De cadencias y disonancias Representaciones alternativas de la

Transcription

De cadencias y disonancias
Representaciones alternativas
de la integración regional en el Siglo XXI:
América Latina, Asia
y Europa del Este
Nicolas M. Comini y Tomás Bontempo
(Compiladores)
De Cadencias y Disonancias
Representaciones alternativas
de la integración regional en el siglo
XXI: América Latina, Asia
y Europa del Este
De cadencias y disonancias, representaciones alternativas de la
integración regional en el siglo XXI : América Latina, Asia y Europa del Este / adaptado por Nicolás Matías Comini; compilado por
Tomás Andrés Bontempo. - 1a ed. - Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos
Aires : Universidad del Salvador, 2014.
284 p. ; 22x15 cm.
ISBN 978-950-592-175-1
1. Política Internacional. 2. Enseñanza Universitaria I. Comini,
Nicolás Matías, adapt. II. Bontempo, Tomás Andrés, comp.
CDD 327.107 11
Fecha de catalogación: 26/03/2014
Consejo Editorial
Mg. Haydée Nieto
Maura Ooms
Prof. Liliana Rega
Armado y diagramación: David Nudelman
ÍNDICE
Autores ..................................................................................................... 9
Authors .................................................................................................... 13
Prefacio .................................................................................................... 17
Preface ..................................................................................................... 37
Primera parte
América Latina
Unasur,
Un modelo de integración con identidad propia
María Cecilia Mendoza .......................................................................... 59
El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano.
Una perspectiva desde Chile
Carlos Maldonado Prieto ........................................................................ 79
Integración y Recursos Naturales vistos
desde las Relaciones Internacionales y
el proceso MERCOSUR-UNASUR
Ana Emérica Seitz .................................................................................... 97
El papel de los TLC’s y las “asociaciones económicas
estratégicas” en la configuración de nuevos espacios
económicos: Los TLC’s en Asia Pacífico.
Una mirada desde América Latina
Carlos Moneta ........................................................................................ 107
Segunda parte
Asia y el Cáucaso
ASEAN: Calibrating sovereignty and community
Sartika Soesilowati ............................................................................... 129
Myanmar Security & ASEAN Integration
Phyu Yamin Myat .................................................................................. 151
Analysing Regional Integration In South Asia:
A Security Perspective
Sachin Pardhe ........................................................................................ 171
New Regional Security Challenges:
Japan’s outlook since March 11
Yusuke Dan ............................................................................................ 187
Integration In The South Caucasus:
Opportunities And Challenges
Beniamin Poghosyan ............................................................................ 205
Tercera Parte
Europa Oriental
The Prospects Of European Integration
Constantinos Koliopoulos ..................................................................... 223
The Wedding Rings of Europe:
Some Military Aspects of Euro-Atlantic Integration
Polina Sinovets ...................................................................................... 241
Directions of Russian Political and Economic Integration:
Expectations and Implementation
Ekaterina Arkhipova ............................................................................ 267
“Dedicado al invaluable amor de nuestras familias, al apoyo leal de
nuestros amigos y al acompañamiento de nuestros colegas de conciencia. Asimismo, agradecemos profundamente a las autoridades y
compañeros de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales que han hecho posible
que este libro se convirtiera en realidad”.
AUTORES
ARKHIPOVA, EKATERINA
Rusa. Doctora en Historia, profesora asociada en el departamento de
Relaciones Internacionales y Estudios de Área, Volgograd State University (Rusia). Autora de 27 publicaciones sobre las relaciones internacionales en el Cáucaso del Sur, cuestiones de seguridad en las fronteras y
cooperación transfronteriza dentro de la zona post-soviética, e integración regional.
BONTEMPO, TOMÁS
Argentino. Licenciado en Relaciones Internacionales por la Universidad del Salvador, donde realizó además cursos de posgrado en Causas y
Resolución de Conflictos, Estudios sobre la Paz y Política Internacional
del Medio Ambiente de la Maestría en Relaciones Internacionales. Es
candidato a la Maestría en Integración Latinoamericana de la Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero. Ha ejercido como docente adjunto
en la asignatura Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad del Salvador. Es Secretario General de la Fundación para el
Desarrollo de acciones Humanitarias en Red, y trabaja actualmente en
el Ministerio de Planificación Federal, Inversión Pública y Servicios de
la Nación Argentina.
COMINI, NICOLÁS M.
Argentino. Licenciado en Relaciones Internacionales (Universidad del
Salvador), Magíster en Integración Regional (Universidad Nacional de
Tres de Febrero) y candidato a Doctor en Ciencias Sociales (Universidad de Buenos Aires). Director de la Maestría en Relaciones Internacionales. Becario doctoral del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas de Argentina (CONICET).
DAN, YUSUKE
Japonés. Profesor del Departamento de Estudios Internacionales y Director Ejecutivo Adjunto de la Dirección General de Asuntos Internacionales de la Universidad de Tokai. Director Ejecutivo de la Oficina de
Enlace Seúl-Bangkok-Viena.
KOLIOPOULOS, CONSTANTINOS
Griego. Profesor adjunto de Política Internacional y Estudios Estratégicos de la Universidad Panteion, y profesor de Estrategia en el Colegio
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DE CADENCIAS Y DISONANCIAS
Helénico de Defensa Nacional. Es autor, co-autor y co-editor de cinco
libros sobre Política Internacional y Estudios Estratégicos, siendo el último de ellos un volumen co-editado sobre los orígenes de la Guerra Fría.
MALDONADO PRIETO, CARLOS
Chileno. Licenciado en Historia por la Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle,
Alemania. Miembro de la Fundación Felipe Herrera. Posee una Maestría en Política de Defensa de la Academia de Guerra del Ejército de
Chile. Ha escrito El Prusianismo en las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas: Un
estudio histórico, 1885-1945 (Santiago: Documentas, 1988) y ha publicado artículos sobre inteligencia, historia de las Fuerzas Armadas, servicio militar y cuestiones policiales en revistas de varios países. Como
asesor internacional del Ministerio de Defensa de Chile participó activamente en la gestación del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano.
MENDOZA, MARÍA CECILIA
Argentina. Licenciada en Ciencia Política por la Universidad del Salvador. Es miembro del Cuerpo de Administradores Gubernamentales
desde 1989. Entre 2006 y 2010 formó parte del Equipo de Asesores del
Ex Canciller Jorge Taiana en cuestiones de comunicación institucional
e integración regional. Desde este cargo participó en la redacción del
Tratado Constitutivo de UNASUR, y se desempeñó como Coordinadora
Nacional Alterna ante ese bloque durante los años 2009 y 2010, teniendo a su cargo la coordinación entre la Cancillería y la Secretaría General
de UNASUR durante la gestión del Ex Presidente Néstor Kirchner. Durante 2011 estuvo a cargo de la Dirección de Asuntos Académicos del
Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación (ISEN).
MONETA, CARLOS
Argentino. Director de la Especialización en Economía y Negocios con
Asia Pacífico e India, Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero. Consultor de distintas Organizaciones regionales e internacionales sobre
temas de Asia Pacífico y sus relaciones con Latinoamérica. Creador de
la Red de Centros de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre Asia Pacíficos
(REDEALAP). Autor o colaborador en 18 libros publicados sobre temas
asiáticos en América Latina, EEUU, países de la Unión Europea, China
y Japón.
PARDHE, SACHIN N.
Indio. Profesor adjunto en el Departamento de Educación Cívica y
Política de la Universidad de Mumbai, Mumbai. Sus áreas de interés
Autores
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abarcan las relaciones internacionales y ha dictado cursos, entre otros,
sobre las Naciones Unidas, el sur de Asia, la política exterior de Estados
Unidos y la seguridad interna de la India. Ha participado y presentado ponencias en diversos congresos y seminarios estatales, nacionales
e internacionales. Ha pertenecido al Comité de Diseño Curricular del
Programa Semestral por créditos de la Universidad de Mumbai. Es Magíster en Ciencias Políticas (con honores) y actualmente cursa un doctorado sobre el Sudeste Asiático.
YAMIN PHYU MYAT
Myanmar. Máster en Políticas Públicas (MPP) por la Escuela de Políticas
Públicas Lee Kuan Yew, Universidad Nacional de Singapur, Singapur. Es
investigadora, analista y consultora en políticas de desarrollo social y
proyectos económicos en Myanmar. También es miembro fundadora
y actual directora ejecutiva de una empresa social, Myanmar Socios de
Desarrollo, centrada en el desarrollo de Myanmar. Se desempeña además como profesora y capacitadora en temas de política pública y cursos de metodología de investigación en ciencias sociales en el Instituto
de Egresados de Myanmar y otras organizaciones no gubernamentales
en ese país.
POGHOSYAN, BENIAMIN
Armenio. Posee una Maestría por la Universidad Estatal de Ereván y
un Doctorado en Historia por la Academia Nacional de Ciencias. Se incorporó al Instituto Nacional de Estudios de Seguridad (INSS) en 2009
como investigador y fue nombrado Director Adjunto en 2010. Previo a
eso, fue asesor de política exterior del Vocero de la Asamblea Nacional
de Armenia. Desde el año 2006, también ha servido como investigador
principal en el Instituto de Historia de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias y como profesor adjunto en la Universidad Estatal de Ereván y la
Academia Regional Europea. Desde 2011 es también el director ejecutivo de la Asociación de Ciencia Política de Armenia. Es autor de más de
40 trabajos publicados en Armenia y en el extranjero.
SEITZ, ANA EMÉRICA
Argentina. Doctora en Relaciones Internacionales, Profesora en Ciencia
Política y Licenciada en Ciencia Política por la Universidad del Salvador. Es investigadora, miembro de la Carrera de Investigador del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET).
Coordinadora del Área de Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina del Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales de la Facultad de
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Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad del Salvador. Es miembro fundador
y Secretaria de la Red para la Integración Latinoamericana (REDILA).
SINOVETS, POLINA A.
Ucraniana. Profesora Asociada de la Universidad Estatal de Odessa Î.I.
Mechnikov, Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales. En 2000 obtuvo la Maestría en Relaciones Internacionales de la misma universidad. En 2004 recibió su doctorado en
ciencias políticas. Desde entonces ha trabajado como profesora asistente y, desde 2006, como profesora adjunta en el Departamento de
Relaciones Internacionales. También desde 2004, trabaja como investigadora asociada en la sede de Odessa del Instituto Nacional de Estudios
Estratégicos de Ucrania. Hasta la fecha, la Dra. Sinovets tiene más de 45
publicaciones.
SOESILOWATI, SARTIKA
Indonesia. Profesora Titular en el Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales de la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Universidad
Airlangga, Surabaya, Java Oriental, Indonesia. Es egresada de la Universidad Gadjah Mada y posee título de Máster y Doctorado de la Universidad Nacional de Australia, Canberra, Australia. Actualmente imparte
diversos cursos como: Teoría de Relaciones Internacionales; Paz y Seguridad Internacional; Conflicto, Intervención Humanitaria y Nación;
Estado y Política en el Sudeste de Asia. Desde enero de 2010 tiene un
nombramiento como Directora de la Maestría en Relaciones Internacionales. También ocupa el puesto de jefe en la oficina de seguridad y
terrorismo en el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos y Globales. Su área investigación se centra en los ámbitos de la paz y la seguridad, incluida la
seguridad no tradicional; resolución de conflictos y la regionalización,
con un interés particular en la política de seguridad en el sudeste de
Asia, cuestiones de soberanía y el terrorismo.
Editores: Iván Stola y Alejandra Peñalva
Colaboradoras: Rosa María Cecilia Donati y Helga Fourcade
AUTHORS
ARKHIPOVA, EKATERINA
Russian. PhD in History, associate professor at the department of International Relations and Area Studies, Volgograd State University (Russia). Author of 27 publications on international relations in the South
Caucasus, border security issues and cross border cooperation within
post-soviet area, and the area of integration.
BONTEMPO, TOMÁS
Argentinean. Bachelor Degree on International Relations at the University of Salvador, where he also completed postgraduate courses on
Causes and Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies and International Environmental Policy of the Master’s Program on International Relations
(USAL). He is a Master’s candidate in Latin American Integration at the
National University of Tres de Febrero. He has served as adjunct faculty
in the subject History of International Relations at the University of Salvador. He is Secretary General of the Foundation for the Development
of Humanitarian Action Network, and works at the Ministry of Federal
Planning, Public Investment and Services of Argentina.
COMINI, NICOLÁS M.
Argentinean. Bachelor Degree on International Relations (University of
El Salvador), Master in Regional Integration (National University of Tres
de Febrero) and Ph.D. candidate in Social Sciences (University of Buenos
Aires). Director of the Master’s Program in International Relations. Doctoral Fellow in the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research
of Argentina (CONICET).
DAN, YUSUKE
Japanese. Professor at the Department of International Studies and
Deputy Executive Director of the Directorate General of International
Affairs at the University of Tokai. Executive Director of Liaison Offices
(Seoul, Bangkok, Vienna).
KOLIOPOULOS, CONSTANTINOS
Greek. Associate Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at Panteion University, and professor of Strategy at the Hellenic
National Defense College. He is the author, co-author and co-editor
of five books on International Politics and Strategic Studies, the last of
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them co-edited a volume on the origins of the Cold War.
MALDONADO PRIETO, CARLOS
Chilean. Bachelor’s Degree on History from the Martin-Luther-University, Halle, Germany. Member of the Felipe Herrera Foundation. He has
a Master Degree on Defense Policy from the Army’s Academy of War,
Chile. He has written The Prussianism in the Chilean Armed Forces: A
Historical Study, 1885-1945 (Santiago: Documentas, 1988), and has
published articles on intelligence, military history, military and police
issues in magazines of several countries. As an international advisor of
the Ministry of Defense of Chile, he participated actively in the creation
of the South American Defense Council.
MENDOZA, MARÍA CECILIA
Argentinean. Bachelor’s Degree on Political Science from the University
of Salvador. She is a member of the Squad of Government Administrators since 1989. Between 2006 and 2010 she was part of the advisory
team of former Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana in corporate communication issues and regional integration. In this role, she participated in the
drafting of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR, and served as National
Coordinator Alternate to the block during the years 2009 and 2010, taking charge of the coordination between the Foreign Ministry and the
General Secretariat of UNASUR during the administration of former
President Nestor Kirchner. In 2011 she was in charge of Academic Affairs of the Foreign Service Institute of the Nation (ISEN).
MONETA, CARLOS
Argentinean. Director of the Specialization in Economics and Business
in Asia Pacific and India, National University of Tres de Febrero. Consultant to various regional and International Organizations on issues of
Asia Pacific and its relations with Latin America. Creator of the Network
of Latin American Studies on Asia Peaceful (REDEALAP). Author or
contributor to 18 books on Asian issues in Latin America, USA, European Union countries, China and Japan.
PARDHE, SACHIN N.
India. Assistant Professor of the Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai. His main area of interest is international relations
and teaching courses on the United Nations, South Asia, U.S. foreign
policy, internal security of India, etc. He has participated and presented papers at various national conferences and seminars, national and
Authors
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international. It has belonged to the panel of the Committee for Curriculum Design Semester Program based on credits from the University
of Mumbai, i.e. MA in Political Science (Honors). Currently pursuing a
Ph.D. in South Asia.
YAMIN PHYU MYAT
Myanmar. Master in Public Policy (MPP) from the School of Public Policy Lee Kuan Yew, National University of Singapore, Singapore. She is a
researcher, analyst and consultant on social development policies and
economic projects in Myanmar. It is also a founding member and current executive director of a social enterprise, Myanmar Development
Partners focused on the development of Myanmar. She is Professor and
trainer on issues of public policy, social science research methodology and basic courses in Alumni Myanmar Institute and several other
NGOs in that country.
POGHOSYAN, BENIAMIN
Armenian. MA from Yerevan State University and PhD in History from National Academy of Sciences. He joined INSS in 2009 as a research fellow
and was appointed Deputy Director in 2010. Before that he was Foreign
policy adviser to the Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia. Since
2006 he has served also as a senior research fellow in the Institute of History, National Academy of Sciences and was adjunct professor in Yerevan
State University and in European Regional Academy. Since 2011 he is also
the executive director of the Political Science Association of Armenia. He is
the author of more than 40 publications in Armenia and abroad.
SEITZ, ANA EMÉRICA
Argentina. PhD in International Relations, Professor of Political Science and BA in Political Science from the University of Salvador. She is
a researcher, a member of the Investigator Career of the National Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). Coordinator of International
Relations Latin American Research Institute in Social Sciences Faculty
of Social Sciences at the University of Salvador. Founding member and
Secretary of the Latin American Integration Network (REDILA).
SINOVETS, POLINA A.
Ukrainian. Associate Professor at National University Î.I. Mechnikov
Odessa, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations. In 2000 he won the Masters in International Relations at the same
university. In 2004 received his doctorate in political science. He has
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since worked as an assistant professor and, since 2006, as an assistant
professor in the Department of International Relations. In 2004 he also
began working as a senior research associate at the headquarters of
Odessa National Institute of Strategic Studies of Ukraine. To date, Dr.
Sinovets has more than 45 publications.
SOESILOWATI, SARTIKA
Indonesia. Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Airlangga University,
Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia. Graduate of Gadjah Mada University.
Master and Ph.D. from the National University of Australia, Canberra,
Australia. Currently teaches courses several as: International Relations
Theory, International Peace and Security, Conflict, Humanitarian Intervention and Nation, State and Politics in Southeast Asia. Since January
2010 has an appointment as Director of the Master’s Program in International Relations. It also has position as bureau chief of security and
terrorism at the Center for Strategic and Global. His research focuses on
the areas of peace and security, including non-traditional security, conflict resolution and regionalization with a particular interest in security
policy in Southeast Asia, issues of sovereignty and terrorism.
Editors: Iván Stola y Alejandra Peñalva
With the collaboration of Rosa María Cecilia Donati and Helga Fourcade
PREFACIO
¿Cómo buscar miradas alternativas
en un mundo en transformación?
Nicolás M. Comini y Tomás Bontempo
Cuando de procesos sociales se trata, cada acontecimiento es único e
irrepetible. Más allá de sus puntos en común, de sus similitudes o de la
manifiesta intención por calcar experiencias pasadas, lo ya acontecido
puede adquirir nuevas formas, probablemente afines, más nunca idénticas. Lo mismo sucede con los proyectos de integración regional que
emergen a lo largo y ancho del mundo: éstos nacen, se desarrollan y
transforman sobre plataformas coyunturales específicas, movilizadas,
asimismo, por determinadas visiones y perspectivas de actores y sectores particulares. En la actualidad, las distintas regiones del planeta ven,
piensan y construyen procesos de integración de diferente forma a lo
que lo hacían sesenta, treinta o diez años atrás. Pero no solo se trata de
regiones. Dentro de cada región conviven Estados, gobiernos, sociedades e individuos con diferentes identidades, intereses y representaciones que le otorgan múltiples perfiles y significados a los interrogantes
de “por qué”, “para qué” y “cómo” integrar a las naciones.
Frente a esta coyuntura, podemos afirmar que la dinámica de un
mundo en constante movimiento y transición demanda a las Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina la necesidad de comprender el
estudio, formulación, construcción, desarrollo y proyección de los procesos regionales de integración que se han hecho presentes en la historia, tanto en nuestro subcontinente como en el resto del orbe.
De allí se desprende precisamente, el peculiar y ampliamente debatido titulo de esta compilación, “De cadencias y disonancias”. La Real
Academia Española define cadencia como el “ritmo, sucesión o repetición de sonidos diversos que caracterizan una pieza musical”. Asimismo, concibe a la disonancia como un “sonido desagradable”. En un
intento por metaforizar las oscilaciones experimentadas en el marco
de los procesos de integración, se pretende reflejar las diversas motivaciones de una multiplicidad de actores que inciden, en mayor o menor
medida, en la construcción y ampliación de estos procesos, en el marco
de un entramado de hechos históricos que reflejan momentos de auges
y retrocesos, profundizaciones y estancamientos, éxitos y fracasos.
Somos conscientes, sin embargo, que la forma de evaluar estas ca-
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dencias y disonancias depende, en gran medida, de las aproximaciones
metodológicas adoptadas, las posiciones amparadas, las subjetividades
latentes y las ideologías subyacentes. Aceptamos, por lo tanto, que la
objetividad positivista que pregona una separación radical entre el sujeto cognoscente -que aprecia a los fenómenos bajo la luz de una razón
que se torna distante- y el objeto conocido -al que el sujeto ilumina,
otorgándole sentido-, se torna inverosímil. En el estudio de los procesos
sociales siempre persiste, aunque sea de forma silenciosa, una cuota de
subjetividad.
Es por ello que comprendemos que en las diferentes partes del
mundo, distintas personas perciban de disímiles maneras el “por qué”,
“para qué” y “cómo” integrarse y qué cada respuesta a cada una de estos
interrogantes está marcada -explícita o implícitamente- por especificidades históricas y culturales. En esa línea, a través de esta compilación
hemos buscado acercarnos a visiones alternativas de las diversas experiencias de integración vigentes en el sistema internacional desde el
aporte particular de profesionales que forman parte de esas experiencias. Es decir, hemos pretendido contar con la visión de estos procesos,
desde su propia óptica e interpretación. Como se ve a lo largo de los artículos, el espíritu de este libro ha sido la certeza de que en la convivencia de la diversidad; en la heterodoxia y flexibilidad para advertir que no
existen caminos unidireccionales sino numerosas vías; en el consenso,
el diálogo y, principalmente, en la reflexión -como acción antagónica a
la persuasión- se hallan los engranajes esenciales para alcanzar verdaderos avances en la integración de los pueblos.
En ese marco, esta obra sintetiza una diversidad de miradas y representaciones, perspectivas y opiniones, reflejando, en un mismo
producto, la pluralidad de pensamientos en relación a diferentes iniciativas regionales de integración que existen en nuestro mundo contemporáneo.
I. BUSCANDO MIRADAS ALTERNATIVAS Y PROPIAS
Para alcanzar lo hasta aquí mencionado, contamos con el aporte de distinguidos profesionales de las más variadas disciplinas científicas dentro
de las ciencias sociales, de diversas universidades del mundo, comprendiendo a países como Argentina, Armenia, Chile, Grecia, India, Indonesia, Japón, Myanmar, Rusia y Ucrania. Este diagrama triangular constituido por las tres regiones de las que forman parte estos países -América
Latina, Asia (con la subregión del Cáucaso) y Europa del Este-, resulta
Prefacio
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sumamente interesante por diversas razones: El aporte innovador de los
estudios compilados en el presente libro representa un intento por generar enfoques superadores de aquellas orientaciones predominantes,
que suelen centrarse en la variable económico-financiera en sus análisis
de los procesos de integración. Una visión superadora se torna esencial,
especialmente en las regiones que, como se desarrolla más adelante,
son mal llamadas periféricas y donde la hegemonía del pensamiento
neoliberal se ha visto capaz de juzgar el éxito de los procesos integracionistas en función la simplificación de los mismos según sus avances en
materia de apertura y liberalización comercial.
No obstante, como segunda cuestión, y continuando brevemente lo expuesto en la sección anterior, nos referimos a la búsqueda de
miradas alternativas. A modo de ejemplo, la integración en Europa es
estudiada desde la óptica griega, ucraniana y rusa, países que no comprenden el centro económico europeo y que, a excepción del primero,
no forman parte de la Unión Europea (UE). Grecia, representa un caso
paradigmático. Es considerada la cuna de la democracia occidental y
moderna, pero se suele ser percibida como parte del último cordón -o
del eslabón más endeble- del bloque, reflejando, en sí misma y tal vez
más que cualquier otro de sus miembros, la crisis del proyecto neoliberal de integración.
Como tercer punto a destacar, la mayoría de los trabajos provienen
de países cuya relevancia en el sistema internacional se ha ido ampliando en los últimos años. El rol de Grecia en la UE, el de Argentina, Indonesia e India en el G-20, el de éste último en el grupo BRICS1 y el de Chile en la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico
(OCDE) representan muestras concretas de esta afirmación. Inclusive
Japón y Rusia -como miembros del G-8- participan del G-20 y, en el segundo caso, de los BRICS. De modo que nos encontramos con el aporte
de intelectuales de países que, en mayor o menor medida, serán claves
en la reconfiguración de las relaciones internacionales, interestatales e
interregionales del próximo orden mundial.
En cuarto lugar, se trata de perspectivas ancladas en espacios geográficos caracterizados por notables diferencias sociales, culturales e
históricas, en muchos casos alejados -no necesariamente por distancia
física- entre sí. Tomemos, a modo de ejemplo, el caso de la idea de “tradición unificadora”.
Mientras que ya casi todas las naciones latinoamericanas tienen dos
siglos de vida y una larga tradición unificadora que, aún con altibajos,
1 La sigla BRICS hace referencia a los países que conforman este grupo: Brasil, Rusia, India,
China y Sudáfrica.
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nunca ha dejado de estar presente, no sucede lo mismo en otras regiones. Esto es destacable en aquellos Estados surgidos de los procesos de
la primera etapa descolonizadora y que comienzan, de forma relativamente reciente, a involucrase en esquemas de integración regional. Tal
es el caso de la India (1947), quien más allá de su adhesión al Movimiento de Países No Alineados (MPNA), formará parte de la Asociación
Sudasiática para la Cooperación Regional (ASARC) recién en 1985. Algo
similar ocurriría con Indonesia (1945) y Myanmar2 (1948). Si bien la
primera sería, en 1967, fundadora de la Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ASEAN), Myanmar recién ingresaría al bloque en 1997.
Japón por su parte, exento de este escenario, forma parte de la denominada ASEAN+3, junto con China y Corea del Sur.
La vocación integracionista presenta también características propias y dinámicas diferenciadas en el caso de las ex republicas soviéticas -Rusia, Ucrania y Armenia-. En ese marco, resulta sumamente
enriquecedor dar cuenta del pensamiento, las ideas, y las motivaciones de especialistas que provienen de contextos y espacios históricos
caracterizados por altos niveles de bipolaridad y hasta traumáticos
procesos de desintegración que desembocaron en escenarios de notable volatilidad y disputas territoriales y políticas3.
Un quinto motivo de interés en el triangulo regional aquí presente se
encuentra relacionado al hecho de que si bien la mayoría de las naciones representadas suelen estar asociadas a la errónea idea de “periferia”
-con las excepciones de Rusia y Japón- la proyección de escenarios futuros las puede postular -especialmente al Sudeste Asiático-, como los
próximos centros dinámicos de la económica mundial e incluso tal vez
como nuevos poderes normativos.
Esto ha sido mencionado por Eric Hobsbawm. En contraposición
a la conocida concepción hegeliana según la cual la historia universal
transcurría desde Oriente hacia Occidente -siendo Asia su comienzo
y Europa su final-, el historiador aseguraba que “hoy estamos en una
etapa de transición de una economía mundial dominada por el norte
(en los últimos tiempos por Estados Unidos) a un nuevo esquema probablemente con eje en Asia” (Hobsbawm, 2008: 46).
De esta forma, el traslado hacia un sistema internacional de tendencia multipolar, ampliamente debatido en las disciplina de las relaciones
internacionales, contempla la emergencia de actores de notable relevancia en temáticas especificas. Esta multipolarización ha desatado el
2 Hasta el año 2010 la actual Myanmar fue llamada Birmania.
3 Algunos indicadores de esto, son el conflicto por Nagorno-Karabaj y, más recientemente, la
Revolución Naranja del 2004 y la Guerra de Osetia del Sur en el 2008.
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21
temor de quienes como Kenneth Waltz (1988: 201) han concebido al
mundo bipolar como la mejor alternativa para mantener el orden en el
sistema internacional o quienes, como Ian Bremmer (2012) edifican la
idea de un supuesto G-0 -donde no existe un actor o alianza de actores
capaz de asumir un liderazgo global-, ilustran un estancamiento global
y bosquejan un futuro cercano caracterizado por la incertidumbre, la
volatilidad, la competencia y hasta los conflictos abiertos. Sin embargo,
la multipolarización despierta la esperanza de aquellos que se resisten
a estar atados a la voluntad de los grandes poderes y encuentran, en su
seno, alternativas para reposicionarse en el mundo.
II. REPENSAR CONCEPTOS PARA REPENSAR LA INTEGRACIÓN
Frente a este panorama, resulta evidente la necesidad de reflexionar
acerca de ciertas categorías conceptuales cuya validez fáctica resulta
difícil de corroborar. A tales fines, nos centraremos específicamente en
la dialéctica centro-periferia, por considerarla esencial en el estudio de
las relaciones internacionales en general y de la integración regional
en particular, sobre todo la de países como aquellos incluidos en esta
compilación.
¿DESDE DÓNDE PARTIMOS?
Comencemos por destacar algo que resulta un tanto obvio, pero no por
ello innecesario: la tendencia dominante en los estudios sobre regionalización ha estado, por sus notables avances en materia de institucionalización, fuertemente grabada por la experiencia europea. Claro que
al referirnos a Europa, podemos afirmar que nos encontramos con una
región marcadamente heterogénea, colmada de contrastes e incluso
poli identitaria, como el mismo Edgard Morin (2003) lo ha destacado.
Sin embargo, sabemos que, en su conjunto, se trata de una región considerada central en el escenario internacional de poder y que ha sido
erigida como el estandarte de la civilización Occidental y modelo a seguir en diferentes caminos.
Michel Foucault encontraba, sin embargo, que esa centralidad había sido adquirida mediante métodos que parecían ir a contramano de
los propios parámetros occidentales y expresaba
A partir del siglo XIX, hay que decir sin duda que los esquemas de pensamiento, las formas políticas, los mecanismos eco-
22
nómicos fundamentales que eran los de Occidente se universalizaron por la violencia de la colonización, o bueno, digamos
que la mayoría de las veces cobraron de hecho dimensiones universales. Y eso es lo que entiendo por Occidente, esa suerte de
pequeña porción del mundo cuyo extraño y violento destino fue
imponer finalmente sus maneras de ver, pensar, decir y hacer al
mundo entero (Foucault, 2003: 31).
La segunda década del siglo XXI presenta considerables cambios
respecto de los tiempos que describía el filósofo francés. A pesar de ello,
existen ciertas cuestiones que parecen no haberse alterado mucho con
el paso de los años. Las Ciencias Sociales no logran escaparse de la lógica occidentalista y, en su seno, descansan los análisis de los procesos de
integración que sitúan a Europa en el centro de la escena y con el papel
protagónico.
Pero la UE, promotora de los valores de la identidad europea tanto
hacia adentro como hacia fuera de sus fronteras, se encuentra actualmente en una pugna de proyectos que la ponen en crisis. El Estado de
seguridad contra el Estado de bienestar. La xenofobia contra la convivencia. La Europa tecnocrática contra la Europa política. La Europa
neoliberal contra la Europa solidaria.
Sin embargo, es posible encontrar, todavía, una gran cantidad de
estudios -no solo en el viejo continente sino también en otras parte del
mundo-, que se empeñan establecer a la Unión Europea como el deber
ser de los procesos de integración. No obstante, debe advertirse que dicha iniciativa surge de motivaciones específicas de la segunda posguerra
y que nos encontramos con regiones que, como veremos en cada uno de
los capítulos, poseen características particulares, producto de sus propias
experiencias históricas, que pueden llegar a asemejarse unas con otras
pero que son únicas, irrepetibles y sumamente diferentes a la europea,
sin que quepan en ellas conceptos de aplicación universal. Como expresaba Fernand Braudel, “ninguna civilización actual es verdaderamente
comprensible sin un conocimiento de los itinerarios ya recorridos, de los
valores antiguos, de las experiencias vividas. Una civilización es siempre
un pasado, un cierto pasado vivo” (Braudel, 1970: 34).
¿CÓMO NOS PENSAMOS Y CÓMO PENSARNOS?
Lo anteriormente destacado no significa desconocer o restarle importancia a la experiencia europea; mucho menos desechar a sus tantos
grandes pensadores. Se trata de una demanda por rescatar las comple-
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23
jidades, fluctuaciones, ruidos y caos que nos hacen similares pero diferentes y contrarrestar las estructuras atemporales, restituyendo la idea
de que los tiempos de los unos no tienen por qué ser los tiempos de los
otros. No existen construcciones teóricas capaces de fijar criterios de
realidad y de veracidad unívocos y excluyentes.
Oscar Oszlak, lo destaca acertadamente en el caso de América Latina a partir de lo que denomina la existencia de una “especificidad histórica” en la región. De esa forma, el economista argentino no se conforma con el análisis particular del Estado argentino sino que lo precede
con el análisis de un marco general regional. Allí expresa que “adquieren nuevo sentido ciertos rasgos comunes observables en la evolución
histórica del aparato estatal en América Latina” (Oszlak, 1999: 36-37).
Esto resulta notablemente representativo en el contexto histórico
posterior a los procesos independentistas en la región, el cual podría
considerarse como la época de nacimiento e infancia de nuestros Estados-nacionales. Aquellos se conformarían bajo la organización política
surgida de la modernidad europea y sobre las bases de un modelo de
acumulación y desarrollo que los insertaría en la economía capitalista
mundial como exportadores de materias primas, dirigidas esencialmente hacia un centro desarrollado encarnado en las figuras de Europa
y los Estados Unidos, dependiendo del caso.
Ahora bien, como forma de profundizar un enfoque analítico para
el estudio de los procesos de integración regional -especialmente en
América Latina-, podemos destacar que la existencia de ciertos aspectos específicos en nuestra realidad histórica, a los cuales hemos hecho
mención en el párrafo anterior, deben complementarse con aquellos
factores que permiten adentrarnos en la psicohistoria de nuestra región. De esta forma, estamos apuntando a comprender la problemática
acerca de la denominada condición periférica de la región latinoamericana, algo que no puede ser entendido exclusivamente desde la perspectiva material.
Consideramos que esta visión o interpretación de tendencia dominante hacia la dialectización de un mundo en el cual coexisten un centro dominante y una periferia que lo circunscribe, es una afirmación
parcialmente correcta, ya que deja de lado la complejidad del fenómeno y presenta ciertas dificultades a la hora de encontrar su correlato
en el mundo fáctico. Presentaremos, en cambio, una interpretación
alternativa. Para esto, comenzaremos utilizando los enfoques del psicoanalista francés Jacques Lacan, quien propuso las dimensiones de lo
simbólico, lo imaginario y lo real (D’Angelo, Carbajal y Marchilli, 2005),
como registros entrelazados en la forma de un nudo borromeo, eviden-
24
ciando cómo forman parte de la psiquis de un sujeto. Nosotros utilizaremos los primeros dos en aplicación a nuestra región.
En el caso de lo simbólico, éste se encuentra vinculado con el lenguaje y su relación con los significantes y los significados. No obstante,
es posible que existan significantes con significados diferentes para diferentes sujetos, formando, en cada uno, redes de significantes albergadas en el inconsciente. El registro de lo simbólico proviene, como una
forma impuesta, de lo externo, del lenguaje y la dimensión cultural.
Lo imaginario, por otro lado, comprende una imagen externa, diferente del individuo, pero con la cual aquel se identifica. Se trata de lo que
Lacan denomina “le stade du miroir”, es decir, cuando el sujeto erige su
imagen con un “yo” -su ego-, constituido por la imagen que proviene del
“otro”. Es decir, que el sujeto, al nacer, reproduce la imagen externa que
observa, y la proyecta hacia su interior, formando un registro imaginario.
Por lo tanto, la formación del “yo” es explicada en la perspectiva lacaniana a partir de la identificación con una imagen externa.
El mundo central occidental -y especialmente Europa- ha sido el espejo en el cual nuestra región ha construido su imagen a través de las
oligarquías que dominaron el poder político y llevaron adelante los procesos de conformación de los Estados modernos. Agregando además
un significado que otorgamos al desarrollo como significante, como el
establecido por la concepción capitalista de la ciencia económica dirigida al establecimiento de una relación de dependencia con el centro
económico mundial, donde se encontraba el poder hegemónico.
Sin embargo, resulta más adecuado e indispensable, profundizar
este planteo haciendo referencia a la existencia de un “habitus periférico” como otro de los agregados a esta condición estructural condicionante de los procesos integradores en la región.
Procediendo, entonces, a continuar la deconstrucción de esta idea,
comenzamos por definir la idea de habitus. En Esquisse d’une theorie de
la pratique (1972), Pierre Bourdieu la define como
Un sistema de disposiciones durables y transferibles -estructuras estructuradas predispuestas a funcionar como estructuras
estructurantes- que integran todas las experiencias pasadas y
funciona en cada momento como matriz estructurante de las
percepciones, las apreciaciones y las acciones de los agentes
cara a una coyuntura o acontecimiento y que él contribuye a producir (Bourdieu, 1972).
Desde esta visión, el habitus rescata la existencia de factores estruc-
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25
turales que se insertan en la subjetividad del percibir y accionar de los
sujetos. El tiempo, la historia, la experiencia, son algunos de los tantos
factores que, desde esta perspectiva, dan lugar a la configuración y organización de prácticas y representaciones que “pueden ser objetivamente adaptadas a su meta sin suponer el propósito consciente de ciertos fines (...), objetivamente ‘reguladas’ y ‘regulares’ sin ser para nada
producto de la obediencia a determinadas reglas” (Bourdieu, 2007).
A partir de allí, Boudieu aclara que el mundo práctico que se constituye en la relación con el habitus -como sistema de estructuras cognitivas y motivadoras- es un mundo de fines ya realizados y eso se debe
a que las regularidades inherentes a una condición arbitraria tienden
a aparecer como necesarias, incluso como naturales, por el hecho de
que están en el principio de los esquemas de percepción a través de los
cuales son aprehendidas.
Es aquí donde emerge la idea del habitus periférico latinoamericano. No solo hemos construido nuestro “yo” a partir de la imagen externa de Europa, sino que además nos hemos asimilado como la periferia.
Tanto Enrique Dussel como Carlos Escudé representan ejemplos
de razonamientos acerca de un mundo dialéctico. Enrique Dussel expresando que desde 1492 en adelante América Latina se convertiría en
la primera periferia de la Europa moderna (Dussel, 2001: 59). Por su
parte, Carlos Escudé se refería a la región como países periféricos, vulnerables, empobrecidos y poco estratégicos para las potencias centrales” (Escudé, 1992: 281-282). Esta perspectiva de blancos sobre negros
carece, sin embargo, de justificación empírica. Esto quiere decir, que el
sistema internacional es mucho más complejo y abundan los grises. En
el campo fáctico es posible percibir la existencia de múltiples periferias
dentro de los centros y distintos centros dentro de las periferias.
En su famosa “teoría estructural del imperialismo”, el sociólogo y
matemático noruego Johan Galtung (1996) evidenciaba la tremenda
desigualdad entre y al interior de las naciones, y definía al imperialismo como la relación entre la nación Centro y la nación Periferia en la
que existía armonía de intereses entre el centro de la Nación Centro y
el centro de la Nación Periferia; y donde existía desarmonía entre la periferia de la Nación Centro y la periferia de la Nación Periferia. Es decir
que, desde esta perspectiva, el desarrollo en el marco del capitalismo
no permitiría la relación entre las periferias.
En cada país del mundo coexisten ricos y pobres y abundan las asimetrías, en todos sus niveles. En ese sentido, y retomando la existencia
de vínculos entre los centros, es mucho más probable que, como producto de estas construcciones sociales, una persona de proveniente de
26
un sector urbano con estudios universitarios en Buenos Aires, Santiago
de Chile o Montevideo se sienta más identificado con otra de condiciones similares en Atenas, Moscú o Tokio que con un par procedente de
un espacio rural del altiplano jujeño, Concepción o Canelones.
Tomando esto en consideración, vale rescatar el estudio que Manoranjan Mohanty realiza sobre la sobre la teoría política india contemporánea, principalmente porque allí esboza un balance de una situación
que también puede apreciarse en América Latina. Mohanty sostiene
que el pensamiento político colonial ha penetrado en la cultura generando, al mismo tiempo “un complejo de inferioridad en los colonizados” (Mohanty, 2000). Esto resulta sumamente interesante, ya que
cuando nos referimos a la psicohistoria y las representaciones en una
región, hacemos hincapié no solo en las formas de pensar sino también
en las de sentir: en las creencias, los miedos, el inconsciente y demás.
Lo que desde la Escuela de Annales Francesa sería la mentalité.
De esta forma, América Latina, no es periférica sino que se autopercibe congénitamente de esa forma y, en base a ello, articula su
comportamiento generando lo que aquí hemos denominado su habitus periférico. Este habitus ha podido forjarse gracias a que el ego periférico latinoamericano ha sido constituido, en gran medida, a partir
de un reflejo en la imagen que sobre él ha edificado su alter (europeo
o norteamericano), como lo destacábamos previamente desde la concepción lacaniana. A partir de allí permite que en una región repleta
de recursos materiales persistan estructuras sociales altamente desiguales que la llevan a autopercibirse en condiciones de inferioridad
por contraste.
Retomemos nuevamente a Fernand Braudel, quien concebía a las
civilizaciones como un grupo de sociedades, espacios geográficos, economía y mentalidades colectivas, que trascienden amplios espacios
cronológicos que superen un determinado aspecto social. Para el historiador francés
Al alcanzar a las masas de una población que se está urbanizando, la civilización sudamericana se abre obligatoriamente,
en la actualidad, a una poderosa vida autóctona, que no puede
aceptar la herencia europea sin someterla a muy importantes revisiones y transformaciones. América Latina está fabricando una
civilización original, su civilización (Braudel, 1970: 391).
Incluso lo expresaba aquel que junto a José Vasconcelos y José Rodó
formara aquella famosa generación del 1900. Nos referimos al argenti-
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27
no Manuel Ugarte, quien, contrastando con la imagen de los Estados
Unidos, expresaba que “la América del Sur, donde predomina el elemento latino, ha tomado otros rumbos, que no son ni superiores ni inferiores,
que son simplemente diferentes” (Ugarte, 1953).
Y es a través de este fragmento del pensador argentino que nos es
posible abordar otra cuestión importante a la hora de comprender los
procesos integradores en la región (ahora no solo en el plano del pensamiento sino también de lo fáctico) entendida en el papel de los Estados
Unidos, es decir, de un centro de poder hegemónico.
Nos referimos a una hegemonía que “en el sistema mundial significa por definición que hay una potencia en posición geopolítica de imponer una concatenación estable de la distribución social del poder”
(Wallerstein, 2001: 28). Como destacan autores como José Paradiso y
Mariana Luna Pont (2003), los países de América Latina, aunque con
notables gradualidades, han experimentado la cohabitación, en su propio territorio, con un poder hegemónico que en un primer momento
demostró tener aspiraciones continentales en expansión y, posteriormente, pretensiones universales.
