socialism and joined the NSDAP in
1930. In the same year, Krauel returned to Switzerland to attend the obligatory military
service in the Swiss army. After fulfilling his service in the army, Krauel moved to
Lausanne where he helped building up a foreign organization of the NSDAP. He had to
terminate his German membership, because of his Swiss nationality in April 1932, so he
joined the NF instead.180
Krauel was confronted with the Swiss authorities because of his political activities
in 1937. The conviction for political activity in turn resulted in difficulties to find a job,
since nobody wanted to hire a German Nazi in Switzerland. Therefore, he had to leave
the country once more in 1938. He joined the Waffen-SS in October 1941 at the age of
thirty-four and was appointed to the “SS-Ersatz Battalion Der Führer”. 181 In Germany, he
applied for the renewal of his membership in the NSDAP in 1942. Yet, the application
initially was turned down because of his Swiss citizenship and because there was a gap
in his membership fees. However, after Leonhard182 confirmed his loyalty to the
National Socialistic ideology, he was finally accepted in September 1942 and received
the German citizenship.183 Krauel could also be allocated to the category National
Socialist and to a certain extent to job hunt. However, since he did not grow up in
Switzerland, his dual citizenship is the more decisive feature that must have influenced
him in his decision to leave Switzerland. His socialization varied considerably from the
other volunteers and it can be assumed that he experienced director propaganda in his
Antrag für die Eheschliessung, Lebenslauf von Ernst Krauel an das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt,
Berlin 28. Januar 1943, In: BArch RS D 0230/799.
181 Antrag für die Eheschliessung, Lebenslauf von Ernst Krauel an das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt,
Berlin 28. Januar 1943, In: BArch RS D 0230/799.
182 Ernst Leonhard was the founder of the SGAD. More information on his person is to be found in chapter
1.3.2.
183 Brief von Ernst Leonhardt, Leitung der Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP an den Reichsschatzmeister
der NSDAP, Ort unbekannt 2. September 1942, In: BArch PK G 0241/1809.
180
50
school years in Germany. Unfortunately, the sources do not indicate what happened to
Krauel after the war. Yet, it can be assumed that he stated in Germany.
What is striking about the findings in this chapter is that the Swiss volunteers were
clearly better educated volunteers, either in military matters, as well as intellectually.
Two of the volunteers from the category National Socialist even possessed a doctoral
degree. Also, it seems that the ideological committed volunteers were able to have a
certain career within the Waffen-SS. Did they have that career because of their
ideological commitment or because of their educational background, army training and
language abilities or was their ideological commitment the main factor for them to join
the Waffen-SS? In order to shed light on these questions, a special attendance will be
given to the career development of several Swiss volunteers in the next chapter.
51
3. Career Prospects
As concluded in the previous chapter, the Swiss volunteers were all very different in
their profile and background although at the same time resembling and representing
ordinary men who partly shared a similar social origin, personality traits and ideological
tendencies. However, some of the Swiss volunteers were able to achieve higher ranking
positions and respectable positions within the Waffen-SS. Mertens concluded that at
least 52 Swiss achieved the rank of an officer, which corresponds to a percentage of 6.8.
This number was relatively high in comparison with the entire Waffen-SS were only
2.6% achieved a higher rank and the Wehrmacht with only 2.6% of officer corps.
Mertens explained this high number with the high technical and professional
qualification of the Swiss volunteers.184 Mertens did not elaborate on what he precisely
meant by technical and professional qualifications but taken from chapter two, it can be
assumed that language qualifications, as well an excellent military education contributed
to their career.
Gutmann emphasized in his comparison of Swiss, Danish and Swedish officer corps
volunteers, that whilst the neutral regular soldiers may have been uneducated social
“losers” and deviants, drawn by naivety and greed – the higher ranking volunteers were
well-integrated and educated men.185 Although, his statement on the simple soldiers
certainly needs further relativization, his judgment on the officer corps volunteer’s
education is an interesting factor. The higher education seemed to be a special feature of
the neutrals and might have contributed in an active interest to aid the Nazi project
intellectually. Then again, if they were well integrated in Swiss society, why did they not
deploy their talents for a change back home? After all, the NS organizations mostly
displayed a strong sense for nationalism and Swiss pride. Also, Gutmann left it out to
consider, that the politically active Swiss were prosecuted in Switzerland for their
membership in NS organizations and therefore far from being well integrated into
society.
Neulen claimed that Swiss intellectuals joining the Waffen-SS were rather
exceptional, dividing the Swiss volunteers in three groups, namely political activists,
184
185
Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 591.
52
adventurers and criminals.186 However, the volunteers selected in this chapter all had an
excellent educational background either in the Swiss army or intellectually, four of them
even possessing a doctoral degrees. This might be an exceptional feature of the Swiss
volunteers and therefore will be taken into consideration. In this chapter, the career
development of several Swiss volunteers will be investigated through detailed
biographical examination, concentrating on six men; two with commander positions
within Germanic battalions, two involved in the administration of the GL, one holding an
instructor position as camp leader and one war correspondent. The aim of this chapter
is to assess what careers and ranks thy achieved, to what positions they were assigned
and what which qualifications that enabled their careers. The Swiss volunteers were
perceived as Germanic volunteers. However, they were not summarized in a national
unit unlike the Dutch or the French. In this chapter, I will argue that the possibility for
these Swiss volunteers to gain a career within the Waffen-SS was thanks to their
ideological commitment to National Socialism and their engagement in NS organizations
in Switzerland. Another factor is that most of them were already militarily educated in
Switzerland. Additionally, their perception of being “German like”, and being truly
Germanic, plus their language abilities, made them well respected and desired
manpower.
In order to understand their achievement of position within the Waffen-SS, a short
biography will be created, including their life conditions before the war. The chapter is
structured according these biographies and accounts. Since this chapter deals with
careers within the Waffen-SS, it goes without saying that the Swiss men described here
were committed National Socialists. Lastly their socioeconomic factors and personal
backgrounds will be described, trying to compare the findings with the previous chapter.
This will help to clarify their motivation to join the Waffen-SS, which will be subject of
the following chapter.
186
Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 176.
53
3.1. The Bureaucrat Dr. Franz Riedweg
Although Franz Riedweg was not the highest
ranking Swiss volunteer, he was the one with
the most impressive career of all Swiss who
joined the Waffen-SS. Riedweg was a protégé
of Heinrich Himmler, only standing two
ranks below his mentor in the SS-HA, the
central administration of the SS. Riedweg
had a remarkable desk career as SSObersturmbannführer and “Stabsführer” of
the GL, where he was involved in the
organization and decision making process
Image 1 Franz Riedweg, In: Swiss.info Online:
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/culture/A_Swiss_in_
the_service_of_the_SS.html?cid=29419904
[13.11.2013]
concerning the Germanic volunteers.187 He truly believed in the idea of the Germanic
Empire in which he saw Switzerland playing an important role. He was an advocate for a
united Europe with a federalist structure in which Germany would be given the leading
position whilst all other Germanic countries were equal.
Dr. Med. Franz Riedweg (10. April 1907, Lucerne) grew up with his older brother
and sister in a prosperous family home. Since his father was a successful hotelier, Franz
enjoyed a good lifestyle in his youth and was able to study medicine at the University of
Bern. He studied four semesters in Germany188 and graduated eventually as doctor in
medicine at the University of Bern in 1933.189 In 1934, after his graduation, he worked in
the gynecological clinic as a PhD candidate in Berlin. Thereafter, he continued to work in
various Swiss clinics.190
Riedweg already engaged in politics as a student, convinced that communism
posed a considerable threat to Europe. He believed that only a united Europe on the
base of anti-communism with total equality under its members could protect the
civilized world from the Red Terror. He longed for a new order in which all the
According to Marco Wyss, a Swiss historian who published a biography on Riedweg, Riedweg can be
seen as brains behind the idea of the Waffen-SS as a military and political elite in a Europe ruled by the
Nazis. Interview mit Marco Wyss durch Kuenzi Renate auf Swiss.info,4. Februar 2011. Online:
[16.11.2013]. However, Wyss’ assessment certainly is an exaggeration.
188 He studied 3 semesters in Berlin and one in Rostock.
189 Lebenslauf Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Berlin 11. Juni 1938, In: BArch SS-Führerpersonalakten, (SSO
030B) 30-B Riedl-Rieger, Max.
190 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4.
September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente
und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948).
187
54
European states would be equal under the leading of Germany.191 In his curriculum vitae
for the Waffen-SS, Riedweg indicated that he started to engage actively in politics in
1937.192 However, he already joined the NF in 1933 where he remained member until
1935.193 Additionally, he was leading the “Zentralbüro der Schweizerischen Nationalen
Rechten” and he was cofounder of the Swiss action against communism and served as
cabinet minister and secretary of Federal Council Jean-Marie Musy,194 who was chief of
the campaign.195 Riedweg started to distance himself soon from the movement, since he
felt that it became more and more the copy of the NSDAP, which according to him was
undesirable. He was advocated the opinion that National Socialism could not be an
export article but that every country had to establish an own dynamic and form.
However, thanks to his function in the Swiss movement against communism, Riedweg
was able to establish important connections with leading personalities in Germany,
especially within the circle of the Anti-Comintern196 and SS.197
In 1937, Riedweg attended a “Reichsparteitag” in Nuremberg as a special guest of
the Anti-Comintern. There, he had the possibility to meet Himmler in person and they
established a personal connection so that they continued to meet on various occasions.
Motivated and influenced from this event, Riedweg returned to Switzerland where he
filmed the movie “Die Rote Pest” (the red pest). The movie was shown in Switzerland
several times, however banned at a later point out of considerations for the communist
Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4.
192 Lebenslauf Franz Riedweg, Berlin 11. Juni 1938, In: BArch SS-Führerpersonalakten (SSO 030B) 30-B
Riedl-Rieger, Max.
193 Quadri, P. (2010) „Riedweg, Franz“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhsdss.ch/textes/d/D42138.php [06.11.2013]
194 Jean-Marie Musy was a Swiss Federal Council from 1919 until 1934, affiliated with the Christian
Democratic People’s Party (CVP). Musy was conservative, antisocial and acquainted with Himmler.
However, by the end of World War II, Musy engaged in negotiations with the Nazis to rescue large
numbers of Jews from the concentration camp Theresienstadt. Sebastiani, D. (2009) „Jean Mary Musy“, In:
Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D3938.php [13.11.2013]
195 Lebenslauf Franz Riedweg, Berlin 11. Juni 1938, In: BArch SS-Führerpersonalakten (SSO 030B) 30-B
Riedl-Rieger, Max.
196 Anti-Comintern was a special agency within the Propaganda Ministry under Joseph Goebbels and
charged with administering anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns. Waddington, L. L. (2007) „The AntiKomintern and Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda in the 1930s”, In: Journal of Contemporary History, 42(4),
Pages 573-594, here 573.
191
55
parties in Switzerland.198 Riedweg obviously was a multi-talented man, devoted to help
creating a better world according his beliefs.
In 1938, Riedweg decided to leave Switzerland illegally and migrate to Germany, at
the age of thirty-one. He stated in his postwar trial in Hiddesen near Bielefeld, that he
left Switzerland because of the adverse political climate, in which his ideas where
condemned, whereas in Germany they were highly welcomed. Once in Germany, he kept
on attending important meetings of the political elite and on one of these occasions he
got to know the General Field Marshal of the Wehrmacht, Werner von Blomberg.
Riedweg married his daughter Sybille von Blomberg in Munich shortly thereafter. With
this marriage he ensured his position in the political elite of Germany. This tie was not
the only reason for his career but was proved to be a fruitful basis to establish further
important connections. In the same year Riedweg received the German nationality,
being a dual citizen henceforth. Although he could have conscribed to the Wehrmacht
now, Riedweg decided to join the Waffen-SS on July 1th, 1938. Initially, he got a position
as a medical in the “Sanitätsstaffel der SS-Verfügungstruppe”, starting immediately with
the rank of a SS-Hauptsturmführer. He got promoted to SS-Sturmbannführer a year
thereafter and to SS-Obersturmbannführer in 1942.199
Riedweg’s remarkable desk career started in 1941, after he was appointed
“Stabsführer” (chief of staff) of the GL in the SS-HA. The Swiss authorities assessed in
Riedweg’s postwar trial, that he and the Reichsführer-SS shared in their belief that the
Waffen-SS should become an organ of power within the Germanic Reich and that there
should be an organic solution for Switzerland, meaning that Switzerland should become
incorporated in the new Germanic order as an equal member. Thus, Riedweg was
working and preparing for the National Socialist accession of power in Switzerland.
Riedweg was on a list200 from the SS-HA that recorded Swiss personalities with potential
to become a leader in the future incorporated Switzerland.201 The archive documents
200 The list was named „Liste der für den politischen Einsatz in der Schweiz vorgesehene Schweizerische
SS-Führer“. It listed several higher ranking Swiss volunteers, such as Riedweg, Büeler, Herrsche, Schaeppi
and many others. Bericht an die Anklagekammer des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes Lausanne, Luzern,
23. Juni 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
201 Bericht an die Anklagekammer des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes Lausanne, Luzern, 23. Juni 1947,
In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
198
56
indicated that Riedweg believed that Switzerland would play an important role in the
new structure.202 However, it is questionable to what extent Himmler actually planned
Switzerland in. It is more likely that the promise of equality in the new Reich served to
keep the Germanic allies in the boat.
Riedweg was truly convinced that the SS would be the foundation and the political
elite in the new Reich. He therefore set up plans to establish a “Germanische SSSturmbanne Schweiz”, based in Switzerland for which 300 chosen men were designated.
However, the plan never succeeded. The authorities assumed that the Sportschule Maag,
which was described in the previous chapter, served as a recruitment basis to
accomplish the “Plan-S”. Riedweg as Stabschef of the GL had an important function in the
SS-HA, being in charge of the Germanic volunteers but he also played an important role
for the Swiss volunteers. His area of responsibility encompassed an advisory function in
the GL for Himmler and Gottlob Berger concerning “Swiss questions”. Also, he was
involved in the construction of the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart, for which he held
supervision. Riedweg made sure that the Panoramaheim was working closely with the
“Staatspolizei Leitstelle Stuttgart” (state police) and the “militärische Abwehrstelle”
(military defense agency), and that in turn made the Swiss authorities believe that the
Panoramaheim indeed was an espionage center. Additionally, Riedweg initiated the
observation of potential men in the NS movements in Switzerland and he supported
training courses and political seminars for the BSG.203
Thus, Riedweg was moving in the higher ranks of the Waffen-SS hierarchy. His
success resembled a meteoric rise and it seemed that he had a bright future. However,
Riedweg’s success and luck did not last. There are two periods distinguishable in
Riedweg’s career; the first period in which he started his career in the leading position
of the GL and a second period where he was removed from his post and relocated to the
front in 1943. Riedweg was relocated to the “3. Germanische Panzerkorps”, because of a
fundamental disagreement with Himmler and chief of the SS-HA, Gottlob Berger.204
Heinrich Büeler, who replaced Riedweg, stated that there were people in the SS-HA that
Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar
1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
202
57
were against the “Verschweizerung” (becoming Swiss) of the GL.205 Another explanation
of Büeler was, that the imperialistic forces in the SS-HA and GL took over so that the
representatives of the federalist idea were removed from their post.206
In Switzerland, Riedweg was expatriated in September 1944 and summoned to
appear in court in 1947, which he never did. However, he was convicted by a tribunal in
Hiddesen, Germany where he was convicted to a penalty of 2000 DM, the same year he
was supposed to appear in court in Switzerland. This matter will be discussed in chapter
five dealing with the post war punishment of the Swiss Waffen-SS volunteers. Riedweg
never returned to Switzerland but lived in Germany until his death in 2005.207 Riedweg
can be described as full-fledged Nazi. He was probably well informed about the
Holocaust, since he was moving in the highest Nazi circles.208Yet, he never expressed
guilt or remorse nor did he distance himself from the Nazi worldview.209
3.2. The Idealist Dr. Heinrich Büeler
Dr. Heinrich Büeler was Franz Riedweg’s right hand in the GL. He does not seem to have
been a brave man, striving for soldiership and heroism. He was a man of books, admiring
the National Socialism for its use of big words and dreams. He is called an idealist,
because he perceived the National Socialism as a sort of remedy and he was convinced
that he acted in the best interest of Europe and Switzerland without thinking that the
Nazi ideology would cause any harm. At some time, he commiserated the National
Socialists misunderstanding of true National Socialism. His daughter stated that he was
not an anti-Semite but that he was furious about Jewish dominance in finance.210
Heinrich Büeler (12. December 1901) was born in British India. With the age of six,
he returned with his two younger siblings to Switzerland where they lived with their
grandfather in Winterthur. Büeler always had been very studious as a child, so he
decided to study law at the University of Zürich, eventually graduating with a PhD in law
Büeler used the word „Verschweizerung“, which did not only refer to Riedweg. There were more Swiss
volunteers working in the GL. Riedweg and Büeler are the only Swiss volunteers discussed in the course of
this research.
206 Büeler‘s Stellungnahme zu den Anschuldigungen während der Strafuntersuchung und der Anklage vor
Bundesgericht in der Einvernahme, Ort unbekannt 1947, In AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, 10.2
Schriftsätze Heinrich Büeler zu seiner Verteidigung.
207 Quadri, P. (2010) „Riedweg, Franz“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhsdss.ch/textes/d/D42138.php [06.11.2013]
208 Schweizerische Hauptvertretung für die Britische Zone an das Eidgenössisch Poltische Departement,
Politische Angelegenheiten, Frankfurt M. 3. August 1949, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
209 Wyss 2010, Un Suisse, pp. 168.
210 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 162ff.
205
58
in 1924. During his time as a student, Büeler spent one semester at the University of
Hamburg and after his graduation he spent some time in Paris to deepen his French
knowledge. He finally opened his own chancery in Zürich in 1930. In the same year he
had to travel to The Hague for business purposes, where he met his future wife Johanna
Elisabeth de Vries. They got married in The Hague in 1931 and moved to Zürich
thereafter. They had three daughters.211
His family had close ties to Germany, since his father was honorary consul of
Germany between 1912 and 1914. So Büeler had already spent a lot of time in Germany
in the thirties when he visited his father. He maintained a close tie to Germany and
German friends, and therefore came to the belief, that the National Socialism could
restore Germany’s relevance in Europe and protect the civilized world against the
Bolshevist threat. As a result, he decided to join the Swiss renewal movement in 1932.
From that time on, Büeler started to network with the German Nazis but also with
leading personalities within NS organizations in Switzerland. Hence, the Swiss
authorities soon started to monitor Büeler because of his political activities. He was put
in custody in May 1941, from which he was released five months thereafter. However,
his reputation was damaged and that in turn affected his chancery. Confronted with the
resulting financial problems and an adverse political climate in Switzerland, Büeler
decided to emigrate to Germany. He stated in his curriculum vitae that he was in deep
consternation about the accusations by the Swiss authorities with regard to
endangerment of the Swiss independence, since he was convinced that he acted in
Switzerland’s best interest.212
Büeler left Switzerland illegally in November 1941, at the age of forty. He left
Switzerland with the intention to join the Waffen-SS. Thanks to his engagement in NS
organizations and his excellent connection to Riedweg, Büeler was appointed SSUntersturmführer right away and was appointed to SS-Sturmbannführer thereafter. He
initially arrived in the SS training camp Sennheim213 in January 1942 where he joined
the Waffen-SS. Afterwards, he attained the “Germanische Offizierslehrgang” in Bad Tölz
from October 1942 until March 1943. Büeler settled well in Germany and continued to
Curriculum Vitae Heinrich Büeler, Regensdorf 6. Juni 1951, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler,
Biographische Materialien, 1.2. Lebenslauf.
212 Curriculum Vitae Heinrich Büeler, Regensdorf 6. Juni 1951, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler,
213 The SS-Ausbildungslager Sennheim served as a training camp for the officer corps of mainly French
battalions. Mounine, H. (1999) Cernay 40-45. Le SS-Ausbildungslager de Sennheim. Edition de Polygone:
Ostwald, pp. 12.
211
59
speak High German only, refusing to speak Swiss German from that point on. He got an
authentic German pseudonym and called himself Dr. Schmitt.214 Büeler enjoyed his stay
in Germany very much and in a letter to his wife Johanna, Büeler expressed his feelings
in a poetic manner, swarming about the peace and recreation he found there. 215 Büeler
as a convinced National Socialist must have felt exhilarated now that he was in Germany,
feeling that he could help making a change and make the world a better place, protected
from the red pest and the antisocial forces. In his first letter to his wife Johanna he did
not ask her how she was doing and if she was coping without him. He started the letter
by saying how beautiful and good it was in Germany and then going on about politics
straight away. It is likely that Johanna did not understand her husband at that point
anymore. Later she divorced him and they never met each other again.216
In April 1942, Büeler was ordered to deputize the Panoramaheim for three weeks.
This indicates that he belonged to the higher circle of Swiss volunteers and moreover,
that some leadership capabilities were recognized. Between Mai 1942 and September
1943, he was responsible for the department for press and propaganda, in the GL. He
had a respectable career within the GL, as person in charge for the “Referat Schweiz”
(department Switzerland), functioning as Riedweg’s right hand. 217 His task was to
supervise and support the Swiss volunteers and their relatives. Büeler regarded the SSHA as “mental-ideological-political leadership medium” but denied that the Waffen-SS
ever engaged in politics towards Europe or that there had been plans for a future
incorporated Switzerland. He claimed only the “Führerhauptquartier” was in charge of
political considerations. He concluded that the fact that Berger was not convicted in
Nuremberg was proof enough that the SS-HA never played a role in foreign politics.218
Thus, Büeler was either very naive or he clearly downplayed the matters in front of the
authorities in order to clear his name and deeds in retrospect.
Similar as Riedweg, Büeler was not able to stay in office during the whole wartime.
Thanks to his fluency in French, he was transferred with the order to inspect the French
1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
215 Brief von Heinrich Büeler an seine Frau Johanna Elisabeth de Vries, Sennheim 20. Januar 1942, In: AfZ
Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, 17.9 Korrespondenzen und Personendossiers.
216 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 77f.
1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
218 Büeler‘s Stellungnahme zu den Anschuldigungen während der Strafuntersuchung und der Anklage vor
Bundesgericht in der Einvernahme, Ort unbekannt 1947, In AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, 10.2
Schriftsätze Heinrich Büeler zu seiner Verteidigung.
214
60
Waffen-SS in April 1944. As education officer and company commander he was assigned
to the “Ersatzbattailon of the Waffen-SS Grenadier Division Charlemagne” in Sennheim,
where he came under Hersche’s command.219 He stayed as company commander at the
front until the end of the war and was engaged in defense battles in West Prussia and
Pomerania. 220
By the end of the war, Büeler and his company were taken prisoner by American
troops; however he was able to flee. Whilst he was fleeing in direction south he was
picked up once more, this time from French troops. The French did not recognize him as
a Waffen-SS member, since Büeler did not have the tattoo on his arm. They probably
assumed that he was a Wehrmacht soldier and they soon realized his utility and released
him under the condition that he worked for them as a translator. So, once more his
language abilities helped him further. In July 1945 Büeler tried to return to Switzerland.