Esto ha llevado a que el escritor uruguayo Eduardo Galeano mencionara en su obra “Las venas abiertas de América Latina” que “ahora
América es, para el mundo, nada más que los Estados Unidos: nosotros
habitamos, a lo sumo, una sub América, una América de segunda clase,
de nebulosa identificación” (Galeano, 2010: 16). Aunque en sus palabras se denota, obviamente, una sutil ironía, las mismas representan
una fiel expresión literaria de esta condición que vive nuestra región
como característica única e irrepetible de cohabitar con el centro hegemónico más importante de prácticamente el último siglo.
A través de una cohabitación de largo camino que nos lleva desde
la Primera Conferencia Panamericana en Washington (1889) y las ocupaciones militares bajo la doctrina del “Big stick”, hasta el Consenso de
Washington y el fracaso del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas
(ALCA) en la Cumbre de Mar del Plata del año 2005, la relación con los
Estados Unidos resulta esencial para comprender no solo las motivaciones surgidas en la región a los proyectos integradores sino también a
las formas tomadas por estos.
Un elemento importante en este proceso ha sido lo que denominamos “percepción hegemónica”, es decir, la percepción del poder hegemónico, por parte de América Latina. Por lo cual, como ya hemos definido
lo que entendemos por hegemonía, es necesario centrarnos en el poder
o, más precisamente, en los mecanismos a través de los cuales aquel es
ejercido y aplicado, alterando con esto la percepción del mismo.
28
Recurriendo nuevamente a Foucault, éste aclara muy acertadamente que
Lo que hace que el poder se sostenga, que sea aceptado, es
sencillamente que no pesa solo como potencia que dice no, sino
que cala de hecho, produce cosas, induce placer, forma saber,
produce discursos; hay que considerarlo como una red productiva que pasa a través de todo el cuerpo social en lugar de como
una instancia negativa que tiene por función reprimir (Foucault,
2008: 148).
Seguramente, la amplia diferencia de las políticas hacia la región
esgrimidas por la política de intervenciones del gobierno de Theodore
Roosevelt o de la política del buen vecino del gobierno de Franklin D.
Roosevelt -que responden a los cambios en el sistema internacional y
la posición de los Estados Unidos en el mismo-, generaron distintas reacciones acerca de la cohabitación en América Latina o, dicho de otra
forma, diferentes percepciones sobre la interacción con el poder del
centro hegemónico.
Sin embargo, la evolución en la ejecución del poder de los Estados
Unidos como centro de poder hegemónico ha evolucionado desde las
intervenciones militares directas hacia la configuración de un complejo entramado de relaciones político-comerciales en relación al rol de
las empresas transnacionales y de los mecanismos y organizaciones
financieras -muchas veces asociadas al endeudamiento externo de los
países-, así como de visiones de seguridad nacional sobre las Fuerzas
Armadas que han sido aplicadas a través de advertencias, amenazas y
acciones, en forma de violencia simbólica.
Resulta necesario, por lo tanto, realizar esfuerzos por contribuir
a la búsqueda histórica de incrementar nuestros márgenes de autonomía. En ese contexto se inserta esta compilación, que representa
una invitación desde América Latina hacia otras regiones a pensarse
a sí mismas, desde lo propio y según sus propias perspectivas, desde sus múltiples particularidades y subjetividades, en un mundo en
transformación. Es en el campo de las ideas donde debe librarse la
batalla. Como decía Martín Hopenhayn, se trata de una batalla por
la visibilidad “menos sangrienta que las batallas de carne y hueso, es
cierto, porque aquí son los símbolos quienes matan y mueren” (Hopenhayn, 2005: 90). Sin embargo, aclaraba, los símbolos no son inocuos, “de símbolos está hecho el poder de unos sobre otros, con símbolos construimos los sentidos de nuestras vidas y mediante símbolos
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29
convergemos en nuestros destinos como comunidad de ciudadanos”
(Ibídem: 91).
III. LOS APORTES DE ESTE LIBRO
Desde América Latina, contamos con los artículos de María Cecilia
Mendoza y Carlos Maldonado Prieto, quienes escriben en el marco de
la reciente Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR).
María Cecilia nos propone el estudio de la UNASUR, desde una forma innovadora, considerando a la misma como un modelo de desarrollo con perfil propio; buscando caracterizar el tipo de bloque que representa; recogiendo los principales debates que se han experimentado en
la región acerca de la integración en el siglo XXI; y analizando su convivencia con otros proyectos de integración en la región. En ese marco,
la autora afirma que la UNASUR se ha logrado afianzar -a pesar de que
sus temáticas pueden ser compartidas con otros ámbitos a nivel hemisférico como la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA)- como un
espacio de cooperación intergubernamental, más flexible y voluntario.
Posteriormente, Carlos se enfoca en un aspecto más puntual del
nuevo bloque: la evaluación del proceso constitutivo y la evolución del
Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano (CDS). El autor parte de las transformaciones de las percepciones de defensa en Chile -materializadas,
entre otras cosas, a través de un proceso de modernización y profesionalización progresiva-, que se expresan en indicadores tales como la
mayor participación en Operaciones para el Mantenimiento de la Paz
o la formación del batallón combinado y conjunto Cruz del Sur con
la Argentina. Aquello se da en un contexto de optimismo por parte de
Chile respecto del incremento de los niveles de confianza mutua en el
escenario regional, producto de un cambio más profundo en las concepciones de defensa experimentadas en una región que se ha constituido como una zona de paz, libre de armas de destrucción masiva y
con gastos en defensa relativamente bajos.
Es en este ambiente propicio donde nace un CDS, como un espacio de cooperación en un esquema de integración, profundizando la
confianza mutua basándose en la gradualidad y desconectando a las
temáticas de Defensa con aquellas de seguridad interior. Asimismo, ha
propiciado la formación del Centro de Estudios Estratégicos para la Defensa como el medio para la construcción de un pensamiento estratégico regional, de una identidad sudamericana de defensa y de una visión
regional del mundo.
30
La vinculación entre la integración y los recursos naturales -energía
y biodiversidad- en relación a la distribución del ingreso, el cambio climático y las relaciones de poder en la región latinoamericana, adquieren forma bajo el muy apreciado aporte de Ana Emérica Seitz. En ese
marco, el surgimiento de la Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional (IIRSA) creada en el año 2000, surge, como remarca
la autora, en un contexto de disyuntiva entre el ALCA y el MERCOSUR,
ratificando así un escenario en donde existe un notable escenario de
proyectos en pugna, que se complejiza aún mas abordando las cuestiones presentadas.
Por su parte la contribución de Carlos Moneta es un aporte que
pone en roce o contacto dos de las geografías abarcadas en este libro.
Presenta la originalidad de revelar una mirada latinoamericana sobre
los procesos de regionalización en el Asia Pacifico, algo que involucra
indirectamente a la región desde la cual expresa su visión.
Este proceso, donde se va a destacar un primer papel protagónico
de Japón y posteriormente de China, comienza con los llamados “dragones” y “tigres” en un proceso gradual de desarrollo económico que
involucra a las inversiones extranjeras directas y la tecnología. Carlos se
propuso mostrar al lector la percepción de aquellos elementos que a su
criterio fomentan el impulso del proceso de regionalización en el Asia
Pacifico, derivando posteriormente en la proliferación de acuerdos de
libre comercio, en su mayoría posteriores a la fuerte crisis financiera de
fines de los años noventa, la cual marcó un quiebre en la relaciones con
los Estados Unidos.
Desde la inmensa Asia contamos con los aportes Sartika Soesilowati, en cuya contribución comienza analizando la relación entre los
conceptos de soberanía y de comunidad de seguridad en la concepción de un orden regional, en el cual los miembros de la ASEAN manifiestan una clara tendencia al enfoque westfaliano de las Relaciones
Internacionales.
Sin embargo, Sartika se encarga, muy acertadamente, de mencionar
que el concepto de soberanía comprendido a través de los distintos enfoques teóricos de las Relaciones Internacionales no puede aplicarse de
forma pura y completa al escenario del Sudeste Asiático, dadas las particularidades propias de la región. La autora rescata lo que se denomina
la “ASEAN way”, como una forma de no interferencia en los asuntos internos de los Estados, e incluso vista como una forma de apoyo mutuo
en el escenario regional.
No obstante la visión del concepto de soberanía, la ASEAN way
responde también, como destaca Sartika, a una posición histórica y
Prefacio
31
geopolítica única de la región, que se encuentra anclada a la seguridad
nacional y regional, y que ha facilitado, a través de las memorias del
colonialismo y las intervenciones militares extranjeras, que el concepto
de soberanía se encuentre fuertemente vinculado al nacionalismo.
De esta forma, a través de la psicohistoria de la región evidenciamos
cómo la soberanía se torna un concepto central para la estabilidad de
la zona, conformando a la modelo westfaliano como el principio rector de las relaciones internacionales bajo un esquema de integración
del cual Indonesia ha sido miembro fundador en 1967 y que apunta a
ahondar una cooperación que afiance las posiciones soberanas de sus
miembros.
También desde el Sudeste Asiático -y con un análisis que comparte
muchos puntos en común con la perspectiva del artículo anterior- tenemos los aportes de nuestra colega de Myanmar, Myat Phyu Yamin,
quien, en un primer momento remarca la existencia de una época histórica de monarquías guerreras en el país hasta la pérdida de soberanía
ante Gran Bretaña como potencia colonial, recobrando su independencia recién en 1948.
El escenario internacional posterior a la independencia, así como
la intervención china de 1950, propiciaron el establecimiento de los
militares en el poder de Myanmar. Así, el país experimentó prácticas
de gobierno fuertemente vinculadas a una seguridad nacional definida
por los sectores militares asociados con el nacionalismo. De esta forma,
el concepto de seguridad nacional, o lo que la autora llama, Lone Choan
Yei, fue el factor clave en la definición de prioridades de los gobiernos
militares, asociados a un paternalismo patriótico.
Estos hechos resultaron en la preponderancia sobre las problemáticas internas de una mirada o visión militarizada nacida de la seguridad
nacional, que dirigió a Myanmar a adoptar una posición de independencia y no alineamiento, convertida casi en aislamiento.
Es por esto, que Myat Phyu Yamin destaca el rol de la ASEAN y ratifica, de esta forma, los principios de la mencionada “ASEAN way”: verbigracia, soberanía estatal, no interferencia en asuntos internos, renuncia
al uso de la fuerza y promoción de la cooperación regional.
La organización fue -y es- un vehículo no solo para Myanmar hacia
el escenario regional, sino también para el país en su reconexión con
la comunidad internacional en un marco de integración económica
(China se ha convertido en el mayor inversor e India en el mayor socio comercial para las exportaciones) y cooperación, especialmente a
partir de la transición democrática del 2010 y del actual replanteo del
concepto de seguridad en ese país.
32
Por su parte, el aporte desde India de Sachin Pardhe intenta evidenciar cómo el éxito de la integración en la zona se encuentra fuertemente definido por la relación entre la India y Pakistán. También subraya la
presencia de cierto escepticismo por parte de los Estados más pequeños
ante un poder emergente como India en su papel de hegemón regional.
Sin embargo, para delimitar completamente los factores que determinan la integración en la región, Sachin menciona la influencia de los
intereses chinos y rusos, así como de actores extra regionales -como Estados Unidos-, que ven facilitada la expansión de su influencia dadas
las rivalidades entre los Estados más grandes. De esta forma, la India se
encuentra en un relacionamiento estrecho con los Estados Unidos, tal
como Pakistán con China.
El autor resume que debe asumirse el vínculo estrecho que existe
entre los procesos de integración y su relación con la arquitectura de
seguridad de la región, para comprender un escenario regional de débil
integración e identidad fragmentada, afectado, además, por la nuclearización de los principales actores, por las concepciones de amenaza y
por el déficit de confianza.
Yusuke Dan, plantea lo que interpreta como los principales desafíos
para la seguridad regional, desde la óptica japonesa. Como un entramado geopolítico destaca una serie de tensiones territoriales centradas
en disputas referentes a islas de su país con China, Taiwán, Corea del
Sur y Rusia, lo cual es percibido como una cuestión de soberanía discutida, especialmente desde el fin de las ocupaciones japonesas terminada la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
Esto se suma, además, a los dilemas que ponen en cuestión el futuro
de la energía y la seguridad ambiental, especialmente luego del tsunami que dejó inactivas la mayoría de las centrales nucleares con las que
contaba Japón.
Continuando con los aspectos vinculados a la seguridad es que enmarcamos la perspectiva que, desde Armenia, nos brinda Beniamin
Poghosyan, quien se propone entender el proceso de integración regional después del colapso de la Unión Soviética, que desembocó en
la conformación de quince naciones independientes con diferentes características e incluso con latentes conflictos limítrofes. Estados como
Armenia, Georgia y Azerbaiyán parecerían estar más interesados en
mantener su seguridad individualmente, que en embarcarse en la conformación de procesos de integración regional.
Sin embargo, Beniamin menciona diferentes iniciativas integracionistas que evidencian la existencia de diferentes percepciones de seguridad entre estos tres Estados. Dado que mientras Azerbaiyán -que
Prefacio
33
mantiene un estrecho vínculo con Turquía-, intentaría aislar a Armenia
-con quien mantiene un conflicto por la región de Nagorno Karabakhde los proyectos energéticos, Armenia habría estrechado su vínculo con
Rusia, país al cual otros países, especialmente Georgia -que apuesta a
su incorporación a la UE-, perciben como una amenaza. No obstante,
el autor menciona que Armenia en la actualidad ha comenzado una
política de relacionamiento más estrecho con la UE y la Organización
del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN).
Para Beniamin, los proyectos energéticos representan la herramienta clave para la integración en la región del sur del Cáucaso, dado que
permitirían transportar gas y petróleo a Europa sin pasar por Rusia,
permitiendo reducir su influencia en la región -que mantiene una base
militar en Armenia-, como desean ciertos sectores de los Estados Unidos y de la UE.
En ese marco, la región cuenta con un inmenso potencial energético, pero también con la persistencia de conflictos entre sus miembros y
de una notable carencia de confianza mutua. El autor argumenta que el
potencial de la región solo puede ser realizado bajo la integración de todos sus miembros, actuando como una región unificada. Es decir, concibe a la integración regional como una vía para la resolución de las problemáticas vigentes y para el desarrollo de aquel espacio geopolítico.
Desde Europa, contamos con el aporte de Constantinos Koliopoulos, quien se propuso analizar el proceso de integración europeo
a partir de los desafíos futuros que se al mismo se le presentan. En
su análisis destaca la Unión Monetaria y Económica y la falta de una
identidad común, en un marco tan heterogéneo en términos políticos
y económicos. Constantinos contrasta la emoción que puede generar
una bandera nacional, a diferencia de una bandera europea.
En un contexto de crisis y deudas y en el marco de una creciente
renacionalización de las políticas de los Estados miembros, se denota la
preeminencia del Consejo de Europa, -órgano eminentemente intergubernamental-, además de una creciente lógica discursiva de nacionalismo individual y de una carencia de líderes que se encuentren -como en
los inicios del proceso- altamente comprometidos con la integración.
Por su parte, nuestra colega ucraniana, Polina Sinovets, se ha propuesto el estudio de los proyectos de defensa en la integración euroatlántica actual, especialmente a través del rol de las armas estratégicas
provistas por los Estados Unidos a los miembros europeos de la OTAN.
Polina expresa que así como las armas estratégicas funcionaron
como elemento de integración euroatlantica en materia de defensa ante
el factor de una posible agresión soviética, en la actualidad el replanteo
34
de este mecanismo de seguridad colectiva puede ser fundamentado
a través del sistema de defensa de antimisiles, el cual genera, a su vez
posturas contrastantes de los países europeos, en su concepción de las
relaciones con los Estados Unidos y con Rusia.
Como remarcamos al momento de hacer referencia a las miradas
alternativas, sorprende al evidenciar que los procesos de integración
regional en Europa no son considerados exclusivamente como una
adhesión al proyecto de la Unión Europea. Esto es notorio en el caso
del capítulo de nuestra colega rusa, Ekaterina Arkhipova. La autora
demuestra cómo la integración de la región se ha discutido de forma
constante desde el colapso de la Unión Soviética.
Rusia ha dirigido inversiones económicas a los demás países de la
región, consolidándose como proveedor militar de países como Kazakhstan y Uzbekistán, inversiones petroleras en Azerbaiyán, y en
sectores de transporte energético a Europa en Bielorrusia y Ucrania.
Asimismo, se ha transformado en un notable receptor de inversiones
occidentales, abriendo líneas de cooperación, aunque no integración,
con los miembros de la UE. Sin embargo, a pesar de competir geopolíticamente con actores regionales o extrarregionales, Rusia ha sido la
propulsora de iniciativas regionales como la Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), el Treaty of Collective Security (TCS), la Custom
Union, y la Russian-Belorussian State Union, lo cual le ha valido no pocas acusaciones de un nuevo imperialismo.
BIBLIOGRAFIA
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Droz.
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Braudel, F. (1970). Las civilizaciones actuales. Ed. Tecnos. Madrid.
Bremmer, I. (2012). “Every Nations for Itself. Winners and Losers in a GZero World”. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.
D’Angelo, R; Carbajal, E; y Marchilli, A. (2005). Una introducción a Lacan. Buenos Aires: Lugar.
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Dussel, E. (2001). “Eurocentrismo y modernidad (Introducción a las
lecturas de Frankfurt)”, en Mignolo, Walter (Compilador), Capitalismo y
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Veintiuno.
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Buenos Aires: Alianza Editorial.
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Hobsbawm, E. (2008). “Después del siglo XX: un mundo en transición”.
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Aires: Grupo Editorial Norma.
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Oszlak, O. (1999). La Formación del Estado Argentino. Buenos Aires: Ed.
Planeta.
Paradiso, J. y Luna Pont, M. (2003). “Paz y guerra en la trayectoria latinoamericana”, Universidad & Integración, Asociación de Universidades
de América Latina y Caribe.
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matique, Octubre.
Ugarte, M. (1953). El porvenir de América Latina. Buenos Aires: Ed.
Indoamericana.
Waltz, K. (1988). Teoría de la Política Internacional. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano.
Wallerstein, I. (2001). Después del liberalismo. México DF: Siglo Veintiuno.
PREFACE4
How to find alternative perspectives
in a changing world?
Nicolás M. Comini and Tomás Bontempo
In social processes, each event is unique and unrepeatable. Aside from
their points in common, their similarities or the express intent to retrace past experiences, past events may acquire new forms, probably
akin to each other, yet never identical. Similarly - the regional integration programs which are emerging all over the world - originate, develop and undergo transformations on specific platforms moved by the
visions and perspectives of certain sectors and individuals. Today, the
diverse regions all over the planet, contemplate, devise, and build integration processes which differ widely from the ones conceived sixty,
thirty, or even ten years ago. Yet, this does not apply solely to regions,
Within each region there coexist a multiplicity of states, governments,
societies and individuals with different identities, interests and representations, all of which endow them with a multiplicity of profiles and
answers to the “whys and “wherefores” as well as the question of “how”
these nations might become integrated.
At this point, we may be inclined to assert that the dynamics of
an ever-changing world, a world of transition, requires that the Latin
American International Relations should understand the study, formulation, construction, development and projection of the regional integration processes, not only in the history of our sub-continents but also
in the rest of the world as well.
This is precisely the issue that has given way to the peculiar and
widely debated title of this compilation, “On Cadences and Dissonances”. The Spanish Royal Academy defines ‘cadence’ as “rhythm, succession and repetition of diverse sounds which characterize a musical
piece. Likewise, it conceives ‘dissonance’ as a “disagreeable sound”. In
an attempt to find a metaphor to describe the swings that take place
within the framework of integration processes, we have tried to depict
the diversity of motivations which, to a greater or lesser degree, affect a
multiplicity of individuals in the construction and enlargement of the
aforementioned processes, within the web of historical facts which, in
4 We would like to thank the substantial contribution of Rosa Maria Cecilia Donati to this book
in the translation of this preface to the English version.
38
turn reflect summits and regressions, moments of deep exploration and
moments of stagnation, of success and failure.
Still, we are conscious of the fact that the method of assessment of
these “cadences and dissonances” largely depends on the methods of
approach adopted, the positions taken up, latent subjectivities, and underlying ideologies. Thus, we must admit that the positivist’s objectivity,
that is, the radical “cut off” between the cognizant individual (capable
of appreciating phenomena in the dwindling light of reason), and the
object of knowledge – which the individual enlightens and turns into
something meaningful – becomes hard to believe. There is always a
quota of subjectivity which, however silently, always pervades the study
of social processes.
This has led us to understand that different individuals all over the
world have diverse perceptions of the “whys and wherefores” and of
“how” they might achieve integration, and that each of these questions
is – implicitly or explicitly – marked by their specific history and culture. Following that line of thought, this compilation is an attempt to
approach alternative outlooks on the diverse integration experiences
now in force in the international system, through the personal contribution of professionals participating in them, thus obtaining an outlook on those processes from their own point of view. The reading of
these articles reveals the spirit of this book, based on the certainty that
the essential mechanisms to achieve genuine progress in the matter of
world integration are to be found: in the coexistence of diversities; in
the heterodoxy and flexibility which make us aware that there are numerous ways to get there, other than misdirecting roads; in consensus,
in dialogue and, mainly in deep thought, as the opposite of persuasion.
Within this context, our work sums up a diversity of views and representations, perspectives and opinions reflecting, in a single product, the
wide scope of thought regarding the diverse initiatives of regional integration all over our contemporary world.
I. ON THE LOOK-OUT FOR INHERENT,
AS WELL AS ALTERNATIVE VIEWS
In order to achieve all of the aforementioned, we have been honoured
by the participation of distinguished professionals specialized in a great
number of scientific disciplines within the scope of the social sciences,
representing a wide variety of universities all over the world and, in
particular, from Argentina, Armenia, Chile, Greece, India, Indonesia,
Preface
39
Japan, Myanmar, Russia, and Ukraine. This triangular diagram constituted by the three regions comprising the abovementioned countries
– Latin America, Asia (with its Caucasian sub-region), and Eastern
Europe – is highly interesting for a diversity of reasons: The innovative
contribution of the studies compiled in this book represents an attempt
to generate outlooks which excel the, so far, predominant orientations,
usually centred in economic and financial variables when it comes to
analyzing integration processes. Such an outlook becomes essential,
especially in regions improperly defined as peripheries, in which the
supremacy of neoliberal thinking has seen it fit to measure the success
of integration by narrowing down this process merely to a greater commercial opening and liberalization.
Nevertheless, and to complete the ideas set forth in the previous section, we pose a second question: the search for alternative views. To give
a trivial instance, integration in Europe will be studied from the Greek,
Ukrainian and Russian points of view, i.e. countries which do not comprise the European economic centre and which, with the exception of
Greece, are not members of the European Union (EU). This latter country represents a paradigm. It is considered the cradle of modern Western
democracy, though generally perceived as part of the periphery – the
weakest link in the chain – reflecting, perhaps more than any of the region’s other members, the crisis of the neoliberal Project of integration.
A third point to consider is that most of the papers are the work of
countries whose relevance in the international system has expanded
in the late years. The role of Greece in the EU, the roles of Argentina,
Indonesia and India in the G-20 group and, again, the role of India in
BRICS5 as well as Chile’s in OCDE (Organization for Cooperation and
Economic Development), are a concrete evidence of this. Even Japan
and Russia – as members of the G-8 group – have an active participation
in G-20 and, in the case of Russia, in BRICS. We may, therefore, count on
the collaboration of intellectuals from countries which, to a greater or
lesser extent, will be fundamental to the “reshaping “ of international,
interstate, and interregional relations in the future world order.
Fourthly, it concerns perspectives anchored in geographical spaces
characterized by their social, cultural, and historical diversities; furthermore, often separated by great distances – not always geographical.
Take, for example, the case of the concept of ‘unifying tradition’.
While most Latin-American nations have a two century long ‘unifying tradition’ which is still going strong, in spite of its ups and downs,
this is not the case of other regions. This is particularly noticeable in the
5 BRICS is the acronym of the initials of the countries which form this group: Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa.
40
States originated as a result of the first stage of ‘decolonization’ processes, which have relatively recently begun to form part of regional integration schemes. Such is the case of India (1947) which, aside from joining
the MPNA (Movement of Non-aligned Countries), would eventually
form part of ASARC (South-Asiatic Association for Regional Cooperation) as late as 1985. Something similar would occur with Indonesia
(1945) and Myanmar6 (1948) – though, in 1967, the former would be
the founder of ASEAN (Association of South-Asian Nations), Myanmar
would join the group as late as 1997. On the other hand, Japan, excluded
from this scenario, is part of the group known as ASEAN+3, together
with China and South Korea.
This tendency towards integration has also got strictly differentiated
and dynamic characteristics in the case of the ex Soviet republics - Russia, Ukraine and Armenia. In this context, it is highly enriching to account for the thoughts ideas and motivations of specialists representing
scenarios and historical moments characterized by high levels of polarity, and even traumatic processes of disintegration which eventually
developed into remarkably volatile situations and territorial and political disputes7.
A fifth point of interest in the aforementioned regional triangle is related to the fact that, although most of the nations involved are usually
wrongly related to the concept of “periphery” – with the exception of Russia and Japan – the projection of future scenarios is likely to nominate
them – South-East Asia in particular – as the forthcoming dynamic centres of world economy, moreover, maybe even the new regulating powers.
This has been mentioned by Eric Hobsbawm. Contrary to Hegel’s
popular conception which sustained that universal history elapsed
from East to West – Asia being its starting-point and Europe its end –
this historian asserted that “we are, at present, in a state of transition
from a world economy dominated by the northern hemisphere (in the
later years, the United States) to a new outline with its axis in Asia.”8
(Hobsbawm, 2008: 46).
Thus, the change towards an international system with a multi-polar tendency, widely debated within the sphere of international relations, contemplates the emergence of protagonists of great relevance
in specific themes. This multi-polarization has unleashed fear in some
who, like Kenneth Waltz (1988: 201), have conceived a bipolar world as
the best alternative to keep the international system in order; or oth6 Burma came to be called Myanmar in 2010
7 Some indicators of this are the conflict over Nagorno-Karabaj and, more recently, the Orange
Revolution of 2004 and the South Osetian War in 2008.
8 Personal traslation
Preface
41
ers who, like Ian Bremmer (2012) back the idea of a supposed G-O in
which no protagonist or alliance is apt to assume global leadership. In
every case, they illustrate global stagnation and their image of the near
future is characterized by uncertainty, volatility, competition, and even
open conflicts. Nevertheless, multi-polarization offers a grain of hope to
those who refuse to be tied to the will of the great sources of power, as
well as new alternatives to position themselves in the world.
II. RETHINK CONCEPTS TO RETHINK INTEGRATION
This panorama faces us with the evident need to reflect upon certain
conceptual categories whose validity, as facts, is hard to corroborate.
We shall, therefore, focus specifically on the centre-periphery dialectics,
since we consider it essential to the study of international relations in
general, and to regional integration, in particular, especially in the case
of countries such as those included in this compilation.
WHERE DO WE START FROM?
Let us begin by highlighting something somewhat obvious, though not
for that reason unnecessary: the predominant tendency of the studies
on regionalization has been strongly influenced by the European experience on the matter, on account of its overwhelming strides towards
institutionalization. When referring to Europe, we are obviously alluding to a strongly heterogeneous region, overwhelmed with drastic contrasts, even presenting multiple identities, to quote Edgar Morin (2003).
Nevertheless, we are aware that, as a whole, it is considered a central
region in the international context of power and it has become a standard of Western civilization as well as a role model.
Michel Foucault, however, concluded that this central position had
been obtained by methods which seemed to go astray from the Western
parameters:
With the advent of the XIX century, there is no doubt that the
frames of thought, the political schemes, the fundamental economic mechanisms, were those of the Western world, and that
they were universalized through the violence of colonization or,
at least in most cases, were given a universal dimension This is
what I understand by the Western world: that small portion of
the world (so to speak) whose strange and violent destiny was to
42
finally impose its manner of seeing, thinking, saying and doing,
on the whole world. (Foucault, 2003: 31)9.
The second decade of the XXI century is the setting of considerable changes, as compared to the period described by this French philosopher. Yet, there are still certain issues which do not seem to have
changed greatly over the years. Social Sciences can not, yet, avoid occidental logics and still harbour integration process analyses which situate Europe at the centre of the stage, playing the leading role.
Yet the EU, who promotes the values of European identity, both inside and outside its boundaries is, at present, struggling with projects
which are leading it to a crisis: the Security State vs. the Welfare State;
Xenophobia vs. Cohabitation; Technocratic Europe vs. Political Europe;
Neoliberal Europe vs. European Solidarity.
Yet, it is still possible to find a great number of studies – not only in
Europe but also in other parts of the world – which insist on putting
forth the European Union as a model of what integration processes
should be like. Still, it should be noticed that such initiatives emerge
from specific motivations originated in the second post-war period and
that we may come across regions which, as we shall see in every chapter
of this book, possess peculiar characteristics as a consequence of their
own historical experiences, sharing certain similarities, yet still unique,
unrepeatable and highly different from their European “model”, though
not liable to be universally applied. In Fernand Braudel’s words “no civilization today can be really understood if we do not know what paths
have been taken, the old values, life experiences. A civilization is always
its past, a kind of living past.”10 (Braudel, 1970: 34).
HOW DO WE CONCEIVE OURSELVES, AND HOW SHOULD WE CONCEIVE OURSELVES?
The concepts highlighted above do not attempt to ignore or underestimate the European experience; much less do they deny its great thinkers. It is simply a claim for the recovery of the complexities, the fluctuations, the noise and chaos which we share and which - at the same time
- differentiate us, and to counteract timeless structures by reinstating
the idea that the concept of time does not necessarily have to be shared.
No theory is capable of fixing univocal and excluding criteria of reality.
Oscar Oszlak highlights this very clearly in the case of Latin-America, on the basis of the existence of what he defines as “historical spe9 Personal traslation.
10 Personal traslation.
Preface
43
cifics” of a region. Thus, this Argentine economist not only makes a
particular analysis of the Argentine State but, further, introduces it
through an analysis of the general context of the region, demonstrating how “certain shared features observed in the historical evolution of
the state’s framework in Latin America, begin to make sense.”11 (Oszlak,
1999: 36,37).
This turns out to be strongly reflected in the historical context that
succeeded the birth and infancy of our national States. The latter were
eventually built on the foundations of a model of accumulation and development which would insert them in the capitalist world economy, as
exporters of raw-materials essentially directed towards a target developed and embodied in the figureheads of Europe and the United States,
depending on the case.
Now then, a deeper analytical focus on the study of regional integration processes – especially in Latin America – allows us to emphasize
the fact that the existence of certain specific aspects of our aforementioned historical reality must be complemented by other factors which
allow us to probe into the “psychohistory” of our region. We, thus, aim
at a better understanding of the so- called condition of periphery of the
Latin American region, a condition which can not be understood from
an exclusively material perspective.
We shall consider this view or interpretation of a predominant tendency towards the dialectics of a world in which there is a coexistence of
a dominant centre with a circumscribing periphery, as being only partially correct, for it overlooks the complexity of the said phenomenon
and presents certain difficulties when it comes to finding its correlation with the world of facts; in turn, we offer an alternate interpretation.
With that purpose in mind, we shall begin by quoting the French psychoanalyst Jaques Lacan, who posed that the symbolic, the imaginary,
and the real dimensions (D’Angelo, Carbajal and Marchilli, 2005), are
like registers interwoven in a Borromean knot, giving evidence of the
way in which they conform an individual’s psyche. We shall attempt to
apply the two former ones to our region.
The symbolic dimension is related to the language, its significations
and its significances. Nevertheless, there may possibly be significations
which allow for different significances, according to the different individuals, thus forming networks of significations in the subconscious
mind of each and every one. The perception of symbols is originated as
something externally imposed on the individual, through the language
and the cultural dimension
44
The imaginary dimension, on the other hand, comprises an external image which differs from the individual, while identifying itself with
him. It is, in Lacan’s words “le stade du miroir” that is, when an individual builds a personal image – his ego- reflected in the image of “another”. From the moment of birth, the individual reproduces the external
image that he observes and projects it inwardly, thus forming an imaginary register. Therefore, the building of the “ego”, according to Lacan,
derives from the individual’s identification with an external image.
The central Western World – and especially Europe – has been the
mirror of our region, which has built its image from the dominating oligarchic political power that has shaped the modern States. To this we may
add a further significance to the concept of development as a signification, such as was established by the capitalist conception of economic
sciences, which aimed at establishing a relationship of dependence on
the world economic centre, where the dominant power was to be found.
Still, we consider it more adequate and indispensable to probe more
deeply into this by making reference to the existence of a “peripheral
habitus” as a further component of this structural condition which determines the integration processes in the region.
We shall, therefore, proceed to deconstruct this idea, by defining the
idea of habitus. In Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (1972), Pierre
Bourdieu defines it as
A system of durable and transferable rules - structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures – which
form part of all the past experiences and which function, at
all times, as a structuring matrix of the perceptions, appreciations and actions of the agent, on the face of a certain context or incident, which he himself has contributed to cause.12
(Bourdieu,1972).
In this light, the habitus makes up for the existence of structural factors inserted in the subjective perception and actions of the individual.
Time, history, experience, are some of the many factors which, from this
perspective, give way to the configuration and organization of practices
and representations, which “may be objectively adapted to an aim, regardless of the conscious purpose directed to particular ends (…), objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ though in no way the product of the
obedience of certain rules.” (Bourdieu, 2007).
At this point, Bourdieu makes it clear that the practical world related
Preface
45
to the habitus - as a system of cognitive and motivating structures – is a
world of achieved aims due to the fact that the regularities inherent to
an arbitrary condition tend to come across as necessary, even natural,
for the plain reason that they are included in the principle of the perception schemes through which they are apprehended. This is where
the idea of Latin- American peripheral habitus stems from. We have
not only constructed our “ego” as a reflection of the external image of
Europe, we have moreover assimilated ourselves to being part of the
periphery.
Both Enrique Dussel and Carlos Escudé may be considered examples of the reasoning of the dialectical world. Enrique Dussel, by anticipating that Latin-America would, as from 1942, would become the
first periphery of Modern Europe (Dussel, 2001: 59). On the other hand,
Carlos Escudé referred to the region in terms of “peripheral, vulnerable, impoverished, and hardly strategic countries from the point of
view of the central powers.”13 (Escudé,1992: 281-282). Yet this perspective of the whites being above the blacks lacks an empirical justification, which means that the international system is far more complex
and that “greys” abound. In the field of fact it is possible to perceive the
existence of a multiplicity of peripheries within the centres, and different centres within the peripheries. The Norwegian sociologist and
mathematician Johan Galtung showed, in his famous “structural theory
of imperialism”(1996), the tremendous inequality between nations as
well as in their midst, and defined imperialism as the relationship between a Centre nation and a Periphery nation, in which there was there
was a harmony of interests between the centre of the Centre Nation and
the centre of the Periphery Nation; and where there was ‘disharmony’
between the periphery of the Centre Nation and the periphery of the
Periphery Nation. Thus, from this perspective, development within the
scope of capitalism would not allow a relationship among peripheries
In every country in the world the rich coexist with the poor and
asymmetries abound at all levels. In this sense, and considering the existence of links between centres, it is more probable that, on account of
these social constructions, an individual from the urban area of Buenos
Aires, Santiago de Chile, or Montevideo who has, further had access to
university studies, should feel more identified with someone from Athens, Moscow or Tokyo, who shares similar conditions, than with a peer
belonging to a rural area in “altiplano” of the province of Jujuy, Concepción or Canelones.
With this in mind, it is most fitting to make reference to the studies
46
carried out by Manoranjan Mohanty on political theory in contemporary India, mainly because in it he sketches a balance of a state of affairs
which can also be found in Latin-America. Mohanty sustains that colonial political thinking has penetrated the culture simultaneously generating “an inferiority complex in the colonized peoples.”14 (Mohanty,
2000). This is highly interesting for, when we refer to the psychohistory
and representations of a region, we not only emphasize ways of thinking but also of feeling: in fears, in the unconscious, and the like. What
the French School of Annales would call mentalité.
Thus, Latin-America is not peripheral but has a congenital selfperception as such, articulating its behaviour in a way that generates
what we have defined as its peripheral habitus. This habitus has been
forged thanks to the formation of the Latin-American peripheral ego,
constructed largely from the image reflected by its (European or North
American) alter, as was previously pointed out in the light of Lacan’s
conception. This is what allows for a region, brimming with natural resources, to continue to harbour highly unequal social structures which
result in a self-perception of inferiority by contrast.
Going back to Fernand Braudel, he conceived civilization as a group
of societies, geographical spaces, economy, and collective mentalities
which transcend ample chronological spaces that go beyond certain
social features. In this French historian’s words,
When reaching the masses of population who are in the process of urbanization, South American civilizations, today, have
been forced to open up to a powerful autochthonous life which
can, by no means, accept European heritage without submitting
it to profound reviews and transformations. Latin-America is
manufacturing a native civilization, its own civilization.15 (Braudel1970:391).
Furthermore, this was expressed by the Argentine writer Manuel
Ugarte, who belonged to the 1900’s generation, together with José Vasconcelos and José Rodó. He marked a contrast with the image offered
by the United States by affirming that “South America, with its predominant Latin element, has taken new directions which are neither superior nor inferior, they are simply different.”16 (Ugarte, 1953).
It is this Argentine thinker’s excerpt that allows us to embrace another major issue, when it comes to the understanding of the integra14 Personal traslation.
Preface
47
tion processes in this region (at present, not only in the realm of fact)
by understanding the role of the United States, i.e., of a hegemony of
power.
We are referring to hegemony which “in the world system can be
defined as the existence of a great power situated in a geographical and
political position to impose a stable concatenation of the social distribution of power.”17 (Wallerstein, 2001:28). According to other authors
such as José Paradiso and Mariana Luna Pont (2003), the Latin-American countries have, with remarkable gradualness, experienced cohabitation, in their own territories, exercising hegemony which, at first, revealed continental and, later on universal ambitions of expansion.
This has led the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano to mention in
“The Open Veins of Latin America” that “now America is, in the eyes
of the world, more than just the United States: we inhabit, at the most,
a sub-America, a second class America, vaguely identifiable.”18 (Galeano, 2010:16). Though his words denote an obvious, though subtle
touch of irony, they are a faithful literary manifestation of the condition our region lives in, as a unique and unrepeatable characteristic
of cohabitation with practically the greatest centre of hegemony of the
last century.
Along the long road of cohabitation which leads us from the First
Pan-American Conference in Washington (1889) and the military occupations under the “Big stick” doctrine, to the Washington Consensus and the failure of the Area of Free Trade of the Americas (ALCA) at
the Summit conference in Mar del Plata in 2005, our relations with the
United States have become essential in order to understand, not only
the motivations for the integration projects in the region, but also the
different shapes they have taken.
An important element in this process has been the so called “perception of hegemony”, that is, Latin America’s perception of this kind
of power. Since we have already given our definition of hegemony, it is
now necessary to focus on power or, to be more precise, on the mechanisms through which it is exercised and enforced, thus altering its perception.
Foucault clarifies this concept very accurately by expressing that
What sustains power, what makes it acceptable, is simply
that its weight is not only shown in its faculty to say ‘no’ it, in
fact, goes deeper, it produces things, induces pleasure, develops learning, produces speeches; it must be regarded as a pro17 Personal traslation.
48
ductive network which goes right across the social body, rather
than a negative instance whose sole function is to repress.19
(Foucault, 2008: 148).
Surely, the wide difference between the policies for this region applied by the interventionist Theodore Roosevelt, and the ‘good neighbour’ policy which characterized the rule of Franklin D. Roosevelt
–which respond to the changes in the international system and the position of the United States in each case- have generated different reactions towards cohabitation in Latin America or, in other words, different
views regarding interaction with the hegemony centre in power.
Nevertheless, the evolution in the power exercised by the United
States as a centre of hegemony has evolved since the times of direct
military interventions, towards the configuration of a complex network
of political and commercial relations regarding the role of transnational
enterprises and financial organizations – often associated to the countries’ foreign debts - as well as the views on national security over the
Armed Forces which have been enforced through warnings, threats and
actions, in the form of symbolic violence.
It is, therefore, necessary to do our utmost to contribute to the historical search of a greater scope of autonomy. This is the frame of this
compilation which proposes, from Latin-America, to invite other regions to reflect upon themselves, from their own perspectives, taking
into account their countless peculiarities and subjectivities, in a world
of change. It is in the field of thought that the battle must be fought. In
Martín Hopenhayn’s words, it is a battle for visibility “less bloody than
those of the flesh, it is true because, in this case, it is the symbols that
kill and die.”20 (Hopenhayn, 2005: 90). Nevertheless, symbols are not innocuous, “the power that some exert over others is made of symbols,
it is by means of symbols that we give sense to our lives and it is also
through symbols that we converge in our destinies as a community of
citizens.”21 (Ibidem: 91).
III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS BOOK
From Latin America, María Cecilia Mendoza and Carlos Maldonado
Prieto have contributed with their articles written for the recent meeting of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).
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49
María Cecilia proposes an innovative view of UNASUR, conceiving
it as a model of development with inherent features; seeking to characterize the group it represents; collecting all the major debates in the
region, concerning integration in the XXI century; and analyzing coexistence with other integration projects in the region. In this context,
the author sustains that UNASUR has succeeded in asserting itself as a
more flexible and voluntary space for inter-government cooperation –
though the subjects brought up may be shared with other ambits in this
hemisphere, such as the OEA (Organization of American States).
Carlos, on the other hand, focuses on a more specific aspect of the
new group: the assessment of the constitution and evolution of the
South American Defense Council (CDS). The author’s starting point is
the number of transformations undergone by Chile’s perception of defense – materialized, among other things, through a process of progressive modernization and increasing professionalism – expressed by indicators such as the country’s greater participation in Peace Maintenance
Operations or the integration of the combined battalion, Cruz del Sur
(Southern Cross), together with Argentina. All of this occurs in an optimistic context on Chile’s part regarding the increasing levels of mutual
trust within the regional scenario, which results from a deeper change
in the conceptions of defense experienced in a region which has now
become a Peace zone, free from weapons for massive destruction, with
relatively low budgets.
It is in these propitious circumstances that CDS was born, as a space
for cooperation in a context of integration, gradually strengthening
bonds of mutual trust, and disconnecting Defense issues from those
concerning home security. Likewise, it has sponsored the creation of
the Centre of Strategic Defense Studies with the purpose of constructing a regional strategic outlook, a South American identity in matters of
defense, and a regional vision of the world.
The link between integration and natural resources – energy and
bio-diversity – regarding the distribution of income, climate changes,
and power relations in the Latin American region, takes shape thanks
to the highly appreciated contribution of Ana Emérica Seitz. In this context, what gave way to the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional
Infrastructure (IIRSA) created in 2000 emerges, according to this author, in the heart of a dilemma between ALCA and MERCOSUR, thus
ratifying a scenario of contesting projects, further complicated by the
aforementioned issues.
Carlos Moneta’s contribution is an approach that brings together
two of the geographies analyzed inside this book. It accomplishes the
50
originality of revealing a Latin-American point of view on the regionalizational processes of Asia Pacific, indirectly involving the region
from which the article is written.
This process, where Japan will have a first leading role followed later
by China, starts with the so-called “dragons” and “tigers” in a gradual
process of economic development which includes foreign direct investments and technology. Moneta aimed to show the readers the perception of those elements that, according to him, enhance the impulse of
the regionalization process in Asia Pacific, resulting later in the proliferation of free trade agreements, mostly subsequently to the financial
crisis that brought a breakdown in the relations with United States.
From the immensity of Asia we have received the contribution of
Sartika Soesilowati, who begins by analyzing the concepts of sovereignty and of security community within the conception of a regional order,
in which the members of ASEAN express a clear inclination towards the
Westfalian focus on International Relations.
Nevertheless, Sartika very rightly mentions that the concept of sovereignty embraced by the diversity in the theoretical focusing of International Relations, does not purely and completely apply to the South
East Asian scenario. This author considers what she calls the “ASEAN
way”, as a form of non- interference in the home affairs of the States,
moreover, it is regarded as a form of mutual support in the regional scenario.
On the other hand, the conception of sovereignty, also in the case
of the ASEAN way, as Sartika points out, is the result of a historical and
geopolitical position which is exclusive to the region, anchored to national and regional security, which, through the reminiscences of colonialism and foreign military interventions, has allowed the concept of
sovereignty to be strongly linked to nationalism.
Thus, through the psycho-history of the region we may show how
sovereignty has become a central concept to the area’s stability, and
how it conforms to the Westfalian model as the ruling principle of international relations under a pattern of integration, of which Indonesia
was a Founding Father in 1967, and which aims at strengthening a form
of cooperation that will assert its members’ positions of supremacy.
Also from South East Asia – and with an analysis that has several
points in common with the previous article – our colleague from Myanmar, Myat Phyu Yamin, begins by highlighting the existence of a historical period of belligerent monarchies in her country until its sovereignty
was surrendered to the colonial power of Great Britain, only to recover
its independence in 1948.
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51
The international scenario following Independence, as well as the
Chinese intervention in 1950 propitiated the establishment of the military forces as the ruling power in Myanmar. Thus, the country’s government practices became strongly linked to national security, defined by
nationalist military sectors. The concept of national security or, what
the author calls Lone Choan Yei, became the key to the military governments’ definition of priorities, linked to a patriotic form of paternalism.
These actions resulted in a prevalent military outlook or vision of
home affairs born of national security, which led Myanmar to adopt an
independent position of non-alignment, almost of isolation.
This has led Myat Phyu Yamin to emphasize the role of ASEAN, thus
reaffirming the principles of the aforementioned “ASEAN way”: namely, state sovereignty, no interference in home affairs, abstention of measures of force, and regional cooperation.
This organization has been - and still is – a vehicle towards the regional scenario, not only for the sake of Myanmar, but also for the country’s reconnection with the international community in a context of
economic integration (China has become its greatest investor and India
its major commercial exports partner) and cooperation, especially with
the advent of its transition to democracy in 2010 and its present reviewing of the concept of security for the country.
India’s contribution through Sachin Pardhe, on the other hand, attempts to demonstrate how the success of integration in that area is
strongly defined by the relations between India and Pakistan. He also
highlights a certain degree of skepticism on the part of the smaller
States, in the face of India as a growing power in its role of regional hegemony.
Yet, in order to accurately delimit the factors which fix the boundaries of integration in the region, Sachin points out the influence of Chinese and Russian interests, as well as extra-regional ones – such as the
United States – whose expansion is facilitated by rivalries among the
larger States. Consequently, India, as well as Pakistan and China, have
become more closely related to the United States.
To sum up, the author considers the need to assume the bond that
links the different integration processes and the way they are related
to the security design of the region, in order to understand a feebly integrated regional scenario with a split up identity, further affected by
nuclear armed interacting powers, by a dominant conception of pending danger and lack of trust.
Yusuke Dan sets forth what he considers to be the main challenges
for regional security, from the Japanese point of view, conceived as a
52
geopolitical framework characterized by territorial tension centred in
controversies with China, Taiwan, South Korea and Russia, over some
of their islands. This is a sovereignty issue - which mainly dates back
to the latest Japanese territorial occupations, at the end of the Second
World War - in addition to the dilemmas which question the future of
the sources of energy and environmental security, especially after the
Tsunami which destroyed most of the nuclear plants in Japan.
The question of security may also be found in the perspective which
Beniamin Poghosyan (from Armenia) has to offer. He proposes an attempt to elucidate the regional integration process following the fall of
the Soviet Union, which gave way to the formation of fifteen independent nations with their own peculiar characteristics and even latent
border conflicts. Some States such as Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, seem more concerned with their individual security than with regional integration processes.
Nevertheless, Beniamin makes reference to certain integration initiatives which disclose different perceptions of security in the three
aforementioned States. While Azerbaijan is closely linked to Turkey, it
is attempting to isolate Armenia from all energy projects, on account of
their controversy over the Nagorno Karabakh region. Armenia, on the
other hand, has strengthened its relations with Russia which is, in turn
considered a threat by other countries – especially by Georgia – due to
the latter’s desire to be admitted as a member of the EU. Notwithstanding these facts, the author mentions that Armenia is, at present, in the
process of coming to terms with the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (OTAN)
According to Beniamin, the energy projects represent the key to the
integration of the region of Southern Caucassus, for it would allow gas
and oil transportation to Europe without passing through Russia, thus
reducing its influence over the region (which has a military base in Armenia) – as desired by certain sectors of the United States and the EU.
This state of affairs has turned the region into an immense potential
energy source, but the persistent conflicts among its members, generates a remarkable lack of mutual trust. The author argues that the region’s potential can only be achieved through the integration of all its
members, i.e. acting as a unified region. He conceives regional integration as the way to resolve the present issues and achieve the development of the geopolitical space, in question.
Europe is represented by Constantinos Koliopoulos, who proposes
the analysis of the European integration process on the basis of its future
challenges. In his analysis he highlights the Monetary and Economic
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53
Union and the absence of a common identity in a heterogeneous context,
both in political and economic terms. Contantinos contrasts the emotion
that a national banner may arouse, as compared to a European one.
In a background of crisis and debt, and in a context of growing renationalization of the State members’ policies, there is a preeminence
of the European Council – eminently intergovernmental -, apart from
a growing discursive logic of individual nationalism and an absence
of leaders open to dialogue (unlike the preliminary process) – strongly
committed to integration.
Our Ukrainian colleague, Polina Sinovets, on the other hand, has
propounded the study of defense projects in the present Euro-Atlantic
integration, especially through the role of strategic weapons provided
by the United States to the European members of NATO.
Polina sustains that, just as strategic weapons were a successful element of Euro-Atlantic integration in defense matters, on the face of an
eventual Soviet attack, the present restatement of this collective security mechanism may be established through the anti-missile defense
system which, in turn, generates contrasting positions within the European countries, according to the conception of their relations with the
United States and with Russia.
Going back to our previous remarks when making reference to alternative views, it is surprising to evidence that the regional integration
processes in Europe are not exclusively considered as an adhesion to
the European Union project. This is particularly noticeable in the case
of our Russian colleague, Ekaterina Arkhipova. This author demonstrates how the integration of that region has been a permanent subject
of discussion since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russia has made economic investments in the rest of the countries
in that region, gaining strength as a military provider for countries like
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for oil investments in Azerbaijan, and in
sectors of energy transportation to Europe in Belorussia and Ukraine.
It has, likewise, received a remarkable amount of western investments,
opening lines of cooperation, though not of integration, with the members of the EU. Still, in spite of competing geopolitically at a regional or
extra-regional level, Russia has propelled regional initiatives such as the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Treaty of Collective
Security (TCS), the Custom Union, and the Russian-Belorussian State
Union, which has cost the country quite a few accusations of constituting a new imperialism.
54
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Bourdieu, P. (2007). El sentido práctico. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores.
Braudel, F. (1970). Las civilizaciones actuales. Ed. Tecnos. Madrid.
Bremmer, I. (2012). “Every Nation for Itself. Winners and Losers in a GZero World”. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.
D’Angelo, R; Carbajal, E; y Marchilli, A. (2005). Una introducción a
Lacan. Buenos Aires: Lugar.
Dussel, E. (2001). “Eurocentrismo y modernidad (Introducción a las
lecturas de Frankfurt)”, en Mignolo, Walter (Compilador), Capitalismo
y geopolítica del conocimiento: el eurocentrismo y la filosofía de la liberación en el debate intelectual contemporáneo, Colección Plural/2 y Ediciones del Signo.
Escudé, C. (1992). Realismo periférico: Bases teóricas para una nueva
política exterior argentina. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
Foucault M. (2012). El poder, una bestia magnifica. Buenos Aires: Siglo
Veintiuno.
Foucault, M. (2008). Un diálogo sobre el poder y otras conversaciones.
Buenos Aires: Alianza Editorial.
Galeano, E. (2010). Las venas abiertas de América Latina. Buenos Aires:
Siglo XXI Editores.
Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by Peaceful Means. Oslo: Internacional Peace
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Hobsbawm, E. (2008). “Después del siglo XX: un mundo en transición”.
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Hopenhayn, M. (2005). América Latina desigual y descentrada. Buenos
Preface
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Aires: Grupo Editorial Norma.
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Oszlak, O. (1999). La Formación del Estado Argentino. Buenos Aires: Ed.
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Paradiso, J. y Luna Pont, M. (2003). “Paz y guerra en la trayectoria latinoamericana”, Universidad & Integración, Asociación de Universidades
de América Latina y Caribe.
Tokatlian, J.G. (2008). “El final de la Doctrina Monroe”, Le Monde Diplomatique, Octubre.
Ugarte, M. (1953). El porvenir de América Latina. Buenos Aires: Ed. Indoamericana.
Waltz, K. (1988). Teoría de la Política Internacional. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano.
Wallerstein, I. (2001). Después del liberalismo. México DF: Siglo Veintiuno.
Primera Parte
América Latina
UNASUR, Un modelo de integración
con identidad propia22
María Cecilia Mendoza
RESUMEN
Junto con el siglo viene madurando un nuevo actor internacional, la
Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR). En poco tiempo ha logrado un gran protagonismo regional y se ha constituido en interlocutor válido para bloques más consolidados y tradicionales. Su eficacia
para resolver crisis institucionales, asistir en catástrofes naturales y lograr consensos de máximo nivel en corto tiempo, llama la atención. ¿Se
trata de un ensayo más en el superpoblado mundo del multilateralismo, caracterizado por las redundancias en los objetivos, la profusión
de reuniones, las declaraciones pomposas y los escasos resultados? ¿Es
un nuevo modelo que viene a suplantar a otros foros que han cumplido sus ciclos o demostrado inoperancia, como opinan algunos sobre
la CAN y la OEA? ¿Cuál será la relación entre el MERCOSUR y la UNASUR, se complementarán o se superpondrán? ¿Persigue el arquetipo de
integración regional de la Unión Europea o ha logrado una identidad
propia, más afín a la cultura política latinoamericana? Quizás en este
ensayo no pueda responderse taxativamente a estas preguntas, pero
a través del recorrido de su origen, constitución y “modus operandi”,
buscaremos una tendencia que nos permita configurar un poco más el
futuro de la integración regional en América del Sur.
ABSTRACT
Along with the present century is maturing a new international actor,
the Union of South American Nations (in Spanish, UNASUR). In a short
time it has achieved a high profile at the regional level and has become
a valid interlocutor for more established and traditional blocks. Overall
attracts attention its effectiveness in solving institutional crises, natural disasters and achieving consensus at the top level in a short time.
Is it a test more in the crowded world of multilateralism, characterized
22 Este trabajo toma como base “La UNASUR como nuevo actor internacional”, ponencia presentada por la autora en las IV Jornadas de Estado y Sociedad organizadas por la Facultad de
Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires en 2010.
60
by redundancies in the objectives, the profusion of meetings, lofty declarations and poor performance? Is it a new model coming to replace
other forums who have completed their cycles or have proven their ineffectiveness, as saying some of the Andean Community (in Spanish,
CAN) and the Organization of American States (OAS)? What will be the
relationship between MERCOSUR and UNASUR?, will complement or
overlap? UNASUR pursues the archetype of Regional integration of the
European Union or has its own identity, more akin to the Latin American political culture? Perhaps in this work we cannot answer these
questions exhaustively, but through the course of their origin, constitution and “modus operandi”, we will look for a trend that allows us to set
up a little more the future of regional integration in South America.
I. PRESENTACIÓN
A cinco años de la constitución formal de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas (UNASUR), podemos decir que está consolidada en la
agenda y en el vocabulario políticos de la comunidad internacional.
Que esto suceda en tiempos de los Bicentenarios de nuestras luchas
por la independencia, propicia la reflexión sobre una de las ideas claves
que defendieron los teóricos y ejecutores del proceso revolucionario
del siglo XIX, quienes ya entonces pensaban la integración sudamericana como un modelo de desarrollo con perfil propio.
Esa búsqueda de integración sudamericana fue convocada y clausurada periódicamente a lo largo de 200 años. Las experiencias fueron
varias y los motivos de aciertos y fracasos también diversos.
La organización política autoritaria impuesta por las dictaduras
instaladas en América Latina durante la década de los setenta, y hasta entrados los ochenta, alentó recelos y sentimientos beligerantes que
clausuraron la noción misma de integración.
Con la recuperación gradual de la democracia en Sudamérica, en la
década del 80 del siglo pasado, los vínculos entre los Estados comenzaron a sustentarse en las ideas de cooperación y solidaridad que resultan
básicos para los proyectos políticos de los países que aspiran a constituir y consolidar bloques regionales viables.
Con la firma de la Declaración de Iguazú, los Presidentes de Argentina y Brasil, Raúl Alfonsín y José Sarney, plantaron en 1985 el germen
de la integración regional actual.
Desde entonces, es bueno reconocer que más allá de los cambios de
gobierno y de las circunstancias internacionales, se ha podido mante-
UNASUR, Un modelo de integración con identidad propia
61
ner la dirección y profundizar una tendencia a la integración que, más
allá de sus idas y vueltas, ha mostrado grandes avances.
Cabe destacar la vinculación directa que han tenido los procesos de
democratización y de integración. Su funcionalidad ha sido la constante que permitió superar las dificultades que ha padecido la alianza estratégica entre los países de la región, fundamentada en el compromiso
con la democracia, la paz y los derechos humanos.
La Argentina ha sido miembro fundador del Mercosur y de la UNASUR ratificándose así la vocación integradora reflejada en la Constitución Nacional reformada en 1994. En el artículo 75 se define como una
de las atribuciones del Congreso
Aprobar tratados de integración que deleguen competencias
y jurisdicción a organizaciones supraestatales en condiciones de
reciprocidad e igualdad, y que respeten el orden democrático y
los derechos humanos. Las normas dictadas en su consecuencia tienen jerarquía superior a las leyes. La aprobación de estos
tratados con Estados de Latinoamérica requerirá la mayoría absoluta de la totalidad de los miembros de cada Cámara (Constitución Nacional de la República Argentina, 1994: art. 75, inc.24).
Este trabajo busca caracterizar el tipo de bloque regional que va
constituyendo la UNASUR, analizando el contexto que dio como resultado la letra del Tratado Constitutivo firmado por las Jefas y Jefes de
Estado y de Gobierno de los doce países sudamericanos23 y las consecuencias de las Decisiones emanadas del máximo Consejo de la Unión.
II. DE BRASILIA A BRASILIA
En el año 2000, en Brasilia, por iniciativa del entonces Presidente de
Brasil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno
de Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay,
Perú, Surinam, Uruguay y Venezuela; expresaron el propósito de fortalecer la cooperación entre los países de la región sobre cinco pilares:
democracia, comercio, infraestructura, lucha contra el narcotráfico y
ciencia y tecnología. Como primer paso decidieron crear la Iniciativa
para la Integración de la Infraestructura Suramericana (IIRSA), organización compuesta por los doce países suramericanos y en la que participan el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), la Corporación
23 Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Perú, Surinam, Uruguay y Venezuela
62
Andina de Fomento (CAF) y el Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de
la Cuenca del Plata (FONPLATA) y cuyo objetivo principal es mejorar la
infraestructura para el desarrollo en la región. Es importante subrayar
que por el 2000 aún la región vivía los estertores del neoliberalismo y el
ALCA24 era un objetivo a alcanzar.
En julio de 2002 se realizó una segunda Cumbre de Presidentes
Sudamericanos que se expresó en el “Consenso de Guayaquil sobre integración, seguridad, e infraestructura para el desarrollo” en el que se
hizo énfasis sobre la labor de IIRSA. A partir de los antecedentes subregionales, también firmaron la “Declaración sobre zona de paz sudamericana”.
En diciembre de 2004, durante la III Cumbre Presidencial Sudamericana, realizada en Cusco, se produjo un avance mayor al establecerse
la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones. Allí los Presidentes plantearon avanzar en los procesos de “convergencia MERCOSUR/ CAN y
Chile” en el marco de la ALADI y de “integración física, energética y
de comunicaciones en Sudamérica sobre la base de la profundización
de las experiencias bilaterales, regionales y subregionales existentes,
con la consideración de mecanismos financieros innovadores y las propuestas sectoriales en curso que permitan una mejor realización de inversiones en infraestructura física para la región”.
En agosto de 2005, el Presidente de Venezuela Hugo Chávez, a
cargo de la Presidencia Pro Tempore de la Comunidad Andina de
Naciones, y el Presidente del Uruguay Tabaré Vázquez, a cargo de la
Presidencia Pro Tempore del MERCOSUR, propusieron al resto de los
mandatarios de América del Sur constituir una comisión que reflexionara sobre la posible institucionalidad de la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones.
Nuevamente en Brasilia, en septiembre de 2005, los Presidentes se
reunieron en la Primera Cumbre de una sigla que tuvo poca vida: la
“CASA”. Allí se declaró que “La Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones
se establecerá con base en la institucionalidad existente, evitando la
duplicación y superposición de esfuerzos, sin nuevos gastos financieros, estableciendo coordinación entre las Cancillerías, con el apoyo de
los organismos de integración existentes y perfeccionando su funcionamiento”. Esta posición generó el desagrado de Chávez quien se oponía a repetir, según él, “esquemas fracasados”. Este es un debate que se
mantuvo a lo largo de la conformación de la UNASUR y que resurge
permanentemente.
24 Alianza para el Libre Comercio de las Américas, promovida por las Cumbres de las Américas
en el marco de la OEA.
63
III. UN “ROTEIRO” PARA EL TRATADO CONSTITUTIVO
Durante 2006, ya descartada el ALCA luego de la Cumbre de las Américas de Mar del Plata25, se constituyó la Comisión Estratégica de Reflexión sobre el Proceso de Integración Sudamericano, compuesta por
Representantes Personales de los Presidentes. Se reunieron por primera vez en Montevideo, en junio de ese año, ocasión en la que el representante brasileño presentó un documento a modo de guía (en portugués “roteiro”) que fue la base desde la cual se discutió la organización
y el alcance de la Comunidad.
Después de cuatro reuniones sucedidas entre junio y octubre, la Comisión produjo un documento dirigido a los Presidentes. Se mantuvo la
idea de convergencia de los proyectos de integración subregional existentes, se avanzó sobre una cierta institucionalidad y se propusieron
varios objetivos entre los que se destacaron la integración energética,
de infraestructura y financiera.
En diciembre de ese año los Presidentes firmaron la Declaración de
Cochabamba, en la que plantearon “un modelo de integración para el
siglo XXI” como “una alternativa para evitar que la globalización profundice las asimetrías y contribuya a la marginalidad económica, social
y política y procurar aprovechar las oportunidades para el desarrollo”.
En Cochabamba se dieron unas premisas para la construcción de la
integración sudamericana: la superación de las asimetrías, un nuevo
contrato social, la integración energética, la infraestructura para la interconexión de los pueblos, la cooperación económica y comercial, la
integración financiera, la integración industrial y productiva, una ciudadanía sudamericana, la cuestión de la migración, la identidad cultural, la cooperación en materia ambiental, la participación ciudadana y
la cooperación en materia de defensa.
También se planteó un germen de institucionalidad a partir de Reuniones anuales de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, Reuniones semestrales de Cancilleres, Reuniones ministeriales sectoriales, una Comisión
de Altos Funcionarios y una Secretaría Pro Tempore. Se encargó a la
Reunión de Altos Funcionarios la redacción de un “Acuerdo Constitutivo” sobre la base de la propuesta de la Comisión de Reflexión.
En abril de 2007, los Presidentes se reunieron en Venezuela, en la
Isla Margarita en la I Cumbre Energética. Allí se creó el Consejo Ener25 En noviembre de 2005, los cuatro países del Mercosur más Venezuela, se opusieron a continuar propiciando la constitución de un Area de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA),
liderada por los Estados Unidos en el marco del proceso de Cumbres de las Américas. En la
Cumbre de Mar del Plata esos cinco países impidieron el consenso sobre dicho punto en la
Declaración presidencial y se apartaron definitivamente de lo que catalogaban como proyecto
neoliberal.
64
gético Suramericano26 y se delinearon los grandes objetivos en una
materia que, junto con las de infraestructura para el desarrollo y la de
integración financiera, forma el núcleo duro del proyecto integrador.
También en Margarita los Presidentes decidieron otras cuestiones
que quedarían plasmadas en el futuro Tratado: cambiaron el nombre
del bloque por el ya definitivo Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), acordaron que la sede de “una Secretaría Permanente” sería la
ciudad de Quito y transformaron la “Reunión de Altos Funcionarios” en
un “Consejo de Delegados” al que se le encomendó la redacción de un
Acuerdo Constitutivo. Para cumplir con dicho mandato, durante 2007
se realizaron ocho reuniones de este Consejo a lo largo de las cuales se
fue advirtiendo cierto alejamiento del proyecto de Tratado respecto de
los conceptos establecidos en 2006.
Durante los debates, fueron notándose diferencias sobre el modelo
de integración regional a adoptar entre aquellos países que promovían
incorporar el acervo construido durante años en la CAN y en el MERCOSUR y los que pretendían fundar un nuevo orden para la integración
regional27. El concepto de convergencia siempre tuvo una fuerte carga
del componente comercial, por lo que algunos interpretaban que era
un objetivo, además de ideológicamente inaceptable por ciertos gobiernos, imposible de enfrentar a estas alturas por países comprometidos por tratados de libre comercio con terceras potencias28.
Además, influyeron en crear cierto ambiente confrontativo, algunos
conflictos bilaterales que fueron evolucionando durante ese lapso. Esto
obstaculizó en varias oportunidades el proceso de redacción consensuada del texto del acuerdo.
Otro punto de fuerte discusión fue el referido a la posibilidad de incorporación a la Unión. Finalmente se acordó que recién luego de cinco
años de entrado en vigor el Tratado, otros países de América Latina y
del Caribe podrían solicitar estatus de Estados Miembros, siempre que
hubieran transcurrido cuatro años como Estados Adherentes (Tratado
Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas, 2008: art. 20).
La estructura orgánica del bloque también generó fuertes discrepancias en cuanto a la relación jerárquica de los órganos y sus funciones.
A pesar de este contexto, y luego de un llamado a la “reflexión
conjunta para el encaminamiento del trabajo de construcción de la
26 El Consejo Energético Suramericano creado el 17 de abril de 2007, se convirtió en el primer
consejo de nivel ministerial del bloque con la particularidad de que fue instituido antes de la
firma del Tratado Constitutivo de la UNASUR. Por esto mismo es que se lo menciona expresamente en el texto del Tratado como parte de la institucionalidad (Art. 5).
27 En el primer grupo se sentían cómodos los cuatro países fundadores del MERCOSUR, en
tanto que en el segundo, sobresalía Venezuela.
28 Por ejemplo, Chile.
65
UNASUR”29, por parte del Canciller de Bolivia, David Choquehuanca,
por entonces a cargo de una suerte de Presidencia Pro Témpore, se alcanzó un texto consensuado en el seno del Consejo de Delegados que
se reunió en dos ocasiones más y lo elevó a los Cancilleres. Finalmente,
los Presidentes, reunidos en Brasilia el 23 de mayo de 2008 firmaron el
Tratado Constitutivo (T.C.) que debería cumplir el procedimiento constitucional de cada país para ser aprobado por sus Congresos.
Fue hasta esta instancia presidencial que continuó la discusión sobre el orden jerárquico de los órganos y en especial de las funciones
de la Secretaría General. Finalmente terminó siendo aprobada como
figura hoy en los artículos 4 y 10 del T.C. aunque casi con la ruptura del
consenso por parte de Ecuador que promovía una Secretaría General
mucho más jerarquizada.
Producto de esta reunión también se aprobó un Plan de Acción
2008-2009 con lineamientos para la integración financiera, energética,
de infraestructura, de políticas sociales, de educación, de salud y de
mecanismos de solución de controversias en materia de inversiones.
IV. LA REGLA DEL CONSENSO
La UNASUR se caracteriza como un espacio de cooperación intergubernamental, flexible y voluntaria y se basa en el método del consenso
para lograr acuerdos y tomar decisiones en una región en la que existen
una gran gama ideológica entre sus gobiernos y conflictos bilaterales de
larga data y coyunturales.
Tal como se venía utilizando en la práctica de las reuniones previas
a su firma, la regla del consenso se adoptó en el Tratado Constitutivo
como método para la toma de decisiones. La idea de consenso aparece
ya en el artículo 2 (construir un espacio de integración “de manera participativa y consensuada”) y se expresa taxativamente en el artículo 12:
“Toda la normativa de UNASUR se adoptará por consenso”.
El consenso también es necesario para que el Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno apoye la convocatoria a reuniones extraordinarias (Art.6) y este es el sistema que se viene usando también para
los otros órganos y consejos ministeriales.
El consenso es entendido, ya por los usos y costumbres de la UNASUR, como ausencia de oposición expresa (veto). Podemos decir que
posee la característica de generar una gran unidad de criterio a partir
de negociaciones que muchas veces terminan mejorando la propuesta
29 Carta del Canciller Choquehuanca a sus pares sudamericanos de 4 de enero de 2008.
66
inicial, otras resignando aspectos, o también postergando decisiones
hasta que un cambio de circunstancias permita alcanzar el acuerdo general o evitar el veto.
V. LIMBO INSTITUCIONAL
Durante el lapso que medió entre la firma del Tratado Constitutivo
(T.C.) en Brasilia y su aprobación de por al menos nueve Congresos Nacionales requeridos por el propio Tratado para su entrada en vigencia,
transcurrió un período fundacional que puso en una especie de “limbo
jurídico” a la UNASUR. Durante ese tiempo sus acciones dependieron
solo de la voluntad política de los Presidentes.
Desde un punto de vista político, al inicio de esta etapa se planteó la
cuestión sobre si expedirse o no acerca de la situación de terceros países hasta tanto no tuviera existencia jurídica la UNASUR. Esta posición
sin embargo, fue luego superada ante acontecimientos en que la UNASUR tomo posiciones públicas sobre sucesos internacionales, como el
del golpe de Estado perpetrado en Honduras o la asistencia a Haití luego del terrible terremoto sufrido el 12 de enero de 2010.
Más allá de lo formal, quedó claro que la UNASUR comenzó a funcionar y que produjo efectos políticos a pesar de que su Tratado no estuviera aún ratificado. El nuevo bloque dio muestras de un gran dinamismo,
en particular en la fluidez del diálogo político y por su exposición como
actor internacional a través de la denominada “Diplomacia de Cumbres”. La capacidad de unificación de posturas ante las crisis políticas y
naturales, se fue expresando en los casos de los “sucesos de Pando”30 en
Bolivia o de las desgraciadas catástrofes sísmicas en Haití y Chile.
Finalmente, el tratado entró en vigencia con el noveno depósito de
ratificación en marzo de 2011, y en diciembre de ese año el procedimiento fue completado por los doce países.
VI. ESTRUCTURA ORGANIZATIVA
En tanto, se fue ganando tiempo con la creación de varios Consejos Suramericanos y Grupos de Trabajo cuyos estamentos políticos y técnicos
se reunieron para acordar los Planes de Acción de cada área. También
30 Se conoce bajo esa denominación a una serie de hechos violentos ocurridos en la localidad
de Pando y que dejaron unos quince muertos y varios heridos, en el contexto de una grave crisis
política en Bolivia. Esto originó una Cumbre Extraordinaria en Santiago de Chile, sede de la
PPT, en la que los presidentes crearon una comisión investigadora sobre dichos sucesos.
67
estas instancias demostraron una gran capacidad de reacción ante la coyuntura, como el Consejo Suramericano de Salud ante las epidemias de
dengue y de gripe A H1N1 o el Consejo Suramericano de Defensa ante la
fuerte reacción generada por la firma del convenio de cooperación entre
Colombia y los Estados Unidos. Como se ve, aún no estando en vigencia
el Tratado, los doce Presidentes pusieron en funcionamiento varias instancias previstas en el texto aprobado por ellos en 2008.
Allí, en el Art. 4, se enumeran los órganos de la Unión en el siguiente
orden jerárquico: el Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, el
Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, el Consejo
de Delegadas y Delegados y la Secretaría General.
El Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno (Art. 6) se reúne
en forma ordinaria una vez por año (para los traspasos de Presidencia Pro Témpore), pudiendo hacerlo en forma extraordinaria31 toda vez
que se decida por consenso. Se expresa a través de “Decisiones” y entre
otras cosas, define los lineamientos políticos y planes de acción, convoca reuniones ministeriales y adopta los lineamientos sobre relaciones
con terceros.
El Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores (Art. 8)
se expresa a través de Resoluciones. Se reúne en forma ordinaria una
vez por semestre, pudiendo hacerlo en forma extraordinaria32 a petición
de la mitad de los Estados Miembros. Propone proyectos de Decisiones
al máximo Consejo; promueve el diálogo político; realiza el seguimiento y evaluación de lo actuado; aprueba el Programa de Actividades y el
Presupuesto anuales; aprueba el financiamiento de iniciativas comunes; implementa lo decidido respecto de las relaciones con terceros;
aprueba reglamentos y crea Grupos de Trabajo.
El Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados (Art. 9), se reúne con una periodicidad bimestral y se expresa a través de Disposiciones. Implementa
lo definido por los órganos superiores con el apoyo de la Presidencia Pro
Témpore; elabora proyectos de Decisión, Resolución y Reglamento; coordina lo dispuesto por la UNASUR con relación a otros bloques regionales y subregionales con el fin de aunar esfuerzos; coordina los Grupos
31 Esta modalidad ha sido utilizada en la Cumbre de La Moneda el 15 de septiembre de 2008
(“sucesos de Pando”); en la cumbre de Bahía, Costa do Sauipe el 16 de diciembre de 2008; en la
Cumbre de Trinidad y Tobago, el 18 de abril de 2009, en ocasión de la V Cumbre de Las Américas (diálogo con el recién asumido Barack Obama); en la Cumbre de Bariloche el 28 de agosto
de 2009 (bases militares en Colombia); en la, Cumbre de Quito del 9 de febrero de 2010 (ayuda
a Haití) y en Cumbre de Los Cardales del 4 de mayo de 2010 (relación con Honduras, asistencia
a los terremotos de Haití y Chile y elección del Secretario General).
32 Las extraordinarias de jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno suelen estar precedidas por extraordinarias de Cancilleres y Delegados. Además, la cuestión del convenio de seguridad entre
Colombia y EE.UU generó reuniones extraordinarias conjuntas de Ministros de Defensa y de
Relaciones Exteriores.
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de Trabajo y propone el proyecto de Presupuesto anual al Consejo de
Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores. Este Consejo33, sucesor directo del
que redactó el proyecto de Tratado, es el más dinámico y multifacético
ya que si bien no tiene capacidad de decisión, sí puede tomar iniciativas
y todas las cuestiones pasan por él. Es la instancia donde se originan los
consensos que llegarán a los Cancilleres y se elevarán a los Presidentes.
VII. LA SECRETARÍA GENERAL
El texto del Tratado define en su artículo 10 las atribuciones de la Secretaría General, que es conducida por un Secretario General. El hecho
de que sea designado por el consenso del órgano máximo, el Consejo
de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno, y que pueda ejercer su representación por delegación expresa, pone en cuestión su subordinación a
los otros órganos y abre mucho más las atribuciones que taxativamente
se enuncian. También el Art. 10 define que la Secretaría tendrá sede en
Quito, Ecuador.
La Secretaría General, dadas sus funciones, surgió como una estructura administrativa con una burocracia propia, conformada por funcionarios de los Estados Miembros representados en forma equitativa y teniendo en cuenta “criterios de género, idiomas, étnicos y otros” (Tratado
Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas, 2008: Art. 10).
Es de destacar que todos los órganos e instancias de la UNASUR son
colegiados compuestos por doce miembros pares entre sí, excepto la
Secretaría General, ya que tiene una única conducción y no se aclara
que “todos” los Estados deban tener participación en ella. Esto es así
pues los funcionarios no están allí en representación de sus países sino
como funcionarios internacionales.
En la Cumbre Extraordinaria de Los Cardales, el texto de la Decisión de
Designación del Secretario General (2010) explicitaba la necesidad de:
Elegir a una personalidad que cuente con el respaldo político
del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno para que
ponga en práctica los lineamientos, planes de acción, programas
y proyectos del proceso de integración suramericana, así como
proponer toda otra iniciativa tendiente a la consecución de los
fines buscados por la UNASUR.
En este sentido, los Presidentes designaron por consenso al ex Presi33 Quien suscribe esta ponencia ha formado parte de la delegación argentina desde 2006, participando con distintos niveles de responsabilidad hasta mediados de 2010.
69
dente argentino Néstor Kirchner como primer Secretario General en la
historia del bloque. La temprana muerte de Kirchner dejó seis meses de
prolífica gestión desde la Secretaría, destacándose la solución de la crisis entre Venezuela y Colombia, países que habían llegado a la ruptura
de sus relaciones diplomáticas. Como signo de concordia, al tener que
designarse nuevo Secretario General, los Estados Miembros decidieron
que un representante de Colombia y uno de Venezuela compartieran el
mandato de dos años en uno cada uno. Así, la ex canciller colombiana,
María Emma Mejía y el ex ministro de Energía venezolano Alí Rodríguez fueron electos para tal función.
VIII. LA PRESIDENCIA PRO TEMPORE
La Presidencia Pro Tempore (PPT), no es estrictamente un órgano pues
no está incluida en el Art. 4, ni tampoco se la encuadra en la “institucionalidad” del Art. 5. El Tratado define sus funciones y características
en el artículo 7, en el que plantea que será ejercida sucesivamente en
orden alfabético por los Estados Miembros, por un período de un año.
Entre sus funciones figuran las de convocar y presidir las reuniones de
los distintos órganos; proponer el programa anual de actividades; representar a la Unión, por delegación expresa, en eventos internacionales y también por delegación, firmar Declaraciones con terceros.
Es necesario rescatar el rol fundamental que han tenido las presidencias pro tempore en las distintas etapas del recorrido descripto en
esta ponencia, en lo que hace a lograr la cohesión de los representantes
nacionales, evitar rupturas, sortear crisis y sobre todo, hacer un trabajo
de orfebrería para alcanzar los consensos.
Perú y Brasil ejercieron presidencias pro tempore durante la etapa
de formación de la “Comunidad”, marcadas por las Cumbres de Cusco
en 2004 y de Brasilia en 2005. La etapa de redacción del proyecto de
Tratado estuvo a cargo de Bolivia, uno de los países más entusiastas en
conformar el nuevo bloque sudamericano. Se ofreció la primera presidencia pro tempore luego de la firma del Tratado a Colombia, pero este
país declinó ese rol, debido al grave conflicto que atravesaba su relación
con uno de los miembros de la Unión34. Por ese motivo asumió la presidencia Chile, momento en que el país trasandino, bajo la conducción
de la Presidenta Michelle Bachelet, dejó definitivamente atrás la larga
tradición de país reacio a este tipo de proyectos. El primer traspaso for34 En marzo de 2008, Fuerzas Armadas colombianas ingresaron en territorio ecuatoriano en
un operativo en el que murieron más de veinte personas. Allí fue asesinado el líder de las FARC
Raúl Reyes.
70
mal fue de Chile a Ecuador, en coincidencia con el inicio del segundo
mandato presidencial de Rafael Correa, el 10 de agosto de 2009. Hasta
el momento, han pasado por la PPT, Guyana, Paraguay (en forma trunca por ser suspendido a raíz de su ruptura institucional) y Perú.
IX. CONSEJOS SURAMERICANOS SECTORIALES
De acuerdo con el Art. 5 del T.C. referido a Desarrollo Institucional,
pueden “convocarse y conformarse reuniones ministeriales, consejos
de nivel ministerial, grupos de trabajo y otras instancias institucionales
que se requieran, de naturaleza permanente o temporal…”
El procedimiento que lleva a crear Consejos no ha sido único, pero
todos se fundan en los Objetivos del T.C., en el Plan de Acción 20082009 o en Decisiones posteriores. Algunos han surgido de Grupos de
Trabajo anteriores a la firma del T.C. y que con el tiempo generaron una
complejidad que requirió de una mayor institucionalización.
En algunos casos, el Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado ha aprobado
en un solo acto la creación del Consejo y la aprobación de su Estatuto.
En otros, se ha dictado la Decisión que lo crea y se instruye a los Ministros para que se redacte un Estatuto y un Plan de Acción.
Hasta el momento, estos son los Consejos Suramericanos en funcionamiento:
Consejo
Suramericano
Fecha de creación
Cumbre
17 de abril de 2007
Reunión Extraordinaria
de Isla Margarita,
Venezuela, luego
ratificado en el T.C.
Defensa
16 de diciembre de 2008
Reunión Extraordinaria,
en Costa do Sauipe,
Bahía, Brasil.
Salud
16 de diciembre de 2008
Reunión Extraordinaria,
en Costa do Sauipe,
Bahía, Brasil.
Infraestructura y
Planeamiento
10 de Agosto 2009
III Reunión Ordinaria.
Quito, Ecuador.
Problema
Mundial de las
Drogas
10 de Agosto 2009
Quito, Ecuador.
Energético
71
Educación,
Cultura, Ciencia,
Tecnología e
Innovación
10 de Agosto 2009
Quito, Ecuador.
Desarrollo Social
10 de Agosto 2009
Quito, Ecuador.
Economía y
Finanzas
26 de noviembre de 2010
IV Reunión Ordinaria.
Georgetown, Guyana.
Educación
30 de Noviembre de 2012
VI Reunión Ordinaria
Lima, Perú.
Ciencia,
Tecnología e
Innovación
Lima, Perú.
Cultura
Lima, Perú.
Seguridad
Ciudadana, Justicia
y Coordinación
contra la delincuencia organizada
trasnacional
Lima, Perú.
Electoral
Lima, Perú.
X. EL PARLAMENTO SURAMERICANO
Más allá de los Órganos y de las instancias que se describen entre los
artículos 4 y 10 del Tratado, éste prevé en su Art. 17 la conformación
de un Parlamento Suramericano con sede en Cochabamba, a partir
de un Protocolo Adicional. En este sentido, el 17 de octubre de 2008
se realizó en Cochabamba la Reunión de Representantes Parlamentarios Nacionales y Subregionales de la UNASUR, con el fin de debatir
sobre el futuro Parlamento de la UNASUR y constituir un Grupo de
Trabajo que se aboque a desarrollar un proyecto. Aquí aparecieron
interrogantes acerca de la proliferación de “Parlamentos” de los diversos proyectos integradores, como los preexistentes Parlatino, Parlamento Andino y Parlamento del Mercosur. Además de los distintos
niveles de institucionalización que presenta cada uno de ellos, cabe
preguntarse cómo se relacionarán entre sí o si serán compartimen-
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tos estancos en los que se repetirán en gran proporción, objetivos e
integrantes. En este caso aparece la discrepancia no resuelta sobre si
tomar como antecedente lo actuado hasta el momento o comenzar
desde cero, situación que ha impedido hasta el momento la firma del
Protocolo Adicional.
XI. INTEGRACIÓN DE LOS PODERES JUDICIALES
A pesar de no estar previsto en el T.C. con articulado propio, pero sí
contemplarse entre sus Objetivos Secundarios “la promoción de la
cooperación entre las autoridades judiciales de los Estados Miembros
de la UNASUR”, ya con anterioridad a la firma del Tratado comenzaron a reunirse las autoridades de los Poderes Judiciales Sudamericanos. El 12 de abril de 2008 en su II Cumbre realizada en Lima, se
constituyeron Grupos de Trabajo con el fin de uniformar y optimizar
los procedimientos jurídicos referidos a extradición, cumplimiento
de sentencias penales de condena, exequátur y exhortos. La III Cumbre se realizó en Isla Margarita, Venezuela, en octubre de 2008 y la
IV Cumbre de Presidentes de los Poderes Judiciales de la UNASUR se
realizó en Cartagena de Indias el 29 de agosto de 2009. La V Reunión
se realizó en Cuenca, Ecuador en 2010 con un temario que contempló la jurisprudencia en América Latina en el marco de las fuentes del
derecho, la formación de funcionarios judiciales y un debate sobre la
independencia de la función judicial, entre otras cuestiones. En tanto
que en la VI Cumbre realizada en Brasilia en octubre de 2011, se acordó la Carta de Transparencia de los Poderes Judiciales.
XII. RELACIONES DE LA UNASUR CON OTROS PAÍSES Y BLOQUES REGIONALES
La UNASUR ha sido rápidamente reconocida por los bloques de poder
mundial y por terceros países como un nuevo interlocutor regional.
El T.C. prevé en su artículo 15 -“Relaciones con Terceros”- la promoción de “iniciativas de diálogo sobre interés regional o internacional y buscará consolidar mecanismos de cooperación con otros grupos regionales, Estados y otras entidades con personalidad jurídica
internacional”. Prioriza para ello proyectos relativos a energía, financiamiento, infraestructura, políticas sociales y educación, aunque lo
deja abierto a otras temáticas.