However, he the Swiss authorities denied him access to the country. He was sent to the
Swiss consulate with the remark that his documents were not sufficiently in order and
that he had to apply for a new passport. In reality, Büeler was already expatriated; the
customs official just neglected to inform him properly. So, he had no other choice than to
return and keep on working for the French troops. His luck did not last for long, as he
was arrested once more in February 1946. The French had found out about his
membership in the Waffen-SS and transferred him to the detention camp Balingen in
April 1946. He was released in the autumn of the same year and was asked to function as
translator once more. Büeler however decided to return to Switzerland in October 1946
with the wish to confront the authorities and clear his name. He did not succeed, as will
be explained in chapter five.221
Büeler was an idealist who was dreaming of a new European order, in which
Switzerland and moreover he himself would play an important role. He stated in April
1942, that the Swiss volunteers of the Waffen-SS would free Switzerland and that he
himself would play an important role as leader in the future of Switzerland. Therefore,
he observed the renewal movement and its members in Switzerland carefully, preparing
himself for the time after the war, when Switzerland and Europe would be
Heinrich Johann Hersche was another Swiss volunteer who will be described later in this chapter.
219
220
61
reorganized.222 Büeler clearly identified himself with the National Socialist utopia.
However, he can be seen as an opportunist at the same time. He believed in a German
victory and therefore tried to ensure a powerful position for the future. It is doubtful,
that he would have left the country if the Swiss authorities would not have prosecuted
him for his political activity. The fact that somebody loves to talk and lecture about
political utopias, does not automatically mean that he is ready to fight and die for his
ideas.
3.3. The Military Man Heinrich Johann Hersche
Major of the cavalry, Heinrich Johann Hersche was a
well disciplined military army man, known to be a
fanatic National Socialist from the early days.223 His
brother in law was Otto Reimann, who was executed
by the Swiss authorities for treason.224 His army
career was very important to him but he was
declared unfit for military service in December 1939.
In Germany, he was able to regain a respectable
position in the army and run free his perceptions of
soldiership and heroism.225
Heinrich Johann Hersche (30. November 1889,
Image 2 Heinrich Johann Hersche, In: BAR
E2200.156-02 1000/241 131
Appenzell) was raised in a respectable family in St. Gallen. So, once more, there is a
volunteer who was socialized in St. Gallen. His father was hotelier. Hersche was not a
very studious person but more a person of practical matters. He left school when he was
seventeen, graduating with only a high school diploma. After his graduation, Hersche
started an apprenticeship in a bank. However, after he finished his apprenticeship, he
decided to stay in the army. He absolved the officer candidate school and became
lieutenant in 1909. Hersche felt salvaged in the military circle and decided to stay on a
volunteer basis. He had an impressive career within the Swiss army, lastly holding the
1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
223 Bericht des Polizeikommando des Kanton Aargaus an das Eidgenössische Militärdepartement, Aarau,
29. April 1939, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
224 Oertle 2010, Appenzeller, pp. 41.
225 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Locarno 11. Juni 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
222
62
rank of a major of the cavalry in Bern. Yet, by the end of 1935, Heinrich was officially
retired from active service. The Swiss army did not indicate a reason for the forced
retirement but it can be assumed that his political activities and his membership in NS
organizations, as well as his financial problems could have been the decisive factor for
the decision.226
Hersche was politically active from an
early stage on. He joined the NF in 1935
and visited gatherings on a regular basis
but also engaged in smaller renewal
movement
organizations
such
as
the
“Eidgenössische Soziale Arbeiter Partei”,
E.S.A.P (Federal Social Working Party), the
“Eidgenössische Front”, EF (Federal Front)
and had connections to the VB. He was
planning
to
create
a
new
national
movement, which would unite the other
organizations under one big party. The aim
Image 3 Hersche as Cavalry Major in Bern, In: BAR
E4320 B 1970/25 670. C.02-1562.
of the desired movement was the renunciation of the liberal democracy and the
rapprochement with the authoritarian states. After his retirement from the Swiss army,
he started to function within the local NF group Bern in a leading position in November
1935 and in 1936 he became their “Obergruppenführer” (chief group leader).227 Hersche
even run for a post in the National Council but was not elected. He left the NF by the end
of 1936, because of his financial problems and the realization that his political activities
minimized his chances to get a sufficient income. Hersche did not find a good job and
maybe he was unsatisfied not being politically active, so he decided to rejoin the ESAP in
1939. The ESAP only accepted pure Swiss men fulfilling the Aryan ideal and the party
resembled their German brother NSDAP in structure and ideals. After the ESAP was
banned by the Swiss authorities in 1940, Hersche helped founding the NBS where he
again belonged to the leadership circle.228
Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
227 Bericht der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Divisionsgericht IV, Untersuchungsrichter
Hauptmann Schibli, Bern 26. August 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
226
63
The Swiss authorities started to supervise him, because of his involvement in these
NS organizations and the spreading of Nazi propaganda material. They monitored his
mail and observed his meetings. Hersche was outraged and offended about the fact that
the Swiss authorities perceived him as a traitor of the country, since he too believed that
he was acting in the best interest of Switzerland. In an interrogation by the police he
expressed his outrage about the fact that the freedom of press and speech was not
respected in the case of the renewal movement members.229 He even blamed the Swiss
authorities for his financial problems, since he said they resulted out of the permanent
police surveillance.230 However, since his political activities were seen as endangerment
of the Swiss neutrality, the authorities advance was justified.
Hersche perceived himself as a victim of a government that did not read the signs
of the time adequately.231 He was convinced that Germany would win the war and that
Switzerland at some point had to join the new order anyway. That is why he was
convinced that his political beliefs would be rewarded one day.232 Hersche was arrested
in July 1941 and spent fourteen days in custody. This must have aroused him even more,
so that he sent a letter to the minister of the German embassy in Bern, asking for the
German nationality with the comment that he wanted to renounce his Swiss
citizenship.233
Hersche was married and had two children; his son however had died in 1940 of
cancer.234 However, the family was sticking together, so that his wife and daughter
followed him to Germany.235 His financial problems, his desire to live heroism and
soldiership and the animosity of the Swiss authorities against his political ideals
contributed to his desire to leave for a greater future. In Germany he saw the country
Korrespondenz Heinrich Johann Hersche an Erich Teuchgraber aus der Postsperre, Polizeikommando
Bern im Auftrag der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Thun 30. November 1939, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
230 Schweizerisches Armeekommando an die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 4. Mai 1940, In:
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
231 Brief über Politische Massnahmen von Heinrich Johann Hersche an den Führerkreis der Nationalen
Bewegung Schweiz, Basel 22. Juli 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
232 Brief von Major Heinrich Johann Hersche an den Redaktor des Oltener Tagblatt W. R. Amman, als
Reaktion auf einen über ihn erschienenen Artikel im Oltener Tagblatt, Nr. 150 vom 29. Juni 1940, Basel 4.
Juli 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
233 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft durch Inspektor Eberle an den
Chef des eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 10. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25
670, C.02-1562.
235 Aktennotiz zum Vorsprechen von Heinrich Johann Hersche beim Schweizerischen Generalkonsulat,
München 28. Juli 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
229
64
where all his dreams had to become true, where he could earn enough money, where he
and his ideas would be respected and where he could start all over again. Hersche
decided to leave Switzerland illegally on December 13, 1941.236
Hersche stated in the interrogation by the investigative judge Gloor in 1947, that
he left Switzerland, because of a job prospect in a leading position in an armament
concern in Gablonz but that he finally did not accept the job as of a misunderstanding on
the position and salary. However, in the letter to the German ambassador in Bern
concerning his application for the German nationality, he expressed his desire to join the
Wehrmacht as volunteer right away.237 Moreover, Büeler confirmed in an interrogation
by Gloor on the person of Hersche, that they signed in at the same time in December
1941.238 That would mean that Hersche indeed joined the Waffen-SS immediately.
Hersche was directly appointed SS-Stumbannführer, corresponding to his rank of a
major in the Swiss army, was promoted to SS-Obersturmbannführer in 1944 and lastly
SS-Standartenführer in the spring of 1945.239
In his interrogation by the SBA in 1947, Hersche indicated that he was not truly a
SS member, since he never got sworn in, that he never got the blood group tattoo and
that he only was hired to support the education of the Germanic volunteers. He stated
that he initially was hired as a civil riding instructor in Munich in 1942. Moreover, he
claimed that he only was ordered to wear the SS uniform as of disciplinary reasons and
considerations in regard with the other volunteers in 1943. Allegedly, he only agreed
under the condition that he never had to engage against Switzerland.240 Then again,
Büeler stated that Hersche was dismissed from the Waffen-SS in 1943, because of an
internal intrigue. Hersche was said to have been very disappointed and that he was
hoping for a job in the propaganda department. Apparently, Hersche was able to stay in
the Waffen-SS with the help of his friend Riedweg.241 However, it is very likely that
again, Hersche dramatized his dismissal. He was suffering of pulmonary tuberculosis
Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
237 Bericht des Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft durch Inspektor Eberle an den Chef
des eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 10. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670,
C.02-1562.
238 Befragung von Heinrich Büeler betreffend Heinrich Johann Hersche, durch den Eidgenössischen
Untersuchungsrichter O. Gloor, Zürich 3. November 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
241 Befragung von Heinrich Büeler betreffend Heinrich Johann Hersche, durch den Eidgenössischen
236
65
and had already spent some time in various sanatoria. His personal file of the Waffen-SS
remarked that he was dismissed because of his health issues. The dismissal was
repealed in December 1943.242
So, Hersche was transferred to Sennheim where he was ordered to educate a
French battalion. He remained there until October 1944, training French243 and a Dutch
volunteer corps for which he received the “Kriegsverdienstkreuz 2. Klasse” (War Merit
Cross).244 He held the position of a deputy commander in Sennheim and the SBA
reported that in the course of his tasks he held political lectures and wrote articles for
the BSG. By the end of October 1944, the battalion was transferred to Creifenburg in
Pomerania, since the French troops were approaching and Hersche, as well as the SS-HA
wanted to avoid a battle between the French troops and the French Waffen-SS
volunteers. Hersche and his French battalion were fighting a rearguard battle against the
Russians instead until February 1945.245
Afterwards, Hersche claimed that his duty was only of a military nature and that he
was not involved in the ideological education of the volunteers.246 It is hard to believe
that he stated the truth and it can be assumed that he downplayed the facts in order to
escape severe. A career in the Waffen-SS was only possible with the respective
ideological commitment and achieving the rank of a SS-Standartenführer indicates that
he fulfilled this requirement. Furthermore, his previous political activities in Switzerland
clearly show that he was a convinced National Socialist, already involved in ideological
programs and party organization in Switzerland.247 Why should he not continue with
that in Germany, especially since he could satisfy his desire for recognition and success?
Hersche furthermore maintained good relations with the SS-HA and he was on the
list for potential leaders in Switzerland. Herrsche was said to have met Berger and
Riedweg on various occasions, discussing the possibilities of Hersche in a leading
position. Moreover, he engaged in activities of the BSG, helping with the organization
Dienstlaufbahn von Heinrich Johann Hersche, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch SS
Führerpersonalakten (SSO 092 A) 92 – A Hermann, Fritz – Hertel, Harald.
243 The here said battalion was the French „Ersatz-Battalion der 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division SS
Charlemagne“. Oertle 2010, Appenzeller, pp. 20.
245 Verfügung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft über Heinrich Johann Hersche, Bern 17. Oktober
1947, In: E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
247 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft durch Inspektor Eberle an den
Chef des eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 10. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25
670, C.02-1562.
242
66
and implementation of “Sonderlehrgänge” (special courses) for the propaganda of the
Waffen-SS. The SBA suspected that Hersche’s position in “Hitler Germany” and the
Waffen-SS were not only of military nature but of political character and that he clearly
shared the National Socialistic ideology which he also aspired for Switzerland. In regard
of these findings, the SBA prepared a treason trial, which will be discussed in chapter
five.248 Socially marginalized, Hersche died in poor conditions in Hergiswil Switzerland
in 1971.249
3.4. The Nazi Johann Eugen Corrodi
Johann Eugen Corrodi (18. August 1897, Zürich) was the
most highly decorated amongst the Swiss volunteers. He
already engaged in the Swiss renewal moment in the
interwar years and he was a convinced Nazi and antiSemite. Corrodi did not have a desk career, nor was he
dealing with the ideological idea of a Germanic Reich.
Corrodi was a true military man.250
Unfortunately, the archive material could not give
information about his youth or the family he grew up in.
What is known from the sources is that he was the owner
of a fashion store in Zürich in the interwar years and that
he was successful in the Swiss Army, holding the rank of a
major of the infantry. Furthermore, he was a convinced
Frontist. Hence, in the course of the criminal prosecutions
Image 4 Johann Eugen Corrodi, In:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewto
pic.php?f=38&t=28101&start=0
[19.11.2013]
because of his engagement in NS organizations, Corrodi left Switzerland in July 1941 and
joined the Waffen-SS immediately under the pseudonym of Von Elfenau.251 He named
himself after his former villa in Biel; “zur Elfenau” and it can be assumed that he chose
the pseudonym to have a true German name, indicating his membership in the supreme
Verfügung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft über Heinrich Johann Hersche, Bern 17. Oktober
1947, In: E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
249 Oertle 2010, Appenzeller, 152.
250 Wisard 1999, Major biennois, pp. 99-103.
251 Bericht des Bundesrates betreffend Beschwerde von Corrodi gegen eine Verfügung des
Eidgenössischen. Militärdepartements betreffend bedingte Entlassung, Bern 3. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4110 A
1000/1832 105, C.08.15.
248
67
Aryan race.252 Paul Diebold, who was introduced in the previous chapter, described
Corrodi as a very arrogant person, who treated others condescending. Corrodi
apparently only spoke in High German whilst other Swiss were glad to be able to speak
Swiss German once in a while.253
Previously, Corrodi had served as major and commander of an infantry battalion in
the Swiss Army. Therefore, he was appointed SS-Standartenführer in the German
Waffen-SS right away and he eventually achieved the rank of a SS-Oberführer of the 8.. SS
cavalry division. Between November 1941 and April 1942, he was in the Junkerschule
Bad Tölz where he was educated in the norms of the Waffen-SS. Thereafter, he became
an instructor at the “Panzerschule” in Lorraine, France. Thereafter Corrodi was
appointed to oversee the creation of an Italian SS brigade, since he spoke Italian.254
After the war, Corrodi returned to Switzerland where he was sentenced to thirty
months in prison. After finishing his sentence, Corrodi stayed in Switzerland and
reopened a fashion store in Basel. Corrodi died on February 19, 1980 in Basel. During
his lifetime, he never expressed any remorse, nor did he ever distance himself from
National Socialism. He remained a convinced Nazi his whole lifetime and kept on using
his SS rank and pseudonym in Switzerland.255 Moreover, Corrodi is said to have taken
part in various “Säuberungsaktionen” in Poland and the Soviet Union and in 1944
Corrodi was on the hunt of partisans in Italy with the “29. SS division”.256 Unfortunately,
there are no personal statements or further information to be found on these matters.257
Bericht von Dr. Jezler über Johann Eugen Corrodi, Bern 6. September 1948, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783
3315, 1753.
254 Croisier, G. M. (2002) “Informationen über Johann Eugen Corrodi”, In: The Axis History Forum Online:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=38&t=28101&start=0 [19.11.2013].
255 Zeitungsartikel, Untragbar und Unerwünscht. Der Schweizer Brigadier-SS General im Grand Hotel, In:
Israelisches Wochenblatt, Zürich 10. September 1948, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 3315, 1753.
256 Cantini, C. (2004) “Corrodi, Johann Eugen“, In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online:
http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D45271.php [19.11.2013].
257 There is surprisingly little information on Corrodi, neither in the Bundesarchiv Berlin nor in the
Bundesarchiv Bern. One explanation could be that Corrodi for the most part lived in the French part of
Switzerland and that therefore the archives in Geneva and Biel could have more information. Secondly, I
estimate that the military archive in Bern would have more information on him as well. The fact that
Corrodi was never part of a treason trial, fails to explain why there is almost no information on him in the
Bundesarchiv Bern. Furthermore, I did not find his personal files in Berlin either. The reason for this could
be that I was searching with his full name rather than his pseudonym. I do estimate that he could be found
under his pseudonym Von Elfenau. I chose to include him in this chapter since he was the highest ranking
Swiss volunteer in the Waffen-SS.
252
68
3.5. The Instructor Alfred Nikles
Alfred Nikles (4. January 1907, Bern) absolved an
apprenticeship as businessman in Switzerland without
following a higher education thereafter. This was not
atypical, since Nikles decided to follow a higher military
education. He was serving in the Swiss army where he
eventually was appointed lieutenant. Before his
emigration to Germany, Nikles engaged actively in the
NF in Switzerland, where he had an important function
in the local group of Interlaken. Divergences in the NF
resulted in the establishment of the “Bund treuer
Image 5 Alfred Nikles, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 314, C.02-511.
Eidgenossen nationalsozialistischer Weltanschauung” BTE (Association of faithful
Confederates of the National Socialist worldview), where Nikles affiliated shortly
thereafter. Nikles was appointed head of this organization and commissioned with the
creation of a “Schutz-Korps” (Protection Corps) which had the character of an
intelligence service.258
The Swiss Federal Criminal Court convicted Nikles in 1939 to six months in prison,
because of his engagement in NS organizations and espionage activities.259 A year later,
Nikles was expelled from the army.260 Nikles stated that he left Switzerland illegally in
1939, because it was clear to him that there would be a war and he simply did not want
to be in jail once the war broke out. After crossing the border, he immediately joined the
Waffen-SS on his own request on January 1, 1940 at the age of thirty-three.261 Thanks to
the connections he had from the NF, he was appointed SS-Obersturmführer right
away.262 In 1941 he was promoted to SS-Hauptsturmführer.263
Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern
1.Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511.
259 The sentence was based on “Zuwiderhandlung gegen Art. 2 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 21. Juni 1935
betreffend den Schutz der Sicherheit der Eidgenossenschaft“.
260 Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern
261 SS-Hauptsturmführer Alfred Nikles an den Kommandeur des Ersatzkommandos Frankreich, betreffend
Anfrage für den Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer, Paris 5. Juli 1944, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C02-511.
263 Beurteilung von Nikles Alfred durch die Germanische Leitstelle, Berlin 25. September 1943, In: BArch
SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus.
258
69
Initially, he was serving in the SS regiment Germania, where he was active in
combat in the Netherlands and in France in the course of the western campaign.264 An
assessment report on his performance within the regiment Germania concluded that
Nikles was not yet ready to be in a leadership position as instructor in the field, as his
military knowledge and experience were not seen as sufficient. However, because of his
profound National Socialist worldview, he was recommended for an exceptional political
position.265 Therefore, he was entrusted with the leading of the Panoramaheim. He
renamed himself to Dr. Hutten and refused to speak Swiss German from that moment
on. Like Riedweg, Büeler, and Corrodi, Nikles also wanted to be perceived as German.
Several Swiss volunteers gave testimony on the person of Nikles and claimed that he
tried to convince every Swiss man by force and pressure to join the Waffen-SS. Also, he
interrogated the newcomers on military matters.266 Nikles did not remain the leader of
the Panoramaheim until the end of the war but was transferred to the “SS
Ergänzungsstab Frankreich” in Paris where he was promoted to deputy head of office.267
Nikles was able to start a modest career within the Waffen-SS right away, because
of his active engagement in NS organizations in Switzerland. Although he was not
perceived as skilled enough for a military career in the field, the Waffen-SS recognized
his potential and deployed him for political positions instead. It can be assumed that
Nikles, who spoke German, French and English fluently, was suitable for leading
positions, regarding the education of foreign volunteers, mainly Swiss and French. So,
his Swiss background, including a previous higher position in the Swiss army, certainly
was beneficial to his career in the Waffen-SS. However, without his strong NS ideology
and previous engagement in Switzerland in NS organizations, he probably would not
have achieved the rank of a SS-Hauptsturmführer.
Dienstlaufbahn von Nikles Alfred, Ort und Datum unbekannt, BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350
A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus.
265 Abschrift der Beurteilung von SS-Obersturmführer Nikles Alfred, Hamburg-Langenhorn 13.2.1940, In:
BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus.
267 Beurteilung von Nikles Alfred durch die Germanische Leitstelle, Berlin 25. September 1943, In: BArch
264
70
3.6. The War Correspondent Benno Schaeppi
Benno Schaeppi’s (24. November 1911, St. Gallen) career
was different. He had the rank of a SS-Untersturmführer.
He was not involved in the bureaucratic apparatus, nor
did he have a career as a soldier. His vocation was of a
different
nature.
He
made
a
name
as
a
war
correspondent, reporting about the events at the front,
combining his articles with political statements. Schaeppi
is one of the Swiss volunteers, who engaged in the
propaganda work, helping to shape the impeccable and
heroic image of the Waffen-SS soldier by glorifying the
war. In his articles for “Das Schwarze Korps”,268 he was
railing against Switzerland and its neutrality. However, the
Image 6 Benno Schaeppi, In: BAR
E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713
aim of the articles was to increase recruitment of new volunteers.269
Benno Schaeppi was born in St. Gallen as son of a businessman. Schaeppi is the
fifth volunteer in this case study with that particular background. However, the family
moved to Davos in the mountains, because his mother was suffering from a lung disease.
She died when Benno was two years old. Four years later, Benno’s father married for the
second time, however, Benno and his older sister refused to accept the new wife.
Benno’s dream always was to follow a university education, but since his father lost his
money in speculations, Benno had to be content with a commercial apprenticeship. This
increased the family problems and the teenager Benno continued to rebel until his
father sent him to an “Erziehungsanstalt”. It is possible that Schaeppi found a way to
project his frustrations onto political topics. After he became more calm, he joined the
NF in 1933 and from 1938 on the BTE, where he completely felt being in the right place.
He himself stated that from that moment on, he was only living for Swiss National
„Das Schwarze Korps“ (The Black Corps) was the official newsletter of the SS and was published for the
first time in 1935. It contained foreign News reports, theoretical essays on Nazi policies, and most
importantly propaganda advertisements for admission into the SS. Each member was supposed to read
the publication and motivate others to do the same. It was published on a weekly base and free of charge.
Zeck, M. (2002) Das Schwarze Korps. Geschichte und Gestalt des Organs der Reichsführung SS. Niemeyer:
Tübingen, pp. 75.
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
268
71
Socialism. From 1936 until 1938 he was the propaganda leader of the NF.270 However,
like Riedweg and Büeler, Schaeppi believed in a German Reich in which Switzerland
would have an independent position, so that he was against an annexation of
Switzerland by Germany.271
Schaeppi was already working as a journalist in Zürich before he decided to join
the Nazis in their so-called struggle for a new European order. Since 1935, he was
writing for numerous NS newspapers.272 He furthermore functioned as a courier for
secret letters amongst leading Frontists in Germany and Switzerland between 1940 and
1941.273
Just like the other higher ranking volunteers in this chapter, Benno also
experienced prosecution prior to his escape to Germany. Initially, Schaeppi had been
convicted by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court because of his political activities and
membership in the NSDAP to four months in prison in July 1939. Immediately after his
sentence, Schaeppi decided to leave Switzerland with his wife Elisabeth. Since he did not
report to the army after the first and second mobilization, Schaeppi was once more
convicted, this time by the military court “Divisionsgericht 8” in absentia to three years
in prison in September 1941. Two years later, he was convicted once more for having
joined a foreign army. 274 He found a job as foreign correspondent in the company Milei
G.m.b.H but did not stay for long. In the spring of 1941, he joined the Waffen-SS and was
immediately ordered to a propaganda unit at the Eastern Front. He received the “Eiserne
Kreuz” and a “Panzersturmabzeichen” for his military service.275
The Swiss authorities were well informed about Schaeppi’s activities in Germany.