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Ya en la Declaración de Cochabamba de diciembre de 2006, mucho antes de la firma del T.C., se hacía una mención explícita al “Diálogo Externo” y a la “Coordinación con la OMC e Instituciones Financieras Multilaterales”.
Respecto del declamado objetivo de que los países de América del
Sur posean “una sola voz” a través de la UNASUR, su cumplimiento ha dependido hasta ahora de los foros y las materias en cuestión.
Se ha logrado con mayor facilidad ante los “diálogos políticos”. No ha
sucedido lo mismo respecto de la OMC. Hasta el momento, las coincidencias y unanimidades ante otros interlocutores multilaterales se
han logrado más naturalmente en las materias políticas y sociales que
en las comerciales.
Sobre el diálogo político, es de destacar que ya desde antes de la
firma del Tratado, se habían realizado reuniones interregionales entre
los países de América del Sur y los países de África (ASA) y los Países
Árabes (ASPA) con el objetivo principal de desarrollar la cooperación
Sur-Sur.
Con los países africanos se han realizado dos cumbres presidenciales. La primera en noviembre de 2006 en Abuja, Nigeria, dando
como resultado una Declaración, un Plan de Acción y la creación
de un Foro Cooperativo entre África y América del Sur. El segundo
encuentro tuvo lugar en septiembre de 2009 en la Isla de Margarita,
Venezuela, país que ha sido designado como Secretaría de ASA. Los
principales temas tratados en esta reunión fueron la creación de mecanismos financieros para contrarrestar la crisis económica global, el
cambio climático y la soberanía alimentaria. Este foro relaciona a 66
países (54 de África y 12 de América del Sur).
Con los 22 Países Árabes también se constituyó un mecanismo de
cooperación y un foro de diálogo político cuya primera reunión se
realizó en mayo de 2005 en Brasilia y que se organiza a partir de una
estructura de coordinación que involucra : una instancia de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores que se reúne cada dos años, un Consejo
de Altos Funcionarios que se reúne semestralmente, cinco Comités
Sectoriales (Cooperación Económica, Cultural, Ciencia y Tecnología,
Medio Ambiente e Temas Sociales), también de secuencia semestral,
y un Grupo Ejecutivo de Coordinación formado por las presidencias y
las secretarías generales de ambas organizaciones. La última Cumbre
ASPA se ha realizado en Lima, Perú, en octubre de 2012.
Respecto de la relación con otros Estados, en ocasión de la V Cumbre de las Américas, la P.P.T. chilena a cargo de la Presidenta Michelle
Bachelet, encabezó una reunión extraordinaria del Consejo de Jefas y
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Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno con el recién asumido Presidente de los
Estados Unidos, Barack Obama. La situación de la inminente firma de
un acuerdo de cooperación sobre seguridad y defensa entre Colombia
y los Estados Unidos y los efectos que este podría generar en la región,
promovieron una serie de reuniones extraordinarias en el seno de la
UNASUR. La Cumbre Extraordinaria de Bariloche, realizada el 29 de
agosto de 2009, determinó que se produjeran una serie de reuniones
ministeriales conjuntas de Relaciones Exteriores y Defensa y en su
Decisión reafirma que “la presencia de fuerzas militares extranjeras,
no puede, con sus medios y recursos vinculados a objetivos propios,
amenazar la soberanía e integridad de cualquier nación suramericana y en consecuencia la paz y seguridad en la región”. Asimismo confirma a Sudamérica como Zona de Paz. Más allá de acciones específicas de gran importancia encaradas por el Consejo Suramericano de
Defensa y el Consejo de Cancilleres35 para acordar un mecanismo de
fomento de la confianza y la seguridad en la región, fue surgiendo la
necesidad del diálogo con los Estados Unidos. El 4 de diciembre de
2009, el Presidente de Ecuador, Rafael Correa, a cargo de la presidencia temporaria de la UNASUR, envió una carta a la Secretaria de Estado norteamericana, Hillary Clinton, invitando a los Estados Unidos a
mantener un diálogo sobre temas de mutuo interés. La invitación fue
aceptada y se constituyó un Grupo de Trabajo ad-hoc.
Otra relación con un país extra regional es la que existe entre la
UNASUR y Haití, surgida a raíz del terremoto de principios de 2010. Esta
tragedia motivó una Cumbre Extraordinaria de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y
de Gobierno el 9 de febrero de 2010 en Quito, con un único punto en la
agenda referido a la asistencia a Haití, y que contó con la participación
del presidente René Préval. Mediante la “Decisión de Solidaridad de la
UNASUR con Haití” se plantearon una serie de compromisos a través
de diversos mecanismos de cooperación, incluyendo la ayuda financiera. Ha sido constituida una “Secretaría Técnica UNASUR-Haití” con
sede en Puerto Príncipe con el fin de coordinar los esfuerzos y cumplir
un Plan de Acción.
XIII. EL FUTURO
Podemos caracterizar el grado de integración que propone la UNASUR
como menor que el que se ha planteado el MERCOSUR, ya que éste
35 Dado que para algunos países, como la Argentina, los temas de seguridad interior no son de
incumbencia de los Ministerios de Defensa, se suman a este tipo de reuniones los Ministros de
Relaciones Exteriores.
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supone un camino de supranacionalidad que, aunque con obstáculos,
se puede percibir en sus fundamentos y en su evolución. En tanto, la
UNASUR se caracteriza como un espacio de cooperación intergubernamental, flexible y voluntario.
Sin embargo, parte de un grado de institucionalización y una complejidad que otros foros multilaterales como el Grupo de Río, el espacio
Iberoamericano o la CELAC no poseen. Algunos analistas suponen que
podría competir –desde una especialización territorial- con la OEA, debido a que varios países de la nueva Unión critican la eficacia y sesgo
que ha tenido la organización hemisférica hasta el momento36.
El escaso tiempo de existencia de la UNASUR impide responder algunas preguntas que surgen ante la comparación obligada con otros
proyectos integradores: ¿son complementarios, redundantes o competirán entre sí? ¿El MERCOSUR y la CAN se subsumirán en la UNASUR?
¿Se producirá una división del trabajo regional por la cual el MERCOSUR será un bloque comercial y la UNASUR uno político y social? ¿La
UNASUR se acerca más o menos que el Mercosur al modelo de la Unión
Europea?
Las respuestas a estas preguntas comenzarán a surgir a medida que
la UNASUR afirme su existencia. Mientras tanto, podemos avizorar tendencias y potencialidades.
Queda por ver si, al desarrollarse cada vez más las actividades y metas asumidas por los Consejos Suramericanos de nivel ministerial, llegará un punto en que haya que pensar en un grado mayor de compromiso, y por ende, de instituciones que además de acordar y coordinar,
controlen y obliguen a las partes a cumplir los objetivos definidos.
Otro aspecto por develarse será, con el paso del tiempo, el tipo de
relación que asumirá la UNASUR con sus predecesores, la CAN y el
MERCOSUR. Puede preverse que el grupo andino –por sus diferencias
políticas y comerciales- vaya perdiendo identidad, y que un MERCOSUR reforzado por la incorporación de Venezuela y las posibles de
Bolivia y Ecuador, fortalezca su perfil de Unión Aduanera no contemplado para la UNASUR, en tanto ésta absorba las actividades referidas
a otra multiplicidad de políticas públicas. Si bien es un tema aún no
dirimido, es recurrente la discusión sobre cómo generar una interfase
con el MERCOSUR ampliado, foro que ya viene trabajando a través de
grupos y reuniones ministeriales, en temas que ahora también aborda
la UNASUR.
Otro examen que deberá aprobar el bloque sudamericano es si resulta más eficaz que otros organismos, como la OEA o el MERCOSUR,
36 En especial en lo que hace al abordaje de las crisis de gobernabilidad en la región.
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para resolver crisis de gobernabilidad y prevenir la utilización de alternativas inconstitucionales de sucesión de gobiernos en la región.
Los casos de Ecuador y Paraguay aún no permiten dar una respuesta
unívoca.
Más allá de estas cuestiones, hay algunas incógnitas que se resolverán en un más corto plazo y que son fundamentales para la consolidación del proyecto UNASUR, como plasmar el impacto de la integración
en la realidad territorial, económica y social.
Respecto de los ejes sectoriales de la UNASUR, los tres más emblemáticos -energía, infraestructura y finanzas- aún no han dado sus frutos y de ellos depende más claramente la medida del éxito de la integración sudamericana. Sobre esas materias es más compleja la obtención
de los consensos imprescindibles para aprobar planes de acción, pero
sin dudas sus resultados incidirán en la mejora de la vida cotidiana de
los sudamericanos.
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
Comunicado de la Primera Cumbre Sudamericana Presidentes (2000).
Brasilia, República Federativa del Brasil, 1 de septiembre.
Constitución Nacional de la República Argentina (1994). Convención
Nacional Constituyente. Ciudad de Santa Fe, 22 de agosto.
Decisión de Designación del Secretario General de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (2010). Reunión Extraordinaria del Consejo de Jefas
y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas. Los Cardales, Argentina, 4 de mayo.
Declaración de Cochabamba (2006). Cochabamba, Bolivia, 9 de Diciembre.
Declaración de la Moneda (2008). Santiago de Chile, 15 de septiembre.
Declaración sobre Zona de Paz Sudamericana (2002). Guayaquil, Ecuador, 27 de julio.
Documento sobre Integración Energética Sudamericana (2006). Segunda Cumbre de Jefes de Estado de la Comunidad Sudamericana de
Naciones. Cochabamba, 9 de diciembre.
77
Primera Cumbre Energética Sudamericana (2007). Decisiones del Diálogo Político entre los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno. Isla Margarita, Venezuela, 16 de abril.
Primera Cumbre de la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones
(2005). Declaración presidencial y Agenda prioritaria. Brasilia, 30 de
septiembre.
Declaración Final de la Reunión Extraordinaria del Consejo de Jefas y
Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas
(2009). San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, 28 de agosto.
Segunda Cumbre Sudamericana Presidentes (2002). Consenso de Guayaquil sobre Integración, seguridad e infraestructura para el desarrollo.
Guayaquil, 27 de julio.
Tercera Cumbre de Presidentes de América del Sur (2004), Declaración
de Cusco sobre la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones. Cusco, Perú,
8 de diciembre.
Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas (2008).
Brasilia, 23 de mayo.
El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano.
Una perspectiva desde Chile
Carlos Maldonado Prieto
RESUMEN
El artículo analiza la gestación y el desarrollo de la Unión de Naciones
Suramericanas (UNASUR) en el período 2008-2012. Este nuevo bloque
aparece como una iniciativa política de Brasil para evitar la división
ideológica que comenzaba a profundizarse en Sudamérica entre países
gobernados por regímenes proclives a economías abiertas y liberales, y
los Estados que en 2004 crearon la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos
de Nuestra América (ALBA), organización que reúne a regímenes socialistas y populistas.
La UNASUR se presenta como un reto para establecer un diálogo
político cada vez más difícil de lograr, con especial énfasis en la resolución de conflictos y crisis políticas y en la cooperación en temas de
seguridad y defensa. Esto ha quedado refrendado en la creación del
Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS) como el primer foro que reúne solo a los ministros de Defensa de la región.
Sin embargo, el mayor desafío de la UNASUR es contribuir a reforzar
una identidad regional en tiempos de fuertes nacionalismos y de organizaciones hemisféricas y regionales en peligro de caer en decadencia e
irrelevancia.
ABSTRACT
The article analyzes the creation and development of the Union of South
American Nations (in Spanish, UNASUR) in the period 2008-2012. This
new block appears as a political initiative of Brazil to avoid the ideological divide that began to deepen in South America from countries ruled
by regimes inclined toward open and liberal economies, and states that
in 2004 created the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
(in Spanish, ALBA), umbrella organization of socialist and populist regimes.
UNASUR is presented as a challenge to establish a political dialogue
increasingly difficult to achieve, with special emphasis on the resolution of conflicts and political crises and cooperation in security and de-
80
fense issues. This has been endorsed by the creation of the South American Defense Council as the first forum which brings together defense
ministers from the region.
However, the biggest challenge of UNASUR is to help strengthen
regional identity in times of strong nationalism and hemispheric and
regional organizations in danger of falling into decline and irrelevance.
I. INTRODUCCIÓN
En el presente trabajo se pasa revista a la constitución del Consejo de
Defensa Suramericano (CDS) tomando con especial consideración las
percepciones y las políticas de seguridad y defensa de Chile. Como se
sabe, Chile, que ejerció la presidencia pro tempore de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) entre mayo de 2008 y agosto de 2009,
tuvo a cargo el grupo de trabajo que se creó para redactar el estatuto
constitutivo del Consejo de Defensa. Esta labor de dirección fue realizada por los Ministerios de Defensa y Relaciones Exteriores de Chile. Concluyó con la aprobación del estatuto por parte de los doce jefes
de Estado de la UNASUR en Salvador de Bahía, Brasil, en diciembre de
2008, y con la primera reunión de Ministros de Defensa sudamericanos,
cita que se llevó a efecto en marzo de 2009 en Santiago de Chile.
En las siguientes páginas se analizan las nuevas circunstancias políticas, domésticas y de cooperación internacional, principalmente en el
Cono Sur, que ponían a Chile en una excelente disposición para unirse
resueltamente al desafío planteado por Brasil a inicios de 2008 de crear
el Consejo de Defensa. Esta iniciativa nunca fue vista en Chile, al menos
desde las esferas gubernamentales, como una imposición o una velada
maniobra del gigante carioca para ser un trampolín de sus supuestas
pretensiones hegemónicas. Por el contrario, este emprendimiento estaba en la misma línea de cooperación en la que Chile se había embarcado desde principios de los años noventa cuando se restableció la
democracia en el país. Aunque hay que tener en cuenta que también
había elementos negativos que tendían a privilegiar las contradicciones
y las percepciones de amenaza provenientes del pasado que, aunque
en vías de superación, se resistían a morir.
II. LA POLÍTICA DE SEGURIDAD Y DEFENSA DE CHILE
Es indudable que el desafío mayor que implicó la conformación de la
El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano. Una perspectiva desde Chile
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UNASUR y, particularmente de su Consejo de Defensa, fue un acontecimiento que marca un momento fundacional de la mayor importancia
para todos los países sudamericanos, especialmente en momentos de
fuertes tensiones entre varios países de la región.
En el caso particular de Chile, las autoridades del área de seguridad y defensa estaban involucradas en una amplia reforma del sector,
lo que implicaba la presentación de un paquete de proyectos de ley y
la implementación de varias reformas y ajustes administrativos. Las
más importantes modificaciones tenían que ver con el proyecto de
modernización del Ministerio de Defensa, que incluía el reemplazo de
subsecretarías institucionales –una por cada rama castrense- por subsecretarías funcionales –una de Defensa y otra de Fuerzas Armadas- y
el regreso de las Policías al Ministerio del Interior luego de casi tres décadas; la creación del Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas,
que originalmente le otorgaba a su jefe paridad respecto de los Comandantes en Jefe de las tres ramas militares; la ley del soldado profesional,
como un paso hacia la profesionalización progresiva del servicio militar
devenido prácticamente en voluntario; la normativa que regula la participación en operaciones de paz; la reforma de la justicia militar que
restringe la competencia de los tribunales castrenses en el juzgamiento
de civiles; la publicación de la tercera versión del Libro de la Defensa
Nacional, proceso de transparencia en el cual Chile fue pionero en la
región (García y Montes, 2009: 86-105), y, por cierto, el desarrollo de los
planes de alistamiento del batallón combinado y conjunto argentinochileno “Cruz del Sur”, como el mayor emprendimiento de cooperación
militar del país en el exterior (Maldonado, 2010ª: 12-15).
Pese a este enorme trabajo, Chile vio en la creación del Consejo una
oportunidad para ampliar el compromiso internacional del país que,
hasta ese momento, estaba centrado básicamente en el estrechamiento
de vínculos políticos e institucionales con Argentina, Brasil y Estados
Unidos.
En los años anteriores, Chile había estado especialmente activo en
una serie de eventos que pueden verse ahora como pasos previos para
la formación del Consejo de Defensa. Uno de ellos fue la propuesta
que el entonces Ministro de Defensa chileno Jaime Ravinet le hiciera
a su homólogo brasileño José Alencar, en el seno del Grupo de Trabajo Bilateral de Defensa Brasil-Chile en noviembre de 2005, para que se
realizara una Reunión Especializada de Ministros de Defensa del MERCOSUR ampliado, incluyendo a Bolivia y Chile. “La idea fue acogida
y tomó fuerza en la propuesta específica del Ministro Alencar, que se
comprometió a convocar el primer encuentro y a realizarlo en Brasilia”.
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El Ministro de Defensa chileno José Goñi volvió a plantear el asunto a
su colega brasileño Nelson Jobim, recién instalado en el cargo, en una
nueva reunión bilateral en diciembre de 2007. “Cinco meses más tarde,
el Ministro Jobim venía a Chile, como parte de su gira suramericana
para dar forma al Consejo de Defensa Suramericano” (Las reuniones
bilaterales Chile-Brasil, 2009: 51-52).
A ello se suma la primera y única Conferencia de Ministros de Defensa de la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones -antecesora de la
UNASUR- que se efectuó en junio de 2006 en Bogotá. Allí se constató
que:
Los Comandantes en Jefe de los Ejércitos del Mercosur ampliado habían aprobado sus estatutos en marzo del mismo año,
dando paso a un proceso de institucionalización que llevaría a
constituir, en 2008, el Comité de Comandantes de Ejércitos de
países del Mercosur ampliado. La iniciativa militar ponía en evidencia que la ausencia de instancia de Ministros de Defensa podía interpretarse como una carencia del proceso de integración,
y, además, podía percibirse como disfuncionalidad o déficit en
relación con el avance de los procesos de control político civil de
la defensa en los países suramericanos (Ruz, 2011: 4).
Tomando en consideración esos antecedentes integracionistas, las
autoridades chilenas siempre tuvieron una visión optimista, a pesar de
que la iniciativa brasileña de creación del Consejo coincidió temporalmente con la agudización de la controversia con el vecino Perú y, en
menor medida, con un enfriamiento de la relación política con la Venezuela de Hugo Chávez.
En enero de 2008, Perú desafió diplomáticamente a Chile con la
presentación de una demanda por el límite marítimo en la Corte Internacional de Justicia de La Haya. Chile lo consideró un acto inamistoso,
mientras que Perú trató de encapsular el contencioso inaugurando una
“política de cuerdas separadas” que finalmente terminó imponiéndose. En lo referido a la relación con Venezuela, en 2003 Chávez apoyó
públicamente la reivindicación de Bolivia de acceso soberano al Océano Pacífico al afirmar que soñaba con bañarse “en una playa del mar
boliviano”. En todo caso, la situación tendió a distenderse cuando la
Presidenta Michelle Bachelet realizó una visita de Estado a Venezuela
en abril de 2007.
Esos hechos, entre otros, condicionaban a buena parte de la opinión
pública chilena a tener una visión más bien pesimista de las relaciones
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vecinales y regionales. Varios analistas civiles y militares tendían a ver
una reedición de la guerra fría a escala regional, augurando que Sudamérica se encontraba prácticamente al borde de una guerra entre los
países de la órbita bolivariana y aquellos que han abrazado el modelo
de economía abierta.
Esa visión pesimista sostenía que los gobiernos de países como
Chile pecaban de ingenuidad ante el bolivarianismo que, en su lucha
contra Estados Unidos, “lo lleva a instrumentalizar con dicho propósito
a todos los foros de cooperación regional para el desarrollo y la seguridad, como ejemplifican los casos de la OEA, de la CAN y de la UNASUR”.
Por lo mismo, la conclusión era que “la mantención de la paz en Sudamérica no está en modo alguno asegurada” (Contreras, 2009: 42 y 44).
Este pesimismo también veía sumamente complejo el escenario vecinal. Según Cristián Garay Vera (2009) “los conflictos [de Chile] con los
vecinos son variados y multiformes y no solamente de naturaleza puramente militar. La desconfianza mutua se ha traducido en varios frentes
no todos homogéneos, sino como la región, heterogéneos. El primero
de ellos y ya solucionado fue la suficiencia energética [procedente de
Argentina]”. En el caso peruano, “las querellas con Perú son recurrentes, y abarcan todo el ámbito de las relaciones, no solo de las de política
exterior, seguridad o defensa. Sino que abarcan un contencioso inacabable en lo comercial, educacional, etcétera. (…) Se aplican también
al imaginario y las relaciones económicas: a duras penas han sobrevivido las cuantiosas (pero rentables) inversiones chilenas en ese país”.
Lo mismo en el caso boliviano, pues con “una base ‘boliviariana’ en
medio del continente Bolivia (…) tiene una alta conflictividad a mediano plazo como contraparte de un modelo neoliberal que Chile parece
quintaesenciar”. A ello se agregaba el “inquietante” y amplio convenio
militar boliviano-venezolano (p. 50-53).
Por el contrario, las autoridades de seguridad y defensa de Chile
miraban con mucho más optimismo la situación regional, apostando por un incremento sustantivo de escenarios de confianza mutua,
como una alternativa sine qua non para superar las percepciones de
amenaza y conflictividad. Ello implicaba apostar por la construcción
de mecanismos y estructuras para desarrollar la confianza mutua. En
todo ello fue fundamental la lección que aprendió la mayoría de los
países sudamericanos con la misión de MINUSTAH en Haití. Hay que
recordar que Chile fue el primer país de la región en enviar un contingente militar –y luego uno policial- a la isla. De acuerdo a uno de los
funcionarios involucrados en cimentar la participación chilena en la
isla caribeña:
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Cooperamos en Haití convirtiendo ese escenario en la pieza
maestra del cambio de las percepciones de defensa más amplio
y profundo que ha tenido la región en décadas. Allí encontramos
modelos de entrenamiento, dimensionamos la capacidad y empleabilidad de nuestras Fuerzas Armadas; y sobre todas las cosas, descubrimos diariamente un mecanismo de estabilización
de la paz en un Estado mal llamado fallido y que se puede convertir en modelo para que Naciones Unidas adopte mecanismos
de consolidación de la paz (García, 2009: 35).
A ello se sumó el profundo convencimiento de que la región sudamericana destaca por una serie de atributos positivos en el ámbito
de la seguridad y defensa que la hace singular. Probablemente el más
importante es que Sudamérica es una zona de paz, libre del peligro de
guerras internacionales por recursos naturales, disputas fronterizas o
fundamentalismos religiosos. Sumado a ello, en la región no existen armas nucleares, químicas o biológicas y el gasto de defensa es uno de los
más bajos en el orbe. Además, como nunca antes en la historia política
de la región, las Fuerzas Armadas se encuentran subordinadas a las autoridades generadas democráticamente.
III. EL GRUPO DE TRABAJO Y EL ESTATUTO DEL CDS
Hay que reconocer que el surgimiento del Consejo de Defensa ocurrió
en un momento de tensión política regional, lo que dio pábulo para visiones extremadamente pesimistas dentro y fuera de la región, que han
quedado testimoniadas más arriba en ejemplos del caso chileno. Muchas de ellas presagiaban el inminente fracaso de las nuevas propuestas
de integración que implicaban, entre otras cosas, contar con organismos regionales sin la presencia de Estados Unidos.
Como después han reconocido funcionarios brasileños, la decisión
para impulsar la idea del Consejo se hizo una necesidad apremiante
luego del ataque militar colombiano en Angostura, Ecuador, en marzo
de 2008 (Saint-Pierre y Castro, 2008: 1). Este hecho los reforzaba en el
convencimiento de “que la seguridad de un país se ve afectada por el
nivel de inestabilidad de la región en que el mismo está situado – en
este caso, América del Sur” (Jobim, 2009: 19).
A este grave incidente, que tuvo como implicancia que Ecuador y
Venezuela rompieran sus relaciones diplomáticas con Colombia, se
agregó una crisis todavía más compleja cuando Colombia dio a cono-
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cer la invitación a tropas estadounidenses para el uso y usufructo de
siete bases militares en su territorio. El acuerdo fue suscrito por ambos naciones en octubre de 2009. Aunque varios países reaccionaron
criticando la medida, fue Venezuela la que extremó su enfrentamiento,
movilizando incluso tropas a la frontera común. Tampoco había ayudado mucho al clima de armonía la sugerencia venezolana de que el
gobierno colombiano reconociera carácter de fuerza beligerante a las
FARC (Ruz, 2011: 6).
Y como si esto no fuera suficiente, pronto se agregó un nuevo elemento perturbador cuando Estados Unidos, sin informar previamente
a sus pares latinoamericanos, anunció en mayo de 2009 la reactivación
de su IV Flota luego de casi seis décadas, creando la sensación en varios países que se estaba ante la presencia de una ofensiva militar para
intimidar a las naciones que tenían una posición de confrontación con
Washington.
Habida cuenta del escenario inicial tan poco auspicioso, es importante tener en cuenta la actitud que asumió el Grupo de Trabajo del
Consejo. Como señaló su presidente Gonzalo García, Subsecretario de
Guerra de Chile, en mayo de 2008 cuando se iniciaron las labores de redacción del estatuto, había solo dos posibilidades: o se recurría a “una
modalidad latinoescéptica o, por el contrario, [se construía] desde un
modelo latinófilo” (García, 2009: 30).
El Grupo de Trabajo se abocó durante varios meses a la redacción
del estatuto del Consejo. En éste quedó plasmado el máximo consenso
posible en un momento que, como se vio más arriba, era especialmente
complejo. El primer acuerdo que se estableció fue que el Consejo no
iba a ser un organismo de seguridad colectiva –evitando homologar a
la OEA y a su desacreditado Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca (TIAR)- ni que tampoco representaba una alianza militar que
pudiera conducir un plan operacional de una fuerza sudamericana de
paz o algo similar (Ruz, 2011: 4).
En rigor, el Consejo de Defensa se inscribe dentro de los mecanismos propios de la seguridad cooperativa. Por lo tanto, se aparta de la
dimensión operativa que podía sugerir una alianza de naturaleza militar abarcadora de una política regional propiamente tal. Su doctrina,
estrategia y despliegue se entiende en el marco de la colaboración y
cooperación en defensa desarrollando todas las perspectivas que esta
modalidad le ofrece. Ellas van desde “la representación de intereses
comunes de la región ante los foros multilaterales de defensa hasta la
aproximación conceptual de cuestiones complementarias a las políticas de defensa de cada uno de los países” (García, 2009: 38).
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En seguida se acordó que el Consejo se circunscribiría exclusivamente a tratar cuestiones de defensa, descartando inmiscuirse en asuntos de seguridad interna de los países. Éste fue un logro mayor tomando
en cuenta que en varios países de la región, el tema de la separación de
la actividad militar de la policial y su ámbito de competencia no está
completamente resuelto.
Se estableció, como tercer principio rector, que el Consejo no se
dirigía contra ningún país en particular. Con este acuerdo, que en los
hechos implicaba desterrar una actitud hostil hacia Estados Unidos, se
conseguía evitar una polémica que podría resultar muy desgastadora y
estéril.
Por último, se logró el compromiso asumido por todos los integrantes del Consejo de avanzar siempre y en toda circunstancia en forma
gradual, buscando los elementos comunes de una visión conjunta
en defensa, y que esa gradualidad va a estar respaldada siempre por
acuerdos colectivos que se plasmen por el consenso de todos los países
miembros. Este principio implica un tremendo desafío, pues “la sola
idea de contar con ‘elementos comunes de visión conjunta en defensa’ importa transitar en plenitud las medidas de confianza mutua para
alcanzar las medidas de integración en defensa” (García, 2009: 40). La
gradualidad y el consenso se complementan con el compromiso de reducir las asimetrías y las desigualdades existentes, reconociendo las diferentes realidades nacionales” (Del Pedregal, 2009: 78). Este compromiso se suscribió ante la expresa petición de Guyana y Surinam, países
con débil estructura militar y escasos recursos humanos y materiales
dedicados al área de la defensa, pero que, sin embargo, buscan mediante la cooperación regional disminuir las evidentes asimetrías con el resto de la región.
Como epílogo de esta fase inicial, en enero de 2009 se llevó a cabo en
Santiago de Chile la primera reunión de la Instancia Ejecutiva del Consejo, compuesta por los Viceministros de Defensa de los doce miembros
de la UNASUR. En esa ocasión se aprobó el primer Plan de Acción, que
preveía responsabilidades concretas de cada país en el cumplimiento
de los compromisos suscritos. Se optó por esta modalidad teniendo en
cuenta que ello facilitaría tanto la materialización como el seguimiento
de las metas propuestas. Asimismo, “se constató que, para avanzar de
manera gradual y realista, la mejor opción era tomar como punto de
partida las experiencias de cooperación en defensa que algunos países
ya implementaban de manera bilateral, junto con las medidas de fomento de la confianza y la seguridad que varias naciones llevaban adelante en el marco de las responsabilidades asumidas en la Organización
87
de los Estados Americanos (OEA)” (Ruz, 2011: 6).
El Plan de Acción 2009 delineó cuatro esferas para el desarrollo de
las actividades del Consejo: 1) Políticas de Defensa; 2) Cooperación militar, acciones humanitarias y operaciones de paz; 3) Industria y tecnología de la Defensa, y 4) Formación y capacitación.
Entre los eventos y programas que se incluyeron en el primer Plan
de Acción del Consejo y que se fueron concretando a partir de entonces, se destacan los siguientes: un seminario sobre modernización de
los Ministerios de Defensa, llevado a cabo en Quito, Ecuador; propiciar la definición de enfoques conceptuales a través de la realización de
talleres efectuados en Caracas, Venezuela; un ejercicio combinado de
asistencia en caso de catástrofe o desastres naturales, realizado en Ica,
Perú; una conferencia sobre lecciones aprendidas en operaciones de
paz, acaecida en Montevideo, Uruguay; elaborar un diagnóstico de la
industria de defensa de los países miembros, realizado en Quito, Ecuador; y crear el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Defensa (CEED), inaugurado en 2011 en Buenos Aires, Argentina (Plan de Acción…, 2009:
175-177).
IV. LOS LOGROS DEL CDS
Luego de las presidencias pro tempore de Chile (2008-2009), Ecuador
(2009-2010), Perú (2010-2011), Paraguay (2011-2012) y Perú nuevamente (2012-2013), se puede afirmar que la etapa de formación y desarrollo inicial del Consejo se ha cumplido plenamente. Queda ahora
pendiente una segunda fase de consolidación, más compleja que la
anterior pues los desafíos son mayores. Un impulso importante en este
proceso lo marcó la ratificación del tratado constitutivo de la UNASUR
que había sido suscrito en Brasilia en 2008. En un período relativamente breve de tiempo y superando todas las posturas pesimistas iniciales,
los parlamentos de los doce países miembros ratificaron el documento.
El último en hacerlo –en una singular paradoja-, fue Brasil en julio de
2011. Un mes antes lo había hecho Paraguay.
En todo caso, luego de su constitución formal el Consejo debió seguir superando escollos políticos importantes. Debido a la crisis producto de las bases colombianas ofrecidas a Estados Unidos, los Presidentes y Jefes de Estado de la UNASUR se reunieron en una cumbre
extraordinaria en Bariloche, Argentina, en agosto de 2009. Allí mandataron a los Cancilleres y a los Ministros de Defensa para elaborar una
arquitectura de seguridad que contemple un mecanismo de medidas
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de confianza y transparencia que permita desactivar posibles conflictos
y crisis a nivel regional. Un mes después, en Quito, el Consejo de Defensa recibió el encargo de elaborar una suerte de código de conducta
que incluyera medidas de confianza mutua tales como transparencia
en gasto y legislación, notificación de la suscripción de acuerdos con
terceros países, garantías negativas de no intervención, visitas a observar ejercicios y maniobras militares e inspecciones de bases militares, y
redactar un Protocolo de Paz, Seguridad y Cooperación, iniciativa presentada por Perú.
Después de casi un año de labor, que en parte retrasó la implementación del Plan de Acción, el Consejo elaboró el documento “Propuestas de mecanismos de medidas de fomento de confianza y seguridad de
Suramérica”, además de un “Código de conducta sobre cuestiones de
defensa y seguridad internacional”. Estos fueron los puntos de partida
para las discusiones realizadas en el Consejo de Ministros, que en mayo
de 2010 aprobó una propuesta de procedimientos para la implementación de las medidas de confianza mutua. El documento comprende
cinco áreas específicas, que incluyen intercambio de información y
transparencia sobre sistemas de defensa; comunicación entre fuerzas
militares en la frontera; mecanismos de notificación de maniobras,
despliegues y ejercicios militares con países de la región y extra regionales; medidas de garantía y medidas de verificación (Ruz, 2011: 7-8).
Este esfuerzo debe ser considerado como uno de los logros más importantes del período formativo del Consejo y, aunque no fue buscado
expresamente, su cumplimiento integral constituye un desafío mayor
para los próximos años.
Otro de los logros más significativos es la creación del Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Defensa. La iniciativa provino de Argentina que
ofreció tanto la sede como la infraestructura inicial para echar a andar
sus labores, y fue secundada con entusiasmo por Brasil y Chile. Los tres
países conformaron un grupo de trabajo en 2009 para elaborar un anteproyecto de estatuto del Centro, el que fue aprobado un año después.
El CEED fue inaugurado en mayo de 2011 en Buenos Aires con un seminario académico que contó con la presencia de destacados analistas
y varios Ministros de Defensa.
La idea que dio vida al Centro es generar un pensamiento estratégico regional que contribuya a elaborar productos y diagnósticos, a través
del Consejo, para la adopción de estrategias y políticas sostenibles para
el logro de objetivos que respondan a los intereses comunes regionales;
contribuir a la construcción de una identidad suramericana en materia
de defensa, y articular en doctrina, en estrategia y en políticas viables y
89
sostenibles nuestro más valioso capital: un pensamiento común como
pueblos, como naciones y como región (Guarda, 2011: 57). Al momento
de redacción de este trabajo, en el Centro laboran en forma permanente delegados de Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, Surinam, Uruguay y
Venezuela. Asimismo, otros países están representados transitoriamente por sus agregados de defensa acreditados en Argentina.
Volviendo a la perspectiva chilena, se puede señalar que el desarrollo del trabajo del Consejo permitió al país hacer hincapié en algunos
temas considerados especialmente importantes debido a la experiencia acumulada. Es el caso de la homologación de la medición de gastos
de defensa, siguiendo el exitoso ejemplo argentino-chileno de los años
noventa y el inicio del mismo proyecto con Perú que, debido al enfriamiento de la relación bilateral, quedaron suspendidos en 2008. En este
caso, a partir de 2010 Chile se encargó de liderar el grupo de trabajo
del Consejo que busca trasparentar los gastos de defensa y crear una
metodología de medición común. De hecho, en 2012 se dio a conocer
que seis 6 países (Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay y Uruguay) habían entregado información oficial de sus gastos militares que
abarca el período 2006-2010, con el objetivo de avanzar en las medidas
de confianza mutua y dando cumplimiento a un acuerdo de noviembre
de 2011 (Gutiérrez, 2012).
Otro tema sensible para Chile ha sido la coordinación militar en el
caso de desastres naturales, habida cuenta del terremoto y posterior
tsunami de febrero de 2010 y la experiencia acumulada por aciertos y
falencias evidenciados durante esa emergencia. “Este punto constituye,
per se, una medida de confianza mutua de gran valor para Chile por
cuanto se viene a alinear con lo que es su política de participación en
misiones de paz” (Leyton, 2009).
Se pueden enumerar muchos otros logros y metas alcanzadas en
la breve existencia del Consejo. Por ejemplo, la cooperación y el entendimiento que se ha producido entre los equipos de funcionarios y
asesores de los Ministerios de Relaciones Exteriores y de Defensa de
cada país, contribuyendo así a superar comportamientos burocráticos
que muchas veces han entorpecido la necesaria coordinación que debe
existir entre estas dos importantes áreas de las políticas públicas.
Asimismo, en el caso particular de Chile ha quedado en evidencia
que, con independencia del cambio de coalición política en el gobierno del país ocurrido en marzo de 2010 –hay que recordar que la Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia gobernó sin interrupción por
veinte años desde el retorno de la democracia-, las nuevas autoridades
gubernativas han proseguido las directrices centrales de la política de
90
defensa, entendida como una política de Estado, respetando los compromisos con la UNASUR y todas sus instancias, y muy especialmente
con el Consejo de Defensa.
Una mención especial merece la participación de los oficiales de las
Fuerzas Armadas, tanto de Chile como de los demás países. Su apoyo
decidido a las labores emprendidas por el Consejo, junto a su disciplina, tenacidad y asesoría técnica imprescindible, han sido un apoyo invaluable al momento de poner en práctica todas las medidas que han
contemplado los Planes de Acción desde 2009 hasta ahora.
V. LOS DESAFÍOS DEL CDS
Es obvio que queda mucho por hacer. La identidad suramericana en
defensa –verdadero leitmotiv de la iniciativa- se debe ir forjando paso a
paso. Por una parte, la región debe ir modelando su propia individualidad y su visión del mundo, además de apostar a presentarse como un
solo conglomerado frente al resto de la comunidad internacional. Éste
es un desafío mayor. Por el otro, Sudamérica deberá aprender a solucionar sus problemas en conjunto y en armonía.
En la relación de la región con el resto del mundo, el Consejo puede
jugar un papel preponderante. Por lo pronto, el Consejo deberá relacionarse tarde o temprano con Estados Unidos, pues precisamente en el
área de defensa Sudamérica y la superpotencia hemisférica poseen una
larga tradición de cooperación a través del Comando Sur, de la Junta
Interamericana de Defensa y más recientemente de las reuniones bianuales de los Ministros de Defensa de las Américas. En 2009, en medio de la crisis de las bases, el mandatario ecuatoriano Rafael Correa,
en su calidad de presidente pro tempore de la UNASUR, propuso abrir
un diálogo con Washington. Tampoco es casual que Brasil le haya comunicado anticipadamente a Estados Unidos la idea de la creación del
Consejo de Defensa y casi simultáneamente haya firmado un amplio
acuerdo de cooperación en defensa con el país del norte, el primero
desde 1977, desterrando con ello cualquier percepción de aislacionismo regional. Por cierto, a diferencia de Colombia, Brasil dio a conocer
en el seno del Consejo los detalles del acuerdo suscrito con Estados
Unidos, marcando un hito de transparencia y confianza mutua en esta
parte del mundo (Wade, 2010: 60-61).
Y por cierto, el Consejo también podrá relacionarse con otras regiones del mundo. De hecho, desde el momento mismo de la gestación de
esta instancia ha habido interés de ciertos países por ser observadores
91
permanentes en el Consejo. Lo mismo ocurre con la Unión Europea.
Por ejemplo, en febrero de 2010 una delegación de representantes de
los doce países miembros del Consejo fue invitada por el gobierno de
la República Federal de Alemania, para ver en terreno la experiencia
germana y europea en la implementación de medidas de fomento de la
confianza y la seguridad en el viejo continente (Maldonado, 2010b).
En el plano intrarregional, los desafíos son innumerables. Uno de
ellos será el incremento de las operaciones de paz en otras zonas del
mundo, probablemente con contingentes combinados procedentes de
varios países y sacando las lecciones de la masiva presencia sudamericana en Haití, misión que comienza a llegar a su fin. El ejemplo del
batallón argentino-chileno “Cruz del Sur” puede ser un modelo a seguir. De hecho, en las conversaciones del mecanismo 2+2 entre Chile
y Perú –que reúne a los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores y Defensallevadas adelante antes de 2008, el gobierno peruano sugirió la idea de
incorporarse a ese batallón destinado a operaciones de paz. Ése podría
ser un paso natural en el necesario proceso de reconciliación chilenoperuano y, eventualmente, una forma superior de integración militar
en la región. De hecho, contingentes chilenos y ecuatorianos, por ejemplo, han operado en forma conjunta en el marco de MINUSTAH.
Otro tema central es la cooperación en materia de desastres naturales, donde las Fuerzas Armadas tienen un papel central que jugar.
Y por cierto, el desafío mayor es perseverar en la cooperación y en la
profundización de las medidas de confianza mutua, único camino para
desvirtuar los conflictos bilaterales, disminuir las tensiones y las percepciones de amenaza y prevenir crisis y nuevos desacuerdos. Para ello
es necesaria más transparencia en el gasto militar, en las adquisiciones
de sistemas de armas, mediante la publicación de más libros blancos
de defensa y un mayor diálogo entre los Ministerios de Defensa de los
países.
En ese sentido, en su corta existencia el Consejo ha echado las bases para un sistema de medidas de confianza mutua y verificación en
terreno que debe ser implementado. Se trata obviamente de una tarea
ardua, compleja y no exenta de dificultades, pues es una nueva forma
de comportamiento que socava el secretismo y la opacidad, verdaderos principios y formas de vida profundamente arraigadas en el mundo
castrense y en los ámbitos políticos y burocráticos sudamericanos que
han perdurado por décadas.
Hay evidentemente otros desafíos y tareas que deberán ser asumidas en los años venideros. Una de ellas es la industria de defensa. Hay
elementos iniciales en los Planes de Acción precedentes dirigidos a ha-
92
cer un diagnóstico de las capacidades industriales y científico-técnicas
de los países, destinado a identificar futuras áreas de asociación estratégicas, para promover complementariedad, investigación y transferencia tecnológica. Incluso hay un grupo de trabajo que analiza la posibilidad de construir un avión de entrenamiento básico que pudiera ser
el modelo estandarizado de la región.
VI. CONCLUSIONES
a UNASUR y el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano son hoy día una reaL
lidad. Hace tres o cuatro años había muchos más pesimistas que ahora respecto a su viabilidad. Tampoco se han materializado los negros
augurios que profetizaban supuestas hegemonías imperiales, competencias internas descontroladas y hasta vientos de guerra. Esa posición
catastrofista se cimentaba sobre la base que proporcionaba una constelación regional diplomática y estratégicamente difícil.
Hoy día, la crisis que coincidió con el surgimiento del Consejo está
superada. Colombia, por un lado, y Ecuador y Venezuela, por el otro,
han hecho las paces y gozan de una relación mucho más constructiva.
El fantasma de las bases estadounidenses en territorio sudamericano
ha quedado en el pasado, desvirtuado por la propia institucionalidad
de los países de la región. En 2010, el Tribunal Constitucional colombiano consideró inconstitucional el acuerdo firmado entre ambos países y el nuevo Presidente Juan Manuel Santos decidió sabiamente no
insistir en el proyecto.
Asimismo, Colombia, superando sus resquemores iniciales, se ha
incorporado plenamente a los trabajos del Consejo. Por su parte, Estados Unidos, bajo una administración de menor confrontación que la
que lideró George W. Bush, ha tendido puentes con la mayoría de sus
adversarios.
El nuevo escenario hemisférico y regional ha sido un incentivo primordial para la consolidación del Consejo de Defensa y, asimismo,
para el afianzamiento de las posturas más optimistas.
Destaca como primer resultado del esfuerzo iniciado por Brasil en
2008, el hecho indesmentible que los países de la región sudamericana
se han sentado a hablar sobre defensa por primera vez en su historia
republicana. Con ello se logra superar visiones impuestas o sugeridas
desde afuera. Se habla ahora sobre “defensa real”, dejando en otros ámbitos de la propia UNASUR asuntos de seguridad como el narcotráfico,
el crimen organizado y similares (Ugarte, 2009).
93
Por cierto, hay que destacar el papel jugado por Brasil. Su mayor
contribución no ha sido su impulso inicial de creación del Consejo de
Defensa, de por sí loable. En verdad, ha sido su empeño y sapiencia en
cooperar decididamente en la construcción del Consejo, sin imposiciones o vetos, desterrando con su comportamiento ejemplar los innumerables prejuicios iniciales que hablaban de un supuesto imperialismo
brasileño, sus pretensiones hegemónicas o su intención de instrumentalizar la nueva institucionalidad para apoyar su ingreso al Consejo de
Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, parte de las muchas afirmaciones temerarias de aquellos días de 2008.
Lo mismo rige para el comportamiento de Venezuela, vilipendiada
en su momento como el enfant terrible de Sudamérica. Es cierto que
el Presidente Chávez acuñó a principios de 2008 la idea de crear una
OTAN de Sudamérica, opuesta en su esencia al futuro CDS, y encabezó
una cruzada retórica contra Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, constituidos
la UNASUR y el Consejo de Defensa, la actitud venezolana tendió a la
moderación y al involucramiento real en las tareas de los Planes de Acción. Por lo mismo, otro de los prejuicios, el que señalaba que Caracas
instrumentalizaría al Consejo en su política anti estadounidense, tampoco se evidenció como verdadero.
Finalmente, unas palabras sobre el aporte chileno. En este balance
de logros y de crecientes desafíos, hay que señalar que Chile se tomó
muy en serio la tarea de crear y desarrollar el Consejo de Defensa aportando su experiencia forjada tanto dentro como fuera de sus fronteras,
sus ideas sobre la política de defensa en democracia y su visión de que
la cooperación y el trabajo mancomunado pueden aportar decisivamente a la consolidación de Sudamérica como una región unificada y
progresista en el concierto de las naciones.
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Alianza estratégica entre Argentina y Chile. Atenea. Seguridad y Defensa, 13, 12-15.
Maldonado Prieto, C. (2010b). La UNASUR visita Alemania, Atenea, 26
de febrero, en http://www.revistatenea.es/RevistaAtenea/REVISTA/articulos/GestionNoticias_1692_ESP.asp.
Plan de Acción 2009 del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS) de
la UNASUR. Grupo de Trabajo del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano
95
(2009). Consejo de Defensa Suramericano de la UNASUR. Crónica de su
gestión. Santiago: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile, 173-177.
Ruz, M.I. (2011). El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano a dos años de
su instalación. Hans Mathieu y Catalina Niño Guarnizo (ed.). Anuario
2011 de la seguridad regional en América Latina y el Caribe. Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung: Bogotá, 3-10.
Saint Pierre, H. (2009). La Defensa en la Política Exterior del Brasil: el
Consejo Suramericano y la Estrategia Nacional de Defensa. Documento
de Trabajo, Real Instituto Elcano, 50.
Saint-Pierre, H. y Castro, G. (2008). El Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa. Boletín RESDAL, 29, Junio.
Ugarte, J. M. (2009). El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano: Balance y
perspectivas. En http://www.fes.org.ar/Publicaciones/2010/PAPER_
Ugarte_Mayo_2010.pdf.
Wade, A.E. (2010). The Union of South American Nations (“UNASUR”):
Challenges and Opportunities for States Pursuing Regional Integration.
(Unpublished master thesis). Washington D.C: The George Washington
University.
Integración y Recursos Naturales vistos
desde las Relaciones Internacionales
y el proceso MERCOSUR-UNASUR
Ana Emérica Seitz
RESUMEN
El sistema internacional está situado dentro de una transición estructural entre dilemas ambientales y energéticos y la construcción del cambio hacia nuevos ejes de poder. Esto supone condicionalidades para todos los actores, incluidos los de menor poder relativo, como es el caso
sudamericano.
Nuestra perspectiva combina así una caracterización del cambio
internacional con una visión situada tanto en los objetivos de nuestro
continente cuanto en la idea de “Integralidad”.
Nos proponemos aquí hacer una aproximación respecto del proceso que vincula MERCOSUR-UNASUR-IIRSA y ubicarlos en relación
tanto al contexto internacional cuanto a los dilemas de la distribución del ingreso, el cambio climático y las subsecuentes relaciones
de poder.
ABSTRACT
The international system is within a structural transition between energy and environmental dilemmas and the construction of new lines
shift of power. These are conditionalities for all actors including those of
lower relative power such as South America.
Our approach combines the concept of international change with a
located view, both in the idea of “Integrity” and in the objectives of our
continent itself.
We propose here an approximation of the linking process UNASUR,
MERCOSUR-IIRSA and place in relation to both, the international context and the dilemmas of income distribution, climate change and the
subsequent power relations.
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I. DESARROLLO
En este trabajo nos proponemos analizar la situación de América Latina
en su sector sudamericano, presionada por la necesidad de lograr objetivos de pleno empleo y desarrollo económico y tecnológico y por las
tensiones que surgen de la lucha por el poder y la sobrevivencia energética dentro de los procesos de cambio internacional. En este contexto,
los Estados Sudamericanos han coincidido en varios proyectos de integración durante las últimas décadas y de estos, los dos que expresan
más solidez son MERCOSUR y UNASUR (Seitz, 2010). En paralelo surge
de forma cada vez más importante la mención del proyecto IIRSA surgido a partir de las transformaciones globales de los años 90’.
Estamos en los primeros 30 años de democracia y participación política en simultáneo en toda la región, reproduciendo la dinámica de la
etapa independentista. De este modo, la vida y las aspiraciones de las
poblaciones del continente se encuentan en medio del dilema decisional entre política e intereses económicos que genera la idea de representación entre los funcionarios estatales y políticos; la tecnocracia y
los actores surgidos del mercado productivo y financiero. Este dilema,
a su vez, transcurre en un continente que, habiendo recuperado la Democracia, al menos formalmente, en su totalidad sigue ostentando la
distribución del ingreso más inequitativa del planeta, dentro de lo que
hemos denominado “Situación Populista” concebida como “aquella
en la que las soluciones institucionales establecidas quedan en estado
de insuficiencia respecto de sí mismas y fuerzan al reclamo por y a la
toma efectiva de medidas que ponen dicha institucionalidad al límite
para satisfacer las demandas tanto sectoriales como sociales crónicamente insatisfechas.” (Seitz, 2004) Por todo ello vemos que la crisis y el
cambio son la “normalidad” esperable en función de la dualidad social
latinoamericana.
Habíamos dicho inicialmente que nos proponíamos aquí hacer una
aproximación respecto de las capacidades, compromisos y conflictos
en materia de integración y recursos naturales de los países del MERCOSUR-UNASUR-IIRSA y ubicarlos en relación tanto al contexto internacional cuanto a los dilemas de la distribución del ingreso, el cambio
climático y las subsecuentes relaciones de poder.
Nuestro punto de partida es la idea de integración como “el proceso
por el cual unidades políticas diferenciadas van organizando estructuras comunes y unificadas de decisión”. Cuando hablamos de proceso
consideramos implícito el camino de construcción-deconstrucciónsíntesis por el cual transita la historia (macro y micro) del esfuerzo inte-
Integración y Recursos Naturales
99
grador. Se basa en la idea de que “política exterior, lejos de ser solo una
política burocrática, es la resultante de un vector dinámico de fuerzas y
presiones que se ejercen desde dentro de los países y desde el sistema
internacional en su complejidad y que termina por ser sintetizada en
las decisiones burocráticas aludidas.” Así, esta construcción de estructuras comunes entre los países sudamericanos, no es solamente lo que
aparece como tal sino lo que las deconstruye. MERCOSUR-UNASURIIRSA resulta entonces un proceso que no ha podido resolver la planificación macroeconómica ni el federalismo, un proceso que requiere
inescapablemente del sostén activo de la inversión económica porque
está desafiado por el subdesarrollo y la inequidad y, sin embargo, es un
proceso que se recrea y no se detiene.
Dentro de esa situación, tanto para hablar de los recursos naturales
cuanto para hablar de la dinámica de poder que nos compromete estimamos que el concepto de “integralidad” en el sentido de Integralidad
socioambiental. En este concepto nos interesan dos ejes. Primero, lo
integral da idea de “lo global o total” y al mismo tiempo “dicho de cada
una de las partes de un todo” (Diccionario de Lengua Española, 2001:
1288). En segundo término, desde lo ambiental, la biodiversidad “designa la variedad de la vida sobre la tierra y las características que esta presenta, en tres dimensiones: variedad de las especies (plantas, animales
y microorganismos), variedad dentro de cada especie y variedad de los
ecosistemas (desiertos, bosques, zonas húmedas, montañas, ríos, paisajes agrícolas, etc.).”(Harribey, 2008: 43). Por todo esto definimos integralidad como la forma de evaluar las cuestiones político-ambientales
desde las unidades más pequeñas a las mayores en el complejo sentido
de lo que llamamos biodiversidad intra e inter especies y ecosistemas
constitutivos del todo regional. Por eso nos interesa tanto la dimensión
micro cuanto la dimensión global en permanente interacción. Por eso
nos interesa tanto el patentamiento de especies naturales cuanto la deforestación o la contaminación de las cuencas hídricas. Estimamos que
el concepto tiene, como en la realidad interactuante, una unidad intrínseca. El contexto mundial en el que esto se desarrolla está descripto
como “la sexta extinción de especies más importantes de la historia de
la vida” (Harribey. Ibidem) y nuestra región no está ajena al fenómeno.
A esto hay que sumarle primero el dilema decisional que supone no
tener un orden prefijado entre la representación política y la representación de intereses genera las oportunidades desestabilizadoras desde
el mercado hacia el sistema político en una realidad como la latinoamericana con las peculiaridades de su perfil de distribución del ingreso. En
segundo término debemos sumarle los desafíos ambientales señalados
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previamente como contexto para todo el sistema.
Lo observado, desde luego, no ocurre en el vacío sino dentro de un
sistema internacional en crisis por los desafíos que generan tanto la
prolongada crisis financiera cuanto los desastres generados por el uso
abusivo de la naturaleza sumados a la crisis energética implícita en el
modelo productivo y extractivo vigente. Todo esto mientras hay nuevos
actores que tienden a estar situados en una competencia por el poder
con los EEUU en el mediano plazo. Estos nuevos protagonistas de primera línea son provenientes de la zona del Pacífico, como China.
Dilemas, siempre dilemas, democráticos, decisionales, ambientales
e internacionales. Frente a esto, desde Sudamérica vemos que el MERCOSUR, siendo la estructura más compleja y sólida en lo que ha llegado
a negociar y pactar no ha logrado mucho en la cuestión ambiental, particularmente en el tema de la integralidad de las cuencas hídricas y la
biodiversidad. Sin embargo, ese mismo sistema, para festejar el 20 Aniversario del Tratado de 1994, ha tomado la decisión de lograr el objetivo
de instalar lo que se llama “ciudadanía del MERCOSUR” para lo cual ha
aprobado un Estatuto37 de la ciudadanía del MERCOSUR con la idea
de incorporar el concepto y que forme parte del Tratado de Asunción.
Los temas considerados en dicho Estatuto son los siguientes: circulación de personas; fronteras; identificación; documentación y cooperación consular; circulación de personas; previsión social; educación;
comunicaciones; defensa del consumidor y derechos políticos. El perfil
resultante del mismo se acerca mucho al diseño institucional que surge implícitamente en IIRSA ya que en ningún caso hay atisbo alguno
de la existencia de Estados ejercitando un rol básico de planificación y
control en general, particularmente en lo ambiental. Esto debería ocurrir entre 2014 y 2015, etapa en la que habría también en marcha una
renovación del liderazgo político a nivel presidencial en forma bastante
generalizada.
Esto se está haciendo visible en las tensiones surgidas a raíz de la
presencia de inversión extranjera, particularmente la minería, que está
dinamizando la economía pero garantizando la existencia de gravísimos problemas ambientales presentes y futuros como son los casos ya
más antiguos de Alumbrera y Pascua Lama o los conflictos más recientes del Yasuní, Tipnis, Conga y Belomonte (con Ecuador, Bolivia, Perú y
Brasil como países involucrados). En este sentido podemos encontrar
la huella de concepciones vinculadas planteos teóricos como los de Kenichi Ohmae (1997: 63) que, proveniente de las empresas multinacio37 Ver:MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC.N°64/10http://www.mercosur.org.uy/innovaportal/file/2808/1/DEC_064-2010_ES_Estatuto%20de%20
Cidadania.pdf.
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nales japonesas, nos manifiesta respecto de la actual etapa económica
global que “es la actividad económica la que define el paisaje en el que
han de operar todas las demás instituciones, incluido el aparato de la
soberanía”.
Viniendo de las Relaciones Internacionales como disciplina valoramos aquí la interpelación politológica que se le ha hecho a la disciplina
con Kjell Goldmann respecto del método y las dudas respecto de “cómo
es un análisis apropiado de la acción”, si responde a un “constructo cultural arbitrario” y si, no termina siendo “una limitación opresiva sobre
el pensamiento” (Goldmann, 614). Es así que nos apoyamos en la Filosofía Latinoamericana,“la tradición de pensamiento propia de América
Latina, que asume el quehacer filosófico como una tarea de reflexión
contextual sobre la situación general y los problemas concretos de una
comunidad históricamente situada.” (Fernandez Nadal, 2008: 232)
Todo esto nos lleva a valorizar los dilemas que observamos en la región
y que nos permiten prever futuras tensiones entre integración, democracia e inversiones.
Contando con esos elementos diagnósticos, habíamos sumado
también la proyección de la demanda de China y Asia-Pacífico en el
perfil y el motivo profundo de este rediseño político-económico reflejado en IIRSA. Veníamos de considerar tensiones entre proyectos frente
a una mirada adaptativa a las necesidades del mercado global. En qué
consiste esa mirada adaptativa? Hemos mencionado reiteradamente al
Proyecto IIRSA y sabemos que se ha integrado como un todo a la UNASUR desde 2009, a través de la Comisión de Planificación COSIPLAN.
Pero qué es IIRSA? Es la Iniciativa de Infraestructura Sudamericana
que surgió con la importante ayuda del GEF38 organizado por el Banco
Mundial con apoyo del BID como parte del proceso de transformación
de las instituciones internacionales surgido en esa década. Qué es este
proceso? El lento cambio respecto de la proporción del financiamiento
de los Organismos Internacionales que responde a los fondos fiduciarios en perjuicio de los tradicionales fondos multilaterales. Este predominio de una forma de financiación por sobre otra se convierte en
realidad en un hecho político, en el sentido más básico y tradicional ya
que, a diferencia de las formas tradicionales de Naciones Unidas, equipara en calidad de membresía a los Estados-Nación con los “donantes”
privados que registran una importante presencia de empresas multinacionales. Todo esto no coincide con la idea de representación política
ciudadana tradicional y va instalando el predominio de un tipo de voluntad sobre otra, la voluntad de los factores dinámicos y concentrados
38 Enviromental Fund Group.
102
de las finanzas y la producción, por sobre la voluntad democrática expresada electoralmente. Es una lenta transformación estructural.
El Proyecto ha tenido antecedentes en América Latina, en tanto forma jurídica, los dos más destacados son el Plan-Puebla-Panamá y el
Acuífero Guaraní. Respecto de este último proyecto, podemos decir que
surgió como reacción subregional en términos de reserva de derechos
frente a la eventualidad de que el Acuífero sea declarado “bien común
de la humanidad” por las Naciones Unidas. En su concreción y ejecución no hubo planificación estratégica integral ni consenso y, mucho
menos, hubo un análisis de los aprovechamientos y las inversiones en
esa reserva de agua que existe gracias a una acumulación subterránea
de varios siglos y que no tiene la posibilidad de renovación garantizada
en calidad y en cantidad. No hay políticas ambientales comunes y esto
se ve también en este caso.
Respecto al Plan Puebla-Panamá, contiene múltiples proyectos y
expresa la proyección garantizada del NAFTA hasta el lugar más estratégico del comercio marítimo entre el océano atlántico y el océano pacífico: el canal de Panamá. En este caso, resulta clara la atracción de la
demanda asiática en general y china en particular. El sentido estratégico de este diseño se puede advertir tanto por la remodelación del Canal
de Panamá cuanto por la propuesta de un Canal por Nicaragua hecha
pública en 2013.
En cuanto al Proyecto IIRSA en sí, se desarrolla explícitamente a
partir de la Primera Reunión de Presidentes Sudamericanos convocada por Fernando Henrique Cardozo en el año 2000. Es decir, surge en
medio del proceso que tensiona las relaciones hemisféricas respecto de
si se concreta un Proyecto como el MERCOSUR o se da lugar a la red
de Conferencias de Ministros de Defensa, Economía y Relaciones Exteriores surgida luego de la Cumbre de Miami. IIRSA surge, entonces, en
medio de la disyuntiva hemisférica y sudamericana ¿ALCA o MERCOSUR? (Seitz, 2012, Lagos, 2008 y Dahrendorf, 2005).
Sus propósitos han sido constituir “un mecanismo institucional de
coordinación de acciones intergubernamentales de los doce países
suramericanos, con el objetivo de construir una agenda común para
impulsar proyectos de integración de infraestructura de transportes,
energía y comunicaciones”39 Para esto, ya en 2002, los Ministros de
Transporte, Energía y Telecomunicaciones de los doce países elaboraron un “Plan de Acción para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional de América del Sur” con el propósito explícito de articular geoeconómicamente al territorio de sus países. Dentro de esta planificación
39 Ver: http://www.iirsa.org/Institucional.asp?CodIdioma=ESP.
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los factores más importantes y activos fueron “los Ejes de Integración
y Desarrollo (EIDs) y los Procesos sectoriales de Integración (PSIs)”40
Estimamos relevante evaluar desde la región el significado estratégico de esta construcción institucional, particularmente tratando de
comprender cómo se toman las decisiones y quiénes las toman. Esta
iniciativa cuya estructura decisional presenta dos ejes, el diplomático- político, expresado en el Comité de Dirección Ejecutiva (CDE), y
el técnico expresado en dos niveles, el Comité de Coordinación Técnica (CCT) y los Grupos Técnicos Ejecutivos (GTE). La más importante conclusión, desde el punto de vista politológico, fue comprender
claramente que, en el diseño de la toma de decisiones, aparecía una
zona gris por la que veíamos que, “los representantes de los respectivos
países se reúnen para plantear las grandes líneas estratégicas de IIRSA,
pero delegan en grupos multisectoriales el planeamiento y ejecución
de esos proyectos, de los cuales su aprobación dependerá de la evaluación que esos grupos realicen y la forma en que se los comuniquen a los
países en cuestión para su aprobación” (De Paula, 2006) Así, vemos que
hay un claro dilema decisional en el diseño que se ha previsto.
Esto era observable en momentos en que centralmente la producción intelectual de la región estaba orientada a debatir las, sin duda importantes, macro-cuestiones del MERCOSUR y el ALCA. Así veremos
aparecer recién en el 10 Aniversario una obra que analizaba integralmente la experiencia sostenida financieramente en el tiempo por el
GEF y el BID. Así, podemos observar que lo que lentamente se consolidaba sin demasiada exposición pública eran una serie de compromisos y de trabajos de coordinación y complementación que actualmente
han pasado a ser responsabilidad de la UNASUR41. En este caso, desde
2009, constituye la Comisión de Planificación del Sistema o COSIPLAN.
Asumidos los ejes de trabajo de IIRSA en COSIPLAN vemos que suponen vertebrar la región entre una serie de líneas Este-Oeste combinadas con diagonales o rectas que expresan la orientación de los cursos
de los ríos, particularmente los de la Cuenca del Plata y los tributarios
del Amazonas. Estos Ejes son los siguientes: a) Mercosur-Chile; b) Eje
Andino; c)Eje Interoceánico Central; d) Eje del Amazonas; e) Eje de Capricornio; f ) Eje del Sur; g) Eje Perú-Brasil-Bolivia; h) Eje del Escudo
Guyanés. En todos estos casos, la comunicación, el transporte y la energía son los servicios de logística que se tiene planificado desarrollar
desde los denominados “Procesos sectoriales”, estos son: Transporte
Aéreo; Transporte Marítimo; Sistemas Operativos de Transporte Multimodal; Facilitación de Pasos de Frontera; Financiamiento de proyectos
40 Ver: http://www.iirsa.org/Institucional.asp?CodIdioma=ESP.
41 Ver: BID-INTAL (2011).
104
de integración física regional; Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicaciones y Mercados Energéticos Regionales.42
Si ponemos las afirmaciones respecto de MERCOSUR-UNASURIIRSA en relación a esto, vemos que las vulnerabilidades que se pueden
advertir en lo socioambiental no tienen en las estructuras pactadas y
organizadas una solución compatible con lo que necesitan. Porqué decimos esto? Porque, como ya se ha señalado, el dilema decisional que
supone no tener un orden prefijado entre la representación política y
la representación de intereses posibilita más las oportunidades desde
el mercado en una realidad como la latinoamericana con las peculiaridades de su perfil de distribución del ingreso que tiene una necesaria
retroalimentación compleja cuando no conflictiva.
Por todo esto es que coincidimos con quienes plantean que “los
patrones dominantes del desarrollo actual deben cambiar y si no iniciamos un gran movimiento de reflexión que vaya mucho más allá de
la simple tecnocracia y economicismo dominante por un lado y de los
ideologismos por el otro, la historia podría volverse en contra nuestra.”
(Parker y Estenssoro, 2010: 17).
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
BID-INTAL (2011), “IIRSA 10 Años después: sus logros y desafíos”, Buenos Aires.
De Paula, Gabriel. (2006). IIRSA: desarrollo de infraestructura regional
y recursos naturales. Reunión Arrial- Idicso-USAL. http://www.salvador.edu.ar/csoc/idicso/rrii_america_latina/publicaciones.htm.
Dahrendorf, Ralf (2005). En busca de un nuevo Orden. B.As. Paidós.
Diccionario de la Lengua española (2001). RAE. Bs.As.
Fernández Nadal, Estela (2008). “Filosofía Latinoamericana” en Biagini,
Hugo y Roig, Arturo.
Diccionario del Pensamiento Alternativo. Bs.As. Ed.Biblos
Harribey, Jean-Marien (2008). Primer Diccionario Altermundista.
ATTAC. Bs.As Ed. Capital Intelectual-Le Monde.
42 Ver: www.iirsa.org.
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Lagos, Ricardo (2008). América Latina ¿Integración o fragmentación?”;
Bs.As. Ed. Edhasa.
Ohmae, Kenichi (1997), El Fin del Estado-Nación. Santiago de Chile.
Ed. Andrés Bello.
Parker Gumucio, Cristian y Estenssoro, Fernando (2010). El desafío del
conocimiento para
América Latina. Santiago de Chile. Ed.Explora-Usach.
Seitz Ana E (2004), El MERCOSUR Político. Fundamentos Federales e
Internacionales, Bs.As. Ed.J.P.Viscardo
Seitz, AM (2012), Hacia una visión situada de la crisis global proyectada
en la integración regional. Red de Política Científica - ISBN 978-9509262-60-7.
Seitz, Ana Mirka (2010). Integración Latinoamericana - Caminos, dilemas y desafíos. , Bs.As. http://www.salvador.edu.ar/csoc/idicso/rrii_
america_latina/publicaciones.htm
El papel de los TLCS y las “asociaciones económicas estratégicas” en la configuración de
nuevos espacios económicos. Los TLCS en Asia
Pacífico. Una mirada desde América Latina
Carlos Juan Moneta
RESUMEN
A la par del notable crecimiento observado en las corrientes de comercio e IED entre América Latina y Asia Pacífico (AP) durante las últimas dos décadas, se ha desarrollado en esta última región un amplio
y complejo proceso de creación de Tratados de Libre Comercio (TLCs)
y “Asociaciones Estratégicas”. El número –aún, relativamente reducidode tratados y Acuerdos en vigencia afecta ya más del 50% de las exportaciones latinoamericanas a esa región.
Además de su notorio peso geopolítico, sus principales exponentes
abarcan un importante porcentaje de la población, el PIB y el comercio
asiático y mundial. En el marco de la Cuenca del Pacífico, se cuenta ya
con 18 TLCs en vigencia y firmados entre países de AP y América Latina, mientras otros seis se hallan en estudio. La mayor parte de ellos, se
concentran en un reducido número de países en la costa del Pacífico
latinoamericano.
Partiendo de un análisis de la evolución de los TLCs de carácter intra e interregional en AP -que también incluye una referencia a los de
carácter transatlántico-, el propósito del trabajo es explorar su potencial incidencia sobre la futura configuración de espacios político-económicos en los que participen Asia Pacífico/India y América Latina y
el Caribe.
ABSTRACT
Along with the remarkable growth witnessed in the trade and FDI flows
between Latin America and Asia Pacific (AP) during the last two decades, it has developed in the latter region a broad and complex process
of creating free trade agreements (FTAs) and “Strategic Partnerships”.
The number -still relatively small- of active treaties and agreements affects now more than 50% of Latin American exports to that region.
108
In addition to its notorious geopolitical weight, its main exponents
cover a significant percentage of the population, GDP and Asian and
global trade. In the frame of the Pacific Rim, it exist already 18 active
FTAs and signed between AP countries and Latin America, while six
others are currently in study. Most of them are concentrated in a small
number of countries in the Latin American Pacific coast.
From an approach of the evolution of character FTAs both intra
and inter AP region -including also a reference to the transatlantic
ones- the purpose of this paper is to explore the potential impact on
the forthcoming configuration of political-economic spaces concerning the participation of Asia Pacific / India and Latin America and the
Caribbean.
I. TLC’S EN ASIA PACÍFICO: DE LA REGIONALIZACIÓN
AL REGIONALISMO43
Diferenciándola del “regionalismo”, se entiende por “regionalización
económica” (Siou Yue, 2004) a los procesos de mayor interdependencia
generados a partir de corrientes crecientes de comercio intrarregional,
tecnología, inversiones y migraciones, que se generan, sin contar con
instituciones formales de vinculación económica, entre los países que
forman parte de ese proceso.
El modelo de regionalización que se llevó a cabo, fue iniciado por
el Japón y corresponde al denominado “vuelo de los gansos salvajes”,
elaborado por el economista japonés Akamatsu Kaname a fines de la
década de los años treinta. En esa concepción, la diferencia de potenciales –junto a otros factores sociales y económicos- permite la especialización del sistema productivo mediante la reubicación en el exterior
de plantas industriales e inversiones, generándose ventajas comparativas (Moneta, 1989).
Como parte del proceso de reconstrucción económica tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se presentan distintas fases que caracterizan el tipo
y movimiento de las corrientes de inversión extranjera directa (IED) de
las empresas niponas en Asia. Tras 1985, con los acuerdos alcanzados
con Estados Unidos para la revalorización del yen y un proceso de apertura económica que comienza a desarrollarse en los países de ASEAN,
se incrementa en forma sustantiva la transferencia de grandes unida43 El desarrollo de esta sección está basada en Moneta, Carlos “China y el nuevo proceso de
institucionalización de la integración en Asia del Pacífico: perspectivas para América Latina y el
Caribe” en, Moneta, Carlos y Cesarín, Sergio (Compiladores) China y América Latina. Nuevos
enfoques sobre cooperación y desarrollo, BID/INTAL, Buenos Aires, 2005, págs. 167-174.
El papel de los TLCS y las “asociaciones económicas estratégicas”
109
des industriales y de compañías japonesas de partes y componentes al
Asia Pacífico.
Este proceso incluyó en una primera etapa a los denominados
“dragones” –Taiwán, Corea del Sur, Hong Kong y Singapur- para
abarcar posteriormente a otros países del Sudeste Asiático, los denominados “tigres”, Indonesia, Malasia, Filipinas y Tailandia. En fases
sucesivas, va incorporando gradualmente a los restantes países del
Sudeste. En la actualidad, va extendiéndose hacia el Sur de Asia (Moneta, 2004).
Este proceso de profunda articulación de los sistemas productivos
en el marco intrarregional –se transfieren plantas, IED y tecnología- se
basa en una alianza público-privada. Los gobiernos determinan objetivos económicos a cumplir, junto a las orientaciones generales que
guían la acción del sector privado. No contándose con acuerdos formales e institucionalizados.
El surgimiento de la R.P. China como nuevo centro mundial de cadenas internacionales de producción en los últimos años del siglo XX,
modificará la posición del Japón y del Sudeste Asiático en ese contexto. Japón mantendrá -enfrentando una creciente competencia de China- un rol de liderazgo relativo en los productos de alto valor agregado,
mientras los países del Sudeste suministrarán a China bienes intermedios y commodities.
El nacimiento del siglo XXI, en virtud de factores y procesos que se
consideran en la sección siguiente, trae aparejada una profunda transformación: la regionalización de AP da paso al “regionalismo”. Su marco, será provisto por estratégicos acuerdos intergubernamentales que
incluyen, según los casos, desde la creación de asociaciones de carácter
político-cooperativo (ej.: la Comunidad de Asia del Este), hasta distintos esquemas de integración y articulación económica.
Cabe señalar que con la excepción del TLC establecido por la Asociación del Sudeste Asiático (ASEAN) en 1992 -el ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (AFTA)-, las propuestas y negociaciones de TLCs y “Asociaciones Económicas Estratégicas” en Asia Pacífico recién surgirán prácticamente a partir del año 2000, alcanzando un enorme impulso en la
década 2000-2010.
¿Qué factores condujeron a esta rápida implosión de TLCs en la región? La crisis financiera asiática de 1997-1998, junto a elementos que
emanan del cuadro político-estratégico y económico regional e internacional, explican este importante cambio en la política económica externa de los países de Asia Pacífico.
110
II. FACTORES QUE CONDUCEN AL REGIONALISMO
EN ASIA PACÍFICO
Sin pretender realizar un análisis exhaustivo, los siguientes factores
adquieren relieve en la génesis y evolución de los procesos de integración en AP (Pangetsu y Gooptu, 2004):
• El impacto negativo de la crisis financiera asiática de 1997-1998
La crisis demostró claramente la necesidad de reducir los problemas de contagio financiero y de estabilidad de las tasas de cambio e
impulsó a los países asiáticos de APEC a explorar opciones de cooperación monetaria y de coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas. Puso
en relieve el alto grado de interdependencia económica alcanzado en
la región y dio lugar a la generación de propuestas para la cooperación
regional en el comercio, la cooperación financiera y monetaria y las
inversiones
• Amplia frustración generada por la actitud asumida por Estados Unidos (y, en menor grado, por la UE) durante la crisis y las presiones ejercidas por la superpotencia a favor de la imposición de los
criterios del “Consenso de Washington”
La posición que asumió Estados Unidos y varios países europeos en
la crisis financiera –observables por vía de las rígidas políticas neoliberales de economía de mercado que estas potencias impulsaron al AP en
el FMI y el Banco Mundial para salir de la crisis y en su renuencia u oposición a distintas acciones planteadas por Japón y otros países asiáticos
en el campo financiero y monetario- no tuvo en cuenta las situaciones
particulares ni las características distintas que presentaba esta crisis
respecto de las anteriores.
Esa conducta condujo a los países de AP al convencimiento de la necesidad de adoptar políticas económicas y financieras que incrementaran y fortalecieran su capacidad relativa de maniobra frente a Estados
Unidos y los Organismos financieros internacionales. Producto de éstas
últimas fue, por ejemplo, la iniciativa conjunta de China, Corea y Japón,
en el período inmediato posterior a la crisis, de organizar una red de
acuerdos swap para el manejo de las divisas, al no poder concretar la
idea de establecer un mecanismo monetario asiático.
De igual manera, en círculos políticos y económicos norteamericanos se consideró, a fines de los años ochenta, la posibilidad de efectuar
111
una propuesta de TLC al Japón y otra, a Corea del Sur. Esta situación
dejó latente en gran número de líderes asiáticos una creciente preocupación.
Se trataba de un enfoque que ubicaba a Estados Unidos como núcleo
potencial de un futuro sistema de acuerdos comerciales que involucrarían al AP. En este esquema, a los países asiáticos les correspondería el
papel de rayos (spokes) de una rueda (hub), en el cual la superpotencia
ocuparía un ventajoso centro. Una situación de esa naturaleza ampliaría las asimetrías existentes, favoreciendo a los Estados Unidos.
• Pérdida de impulso de la Conferencia de Cooperación Económica de Asia Pacífico (APEC)44
En 1994 (reunión de APEC en Bogo, Indonesia), los líderes de las
economías asiáticas finalmente aceptaron, no sin resistencia, el objetivo principal buscado por Estados Unidos, contando con el apoyo de
Australia, Nueva Zelanda, Canadá, Singapur y otros países miembros:
liberalizar el comercio en el 2010 para las economías desarrolladas y
en el año 2020, para los países en desarrollo de la Cuenca del Pacífico.
Si bien en 1995 (Reunión de Osaka) se establece una “Agenda de Acción” para alcanzar ese objetivo por la vía de reducciones arancelarias
voluntarias y coordinadas entre los distintos miembros, en los años siguientes ese proceso no alcanzó el ímpetu esperado. Japón y los países
en desarrollo del grupo asiático se mostraron renuentes a liberalizar
sectores políticamente sensibles en el marco interno.
De igual manera, la incorporación por parte de los EEUU en las
agendas de la APEC de temas políticamente muy delicados (por ejemplo, la promoción en Asia de la “democracia representativa” de corte
neoliberal y tras el atentado del “9/11”, una política antiterrorista que
antagonizaba al Islam), contribuyó a erosionar la voluntad de cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos, si bien se mantuvieron -al menos, formalmente- los objetivos y cronogramas fijados.
Esta situación contribuyó -junto a la necesidad de la R.P. China de
contar con un contexto asiático estable, que favoreciera su crecimiento económico- a que en los años siguientes surgieran múltiples TLCs
intrarregionales, en los cuales participaron, entre otros, Japón, China
44 Las economías APEC cubren en su conjunto, más del 50% del PIB mundial y casi la mitad
del comercio mundial de mercancías, así como el 40% de los servicios. El comercio intra-APEC
representa más del 72% de las exportaciones e importaciones del grupo, siendo EEUU, la RP
China, India y Japón los principales destinos. Ademas, constituye un muy importante receptor
y emisor de IED en el mundo.
112
y Corea del Sur, sin la inclusión de los EEUU45.
• Preocupación en AP por la expansión de los procesos de integración económicos en Europa, América del Norte y América Latina
Causas principales que generaron esta inquietud fueron:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
La expansión de procesos de integración económica por la vía
de TLCs en la mayor parte del mundo –situación en la cual Asia
Pacífico no participaba- que surgían como obstáculos para su
acceso a esos mercados;
el crecimiento económico que se observaba en los países involucrados en los TLCs;
la parálisis que comienza a observarse en la OMC en términos
de obtener avances hacia un sistema multilateral de comercio
más equitativo, que incorporara los intereses de los países en
desarrollo;
el notorio cambio de la política comercial estadounidense, que
modifica su énfasis en la apertura del comercio mundial por la
vía multilateral, adoptando un enfoque a favor de acuerdos alcanzados con regiones o de carácter binacional;
la notoria ausencia de un Foro de Cooperación Regional en el
campo económico que estuviera liderado e integrado solamente por países de Asia Pacífico.
Todos estos elementos contribuyeron a modificar profundamente
las percepciones y la orientación de la voluntad política en Asia del
Pacífico con respecto a las vías más convenientes para asegurar objetivos compartidos en términos de fortalecimiento de su capacidad de
acción económica externa y paulatina construcción de una identidad
regional.
En ese marco, el propósito de aumentar su competitividad externa,
mediante la reducción de los costos de transacción entre economías ya
profundamente vinculadas de facto; un amplio reconocimiento de la
conveniencia de armonizar estándares y regulaciones relativas al comercio, junto a la creciente concentración de éste entre los países asiáticos, contribuyeron a modificar su evaluación respecto de los costos y
beneficios de incorporarse a Acuerdos Económicos Preferenciales. Así,
45 Numerosos miembros de APEC han desarrollado –por fuera de esta Organización- un alto
número de TLCs. Se estima que cuando los acuerdos en gestión y negociación sean concretados, alrededor del 70% del comercio intra-APEC estará cubierto por algún tipo de preferencia
comercial
113
a modo de ejemplo, un informe oficial sobre comercio exterior del MITI
(Ministerio de Comercio Exterior e Industria) señalaba en 1999 que “Japón debería adoptar una posición más activa en las iniciativas de integración y cooperación regional y proponen un modelo que ayude a
fortalecer el sistema multilateral”.
• La creciente importancia económica que asume China en el
seno de AP
Otro factor de gran importancia que influyó en el cambio de posición
en AP respecto de los TLCs, estuvo estrechamente vinculado al progresivo resurgimiento de China como potencia económico-financiera y
geopolítica de primer nivel. En particular, por la dimensión estratégica
que asume en la región como principal mercado para las exportaciones
de los países de AP; su carácter de espacio donde se genera una reestructuración productiva de alcance mundial y su rol como competidor
en las exportaciones a terceros países.
Desde el punto de vista de algunos especialistas japoneses y de
ASEAN (Ichimura, 1993), Japón desempeñó un rol crucial durante gran
parte de este proceso, por la vía del comercio, las inversiones y la transferencia de tecnología, en la obtención de una mayor interdependencia
económica con respecto a ASEAN y Asia del Este.
Esto se logró en AP gracias a procesos en los países de la región que
condujeron -si bien, con asimetrías- al incremento y aceleración de las
tasas de crecimiento y mejoras en la distribución del ingreso, evitando disrupciones políticas significativas. Se contó con un crecimiento
persistente del capital y del ahorro, que tuvo una utilización adecuada,
junto a la capacidad de aumentar el grado de innovación tecnológica
aplicada por vía de la adquisición y desarrollo tecnológico endógeno.
Estos procesos difieren sustantivamente de los que presentó América
Latina durante las últimas cinco décadas (1960-2010).
En forma coherente con las políticas adoptadas, favorables a la profundización y consolidación de los procesos de articulación económica e integración en Asia Pacífico y en respuesta a la iniciativa China de
establecer un TLC con ASEAN a principios del siglo XXI, Japón y luego
Corea del Sur y otros países de la región, ponen en marcha su propio
programa de TLCs con los países miembros de esa Organización. Posteriormente, se extienden sus áreas de interés, incluyendo gradualmente además de los asiáticos, a países y esquemas de integración de otras
regiones del mundo.
114
III. HACIA EL CUBRIMIENTO DEL ESPACIO GLOBAL: LA EVOLUCIÓN DE LOS ACUERDOS COMERCIALES PREFERENCIALES
(ACP/TLCS)
Entre otros factores de gran importancia vinculados a los procesos de
globalización (ej: reestructuración de los procesos productivos; papel
desempeñado por las ETNs; globalización financiera; avances científico-tecnológicos), los procesos que serán comentados en las secciones
siguientes presentan vínculos profundos con dos de los temas presentados previamente: la parálisis registrada en la OMC (reunión de Doha)
y el notable cambio que presenta la estrategia comercial de EEUU. En
el ámbito global, los Tratados de Libre Comercio -que solo eran 16 en
1990- crecieron un 200%, alcanzando a 221 en junio del 2012.
En una primera fase, predominaron los acuerdos intrarregionales,
pero a partir de inicios del año 2000, se produjo un notable incremento
de los TLCs de carácter interregional. Así, entre los años 2000 y 2004,
surgieron 9 acuerdos intrarregionales en Asia, junto a 18 TLCs interregionales. Ese proceso adquirió un mayor vigor en la segunda mitad de
esa década, ya que entre los años 2005 y 2009 se acordaron 20 TLCs en
Asia y 34 interregionales.46
En ese marco, han sido Asia y Oceanía las regiones que a partir del
2010 concentraron el mayor número de TLCs (Cuadro 1) ya que 60%
del incremento de los TLCs en esas regiones entró en vigencia después
del año 2005. En ese contexto ocupa un lugar preferente el haberse
completado en el 2010 el Acuerdo “ASEAN+1”, que vincula a la ASEAN
mediante distintos Acuerdos, con Japón, Corea del Sur, RP China, Australia, Nueva Zelanda e India.
Cuadro 1
Número de TLCs establecidos en los últimos años por país/región
(01/06/2011)
País/
Región
Europa
2010 al
presente
5
Total
28
Rusia/
CIS
Medio
Oriente/
África
Asia/
Oceanía
América
del Norte/
Centro y
Sur
4
28
9
40
26
Fuente: http://rtais.wto.ong
46 Fuente: http://rtais.wto.ong
Trans
regionales
Total
3
12
68
199
115
Cuadro 2
TLCs bilaterales y multilaterales en AP
(por país y estadio de negociación, junio 2012)
ASEAN
Japón
EF
ASEAN
EF
Japón
EF
Corea
del Sur
India
EF
EF
EF
EV
BN
EV
China
Australia
Nueva
Zelanda
EF
BN
EV
EF
BN
EF
EF
BN
BN
EV
BN
China
EF
EV
Corea del
Sur
EF
BN
EV
India
EF
EF
EV
EF
BN
BN
BN
EV
EV
EF
BN
EV
Australia
Nueva
Zelanda
EF
EF
EF
EF
Fuente: CEPAL, sobre la base de informaciones oficiales.
Aclaraciones:
1) No se han especificado aquí, entre otros, distintos Acuerdos establecidos individualmente por miembros de ASEAN con los países que figuran
en el Cuadro (ej: Tailandia-India; India-Singapur; Japón-Indonesia; etc.).
Tampoco los correspondientes a la R.P. China con Hong Kong y Macau.
2) EF: Acuerdo vigente o firmado; BN: en negociación; EV: en estudio
de viabilidad.
El Cuadro 2 presenta la situación a mediados del 2011 de los TLCs
bilaterales y multilaterales establecidos en AP/ India. A su vez, el Cuadro 3 incorpora los “Mega Acuerdos” de carácter regional y trasnpacífico más importantes que se están negociando actualmente: el “Acuerdo
de Asociación Económica Regional Integral” (RCEP) y el “Acuerdo de
Asociación TransPacífica” (TPP).