They knew that he had joined the Waffen-SS, that he held the rank of a SSOberscharführer and that he was working as war correspondent, being involved in
Schweizer in der Waffen-SS, Sendung von Hans-Rudolf Lehmann auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ
Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit. Cf. Lebenslauf Benno Schaeppi, Bad Tölz 28. Januar 1944, In:
BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 068 B) 68 – B Schaefer – Schaettiger.
271 Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundeanwaltschaft, Zürich 8. Dezember 1938, In: BAR E 4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
272 NSZ Rheinfront, Bodensee-Rundschau, Der Führer Karlsruhe, Schwarz-Wälder-Tageblatt, Hessische
Landeszeitung, NS Kurier Stuttgart, Die Front, Schweizervolk, Schweizerdegen und Nationale Hefte.
Abhörungsprotoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft,
Zürich 20. Januar 1939, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
273 Abschrift aus der Abhörung des Dr. Hügel durch die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Ort
unbekannt 28. Januar bis 5. Februar 1946, In: E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
274 Bericht des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartement bezüglich Ausbürgerung von Benno
Schaeppi, Bern 3. Dezember 1943, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16.
275 Auskunft des Schweizerischen Konsulates über Benno Schaeppi, Stuttgart 18. August 1941, In: BAR
E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16.
270
72
propaganda work. They furthermore knew that Schaeppi and his wife were members of
the BSG.276 So the authorities were aware of his ideological commitment to the Reich. In
a letter to Schaeppi, they asked him to continue to support his own father, who was left
indigent in Zürich. The authorities therefore ask him not to let out his frustration
political on the “Armenpflege” Zürich. They reminded him that it might be easier to hide
behind his ideology but that he nonetheless was having obligations towards his mother
country. They urged him to take his responsibilities towards his family as serious as his
fight against bolshevism and they requested to pay 40 RM each month.277 Whilst in
Switzerland his reputation was damaged, Germany he and his wife were both perceived
as capable, striving and reliable people.278
In 1942, Schaeppi was promoted to SS-Untersturmführer and Riedweg ordered
him to the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart.279 So, Benno took over Nikles’ position as new
Panoramaheim leader. In his function as author for the Black Corps, he had proven to be
the ideal person for recruitment and persuasion of new Waffen-SS volunteers. From that
point on, it seems that the recruitment style in the Panoramaheim became more drastic,
because Schaeppi was leading a stricter regime. The Swiss Federal Justice and Police
department concluded in a report on Schaeppi, that he was influencing the Swiss men
politically. Apparently, Schaeppi engaged in the interrogations of the so-called
“Schwarzgänger” (Swiss men who crossed the Swiss border illegally) by the Gestapo. It
seems that Schaeppi wanted to be involved in the selection of the potential volunteers’
right from the start.280 Also, Schaeppi was said to have been more diligent than Nikles.
Apparently, Schaeppi was striving for every single volunteer within the Panoramaheim,
whilst Nikles delegated a lot to his secretary.281
Bericht des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartement bezüglich Ausbürgerung von Benno
Schaeppi, Bern 3. Dezember 1943, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16.
277 “Wir ersuchen Sie dringend, Ihre Empörung über die Schweiz. Regierung nun nicht ausgerechnet an
der Armenpflege der Stadt Zürich auszulassen, die seit Jahren für Ihren mittellosen Vater sorgt. Denken
Sie doch in erster Linie an Ihre Pflichten als Sohn, wenn Sie schon die Pflichten Ihrem Vaterland
gegenüber nicht erfüllen wollen.“ Brief des Fürsorgeamtes Zürich an Benno Schaeppi, Zürich 15.
Dezember 1941, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16.
278 Auskunft des Schweizerischen Konsulates über Benno Schaeppi, Stuttgart 18. August 1941, In: BAR
E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16.
279 Lebenslauf Benno Schaeppi, Bad Tölz 28. Januar 1944, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 068 B)
68 – B Schaefer – Schaettiger.
280 Bericht des Schweizerischen Konsul an das Eidgenössische Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Ort
unbekannt 1943, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16.
281 Abschrift aus der Abhörung des Dr. Hügel durch die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Ort
unbekannt 28. Januar bis 5. Februar 1946, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
276
73
Like Büeler, Corrodi and Nikles, Schaeppi also decided to use a pseudonym and
named himself Bernd Schäfer. Schaeppi was a very ambitious man, involved in many
different tasks. Between spring and autumn 1942, Benno was engaged in the GL, where
he was responsible for “Schweizerfragen” and press activities. Schaeppi remained leader
of the Panoramaheim until March 1944. Until that time, he also gave training courses in
the Germanic officer school Junkerschule Bad Tölz and he was involved in the erection of
a Germanic SS Switzerland.282 By the end of the war, Schaeppi was appointed leader of
the “Kriegsberichter Kompanie” (war correspondent company) in the “III. SS
Panzerkorps”. There he witnessed the collapse of Berlin and was taken POW by the
Americans. During his imprisonment, Schaeppi too was able to secure a position as
translator in the SS-Sonderlager Darmstadt, thus enjoyed a good position and the
respect of the American camp commander.283
Although Schaeppi did not achieve a higher rank in the Waffen-SS, he was
nonetheless involved in the propaganda activities of the Waffen-SS and he played an
important role in the Swiss matters especially. He can be seen as a linking person, who
connected the interests of the Swiss National Socialists with the Nazi authorities. Like
Riedweg and Büeler, Schaeppi was convicted in the treason trial in 1947, which will be
subject of chapter five. In 1955, Schaeppi received the German citizenship and after he
had been dismissed from prison in 1956, he decided to live in Germany and Paris.
Schaeppi died in 1988 in Eckernförde, Germany.284
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
283 Antrag auf Amnestie an den Präsidenten des ausserordentlichen Kassationshofes am Schweizerischen
Bundesgericht, Strafanstalt Regensdorf Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
284 Wolf, W. (2011) „Schaeppi, Benno Heinrich“. In: Schweizerisches Lexikon Online: http://www.hls-dhsdss.ch/textes/d/D43428.php [3.12.2013].
282
74
4. Motivation and Ideological
Commitment
The SS called themselves elite troop of the Führer and a community of ideological
committed National Socialists. According to Jean-Luc Leleu, the Waffen-SS was
increasingly perceived as a social model of a society in war times and as an ideal for the
ethnic community.285 The Waffen-SS man was not just a simple soldier, but rather a
political soldier and representative of the National Socialist world view.286 In spite of
this, Stein remarked in his study that the SS ideology in theory and the Waffen-SS
ideology in practice were not always identical. Although the Waffen-SS had a distinct
ideology, it served more as a manipulative device than as a true ideology. Yet, he
underlined that the recruits joining the Waffen-SS before 1943287 were all volunteers,
who hardly could have failed to recognize the uniqueness and ideology of the formation
they were conscribing to.288 However, this does not necessarily imply that all the
volunteers joined out of ideological commitment. Yet, Thomas Casagrande stated in his
study on the SS-division “Prinz Eugen”, that the motivation of the Germanic volunteers
originated from a political motive, combining the Germanic idea, as well as the
considerable commitment to National Socialism, which in turn signified the desire to
fight bolshevism and to stand on the side of the victorious German troop.289
Gutmann pointed out that the Swiss officer corps volunteers had developed a
longing for a radical reorganization of the European political, social and economical
conditions before joining the Waffen-SS and that this longing was amplified by what
these men perceived as threat to the core of European civilization. He furthermore
assessed that there was a significant number of well-integrated and educated men, who
left for Germany with an active interest in contributing to the Nazi project. He concluded
that the officer corps volunteers had an ideological inclination towards fascism with an
Tagungsbericht Vergemeinschaftung und Ausgrenzung. Neue Forschungen zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS.
02.12.2010-04.12.2011, Dresden, in: H-Soz-u-Kult, 11.03.2011, Online: http://hsozkult.geschichte.huberlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=3573 [16.04.2014].
286 Dingel 2007, Waffen-SS, pp. 862.
287 From 1943 on, the Waffen-SS was allowed to draft recruits under duress. Hein 2011, Himmlers Orden,
276.
288 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 122, 125.
289 Casagrande, T. (2003) Die Volksdeutsche SS-Division „Prinz Eugen“. Die Banater Schwaben und die
Nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrechen. Campus Verlag: Frankfurt, New York, pp.323.
285
75
imbedded pan-Europeanist tension.290 Oertle on the other hand, claimed that antibolshevism and ideological commitment was not a main factor in the motivation and
therefore, only of little significance. He assessed that the young volunteers mostly
became ideologically committed, because of the special training and “Weltanschauungs
Unterricht”.291
Oertle admitted that the motivation was manifold. At the same time, he explained
the phenomenon of Swiss participation in the war as a surrogate for the mercenary
army and by doing so, using an old image of the Swiss confederate soldier. This
explanation certainly is obsolete and does not explain why the Swiss chose for Germany,
since they could have joined the Allies instead. Lastly, Oertle concluded that the Swiss
renewal movement did not succeed to influence the volunteers, as the movement was
too fragmented and estranged and therefore insignificant.292 However, twelve out of
seventeen men in this case study were member of NS organizations prior to their
conscription to the Waffen-SS. Oertle clearly underestimated the influence of ideological
commitment, as well as the importance of the renewal movement in Switzerland.
This chapter focuses on the ideological committed volunteers in this case study.
Similar as the different NS organizations, the volunteers in this case study also disposed
different values. They all had a strong sense for National Socialism but at the same time,
they were not all equally motivated or driven by the same convictions. As a
consequence, even ideological commitment as a motivation has to be differentiated. The
renewal movement in Switzerland was not a uniform movement but rather composed of
many different NS organizations. As a result, the ideologically committed volunteers
were all National Socialist in character but stressed different values. Some advocated an
own Swiss National Socialism, others longed for an affiliation and incorporation to the
German Reich. However, they all aspired a restructuring of the political, economical and
social conditions in Switzerland and Europe.
The question is what different values of National Socialism were expressed by the
ideological committed volunteers? Thus, the different aspects of National Socialism have
to be addressed and linked to personal statements from the volunteers. Race struggle
and anti-Semitism were the crucial aspects of German Nazism. So it has to be assessed, if
these matters were equally important for the Swiss volunteers. Furthermore,
Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 585, 591f.
Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 47ff.
292 Ibid.
290
291
76
Bolshevism was perceived as the main threat against National Socialism and certainly
served as a good excuse for conscription in the post war trials. Additionally, Hitler
aspired a Greater Germanic Reich in which all Germanic people would live together. Did
that vision for a greater Reich excite and influence the Swiss volunteers? Lastly, as
established in chapter three, the higher ranking volunteers were driven by opportunistic
considerations. That is why special attention will be given to that aspect of motivation.
4.1. National Socialism and Anti-Semitism
The German National Socialism or Nazism incorporated scientific racism, anti-Semitism
and asserted the superiority of the Aryan race.293 As a consequence, the rhetoric of race
struggle was adopted by the renewal movements in Switzerland. The Swiss NS
volunteers, like Franz Riedweg, openly expressed their desire for a return to traditional
values like Volk and homeland.294 However, the understanding of the term Volk was not
just restricted to the Swiss nationality. In contrary, the NS volunteers felt that they
belonged to the German Volk, since the Swiss language and culture were believed to
originate from Germany. As a consequence, they perceived the German struggle as their
very personal struggle. Schaeppi for example expressed his conviction accordingly:
„Wir sind Fanatiker. Wir bekennen uns zum Nationalsozialismus. Wir sehen, dass
es in unseren Tagen nur ein Volk gibt auf dieser ganzen Erde, dass den Sinn allen
Seins verstanden hat und darnach handelt: Deutschland. Wir gehören zu diesem
Volke. Wir Schweizer Nationalsozialisten stehen heute noch mitten im Kampf um
die Seele dieses Volkes.“295
The volunteers adopted the NS vocabulary, by expressing their pride for “Volk und
Rasse”, as can be noticed in Othmar Maag’s letter to his friend and fellow soldier Fritz:
Definition National Socialism, In: Encyclopaedia Britannica, last updated 7.1.2014. Online:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405414/National-Socialism# [18.05.2014].
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
293
77
“(…) Bei deinem Spaziergang über Land hätte ich dich gerne begleitet, gibt es doch
nichts Schöneres als Volk und Land kennen zu lernen. Dass man dabei die
Feststellung machen muss, dass viel von der Bodenständigkeit verloren gegangen
ist, ist ansich nicht erstaunlich. Denn dank dem Liberalismus der uns den „Segen“
dieser gegenwärtigen Demokratie und „Menschenwürde“ gebracht hat, haben sich
rassenfremde Leute angesiedelt und unsere bodenverwachsene Bauern vertrieben.
(…)296
The ideologically driven volunteers were convinced that they had to contribute to
the spread of National Socialism in Switzerland. Ten out of seventeen volunteers in this
case study engaged actively in NS organizations, either as active members, in leading
positions, or were involved in the spread of propaganda material. Benno Schaeppi for
example worked as a journalist in Switzerland and was writing for several NS
newspapers. He propagated the NS ideology with a lot of passion and conviction. In an
interrogation by the SBA regarding his political activities Schaeppi stated that:
“Unter
Deutscher
Propaganda
verstehe
ich
die
Propagierung
des
nationalsozialistischen Gedankengutes. Es ist mir selbstverständlich daran
gelegen, dieses Gedankengut hier zu verbreiten, (…). (…) es ist Gewähr geboten,
dass keine Möglichkeit ausser Acht gelassen wird, den Nationalsozialismus in allen
seinen Bezirken und Erscheinungsformen nach und nach hier zum Durchbruch zu
verhelfen, zum Allermindesten aber zu Verständnis für unsere Weltanschauung zu
führen.“297
The detailed examination of the personal statements revealed that the struggle of
the Aryan was not a primary consideration for the Swiss volunteers. For most of them
National Socialism was attractive, since it was an extreme form of nationalism. Although
they adopted the NS rhetoric and fancied the notion of the Volk, they were more
concerned with the restructuring of Europe. It can be assumed that the discourse of race
struggle was not central for the Germanic volunteers in general. Stein remarked that
already the recruiting pamphlet issued to all potential Germanic volunteers, suggested
Brief von Othmar Maag an Leutnant Fritz Steiner, Winterthur 21. August 1940, In: BAR E4320 B
1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
297 Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 8. Dezember 1938, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
296
78
that the race struggle was not the primary emphasis. On the contrary, comradeship,
heroism and brotherhood were the more noticeable slogans.298 However, there is
another aspect of race struggle that cannot be left out in the assessment and that is antiSemitism.
Anti-Semitism was a crucial part of the Swiss NS party programs. As a result, the
rumor on Jewish world conspiracy, especially in the financial sector, found its way into
the political discourse of these movements. Yet, not all the Swiss who were National
Socialists were anti-Semitic at the same time. Nonetheless, the volunteers accepted antiSemitism as part of the party program and did not question its relevance. Schaeppi
answered the question on the role of anti-Semitism in the radio interview:
“Ich habe an sich mit Juden nie Kontakt gehabt und, jedenfalls bewusst nicht, und
ich konnte also nicht etwa aus Hassgefühlen von innen heraus Antisemit werden.
Auf der anderen Seite gab es damals in der Schweiz eine beträchtliche
Arbeitslosigkeit und wir wurden darauf aufmerksam gemacht, und wir sahen das
ja auch, dass z.B. der Mittelstand zugrundeging, wegen der Warenhäuser, die doch
im wesentlichen in jüdischen Händen waren.“299
Although Schaeppi claimed that anti-Semitism was not influential in his decision, this
statements underlines that he clearly was influenced by anti-Semitic feelings. The
emphasis on the destruction of the middle class through Jewish stores represents the
typical NS rhetoric.
Most of the volunteers did not mention anti-Semitism explicitly in their statements.
It could be possible that they did not mention it in the interrogation, since they were
aware that this would not be helpful to lower their degree of penalty. However, it can be
assumed that they all displayed a form of anti-Semitism, the same way they adopted the
other aspects of National Socialism. For Othmar Maag for example, anti-Semitism indeed
The pamphlet issued the following: „if you answer the call of the Waffen-SS and volunteer to join the
ranks of the great front of SS divisions, you will belong to a corps which from the very beginning has been
associated with outstanding achievements, and therefore has developed an especially deep feeling of
comradeship. You will be bearing arms with a corps that embraces the most valuable element of the young
German generation. Above all, you will be especially bound top the National Socialist ideology.” In: Stein
1966, Waffen SS, pp. 125.
299 Schweizer in der Waffen-SS. Sendung von Hans-Rudolf Lehmann auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ
Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit.
298
79
was a motivational factor to leave to Germany and join the Waffen-SS. In various letters
to his parents he expressed his obsession with the Jewish conspiracy:
“Liebe Eltern, es tut mir schrecklich leid, dass ich Euch diesen schrecklichen
Schmerz verursachen musste, dass ich ohne Euch etwas zu sagen, das Land
verlassen habe. Wir taten es nicht aus Feigheit oder aus Fahnenflucht, sondern
weil wir genau wussten, was uns durch jüdisch-freimaurerische Gerichte alles
getan worden wäre. (…) Wenn auch die Presse schreibt, wir würden von hier aus
gegen unser Vaterland arbeiten, so ist das wieder eine ganz gemeine Lüge. Gegen
unser Vaterland und Volk haben wir nie gearbeitet und werden es auch nie tun,
sondern gerade das Gegenteil.“300
A year later in another letter to his parents Maag rhapsodized on Germany’s wealth and
pride. However, he did not miss out to blame the Jews for all the negative things in
Switzerland at the same time:
“(…) Es ist ein Skandal! Aber auch diese verdammten Juden- und Freimaurerbrut
in der Schweiz wird einmal sein Bündel packen müssen und das gelobte Land
verlassen. Wohin sie dann noch ziehen wollen, ist mir allerdings nicht ganz klar.
Amerika’s Boden dürfte diesem Übel der Menschheit auch langsam zu heiss
werden. Nun, dann sollen sie zur Hölle fahren, diese verdammte Lügenbrut, die die
ganze Menschheit in Krieg und Elend stürzen nur um sich das Reich Zion
aufzubauen. Auch in unserem Vaterlande, in der Schweiz, wird einst das scharf
geschliffene Schwert des germanischen Schweizervolkes Ordnung schaffen. Einst
kommt auch der Tag, in dem auch unser Volk von den Fesseln des Judentums und
seiner Helfershelfer befreit wird. (…)“301
In another letter to his parents he went on saying:
“(…) Es ist klar, dass die Juden versuchen, unser Volk durch jüdisches Blut zu
versauen, aber es wird ihnen nicht gelingen; obschon der Hass gegen diese
Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 25. Dezember 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916,
C.2-5358.
301 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 6. Dezember 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.25358.
300
80
Blutsauger aller Völker durch die gemeinsamen Hetzen und Lügen langsam
verblasst ist, so ist trotzdem die grosse Abneigung in beinahe allen Volksschichten
gegen die jüdische Blutvermischung gross. Und dieses saubere, urdeutsche, rein
germanische Blut wird einst auch wieder in der Schweiz reden und handeln
dürfen. Dann müssen die Grenzen zum grossen Deutschen Vaterland fallen, dann
wird unser geliebtes Volk wieder dorthin zurückkehren, wohin es gehört, nämlich
ins Reich, ins Reich aller Deutschen! (…)302
Maag was a true Nazi and obsessed with the Jews. In every letter he wrote to his
parents he displayed anti-Semitism and his impressions from the Eastern Front only
underlined his previous stance. In 1942, he was transferred to Cholm in Poland.303 He
described his impressions in another letter to his parents:
“(…) Wie so eine Ostpolnische Stadt aussieht, könnt Ihr euch bestimmt nicht
vorstellen. (…) Die Polen selbst sind schmutzig. Was aber das schlimmste ist, sind
die Juden. Unheimlich viele leben hier im Dreck und Gestank. Es gibt Orte wo mehr
Juden als Polen leben. Hier in Cholm hausen heute noch ungefähr 14‘ 000
Judenschweine, und wie die aussehen. Wenn ich früher so Judenbilder im Stürmer
sah, glaubte ich, das sei übertrieben. Habe jetzt aber tatsächlich die Feststellung
zu machen, dass die Kerle in Wirklichkeit noch viel schlimmer aussehen. (…)“304
„(…) Das mit Obergruppenführer Heydrich ist doch allerhand. Aber so sind die
meisten Völker im Osten. Feig und verschlagen. Man muss nur mal unter den
Kerlen gelebt haben, da hat man so leicht einen Begriff davon. Ihr könnt es euch
gar nicht vorstellen, dass Menschen so vertiert sein können. Ein Leben führen die,
wie wir es nicht einmal den Hunden zumuten, denn die werden wenigstens noch
gewaschen und gebürstet. Diese Ostvölker aber scheuen sich vor Wasser, Luft und
Sonne. Dann diese Verschlagenheit, Falschheit und Hinterlist in den Gesichtern.
Doch die werden schon noch klein beigeben. Dieser gemeine Anschlag in Prag wird
Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 18. Januar 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.25358.
303 Maag indicated the city of Cholm in his letters. He referred to the city of Chelm in Poland but used the
Russian pronunciation instead.
304 Abschrift, Brief von Untersturmführer Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Cholm 30. April 1942, In: BAR
E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
302
81
bestimmt bitter gerächt werden. Es ist tatsächlich so, dass man alles
niederschlagen sollte, denn hier im Osten hat sich der Auswurf der Menschheit
niedergelassen. (…)“305
What Maag referred in his letter to the assassination attempt in Prague, in which course
Reinhard Heydrich was deadly wounded. Heydrich’s death caused a storm of outrage in
Nazi Germany. Gestapo officials retailed for his death by executing hundreds of Czechs
and wiping out entire villages.306
Maag signed every letter with “Heil Hitler”, as was right and proper for a Nazi.
More importantly, Maag felt a flush of victory. The realization that history was changing
and that he was a part of that change may have even been more influential in his
decision making process. Maag was sure that Germany would win the war and he
wanted to be part of it. In another letter to his parents Maag wrote:
“(…) Der Schweizer ist ein Germane und gehört zum Deutschen Vaterlande. Wir
sind es die schon vor Jahren die Zeit richtig erkannt haben. Nicht Untertanen oder
blöde Nachäffer wollen wir sein, sonder wertvolle und geschätzte Mitarbeiter am
(…) Europas. Eine herrliche Zeit, in der wir leben und für die wir auch jederzeit mit
stolzem und tapferem Herzen in den Tod gehen. (…) Wunderbar diese
Siegeszuversicht bei allen Schichten der Bevölkerung, dieser Stolz, dabei sein zu
dürfen und teilhaben zu dürfen an diesem grössten geschichtlichen Ereignis der
Menschheit. (…)“307
He was ready to sacrifice his life for what he believed a better future:
“(…) Aber das Volk muss so erzogen sein, alle ihm schädlichen Elemente
auszurotten und wenn nötig auch bereit sein, mit der Waffe in der Hand um seine
Lebensrechte und Lebensnotwendigkeiten zu kämpfen. Nur wer kämpfen kann,
Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 4. Juni 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.25358.