IV. EL “ACUERDO DE ASOCIACIÓN ECONÓMICA REGIONAL INTEGRAL” (RCEP)
La decisión de avanzar hacia la firma del RCEP, surge en la XXI Reunión
de los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de ASEAN –junto con sus contra-
116
partes de China, India, Corea del Sur, Nueva Zelanda y Japón, celebrada
en Phnom Penh, Cambodia, el 20 de noviembre de 2012. Su propósito
es alcanzar una Zona de Libre Comercio entre las Partes. Comprenderá
el comercio de bienes y servicios y las inversiones; la cooperación económica técnica; propiedad intelectual y competitividad.
Cuadro 3
Liberalización competitiva en Asia Pacífico.
“ASEAN + 6”
Propuesto por
Japón (Ago.
2006).
Actualmente Regional
Economic
Comprehensive Partnership
-(Asociación
Económica
Regional
Integral)
Transpacific
Strategic and
Economic Partnership (TPP)
– (Acuerdo de
Asociación
Transpacífica)
(Mar. 2010)
Tratado de
libre comercio
trilateral
ASEAN, Japón,
China, Corea
ASEAN, Japón,
China, Corea,
Australia,
India, Nueva
Zelanda.
Nueva Zelanda,
Singapur,
Brunei, Chile
(P4) + EE UU,
Australia,
Perú, Vietnam,
Japón*, México*
y Canadá*
China, Corea
Japón (dic.
2012)
Población
(en millones)
2.059,4
3.207,9
657,8
1.500
Comercio
(en millones
de USD)
2.533.847
2.893.252
20.000
690.000
PIB (en millones de USD)
9.899.420
13.835.060
20.727
12.000.000
-
-
Liberalización
competitiva en
Asia Pacífico.
TLC
Países
Comercio
intra-regional
“ASEAN + 3”
Propuesto por
China (Nov.
2004)
43,1%
43,6%
Fuentes: Elaborado por el autor de este trabajo a partir de documentos
del MOFA, Japón, ASEAN Secretariat; Prensa Asiática; Williams, Brock
R. CRS Report for congress. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries:
Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis. Enero 2013
* Los tres países se incorporaron recientemente a las negociaciones.
117
La idea de avanzar en este nuevo esquema de asociación económica regional –concebido originalmente como “ASEAN + 6” fue discutida
previamente en una reunión celebrada en noviembre de 2011, con el
propósito de ampliar y profundizar los TLCs y acuerdos económicos
previamente existentes entre ASEAN y esos países.
El Acuerdo, -que debe ser consistente con las reglas de la OMC y
el GATT- establece los principios de transparencia; integración económica, tratamiento preferencial y diferenciado para los países de menor
desarrollo relativo de ASEAN (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam y Myanmar);
medidas para facilitar el comercio y las inversiones y contendrá una
clausula que permita la participación d cualquiera de los miembros del
TLC de ASEAN que deseen incorporarse posteriormente al Acuerdo, así
como el acceso de otros “socios económicos” de ASEAN.
V. ACUERDO DE ASOCIACIÓN TRANSPACÍFICA (TPP)
El TPP surge a partir de la propuesta estadounidense de formar parte
del TLC firmado en el 2006 por Chile, Brunei, Nueva Zelanda y Singapur
(conocido como “P4”).
Como ya se ha señalado, esta potencia procuraba desde tiempo
atrás, contar con un acuerdo económico – comercial que le permitiera
insertarse en los esquemas de integración asiáticos, dado que sus intentos de promover un “TLC APEC”, de carácter transpacífico, habían
fracasado hasta ese momento, mientras se establecían numerosos TLCs
intra asiáticos que no contaban con su participación.
Al comunicar Estados Unidos su intención de sumarse al “P 4” para
que este constituyera la base de un futuro acuerdo que incorporara a
los restantes miembros de la APEC, Canadá y varios países de Asia Pacífico y de Suramérica se sumaron al proyecto: Australia, Malasia, Singapur, Vietnam, Perú y México.
Los negociadores por parte de Estados Unidos, país que lidera ampliamente este proceso, señalaron su deseo de alcanzar un TLC “integral y de altos standards”, que avanzara fuertemente en la liberalización
del comercio de bienes y servicios más allá de las reglas de la OMC.
Cabe señalar que en una reunión ministerial de la APEC (Honolulu,
11/11/2012) se concibió al TPP como un Acuerdo que podría eliminar
las barreras tarifarias y no tarifarias entre las Partes y servir como base
para nuevos emprendimientos de este carácter con otros miembros de
APEC y actores externos.
En la concepción del gobierno estadounidense y según lo señala-
118
do por sus funcionarios, el Acuerdo satisface varios objetivos comerciales estratégicos:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Se convierte en la iniciativa líder en ese campo de la Administración Obama;
Constituye una clara manifestación de la transferencia del centro de gravedad de los intereses norteamericanos al Asia del Pacífico;
Provee una nueva base para los conjuntos de negociaciones
comerciales que seguirán a la concreción de los TLCs firmados
con Colombia, Panamá y Corea del Sur;
Sirve como vía alternativa para superar la prolongada parálisis
de la Reunión Doha de la OMC y,
Si se firma, resultará de utilidad para configurar la arquitectura
económica de Asia Pacífico, mediante la armonización de los
acuerdos ya existentes con socios de los Estados Unidos.
El actual proceso de negociaciones cubre: Acceso al Mercado (agrícola, industrial y textil), Reglas de Origen; Procedimientos de Aduana;
SPS; TBT; Compras Gubernamentales; Propiedad Intelectual; Políticas
de Competencia; Comercio Transfronterizo de Servicios; Servicios Financieros; Telecomunicaciones; Comercio Electrónico; Inversiones;
Medio Ambiente; Trabajo; Aspectos Institucionales; Solución de Disputas y temas “horizontales” (coherencia en las regulaciones; competitividad; facilidades de negocios; PYMES y desarrollo).
En la última Ronda de Negociaciones (XVI), celebrada en Singapur
entre el 4 y 13 de abril del presente año, los temas examinados los temas
relativos a: acceso a mercados de bienes; aduanas; propiedad intelectual; compras de gobierno; medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias; inversiones; servicios; desarrollo y coherencia regulatoria.
Además, Singapur organizó una sesión de trabajo en cada sector,
invitando a los actores privados de las partes interesadas; participaron 300 representantes de los países miembros. Hubo encuentros con
negociadores del TPP y se presentaron las posiciones y sensibilidades
existentes sobre distintos temas.
El TPP, además de los disciplinas que normalmente se incluyen en
este tipo de Acuerdos, agrega otros, muy específicos, vinculados a las
TICs y a las interacciones -generalmente conflictivas- correspondientes
a la competencia entre el Estado y las empresas privadas, en este caso,
promoviendo reglas totalmente favorables a estas últimas. Tal es el
caso, por ejemplo, de la estandarización de los sistemas de regulación
119
entre los países que participan del proyecto, que parece estar realizándose (las negociaciones son reservadas) de manera tal que resulte muy
compatible con los intereses de las ETNs estadounidenses.
También se procura obtener altos estándares en temas de propiedad intelectual, y ámbitos laboral y medioambiental. Así, el propósito
perseguido por los negociadores estadounidenses es alinear el régimen
de propiedad intelectual en el comercio que sostendrá el TPP, con el
régimen de regulaciones de los EEUU. De igual manera, este país ha
puesto sumo énfasis -en forma acorde con los intereses de las corporaciones estadounidenses- en disciplinar a las empresas estatales de los
restantes países que negocian el Acuerdo en lo referente a las cadenas
de suministro y la competitividad, transparencia y coherencia de los
sistemas de regulación.
En la interpretación de un famoso especialista indio: “TLCs y pactos
regionales como el TPP son parte de un proceso de autoengaño… cuando se trata de la política comercial estadounidense, ésta es liderada por
los lobbies… ellos obtienen que sus intereses sean parte del acuerdo
comercial” (Werewolf NZ, 2012).
Por lo expuesto, se trata de un cohesivo intento de homologar los
sistemas normativos de regulación comercial, introduciendo para ello
reformas en los códigos comerciales y procedimientos litigiosos nacionales que disminuyen su capacidad de control a favor de agentes económicos externos.
VI. ¿TPP Y DESPUÉS?... NOTAS PARA UNA FUTURA EVALUACIÓN.47
Dado que el TPP constituye un proyecto en negociación y que aún no se
dispone de información fidedigna sobre los distintos ámbitos que cubre, solo es dable en este momento –teniendo en cuenta la orientación
política y económica que emerge con cierta claridad de lo hasta ahora
actuado- presentar algunas consideraciones preliminares sobre su potencial impacto geopolítico y geoeconómico.
- DESACUERDOS Y RETICENCIAS CON LOS TÉRMINOS DEL TPP
En este marco, cabe señalar que no todos los potenciales socios están
de acuerdo con los contenidos actuales del proyecto de TLC. Por ejemplo, Japón y México (junto con Canadá) decidieron incorporarse a las
47 Basado parcialmente en Carlos J. Moneta “Las relaciones económicas del Japón con América
Latina y el Caribe. Nuevos senderos de crecimiento y países emergentes”, Docto. de Trabajo,
Secretaría Permanente, Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA), Caracas, Abril, 2013.
120
negociaciones del TPP en noviembre del 2011. En la práctica, Japón recién ahora se incorpora formalmente, dados fuertes disensos internos
sobre esta medida, que cuenta con fuerte oposición del sector rural y de
su lobby en las filas del partido del gobierno.
Si bien Japón está interesado en que se concrete el TPP, al que visualiza como un instrumento que permitirá avanzar en la estrategia deseada por el país para la configuración de un Área del Pacífico integrada,
genera una gran inquietud sobre la posibilidad de mantener sus altos
niveles de protección arancelaria en el sector agrícola. Con ese propósito, trata de negociar con EEUU reglas de juegos preferenciales.
Por su parte, durante la reciente visita a México del Presidente de
China, Xi Jinping (principios de junio del 2013), se decidió elevar las
relaciones bilaterales al nivel de “Asociación Estratégica Integral”, categoría que en la simbología china significa establecer una alianza multidimensional “profunda”. En esa oportunidad, además de firmarse una
docena de acuerdos sobre distintos temas relevantes, se enfatizó políticamente la trascendencia que adquiría esta Asociación, delineándose
importantes planes para el futuro (Ibarra,S/F).
En términos geoeconómicos, distintos analistas mexicanos y extranjeros percibieron a este Acuerdo sino-mexicano como una vía para
construir cierta autonomía frente a EEUU. Si este fuera el criterio del
gobierno de Peña Nieto, es dable esperar tensiones a futuro.
El rigor de los estándares que EEUU procura imponer en el Acuerdo
generan peligrosos desafíos no solo para países de mediano desarrollo,
como Chile, Perú o Malasia, sino también para países más desarrollados, como es el caso de Australia. A modo de ejemplo, las negociaciones en marcha sobre este TLC han generado importantes discusiones
en ámbitos especializados, donde se ha llegado a plantear cuál es el
resultado de la ecuación costos-beneficios que puede generar este
Acuerdo48.
- ¿TPP VERSUS RCEP?
En otro orden, cabe resaltar el potencial carácter de “caballo de Troya”
que este TLC puede representar para los procesos de articulación política cooperativa e integración económica en marcha en Asia Pacífico. Como ya fue mencionado y así lo señalan claramente funcionarios
estadounidenses, “si se firma, resultará de utilidad para configurar la
arquitectura económica de Asia Pacífico, mediante la armonización de
los acuerdos ya existentes con socios de los Estados Unidos”.
48Ejemplo: conversaciones del autor de este trabajo con especialistas de Chile e informaciones
recibidas de distintas organizaciones australianas.
121
La traducción de este párrafo, en clave geopolítica, señala que mediante este Acuerdo los EEUU lograrían introducir una importantísima
cuña en el esquema “Asia para los asiáticos” que sostiene el RCEP. No
solo confronta con esa visión; de tener éxito, lograría incorporar a varios de sus miembros (ej: Nueva Zelanda, Australia, Singapur, Vietnam y
Japón). En particular, contar con la participación de este último adquiere gran relieve, tanto para los EEUU como para China.
- ¿CHINA COMO MIEMBRO DEL TPP?
En este contexto, un punto central se refiere a las posibilidades de que
la R.P. China se incorpore al TPP.
Este tema fue incluido en las conversaciones Xi Jinping-Obama y
explícitamente el Subsecretario de Comercio de EEUU señaló que este
país invitaba a China a que se sumara al Acuerdo de Asociación TransPacífica.
En el entender del autor de este trabajo y en la medida en que el TPP
no modifique profundamente algunos de los criterios que lo rigen, las
probabilidades de que la R.P. China se sume son muy bajas.
En una respuesta indirecta, Hong Lei, vocero del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores chino, presentó varias consideraciones que resulta
importante destacar: i)“se esperaba más transparencia en las discusiones”; ii)“China desea que las partes involucradas establezcan los estándares de ese Acuerdo de comercio, considerando la situación real del
comercio internacional, así como las realidades nacionales de diferentes países”; iii)“que estándares excesivamente rigurosos excluirán a las
economías en desarrollo de estos acuerdos comerciales, afectando su
validez y dañando los intereses de las partes” (CERA, 2013).
Además el vocero del Ministerio de Comercio, Shen Danyang, aseguró que “China analizará las posibilidades de integrarse al TPP con
base en la igualdad y el beneficio mutuo” (CERA, 2013).
- TPP, RCEP, ALIANZA TRANSATLÁNTICA: ¿HACIA LA RECONFIGURACIÓN DE LOS ESPACIOS ECONÓMICOS GLOBALES?
A la dimensión, peso económico y profundos avances sobre las reglas
de la OMC que acompañan a los nuevos proyectos de TLCs asiáticos y
transpacíficos previamente comentados, debe sumarse la posibilidad
que se concrete en el futuro un acuerdo económico preferencial entre
la UE y los Estados Unidos, la “Alianza Transatlántica”. Conviene además, señalar que existen posibilidades de que se concrete un TLC entre
122
la UE y ASEAN y que Estados Unidos y Taiwán reinicien negociaciones
con el mismo propósito, tras seis años de interrupción de las mismas.
El TLC en consideración entre la UE y los Estados Unidos representa
el 47% del PIB mundial, con un stock bilateral de IED acumulado superior a los dos billones de euros y un 30% de los flujos comerciales globales. Podría generar un aumento adicional anual de ingresos de 86.000
millones de euros para la UE y de 65.000 millones de euros para EEUU
a fines de la próxima década.
Según declaraciones del representante de la UE en las negociaciones, “ayudaría a fortalecer los avances de la liberalización del comercio
global”… alcanzar ese acuerdo económico “será un mensaje al resto del
mundo sobre nuestro liderazgo en la configuración de la gobernabilidad económica global, en línea con nuestros valores” (Rebelión, 2013
y PressEurop, 2013). Es decir, el mantenimiento del “Western Liberal
Economic Order”49.
Se destaca el compromiso de las partes “para mantener y promover un nivel muy elevado de propiedad intelectual” y el propósito de
“alinear las respectivas normas internas, de manera tal que pudieran
establecerse como puntos de referencia para la elaboración de normas
mundiales” (Rebelión, 2013 y PressEurop, 2013).
Estos elementos, que constituyen piezas relevantes de un proceso
aún más amplio y complejo, muestran la similitud esencial del proyecto
de mantenimiento de su preeminencia en las nuevas configuraciones
de la economía mundial, por parte de los EEUU y la UE. Impulsan a
reflexionar -dada la rapidez, dimensión y profundidad de las transformaciones a las que estamos asistiendo en la economía mundial- sobre
la necesidad de incorporar estos hechos al análisis estratégico de la
inserción externa latinoamericana y caribeña, dado que cada vez, en
mayor grado, las inserciones económicas en el mundo, utilizan la vía de
los TLCs y privilegian la dimensión interregional.
Es necesario tener en cuenta que el TPP y el RCEP representan en
Asia posiciones en pugna en términos de actores participantes, visiones
sobre la inserción externa (“Asiática” vs. “Pacífica”) y contenidos de los
acuerdos, pudiendo incidir en manera sustantiva en la configuración
de nuestras relaciones con los principales polo de poder mundiales.
En este contexto, se observa que surgen -con respecto a los vínculos
actuales y futuros con AP y en particular, con referencia al TPP- situaciones diferenciadas entre países, subregiones y esquemas de integración en América Latina y el Caribe. (Ver Cuadro 4)
49 Sobre la intención de mantener el “Western Liberal Order” y la posición de Estados Unidos
al respecto, puede verse Le monde en 2030 vu par la CIA Document, Section, Catalyseur de
Changement 6, páginas 248-249, Editions des Equateurs, Paris, 2013.
123
Existen aquellos que ya cuentan con TLCs transpacíficos o procuran establecerlos a corto plazo (por ejemplo: la “Alianza del Pacífico”50)
y otros que no han adoptado decisiones en ese sentido (por ejemplo:
MERCOSUR). De igual manera, existen países de nuestra región que
cuentan con TLCs con los EEUU y con la UE (ejemplos: Chile, Perú,
México, países centroamericanos) circunstancia que los ubica en otra
situaciones, menos desfavorables, con respecto a la posible materialización del RCEP, el TPP o la “Alianza Transatlántica”.
Cuadro 4
América Latina y el Caribe (países y agrupaciones seleccionadas):
TLC´s con socios extrarregionales (febrero 2013)
País
EEUU
Canadá
UE
China
Japón
Corea
del
Sur
EE
C
Colombia
X
F
EE
Costa Rica
X
F
X
Chile
X
México
X
X
Panamá
X
F
Perú
X
X
República
Dominicana
X
India
Otras economías de Asia
del Pacífico
EE
Singapur
X
Australia;
(P4) TPP;
Malasia y
Vietnam
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
TPP (en
negociación)
Pcia. China
de Taiwán;
Singapur
F
X
X
X
Singapur;
Tailandia
X
50 Sus miembros originarios son Chile, Perú, México y Colombia, pero ya desean sumarse
como “países observadores” Canadá, Australia, España, Nueva Zelanda, Guatemala, Paraguay,
Portugal y Japón. También Uruguay ha expresado interés en vincularse con la Alianza, como lo
han hecho, Corea del Sur, Indonesia y República Dominicana y recientemente, la R.P. China.
La Alianza suma a cuatro economías de mercado que procuran alcanzar los niveles de apertura
y competitividad de sus contrapartes del Pacífico. Se constituyó, formalmente, el 27 de abril
del 2011.
Su propósito es crear un área de integración económica profunda, en el denominado “Arco
del Pacífico Latinoamericano” que constituya una plataforma de integración económica y comercial en el marco regional y de inserción externa, para avanzar en la integración con Asia
Pacífico.
124
CARICOM
X
Centroamérica
X
MERCOSUR
EN
X
Pcia. China
de Taiwán
F
EE
EN
EE
X
Fuentes: Elaborado a partir de CEPAL, Panorama de la inserción internacional de América Latina y Caribe, 2011 – 12, cuadro III.10
Acuerdos del nivel del TPP y del RCEP (junto a la “Alianza Transatlántica”), poseen la capacidad de reconfigurar las placas tectónicas de
la economía mundial, modificando profundamente las condiciones
de nuestro desarrollo y de la inserción de nuestra región en el sistema
global. Estos Acuerdos cuentan con la capacidad de imponer normas,
prácticas y resultados; son “hacedores de reglas” ante las cuales, resulta
necesario formular respuestas adecuadas.
Se han obtenido positivos avances –aún notoriamente insuficientesen el campo de la integración. Lamentablemente, éstos se presentan, en
muchos casos, con un discurso que sobredimensiona los logros obtenidos. Subyace otra lectura de la “realidad”: la región presenta una seria
fragmentación económica y política interna, no habiendo aún logrado
instalarse en la conciencia de nuestras sociedades y de sus dirigentes,
el urgente requerimiento de poner en práctica la dimensión “profunda”
de la cooperación ante los desafíos de esta etapa de la globalización.
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
Catalyseur de Changement 6 (2013) Le monde en 2030 vu par la CIA.
Document, Section, páginas 248-249, Editions des Equateurs, Paris,
2013.
CERA (2013). Xi, Obama and the TransPacific Partnership en Cont@cto
Hoy, N°62, Junio 2013, páginas 2 y 3; Stratfor. Junio de 2013. p 2-3.
Ibarra, E. Asociación Estratégica Integral. Disponible en www.forumenlinea.com.
Ichimura, S. (1993). “The role of Japan in Asia”. ICS Press for International Center for Economic Growth. San Francisco.
Jagdish, B. (2012). En entrevista realizada por Gordon Campell, Editor
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oportunidades para América latina. En Moneta, Carlos y Noto, Gerardo
(eds.) SELA.
Moneta, C. (1989). “El proceso contemporáneo de industrialización y
desarrollo de los países asiáticos de reciente industrialización”. Una visión desde América Latina. Documento de trabajo, Caracas: SELA.
Moneta, C. (2004). El Sudeste Asiático y América Latina. Nuevas prioridades al inicio del siglo XXI. En Piovani, J. y Baglioni, S. (eds.). El Sudeste
Asiático. Una visión contemporánea. Buenos Aires: EDUNTREF.
Moneta, C. (2005). China y el nuevo proceso de institucionalización de
la integración en Asia del Pacífico: perspectivas para América Latina y
el Caribe. En Moneta, C. y Cesarín, S. (Compiladores). China y América
Latina. Nuevos enfoques sobre cooperación y desarrollo. Buenos Aires.
BID/INTAL.
Moneta, C. y Cesarín, S. (Compiladores) (2005). China y el nuevo proceso de institucionalización de la integración en Asia del Pacífico. Buenos
Aires. Octubre 2005. 1ra. Edición.
Moneta, C. (2013). “Las relaciones económicas del Japón con América
Latina y el Caribe. Nuevos senderos de crecimiento y países emergentes”. Documento de Trabajo, Secretaría Permanente, Sistema Económico
Latinoamericano (SELA). Caracas. Abril 2013.
Pangetsu, M. y Gooptu, S. (2004). New Regionalism: Options for East
Asia. En Krumm, K. y Kharas, H. East Asia Integrates. BRID, Oxford University Press. Cap. 3.
PressEurop (2013). “Un buen trato para Cameron y Obama”. 18 de junio
de 2013.
Rebelión (2013). “Un Acuerdo Transatlántico y una vuelta más de tuerca”. 22 de junio de 2013.
Siou Yue, C. (2004). East Asian Regionalism. En East Asian Coopera-
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tion: Progress and Future Agenda. Chinese Academy of Social Siences
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1. July 1994.
Cuadro 1: Número de TLCs establecidos en los últimos años por país/
región (01/06/2011). Fuente: http://rtais.wto.ong
Cuadro 2: TLCs bilaterales y multilaterales en AP (por país y estadio de
negociación, junio 2012). Fuente: CEPAL, sobre la base de informaciones oficiales.
Cuadro 3: Liberalización competitiva en Asia Pacífico. Fuentes: Elaborado por el autor de este trabajo a partir de documentos del MOFA, Japón, ASEAN Secretariat; Prensa Asiática; Williams, Brock R. CRS Report
for congress. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative
Trade and Economic Analysis. Enero 2013.
Cuadro 4: América Latina y el Caribe (países y agrupaciones seleccionadas): TLC´s con socios extrarregionales (febrero 2013). Fuentes: Elaborado a partir de CEPAL, Panorama de la inserción internacional de
América Latina y Caribe, 2011 – 12, cuadro III.10
Segunda Parte
Asia y el Cáucaso
Asean: Calibrating sovereignty
and community51
Sartika Soesilowati
RESUMEN
Esta investigación analiza la relación existente entre las ideas de soberanía y de construcción de una comunidad de seguridad, en el marco
de la búsqueda de un orden regional entre los Estados miembros de la
Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ANSA). El estudio refleja
particularmente las preferencias de los estados miembros por la soberanía estatal, han sido mantenidas y ajustadas a fin de crear seguridad
colectiva.
Se identificarán, en primer lugar, las características del concepto de
soberanía relevantes al presente estudio. Se examinarán, asimismo, las
características de soberanía así como existen entre los miembros de la
ANSA. La segunda parte de esta investigación abordará las tensiones
existentes entre el ejercicio de soberanía nacional de los Estados miembros de la ANSA y la promoción de la construcción de una comunidad
de seguridad.
En la investigación se sostendrá que, las consideraciones sobre la
soberanía estatal son centrales en el desarrollo de una seguridad colectiva en ASEAN. En vistas de construir una seguridad colectiva con cierto
éxito en el Sudeste Asiático, los estados miembros de la ASEAN deben
estar “balanceados” de modo que se habilite el tratamiento regional de
temas que son sensibles, posibilitando la acción y toma de decisión colectiva.
ABSTRACT
This study discusses the pursuit of security community among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states and the
idea of state sovereignty. It particularly considers how the organization
members’ preference for state sovereignty has been maintained or adjusted in order to create security community.. It will firstly, examine
the ideas of sovereignty relevant to this study. This will then examine
the characteristics of sovereignty as it exists between ASEAN mem51 This article is based on the paper named “Sovereignty in ASEAN’s Regional Order-Building”.
130
bers. It will afterwards describe some practices which shaped the idea
of state sovereignty among the member-states by considering some of
significant events and policies which influenced the development and
character of ASEAN as a regional organization. It will also highlight the
meaning of compromises that they finally undertook to manage the
problem of balancing sovereign prerogatives and community building
initiatives
This study argues that consideration of state sovereignty is central for the development of the ASEAN security community. In order
to build a security community that can succeed in Southeast Asia, the
ASEAN member-states must be ‘balanced’ so as to allow challenging issues to become more amenable to collective regional decision making
and action.
I. INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to analyze the relationship between the ideas of
sovereignty and security community building in the pursuit of regional
order. In 2003, the member state of ASEAN announced their vision to
build ‘ASEAN Community’ in which the member states would be more
integrated in politics-securities, economics and social. The member
states project that their vision would be achieved on 2015 after initially they set in 2020. Numerous policies and actions have already conducted to support their vision. The ASEAN Charter ratified by all the
states in 2008, signifies that the Association has a vision of creating a
more legalized and formalized set of institutions that might, in the future, constitute three parts of an ‘ASEAN Community’: the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and
the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASC). With only less than two
years from now (2013), there has been a lot of concern about capacities of member states to realize ASEAN Community. In fact, ASEAN’s
experience of community building has shown that the member-states
still have insufficient will to act to reconcile the existing regional system
with a capacity for deeper security cooperation because the predisposition of ASEAN members for Westphalian style sovereignty restricts this
possibility.
Greater theoretical and empirical attention to the complexity of
sovereignty issues is, therefore imperative, enabling a more comprehensive analysis of ASEAN regionalism to be formulated and applied.
In creating a security community the concept of sovereignty raises im-
Asean: Calibrating sovereignty and community
131
portant questions. How, for example, will the ASEAN states manage
their ‘sovereign statehood’ within the process of security community
building? Can ASEAN mature into an institution that develops collective approaches to issues that reflect greater interdependence among
its members?
The study indicate that building a security community within
ASEAN can only occur if the member-states do not have to substantially
sacrifice their national sovereignty prerogatives, while simultaneously
strengthening their sense of community over time.
In regards, ASEAN’s key member states would be capable of striking a judicious balance between their respective sovereign prerogatives
and community building efforts, but not to the point where the primacy
of sovereignty is extinguished.
This will initially identify the characteristics of sovereignty relevant
to this study. It will then examine the characteristics of sovereignty as
it exists between ASEAN members. It will afterwards describe some
practices which shaped the idea of state sovereignty among the member-states by considering some of significant events and policies which
influenced the development and character of ASEAN as a regional organization.
II. THE IDEA OF SOVEREIGNTY: FROM TRADITIONAL TO POST
WESTPHALIAN
Among academics in international relations, the ideas of state sovereignty have created a long debate. This particularly questions whether
the idea of sovereignty is “indivisible” /immune” or “divisible/not immune” from intervention by external forces. I n this regard, it is useful to
categorise at least four different views of sovereignty: the Traditional/
Westphalian, the Realist/Neorealist, the Liberalist/Interdependence
and Postmodernist. The traditional view of state sovereignty is that it is
indivisible. The traditional concept of sovereignty or Westphalian sovereignty is commonly related to the view that the authority of the state
is supreme within its territorial boundaries and should also be legally
immune from intervention by external forces (Ruggie, 1986: 143; Thomson, 1995: 219-220). The preservation of territorial and political integrity is central to these elements of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty.
In such contexts, therefore, sovereignty underlines the exclusiveness of
state power over its territory and the principle of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of the state.
132
Other important understanding of traditional state sovereignty is associated to the perception of the nature of the state relationship within
a system of sovereign states. This traditional view of state sovereignty
adopted by the realist school of thought commonly accepts the world
as an anarchical system. In this view, which is predominantly derived
from Hobbes (Brown, 2005: p. 339) the nature of the international system will naturally lead to the conflict and war. The absence of any ultimate power and authority over states provides no protection to the
states and they are therefore structurally insecure. A preoccupation
with sovereignty is natural for states within such a system. The competitive nature of the system creates fear and generates conflict and states
must make preparations for their survival.
Followed this thought, within the competitive international order,
the Westphalian system provides states with a mechanism that can support the existence of the state. For fragile states, such as those within
ASEAN, the adoption of traditional state sovereignty will assist their effort to survive in an anarchic world. Even though they are without power
and material capacity to compete with larger states and have minimal
desire to ally with external powers, the constructs of westphalian sovereignty provide them with a means to contest physical attacks against
their territory and to resist other forms of unwanted interference.
Nevertheless, the notion of sovereign states led by internal actors
completely free from external influence is by and large an artificial construct for many realists and neo-realists They believe that the idea of
state sovereignty is pointless without the power to exercise it because
states cannot always do as they please nor are they are invariably free
of outside influences. “The sovereignty of states has never entailed their
insulation from the effect of other states’ actions” (Waltz, 1979: 96). Sovereignty is dependent upon the capability of a state to exercise it.
Similarly, the neoliberal/interdependence approach to sovereignty
is predicated upon the state-centric paradigm. State sovereignty is consistently being modified by intensifying interdependence at various
levels of state-to-state interaction. The autonomy of states has been
reduced by factors of interdependence, including monetary and economic factors (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 100-162) The benefits of interstate communications and transactions, particularly those relating to
increased trade and prosperity, clearly diminish the instinct of national elites to sustain autonomy or extreme self-reliance in their policymaking and deepens regional cooperation (Mattli, 2000: 150; Keohane,
1986: 20).
There are two significant approaches to describe how state sover-
133
eignty has been exercised in the integration or institutional process: the
‘functional’, and the ‘intergovernmental/supra national’ approaches.
In explaining a security community, functionalists describe it as being
constructed piece by piece, or from the ‘bottom up’, through transnational organizations that emphasize the sharing of sovereignty instead
of its surrender. Habits of cooperation learned in one technical area
will, they assume, ‘spill over’ into others – especially if the experience
is mutually beneficial and demonstrates the potential advantages of cooperation in other areas (Lindberg, 1963: 10).
The pioneer of Security Community idea, Karl Deutsch (1957: 66)
however, has argued that in order for a security community to be successful, both the elites and people from different states should be able
to communicate, respond and interact. The community building model
actually requires two processes in which the synergies of top down and
bottom up process have to be realized. Deutsch’s thoughts on integration deal with the creation of ‘security communities’ among peoples
who may or may not be unified under a single government.
Variant approaches to the security community model have advanced the notion of a supra authority and non-state actors which actually challenge state sovereignty. For the proponents of security community theory, therefore, to create regional integration a multi-level
integration process is needed to share various levels of state sovereignty. Regional security community building should be achieved by pooling part of state sovereignty, and creating an efficient coordinative body
which is outside the direct control of states. In this situation, if states
cannot moderate their sovereignty by sharing, pooling or surrendering
sovereignty, regional security community building, as the functionalists
see it, could not be realized.
Interesting view from Robert Keohane (1984: 246) who rejects ideas
of a strictly supra authority approach in the process of integration in After Hegemony. He criticizes the attributing of state-centric cooperation
strictly to ‘building headquarters’, ‘imposing mandates’, or ‘centralizing
institutions’: “Institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate
what governments pursue in their own interests through cooperation.”
This is because regimes provide information and reduce costs of transactions that are consistent with their injunctions. As Keohane (1984:
246) observes, “to evaluate the regimes on the basis of whether they effectively centralize authority is misleading.”
Perhaps a more nuance understanding about how states should
behave in accordance with the concerns of state sovereignty and collectivity is presented by Muthiah Alagappa (2003: 50-52) who proposes
134
adopting the notion of ‘solidarity order’ to explain alternative types of
cooperation among states where “national goals and interest are not
absent (…), but these are shaped by considerations of collective identity
and shared identity.” It is clear that Liberal scholars entertain varying
perspectives on how processes of interdependence and transnational
relations affect sovereign prerogatives. They still, however, highlight the
sovereignty of the state.
A dissenting category from which to define sovereignty is post modernism. In this approach, sovereignty rests upon intense cooperation
between autonomous states. States tacitly bargain their sovereignty
in the sense that they allow other states to influence the regulation of
their domestic affairs in return for similar influence over the domestic
affairs of these other countries. The post-Maastricht conceptual discourse has put forward alternative concepts such as ‘post-sovereignty’
or ‘governance beyond the state’, ‘late sovereignty’, ‘open statehood’
and ‘sovereignty belonging to the Member States jointly through the
intergovernmental conference.’ (Wallace, 1999, Walker, 2003, Aalberts,
2005). Postmodernists argue that state actors are no longer the dominant actors in international affairs and that state sovereignty is obsolete.
Growing interdependence through multiple channels of contact and
communication over many issues, growing decentralization through
globalization and localization and most importantly, empowerment
of global nongovernmental organization (NGOs) have all significantly
changed the way sovereignty interest are managed across border. Along
with this, the proliferation of transnational activities such as organized
crime, drug trafficking, international terrorism, and computer hacking
have posed new and difficult challenges to sovereign authorities.
As these various perspectives demonstrate, the idea of sovereignty is
very complex and there is hardly any consensus on what constitutes it:
‘The actual content of sovereignty, the scope of the authority that states
can exercise, has always been contested’ (Krasner, 1999: 235). The absolutist Westphalian system most familiar in the West does not apply
everywhere. Globalization, growing international interdependence and
various effects of security cooperation among states has sometimes encouraged nations to reduce their exclusive control over aspects of their
sovereignty. Shared interests and goals have also ensured that the exclusiveness of state interests does not always prevail. State sovereignty has
been increasingly challenged by both voluntary initiatives such as when
states become members of international or regional organizations and
by coercive efforts such as humanitarian interventions imposed by the
UN, the US or international community.
135
III. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND VARIANT OF SOVEREIGNTY
Diplomatic relations and policies conducted by ASEAN members provide examples that demonstrate state sovereignty is not immune from a
range of external influences. There have also been instances of ASEAN
states supporting each other to solve their internal problems. For example, Indonesia since the 1970s has facilitated negotiations with Muslim rebels, playing a major part in the 1996 Peace Agreement between
Manila. ASEAN was also involved in Cambodian affairs after Prime
Minister Hun Sen’s power grab in July 1997. The Asian Economic Crisis,
the international military intervention in East Timor and the Southeast
Asian haze problem, as well as membership in organization such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) all exemplify situations in which the
traditional sovereignty of ASEAN states have not been immune to external influences.
Indeed, the traditional realist view of sovereignty - in which the idea
of power is central - is becoming less applicable to Southeast Asia. Vietnam, for example, was forced to withdraw its forces from Cambodia
in 1978, permitting the restoration of Cambodian sovereignty. ASEAN
has been successful in creating the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – an
extra-sovereign institution that has successfully presumed upon most
regional powers (US is an exception) to accede to its Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (TAC), the symbolic brand of ASEAN member-states’
collective sovereignty. Within ASEAN itself, a new member such as
Myanmar, has been able to enforce the principle of non-interference
regarding domestic matters, notwithstanding immense international
diplomatic pressure on other ASEAN states to change this posture. This
situation indicates that within the ASEAN grouping ‘sovereignty matters’, but the degree to which it matters and how it is applied needs to be
further explored.
The idea of a post-westphalian order is problematic in the case of
ASEAN because ASEAN does not literally meet the criteria of the post
westphalian order.52 In this new order sovereignties, in the words of
Henry Summer Maine, (in Jutersonkel and Scwarz, 2007) as a ‘Bundle
or collection of power’ that can be separated from one another. Under
52 Post Westphalian is commonly equated with “emergence of distinctively European Community in which states shared their authority with regional or world authorities and with sub-state
authorities.” see Andrew Linklater (1998) The Transformation of Political Community, Ethical
Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era, Cambridge: Polity Press,p. 194. Further explanations
see James Caporaso (2002) Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and
Sovereignty, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, International Studies
Association, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 4-5 and Wallace (2002) The Sharing of Sovereignty, pp. 503-513.
136
these conditions a ‘state may continue to have international legal sovereignty, but the element of territorial control that defies westphalian
conceptions of sovereignty no longer applies’. However, even the most
successful example of the integration of state sovereignty in the world,
the European Union, does not fulfil all the characteristics of a fully postWestphalian order. Indeed, the EU provides an example that demonstrates the complexity of sovereignty as it operates in the real world.
In the current international environment, the global war on terror has
been described as a great challenge to state sovereignty (Mendelsohn,
2005: p. 45). However, Amitav Acharya (2007: p. 274) has argued that the
George W. Bush administration, in commanding a global war on terror exaggerated the challenges posed by terrorist organizations to westphalian sovereignty. Similarly, Robert Jackson (2007: p. 297) argues that
the West’s response to the terrorist attacks had been conducted within
the existing framework of sovereign security responsibilities. This argument relates to the empirical evidence examined in this article. In fact,
external pressure such as the US ‘global war on terror’ has not drastically changed the basic principle of state sovereignty as it operates in
Southeast Asia security politics. The form of cooperation is still based
on state interest rather than the genuine sharing of sovereign authority
among ASEAN member-states. Thus to argue that the concept of state
sovereignty has eroded misrepresents the true situation.
As these examples indicate, the issue of state sovereignty is very
complex and cannot be fully explained by the concepts and ideas proposed by those who posit various and specialized theories. Neither is it
obvious that this issue will simply wither away. The Westphalian system,
although challenged, has by no means yet been transcended in contemporary politics. In fact claims - even to old fashioned forms of state
sovereignty - are defended or asserted more diversely, more frequently,
more visibly and often with greater urgency than ever before (Walker,
2003). On one hand, the idea of sovereignty is subject to growing challenges as an out-mode or inadequate way of making sense of emergent
patterns of legal and political authority and imagining the future. At the
same time, in both legal parlance and political application, sovereignty
remains a key operating principle in constitutional, international and
supranational law. In this broad context, the concept of sovereignty itself is, therefore, open to a range of interpretations, including how sovereignty is constructed within a particular polity, by what methods and
on whose behalf it is constructed.
In light of these contending views of sovereignty it is important
to understand how the concept applies in the case of Southeast Asia.
137
These various explanations of sovereignty link to this study of ASEAN in
several important ways. First, if sovereignty is not ‘absolute’ but is more
divisible than indivisible then state sovereignty in ASEAN might also be
expected to exhibit these characteristics. It is argued here that the traditional meaning of Westphalian state sovereignty does apply in ASEAN,
but this is not the only characteristic of sovereignty to be found in
Southeast Asia. Sovereignty in ASEAN also operates within the similar
parameters as those described in the institutionalism or liberalist and
intergovernmentalist perspectives. For example, the rigid and strong
territorial claims on the South China between some ASEAN countries
and China have been modified by the claimants agreeing to explore and
share the resources in the area. ASEAN has developed economic integration in various sectors: custom, tourism, financial, transport, investment etc. The organization has also developed functional cooperation
across many fields: education, women, health, drug prevention, etc.
As such, Westphalian and intergovernmental types of sovereignty
are the most significant features of sovereignty as they consistently are
applied by the ASEAN member states. Post-Westphalian sovereignty
has not been clearly articulated by Southeast Asian nations, but, indeed, has been mostly rejected, as will be discussed below. Second,
ASEAN member-states’ traditional emphasis on sovereign prerogatives may have complicated the institution’s role in regional security
community-building, but it has not fatally compromised the process.
This is because the member-states have increasingly recognized the
value of developing means for maintaining control over sensitive sovereignty issues while simultaneously exploring ways to gradually transform their traditionally narrow national interests into more ecumenical
approaches increasingly broaden reflecting region-centric concerns.
Third, deepened regional cooperation among ASEAN countries can be
developed because their varying national outlooks and identities can
be ‘conditioned’ to constitute a more distinct collective identity.
IV. THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF SOVEREIGNTY ASEAN MEMBER STATES
Sovereignty has been represented as a key idea in the formation of
ASEAN’s normative framework. ASEAN members view the mutual respect of sovereign prerogatives as integral to maintaining and promoting the westphalian notions of state-centric relations which they revere
(Narine, 2004: 437, Moon and Chun, 2003: 106-140). The collective com-
138
mitment by Southeast Asia’s elites to the westphalian system means
‘non interference is still sacrosanct to the grouping’ (Ramcharan, 2000:
60) Compared to other norms, sovereignty still enjoys the highest position in ASEAN member-states’ hierarchy of values. Evidence of this
commitment can be examined through looking at how declarations or
treaties between them have been embodied into the ‘ASEAN Way’. In
addition, the preservation of sovereign prerogatives have been influenced by important ideational and material factors, including colonial
memories, the Cold War experience, priority for domestic or regime
stability and the nascent institutions of state.
TRACING ASEAN TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
One way to demonstrate that sovereignty in ASEAN is closest to traditional meaning of state sovereignty is by tracing the content of the organization’s declarations and the agreements. ASEAN’s adherence to traditional understandings of westphalian sovereignty is strongly apparent
throughout the formal-verbal histories that such agreements provide.
This can be seen by reviewing documents such as the 1967 Bangkok
Declaration and the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration. Both of these statements emphasize ASEAN member-states’ national existence free from
outside interference. The document that most obviously underscores
ASEAN member state sovereignty, however, is the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) in 1976. Article 2 mandates: “respect for the
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national
identity of all nations; non interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of disputes by peaceful means and renunciation of the
threat or use of force.” There is no doubt that these interpretations of the
shared principles embodied in the TAC have greatly helped to establish
and improve friendly relations between the nations of ASEAN.
Other agreement that pertains to ASEAN member-states’ sovereignty is the ASEAN Charter, which was released in Singapore, 21 of November 2007. In Chapter 1, Article 2, it is mentioned that:
“ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles:
(a) Respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial
integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States.