306 Reinhard Heydrich, In: Encyclopedia Britannica, last updated 3.3.2014. Online:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/264683/Reinhard-Heydrich [01.06.2014].
307 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 25. Dezember 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916,
C.2-5358.
305
82
kann auch leben. Wer zu feige zum kämpfen ist, vegetiert so lange daher, solange
es seinem Gegenspieler passt. (…)“308
„(…) Europa wird und muss neugestaltet werden, nicht durch Worte, sondern
durch die blanke Waffe. Humanitätsduselei darf man dabei nicht kennen, wenn es
um die Reinhaltung unserer Germanischen Rasse geht, die allein berechtigt ist,
Europa und damit die Welt zu führen. (…)“309
As mentioned in chapter two, Maag was a downright nationalist and a convinced
militarist.310. In Switzerland, he had joined the cadet corps with twelve and in his
interrogation by the SBA he stated without hesitation that he was a fanatic soldier.311
Evidently, commitment to National Socialism also signified the desire to fight
bolshevism.
4.2. Anti-Bolshevism
Hitler regarded Bolshevism as the inevitable ideological enemy of the Nazi new order in
Europe. The fight against Bolshevism was inextricably entwined with the ideology and
political immortality of National Socialism. Consequentially, the invocation to fight the
red threat found its way into the Waffen-SS rhetoric and posed a core argument in
recruitment. For the ideologically indoctrinated soldier of the Waffen-SS, the battle
against the Red Army was a holy crusade. In the East, the Waffen-SS fought the hardest,
the longest and the most fanatically.312 The Swiss volunteers in this assessment were not
all stationed at the Easter front. However, most of them indicated their desire to fight
Bolshevism in their motivation to join the Waffen-SS. Diebold for example asked the
Waffen-SS for permission only to be stationed as a soldier on the Eastern front.313
A German newspaper article dating from 1952 concluded that about 800 Swiss
risked their lives for their fight against bolshevism. The article stated that the Swiss
joined at the time when the campaign in the East started and praised them as saviors. It
Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 8. Juli 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.25358.
309 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 1. August 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916,
C.2-5358.
310 Brief von Othmar Maag an seinen Freund Fritz, Winterthur 21. August 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78
916, C.2-5358.
311 Abhörungsprotokoll von Othmar Maag durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Aarau 13. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
312 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 121f.
308
83
underlined that the Swiss volunteers mostly were not fascists or National Socialists but
idealists who wanted to protect their own country from the Eastern hordes. “Rund 800
Schweizer kämpften im letzten Weltkrieg im deutschen Osten – und nur dort! Sie kamen
vor allem in dem Augenblick, als die Front zu wanken begann, denn sie wollten die
bolschewistische Flut aufhalten. (…)“314
The newspaper article certainly exalted the Swiss volunteers’ role in the war.
However, the archive findings revealed that the fight against bolshevism indeed was the
most often mentioned motivation to join the Waffen-SS, which matched with the idea of
protecting civilized Europe. That is why they claimed not to understand the accusation
of treason, as they were convinced that their fight also served the interests of
Switzerland. Kurt Brüderlin rejected the accusation as following:
“Ich erklärte dem betreffenden Beamten, dass ich nach Deutschland gekommen
sei, um gegen Russland Militärdienst zu leisten und nicht um mein eigenes Land zu
verraten.“315
Diebold similarly stated in his curriculum vitae:
“(…) Als dann im Juni 1941 der Krieg mit Russland ausbrach, war ich der festen
Überzeugung, dass diese Auseinandersetzung mit dem Bolschewismus nicht nur
eine rein deutsche, sondern eine europäische Schicksalsfrage werde. Ich gebe offen
zu, dass ich diesbezüglich sehr stark beeinflusst wurde. (…) Ich glaubte damals
noch an ein neues Europa, ohne dass damit die politische Selbständigkeit der
Schweiz angetastet würde. (…)“316
In a letter to his wife Johanna, Büeler explained his decision to leave without notifying
her:
Zeitungsartikel von Dr. Hans –Otto Meissner, Schweizer Infanterie vor Moskau. Eidgenössische
Freiwillige bezahlten ihren Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus mit Gefängnis und Zuchthaus, In: Die Zeit,
Nr. 10, Baden Baden 7. März 1952, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C02-713.
Bundesanwaltschaft, , Liestal 8. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933.
314
84
“(…)
Das
Reich
und
Europa
werden
nicht
untergehen
trotz
aller
Widerwertigkeiten. Jeder von uns müssen (…) alles einzusetzen, schon unseren
Kindern wegen. Wenn die asozialen Horden niedergeschlagen sind, dann wird das
Schlimmste beseitigt sein. Wie es wohl in der Schweiz aussehen mag? Ich hatte
Gelegenheit die N.Z.Z [Neue Zürcher Zeitung] und die Weltwoche zu lesen. Es ist
einfach erschütternd festzustellen, wie diese Leute weiterhin mit dem Schicksal
unseres Landes spielen, wie diese Leute nach wie vor jenen internationalen Kreisen
Vorschub leisten, die weder sozial noch (…) unserem Land geholfen haben, (…).“317
Another factor involved with the desire to fight bolshevism was the desire to fight
after all. The Swiss volunteers mostly were well trained soldiers; some of them with
respectable positions in the army. After they realized that Switzerland would not
participate in the war, they probably chose to join the Waffen-SS in order to experience a
war after all. Nikles stated that he left Switzerland illegally in 1939, because it was clear
to him that there would be a war and he simply did not want to be in jail once the war
broke out.318 Similarly Kurt Brüderlin; he answered the question why he went to
Germany the following:
“(…) Nach dem Zusammenbruch der deutschen Armee bei Stalingrad und der
darauf erfolgten Proklamation des totalen Krieges, sowie in der Erwägung, dass
mit einer kriegerischen Verwicklung mit der Schweiz nicht mehr zu rechnen sei,
hielt ich es für meine Pflicht, die aus meiner Gesinnung hervorgehenden
Konsequenz zu ziehen und mich für die Entscheidung persönlich einzusetzen.
(…)“319
Benno Schaeppi expressed himself in the radio interview in a similar way:
“Ich habe die Affinität zum Soldatentum schon zuvor angedeutet, dass ich das
Soldatische in der Geschichte der Schweiz immer wieder gefunden habe und sehr
Brief van Heinrich Büeler an seine Frau Johanna de Vries, Sennheim 20. Januar 1942, In: AfZ Nachlass
Heinrich Büeler, 17.9 Korrespondenzen und Personendossiers.
318 SS-Hauptsturmführer Alfred Nikles an den Kommandeur des Ersatzkommandos Frankreich, Betreffend
Anfrage für den Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer, Paris 5. Juli 1944, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C02-511.
Kantons Basselland zu Handen der Militärbehörden und der Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 5. September
1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
317
85
hoch geachtet habe. Für einen überzeugten Nationalsozialisten, war es klar, dass
die Entwicklung des Krieges nur noch zur Ausweitung des Kampfes gegen die
Sowjetunion führen konnte. Und bei diesem Krieg nun allerdings wollte ich von
Anfang an nach Möglichkeit dabei sein.“320
And in a letter to his wife he justified his motivation to participate in Nazi Germany as
following:
“Du fragst mich, warum ich ging. Warum ich aus freiem Willen den grauen Rock
anzog und ohne Befehl den Marsch antrat, von dem wir beide, Du und ich, nicht
wissen, wo er enden wird, und ob ein Tag kommt, an dem wir uns wiedersehen.
Fünfmal habe ich gebeten und zum erstenmal in meinem Leben gar gebettelt:
Nehmt mich auf! Und als mir der Bote den Einberufungsbefehl überreichte, zitterte
meine Hand. Verzeih mir, das war und ist und bleibt die Stunde meines höchsten
Glücks: ich bin deutscher Soldat! Germaniens Stämme nehmen teil am Aufbau
einer neuen Welt und einen neuen Sinn erhält das Menschsein. Das ist der Grund
weshalb ich hier bin, und nicht dort, bei dir.“321
Apparently, the Swiss volunteers mentioned the desire to fight Bolshevism as a
main factor to join the Waffen-SS. However, that claim most likely was exaggerated in
retrospect. They justified their participation in Nazi Germany with the desire for a safe
Europe. The returnees were charged with treason accusations and they were labeled as
“Landesverräter”. In order to correct that picture they probably justified themselves
with visions of a free and unified Europe which was worth fighting for - also in the
interest of Switzerland.
4.3. Dream of a Greater Germanic Reich
Hitler’s Nazism was widely influenced by pan-Germanic expansionism, as well as the
intention to create a bulwark against communism.322 The ideologically committed
Schweizer in der Waffen-SS. Sendung von Hans-Rudolf Lehmann auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ
321 Brief von Benno Schaeppi an seine Frau, gelesen durch Hans-Rudolf Lehmann in der Sendung
Schweizer in der Waffen-SS auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit.
322 Definition National Socialism, In: Encyclopaedia Britannica, last updated 7.1.2014. Online:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405414/National-Socialism# [18.05.2014]
320
86
volunteers strongly felt responsible to contribute in the establishment of National
Socialism in Switzerland and the creation of the Greater Germanic Reich. 323 At the same
time they were frustrated with the political situation in Switzerland, because the Swiss
politics with its readiness to compromise appeared lax in comparison to the impressive
dynamic, discipline and order in Italy and Germany. The turnaround in Germany seemed
electrifying and change was in the air.324 However, the Swiss volunteers had their own
ideals and visions for the new order. Riedweg for instance started to engage actively in
politics already as a student. He was convinced that communism posed the biggest
threat to Europe and according to him, only a unified Europe on the base of equality of
the member countries could meet that threat. As soon as Hitler rose to power, Riedweg
increasingly perceived the Swiss democracy and neutrality as a “dangerous
ignorance”.325 He longed for a new order in which all the European states would be
equal whilst organized by Germany’s chairmanship.326 He advocated his utopia as
following:
“(…) Der grosse Gedanke der germanischen Gemeinschaft, der antiimperialen
Charakter trägt, hat mit Eindeutschung nichts zu tun, ferner, dass nach dem
deutschen Endsieg das grossgermanische Reich im neuen, geeinten Europa
vermeintlich organisch, ja sogar im Sinn der Gleichberechtigung zustandekommen
solle, d.h. in freier Zustimmung der unter deutschen Führung eine gewisse
Autonomie und Eigenständigkeit behaltenden Gliedstaaten, welche, schwerlich
ernst zu nehmende, „organische Lösung“ auch der vorwiegend nordisch
bestimmten Schweiz durch Volksabstimmung zukomme.“327
With the expression of an organic solution for Switzerland, Riedweg was advocating that
Switzerland should become incorporated in the new Germanic order as an equal and
independent member. Büeler had a similar understanding for the new Reich. He justified
Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
324 Rüthemann 1979, Volksbund, pp. 5.
1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
323
87
his decision to join the Waffen-SS in his curriculum vitae, written in the prison of
Regensdorf in 1951:
“(…) Die schwere Anschuldigung der Gefährdung der Unabhängigkeit der
Eidgenossenschaft hatte mich seelisch zutiefst getroffen, (…) Meine Freunde in der
Schweiz und Deutschland rieten mir, nach Deutschland überzusiedeln. Am
21.11.41 begab ich mich illegal nach Deutschland, in der Absicht, später meine
Familie nachkommen zu lassen. (…) Im Dezember 1941 meldete ich mich als
Freiwilliger zur Waffen-SS, da ich in diesem Wehrmachtsteil den europäischen
Gedanken wenigstens im Rahmen der soldatischen Gemeinschaft in seinen
Anfängen verwirklicht sah. (…)“328
The Swiss typically were influenced by the federalist ideal. Therefore, they hoped
and believed in a Germanic Reich, based on a federalist principle. As a result, they all
believed in a Germanic Reich in which Switzerland would have had an independent
position. Paul Diebold for example stated that he believed in the new order but that he
was convinced that Switzerland would not be incorporated into the Reich and would be
able to keep its political neutrality.329 Likewise, Kurt Brüderlin who stated in his
interrogation by the SBA, that he imagined the new Reich as a European federation in
the model of the League of Nations.
“Ich dachte mir einen Staatenbund ähnlich des Völkerbundes. Ich habe dabei die
Eigenstaatlichkeit der Schweiz nie aufgeben wollen.“330 „Die Grenzen innerhalb
unseres Kontinenten spielen keine Rolle, es sei denn als Hindernis für die
Verteidigungskraft dieses selben Menschen.“331
Büeler had a similar understanding and explained his conviction:
Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 8. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933.
328
88
“Weder unsere Bewegung, noch ich persönlich sind der Auffassung, dass einer
mehrheitlich nationalsozialistischen Schweiz nur noch der Anschluss an das
Deutsche Reich übrig bliebe. Genauso wie heute die Schweiz sehr stark im
Einflusskreis des liberalistisch-marxistischen Frankreich steht, kann auch eine
staatspolitisch unabhängige Schweiz im Einflusskreis des Deutschen Reiches ihre
Existenz behaupten. Der Nationalsozialismus ist ja gerade die völkische
Weltanschauung und es ist keinem von uns je eingefallen, das Schweizervolk als
eigenständige Substanz zu verneinen.“332
Apparently, many volunteers were driven by a pan-European sense. However, is it
realistic to assume that the soldiers at the front where still thinking in such heroic terms
or is it rather possible that they glorified their decision after the war? The sources
certainly have to be treated critically. Particularly striking in their statements is their
apologetic and justifying style of reasoning. Diebold for example stated in his curriculum
vitae:
“(…) Ich habe mir immer Mühe gegeben meine Pflicht zu erfüllen, tapfer zu sein vor
dem Feinde, besorgt zu sein für meine mir unterstellten Männer. Ich glaubte durch
gute Pflichterfüllung auch für unser Land Ehre einzulegen. (…)“333
Others like Hersche however, already glorified his decision during the war. In a letter to
his daughter he assured her that everything was just fine:
“(…) Das Leben hier ist sehr interessant. Man sieht viele Soldaten, junge
prachtvolle Menschen, die einen ausgezeichneten Eindruck machen und man kann
es ihnen nicht genug danken, dass sie die Welt gegen die russische Tiere
verteidigen. Überall wird tüchtig gearbeitet und die Menschen hier sind glücklich
und zufrieden. Neulich war ein ziemlich starker Schneefall hier und am andern
Tage, sah man französische Gefangene überall den Schnee wegschaffen. Lachend
Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
332
89
und mit einer Zigarette im Munde machten sie ihre Arbeit und sahen wohlgenährt
und zufrieden aus. (…)“334
The vision of a Greater Germanic can be seen as a basis for their future decision
making to join the Waffen-SS but it certainly was not the tipping point consideration.
Hence, it can be assumed that the volunteers idealized their motivation in retrospect, as
the dream of a new order certainly was not the reason for them to Switzerland. It can be
concluded that the ideological committed Swiss volunteers were strongly influenced by
the political discourse of National Socialism and that their desire for a new Europe
facilitated their conscription to the Waffen-SS. Yet, it does not explain, why they were
willing to risk their life in a war. Most of the Swiss volunteers certainly combined an
ideological factor with self interest. Also, the decision making process was made step by
step and as their political activities had negative effects on their life, the illegal border
crossing became more and more attractive. The so far described considerations in their
motivation certainly all contributed to their decision to leave Switzerland and to join the
Waffen-SS. However, the crucial consideration and the straw to break the camel’s back
certainly was opportunism.
4.4. Opportunism
Even if the volunteers were driven by ideological commitment, the last decisive factor in
the decision was an opportunistic consideration, either out of financial problems
resulting out of the previous criminal prosecution because of political activities, career
aspirations or finally simply because they believed that Germany certainly would win
the war and they wanted to secure their place in the sun. Therefore, they considered to
join from the beginning in order to avoid a loser position in the new Reich. Diebold
justified his participation with the following words:
“(…) Es erübrigt sich bestimmt hier zu begründen was mich zur illegalen Ausreise
nach Deutschland bewog, aber immerhin möchte ich feststellen, dass ich nie gegen
meine Heimat agierte; im Gegenteil bin ich der Auffassung, dass ich für meine
Heimat kämpfe, kein Landesverräter bin, wie das in der Schweiz ausgelegt wird.
Brief von Heinrich Johann Hersche an seine Tochter Brigitte, Berlin 13. Januar 1942, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
334
90
Der Krieg ist heute eine europäische Angelegenheit und schlussendlich steht oder
fällt die Schweiz mit dem Deutschen Reich. (…)“335
So, according Diebold’s understanding, Switzerland’s future and therefore his very own,
were closely connected to Germany’s destiny. Schaeppi too was convinced that Germany
will win the war:
“Das geeinte Europa unter dem Führer aller Germanen wird eines Tages doch den
Sieg davontragen. Wir drohen nicht für diesen Zeitpunkt. Fest steht aber, dass die
heutigen Machthaber sich einmal zu verantworten haben.“336
Another important consideration for the ideological committed volunteers was the
adverse political climate in Switzerland and their legal prosecution by the authorities.
They were monitored and prosecuted for their political activities which resulted in a
loss of status. Diebold for example stated in his curriculum vitae for the Waffen-SS that
he left Switzerland as a political refugee with the intention to join the Waffen-SS.337 In
another curriculum vitae he explained his decision to leave Switzerland:
“(…) Meine politische Einstellung galt immer als sehr deutschfreundlich und ich
war bis zuletzt Mitglied der Nationalen Gemeinschaft Schaffhausen. (…) Diese
Einstellung trug mir beruflich und gesellschaftlich nur Nachteiliges ein und ich
entschloss mich, um einer zweiten Verhaftung wegen „Nationalsozialistischer
Propaganda“ und wegen Spionageverdacht zu Gunsten Deutschlands zu entgehen,
am 11.3.42 die Landesgrenze illegal zu überschreiten um hier als Freiwilliger in
der Waffen-SS Dienst zu leisten. (…)“338
Alfred Nikles too left Switzerland in order to avoid another arrest as of
“Nachrichtendiest zu Deutschlands Gunsten”. Franz Riedweg supported Nikles
application and stated that Nikles as a “Volksdeutsche” would fit perfectly in the
Brief von Paul Diebold an Herrn Dr. jur. Ferdinand Elsener, SS-Standortlazarett München-Dachau 21.
Mai 1943, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 3148, C.29/A116-44.006.
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
337 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch RS A5475/1503.
338 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Stuttgart 27. April 1942, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147
335
91
“Totenkopf Verbände”.339 However, in the following it turned out that Nikles was
militarily not enough qualified for a leading position in the army. Yet, because of his
ideological commitment and excellent “Weltanschauung” it was decided to entrust him
with the leading of the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart.340 It can be noted that the driving
motivation for Nikles was to escape another prison sentence. However, he probably
knew that in Germany his attitude would be appreciated. In a request for the
“Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer”, Nikles described his political activities in Switzerland
and complained about the resulting prosecution and justified his decision to leave
Switzerland:
“(…) Nach einer Untersuchungshaft von 3 ½ Monaten wurde ich vorübergehend
freigelassen, um dann durch das Schweizerische Bundesgericht zu 6 Monaten
Gefängnis verurteilt zu werden. Dies war Juli/August 1939. Da zu diesem
Zeitpunkt schon erkennbar war, dass ein Krieg in nächster Zeit ausbrechen werde,
wollte ich nicht festgesetzt werden und überschritt schwarz die Grenze zum Reich.
(…)“341
It has to be kept in mind that he most likely exaggerated his wish to join in the war, since
the statement was taken out of his application for a military decoration.
Once prosecuted it became more difficult for the volunteers to find a job and to
make a decent living. Their reputation in society suffered under the accusations made by
the authorities’. They were labeled Swiss Nazis and most of the people did not want to
be associated with them. That in turn resulted in financial problems because they were
not hired anymore or even fired. Heinrich Hersche complained in a letter to his friend
Teuchgraber:
“(…) Wir Nationalisten aber wissen besser als alle Bundesräte und
Parlamentarismus, dass es für uns doch ein Meinungsdelikt gib. Wir haben es
Gesuch des schweizerischen Oberleutnants d.R. Alfred Nikles um Aufnahme in die bewaffnete SS durch
Franz Riedweg, Berlin 9. November 1939, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra –
Nikolaus.
340 Beurteilung von Nikles Alfred durch die Germanische Leitstelle, Berlin 25. November 1943, In: BArch
341 Antrag von Alfred Nikles um den Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer an den Kommandeur des
Ersatzkommando Frankreichs der Waffen-SS, Paris 5. Juli 1944, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO
147) 147 Dickten – Diekmeier.
339
92
erfahren müssen, dass wir bespitzelt und um unsere Existenz gebracht werden
dürfen. (…)“342
Hersche stated that he lost his existence and his position within the army because of his
political conviction. In a letter to Brüderlin, a friend and fellow volunteer, he stated that
he felt that there was a targeted campaign directed against the nationalist officer corps
and he suggested to fight back or to leave Switzerland.343 Thus, the threatened existence
in Switzerland gave them reason to leave. All the more because they knew that in Nazi
Germany they were desired and well respected man power. Also, they were all militarily
well educated and mostly multilingual, whereby they could expect career opportunities.
As was shown in chapter three, that assumption was clearly justified.
Benno Schaeppi stated in a request for appeal in 1947 that he left because his
existence was not secure as of his involvement in NS organizations.
“(…) bin am 1. April 1939 nach Deutschland übergesiedelt, weil ich in der Heimat
keine ausreichende Existenz mehr finden konnte. (…)“344
Also, he answered the question on his motivation to leave Switzerland and to join the
Waffen-SS in a radio interview the following:
“Oh, das ist sehr einfach zu erklären. Ich bin 1938, 39, wiederholt verhaftet worden
wegen meiner politischen Betätigung, zunächst in der „Front“, später im „Bund
treuer Eidgenossen nationalsozialistischer Weltanschauung (BTE)“ und vor allen
Dingen auch wegen meiner Presseberichterstattung für deutsche Zeitungen. Diese
Arbeit ist mir praktisch unmöglich gemacht worden, und da ich ja schliesslich
keine Löffel stehlen konnte, um diese wieder zu verkaufen und davon zu leben, bin
ich nach Deutschland gegangen.“345
Korrespondenz Heinrich Johann Hersche an Erich Teuchgraber aus der Postsperre, Polizeikommando
Bern im Auftrag der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Thun 30. November 1939, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
343 Brief von Heinrich Johann Hersche an Artillerie Oberst Brüderlin, Basel 25. April 1940, In: BAR E4320
B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
344 Revisionsgesuch des Bundesstrafgerichtsurteils vom 20. Dezember 1947 von Benno Schaeppi an den
Präsidenten des Ausserordentlichen Kassationshofes am Schweizerischen Bundesgericht Lausanne,
Strafanstalt Regensburg Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
345 Schweizer in der Waffen-SS. Sendung von Hans-Rudolf Lehmann auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ
342
93
For Schaeppi, Büeler, Riedweg, Corrodi, Hersche and Schneider career
considerations certainly played the decisive role. Riedweg stated in his postwar trial in
Hiddesen, that he left Switzerland because of the adverse political climate, in which his
ideas where condemned, whereas in Germany they were highly welcomed.346 Büeler too
combined different aspects in his motivation to join the Waffen-SS. His prosecution was
pivotal for him to leave. His sense for careerism and his intellect certainly told him, that
in Switzerland his chances to achieve a respectable position in society were small. Some
of them like Schaeppi and Büeler aspired more intellectual and political positions whilst
others like Hersche, Corrodi and Maag longed for a military career. In Switzerland, their
political convictions as well as their prosecution certainly were not promising traits for a
career. Hence, an escape to Germany and the conscription to the Waffen-SS enabled
them a career in a shiny uniform.
The volunteers’ personal opportunism was mostly combined with the sense and
frustration that the Swiss government was too weak and ignorant. In addition, they were
frustrated that they were monitored whilst the so called Internationalists were allowed
to go on with their conspiracy. According them, unlike Germany, Switzerland was too
hesitant and tended to wait instead of acting. The government many times was justifying
its passive role with the maintenance of the Swiss neutrality. Othmar Maag for example
took on the government as following:
“(…) Und unsere Regierung hat nicht den Mut, gegen diese traurigen Gestalten
aufzutreten, hat nicht den Mut, diese angegriffenen, vaterlandstreuen Offizieren
zu schützen, nein, diese Regierung hilft dieser Saubande noch und führt ihren
Willen aus. (...)“347
The personal statements that shed light on their motivation to join Switzerland
clearly have to be treated critically. It is striking that they all justified their decision to
leave Switzerland with heroic ideals. They felt that they had to reject the accusation of
being “Landesverräter”. Therefore, the postwar punishment practice and societies
perception on the Swiss volunteers is the central attention in the next chapter.
347 Brief von Othmar Maag an Leutnant Fritz Steiner, Winterthur 21. August 1940, In: BAR E4320 B
1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
346
94
5. Postwar Punishment of the Swiss
Volunteers
The assessment on postwar treatment of the Swiss volunteers offers enough material to
be discussed in a thesis on its own. Therefore, only the most representative examples in
the case study will be described. That is to say, cases who might epitomize the
authorities’ attitude and the publics’ perception towards the Swiss volunteers.
The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg declared the Waffen-SS a
criminal organization due to evidence that it was responsible for war crimes. However,
only the most responsible and higher ranking members were convicted. The Waffen-SS
argued, that it was purely a military organization no different from any other component
of the Wehrmacht and had no connection with the crimes committed by other branches
of the SS. The prosecution at Nuremberg rejected this claim and concluded that the
Waffen-SS was in theory and practice as much an integral part of the SS organization as
any other branch of the SS. However, the proceedings were designed only to identify and
condemn the organizations and the declaration of criminality did not empower the
Tribunal to impose sentence upon them or to convict any individual merely because of
membership. Members of the Waffen-SS had to be tried in separate trials before Allied
military courts, by German denazification courts, or in their home countries.348
The involvement of Swiss citizens in the Waffen-SS put the Swiss authorities in a
difficult situation, as they had to decide how to deal with the returning volunteers.
Neulen remarked that the Swiss authorities decided on harsh sentences but only out of
general policy considerations. He concluded that the stigmatization of some scapegoats
in political trials served as a cover up for the economic collaboration of Switzerland with
the Reich. Accordingly, the criminal law had to enhance the reputation of Switzerland.349
However, the Swiss reputation was not yet affected, since that discourse only came up in
the 1970’s. Additionally, Switzerland already prosecuted members of NS organizations
from 1940 on and expatriated Swiss, who collaborated with the Reich from May 1943.
Altogether, thirty-three men were convicted to death sentences as of treason and
espionage, whereof seventeen were executed between 1942 and 1944.350 Then again,
Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 250f.
Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 180.
350 Ibid., pp. 180.
348
349
95
the Swiss death sentenced, were not Waffen-SS members. Mertens agreed that the Swiss
authorities decided on a harsh punishment of the returning volunteers. Nonetheless, he
pointed out that their approach was not consequent, as the extradition of higher ranking
volunteers was not requested actively. In contrary, the accused sometimes had to apply
for the entry ban to be annulled several times, which Mertens interpreted as a
“calculated action pattern” and labeled it “legal procrastination”.351
The intention of this chapter is to assess how the Swiss authorities judged on the
returnees and on what legal base they convicted the volunteers. Therefore, the different
legal violations will be addressed. The Swiss volunteers were not all judged on the same
base or in the same court, since the authorities’ distinguished between the sole violation
of military law or criminal law. The “common” Waffen-SS soldiers were mostly tried on
the base of military law, whilst, the higher ranking Swiss were tried separately in
criminal trials for endangerment of the Swiss neutrality and treason. Therefore, both
trials will be addressed and elucidated with specific accounts. The criminal trials are
represented by the cases of Riedweg, Büeler and Schaeppi as well as Nikles and Maag.
The military courts will be described through the accounts of Hersche, Corrodi and
Breitenmoser. The question whether the Swiss authorities imposed severe punishment
is of crucial interest. Thus, it is necessary to put the findings into perspective. Hence, a
comparison will be drawn in the conclusion to the punishment practice of other
Germanic countries that had to deal with returning volunteers.
Stein remarked that no study of the Waffen-SS would be complete without a close
look at the question of its criminal activities.352 However, the criminal trials did not
address the question of war crimes or criminal activities of the volunteers in the WaffenSS. That is why one specific account of a potential Swiss war criminal will be introduced.
Oertle addressed the question of war crimes committed by the Waffen-SS and stated
that only a minority was involved in war crimes. He claimed that the relevance of the
Waffen-SS lied in its involvement in the great battles in the defense of Hitler’s Europe.
So, in regard of the Swiss volunteers, he assessed that they were rather committed
soldiers than criminals, only fulfilling their duty as soldiers. He did not see the
membership in the Waffen-SS as a sufficient factor for their conviction as criminals.
According to his study, there was no single Swiss front-line soldier, who was involved in
351
352
Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 308, 310.
Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 272.
96
violations of martial law.353 The assessment of Wipf Eugen’s case in this chapter
however indicated, that Oertle once more chose for an excusing perspective. He claimed
that Wipf only was guilty of crimes against humanity, which clearly had to be
distinguished from war crimes, as Wipf had committed the crimes as a civilian.354
This chapter furthermore includes some newsletter articles, reporting on the case
of Wipf Eugen, in order to approach Switzerland’s post war perception and how society
reacted on the case of Wipf Eugen. Also, it has to be noted, that the Swiss volunteers
were already convicted in absentia by various military trials beforehand, on the base of
leaving the country illegally, and joining a foreign army. Moreover, the highly motivated
Swiss right extremists mostly had left Switzerland exactly because of their prosecution
based on their political activities in NS organizations. Therefore, there has to be a
distinction between the political trials in the years of 1940 regarding political activity in
the renewal movement, then in 1943 because of leaving the country illegally and
eventual expatriation, and lastly the postwar trials from 1945 onward.
5.1.
Main Legal Bases for the Verdicts
The Swiss soldiers used to be famous in Europe for their military skills and were
popular mercenaries. With the foundation of the federal state in 1948, the Swiss Federal
Council started to increasingly restrict foreign military service. Ultimately, a new
military law prohibited the foreign military service under penalty in 1927 and
prohibited the involvement in foreign wars.355 The new military law of 1927, Article 94
“Eintritt in fremden Kriegsdienst” (admission into foreign military service) declared it a
criminal act to join a foreign army, as well as the recruitment there for. The offence
against the law was punished with a prison or penitentiary sentence of up to three years.
This, however, did not apply to dual citizens, who lived in the country of the military
service. This degree of penalty is comparable with offences such as theft according
article 139 StGB, criminal property damage according article 144 StGB and evading
payment of a bill according article 149 StGB, as well as physical injury resulting from
negligence according article 125 StGB. These offences were all punished with a sentence
Oertle, Russland, pp. 451-456.
Ibid., pp. 456.
355 Eggenberger, P. (2012) “Ein düsteres Kapitel. Schweizer in der Waffen SS.“ In: Der Soldat, Nr. 4, Pages
46-47, here 46.
353
354
97
of maximum three years.356 The full article 94 of the „Militärstrafgesetz“, MStGB
(military law) said:
„1. Der Schweizer, der ohne Erlaubnis des Bundesrates in fremden Militärdienst
eintritt, wird mit Gefängnis bis zu drei Jahren oder Geldstrafe bestraft. 2. Der
Schweizer, der noch eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt, im andern Staate
niedergelassen ist und dort Militärdienst leistet, bleibt straflos. 3. Wer einen
Schweizer für fremden Militärdienst anwirbt oder der Anwerbung Vorschub
leistet, wird mit Gefängnis bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe nicht unter 30
Tagessätzen bestraft. 4. In Kriegszeiten kann auf Zuchthaus erkannt werden.“ 357
The article 94 MStGB was the main legal item used in the conviction of the Swiss
volunteers. However, it was not the only offence for which they were sentenced. The
charges
included
furthermore
illegal
border
crossing
as
violation
of
the
“Bundesratsbeschluss”, BRB (Swiss Federal Council decision) regarding “Teilweise
Schliessung der Grenze” (partial closure of the border) of December 13, 1940
respectively September 25, 1942. The Swiss Federal Council decided to close the
borders for the first time on September 26, 1938. It was decided that it was forbidden to
cross the border alongside the official roads. The regulations were extended in 1940,
declaring that the crossing of the border with evasion of the border control was to be
punished with a prison sentence. Henceforth, the crossing of the border with horses,
horse-drawn vehicles as well as motor vehicles became restricted.358
In addition, the Swiss Federal Council decided to expatriate Swiss citizens, who
collaborated with the Reich on May 18, 1943.359 This resolution, however, only applied
to Swiss citizens, who lived abroad and who committed crimes that compromised the
Swiss neutrality or the country’s security. The resolution did not include the wife or
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch vom 21. Dezember 1937 (Stand am 1. Januar 2014). Online:
http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19370083/index.html [31.05.2014].
357Militärstrafgesetz vom 13. Juli 1927 (Stand am 1. Januar 2014), Artikel 94. Online:
http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19270018/201401010000/321.0.pdf
[02.03.2014].
358 Ludwig, C. (1966) Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Schweiz in den Jahren 1933 bis 1955. Bericht an den
Bundesrat zuhanden der Eidgenössischen Räte. Bundeskanzlei: Bern, pp. 94, 187.
356
98
children.360 The validity period of the resolution was designated for two years.361
However, it was prolonged in May 1945 for another two years and finally expired on
May 18, 1947.362 The full article had the following wording:
“1. Das Schweizerbürgerrecht kann einem sich im Ausland aufhaltenden
Schweizer, der sich, im Inland oder im Ausland, schwer gegen die Sicherheit oder
die politische Unabhängigkeit des Landes vergangen und sich dadurch des
Schweizerbürgerrechts unwürdig erwiesen hat, entzogen werden. Von dieser
Massnahme werden die Ehefrau und die Kinder nicht betroffen, sofern der Entzug
des Bürgerrechts nicht auch ihnen gegenüber ausdrücklich ausgesprochen wird. 2.
Der Entscheid über den Entzug des Bürgerrechts steht dem eidgenössischen Justizund Polizeidepartement zu. Zuvor ist die Stellungnahme des Heimatkantons
einzuholen. 3. Der Entscheid wird dem Betroffenen, dem Heimatkanton und der
Heimatgemeinde eröffnet. Wo die Zustellung an den Betroffenen durch das
schweizerische Konsulat nicht möglich ist, wird das Dispositiv des Entscheides im
Bundesblatt und im Amtsblatt des Heimatkantons veröffentlicht.“363
By the end of 1943, only four Swiss citizens had been expatriated, whereof two had
served in the Waffen-SS. Twenty cases were still pending, amongst them Benno Schaeppi
and Alfred Nikles.364 Oertle concluded that in total forty-nine men and two women were
expatriated until May 1947. He furthermore summarized that ten of those men were
additionally sentenced to death in absentia. Yet, none of the death sentenced had been
member of the Waffen-SS.365
The Swiss volunteers were mostly judged upon military law. However, it mattered
whether they had engaged actively in ideological functions or not. The volunteers, who
were solely seen as soldiers were sentenced by military trials, where consideration of
Bundesratsbeschluss über Ausbürgerung, gestützt auf Art. 3 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 30. August
1939 über Massnahmen zum Schutze des Landes und zur Aufrechterhaltung der Neutralität, Bern 18.Mai,
1943 In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2.
361 Bundesratsbeschluss über Ausbürgerung, gestützt auf Art. 3 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 30. August
1939 über Massnahmen zum Schutze des Landes und zur Aufrechterhaltung der Neutralität, Bern 18.Mai
1943, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2.
362 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 489.
363 Bundesratsbeschluss über Ausbürgerung, gestützt auf Art. 3 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 30. August
1939 über Massnahmen zum Schutze des Landes und zur Aufrechterhaltung der Neutralität, Bern 18.Mai
1943, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2.
364 Übersicht über den Stand der Ausbürgerungsfälle auf 1. November 1943, Bern 1. November 1943, In:
BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2.
360
99
military nature played a decisive role. The offences included “Ungehorsam gegen
allgemeine Anordnung” (disobedience of general ordinance), Article 107 MStGB,
“Schwächung der Wehrkraft” (weakening of the military strength), “Dienstverletzung”
(violations of service regulations) according article 72 MStGB, as well as
“Dienstversäumnis” (negligence of duty) according article 82 MStGB.366
The higher ranking Swiss volunteers, in so far as they were involved in ideological
functions in the Third Reich, were seen as traitors of the country and were considered to
have endangered the Swiss neutrality. These men were judged on different legal bases,
namely on article 266 “Strafgesetzbuch”, StGB (criminal law) “Angriff auf die
Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossenschaft” (Attack on the independence of the Swiss
Confederation) and “Landesverrat” (treason):367
“(Abs. 1) Wer eine Handlung vornimmt, die darauf gerichtet ist, die
Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossenschaft zu verletzen oder zu gefährden (Abs. 2)
insbesondere eine die Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossenschaft gefährdende
Einmischung einer fremden Macht in die Angelegenheit der Eidgenossenschaft
herbeizuführen (Abs. 3), wird mit einer Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter einem Jahr
bestraft.368
The charges furthermore included Staatsgefährliche Unternehmen“ (subversive actions)
according article 1, paragraph. 1 and 2, „Datenschutzverordnung“ (data protection
ordinance), DSchV I and DSchV II:369
„Nach Artikel 1 des BRB vom 5. Dezember 1938 betreffend Massnahmen gegen
staatsgefährliche Umtriebe und zum Schutze der Demokratie ist strafbar, wer es
unternimmt, die verfassungsmässige Ordnung der Eidgenossenschaft oder der
Kantone rechtswidrig beseitigen oder zu gefährden (Abs. 1), wer insbesondere
Anklageschrift Divisionsgericht 7A von Huber Hermann, St. Gallen 5. Juli 1947, In: BAR E4320 B
1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333.
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
368 Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch vom 21. Dezember 1937 (Stand 1. Januar 2014), Artikel 266. Online:
http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19370083/index.htm [25.02.2014].
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
366
100
einer Propaganda des Auslandes Vorschub leistet, die auf die Änderung der
politischen Einrichtungen der Schweiz abzielt (Abs. 2).
The article was replaced with the article 1 of the BRB of February 27, 1945 “betreffend
Massnahmen zum Schutze der verfassungsmässigen Ordnung und die Aufhebung der
Parteiverbote“ (sanctions for the protection of the constitutional order and the
suspension of the party ban), DSchV II:370
„Darnach wird bestraft, wer eine Handlung vornimmt, die darauf gerichtet ist, die
verfassungsmässige Ordnung der Eidgenossenschaft oder der Kantone in
rechtswidriger Weise zu ändern oder zu gefährden (Abs. 1), wer eine Propaganda
betreibt, die darauf gerichtet ist, die verfassungsmässige Ordnung der
Eidgenossenschaft oder der Kantone in rechtswidriger Weise zu ändern oder zu
gefährden (Abs. 2), oder wer einer so gearteten Propaganda, insbesondere des
Auslandes , Vorschub leistet (Abs. 3).
Yet, since the violations were committed before 1945, both of the articles were applied
in court. The third base of the verdict was: „Beteiligung an einer rechtswidrigen
Vereinigung” (involvement in an illegal association) according article 275 StGB“:371
„Nach Art. 275 StGB ist strafbar, wer eine Vereinigung gründet, die bezweckt oder
deren Tätigkeit darauf gerichtet ist, unter Art. 266 StGB fallende Handlungen
vorzunehmen, ferner wer einer solchen Vereinigung beitritt oder sich an ihren
Bestrebungen beteiligt oder wer zur Bildung solcher Vereinigungen auffordert
oder deren Weisungen befolgt.“372
Article 275 StGB was applied to the Swiss volunteers who were engaged in the
„Germanische SS-Sturmbanne Schweiz“, or in the NS organizations in Switzerland.
Art. 1, Abs. 1 und 2, DSchV I and DSchV II. Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im
Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
372 Art. 275 StGB. Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess,
Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
370
101
Additionally, they were convicted for “Verbotener Nachrichtendienst” according article
272 StGB:373
“1. Wer im Interesse eines fremden Staats oder einer ausländischen Partei oder
einer anderen Organisation des Auslandes zum Nachteil der Schweiz oder ihren
Angehörigen, Einwohner oder Organisationen politischen Nachrichtendienst
betreibt oder einen solchen Dienst einrichtet, wer für solchen Dienst anwirbt oder
ihnen Vorschub leistet wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder Geldstrafe
bestraft. 2. In schweren Fällen ist die Strafe Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter einem Jahr.
Als schwerer Fall gilt es insbesondere, wenn der Täter zu Handlungen aufreizt
oder falsche Berichte erstattet, die geeignet sind, die innere oder äussere
Sicherheit der Eidgenossenschaft zu gefährden.”374
5.2.
Military Court Sentences
Swiss volunteers who had not engaged actively in NS organizations in Germany were
accused by the Swiss military courts “Divisionsgericht” or “Territorialgericht”, both
belonging to the military judicature. The military courts did not deal with the political
and ideological dimension of the crimes committed by joining the Waffen-SS, but
concentrated merely on the deeds that had violated existing military law. The sole
membership in the Waffen-SS was not perceived as a threat against the neutrality, but as
an offence against military law and therefore judged differently. François Wisard
remarked in his biography on Eugen Corrodi, that the volunteers who were not engaged
in political functions were sentenced at most to three years in prison, which was the
maximum penalty for foreign military service.375 Reichlin claimed that the Swiss
volunteers mostly received a penalty between fifteen and eighteen months in prison.376
Oertle estimated that the majority was sentenced between one and two years in
prison.377
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
375 Wisard 1999, Major biennois, pp. 71.
373
102
As previously mentioned, all the volunteers were already sentenced before the end
of the war. Therefore, the returnees most of the time had to serve their sentences
immediately after their return to Switzerland. Aichle for example, was convicted by a
military court to eighteen months in prison in 1942 and had to serve that sentence in the
prison of St. Gallen immediately after his return.378 Whilst serving his sentence, he was
often surveyed by the police of the SBA regarding other Swiss volunteers and his
involvement in espionage activities.379 Dr. Brüderlin was sentenced to four years in
prison by the military court “Territorialgericht 3A” in July 1943. He too had to serve the
sentence immediately in 1946.380 However, in some cases, the situation had to be
validated once more, as the volunteers did not accept their punishment and appealed.
Heinrich Hersche for instance, was taken POW by the Americans in May 1945, and in the
following imprisoned in fourteen different camps. After two years in captivity, the
Americans released him, because of his severe tuberculosis and because the German
civilian courts handling denazification were not interested in the case Hersche. Hence,
Hersche reported to the Swiss embassy in Munich, expressing his wish to return to
Switzerland. He appealed against his verdict imposed by the “Territorialgericht 2B” of
October 1943, as it was unjustified according to his opinion. The verdict worded as
follow: three years in prison, suspension of active civil rights for five years, exclusion
from the Swiss army and degradation of his rank as major.381
Although the Swiss authorities had known that Hersche was a POW, they refused
to file an extradition request, since they were not interested in his criminal prosecution.
Thus, Hersche returned on his own initiative in September 1947 and was put in prison
immediately thereafter. After his return, Hersche asked for a revision of his case, so that
the military court “Divisionsgericht 7A” in St. Gallen had to roll up his indictment.382 The
trial finally took place in the courthouse of St. Gallen on November 29, 1947. The court
found Hersche guilty and sentenced him to twelve months in prison with the suspension
of active civil rights for two years, based on foreign military service and the disobeying
Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942, In:
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192.
379 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des
Kantons St. Gallen, St. Gallen 6. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192.
380 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an die Eidgenössische Polizeiabteilung z.H. von Herrn Dr. Hohl,
381 Abhörungsprotokoll des Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
382 Bericht des eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter der Militärjustiz der Schweizerischen Armee an
Herrn Dr. Lüthy der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 1. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
378
103
of general orders. Yet, he was allowed to keep his military rank as a major, because he
had been declared unfit for service in 1939.383
The military court decided that Hersche’s involvement in Hitler’s Germany was
solely of military nature. It came to this conclusion, by acknowledging that Hersche was
not involved in any party activities in Germany, that he was not sworn in and that he had
declared upon oath that he would not fight against Switzerland. Mitigating factors
furthermore were his good reputation, that he had not been previously convicted, as
well as his excellent military qualifications. The court additionally acknowledged that
Hersche was denied military service in Switzerland, although he had assigned for it
various times after his forced retirement. Also, his financial problems were accredited as
mitigating factor.384
Next to his military trial, the SBA had initiated a federal criminal procedure based
on “landesverräterische Umtriebe” (treasonable activities). Yet, they decided to drop the
charges as of a lack of proof. Although the authorities acknowledged Hersche’s NS
worldview, his relation to the SS-HA, and his involvement in ideological training courses
in Sennheim, they nonetheless rejected further prosecution.385 The SBA concluded, that
there was no proof that Hersche indeed had entertained closer contacts to the SS-HA,
although Büeler had confirmed in his interrogation on the person of Hersche, that he
indeed had attended meetings in the SS-HA, but that he had distanced himself from
further political activities.386 Also, Hersche’s pension of the “Eidgenössische
Versicherungskasse” (Federal Insurance Fund) was denied exactly because of the fact
that Hersche as SS-Standartenführer certainly was involved in ideological training of his
regiment and therefore had acted against the neutrality of Switzerland.387 The public
reacted outraged that Hersche had the insolence to ask for a pension and all the major
newspapers discussed this in length, condemning him as a Nazi and traitor of his
Bericht des eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter der Militärjustiz der Schweizerischen Armee an
Herrn Dr. Lüthy der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 1. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
384 Urteil des Divisionsgericht 7A, St. Gallen 29. November 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.021562.
385 Verfügung der Bundesanwaltschaft über Rücktritt von der Verfolgung im Bundesstrafverfahren gegen
Hersche Heinrich, der Stellvertreter des Bundesanwaltes Lüthi, Bern 24. Februar 1948, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
386 Befragung von Heinrich Büeler betreffend Heinrich Hersche durch den Eidgenössischen
387 Stellungnahme des Stellvertreters des Bundesanwaltes an die Eidgenössische Justizabteilung, Bern 6.
Dezember 1948, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
383
104
country.388 Hersche’s justification of having insisted not to be forced to act against his
country, his refusal to join NS organizations in Germany and his high military rank
obviously were reason enough to spare him of further criminal prosecution.