(e) Non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States”.
139
The ASEAN Charter clearly defines the commitment of ASEAN members to uphold state sovereignty, even while the organization is facing
criticism of its poor performance in collectively facing new regional security issues and building a regional security community. These documents together demonstrate the enduring strength of ASEAN’s commitment to a very traditional westphalian concept of state sovereignty.
ASEAN has also adopted the UN Charter of state sovereignty as an
important organizational norm. The right to sovereign nationhood was
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945). According to Article 2 of the Charter, the UN and its members are to pursue its
purposes according to certain principles, which include: (1) principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members. (2) To refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state. By adopting the norms
embedded in the UN Charter ASEAN demonstrates that it respects international agreements and reinforces the organization’s concern for
the primacy of state sovereignty.
However, there are some important differences between ASEAN’s
interpretation of this norm and that of the UN Charter. While the UN
Charter mentions in Chapter VII the role of UN Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression” and to take military and nonmilitary action to “restore international peace and security.” ASEAN has not adopted any
similar concept that would compromise its member-states sovereignty.
ASEAN was founded through a common declaration which had the
converse intention of strengthening the national entities that made up
the membership of the Association through their elective support for
non-interference in their individual internal affairs.
THE RELATIONSHIPS STYLE: ‘ASEAN WAY’
Another way to identify the role of state sovereignty in ASEAN diplomacy
is through examining diplomatic style. This is done by raising questions
about: what most consistently cultivates and manages intra-ASEAN
relations and how these relations are actually pursued. In ASEAN the
answers for these questions can be answered by applying and assessing the term, ‘the ASEAN Way’. The practice of ‘the ASEAN Way’ among
these elites is characterized by habits such as close consultation and
accommodation that are fostered by frequent interactions which are
multi-level as well as multi-dimensional. At least around 700 intergovernmental meetings a year are conducted by ASEAN and these provide
140
a mechanism for cooperation and conflict avoidance. Only rarely, however, do they result in binding decisions or mandatory policies.
Furthermore, within ASEAN, these decision-making processes do
not extend beyond the level of elites and government officials. Recently
ASEAN has begun trying to involve other parties outside the elites and
government officials. However, this move has still been criticized on the
grounds that it did not allow any significant role for the non-elite groups
in member-states.53
Historically, the ‘ASEAN Way’ has been practiced among ASEAN’s
elites with great value accorded to the principle of non-interference.
This principle envisions ASEAN elites conforming to a behavioral pattern of “no public challenges, comment, or criticism of other regimes’
legitimacy, domestic systems, conduct, policies or style”; (Antolik,
1990: 156). Thus ASEAN’s diplomatic style can be characterized as quiet diplomacy in which “government leaders generally refrained from
open criticism of their neighbors”. (Funston, 2000: 3) In the past this has
meant that there was no open criticism of military coups in Thailand,
martial law in Philippines, or Indonesian military actions in East Timor.
Before democratic reforms in Indonesia, even critical commentary of
other ASEAN states in the media was frequently followed by government apologies to the offended party. Such behavior has strengthened
perceptions of ASEAN as a grouping that does not wash its dirty linen
in public.
ASEAN was still adhering to this principle of non-interference. The
member states made no official statement to criticize, or place sanctions on Thailand after the military coup that occurred on 19 September 2006 against the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
This was the reaction even though the coup could have endangered the
overall process of democratization in Southeast Asia. At most, expressions of concern were conveyed privately. In an even more recent case
involving suppression of democratic protests in the ASEAN member
state of Myanmar, the organization did not adopt the tough line which
the international community suggested it should adopt. In their official
statement released at the ASEAN summit in Singapore 2007, the ASEAN
Leaders agreed that ASEAN ‘stands ready to play a role whenever Myanmar wants it to do so’ (ASEAN, Chairman Statement on Myanmar, 2007).
In confirmation of ‘the ASEAN Way’ any involvement by the Association
in the Myanmar case will be via ‘constructive engagement’, in which
53 This view is taken from informal interview with member of Commission I, Indonesian Parliament, Jakarta 21 June 2006, and a formal interview with researchers/staff from Forum Asia, Bangkok, August 2006. See also Chavez Joy (2007) New ASEAN Charter lacks vision, Bangkok Post,
20 November <http://www.focusweb.org/new-ASEAN-Charter-lacks-vision.html?itemid:94.>
141
most of the action takes place in private, without a direct confrontation
with Myanmar’s military regime (The Jakarta Post, 9 October 2007). As
the mere event shown that ASEAN has still hesitated to criticized and
to intervene a newly democratic Myanmar government for the case of
ethnic minority Rohingya. The policy of non-interference shows that
ASEAN is not a ‘higher authority’ placed above its member states, but
does intercede selectively and subtly to influence domestic conflicts in
Myanmar and elsewhere within the member-states’ domain.
The practice of the ‘ASEAN Way’, with decision-making carried out
strictly by consensus, has reinforced the maintenance of individual
member-state sovereignty. The rule of consensus has been particularly
important to the ASEAN political process but has also been described
as producing “meat-grinder wisdom”, based on the lowest common
denominator, when unity is not possible to achieve (Sopiee, 1986: 25).
For ASEAN, a decision making style that could not protect its memberstates’ national prerogatives by avoiding international pressure to force
a government to adopt externally imposed policies would be currently
unworkable (Katsumata, 2003: 113). As the ‘ASEAN Way’ became more
prevalent, the raison d’être of non-intervention began to shift from a
mechanism to contain divisions between member-states to a means of
supporting each other (Funston, 2000: 5).
Practices associated with the ‘ASEAN Way’ such as compromising behind closed doors are still perceived to serve the important and
necessary function of helping to mediate estrangement and insecurity
among various ASEAN elites. It is also viewed as limiting interference in
the organization by non-ASEAN states. In this sense, pressure for rapid
institutional reform has not been great until recently and the politics
of security community formation remains a challenging proposition
to ASEAN’s future identity. The legacy of the ‘ASEAN Way’ is a unique
testament to how jealously this institution’s member-states guard their
sovereignty.
JUSTIFICATION OF MATERIAL AND IDEATIONAL
Another way to consider the characteristics of sovereignty within
ASEAN relates to the ideational and material explanations underlying
the concept of state sovereignty. ‘Sovereignty’, in this context, constructed and constituted in highly distinctive ways that reflect ideational as
well as material factors (Hill and Tow, 2002: 161-183). This ideational
perspective is relevant to explaining why ASEAN states have been keen
to preserve their state sovereignty and also why it will be difficult to
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modify how the concept of sovereignty operates within ASEAN.
Sovereignty within ASEAN reflects Southeast Asia’s unique historical and geopolitical position. Historical experience has forced the
ASEAN states to consider state sovereignty as an essential element of
their national and regional security. Chief among these historical forces
are the memories of their colonial experience. Colonial powers often
undermined the rights and dignity of Southeast Asia’s indigenous peoples, extracted resources and often left nothing in return. In many cases
the indigenous people were treated badly. Frequently, the concept of
‘divide et impera’ was applied with different classes and ethnic groups
being set against one another by the imperial power. The painful memories of life under colonialism have created strong nationalist sentiment
(Ramcharan, 2000: 65; Moon and Chun, 2003: 111-112) - particularly
in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar, all of whom have developed a
tradition of rejecting the involvement by external parties, particularly in
their domestic affairs. As a consequence of these experiences, nationalism in Southeast Asia has nearly identical meaning with the notion of
sovereignty. Such memories make them constantly distrustful of external intervention, more respectful of one another’s sovereignty and at
the same time always ready to guard their own sovereignty.
Along with their collective historical memory of colonialism, the
ASEAN states’ perspective of international relations has been shaped
by great power military interventions during the Second World War and
the Cold War. These memories explain why ASEAN members consider
state sovereignty an essential element of national and regional security.
Their national security has often been threatened by other countries’
interference or intervention in their domestic affairs (Katsumata, 2003).
ASEAN countries were also the object of an ideological conflict between
the super powers during Cold War. This experience sometimes led them
to adopt similar policies and strategies to those of their superpower
sponsors in order to secure themselves.
During the Cold War period in particular, the national security problems of most ASEAN states were directly linked to the politics of military
intervention by outside powers. The war in Indochina and the subsequent division of Southeast Asia between the communist bloc and the
capitalist world are illustrative. These interventions internationalized
and intensified local conflicts and, as a result, the national security of
each of the Southeast Asian countries was jeopardized.
The significance of these historical experiences has been to make
the ASEAN countries consider state sovereignty as an essential element
of national and regional stability. Ever since the countries of Southeast
143
Asia established ASEAN, they have been greatly concerned about each
other’s sovereign integrity. This is reflected in policy choices that defend
the concept of sovereignty as a fundamental international norm. Moreover, a concern to build and maintain domestic political legitimacy
within ASEAN has contributed to a reinforcement of state sovereignty
(Narine, 2004: 424; Alagappa 1995: 2).
Emerging inter-state relations between the post-colonial nation
states of Southeast Asia were complicated during the 1950s and 1960s by
various internal challenges (i.e.; communist subversion, secessionism
and communal strife). Ethnic, religious and linguistic conflicts remain
the source of serious political tension in every Southeast Asian state
(Ling, 2001).There is tension between government and Islamic radicals
in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. For Southeast Asian states, there
is no guarantee that intervention by either other ASEAN member-states
or external non member would help to settle these disputes. Part of the
cause is that they believe that the party which intervenes will gain for
their own benefit and that such intervention will undermine state legitimacy. For most ASEAN states, therefore, the consolidation of domestic
socio-political forces is of most significance and will always be priority,
and if the external parties are allowed to become involved it is because
they will help the government.
Moreover, although Southeast Asian governments are keen to be involved in security cooperation with Western countries, such sentiments
are not necessarily shared at the popular or non-elite level of state
politics. The outcry from Islamist groups in Indonesia, for example, has
forced that country to downplay its security cooperation with the United States to combat terrorism.
Their predominant concern with domestic stability has led ASEAN
governments to perpetuate the exalted status of state sovereignty. This
has been reflected in the policies they have adopted in response to various domestic security issues. In other words, domestic national interests are the priority although they have to be developed in conjunction
with pursuing common regional interests. External interference in one
ASEAN state’s affairs by another ASEAN state-member, however, would
have hindered overall institutional co-operation because, for each
member, any interference from the other would have been an obstacle
to their collective nation-building enterprise.
ASEAN states thus presume that an intervention applying force
against any one of them will bring the credibility of the entire organization in to question. This is something that would endanger national
security more than any internal problem. This also reinforces tenden-
144
cies for the ASEAN governments to securitize domestic politics to emphasize the norm of non-interference in internal affairs. “ASEAN states
explicitly reject the norms of humanitarian intervention, because they
recognize their vulnerability to such norms during the state-building
process. They have deliberately limited the institutional power of
ASEAN to prevent it from infringing on their sovereignty” (Narine, 2004:
16). In these circumstances, ASEAN member-states have been greatly
concerned about each other’s sovereignty. There is also sense shared by
ASEAN member-states that looking after their own domestic problems
is more important than becoming involved in others countries’ problems. Limited national resources are better allocated to deal with pressing domestic issues rather than ‘helping others’. Accordingly, the Philippines have not cooperated with Thailand in the case of the Muslim
resurgence in South Thailand, because it needs all the resources it can
marshal to focus on military operations and stabilization campaigns
in southern Mindanao. Similarly, with other security problems such
as terrorism, or ethnic/religious conflict in Myanmar where minority
Rohingya had been displaced. ASEAN states may not always be keen
to work cooperatively because they need to concentrate their efforts to
deal with other, equally pressing, domestic problems. While public sensitivity about such issues varies between different countries, being weak
states, Southeast Asian polities’ logical priorities will be directed toward
achieving at least minimally acceptable levels of domestic well-being
and security, rather than becoming too involved with their neighbors’
security problems.
The very nascent character of domestic political institutions and
structures within ASEAN also mitigate against intervention. Most of the
ASEAN countries have different ideologies and not many of their governments could be categorized as ‘liberal democratic’ (although some
ASEAN countries may have more democratic governments than their
ASEAN counterparts). Additionally, most ASEAN member-states have
different levels of economic and security capacity. Different legal systems also create obstacles to greater coordination of security cooperation which further discourages the development of significant collective support.
While it might seem logical that accepting assistance from states with
greater capacity could be helpful in matters such as counter-terrorism,
such arguments are often not effective within ASEAN. As ‘junior partners’ in any such arrangements, the perception is that they would not
have equal rights and position and they would be subject to pressure
from the external parties. Illustrative is the rejection by Indonesia and
145
Malaysia of an American proposal to upgrade the U.S. Navy’s involvement in securing the Malacca Strait. The basis for this decision was that
both states believed that their authority as independent nations would
have been diminished if they accepted assistance from the U.S or other
developed countries likely to be involved in this scheme.
Logically, such reactions challenge the notion of regional cooperation. When single states are unable to solve security problems, regional
cooperation that draws on the resources of all the member-state would
seem to offer a better capacity to deal with regional security challenges.
However, due to the nascent condition of political structures in ASEAN,
collective security action would highlight the internal and external vulnerability of the member states. There is a strong perception among the
ASEAN members that cooperation, when it occurs should invariably
strengthen state sovereignty, not risks undermining it.
In these circumstances, sovereignty has served as both a legal and
practical framework for ASEAN states to overcome their previous dependency relationships and to gain a more equal status in the international system. Embedding sovereignty within institutional documents
serves as an important protection against the internal and external
weaknesses of the ASEAN states and this is reinforced by the ‘ASEAN
Way’. ASEAN’s socio-cultural norms emphasize states’ rights to make
independent decisions without intervention or pressure from other
members of the Association.
ASEAN’s emphasis on principles and norms, as well as its conceptions of comprehensive security and national resilience, stem from the
comparative weakness of ASEAN states in regional power relations and
their fragility as modern states. ASEAN has therefore been used as a
diplomatic mechanism to counter the greater structural power of larger
regional neighbors (Narine, 2006: 213). It is in this sense that ASEAN
states are committed to traditional Westphalian sovereignty as the major organizing principle in their international relations (Narine, 2004:
444). They view international cooperation and regional cooperation including that in the economic arena - as a means to strengthen sovereignty, not dilute it.
V. CONCLUSION
From above explanation it shows that although ASEAN member state
has already declared regional community, they tend to embrace traditional state sovereignty than the idea of Post Westphalian. The diplo-
146
matic journeys and the national interest among ASEAN member states
actors have contributed underscore the principle of non-interference
as the basis of ASEAN member-state relations. As a result, preserving
sovereign rights has become the standard prescription for many political difficulties in the region and, as noted previously, the corner-stone
of ASEAN’s attempts to create an enduring Southeast Asian regional
order. From this perspective, regional and international cooperation
could only take place on the basis of respect for each other’s national
independence and integrity.
The result is that on one hand, ASEAN can be categorized as preserving the sovereign prerogatives of its member states, while on the
other they can also play the ‘sovereignty card’ in ways that differ from
the accepted international norms. Inherently, sovereignty is much less
immune than not immune. The reality of building a security community in ASEAN, therefore, is that states have attempted to proceed towards
building a security community without substantially sacrificing their
sovereignty. The extent, to which ASEAN’s vision for itself can be actually achieved, however, remains contingent on how it can be reconciled
with individual member-states still strong national interests. In order to
realize security community, therefore, the member states must rely on
managing ‘adaptable sovereignty’; Adaptable sovereignty allows the adjustment of sovereign prerogatives enabling compromise that provides
the impetus toward community-building, but not to the point where the
primacy of sovereignty is surrendered.
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Myanmar Security & ASEAN Integration54
Phyu Yamin Myat
RESUMEN
La integración de Asia del Sur es un milagro. Sucede en países que son
diversos étnica, cultural, política y económicamente. Asimismo, la integración se ha materializado por necesidad ya que solo la Asociación de
Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ANSA), considerada como un conjunto,
puede convertirse en una fuerza de balance que equilibre el surgimiento de las potencias emergentes del Este. Está en búsqueda la supervivencia de sus Estados miembros.
En esta búsqueda, Myanmar ha sido considerada durante décadas
la oveja negra de la ANSA y un obstáculo a su desarrollo, cuestión que
ha provocado la irritación de los países occidentales. La comunidad internacional siempre ha asociado el nombre del país como sinónimo de
mala reputación. A partir de 2010, Myanmar, admitiendo los problemas
antes negados, se ha dedicado a cambiar y se convirtió rápidamente
en la última frontera para los emprendedores sociales, cooperación en
negocios y paladines del desarrollo de todo el mundo.
Sin embargo, Myanmar es débil en lo que a gobernanza y políticas
públicas se refiere. Por lo tanto, necesita de estrategias y socios sinceros
para colaborar con su desarrollo. En ese sentido, el socio más cercano y
más querido para la seguridad de Myanmar es la ANSA. Anticipando el
desafío externo que presenta el actual clima político internacional, así
como el escenario interno, los diversos intereses de los Estados miembros y sus capacidades para crecer juntos, se considera que es ahora el
momento de Myanmar para enfocarse en un abordaje integrado de su
seguridad nacional para ayudar a una exitosa integración de la ANSA
en este ámbito, y para asegurar, de este modo, su propio futuro.
ABSTRACT
The integration of South East Asia is a miracle. It happens in countries
that are diverse ethnically, culturally, politically and economically.
Also, the integration has materialized out of necessity since the Associa54 Acknowledgements: I would like to thank my friends of SUSI-2012 giving me the encouragement and inspiration to write this essay. My gratitude and appreciation to my friend & colleague: Zeya Thu, for his dedicated support in writing this.
152
tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) only as a whole can become
a force to balance the rising super powers in the East. It is in quest for
survival of its member states.
In this quest, Myanmar had been regarded as a black sheep and
spoiler of ASEAN for decades drawing wrath from western countries.
International community always associated the name with bad reputation. Starting from 2010, Myanmar, admitting the problems concealed
before, has devoted to change and quickly became the last frontier for
social entrepreneurs, business cooperation and development advocates rushing from all over the world.
However, on the other hand, Myanmar is weak in capacity for governance and policies thus it needs strategies and sincere partners to collaborate with in securing its future. The nearest and dearest for Myanmar’s security is ASEAN. Anticipating the external challenge as the
climate in world politics, the internal, the diverse interests of member
states and their capacities to grow together, now is the time for Myanmar to focus on integrated approach of National Security to help the
ASEAN integration successful, to secure its own future.
I. INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Myanmar is a country of 60 million people situated in South East Asia
Region. Its big neighbors are India and China in the northwest, north
and northeast. The neighbor in the west is Bangladesh, and Laos and
Thailand are in the southeast. Myanmar, locating between two rising
powers, and the ASEAN are figured as a crossroad of the world politics and global economy. Myanmar has strong political culture and
its military has been a polity rather than just a policy instrument for
governance. Along its recorded history, Myanmar was once ruled by
strong kings, and then lost sovereignty to British colony for more than
100 years. After independence in 1948, the parliamentary democracy
lasted about 10 years before the stage of the military coup with declared
reason to save the country from breaking apart. With this sovereign
background, colonial experiences, and political culture, strong leaders
and politicians have shaped the fate of the country. They are more often
than not the military elites with their politics the necessary focus of “nationalism” and their governance practices in favor of “national security”.
In most part of the history, the country has been “protected” and “managed” by the military or military-backed government or militarized governance. Such a glance through the history will also reflect the rooted
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perceptions of Myanmar people toward the military, and its governance
entwined with national security. Highlighted news on the country in international community usually would start from the period after 1962
with the military backed socialistic regime, when the country’s social
and economic status was gradually declining. However, since the uprising of democracy in 1988, and dramatic so-called Saffron Revolution
in 2007, the country’s name had been associated with human rights issues, undemocratic governance and very poor development status.
International community was pleasantly surprised to see that the
general election in 2010 actually happened and gradually paved the way
to unprecedented reforms. Moves of transition began to be led by elites.
Also, the world was overwhelmed to witness how quickly the country
has restored relations with the international community. The outcomes
of re-engagement had been recognized and legitimized with the visit
of President Obama of the United States of America marking the peak
of recognition. Today, it is widely predicted that Myanmar can become
a rare case of achieving least violence transitions from dictatorship to
democracy in the world history. In official statements of present government, it seems that international pressures aligned with Myanmar
people’s desire for democracy, are taken together as one of the “givens”
rules of the game in process of reform.
On the other hand, ASEAN is the immediate international community for Myanmar. Myanmar has naturally been interdependent, at least
for economic reasons, from other ASEAN members. Myanmar is also
aware that the same fate of being at a crossroad on world politics and
economics is shared among the ASEAN members. Thus, ASEAN has a
role in Myanmar’s improvements today. With a background of the common interests and the same fate of being at a crossroad, the mutual engagement of Myanmar and ASEAN as well as the expectation and outlooks for ASEAN integration can be understood.
This short essay is about “Myanmar security & ASEAN Integration”.
In the context of Myanmar today’s improvements, it will explore the
country’s governance ever entwined with national security issues, as
well as politics and foreign policies how they had been, and how they
became relevant to the ASEAN integration process.
First chapter will be conceptualizing governance in Myanmar entwined with the national security issue followed by an analysis on why
and how Myanmar has chosen militarized regime after regime. Then,
the mutual interest stemming from the same fate among the ASEAN
will be explored followed by the analytical approach on the foreign policies of Myanmar in relation with ASEAN and its integration process to
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fulfill the mandate of ‘peace, stability and security’. The essay will finally
conclude with an ending note hoping to contribute for a more secure
region and a more secure world.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING “NATIONAL SECURITY” IN MYANMAR
According to Prabhakaran Paleri in his “National Security, Imperatives
and Challenges”, National security is the ability to overcome multi-dimensional threats “to the well-being of its people” and “to the survival
as a nation-state at any given time”55 (Prabhakaran Paleri, 2008).
If survival of the nation is to defend physical territory, to strengthen sense of belonging and to maintain the sovereignty, the survival of
people would be providing the citizen’s basic needs, rights and equal
chances for advancement of their life development. This quest put up
by the whole meaning of National Security demands national defense,
diplomatic skill and law enforcement, but also good governance with
economic, policy making, and public management skill relating to the
well-being of its people.
In another short essay that brought me into National Security study,
I wrote about my curiosity to understand how National Security has
been defined and practiced in different countries as I had seen all domestic affairs in my own been obsessed with it. National Security overshadows daily lives of the citizens.
Myanmar has strong political culture and its military has been a polity rather than just a policy instrument for governance. In most part of
its history, the country has been “protected” and “managed” by the military or military backed government or militarized governance. Strong
leaders and politicians have shaped the recorded history of Myanmar
as a sovereign nation. They are, more often than not, the military elites
with their politics the necessary focus of “nationalism” and their governance practices in favor of “national security”.
In 1964, the BSPP (Burma Socialist Program Party) sanctioned National Security Act that banned all civil society and civic associations
deemed political controversial and potential threatening to the ruling
party. To survive, civil society has gone low profile. People’s power and
civil liberty diminished. In 2004, in the same line of the national security
55 “The measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional
threats to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a nation-state at any given
time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, that can be indexed by
computation, empirically or otherwise,and is extendable to global security by variables external
to it.” [Prabhakaran Paleri, 2008]
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act, the previous regime SPDC/SLORC sanctioned “Electronic Transaction Act” which enabled it to extend its national security exercises into
telecommunication and cyberspace.
However, after the general elections of 2010, the country jumped
into democratic transition and now it is gathering momentum. International community so far, has recognized the process as remarkable. Despite the two laws aforementioned the development of new institutions
has been witnessed. Media is relaxed, and civil society was empowered
with rights and responsibilities. Social movements across the country
are making everyday news.
Now the state and society are interacting dynamically. Cases of public policies are under the scrutiny of the public. There is a hope of light
ahead on all inclusive public policy making processes where people
can claim, complain, negotiate and compromise on various issues. One
Myanmar academic has remarked on current social movements and
civil society activities in response to political changes with the metaphor of a grasshopper contending its jumps under the lid of a glass.
With the lid removed, the grasshopper is now testing the new situations
and new possible ceilings by jumping up higher every day.
With all such achievements positives, the former taboo term of National Security is also being contested in numerous workshops and
forums as having detailed and wider meanings; food security, energy
security, territorial security, peace and regional stability, political stability, public health, quality education, and economic development
and etc. Most importantly, people are starting to feel “secure” with the
security being redefined. Wishfully, such good improvements will be in
continuous watch.
However, on the other hand, according to the 2008 Constitution,
Myanmar military can intervene in legislative decisions holding 25% of
the seats in both Hluttaws (Parliaments). It can also intervene in local
affairs with a request by the executive branch. Such practice has been
already witnessed in two recent civil unrests: in Kachin state in the
north and the Rakhine state in the west.
Therefore, amidst today emerging national issues one after another, the question of whether the country would turn back is whispered
aloud by people all the time. Many try to understand the true urge behind the democratization process to guess its legitimacy, credibility and
sustainability that would be inevitably linked with “the possible return
of the military”.
In response to one of those questions confronted him in media interviews (Washington Post, 2012), the President Thein Sein of Myan-
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mar clarified stated that the reform process is in response to fulfill the
people’s desire for democracy from the start. Since the former regime
took enough time in planning and preparing it, he confirmed his government would become in charge for successful implementation that
would sustain the change and enhance the development of the country. He has declared as swell that ‘there will be no turning back”. It also
seems his government has taken international pressures aligning people’s desire for democracy as a “given” rule of the reform game.
As a mere citizen, it is enough to live on with such optimism. However, in the eyes of public policy, the negative potentials that could bring
unintentional dangers from every corner of the process cannot be neglected. In this case, they will mean the combination of “over-expectation of people” with “multi-dimensional challenges on governance capacity”. It would not be possible to elaborate them in more details in this
single article. However, they would be key issues contesting “National
security” in Myanmar in coming years.
III. GOVERNANCE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE MILITARY IN
MYANMAR
Recounting governance in Myanmar, the country experienced more
militarized governance than civil governance along its history. The first
civilian government under parliamentary democracy system after the
independence in 1948 was assumed a failure against the insurgences
and civil unrests as its power expired to the military in 1962. The socialist one-party government after 1962 was heavily backed by the military via its strong ex-military leader and lasted for 26 years. Leaving the
country in general socio-economic decline, the regime collapsed in
1988 with Thein famous uprising. The military staged a coup d’état with
the declared reason to save the country from breaking apart. The military announcing itself to be a caretaker government before the elected
government took over held a nationwide election deemed free and fair.
The winner of the election, National League for Democracy of Aung San
Suu Kyi, couldn’t assume the power because the military government
refused to step down. The rest is history and the country had been under military rulers till 2010. More precisely, till March 2011 before the
newly elected civilian government took an oath.
In Myanmar governance, the survival of the nation is “(the nation’s)
Lone Choan Yei” (security) while survival of the people by their basic
needs is “(people’s) Sar Wut Nay Yei (basic needs). There is a statement
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that Tatmadaw (military) obliges to provide Lone Choan Yei of people
by any means necessary thus the people can peacefully take care of
their own Sar Wut Nay Yei. The national Lone Choan Ye is the sole priority for governance in Myanmar. In other words, National Lone Choan
Yei comes first and it is hard to define the fine line between the two.
On the other hand, such strong military governance has limited resources and skills in providing basic needs and fostering civil liberty
and development. The military governance especially after 1990 did
economic relaxations in response to necessities for the survival of the
country in modern world. Thus, slogans such as “the Tatmadaw (as the
parent of the Nation) is trying to build, develop and modernize the nation” had been broadcasted heavily through the state media and other
means deemed relevant.
However, such a key national agenda always interacts with militarized institutional thinking, country’s domestic instabilities with uncompromising politics and policy worse-offs pairing with poor public
management. Civil affairs are easily interpreted as military affairs and
often managed with military strategy.
Therefore, prescribed policies hardly achieved consensus building
and public participation thus lacking stakeholder’s supports. Then,
poor policy making, corrupted bureaucracy, poor public management
as well as mismanagement of nation resources have prevailed at last.
Such conditions exhibit the role of military and its national security
concept influencing the governance system and the public perception
toward military. The phenomenon is rooted in the country along its recorded history.
A look back through Myanmar history shows that the phenomenon
goes back before the colonial time. The nation that will become today
Myanmar had warrior kings. They brought the task of building a kingdom over the vast land across Southeast Asia. The king would demonstrate his universal conquering powers by a continuous display of military victories. The sole power of the king was its military. Only under the
concept of supreme monarch, ideological justification in politics was
built. If there is the essential difference between military dominance
and sustainable administration, the governance in Myanmar always
prioritized the former to the latter. One analysis said that the performance of such kingship was constrained from pushing its “conquering
the world’s conquests” to their administrative conclusion thus destroying local authorities at the end of the kingdom. Hence, essentially, the
actual size of the kingdom and the successful influence over it varied
with the particular king and his military power in that particular time
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and the true face of the nation only centered its administration. When a
strong king fell, the kingdom often became weak as its influence falter.
Myanmar kings were strong as to build their nations and expand their
kingdom more with military power rather than sustain it with competitive and skillful governance. Today Myanmar politics, strong nationalism, ethnic pluralism, leadership and style of governance derived more
or less directly from it.
The shape of today’s Myanmar territory to which the founding fathers of modern Myanmar had to be contended with the results of settled negotiations between the British and other colonial masters at their
time. When the last kingdom lost its status to colonial regimes, it was
a shame hard to swallow for all the people dwelling in it. If strong nationalism brings arrogance, as much as other nations with their vibrant
histories, Myanmar is no exception, hard to bow to others, even if it had
lost power and desire to influence others.
Such pulsating agony for nationalism created great difficulties for
British administration in disarming the insurgences one after another
even with the total subjugating the country in 1886. The same emotion
and hostile attitude of people towards the occupation made the governors practice different but brutal “direct rule” governance which deported away the king and root out all his supporters from the country,
unlike nearest example, Thailand where monarchy survives in a different form.
Against this background, it was no surprise to see the leadership of
the fight for independence used the same passionate agony of nationalism to organize the whole independence movement, mobilizing all
people into the long fight till the country gained independence back in
1948. Very first Myanmar Tatmadaw was born out of the same leadership56. Many politicians and public leaders after independence were
also born out of the same force.
After 1948, international factors also strengthened and consolidated
the role of military in Myanmar governance. The failure of UN intervention on Chinese invasion over Myanmar’s territory in 1950s, ignited the
urge for strong self-reliance idea in the country’s military elites. Myanmar military became the only force to protect the country from foreign
invasion and intervention while upholding sovereignty. Such fights are
stated as “just war” by regime after regime.
Such ‘just war’ has also been extended to all domestic insurgences;
political or ethnic, if seen as a danger to the security of the nation. In
fact, since independence in 1948, the country has probably had the
56 Burma Independence Army (BIA)
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longest civil war in the world and was occupied with serious domestic
instabilities that were often seen as national security issues with militarized outlook. Back then; the military perceived that the civilian governments and partisan politics always failed to respond effectively on
such devastating issues. And, the national issues the governance has to
tackle range from the world’s longest conflicts to severe poverty among
its population57.
In governing the nation, the military regimes used to claim two enemies as threats to the nation, i.e., internal and external enemies. To deal
with external enemy means foreign interventions. To deal with internal
enemy means maintaining peace and tranquility against civil unrests
and rebellious insurgences across the country. Under the military governance, “National Security”, a vague term, shadowed everyday lives of
citizens.
So, in Myanmar context, it can be seen that the military is not a mere
policy instrument but a prominent polity, having a substantial role in
Myanmar politics and governance. It had been a strong institution assuming itself as the protector and builder of the country, to which people used to perceive as the dictator with poor governance.
Understanding this, Myanmar, being a crossroad country in the
world politics and economy, it is essential to review how such militarized governance has been reflected in foreign policies as they determine the relationship with ASEAN and then with wider international
community.
IV. CROSSROAD OF THE CROSSROADS
I came here because of the importance of your country. You
live at the crossroads of East and South Asia. You border the most
populated nations of the planet. You have history that reaches
back thousands of years, and the ability to help determine the
destiny of the fastest growing region of the world (Obama, 2012).
President Obama’s engagement policy to Asia is now enjoying positive outcomes from Myanmar’s recent improvements toward democracy. Above mentioned was the first paragraph after self-introduction
in the President Obama’s speech that was part of a historic event at
Yangon University, 19th November of 2012, Yangon, Myanmar. That
exhibits how the world’s sole superpower sees Myanmar and the
57 As of today, only 11 out of 17 armed forces are in peace negotiation process with government.
Also, the government recently recognized that one in every four citizens is under poverty line.
160
ASEAN region to which it relates.
Studying Myanmar’s foreign policies from 1948 to present can assure that the successive governments were well aware of the country’s
unique position, strategic location, geopolitical and geo-economic implications with regional and world politics. The cost of locating among
populated countries also seems well-anticipated. Especially, China
has been regarded as a close neighbor and the biggest investor to the
country while India has been a major trade partner for the country’s
major export products that are agriculture-based. Meanwhile, Myanmar is also sharing the threat of migration-related to population burst
in Rakhine State located in the western part of Myanmar with another
neighbor Bangladesh, which is one of the most populated countries in
the world.
Myanmar positions itself in international community with “independent” and “non-aligned” policies to be independent in the international system that was divided into eastern bloc and western bloc by
the Cold War. “Non-alignment” meant not siding with any bloc. “Independent” meant totally free from outside influence. It also comes with
a reasoning that the country has been in serious struggle with domestic
insurgence since independence thus being cautious for the disastrous
contentions from both blocs. Only foreign aid or development assistance with no strings-attached was welcomed.
Such policy concept at least partly explains some of the turningevents of the country. In 1988, after a bloody uprising in the country,
the military took the power and promised to conduct a free and fair
election. To the surprise of quite a few political elites at the time, the
landslide winner became Aung San Su Kyi and her party that they perceived heavily influenced by and attached to the external politics, particularly “the west”. Later, with provocative hints of hostility from the
winning party to existing political groups especially the military elites,
along with their politics, governance and consequences of governance,
the regime refused to transfer power to the newly elected government
and gave rise to latest decades of military led governance.
The result had been the famous story of “a bad country” in South
East Asia, isolated from the world. Isolation was intrinsic as much
as extrinsic. The regime promised the elections again for when the
country was ready, with a roadmap to democracy developed gradually. In such long wait for readiness, it is noteworthy that there had
been governance initiatives on development of the country; building
infrastructure, liberalizing some portions of the market, attempts to
re-connect with foreign countries. However, government failure and
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market failure originating from the socialist era continued.
During the period of isolation, in terms of international relations,
there were obviously not many choices of countries for Myanmar. As the
west posed strong sanctions on the country, only the neighboring countries with interdependence of trade and economy such as China, India
and other East Asia and Southeast Asia countries remain as Myanmar’s
international community. Myanmar is seen trying to maintain goodneighborly relations with neighboring countries while strictly adhering
to its foreign policies.
However, at the same time, Myanmar also had shown inclinations
towards the ASEAN, not only for being neighbors but also recognizing
the same fate being at a crossroad. The relationship has been minimal at
the start, and gradually improved over time. The process was driven by
the concern and willingness of the ASEAN to engage with Myanmar, as
well as Myanmar to integrate into it. Myanmar abides by the common
interest (peace, security, stability and prosperity) implanted in the core
principle of ASEAN when it was founded in 1967.
There was a review in foreign policies in 1971 to become “independent” and “active.” Regarding it, active foreign policy re-assured the
non-alignment and independence in international issues while detailing some more items as five principles of peaceful co-existence58 while
maintaining friendly relations with all nations. It also claims to support
United Nations and affiliated organizations to cooperate in regional
economic and social affairs, and to participate in the maintenance of
international peace, security and equitable prosperity.
Such policy appropriation not only strengthens the country’s long
standing relation with two big powers; China and India, but also made
easy for the regime in 1990s in its cautious attempt to necessarily reconnect to the international community, especially ASEAN whose members happen to be among the country’s largest trading partners as well
as foreign investors.
V. ASEAN & INTEGRATION
As much as the journey of Myanmar integration into ASEAN gradually
improves, the whole ASEAN integration concept has been developed
among member states over time rather than installed from one or few
leading countries. ASEAN core missions are adapting and developing in
58 The 5 principles of coexistence: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, to abide by mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, to
respect for mutual equality and to work for mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
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response to the experiences and challenges of member nations, along
its journey of institutionalization.
To recount, ASEAN as a group of 5 nations was founded according
to Bangkok Declaration with a mission to promote peace, stability and
security. Five founding countries were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
In 1997, the Asian financial crisis alerted and motivated ASEAN leaders to expand their mission of security into economic security of the region to mitigate weakness and necessity of the region’s financial resources. ASEAN Charter in 2007 finally enabled the organization to better
facilitate economic integration while enhancing security cooperation.
The meaning of security for ASEAN is expanding in that way. 2015 has
been targeted for ASEAN integration with the road map for the ASEAN
community (2009-2015) including blue prints for political-security community, economic community and socio-cultural community.
The enhancement of ASEAN’s mission keeps aligned with each
member state’s interest at least in minimal term. Along 45 years of the
journey, ASEAN had drawn other members into the group developing into a regional organization. Myanmar successfully joined ASEAN
in 1997, 30 years after its inception. The last member Cambodia was
admitted in 1999. After 6 months of Cambodia’s introduction, the first
10-nation ASEAN summit was conducted. It finally becomes a legal entity when The ASEAN Charter with 15 purposes was adopted by ten nations in Singapore in 2008.
The development of the organization or institutionalization of
ASEAN over time has been gradual. It has been shaped from a loose
group of several nations into a well-defined institution with all South
East Asian nations as members. The process shows that ASEAN is not
just founded but developed over time by its members.
ASEAN has been considered resembling to European Union in some
aspects but the vital challenge comes from its inner country differences.
All member states are diverse in many ways; economy, politics, growth,
technology, race, religion and culture. To overcome such difficulties,
ASEAN Way emphasizes decision-making through information and
consultation among diplomats that in turn will facilitate group consensus at official meetings. It upholds six principles (1) respect for state sovereignty; (2) freedom from external interference; (3) non-interference
in internal affairs; (4) peaceful dispute settlement; (5) renunciation of
the use of force; and (6) cooperation.
It is also interesting how the “bad apple” Myanmar could possibly be
integrated into ASEAN. Formerly, Myanmar’s inclusion in ASEAN has
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itself been an obstacle to economic and political cooperation with the
EU and the U.S. The positive effect of Myanmar joining the ASEAN has
become vivid only with recent convincing economic liberalization as
well as an unprecedented political reform. Beside the recognition on
the same fate of member states, the ASEAN Way seemed to benefit the
country well in terms of sovereignty respected, and international pressure buffered, development and transition to democracy encouraged
until it can gain control in channeling all forces for democratic change
onto the least damaging path.
The critiques have been on the “ASEAN Way”59; meaning all dressed
up countries’ representatives traveling together, meeting together, enjoying meals and tea together, and playing golf together for no substantial organizational improvement, sharp decisions and effective
interventions on regional matters. Sometime, and many times, efficiency does not go together with democratic way. In fact, the ASEAN
Way does emphasize building a governance platform for consultation,
consensus-building, abide by the rule of non-interference respecting
each member’s sovereignty, thus the organization can adopt the only
policies which satisfy the “lowest common denominator” among its
member states.
If it is just for an organization, efficiency unquestionably is the performance indicator, but for governance hundreds of millions of people
with their lives, democratic way must be the better alternative. It is seen
that ASEAN is developing a kind of collective governance under its core
mandate of peace, security and stability.
Witnessing ASEAN today, such “ASEAN Way” was proven a good
remedy to bring in all diverse countries with intra-conflicts together on
the negotiation table under the same mandate, preventing ‘the worse’,
aiming toward ‘better’. The principles have paved a good way for building respect and trust among members. Further analysis and exploration
can become a case study for scholars of organizational study. However,
from Myanmar National Security perspective, the ASEAN Way helped
this over-burdened country to re-engage with the outside world, buffering the strong world politics and international pressure, leaving a workable space for the country to move forward.
VI. THE INTEGRATION, WAY FORWARD WITH MYANMAR
So far, analysis of ASEAN behavior shows that the institution has poten59 The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs is retained as a basic tenant of ASEAN,
decision are only by consensus.
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tial to be successful not being the most efficient and strong organization
excluding rouge members but including all members to develop a common agenda together. The further success of ASEAN with its roadmap
for integration will depend on the ability, flexibility and leadership to
bring consensus among member states with the consolidation of the
organization over time.
Under ASEAN mandates, ten member countries now collaborate together as well as with other Asian nations China, Japan, Australia, South
Korea and so on and so forth. The ultimate benefit of the ASEAN association is the creation of a discussion table or negotiation platform for
all member states and other neighboring stakeholder countries, thus
paving a way to maintain SEA region’s strategic location and development potential intact.
The common interest or common stake of ASEAN member states
will also continue to grow ever. Global political climate is developing
into possible future of multi-polarity again with the rise of China and
India in both political and economic terms; as well as with invisible,
stateless and dangerous powers (terrorism for instance) opposing the
world’s only super power. Whether it will be a new world order with
several big powers under a superpower or to become a true multi-polar world is wait and see. Nonetheless, there surely will be a struggling
process of powers re-alignment in world politics, looking at the current world affairs relating security and wars. Also ASEAN having many
member states of Islamic community will be more important in facing
global terrorism which has so far been led or caused by extremist Islam.
At the same time, the states of the world will be more and more connected with a high tide of economic relations. ASEAN will be enjoying
the tide which will bring prosperity for its people.
Now Myanmar has been successfully on board; already set to chair
the ASEAN in 2014. It is actively participating in regional affairs.
“We are going for the integration. It is the honor to fulfill overdue
responsibility to chair ASEAN in 2014.” That exactly is the view of Myanmar on ASEAN today. Myanmar will keep up its foreign policies and
will collaborate more with international community, especially with
ASEAN as its reform process accelerates.
The importance of the relation between Myanmar and ASEAN that
in turn extends relations to the global system was reflected in a recent
speech by Derek Mitchell, U.S Ambassador to Myanmar for about
twenty years, in Atlanta. He claimed rapid political reform of Myanmar
is unlocking opportunities for U.S companies across the Southeast Asia.
From the process, the U.S will not only benefit a new market but also a
165
leeway to deal with ASEAN, a growing region that is vital to American
economic and military interests, as U.S believes.