The case Hersche is indeed an inconsistent one, since it seems that the authorities
themselves were not sure how to proceed with him. On one hand, they knew about the
person of Hersche and they knew that he was a high ranking Swiss Waffen-SS member,
who was on the list for potential leaders for Switzerland in the new Reich and who was
tasked with the training of volunteers. On the other hand, they refused to request his
extradition from the Americans whilst he still was a POW. Furthermore, he was wanted
in Switzerland for “Angriff auf die Unabhängigkeit” which entailed a political dimension
of crime.389 Yet, the criminal prosecution was rejected and he only had to stand trial in
front of a military court, where he received a lower penalty in comparison to his
previous one and other high ranking Swiss volunteers.
Corrodi is another higher ranking volunteer who was only sentenced based on
military offences. Prior to his return to Switzerland, Corrodi was convicted in absentia
by the military court “Territorialgericht 2A” to three years in prison, degradation of his
military rank, expulsion from the army and suspension of active civil rights for ten years
in December 1943. The sentence was based on violations of military secrets, violations
of official instructions and incitement of these violations. The same court convicted him
once more in absentia in April 1945 for an additional sentence of two years in prison
because of foreign military service. Hence, Corrodi had to serve a sentence of five years
in total. Corrodi returned to Switzerland in Mai 1945 and since he had not been
expatriated, his return was not denied. He was immediately arrested and jailed but he
appealed against the verdicts.390
After his request of revision, the previous two sentences were reversed and a new
court proceeding was initiated. The “Territorialgericht 2A” finally sentenced him to
thirty months in prison, degradation of his military rank, expulsion from the army and
suspension of active civil rights for five years in December 1945. The sentence was
based on foreign military service, noncompliance of military orders as well as
Zeitungsartikel, Aus dem Bundesgericht. Der Nazi und sein Pensionsanspruch, In: Neue Zürcher
Zeitung, Nr. 2503, 21. November 1950, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.
389 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das eidgenössische Politische
Departement, Politische Angelegenheiten, Bern 4. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.021562.
390 Bericht an die Redaktion des Landboten, Verfasser unbekannt, Bern Oktober 1948, In: BAR E4001 C
1000/783 3315, 1753.
388
105
disobedience of general orders. The accusation of espionage was considered not proven.
Corrodi started serving his sentence immediately after the trial in the prison Witzwil in
Bern.391 However, he still did not agree with the sentence and asked for a conditional
release in December 1946. The Swiss army department dismissed his request on the
grounds of “Zweifel am Wohlverhalten des Verurteilten” (doubt on the good conduct of
the convicted in society). Corrodi was persistent and asked for conditional release once
more in April 1947, which was again dismissed, this time definitely. Corrodi was finally
released in November 1947.392
It is striking that two such high ranking Swiss volunteers were not indicted by a
criminal court and that their revalidated sentences were lower than the previous ones. It
was expected, that the higher ranking volunteers, engaging in NS organizations in
Switzerland prior to their escape and involved in the training of volunteers, would have
been accused of treason and therefore sentenced harsher. An explanation could be that
their high Swiss military rank and their refusal to participate in NS organizations
protected them, since they were solely perceived as soldiers.
The case of Breitenmoser supports this presumption. On May 2, 1945
Breitenmoser and his company were taken prisoner by the Russians whilst defending
Berlin. He initially was interned in a camp in Berdychiv, Ukraine. Thereafter, he was
transferred to a transit camp in Odessa. He managed to flee in July 1950 and returned to
Switzerland on an adventurous way home. 393 Breitenmoser surrendered to the police in
Buchs, St. Gallen in August 1950. Thereafter, he spent ten days in military jail. He was
interrogated by the police and he reported that he had suffered under harsh
interrogations and physical abuse during his detention in the Russian POW camp. The
police interrogation did not focus on his deeds in the Waffen-SS, but on his time and
experiences in the Russian POW camp. After the police made sure that Breitenmoser
was not “infected” by Communism, their tone in the interrogation changed considerably,
insinuating sympathy and understanding. They described Breitenmoser’s experiences
with the following words:
Bericht an die Redaktion des Landboten, Verfasser unbekannt, Bern Oktober 1948, In: BAR E4001 C
1000/783 3315, 1753.
392 Bericht des Bundesrates betreffend Beschwerde von Corrodi gegen eine Verfügung des
Eidgenössischen Militärdepartements betreffend bedingte Entlassung, Bern 3. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4110 A
1000/1832 105, C.08.15.
393 Aussage Josef Breitenmoser vorgeführt in der Kantonalen Strafanstalt Saxerriet, Saxerriet 18. Januar
1951, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124.
391
106
“(...) Seine Erlebnisse in der Russischen Kriegsgefangenschaft und die Flucht aus
derselben würden ein ganzes Buch füllen. Trotzdem seine Darstellung über die
Flucht aus dem Gefangenenlager in Odessa, den Fluchtweg, die erlittenen
Strapazen und überwundenen Hindernissen fast unglaublich klingt, darf ihr m.E
[meines Erachtens] Glauben geschenkt werden. Die teilweise unmenschliche
Behandlung in der Gefangenschaft, das Ungewisse über den Zeitpunkt der
Entlassung und der Drang, nach mehr als 5-jähriger Gefangenschaft endlich
wieder Mensch zu sein, dürfte ihm und seinem Kameraden den Willen und die
Ausdauer gegeben haben alles zu versuchen, um durchzukommen. (…)“394
Breitenmoser was already sentenced to three years in prison in absentia in 1943,
because of foreign military service and “Ungehorsam gegen allgemeine Anordnung”. 395
After his return to Switzerland, he appealed against the sentence.396 Breitenmoser
finally stood trial in the military court “Divisionsgericht 7a” on November 10, 1950. He
was sentenced to one year in prison without probation. His military defense lawyer Mr.
Baumgartner however, intended to request for a pardon after a couple of months.397
Hence, Breitenmoser’s sentence too was lowered after his return. It is striking that
the post war military court sentences were lower than the previous ones. It appears that
a strong sense for soldiership and heroism was a mitigating factor for the military
courts. However, the Swiss volunteers received similar high sentences in comparison to
other Germanic countries. Neulen concluded that almost all the countries decided on a
severe punishment. However, there were differences. The Netherlands had introduced
two new criminal acts reactively and special courts were dealing with the returnees,
collaborators and war criminals. Waffen-SS volunteers received mostly prison sentences
between four to eight years and some of them were expatriated. However, expatriated
Dutch had the possibility of reintegration after 1951. War criminals and collaborators
received sentences between five and ten years.398
Bericht des Spezialdienstes der Kantonspolizei St. Gallen an das Kantonale Polizeikommando, 19. St.
Gallen, 19. Januar 1951, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124.
395 Schreiben des Polizeikommandos des Kantons St. Gallen an den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 14. August 1950, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124.
2701, C.29/A116/43.124.
397 Notiz vom Adjunkt der Kantonalen Fremdenpolizei Herr Baumgartner an den Spezialdienst des
Polizeikommandos St. Gallen Herr Rüthemann, 11. Januar 1951, In: E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A11643.124.
398 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 65f.
394
107
The Belgium authorities initially were stricter. The volunteers for the most part
received lifelong prison sentences or were executed by shooting. Even “simple”
volunteers received the maximum penalties. Yet, the prisoners were released mostly
after a short time. So the Flemish authorities decided on extreme harsh sentences that
were not executed accordingly.399 Differently in France, where a surge of retaliation was
practiced including extrajudicial killings and illegal revenge methods. For many
returnees the only solution was the escape into the Foreign Legion.400 Denmark too had
a strong legal response and added supplementary provisions to the legal code, and
reintroduced the death penalty. The volunteers mostly received a prison sentence
between two and five years, depending on their Waffen-SS rank. Yet, most of them were
released after halftime of their sentence.401 Norway also practiced a cleansing justice, by
imposing prison sentences between seven to eight years for the volunteers of the first
days. The later volunteers received lower prison sentences between three to four years
varying on their period of service. The Norwegian Waffen-SS members were tried for
treason but never for war crimes. Many volunteers lost their civic rights and the death
penalty was reintroduced. However, a decree was established in 1948 that allowed the
prisoners to remit their sentences after having served half of it.402
Sweden, the only independent country in the comparison, interestingly did not
impose any legal sanctions nor did they criminalize the volunteers.403 The Swedish
volunteers were admittedly not very numerous. Guttmann estimated a number of 300
Swedish volunteers in the Waffen-SS. He explained this low number with the great
difficulty of border crossing to Norway or Finland without being caught by the border
police, rather than a lack of interest for the service in the Waffen-SS. He estimated that
there was no doubt a higher number of aborted crossings by potential volunteers.404
Sweden is the only neutral country in comparison and had a remarkable different
postwar punishment practice than Switzerland, since they had none.
Ibid., pp. 78f.
Ibid., pp. 112f.
402 Ibid., pp. 160.
403 Ibid., pp. 167.
404 Guttmann 2014, Myth, pp. 590.
399
400
108
5.3.
Treason Trial: Riedweg and Seventeen Co-Defendants
Swiss citizens who had endangered the Swiss neutrality, who were involved in
espionage activities or who were engaged ideologically in the Third Reich were
prosecuted by criminal trials. The proceedings were mainly about involvement in
foreign agencies, parties or organizations that intervened in the internal affairs of
Switzerland.405 However, there was a differentiation, as some crimes were perceived as
especially grave. These crimes were judged in treason trials through Federal criminal
courts. In total, six treason trials were conducted between 1946 und 1948. However,
only one treason trial was directed against Swiss Waffen-SS members.
The Swiss Federal Council decided to conduct criminal procedures against former
Swiss military and civil staff members of the SS-HA in July 1945.406 The proceedings
were directed against Franz Riedweg and seventeen other higher ranking Swiss WaffenSS volunteers, amongst them Büeler and Schaeppi. They were standing trial in the
Federal Criminal Court, which took place in the former city hall in Lucerne from the 4 th
until the 20th of December 1947.407 The court was mainly interested in Nazi Germany’s
future plans to annex Switzerland and the role the higher ranking Swiss volunteers
played therein. The indictment was based on attack on the independence of the Swiss
Confederation, subversive undertaking, establishment of an illegal association, illegal
intelligence service as well as foreign military service. Thereby, the SS-HA, the GL and its
Swiss “Referat” as well as the Panoramaheim received special attention in the
hearings.408 Not all the accused appeared in court. Some of them were indisposed
because they were still in Allied war captivity, others simply decided to stay in Germany
in order to elude penitentiary. Most of the accused were already expatriated beforehand
and therefore they encountered difficulties to return to Switzerland. Ultimately, the
Federal Criminal Court sentenced them all to long prison terms.409
Franz Riedweg was the main defendant in the trial. Yet, he did not appear in court,
since he was a witness in Gottlob Berger’s trial in Nuremberg at the same time. Riedweg
Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 501.
Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Verfahren gegen nationalsozialistische
Schweizer wegen Angriff auf die Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossen, 30. November 1948, In: Berichte des
Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945.
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
409 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 520f.
405
406
109
initially intended to appear in court to justify himself.410 However, at first, he was denied
entry into the country because of his expatriation. After the Swiss authorities lifted the
entry ban, Riedweg in the meantime had changed his mind and refused to attend the
hearings after all.411 His lawyer Dr. Korner apparently had advised him to stay away
from the trial because he expected a harsh verdict and severe punishment.412 It can be
assumed that Dr. Korner had given him this advice, in order to retain the possibility for
an appeal, which was only likely in case Riedweg could prove that he could not attend.
Riedweg furthermore profited from the fact that the SBA and the chief prosecutor were
not interested in Riedweg’s presence in court after all. Ultimately, the British authorities
demanded an extradition request by the Swiss Federal Justice Department. Because the
Swiss authorities were not interested in the appearance of Riedweg, an extradition
request was never submitted.413
Riedweg was sentenced in absentia to sixteen years in prison, as he was the
“Stabsführer” of the GL and therefore able to influence Himmler’s plans for Switzerland
within the Greater Germanic Reich. The judges convicted him because of his decisive
role in the future annexation plans, as well as for a takeover of National Socialism in
Switzerland. Riedweg had ordered Büeler to set up a Swiss SS, as basis for the new order
in Switzerland, and he founded the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart as collection point,
recruitment site, as well as intelligent service headquarter.414
In addition, Riedweg stood trial in a denazification court in Hiddesen near
Bielefeld, the same year he was supposed to appear in court in Switzerland. That court
concluded that Riedweg was well aware of the criminal character of the SS and that he
had been informed about the murder of the Jews. However, he was not sentenced to
prison but only convicted for a penalty of 2000 DM, which he never had to pay, since it
had been settled with his previous detention.415 The court justified the mild verdict with
the fact that Riedweg had supported Germany’s struggle in times of need and as a result
Brief von Franz Riedweg an das Schweizerische Generalkonsulat, Nürnberg 4. April 1947, In: BAR
E2200.156-02 1000/241 176.
411 Rechtsanwalt Dr. Siegfried Wille an das Schweizerische Generalkonsulat, München 30. August 1947, In:
BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 176.
412 Brief des Generalkonsulates an das Eidgenössisch Politische Departement für juristische
Angelegenheiten, München 9. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 176.
413 Aktennotiz Schweizerisches Generalkonsulat, München 9. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2200.156-02
1000/241 176.
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
415 Urteil im Spruchgerichtsverfahren Franz Riedweg durch das Spruchgericht Hiddesen, Hiddesen 20. Juni
1948, In: AfZ Nachlass Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg, Nürnberger Dokumente und
Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948).
410
110
lost his Swiss citizenship.416 After the trial, Riedweg decided to stay in Germany, because
he was expatriated in Switzerland and in possession of the German citizenship.
Moreover, the German verdict was way lower than the Swiss one.
Heinrich Büeler was accused on the same base like Riedweg and was finally
sentenced to eight years in prison by the same court. Büeler returned to Switzerland on
his own initiative in order to confront the authorities and clear his name. Initially, his
return was denied in July 1945 because of his expatriation. He appealed against his
expatriation, which was denied. He finally returned to Switzerland in October 1946.
Hence, Büeler had taken quite some efforts to return to Switzerland. 417 The Federal
Criminal Court in Lucerne decided that Büeler was guilty of treason, as he had engaged
in the ideological training of a French battalion, and since he was the leader of the
Panoramaheim for several weeks. The judges furthermore labeled him as Riedweg’s
right hand, being charged with press and propaganda matters in the GL, as well as
entrusted with the support, care and recruitment of Germanic volunteers. Also, he had
acted against the Swiss neutrality by preparing the National Socialist takeover in
Switzerland.418 Additional to the sentence imposed by the Federal Criminal Court, he
also had to serve the sentence of four years, which he had received in absentia in March
1944. Büeler served his sentence in the prison of Regensdorf in Zürich and was released
in 1954. Thereafter he moved to Germany.419
Schaeppi was the fifth accused in the Federal Criminal court. However, he was
unable to attend, as he was still a POW. Schaeppi was already expatriated in 1943. Like
Riedweg, Schaeppi was sentenced to sixteen years in prison. He was found guilty
because of his front duty, as well as his activities as war correspondent and his function
as Panoramaheim leader. He had actively tried to convince Swiss men to join the
Waffen-SS, rather than to volunteer for work. Moreover, he had influenced and trained
the volunteers in Sennheim ideologically. Furthermore, Schaeppi, like Büeler, worked in
the GL for several months, tasked with press and propaganda matters and he was
involved in the attempt to found a Germanic SS-Schweiz. The main reason for his high
sentence however, was his espionage activity for the SD in Stuttgart, functioning as a
Zeitungsartikel, Mitleid mit einem Hochverräter, In: Der Tagesspiegel, Nr. 1127, 26. Juni 1949, In: BAR
E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
418 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 419.
416
111
courier between NS organizations in Switzerland and Germany.420 Schaeppi returned to
Switzerland after the trial, with the intention to appeal. Yet, he had to serve his sentence
imposed by the Federal Criminal Court as well as his previous sentence of four years
imposed by a military court. Schaeppi was released in 1956. After his release he decided
to live in Germany and Paris.421
The trial attracted a lot of media attention. All the newspapers in Switzerland were
reporting in a harsh and denouncing manner, calling them disloyal and treacherous
Swiss Nazis.422 Other Swiss volunteers were not involved in the treason trial but still
convicted on the base of treason. Not unlike the others, Maag was also already sentenced
to three years in prison in absentia in May 1943. The military court “Territorialgericht
3A” based the sentence on foreign military service, disobedience of general orders and
noncompliance of military regulations. In addition, his rank of lieutenant was revoked
and he was expelled from the Swiss army. His case was once more judged by the federal
criminal court in March 1944 and he was sentenced in absentia to another three years in
prison, based on attack of the independence and “Zuwiderhandlung” against article 1 of
the BRB of December 5, 1938 regarding “Massnahmen gegen staatsgefährliche Umtriebe
und zum Schutze der Demokratie” (measures against activities that endanger the state
and protection of the Democracy). Maag was expatriated in 1943.423
His father had appealed against that decision, stating that the expatriation of his
son could not be based on a political disagreement and that his son definitely was not
guilty of treason. The Federal Council rejected the complaint in May 1945.424 Thus, Maag
had to serve his sentence of two times three years in prison after his return to
Switzerland. He started his first sentence imposed by the federal criminal court in
September 1945 and was released in September 1947, because of his good behavior, as
well as his promise that he would never engage in political activities again.425
Thereafter, he started his second sentence pronounced by the military court, in the
1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713.
421 Biographie Benno Schaeppi, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Nachlass von Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.1.
Biographie
422 Zeitungsartikel, Schweizer SS Leute verurteilt, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 104, 29. Dezember 1947,
In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. Zeitungsartikel, Mitleid mit einem Hochverräter, In: Der
Tagesspiegel, Nr. 1127, 26. Juni 1949, In: E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.
423 Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates bezüglich Othmar Maag, Bern 1. Mai 1945, In: BAR E4320 B
1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
424 Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates bezüglich Othmar Maag, Bern 1. Mai 1945, In: BAR E4320 B
1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
425 Die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an den Vorsteher des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und
Polizeidepartementes, Bern 29. August 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
420
112
prison Regensdorf in September 1947 and was once more released on parole for good
behavior in September 1949.426 Since Maag had lost the Swiss citizenship, it can be
assumed that he had to leave the country after having served his prison sentences.
Unfortunately the sources do not tell where Maag went thereafter but it can be assumed
that he went to Germany. One can wonder why Maag returned to Switzerland anyway,
since he would have escaped a conviction in Germany. It can be assumed that he
returned because of his family. After all, his father campaigned strongly for the revision
of his expatriation.
Riedweg, Büeler, Schaeppi and presumably Maag were certainly not the only Swiss
volunteers who chose to move away from Switzerland and settle in Germany. There
were other Swiss volunteers who did not return to Switzerland, since they expected
harsh punishment. In Germany they did not have to fear legal prosecution, since, the sole
membership in the Waffen-SS was not punished unless they were involved in war
crimes427. Alfred Nikles, for example, was sentenced in absentia to two years in prison
and a fine of 200 Swiss Francs in 1943 because of continuing weakening of the military
strength. He furthermore lost his civil rights for five years. 428 The Swiss Justice and
Police department stated in a final report in 1946, that they did not know where Nikles
was. The Swiss authorities assumed that he was in Allied war captivity. They only found
out about the grave violations Nikles committed in Sennheim because returning Swiss
volunteers mentioned him in their interrogations. Hereafter he was expatriated in
November 1946.429
The analysis on the criminal trial indicates that some volunteers were sentenced
exceptionally harsh. However, the trials only dealt with activities that had violated Swiss
law and endangered the Swiss neutrality. Mostly, the crimes committed in the Waffen-SS
were not subject of the proceedings. The authorities at that time were often very
unaware of the war crimes committed at the Eastern Europe. However, there are rare
Bedingte Entlassung Othmar Maag, Eidgenössisches Militärdepartement, Bern 29. Juli 1949, In: BAR
E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358.
427 The occupation powers USA, England, France and Russia had installed the “Kontrollratsgesetz” as a
legal base for postwar Germany from 1945-1948. However, in 1946 they recommended the establishment
of a new German court for the trial of German war criminals. Members of the Waffen-SS who were not
involved in war crimes were not tried. Broszat, M (1981) “Siegerjustiz oder Strafrechtliche
Selbstreinigung. Aspekte der Vergangenheitsbewältigung der Deutschen Justiz während der
Besatzungszeit 1945-1949“, In: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 29(4), Pages 477-544, here 480.
428 Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1.
429 Entwurf Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement, Bern 30. November 1946, In: BAR E4320 B
1970/25 314, C.02-511.
426
113
cases where the authorities had to assess potential war crimes. This is especially true for
the case of Eugen Wipf, who was convicted in Switzerland’s only war crime trial.
5.4.
The Swiss War Crime Trial: Stating an Example on Wipf Eugen
The indictment of Swiss volunteers who were said to have committed war crimes in the
service of the Waffen-SS posed a number of problems for the Swiss courts. The term war
crimes did not exist in Swiss law and the authorities had to consider whether the Swiss
courts should bring Swiss citizens to trial, who had committed crimes outside the
country. Furthermore, they had to reflect on whether the Swiss courts should be
responsible for the indictment of criminal military acts committed in a foreign military
service.430
The most famous case of such a trial was the
inglorious case of Eugen Wipf (12 December 1916,
Zürich). He became known in Switzerland as the Swiss
war criminal “par excellence”. Wipf was imprisoned as
a civilian in the SS-Sonderlager Hinzert in Tier,431
where he managed to get promoted “Oberkapo”.
Thereafter he was enrolled in the “SS-Sonderstab
Dirlewanger”, as SS-Unterscharführer.432
Wipf came from a simple background. His father
was farmer and the family Wipf had a low income. Wipf
himself worked as laborer and blacksmith and later on
served in the army, where he signed up for voluntary
border service. Wipf was a notorious drinker and came
Image 7 Wipf Eugen leaving the Court
in 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571
1571, B.53.31.11
into contact with the law several times, because of theft and alcoholism. After escaping
the military prison, where he was imprisoned for violation of the military discipline, he
Bericht des Oberauditors in der Verwaltung der Militärjustiz im Eidgenössischen Militärdepartements
an das Eidgenössische Justiz- und Militärdepartement, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4110 A
1000/1831 1372, F.07.
431 The SS Sonderlager Hinzert was a German concentration and detention camp in Trier. It existed with
various changes of function between 1939 until 1945. Homepage Gedenkstätte SS Sonderlager/KZ
Hinzert. Online: http://www.gedenkstaette-hinzert-rlp.de/ [18.05.2014]
432 Schneider, V. (2003) „Oberkapo Wipf. Ein Scheusal in Menschengestalt. Zu einem KZ Verfahren in der
Schweiz im Zusammenhang mit dem ehemaligen Konzertrationslager „SS Sonderlager Hinzert“.“ In:
Online Publikation. Pages 1-132:
http://www.gymherm.de/web/07_angebote/Projekte/hinzert/downloads_hinzert/OberkapoWipf.pdf
[15.12.2013].
430
114
left Switzerland illegally in August 1940. Wipf stated in the interrogation by the SBA,
that his escape to Germany had nothing to do with ideological commitment and that he
never engaged in a political organization in Switzerland. He simply escaped because he
did not see any other solution to avoid criminal prosecution by the Swiss army.433
After crossing the border, Wipf was arrested by the Gestapo and brought to the
Panoramaheim, where he assigned to labor service. However, he was still an alcoholic
and therefore not a reliable worker. Consequently, he was arrested several times by the
Gestapo and finally, after complaining about Nazi Germany in public in a drunken state,
he was imprisoned in the SS-Sonderlager Hinzert in 1941. After some time, Wipf
managed to get a confidential post, as of his good conduct. He was promoted “Oberkapo”
in mid 1942.434 His duty was to arrange the labor battalions, ensure order in the
barracks and help as an interpreter and translator in German and French. Wipf himself
stated later on, that he was not comfortable with his tasks and that he requested for
release in 1944. The SS camp commander decided that Wipf could be released, but only
if he joined the Waffen-SS, which he gladly did.435
Wipf was assigned to the “SS-Sonderstab Dirlewanger”. This infamous unit was
established by Gottlob Berger during the summer of 1940 as a result of his creative
search for additional manpower. The special formation utilized the many convicted,
serving sentences in the SS-controlled prisons and concentration camps. The unit
committed numerous atrocities, most notably in the Warsaw uprising in August 1944
and was involved in operations against civilians and partisans. The formation committed
so many atrocities that even SS officials were led to complain about its activities. Toward
the end of the war, political prisoners from the concentration camps were assigned to
the unit. The formation was said to have been extremely violent and brutal against
civilians. Beating with clubs and shooting out of hand seemed to have been common
practice.436
After the war, Wipf returned to Switzerland, where he was immediately
imprisoned for fifteen months, due to his sentence for “Nichtbefolgung von
Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft,
Zürich 5. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P.
434 Wipf did not remember the exact date or time himself. He estimated that he was promoted either in
mid or by the end of 1942. Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der
Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 5. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.02313 P.
435 Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft,
Zürich 5. September 1946, In : BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P, pp. 3f
436 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 264, 266ff.
433
115
Dienstvorschriften”, illegal border crossing and foreign military service. He was serving
his sentence in the prison of Regensdorf in Zürich, when the Swiss authorities were
informed by former concentration camp inmates from Hinzert, that Wipf had been a
sadistic camp guard there and that he was responsible for several deaths. The Swiss
authorities initially believed that it had to be a misunderstanding and confusion, since
they did not believe that a Swiss citizen would be able to commit such crimes. However,
their investigations soon proved their assumptions wrong.437 As a result, the Swiss
authorities decided that he had to be tried by a federal court, based on criminal law as of
war crimes, even though he had committed the murders in the German SS-Sonderlager.
According to German law, article 211, he would have been sentenced to death for
murder.438 However, the Swiss authorities were not willing to expatriate or extradite
him. As a result he was tried according Swiss law.439 Luckily for him had the death
sentence for civil offences been abandoned in January 1943.440
The criminal trial in Zürich started in July, 1948 and lasted one week. The
prosecution was based on various witness accounts from camp inmates, testifying on
Wipf’s sadistic personality. He was accused for being responsible for various deaths of
prisoners, as a result of his brutal behavior. Wipf repeatedly had beaten prisoners so
heavily that they suffered from severe injuries, eventually leading to their death. He
furthermore forced prisoners to take cold showers for such a long time, that the already
exhausted and weak prisoners died. Also, he deprived the prisoners of food. Some
witness stated that Wipf was regularly drunk when he attacked the prisoners and Wipf
himself admitted that he always had an alcohol stock in the camp. 441
Initially Wipf denied that he was involved in any killings. However, with time, he
admitted that he had drowned at least two prisoners in a washing tray and that he was
partially responsible for the murder of several Flemish and Polish prisoners. Taken from
the interrogation file, Wipf confessed the following:
Auszug aus dem Bericht Nr. 82 der Bundespolizei, Geheim, Ort unbekannt August 1947, In: BAR E2001
E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
438 Artikel 211, Satz 1, Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Recht [RStGB] Schneider 2003, Oberkapo, pp.8.
439 Art. 6, Satz 1 StBG of 21, December 1937 stated the following: „Verbrechen oder Vergehen von
Schweizern im Ausland. 1. Der Schweizer, der im Ausland ein Verbrechen oder ein Vergehen verübt, für
welches das schweizerische Recht die Auslieferung zulässt, ist, sofern die Tat auch am Begehungsort
strafbar ist, diesem Gesetz unterworfen, wenn er sich in der Schweiz befindet oder der Eidgenossenschaft
wegen dieser Tat ausgeliefert wird. Ist das Gesetz des Begehungsortes für den Täter das mildere, so ist
dieses anzuwenden. (…)“ Schneider 2003, Oberkapo, pp.52.
440 Schneider 2003, Oberkapo, pp.8.
441 Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft,
Zürich 5. September 1946, In : BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P.
437
116
“(…) Die erste Prozedur erhielt Hanau von mir in Form von 20 Min. kalte Dusche
im Auftrag von Schaaf. Nachher befahl Schaaf 3 Tage ohne Nahrung, was ich zu
beaufsichtigen hatte. Dann musste ich Hanau 4 Gamellen Suppe aufzwingen,
Schaaf war dabei. Der Endzweck hätte sein sollen, Platzen des Magens, was aber
nicht eintraf. (…) Von Windisch wurde ich nachträglich gerufen um dem Hanau
eine kalte Dusche zu verabfolgen, deutsch gesagt um ihn „fertig“ zu machen. In der
Waschküche war bereits ein Pole, welcher den Hanau im nackten Zustand mit
kaltem Wasser mit einem Schlauch bespritzte bis er zusammenbrach und zwar
bewusstlos. (…) Im Auftrag meiner Vorgesetzten habe ich mitgeholfen den Juden
Hanau zu beseitigen und ich fühle mich deshalb an seinem Tode mitschuldig.“442
One of the witnesses was a doctor in the camp and he described Wipf as a true sadist,
who fully enjoyed the violence connected to his position.
“Vom medizinischen Standpunkt kann ich bezeugen, dass Wipf anlässlich seiner
Schlägereien wirklich sadistisch veranlagt war. Bei diesen Ekzessen bekamen seine
Augen speziell einen ganz grauen Ausdruck. Wipf schlug bei jeder sich bietenden
Gelegenheit Tag und Nacht von sich aus um sich selbst zu gefallen und um seinen
Posten der SS gegenüber zu behalten. (…)“443
Wipf claimed during his trial that he was not directly and solely responsible for
these deaths but that he was only partially responsible. Although Wipf stated that he had
only acted upon orders by death treat, the judges were not willing to accept his claim of
putative duress.444 The Criminal Court sentenced him to life imprisonment, based on
repeated murder in fourteen cases, aiding and abetting in intentional homicide, grievous
bodily harm and repeated abandonment in July 1948.445 However, he was not sentenced
for war crimes. Unfortunately, the sources do not indicate why the sentence was solely
Fortsetzung der Abhörung von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 23. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P.
443 Fortsetzung der Abhörung von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 23. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P.
444 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement, Politische
Angelegenheiten, Bern 12. August 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
445 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement, Politische
Angelegenheiten, Bern 12. August 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
442
117
on murder and not on war crimes. It can be assumed, that the reason therefore was that
he committed the crimes as a prisoner and not as a Waffen-SS solider, and therefore the
term war crimes could not be applied. However, his deeds in the SS-Sonderstab
Dirlewanger were not assessed. Wipf joined the unit in 1944, so he was probably
involved in atrocities committed in the Warsaw uprising. Hence, it can be assumed that
Wipf committed further crimes; this time in a Waffen-SS uniform.
Wipf Eugen had committed gruesome deeds including murder in the concentration
camp Hinzert. Almost every newspaper of Switzerland reported about the trial, calling
Hinzert an inferno of agonies for the victims, a regnum of infernal joys, and bestial
pleasures for Wipf.446 Common for the time, the articles were mostly written in a very
dramatic manner, not succeeding in describing Wipf at all. The newspaper depicted him
as a monster, rather than an alcoholic with sadistic tendencies. However, it was the first
time in history that a Swiss person was accused of war crimes and the journalists
sensation-seekingly blew it out of proportions and cannibalized it in detail.
The newsletters reacted diversely on the verdict itself. The “Neue Berner Zeitung”
for example stated that a verdict of life in prison was way to gentle, since this could
mean a release after fifteen years.447 The Neue Zürcher Zeitung expressed the opinion
that Wipf was lucky that Switzerland did not extradite him, although he would deserve
nothing less than that.448 The “Schweizerische Metall- und Uhren Arbeiter Zeitung” was
even demanding the death penalty for Wipf was a true monster, who did not deserve to
walk on earth anymore.449 However, they all expressed their shocked about the fact that
a Swiss person was involved in the crimes of Nazi Germany and capable of such brutal
deeds. The newsletter “Freies Volk” was basically worried about how Switzerland could
be perceived as a country thereafter, since the world judged brutally on Germany
because of World War II:
“Mit Tränen in den Augen haben Französische Offiziere geklagt, dass sie diese
Behandlung von Deutschen hätten verstehen können, nicht aber von einem
Zeitungsartikel, Nach dem Zürcher Kriegsverbrecherprozess, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 1440, 7. Juli
1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
447 Zeitungsartikel, Nur ein Bruchteil der grauenhaften Taten. Anklage und Verteidigung im Prozess Wipf,
In: Neue Berner Zeitung, /. Juli 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
448 Zeitungsartikel, Nach dem Zürcher Kriegsverbrecher Prozess, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 1440, 7.
Juli 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
449 Zeitungsausartikel, Recht soll Recht bleiben, In: Schweizerische Metall- und Uhren Arbeiter Zeitung, Nr.
28, Bern 14. Juli 1948. In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
446
118
Schweizer, dessen Heimat sie als Hort anständiger Menschen schätzten. Wir
können nur wünschen und hoffen, dass diese Überlebenden die Verallgemeinerung
nicht mitmachen und dass sie in diesem Capo Suisse eben den Einzelmenschen, und
zwar einen Asozialen sehen.“450
The realization that a “monster” like Wipf was a Swiss citizen had a profound
impact on Swiss society and the newsletters did not leave out one singularity of his
monstrous deeds. It seem to have been difficult to process the fact that the Holocaust did
involve Switzerland to a certain extent and that every nation could bear monsters and
what was even worse; that they looked so ordinary and inauspicious that you would not
recognize them on the street.451 The trial of Wipf can be seen as an example trial, in
which Switzerland tried to show that they were judging hard on such crimes and that
Wipf himself was not representative for Switzerland at all. Wipf’s trial certainly was a
shock, since the Swiss society suddenly was directly confronted with the Second World
War and the Holocaust. The traitors’ trials were not perceived in the same way, as the
defendants were only punished for the fact of betraying and weakening the country.
Wipf however, was perceived the embodiment of true Nazism and barbarity.
Zeitungsausartikel, Der Fall Wipf von der andern Seite gesehen, In: Freies Volk, Bern 9. Juli 1948, In:
BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
451 Zeitungsartikel, Capo Wipf, ein Nachspiel des Grauens in der Schweiz, In: National Zeitung, Nr. 310,
Basel 8. Juli 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11.
450
119
Conclusion
Why did the Swiss volunteers leave the safe haven of Switzerland and why did they
decide to join the Waffen-SS? The theorem of a threatened identity and pragmatic
collaboration as a motif for joining does not succeed to explain participation in the Swiss
case. Hence, this thesis principal aim was to introduce Swiss volunteers and assess their
motivation to join the Waffen-SS. Therefore, the background and socialization of
seventeen Swiss volunteers, as well as their admission, ranks and careers were the
central focus in this work. In addition, the post war punishment practice in Switzerland
was included in the assessment. It was argued, that since motivation is a multifaceted
characteristic, a biographical approach with an assessment of personal statements had
to be applied. Only the implementation of case studies offered the possibility to assess
the motivation individually in order to work out similarities or divergences, which in
turn enabled a certain generalization.
Motivation is a personal matter which is influenced by the own personal situation.
That is why the individuals in this case study were presented in chapter two and tree. In
chapter two, the category work hunt was exemplified through the accounts of Josef
Jakob Breitenmoser, Otto Alfons Aichle and Alfons Straub. The three men were all very
young. Aichle, who was the oldest, was only twenty one when he crossed the border.
They were not married and their family and life situation was unstable. They all
descended from a lower income class. Straub had lost his parents early and was under
guardianship and Breitenmoser’s parents were too poor to support him financially. So,
he was not able to finish an apprenticeship which resulted in lower income jobs. In
general, young men like the described ones were more likely to leave everything behind,
since they were not responsible for a family yet. Thus, they were easily influenced by the
stories of war success and prosperity in Germany. It has to be noted that for the three
men in this paragraph the motivation to leave Switzerland was not the same as to join
the Waffen-SS.
Breitenmoser and Aichle could both also be allocated to the category of criminals.
Aichle had been arrested in Switzerland for theft several times. Breitenmoser was
arrested by the police because of theft and illegal possession of a weapon and his
membership in the ES brought him in conflict with the authorities. Breitenmoser himself
120
stated that these conflicts heightened the tensions with his parents, which in turn
contributed to the motivation to leave Switzerland. However, since they both stated in
the police interrogation that their main motivation to leave Switzerland was to find
work, it was decided to allocate them to work hunt. Also, all the higher ranking
volunteers were previously convicted as of their political activities, so the description
criminal would need further differentiation. That is why it was decided not to use
“criminal” as a category, since it would be insufficient as explanation. Straub did not
have a criminal background but he had a pro-German attitude, because of his German
origin. However, the Swiss army and his employer both perceived him as unreliable. So,
Straub was clearly having problems to get a grip on his life.
The assessment on volunteers who were basically on work hunt proved, that they
were not intending to conscribe to the Waffen-SS in the first place. After they crossed the
border, they were picked up by the border control and thereafter questioned by the
Gestapo. The Gestapo had orders to forward the volunteers to the Panoramaheim, where
they were mostly persuaded to join the Waffen-SS. The archive documents revealed that
the work hunters all conscribed in late 1941 or 1942. Aichle joined by the end of 1941
and Breitenmoser in October 1942. Straub’s precise date of accession is unknown but it
can be estimated around autumn 1942. As established, these were the years where the
volunteers many times did not have the option anymore to choose between work
service and Waffen-SS duty. The Waffen-SS had lowered their requirement standards for
recruitment out of an urgent lack of man power and increasingly started to force
conscription. As a matter of fact, the work hunters mostly were drawn into the war,
without fully knowing what they were fighting for.
Although Breitenmoser, Aichle and Straub mainly were on work hunt, they also
tried to escape their unfavorable personal circumstances. Evidently, difficult life
conditions and problems at home were among the driving factors for the volunteers to
leave Switzerland in order to find work and linked to that, the desire to start a new life.
The category of National Socialist was outlined through the accounts of Othmar
Maag, Dr. Kurt Brüderlin, Paul Diebold, Hermann Huber and Dr. Ernst Schneider. The
men in this profile category were all ideologically committed and mostly already
politically active in the renewal moment in Switzerland, with the exception of Dr.
Schneider. Yet, Dr. Schneider was involved in the department for Aryan culture and
linguistic at the University of Munich. Maag and Brüderlin had engaged in leading
121
positions and Huber in the distribution of propaganda material. Diebold was not having
a leading position, yet he was an active member. However, it has to be pointed out, that
all men in this profile group combined an ideological factor with self interest. Maag, Dr.
Brüderlin and Dr. Schneider clearly wanted to achieve a career which was impossible in
Switzerland. Diebold and Huber acted out of financial considerations.
Although political activity was not always the sole characteristic, it was the most
striking feature. Diebold and Huber could also be assigned to the group of job search.
Their financial situation certainly took its influence on the decision making process. Yet,
it does not explain exclusively why they engaged in these organizations, and why they
decided to join the Waffen-SS instead of just searching for work. Also, Maag and Dr.
Brüderlin could be allocated with soldiership. Diebold furthermore had a criminal
background. Regarding their social status it can be noted that Dr. Brüderlin, Dr.
Schneider and Maag were of a middle or upper class upbringing, well educated and
integrated into the society. Diebold and Huber on the other hand were of a lower class
upbringing, struggling to get a grip on their life.
In comparison with the category job search, the men in this group were already
older when they left Switzerland. They were all around thirty years old. Maag is with
twenty-five years the youngest of them. Their family background however varied. Whilst
Diebold and Huber were having an unstable background, Brüderlin and Schneider were
both intellectuals with a doctoral degree. Moreover, Maag and Dr. Schneider both had
German ancestry, which might have contributed to the sympathy for Nazi Germany. It is
furthermore interesting to note that they all had a career within the Waffen-SS. Dr.
Brüderlin as Hauptsturmführer was the highest ranking amongst them, followed by Dr.
Schneider as SS-Untersturmführer and lastly Maag and Diebold as SS-Obersturmführer.
It is striking that two of them had a doctoral degree; Dr. Brüderlin had a PhD in
economy and political science and Dr. Schneider in philosophy. Dr. Brüderlin
additionally held the rank of a senior lieutenant, in the Swiss army. Maag and Diebold
were holding the rank of a lieutenant. The only exception is Huber, without a good
education or a fabulous career.
The last group of double citizens was exemplified through the accounts of Fritz
Arnold and Ernst Krauel. They both possessed the Swiss citizenship. However, Arnold’s
father was naturalized during the World War I. Krauel was born in Hamburg but had the
Swiss citizenship, since his great grandfather immigrated to Switzerland. For them the
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war situation caused a conflict of conscience, as they felt that they had to take a side. The
desire to fight for their father country certainly contributed in their later decision to join
the Waffen-SS. However, Krauel sympathized with National Socialism and displayed
ideological commitment. Maag would also fit in this category, since he too had a German
origin and relatives in Switzerland.
Chapter two indicated that the group of National Socialists was able to have a
certain career within the Waffen-SS. That is why chapter three focused on the career
development of six volunteers. The six volunteers described in this chapter, were all
deployed according their talents; Franz Riedweg as politician and bureaucrat, Heinrich
Büeler as official in the GL, Johann Eugen Corrodi and Heinrich Hersche in military,
Alfred Nikles as instructor and Benno Schaeppi as war correspondent. Corrodi as SSOberführer was the highest ranking among them but Riedweg as Stabsführer of the GL
had a more influential position. He achieved the rank of an SS-Obersturmbannführer.
Hersche was promoted SS-Standartenführer shortly before the end of the war, followed
by Büeler as SS-Sturmbannführer, Nikles as SS-Hauptsturmführer and lastly Schaeppi as
SS-Untersturmführer. What they had in common were their career aspirations.
The intellectuals like Riedweg and Büeler were fluent in French and German and
thanks to their ideological commitment to National Socialism – they were given
positions responsible for training and education of the Germanic volunteers. However,
we can recognize a shift after 1943. Prior to 1943, the federalist idea about the Germanic
Reich supported the career of these men. However, after 1943, the Swiss volunteers lost
their positions and were mostly transferred to the front, since the Waffen-SS leadership
was in need of soldiers at the front rather than intellectuals in the bureaucracy.
Additionally, the Swiss higher ranking volunteers were very well educated in the
military matters with higher ranks in the Swiss army. Therefore, the Swiss officer corps
volunteers all started with a higher rank in the Waffen-SS, corresponding with their rank
in the Swiss army. Hersche’s and Corrodi’s military education for instance turned out to
be beneficial for their position within the Waffen-SS. They were installed as
commanders of battalions at the front and additionally used for practical training of the
volunteers. The language abilities of the Swiss were highly welcomed, with Hersche
being fluent in French and Corrodi in both Italian and French.
The Swiss officer corps volunteers where all already engaged in NS organizations
in Switzerland. They were all ideologically committed, however not for the same
123
reasons. Riedweg and Büeler believed in an organic solution in which Switzerland would
play an important role in the new order for Europe. Hersche on the other hand did not
specifically account on what exactly convinced him about the NS ideology. His
motivation was a more opportunistic one and the same applies to Büeler. These two
men were politically prosecuted in Switzerland and both had a desire for a career.
Where could they better fit in than in Nazi Germany where the willing and fit Aryan was
welcome anytime?
In comparison to the lower ranking volunteers, they were all very well educated,
already a bit older and they all came from middle and upper class families. Furthermore,
they all believed that Germany would win the war and set up a new order in Europe.
Since they did not want to be too late, they decided to join the Waffen-SS to ensure
themselves a future position in the new order. Additionally, they also wanted to ensure
that Switzerland would not have to join as a loser country, but as an equal Germanic
country that deserved a special position within the Reich. This stance was quiet
idealistic and very much opportunistic at the same time. This, however, also led them to
feel offended by their treatment back in Switzerland. Especially the accusation of being
guilty of treason shocked them deeply, since they were convinced that they had only
acted in the best interest for their country.
Chapter three proved that all the higher ranking volunteers were ideologically
committed. However, it was established that they were not equally motivated. It is clear
that a person was not only driven by one motivation type but that he in contrary
possessed various aspects that overlapped. That is why chapter four further
differentiated the motivation of the ideologically committed Swiss volunteers.
Twelve out of seventeen volunteers in this case study were ideologically
committed and driven by a sense for nationalism. However, the renewal movement in
Switzerland was not a uniform movement but rather composed of many different NS
organizations. So as a result, the ideologically committed volunteers were all convinced
National Socialists but they highlighted different values within National Socialism. Some
advocated for an own Swiss National Socialism, others longed for an affiliation and
incorporation to the German Reich. However, they all aspired a restructuring of the
political, economical and social conditions in Switzerland and Europe. The Swiss NS
volunteer, like Franz Riedweg, openly expressed his desire for a return to traditional
values like Volk and homeland. However, the understanding of the term Volk was not
124
limited on the Swiss nationality. In contrary, the NS volunteers felt that they belonged to
the German people. As a result, the volunteers felt that they had to contribute to the
spread of National Socialism.
The detailed examination of the personal statements revealed that the struggle of
the Aryan was not a primary consideration for the Swiss volunteers. Nonetheless, the
volunteers accepted anti-Semitism as part of the party program and did not question its
relevance. However, most of the volunteers avoided anti-Semitism in their personal
statements. What was more important is that they felt a flush of victory as they were
convinced that Germany would win the war. So the decision to leave for Germany
entailed a desire to be on the winner side.
Commitment to National Socialism also entailed the desire to fight bolshevism. As a
consequence, the battle against the Red Army was a holy crusade. All of them indicated
their desire to fight the red threat in their motivation to join the Waffen-SS. The fight
against Bolshevism was the most often remarked motivation to join the Waffen-SS and
matched with their idea of protecting civilized Europe. Consequently, another factor
involved in the desire to fight bolshevism was the desire to fight after all. The military
highly educated Swiss volunteers realized that Switzerland would not participate in the
war, so they chose for the Waffen-SS in order to experience a battle after all. Apparently,
the desire to fight was an important motivational factor. Nevertheless, it has to be kept
in mind that anti-Bolshevism most probably was exaggerated in retrospect by the
volunteers in order to serve as an excuse and lower the degree of punishment.
The ideologically committed Swiss volunteers claimed that they strongly felt
responsible to contribute in the establishment of National Socialism in Switzerland and
the creation of the Greater Germanic Reich. However, the Swiss volunteers typically
were influenced by the federalist ideal. As a result, they all believed in a Germanic Reich
in which Switzerland would have had an independent position. The vision of a Greater
Germanic can be seen as a basis for their future decision making to join the Waffen-SS.
Yet, it was not the tipping point consideration. Most of the Swiss volunteers certainly
combined an ideological factor with self interest. Their political activities had negative
effects on their life so that the illegal border crossing became more and more attractive.
The last decisive factor in the decision was an opportunistic consideration, either
out of financial problems resulting out of the previous criminal prosecution because of
political activities, career aspirations or finally simply because they believed that
125
Germany certainly would win the war and they wanted to secure their place in the sun.
Also, their personal opportunism was mostly combined with the sense and frustration
that the Swiss government was too weak and ignorant.
The last chapter’s focus was the post war punishment of the Swiss volunteers.
Therefore, the legal bases as well as the various trials were the center of attention. The
Swiss volunteers were all sentenced on the base of article 94 MStGB for foreign military
service. The charges included furthermore illegal border crossing as violation of the BRB
regarding “Teilweise Schliessung der Grenze”. Moreover, the Swiss Federal Council
decided in 1943, to expatriate Swiss citizens who were collaborating with the Reich. The
sentences based on military law additionally included offenses as “Ungehorsam gegen
allgemeine Anordnung”, article 107 MStGB, which included violations of the “BRB
betreffend teilweise Schliessung der Grenze”, “Dienstverletzung” according article 72
MStGB, as well as “Dienstversäumnis” according article 82 MStGB. Hence, the Swiss
volunteers were all already convicted by military courts before the end of the war. The
men in my sample had to serve their sentences immediately after their return. Some of
the volunteers like Hersche, Corrodi and Breitenmoser appealed and interestingly
received lower sentences than the previous ones.
Consulting the archive documents in regard with the various trials of the Swiss
volunteers, it was established that the Swiss authorities were mainly interested in the
volunteers’ activities that endangered the Swiss neutrality. As a result, the higher
ranking Swiss volunteers, who were ideologically involved in the Third Reich, were
sentenced separately by criminal trials. Riedweg, Büeler and Schaeppi additionally were
tried in a special treason trial based on attack on the independence of the Swiss
Confederation, subversive undertaking, establishment of an illegal association, illegal
intelligence service, as well as foreign military service. Riedweg and Schaeppi both
received very high prison sentences of sixteen years and Büeler was sentenced in total
to twelve years in prison. An analysis of the results showed, that the criminal trial
verdicts were way harsher in comparison with the ones imposed by military courts. This
cannot be explained with the presumption that the criminal courts sentenced harsher
than the military courts. Maag received the same sentence in both courts, namely twice
three years.
The difference in the evaluation of volunteers involved in political activities next to
volunteers who were merely soldiers is the most striking. Corrodi and Hersche were
126
both ideologically committed. However, that commitment was combined by a high sense
of soldiership. That implies that they had a strong sense for duty and honor. The Swiss
authorities seemed to have been more understanding with that mindset. It appears that
a strong sense for soldiership and duty was a mitigating factor for the military courts.
Riedweg, Büeler and Schaeppi, who were soldiers and somehow politicians at the same
time, were sentenced much harsher.
As announced in chapter five, the sentences had to be compared to the punishment
practice of other European countries that had to deal with their returnees, in order to
put the findings into perspective. Compared to the Netherlands, the Swiss higher
ranking volunteers received higher sentences and the Swiss did not have the possibility
of reintegration once they were expatriated. The Belgian authorities imposed higher
sentences but did not execute them accordingly. So, once more the Swiss were worse off.
The most striking comparison is Sweden. It is the only neutral country in the
comparison and unlike Switzerland they did not impose any legal sanctions on the
volunteers. Overall, the higher ranking Swiss received very high sentences in
comparison. The lower ranking volunteers, however, seem to have been punished
comparably or less severe. The comparison to the punishment practice in other
countries was included in order to put the Swiss sentences into perspective.
The topic Swiss volunteers is still representing a research gap and the source basis
remind unorganized. Oertle’s standard work on the Swiss volunteers offered a basis for
research on the topic and the references on archive material were invaluable. His
assessment unfortunately lacked the necessary in depth, as he only offered superficial
and obsolete explanations. To explain collaboration with the tradition of the Swiss
mercenary army or the natural curiosity of the Swiss for traveling only underline this
conclusion. Oertle’s and Neulen’s distinction of different motivation categories
facilitated the assessment of motivation. Yet, their division into percentage is not overall
convincing. Since most of the volunteers were featuring more than one profile
characteristic, the calculation in percentage distort the understanding on motivation.
The various Swiss men were as diverse as possible, yet they shared similarities. There
were motivation patterns, linking that specific group of Swiss volunteers together.
Although the background differed, the war context with its political and economical
consequences influenced their decisions as well as their personal situation, regarding
money, freedom and chances. So what emerged upon detailed study of their biographies
127
is not one unifying characteristic but a multitude of individual stories of diverse men,
who partly shared a similar social origin, personality traits and ideological tendencies.
Oertle claimed that anti-bolshevism and ideological commitment was not a main
factor in the motivation and therefore, only of little significance. He assessed that the
young volunteers mostly became ideologically committed, because of the special
training and “Weltanschauungs Unterricht”. Also, he Oertle concluded that the Swiss
renewal movement did not succeed to influence the volunteers, as the movement was
too fragmented and estranged and therefore insignificant. However, twelve out of
seventeen men in this case study were member of NS organizations prior to their
conscription to the Waffen-SS. Oertle clearly underestimated the influence of ideological
commitment, as well as the importance of the renewal movement in Switzerland.
The archives findings supports Guttmann’s evaluation that the Swiss officer corps
volunteers had developed a longing for a radical reorganization of the European
political, social and economical landscape before joining the Waffen-SS and that this
longing was amplified by what these men perceived as threat to the core of European
civilization. However, he did not combine that longing with a desire for a career at all. He
left the factor of opportunism out and therefore missed an important factor. Ideological
commitment and opportunism cannot be assessed separately as they belong together.
Mertens assessed that economical considerations were only a secondary motive.
The archive findings, however, suggest that Mertens underestimated that dimension of
motivation. The financial motives were equally important to the officer corps as well as
the lower ranking volunteers. However, Mertens also advocated the opinion that there
certainly was not a uniform motive, but rather a bundle of individual reasons. This
included a national socialist worldview or an anti-communist attitude, private and
vocational problems, escape from prosecution, enthusiasm for the war, as well as
adventurism. The emphasis on vocational and private problems according this case
study clearly is justified and certainly played a major role in the motivation to leave
Switzerland illegally.
The findings on the treason verdicts underlined Neulen’s presumption of the
stigmatization of some scapegoats in political trials. However, Neulen claimed that the
Swiss authorities only decided on harsh punishment out of general policy
considerations. Then again, Switzerland had prosecuted the volunteers already during
the war and retained the harsh punishment in general. So, the argument that it served as
128
a cover up for economical collaboration does not succeed to explain the authority’s
stance sufficiently. The archive findings are in agreement with Mertens, that the
authorities’ approach was not overall consistent. However, not as Mertens stated
because of refusal to request extradition. The authorities did not request extradition at
all but once the person concerned was standing trial they decided on strict punishment.
However, Mertens has a point by calling it “legal procrastination”. Unlike him, I would
not label it “calculated action pattern” but rather typical Swiss political nature. That said
the Swiss system prefers it to assess single cases, rather than formulating an overall rule.
This strategy always allows keeping a backdoor open, which in turn offers flexibility.
This stance is typical for the Swiss federalist structure and a good legal system.
Although a sample of seventeen men does not qualify an overall statement, it is still
possible to point out tendencies. The personal statements can be seen as little mosaic
stones that eventually form a picture. The picture of the Swiss volunteers is as colorful
and diverse as one can imagine but it nonetheless forms an image. It is a picture of
personal problems, search for chances, idealism, fanaticism and opportunism.
129
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Eidgenössische Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Ort unbekannt 1943.
BAR E4110 A 1000/1831 1372, F.07, Bericht des Oberauditors in der Verwaltung der
Militärjustiz im Eidgenössischen Militärdepartements an das Eidgenössische Justiz- und
Militärdepartement, Ort und Datum unbekannt.
BAR E4110 A 1000/1832 105, C.08.15, Bericht des Bundesrates betreffend Beschwerde
von Corrodi gegen eine Verfügung des Eidgenössischen. Militärdepartements betreffend
bedingte Entlassung, Bern 3. Juni 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511, SS-Hauptsturmführer Alfred Nikles an den
Kommandeur des Ersatzkommandos Frankreich, betreffend Anfrage für den
Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer, Paris 5. Juli 1944.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511, Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an
die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1. Oktober 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511, Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an
die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1. Oktober 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511, Entwurf Eidgenössisches Justiz und
Polizeidepartement, Bern 30. November 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch
den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 8. Dezember 1938.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Abhörungsprotoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den
Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 20. Januar 1939.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Abschrift aus der Abhörung des Dr. Hügel durch
die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Ort unbekannt 28. Januar bis 5. Februar 1946.
135
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Einvernahme von Kurt Brüderlin aus der Haft
vorgeführt, Protokoll an das Polizeikommando des Kantons Basselland z.H. der
Militärbehörden und der Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 5. September 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25
419,
C.02-713,
Anklageschrift
der
Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Zeitungsartikel von Dr. Hans –Otto Meissner,
Schweizer Infanterie vor Moskau. Eidgenössische Freiwillige bezahlten ihren Kampf
gegen den Bolschewismus mit Gefängnis und Zuchthaus, In: Die Zeit, Nr. 10, Baden
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BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Revisionsgesuch des Bundesstrafgerichtsurteils
vom
20.
Dezember
1947
von
Benno
Schaeppi
an
den
Präsidenten
des
Ausserordentlichen Kassationshofes am Schweizerischen Bundesgericht Lausanne,
Strafanstalt Regensburg Datum unbekannt.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Antrag auf Amnestie an den Präsidenten des
ausserordentlichen Kassationshofes am Schweizerischen Bundesgericht, Strafanstalt
Regensdorf Datum unbekannt.
BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Bericht der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft
an das Armeekommando, Abteilung Sicherheitsdienst, Bern 4. Juli 1941.
BAR
4320
B
1970/25
504,
C.02-933,
Bericht
des
Eidgenössischen
Volkswirtschaftsdepartements der Kriegsindustrie und Arbeitsamt an den Chef der
Bundespolizei der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 26. August 1942.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an die
Eidgenössische Polizeiabteilung z.H. von Herrn Dr. Hohl, Bern 3. Juli 1944.
BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Bericht von Dr. H. Matty, Advokat an die
Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 6. Juni 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 504, Abhörungsprotokoll von Kurt Brüderlin durch den
Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Polizeidienst, Liestal 8.
September 1946.
136
BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft an den Chef des Eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 9.
September 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Bericht des Polizeikommando des Kanton
Aargaus an das Eidgenössische Militärdepartement, Aarau, 29. April 1939.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Korrespondenz Heinrich Johan Hersche an Erich
Teuchgraber
aus
der
Postsperre,
Polizeikommando
Bern
im
Auftrag
der
Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Thun 30. November 1939.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Brief von Heinrich Johann Hersche an Artillerie
Oberst Brüderlin, Basel 25. April 1940.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Schweizerisches Armeekommando an die
Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 4. Mai 1940.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Brief von Major Heinrich Johann Hersche an den
Redaktor des Oltener Tagblatt W. R. Amman, als Reaktion auf einen über ihn
erschienenen Artikel im Oltener Tagblatt, Nr. 150 vom 29. Juni 1940, Basel 4. Juli 1940.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Brief über Politische Massnahmen von Heinrich
Johan Hersche an den Führerkreis der Nationalen Bewegung Schweiz, Basel 22. Juli
1940.
BAR
E4320
B
1970/25
670,
C.02-1562,
Bericht
der
Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft an das Divisionsgericht IV, Untersuchungsrichter Hauptmann
Schibli, Bern 26. August 1940.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann
Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Locarno 11.
Juni 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Brief von Heinrich Johann Hersche an seine
Tochter Brigitte, Berlin 13. Januar 1942.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft durch Inspektor Eberle an den Chef des eidgenössischen
Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 10. September 1945.
137
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft an
das
eidgenössische
Politische Departement,
Politische
Angelegenheiten, Bern 4. September 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Aktennotiz zum Vorsprechen von Heinrich
Johann Hersche beim Schweizerischen Generalkonsulat, München 28. Juli 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Abhörungsprotokoll des Heinrich Johann
Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3.
Oktober 1947.
BAR
E4320
B
1970/25
670,
C.02-1562,
Verfügung
der
Schweizerischen
Bundesanwaltschaft über Heinrich Johann Hersche, Bern 17. Oktober 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Befragung von Heinrich Büeler betreffend
Heinrich Johann Hersche, durch den Eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter O. Gloor,
Zürich 3. November 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Urteil des Divisionsgericht 7A, St. Gallen 29.
November 1947.
BAR
E4320
B
1970/25
670,
C.02-1562,
Bericht
des
eidgenössischen
Untersuchungsrichter der Militärjustiz der Schweizerischen Armee an Herrn Dr. Lüthy
der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 1. Dezember 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Verfügung der Bundesanwaltschaft über
Rücktritt von der Verfolgung im Bundesstrafverfahren gegen Hersche Heinrich, der
Stellvertreter des Bundesanwaltes Lüthi, Bern 24. Februar 1948.
BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Stellungnahme des Stellvertreters des
Bundesanwaltes an die Eidgenössische Justizabteilung, Bern 6. Dezember 1948.
E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Zeitungsartikel, Aus dem Bundesgericht. Der Nazi
und sein Pensionsanspruch, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 2503, 21. November 1950.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an Leutnant Fritz Steiner,
Winterthur 21. August 1940.
138
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar
18. Januar 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Lebenslauf von Othmar Maag aus der
Untersuchungshaft, Zürich 10. Juni 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seinen Freund Fritz,
Winterthur 21. August 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an einen Verwandten in
Deutschland, Name unbekannt, Schweinefurt 11. Oktober 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar
25. Dezember 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Abschrift, Brief von Untersturmführer Othmar
Maag an seine Eltern, Cholm 30. April 1942.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort
unbekannt 4. Juni 1942.
unbekannt 8. Juli 1942.
unbekannt 1. August 1942.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 6.
Dezember 1942.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement
an den Regierungsrat des Kantons Zürich, Bern 31. Juli 1944.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates
bezüglich Othmar Maag, Bern 1. Mai 1945.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Abhörungsprotokoll von Othmar Maag durch die
Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Aarau 13. September 1945.
139
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an den
Vorsteher des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartementes, Bern 29. August 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Bedingte Entlassung Othmar Maag,
Eidgenössisches Militärdepartement, Bern 29. Juli 1949.
BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618, Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum
unbekannt.
BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P, Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch
den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 5. September 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P, Fortsetzung der Abhörung von Wipf Eugen
durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 23. Oktober
1946.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Abhörungsprotokoll von Hermann
Huber durch die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Oberriet 26. Oktober 1940.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Bericht des Polizeikommando St.
Gallen an den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, St. Gallen, 10.
Februar 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Anklageschrift von Hermann Huber
durch den Auditor Major Popp des Divisionsgerichts 7A, St. Gallen 5. Juli 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Anklageschrift Divisionsgericht 7A
von Huber Hermann, St. Gallen 5. Juli 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Zeitungsartikel, Nachzügler des
Leonhardt-Prozesses, In Vorwärts Nr. 129, Ort unbekannt 20. August 1946.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A116/42.629, Abschrift der Politischen Abteilung
der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St.
Gallen, Bern 6. Juni 1942.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A116/42.629, Bericht der Politischen Abteilung der
Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen,
Bern 18. August 1942.
140
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192, Polizeirapport des Kantonalen
Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942.
E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192, Abhörungsprotokoll von Otto Alfons
Aichle durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundessanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 4.
Juni 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192, Bericht des Polizeidienstes der
St. Gallen 6. Juni 1947.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/43.124, Notiz vom Adjunkt der Kantonalen
Fremdenpolizei Herr Baumgartner an den Spezialdienst des Polizeikommando St. Gallen
Herr Rüthemann, 11. Januar 1951.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124, Polizeiliche Einvernahme von Otto
Ehrenzeller über Josef Breitenmoser, Ort unbekannt 27. Mai 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124, Polizeiliche Einvernahme von Josef
Breitenmoser, Will 8. Juli 1941.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Abschrift der Politischen Abteilung
der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St.
Gallen, Bern 6. Juni 1942.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Bericht der Politischen Abteilung der
Bern 18. August 1942.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Brief von Breitenmoser an seinen
Freund, Ort unbekannt 18. August 1943.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124, Polizeiliche Einvernahme des Josef
Breitenmoser, St. Gallen 7. August 1950.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Schreiben des Polizeikommando des
Kantons St. Gallen an den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, St.
Gallen 14. August 1950.
141
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Notiz vom Adjunkt der Kantonalen
Fremdenpolizei Herr Baumgartner an den Spezialdienst des Polizeikommando St. Gallen
Herr Rüthemann, 11. Januar 1951.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Aussage Josef Breitenmoser
vorgeführt in der Kantonalen Strafanstalt Saxerriet, Saxerriet 18. Januar 1951.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Bericht des Spezialdienstes der
Kantonspolizei St. Gallen an das Kantonale Polizeikommando, St. Gallen 19. Januar 1951.
BAR E4320 B 1993/214 3148, C.29/A116-44.006, Brief von Paul Diebold an Herrn Dr.
jur. Ferdinand Elsener, SS-Standortlazarett München-Dachau 21. Mai 1943.
Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über antidemokratische Tätigkeit
von Schweizern und Ausländern im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriegsgeschehen 19391945 (Motion Boerlin), 28. Dezember 1945, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die
Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945.
Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Verfahren gegen
nationalsozialistische Schweizer wegen Angriff auf die Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossen,
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148
Appendix I
Rank Overview in Comparison, 1939-1945
Waffen-SS
Schweizerische Armee
Schütze, Grenadier
Schütze, Grenadier
Oberschütze, Obergrenadier
-
Sturmmann
Gefreiter
Rottenführer
-
Unterscharführer
Korporal
Scharführer
Wachtmeister
Oberscharführer
Feldweibel/Fourier
Hauptscharführer
-
Sturmscharführer
Adjutant-Unteroffizier
Junker
-
Standartenjunker
-
Standartenoberjunker
-
Untersturmführer
Leutnant
Obersturmführer
Oberleutnant
Hauptsturmführer
Hauptmann
Sturmbannführer
Major
Obersturmbannführer
Oberleutnant
Standartenführer
Oberst
Oberführer
-
Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen SS
Oberbrigadier
Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen SS
Oberdivisionär
Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen SS
Oberkorpskommandant
Oberstgruppenführer und
Generaloberst der Waffen SS
General
149
Appendix II
Overview of the Men in this case study
Name
1
2
3
Position in the
Waffen-SS
Otto Alfons
Aichle
Alfons
Straub
Year of
Admissio
n into
the
WaffenSS
Nov 1941
1942
Motivation
Post War Trial
Sentence
Work
hunt/criminal
Work hunt/pro
German
attitude/
problems at
work
Work hunt/
NS/criminal
18 months
prison
unknown
Josef Jakob
Breitenmose
r
Othmar
Maag
SS-Sturmann
Oct 1942
SSObersturmführer
Apr 1942
NS/soldiership
/anti-Semitism
Dr. Kurt
Brüderlin
Paul Diebold
SSHauptsturmführer
SSHauptsturmführer
March
1943
March
1942
NS/soldiership
unknown
Feb 1942
NS/work hunt
9
Hermann
Huber
Dr. Ernst
Schneider
Fritz Arnold
SSObersturmführer
SSUnterscharführer
March
1941
Jan 1942
10
Ernst Krauel
SS-Sturmann
Oct 1941
11
Dr. Franz
Riedweg
SS-Obersturmbannführer
July 1938
NS/pro
German
Double
citizen/pro
German
NS/Double
citizen
NS/opportunis
m
4
5
6
7
8
NS/ work
hunt/criminal
1 year in prison
without
probation
Twice 3 years
prison (total 6),
released both
times after one
year/
expatriated
4 years prison,
expatriated
18
months/postwar
sentence
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
16 years prison
in absentia/
expatriated
150
12
Dr. Heinrich
Büeler
SSSturmbannführer
Nov 1941
NS/
opportunism
4 years plus 8
years prison
(total 12y),
released in
1954/
expatriated
13
Heinrich
Hersche
Johann
Eugen
Corrodi
Alfred Nikles
SSStandartenführer
SS-Oberführer
Dec 1941
NS/soldiership
1 year prison
July 1941
2,5 years prison,
released in 1947
SSHauptsturmführer
Jan 1940
NS/antiSemitism/
soldiership
NS
16
Benno
Schaeppi
SSUntersturmführer
Spring
1941
NS
17
Eugen Wipf
SSUnterscharführer
1944
criminal
14
15
2 years prison in
absentia/
expatriated
16 years in
prison, released
1956/
expatriated
Lifelong (he died
shortly after the
trial)
151
Appendix III
List of National Socialist Organizations in Switzerland
BSG
Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland
BTE
Bund treuer Eidgenossen
ES
Eidgenössische Sammlung
ESAP
Eidgenössische Soziale Arbeiterpartei
Germanische SS-Schweiz
MNS
Movement National Suisse
NBS
Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz
NF
Nationale Front
NSBidS
Nationalsozialistische Bewegung in der Schweiz
NSSAO
Nationalsozialistische Schweizer Arbeiter Organisation
NSSAP
Nationalsozialistische Schweizerische Arbeiter Partei (Volbsbund)
NSSB
Nationalsozialistischer Schweizerbund
SGAD
Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie
VB
Volksbund
152
Acknowledgments
Several people provided guidance and support whilst writing this thesis. Without them I
certainly would not have accomplished this work. I would like to express my special
thanks and gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate who guided
me along the whole process of writing. His critical comments and his supportive
communication helped me to shape the outlines of this thesis. There is not much written
on the topic “Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS”, whereby the risk of getting absorbed
by the fast amount of archive material was very high. He helped me to select my cases
and create the overview. Also, he certainly helped me to grow as a writer and
researcher. My thanks also belongs to the second reader Dr. Karel Berkhoff who takes
the time to read and evaluate my work.
Secondly, I would like to thank the staff of the “Bundesarchiv Bern”, the
“Bundesarchiv Berlin” and the “Archiv für Zeitgeschichte/ETH Zürich”. They were
helpful and open for my questions any time, as they guided me through the dense forest
of archive material. Their explanations on how to use the search engines and how to
commit the research certainly were invaluable and priceless.
I would also like to thank Marleen Hoffmann, Sandra von Euw and Jonas Kyburz
who took the time to read and edit my chapters. Their critiques on my early drafts
improved the chapters and their valuable suggestions for additional corrections
enriched the assessment in a fundamental way. Also, special thank goes to my fellow
students. Our fruitful discussions during coffee breaks contributed to a creative
exchange of ideas and insights which in turn made this master education such an
enriching experience. Their comments on my research were helpful for my further
approach. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents and my sister.
Without their support and patience I would not have had the endurance to carry out this
research.
153

Between Nazism and Opportunism - UvA-DARE

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