As much as Myanmar gained more politically after joining ASEAN,
this organization is also better off with Myanmar in balancing the
world’s largest political and economical powers. Myanmar is the second largest country in the region, especially the largest land country
with fertile soil, energy and other resources. Being itself a big market
for other ASEAN countries, Myanmar can also become a good exporter for agricultural produces and low skill industrial products once it
starts developing. Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN/AFTA is expected as a positive impact on its economic development in the short to
medium-tem. Thus, cooperation and collaboration will benefit Myanmar and the rest of ASEAN for more development and prosperity of
the region.
Myanmar leadership today, both the President and Daw Aung San
Sun Kyi, stated that Myanmar would not turn back from its reforms toward democracy. ASEAN praised it. United States recognized it. China
will not interdict it. The rest of the world recognized and were excited
about it. Some experts are saying that if Myanmar can maintain the momentum or reform today, it can become the fastest developing country
in the world as well as a role model for non-violence democratizing and
political system reform.
Nonetheless, there are many facets in term of National Security for
today Myanmar. The new democratic government is on quest to stabilize
the country, institutionalize emerging democratic institutions, building
peace and poverty reduction by people-centered development. Also,
it needs to improve international relations and diplomacy, while safeguarding national sovereignty, and national interest for “peace, security, stability and prosperity”. The capacity of good governance has to
overcome “multi-dimensional challenges” as well as “over-expectation
of people”.
To do the entire task, accounting present governance capacity and
policymaking, the clock is now ticking in ASEAN timetable of integration. Myanmar will definitely need a lot of efforts, helping hands and
strategies from its neighbors and sincere partners of ASEAN in coming
exciting decades.
Only the political, economical and social maturity of the organization through its integration process will benefit all member states including Myanmar and their neighboring countries. For the ASEAN and
its integration coming years, Myanmar is expected to stay positive, supportive, and collaborative and be an active member.
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VII. ENDING NOTE
National security is a taboo word in global system. Powerful countries
believe that only the power (hard or soft or smart) over others can secure
their security. For smaller and weaker countries, it is the right to “sovereignty” although they will not alight from the quest for more power.
Practices follow the belief and the world has been in security dilemma.
“Among the differences, find a common ground to start working
together for better rewards”. If it is the useful fundamental of negotiation, will it be still a coherent statement when it comes to the issue of
Security?
If national security of a sovereign country is to survive and develop, to enjoy peace, stability and prosperity, it is definite that different
countries of the world with all their differences race, religion, culture,
politics, and development stages must have such common interest. Are
those interests mutually exclusive or inclusive? The task of aligning national interest of sovereign countries cannot be the easy task. Moreover,
such a novel agenda will be unlikely to get somewhere when the global
security dilemma in global politics is undermined. The agenda must be
implemented together by all the member states of the world.
Will ASEAN as a group of developing nations in South East Asia
make a difference in this quest? Can Myanmar enrich ASEAN to be successful in its endeavors? There are quite a few wishful thinking and intriguing questions but no answer yet. Also, we will have to walk through
the mist to see the future.
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Analysing Regional Integration In South Asia:
A Security Perspective
Sachin Pardhe60
RESUMEN
Existe una relación intrínseca entre política y economía. Si una región
avanza en su desarrollo económico, las posibilidades de un conflicto
interestatal suelen decrecer a causa de una creciente interdependencia económica. Sin embargo, en regiones políticamente fragmentadas,
los lazos económicos deben construirse para fortalecer los vínculos
políticos. Asia del Sur no es una excepción a esta regla. Desde de la
Segunda Guerra Mundial, el sur de Asia se ha mantenido como una
región frágil, especialmente luego de su nuclearización. El proceso de
integración regional se ve afectado por las tensiones políticas existentes entre los países en asuntos de comercio y economía, causando un
“déficit de confianza” que ha sido motivo de mayor preocupación para
la seguridad regional. El primer paso concreto hacia la integración regional en Asia del Sur fue dado en 1985 con la formación de la Asociación Sudasiática para la Cooperación Regional (ASACR). No obstante, la ASACR no es una panacea. La pregunta natural que surge es:
¿qué salió mal? Asia del Sur es una región bien definida en términos
geográficos, con un legado único de identidad compartida tanto en lo
cultural como en lo histórico. Sin embargo, la región aún sigue luchando por arraigar su identidad fragmentada como región. Este artículo
intentará analizar los factores causales detrás de la débil integración
regional en Asia del Sur y sus implicaciones para la seguridad regional,
y viceversa.
ABSTRACT
There is an intrinsic relationship between politics and economy. If
a region goes well with composite economic development there are
lesser chances of conflicts among states within the region because of
economic interdependence. However, in politically fragmented regions
economic ties need to be built to strengthen political ties. South Asia is
60 The author is an Assistant Professor, at the Department of Civics and Politics, University of
Mumbai, Mumbai (MS), India
172
not an exception to this rule. Post-Second World War South Asia, has
remained a fragile region more specifically after the nuclearisation of
the region The difficulties in regional integration in South Asia thus
imply the pronounced influence of political tensions among countries
on trade and economy causing ‘trust deficit’, which has been major regional security concern. The first concrete step towards regional integration in South Asia was taken in 1985 with the formation of the South
Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC); however SAARC
couldn’t prove a panacea. The natural question that arises is: What went
wrong? South Asia as a region is well defined in terms of geography with
a unique legacy of shared cultural and historical identity yet the region
is still struggling to accommodate its fragmented identity as a region.
This article is an attempt to analyze the causative factors behind the
weak regional integration in South Asia and its implications for regional
security and vice versa.
I. INTRODUCTION
Post Cold War international relations are being determined by the
swapping trends of globalisation and economic integration, giving leverage to economy over polity as against the preceding century world.
South Asia, though not an exception to the same, is still struggling to accommodate its fragmented identity as a region despite its well defined
geography with a unique legacy of shared cultural and historical identity. Due to the complex nature of political relations among states, the
region remained fragile, it is because of this tense relationship among
states, regional integration has become more difficult and cooperative
measures like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) failed to achieve the desired goals.
This paper argues that the major reason for the weak regional integration in South Asia is primarily the security concerns or the threat
perceptions of states and what is called as ‘trust deficit’61 in the region
and unless it is addressed properly, it is difficult to seek regional integration in South Asia. Therefore, while analysing regional integration
in South Asia it is essential to understand the security architecture of
the region that has been crucial in determining the pace of regional
integration.
61 BBC News South Asia (2010), India PM says trying to tackle Pakistan ‘trust gap’, available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10146278 and The Indian Express (2010), Talks better than expected, trust deficit remains: Pak, available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/talks-betterthan-expected-trust-deficit-remains-pak/613777/2
Analysing Regional Integration In South Asia
173
II. SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The South Asian security architecture is shaped by the interplay of geographical and political forces that determine the behaviour of the regional states as well as extra- regional actors including non-state actors.
These geographical and political forces though overlap sometimes, can
be studied from two broad perspectives.
GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
Geographical configuration of South Asia has been crucial in shaping
the security architecture of the region and behaviour of the states. Considering the geographical aspects of the region three major factors need
special attention.
One, geographically South Asia is an ‘Indo-centric’ (Kishore C.
Dash, 2008: 46) region making India appear as ‘de-facto hegemon’ of
the region. In terms of geographical area India alone occupies almost
72 per cent area of the region. ‘It is one of the inescapable realities of
life in South Asia that India lies at its center in every way imaginable.
Its massive landmass lies at the physical center of the subcontinent. Every South Asian state, except Afghanistan and the island nations, borders India, and practically none of the others share borders’ (Hagerty,
2005: 90). This Indo-centric geography has been playing a psychological catalyst in shaping the threat perceptions more precisely of smaller
states like Nepal and Bhutan making them sceptic about India. It has
also caused what Hewitt suggests ‘small state’ complex (Hewitt, 1997:
62) among smaller states in South Asia. Some scholars like Mohammed Ayoob had suggested that the ‘the primary objective and overriding concern of Indian foreign policy since the dawn of independence in
1947 has been the establishment of India’s predominance in South Asia
-a predominance whose legitimacy would be accepted by other nations
in the region’ (Ayoob, 1990: 107-133). On the other hand scholars like
Subrata Mitra (2003: 399) described India as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ and
argues that the hiatus between India’s self-perception as a status quo
power and its perception by neighbouring states as a regional bully is a
main cause of stalemate in the South Asian security environment. Considering above inferences it can be argued that this Indo-centric geography has caused fear among smaller states which seem to be based on
the assumption that India might extend its borders or interfere in the
domestic affairs of smaller states.
Second, every South Asian state except Maldives and Sri Lanka,
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share territorial boundaries with India and as Kautilya’s Mandal Siddhanta suggests that the neighbouring states are more likely to be enemies than friends, almost each of them have some disputes either over
border or over river water sharing with India, thus, making the region
more prone to conflicts and disputes. However, it is the Indo-Pakistan
relationship, in this context, that has been more decisive in defining the
security architecture of the region as well as determining the success
of the regional integration. This relationship has been shaped by many
factors including the ‘colonial legacy in India and Pakistan’ (Jalal, 1995:
9). The trauma of partition and the Kashmir issue still haunts the region.
The creations of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971 not only
sharpened the existing conflict between India and Pakistan, but also
turned the geopolitics of the region in favour of India.
The third geographical factor has extra-regional elements involved
in it. The strategic geographical location of states in South Asia has a
crucial role to play in the realpolitik of the region that has attracted great
powers making them important actors in the regional security architecture. For example the geo-strategic location of Pakistan and its proximity with Afghanistan attracted US involvement in Pakistan, the position
of Nepal and its proximity with Tibet, Sri Lanka and Maldives in Indian
Ocean Region led to the Chinese involvement. Thus analysis of this factor require careful investigation of major extra-regional stakeholders
including the US, China and Russia.
The United States has been an important extra-regional actor in
the security architecture of the region because of its vital interests in
Afghanistan and the subsequent relationship with Pakistan making it
a key extra-regional actor after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in
1989 from Afghanistan. The nuclearisation of the region in the context
of tense Indo-Pak relations further attracted the US involvement in the
region; however, it is the ‘Asian century’ narrative and the rise of China
that has led to further cooperation between India and the US to counterbalance the Chinese growing influence in South Asia and the Indian
Ocean region, causing fundamental changes in the security dynamics
of the region. The People’s Republic of China is another major stakeholder in the region having not only geographical proximity but also
vital interests in the Indian Ocean Region concerning to quench its increasing thirst of energy. It is this energy requirement that has led China
to secure its oil root in the Indian Ocean Region by developing ports
and bases in neighbouring states of India including Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, which India perceives as the encirclement
of India by China, described as ‘the string of pearls’, (Athwal, 2008:44-
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46), (Chapman, 2011: 60) and as a threat to its national security.
The Chinese claim. however, can be studied from two fundamental
concerns, one, that it shares border with the region and has a vital security interests involved more specifically in Tibet. Second, it has to secure its energy root to satisfy the needs of its growing economy. Hence,
the role of China becomes more crucial in determining the threat perceptions of South Asian states in general and India in particular. The
third major extra-regional stakeholder is Russia. Post Cold War balance
of power though not much inclined in favour of Russia, yet it seems to
start a new inning in the politics of South Asia by reviving its relationship with India as well as developing relationship with Pakistan and has
potential to influence the security dynamics of the region. The role of
extra-regional actors in the region has also become more important because many smaller states tend to rely more on extra regional power
for security than forming any regional security arrangement ‘to offset’
(Dash, 2008: 77) the power of India, making regional integration much
difficult.
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
Inter-state political relations in South Asia are shaped by many factors
including the history, sharing of natural resources, border tensions, and
illegal migration, cross border terrorism (India and Pakistan) and over
emphasised nationalism. South Asia is a region that has seen almost
every type of government in the recent past, including democracy, authoritarian rule, military rule and monarchy. To further worsen the situation it has two largest states as neighbours that had fought four wars
and are nuclear states, making the region more dangerous. It is primarily the tense political relationship between India and Pakistan that has
been a major hurdle in regional integration in South Asia, because of
two obvious reasons. One, India and Pakistan are two largest states in
the region and regional integration is not possible without their cooperation. Second, both the states are nuclear powers and hence their behaviour influences not only the behaviour of smaller states in the region
but also attract major global powers towards the region.
This political perspective, has two dimensions to it, one internal dimension which is shaped primarily by the behaviour of India and Pakistan the two largest and powerful states in the region and the second,
that is external dimension which is shaped by the non-regional actors
or great powers influencing the behaviour of not only smaller states
but also India and Pakistan, as T.V. Paul aptly suggests that ‘the peace
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and conflict patterns of a given region are often significantly affected by
the interactions and interventions of great powers in that region’ (Palit,
2011: 101) which is more visible in South Asia.
Internal dimension has to do with the issues of inter-state conflicts
(like between India and Pakistan the issue of Kashmir, India and Bangladesh the issue of illegal migrants, between India and Sri Lanka the
issue of Tamils, etc.) and cooperation (Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and
Friendship of 1950, Pakistan-Sri Lanka relations, etc.), between and
among the regional states as well as the role of regional major powers
to influence the behaviour of smaller states. Another significant feature
of the internal dimension of security architecture in South Asia is its bipolarity or what Barry Buzan prefers to call a ‘bipolar Regional Security
Complex’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 37). A prominent feature of this bipolar Regional Security Complex is what is called ‘trust deficit’ between
the major regional powers that further led to hostility between them
eventually making regional integration a tough task.
The external dimension has wider implication for South Asian security as it involved wider interests of extra-regional actors that tend
to counterbalance the influence of regional major actors like India, as
Dash has observed that ‘India’s ability to exert too much control in the
region is limited by three factors including India’s inability to meet with
all the development needs of small states, Indo-Pakistan, Indo-China
rivalry and the perceived threat of India to the security of small states
(Dash, 2008: 77). These factors provide an opportunity to the extra-regional actors to play in the game. Further, ‘the asymmetry paradigm,
which favours China over India and India over Pakistan, offers certainly
a clue to the triangular configuration, particularly to its strategic dimension’ (Racine, 2001: 1) compelling states, even major regional states like
India and Pakistan, to strengthen ties with extra-regional powers like
USA and China. This explains why India seeks relations with US and
Pakistan’s developing relations with China. C. Raja Mohan and Alyssa
Ayres, however, argue that, ‘China’s economic penetration of its peripheral states has encouraged India to adopt the slogan of promoting
a ‘peaceful periphery’, open its market for goods from the neighbours,
and go more than halfway in resolving the many contentious bilateral
political disputes.’ (Mohan and Ayres, 2009: 319). In a nutshell, this external element does influence the behaviour of South Asian states and
to an extent the cooperation among them.
To consider the geographical and political factors it can be stated
that the role of geopolitics in defining the security architecture is much
crucial in South Asia. Considering the above discussed geo-political
177
factors, it can be argued that the cooperation among states remain a
difficult task not only because of the political tensions among regional
states but also because of the strategic choices of the great powers while
forming ties with South Asian states that further lead to increase suspicions among regional states. It is therefore need to be emphasised that
when it comes to cooperation in such politically fragmented and geographically asymmetric region like South Asia it is primarily the political will of member states, to respond to the cooperative agreements that
determine the success of the regional integration.
While analysing regional integration in South Asia in the context of
above discussion at least three major factors along with many others
can be identified that have been crucial in determining regional integration in South Asia:
a) The bipolar ‘Regional Security Complex’ and the mutual relationship
of India and Pakistan.
b)The role of Extra-regional Powers in shaping the behaviour of regional states as well as counterbalancing the influence of major regional
powers, and
c) The threat perceptions of the states.
III. REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA: A THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE
‘A common definition of regional integration states that it is a shifting of
certain national activities toward a new centre (Haas, 1958). Integration
therefore is a form of collective action among countries in order to obtain
a certain goal.’ (Feng Yi and Genna, 2003: 278). Regional integration requires common political and economic agenda among member states to
foster regional integration, however, the lack of such common approach
towards institutional arrangement causing major problems. This behaviour of South Asian states and their perceptions of regional integration
can thus be studied from theoretical perspective to get better insight.
THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Theories of integration have mainly been developed to explain European integration. Europe was the region of the world,
where regional integration started in the early 1950s with the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Ernest
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Haas theorized this experience in The Uniting of Europe (1958).
The main theoretical contribution was the concept of spill-over
(Finn Laursen, 2008: 3).
However, while analysing regional integration in South Asia the
neo-functionalism of Haas and his concept of spill-over does help understand India’s role in the overall development of the region, yet, it is
the neo-realist and neo-liberal approach, that explains the behaviour of
South Asian states when it comes to regional integration.
NEO-REALISM AND NEO-LIBERAL APPROACH
Neo-realists hold that states are more sensitive to relative
gains than absolute gains in cooperation. That is, even if a cooperative deal were to yield absolute gains to a state, it would still
be willing to forgo cooperation if it believed that other states,
especially if potentially threatening, would gain relatively more.
Hence, cooperation can be successful only if it does not upset the
perceived power balance to which states are sensitive, no matter
what absolute gains one can point to as the fruits of cooperation…
Neo-liberals on the other hand “argue that the degree of a state’s
concern for relative gain is conditional and depends on the intensity of the security dilemma it faces… (Sridharan, 2011: 78-79).
If we analyse both neo-realist as well as neo-liberal interpretation of
regional integration in the context of South Asia, both seem to explain
the behaviour of states in South Asia. It is the disjuncture between perceptions of benefit from an increased economic integration versus the
suspicions of security competition particularly acute in India-Pakistan
relationship as neo-realists suggest by using the ‘relative gains’ theory,
that is causing slow movement towards regional integration in South
Asia. However, neo-liberal approach explains the behaviour of smaller states as the intensity of the security dilemma of these states differs
from one another, making some of them willing partners and others
still sceptic. This explains why Pakistan long denied the MFN (Most Favoured Nation) status to India under SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade
Area), despite potential trade benefits to both the countries or why the
initiative to form a regional group like SAARC came from a small state
like Bangladesh and not from India or Pakistan.
Thus South Asia as can be seen in figure 1 remained the least integrated region in the world and the primary reason is the primacy
179
given to the relative gains over the absolute gains by the major actors
because of mistrust and suspicion between and among states. However,
it doesn’t mean that the initiatives towards cooperation and integration
had not been taken or there are zero chances of regional integration in
South Asia. A major and concrete step towards regional cooperation
and integration was taken in 1985 by forming the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). However, SAARC couldn’t
prove a panacea, yet it has a tremendous potential and had taken further initiatives like SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)
and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) towards regional integration.
Thus the role of SAARC in regional integration needs to be analysed
with the study of its inbuilt fault lines and major challenges.
Figure 1. SAARC vis-à-vis Other Regions62
IV. THE ROLE OF SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL
COOPERATION (SAARC)
It was in 1985 with the initiatives of the late president of Bangladesh
62 Source: Selim Raihan (2012), SAFTA and the South Asian Countries: Quantitative Assessments of Potential, South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM),Department of
Economics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka , Bangladesh Implications. Munich Personal RePEc
Archive, MPRA Paper No. 37884, posted 7, available at : http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.
de/37884/1/MPRA_paper_37884.pdf
180
Ziaur Rahaman, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was
formed with seven founding members namely Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan joined the
organisation in 2007.
The SAARC seeks to promote the welfare of the peoples of South
Asia, accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region, promote and strengthen collective self-reliance,
promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in various fields,
strengthen cooperation with other developing countries, strengthen
cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of
common interests; and cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes (SAARC Charter).63
However, it needs to be emphasised that the countries of South
Asia were ruled by leaders of different denominations when SAARC
was conceived and created. They included two military dictators from
Pakistan and Bangladesh, two monarchs from Nepal and Bhutan, two
democratically elected leaders from India and Sri Lanka and one autocrat from Maldives who came together to establish this body.
To think that these leaders did not have any agenda other than a
regional agenda would be a mistake.’(Pattanaik, 2011: 239) and hence
from the very creation of SAARC, member States remained sceptic
about the hidden agendas of each other. For example, India perceived
SAARC as a ganging up by the smaller neighbours against India, Pakistan on the other hand was sceptic about Indian dominance within the
institutional arrangement. Even one cannot firmly assert that the motive behind the initiative towards creation of SAARC by Bangladesh was
mere regional cooperation and not to counterbalance the Indian influence in the region.
Therefore, considering the conditions in which the foundation of the
SAARC was laid amid the atmosphere of mistrust, the organisation was
bound to be weak and thus remained very insignificant and the intraregional cooperation and trade couldn’t increase.
However, when it comes to economic cooperation, the role of India in the region need to be studied carefully to understand what Ernst
Haas calls the spill over effect.
‘India’s economy is disproportionately larger than its neighbours.
Currently India accounts for about 80 percent of the region’s GDP, Pakistan accounts for about 10 percent, Bangladesh 6 percent, Sri Lanka 2
percent, and the rest less than 2 percent and the modest impact in the
post reform era indicates that India is able to influence growth in the re63 Source: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), (1985) SAARC Charter,
available at: http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Charter/5/
181
gion, however, the level of India’s growth spill over remained low compared to other economic powerhouses. (Ding and Masha, 2012: 7-8, 19).
India’s economic role in the region thus can be understood in the light
of the fact that despite the increase in overall trade with SAARC states,
the share of India’s trade with non-SAARC countries is also increasing
considerably (see figure 2). It is because of this increasing trade with
non-regional states; critics argue that even institutional arrangements
like SAFTA may not substantially help intra-regional trade in SAARC.
Figure 2.64
However, SAARC can not be called a complete failure, despite the
several challenges and hurdles, SAARC members succeeded in forming
the SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) in 1993 and transformed it into South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2004.
Despite these major initiatives and institutional arrangement, regional integration in South Asia remained a long cherished dream. Ratnakar Adhikari argued that two political factors namely Indo-Pakistan
relations and domestic political economy factors has led to fragment64 Source: Ding Ding and Iyabo Masha (2012), India’s Growth Spillovers to South Asia, International Monetary Fund, February, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/
wp1256.pdf
182
ed trading arrangements in South Asia and has reduced incentives to
strengthen SAFTA.(Adhikari, 2009: 7).65 These restrictive trade practices
despite the institutional arrangements, however, increased the informal or unofficial trade between the states in South Asia that actually
suggests the potential of intra-regional trade in South Asia.
However, there have been several positive changes in the region in
the past decade and more positive initiatives started coming from the
member states like Pakistan’s decision to replace its ‘Positive List’ with
a ‘Negative List’ for trade with India, India’s decision to lift a ban on
investment from Pakistan66 or India granting duty-free market access
to Afghanistan along with LDCs.67 Nevertheless, to realise the dream of
more united and integrated South Asia certain fundamental challenges
need to be readdressed. During her visit to India in 2012, Bangladesh
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had suggested a very important thing,
while responding to a question regarding anti-India mindset in Bangladesh she said: “Anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh may perhaps remain. I cannot change that. But common people want better lives and if
results are achieved in India-Bangladesh cooperation, these sentiments
will not work”.68 Thus the best way to resolve the existing deadlock is to
keep the political issues aside and pursue regional economic cooperation assertively such that economic imperatives ultimately dominate
the scene and pacify the tense relations among states.
V. CONCLUSION
South Asia as a region has huge potential as Sadiq Ahmed, a World Bank
director of regional cooperation for South Asia observed that ‘eliminating restrictions would result in intra-regional trade in South Asia quadrupling from $5 billion to $20 billion’.69 However, unless the political
65 Ratnakar Adhikari (2009), Intra-regional free trade agreements: Implications for regional
trade integration in South Asia, in South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment
(SAWTEE), no. 9, available at: http://www.sawtee.org/publications/Briefing-Paper-19.pdf
66 The Times of India (2012), India lifts ban on investment from Pakistan, available at: http://
articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-02/india-business/33000272_1_negative-listindia-and-pakistan-energy-trade
67 The Hindu (2011), India allows duty free market access to Afghanistan, available at: http://
www.thehindu.com/business/markets/article2073708.ece
68 The Economic Times (2010), India, Bangladesh may ink extradition treaty, available at:
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-01-14/news/28385913_1_extraditiontreaty-terror-cooperation-mutual-legal-assistance
69 Sadiq ahmed, Saman kelegama and Ejaz ghani, Promoting Economic Cooperation in South
Asi, Preface. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-1192413140459/4281804-1192413178157/4281806-1265938468438/BeyondSAFTAFeb2010Preface.pdf
183
issues are kept aside by the regional actors and decision makers, cooperation seems difficult.
Since, it is very clear that the primary factors affecting regional integration in South Asia are the so-called Indian hegemony, the trustdeficit among states, the Indo-Pakistan relationship and the reluctance
of the larger countries particularly India and Pakistan, to discharge the
responsibility to ensure the success of the regional integration arrangement. Haacke thus, suggests, ’when analysing cooperative security arrangements and regional organisations it is also necessary to bear in
mind that relations between members and the major powers shape
their development and achievements’ (Hoadley and Jurgen, 2006: 129).
As Paul argued that ‘South Asia’s multidimensional insecurity can be
explained largely by two critical factors: the presence of weak states and
weak cooperative interstate norms’ (Paul, 2010). Thus while dealing
with the existing situation in South Asia two directional positive efforts
to strengthen cooperation are required, one, towards each other that
is the mutual relations among member states in general and India and
Pakistan in particular, second, towards SAARC as an institution.
I n this context, there could be three ways to deal with the issue of
dawdling regional integration in South Asia:
1. Considering the anti-India mindset amongst smaller states in
South Asia, India needs to be more proactive towards cooperation through institutional arrangement like SAARC or even
while adopting policies towards smaller states need to be more
lenient as suggested by the former Indian Prime Minister, I.K
Gujral in his well known ‘Gujral Doctrine’ (Prys, 2012).
2. Since, the Indo-Pak relationship is the major obstacle in regional integration, both of them should try to resolve their political
issues bilaterally or through institutional mechanism or just
keep them aside while defining economic future of the region
so that it won’t affect the functionality of the institution.
3. Strengthening SAARC and making it more effective and functional by allowing it to deal with bilateral and even complex political issues.
Major political tensions with smaller states thus can be tackled easily if India adopts more responsible and positive engaging approach
towards its small neighbours. However, when it comes to the role of India and Pakistan, both the states need to strengthen the institutional
arrangement by virtue of being the major regional actors, because, as
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Gujral suggested, the major reason behind less cooperation in South
Asia is an ‘overload of mistrust’: ‘Unless we sympathetically appreciate
each other’s constraints, we will continue to sink in this quagmire.’ (I.K.
Gujral, 2003: 194).
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india-business/33000272_1_negative-list-india-and-pakistan-energytrade
New Regional Security Challenges:
Japan’s outlook since March 11
Yusuke Dan
RESUMEN
Este artículo analiza tres desafíos de seguridad regional en el este de
Asia haciendo foco en Japón: tensiones geopolíticas regionales, dilemas
en el ámbito energético y medioambiental y liderazgo político. En este
sentido, el concepto “seguridad regional” es utilizado en su sentido más
amplio. Cuáles son los factores claves de los que se desprende la estabilidad regional? ¿Qué puede hacerse para avanzar hacia una región
más segura? ¿Cuáles son los límites para un liderazgo de Japón? Este
artículo intenta responder a estas preguntas de pertinencia geopolítica,
energética y de liderazgo. En la sección final, He tratado de resaltar los
desafíos clave para la integración regional.
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses three regional security challenges in East Asia focusing on Japan: regional geopolitical tensions, energy and environmental dilemmas, and political leadership. The term regional security
is here used in a broad sense. What are the key regional factors preventing regional stability? What can be done to develop a more secure region? What are the national constraints to leadership? This paper tries
to respond to these pertinent questionas on geopolitics, energy and
leadership. In the concluding section I have tried to highlight the key
challenges for regional integration.
I. GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES
Since 2012, there suddenly emerged bursts of regional, chiefly bilateral,
tensions stemming from older geopolitical frictions in East Asia. The issue of comfort women who the Japanese government forcefully recruited when occupied Korea during World War II (WWII) has reignited 20
years after the issue surfaced and remains unresolved without a proper
public apology from Japan.
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Japan is currently dealing with three territorial issues around different islands which have become an object of renewed contention almost simultaneously: Diauyou vis-à-vis mainland China and Taiwan,
between South Korea and Japan, and between Russia and Japan.
This situation has not been mitigated by the domestic political weaknesses in mainland China, South Korea and Japan, as their leaders prepared for transfer of power. It seems as if the leaders are following the
conventional international relations (realist) textbooks to divert voters’
attention to a common external enemy.
At the time of writing this chapter, Japan’s chief geopolitical enmity
continues to be against China and South Korea.
CHINA
Since 1895, Japan maintained its sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diauyu)
Islands. Over the past couple of years, there have been clashes between
Japan’s National Coast Guard and China’s fishing boats and research
vessels. Three of the five privately owned islands were rented by the national government since 2002. It suddenly became known to the Japanese people in the spring of 2012 that 4 of the islands have been owned
by one private Japanese national, and that there was a conversation of
the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase them. The conservative
mayor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, asked for donations from the people
at large, succeeding in collecting 1.8 billion yen (approx.21 million US
Dollars), enough to purchase the islands and start negotiating with the
owner. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, of Democratic Party of Japan,
after unsuccessfully negotiating with the Japanese Mayor, decided to nationalize them without using the metropolitan donation money.
Incensed by these moves, Chinese citizens waged large scale demonstrations in over 100 cities in China in August and September 2012,
asserting China’s territorial rights. The Chinese government did not
dare to subdue the violent marches until mid-September when some
protesters started voicing their complaints of their own government
about the expanding income gap which has hurt many workers in
China. The violent riots in China against Japanese restaurants, hotels
and factories resulted in 40% decrease on passengers visiting China on
airliners in September alone, and even fewer Chinese tourists flying to
Japan. Many Japanese companies expect direct and long term losses,
while many expect to exit China permanently to find safer production
sites. The Chinese government cancelled official events celebrating the
normalization of diplomacy between the 2 nations 40 years ago. Some
New Regional Security Challenges: Japan’s outlook since March 11
189
bilateral cultural programs have halted; experts comment that this has
been the worst year in the last forty years.
In November 2012, a couple of weeks after the transfer pf power taking place in Beijing, Chinese pficial patrol boats kept visiting the neighboring seas of the islands, as a sign of China’s continuing interest. Only
a few years ago, China began to assert its territorial rights over them. In
the first half of 2013, Chinese official patrol, survey and fishing boats,
but not the navy, have entered the seas controlled by Japan on numerous occasions. The United States has officially asserted that the islands
are under Japan’s administration, but does not state that they belong to
Japan.
Since taking office in December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
with his conservative political views, has incensed Japan’s neighborsby
calling for the revision of Japan’s peace constitution, by trying to rename
Japan’s Self Defense Forces to National Defence Army, and by reviving
the debates on war memorial and apology for the atrocities commited
by Japan during WWII. Mr. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, with an unstabnle but unusually high support rate, intends to win the upper house
election in July 2013, to pursue these policies, which may destabilize the
geopolitical balance in the region.
SOUTH KOREA
As far as Japan’s general public opinion was concerned, there existed a
vague understanding that the Dokdo Islands (Takeshima Islands in Japanese, or Liancourt Rocks as internationally known) were the attention
of a low key territorial issue between the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan. Since the summer of 2012, however, the issue has come
to the front pages, with a South Korean football player hoisting a political
banner during the London Olympic Games, and with the South Korean
President literally setting his feet on the islands as a political gesture. The
islands are an object of territorial dispute at least in theory among North
and South Koreas and Japan. Currently the contestation continues between South Korea, which lies closer to the islands, and Japan.
After Japan’s 30 year of colonial occupation of the Korean Peninsula
ended in 1945, sovereignty issues were hardly discussed between South
Korea and Japan. Even after the diplomatic relations between the two
nations were normalized in 1965, Japan did not bother to voice its territorial rights over the islands. This was at the height of the Cold War, and
the region had to deal with much more serious geopolitical issues under
this global regime. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, South
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Korea continues to be at war with North Korea, while Japan struggles to
solve the issue of Japanese nationals kidnapped by the North Korean
government in the 1970s and 80s.
From a Japanese perspective, the sudden show of Korean nationalism in the summer of 2012 has been perplexing. The Dokdo Islands are
practically occupied, even inhabited, by Koreans, and it seems doubtful
that the Koreans gained anything by President Lee Myung Bak setting
his feet on the islands, other than his political popularity.
As Professor Park Cheol-Hee, Seoul National University contends,
territorial conflicts may provide a certain gain in domestic politics in
the short term, but in the long term can lead harm or even poison diplomatic relations_ (Park, 2012). His proposal is for both nations to agree
on a political moratorium so that regional actors would not take advantage of this issue for domestic political gains.
RUSSIA
The focal point between Russia and Japan is the Kuril Islands (Hopporyodo [Northern Territories] in Japanese, consisting of 4 islands just
off the coast of Hokkaido). The 4 islands, which had been inhabited by
17,000 Japanese nationals until the end of WWII, have been occupied
and inhabited by Russians since 1945. They became headline news in
late 2010 when Russian President Dmitri Medvedev visited Kunashir
(Kunashiri in Japanese), one of the islands, for the first time as a Russian
president (BBC, 2010). Japan’s Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Foreign
Minister Seiji Maehara strongly condemned his visit to part of Japan’s
territories, to which Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded
by asserting that they are Russian land.
The Japanese general sentiments are averse to Russia because of
two reasons dating from WWII. First, despite the bilateral agreement on
non-invasion during WWII, Russia declared the war against Japan two
days after the first nuclear bombs destroyed Hiroshima, and only a week
before Japan surrendered in 1945; and, second, upwards of one million
Japanese nationals taken hostage in the territories of Soviet Union at the
end of WWII were forced to live and work in Siberian concentrations
camps under devastating conditions for up to ten years, during which
up to one third, i.e., three hundred thousand, died.
In addition, Japan’s ambivalent attitude towards communism plays
a large part in post WWII Japan-Soviet Union (Russia) relations. On the
one hand, there was a strong yearning for socialist/communist revolution as a way to change the society: this was evident in post WWII Ja-
191
pan, during the students’ movement in the 1960s, and even well into
the 1980s as a social atmosphere, which the Communist Part of Japan
still exemplifies today. On the other hand, the majority constituting the
capitalist society were gradually disappointed by what Soviet Union
and, later, Communist China failed to achieve, and, under the military
umbrella of the US-Japan Security Treaty, became suspicious of Russia’s
political motives. However, the fact that the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP, conservative pro-business, pro-capitalist) managed to be the ruling party for half a century with only a very short interruption by socialists till 2006 shows that there was a strong scepticism of communism in
the society.
Since the mid-1980s Japanese people’s sentiments started to change.
Perestroika (rebuilding of socialist economy) started to transform the
society and the international outlook of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing termination of the Cold War affected the general feelings in Japan
towards Russians. In Japan, businesses sought closer ties with Russia,
while students learned Russian in large numbers, hoping for broader
recruitment opportunities. This can be seen as a sign that Japanese people can adapt to changing circumstances, notwithstanding the history
lying between Japan and Russia.
The basic geopolitical picture is as follows: Japan maintains effective
sovereignty over Senkaku Islands against China, but not over Takeshima Islands against South Korea or Northern Territories against Russia.
Taiwan is in a different position, especially because of its diplomatic relationship with mainland China.
Solving these issues bilaterally is difficult, since there is no clear, unbiased solution to any of the territorial issues. Clinging onto a narrow
notion of national sovereignty will not lead to any forward looking outcome. Any bilateral clash will have consequences detrimental to either
side both in the short and long terms.
II. FUKUSHIMA
The nuclear disaster after the earthquakes and tsunamis on March 11,
2011, offers a persistent concern for the future of energy and environmental security. This is still an ongoing issue without any goal in sight.
During the first summer and winter after the emergency, the Japanese people, government offices and businesses conserved energy to
the extreme especially in the north-eastern afflicted areas and successfully avoided major blackouts. As time passed, remaining nuclear plants
192
were obliged to shut down for regular inspection and reinforcement of
safety measures. At the time of writing (June 2013), none except 2 of the
50 nuclear reactors have been restarted, because of general opposition
against their safety.
The experience of the second summer (2012) proved that Japan can
do without nuclear power generation: at least this was the consensus
among the citizens, who saw that with only 2 nuclear power stations in
operation, it is possible to survive the heat without them.
Before the incident, the basic picture had persisted: for the 3 reasons
of economy, environment and safety, the business community insisted
that nuclear power generation was the only viable option to supersede
oil and coal. Even some segments of the civil society supported nuclear
from the standpoint of global warming.
Since March 11, it has become difficult, if not impossible, to insist
on scientific grounds, that nuclear generation is sustainable. The business community continues to support the nuclear power generation
conglomerate, stating that on all 3 aspects the nuclear is still the only
viable option. They assert that even after taking into account the costs
of compensation and reconstruction after the incident, nuclear generation is still the cheapest; that nuclear generation produces virtually no
carbon dioxide conducive to global warming and therefore the cleanest
and least harmful; and that after reinforcing the walls surrounding all
the 50 plants, nuclear generation will be safe enough to operate. As will
be discussed below, all 3 defences are difficult to sustain.
ECONOMICS
According to government statistics, more than two years after the disaster (i.e., June 2013) there were still at least 300, 000 internally displaced
persons in more than 1,200 cities, towns and villages around Japan.
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), virtually nationalized in July
2012, is unable, as well as unwilling, to compensate the losses incurred
by individuals and companies resulting from the incident. A conservative estimate for the general reconstruction needed in the afflicted Tohoku area stands at 25 trillion yen (300 billion US Dollars). Currently
each displaced person receives 100,00 yen (USD 1,000) per month, wich
is not sufficient for those who fled to the mega city area around Tokyo.
TEPCO’s initial estimate of the costs falling under its responsibility,
including those directly related to the management of the 4 destroyed
reactors, stood at 5 trillion yen, which has been secured with the support of the national government. However, on 7 November 2012, TEP-
193
CO’s chairperson Kazuhiko Shimokobe, appointed from outside together with external board members so that the company may regain
trust from the nation, declared that the costs which it needs to bear will
be at least double, at upwards of 10 trillion yen. This is according to 3
reasons: radioactive decontamination of areas with low radioactivity,
and interim storage of contaminated materials will both cost far more
than initially forecast; and decommissioning of the 4 destroyed reactors, which has not even begun, will also cost much more than the initial estimate of 1 trillion yen.
At the time of writing, only 2 out of 50 remaining reactors, 4 having
been destroyed in March 2011, are in operation. Even the future of these
2 at Oi Nuclear Power Plant is uncertain, since independent experts are
convinced that there is a fault line directly beneath the plant location: if
the committee appointed to determine the safety of the plant rules that
the fault line is active and may prove to be a physical risk to the reactors,
these 2 will also have to be shut down. The regional power company,
which owns them, is particularly resistant to this scenario, since this
would mean it will have to survive without any of the nuclear reactors.
Since the 2 plants were restarted with the understanding that they are
the safest and most secure of all the existing nuclear plants, the future of
the rest of them is also quite bleak.
The 9 power companies in Japan, with the exception of the company
in the remote islands of Okinawa to the south, contend that decommissioning any of the 50 surviving reactors is costly for 2 reasons: one, the
depreciation costs of reactors will be a huge liability on their books, especially relatively new reactors; and two, generation costs will rise since
oil, gas and any other green energy sources are more expensive than
nuclear. Furthermore, there is the additional cost of managing the reactors. Whether they are generating, are shut down temporarily, or are in
the 40 year process of decommissioning, nuclear plants need constantly to be cooled, which is totally different from any other generation systems. The maintenance and management costs of the 48 currently dormant reactors are a liability day in day out, without producing a single
watt of energy. They and the business community also argue that it has
already become difficult to purchase other energy sources cheaply because suppliers predict a large demand gap as a result of the shut down,
and possible decommissioning, of the nuclear plants in Japan.
ENVIRONMENT
One of the major reasons why nuclear generation has gained ground is
194
that it does not emit carbon dioxide, a major global warming gas. This
became an international trend after the Rio Summit (UNCED) in 1992,
and under the series of ICCP (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change) commitments over the past 20 years.
Despite the “Climate-gate” scandal which unraveled in 2009, involving the IPCC, which acted unscientifically to continue to affirm the
effects of human-produced global warming gasses, public opinion in
Japan has generally supported nuclear power generation for not producing much carbon dioxide. This was because of the Kyoto Protocol
1997, obligating Japan and other developed nations to control carbon
emission.
Needless to say, the environmental (radioactive) damage being
caused by the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plants has tainted the image
of environmentally friendly nuclear power generation. There was the
huge radioactive emission following the explosions of the 3 reactors
in March, 2011. Today, all 4 reactors continue to emit serious radiation
to the external environment. This will persist until they are decommissioned, which is not expected in the near future. Because of this, the city
of Fukushima, with a population of 300,000, and at least 60km from the
destroyed power plants, posts radiation levels 20 times the normal level
observed before the disaster: 0.92 as opposed to 0.046 micro Sievert per
hour. The city is still inhabited, since the Japanese government is not
able to decide to evacuate them because of huge costs. Citizens voluntarily abandon the region for fear of radiation overdose, especially families with small children who are more susceptible to low-dose radiation.
The procedures for cooling these reactors is worthy of note. Healthy
as well as damaged nuclear reactors need constant cooling. Healthy
ones can recycle cooling water within a closed system, without emitting
much radioactive materials in the open. Damaged ones still need to be
cooled, but they use an open, make shift system, because their regular
cooling systems have been destroyed by the explosions. This means the
water used to cool the reactors exit the containers of the reactors, mix
with underground water flow, before being collected in water tanks.
Huge water tanks continue to be built near the reactors to store this contaminated water, seriously burdening the disaster control process.
Some of the contaminated water invariably spread to the surrounding sea, causing environmental damage. Currently, reactor 4, which did
not explode, which therefore maintains a relatively low radioactivity,
and which stores used and unused nuclear fuel pellets, will start the
decommissioning process of fuel pellet removal. The reactors will keep
contaminating the environment until they are decommissioned, which
195
means for many years to come. It is debatable whether this radioactive
pollution can outweigh the consequences of carbon dioxide emission,
one of the environmental risks.
SAFETY
Before the tsunami-induced nuclear accident in 2011, nuclear power
plants in Japan boasted a relatively clean 40 odd year record as far as
their safe operation was concerned. After the March incident, however,
thorough inspection of all 50 functioning nuclear power plants has revealed that many have inadequate precautions against future tsunami
attacks, as well as potential vulnerability against earthquakes. Some are
known to be built above or very close to a fault line. At the time of writing (June 2013), only 2 plants have been restarted out of 50 functioning
ones (4 plants at Fukushima Dai-ichiare no longer considered operational reactors).
As mentioned above (section 1), the 2 reactors at Ooi power station
may have to be closed down again, because of the fault lines running
directly underneath. This is a crucial situation for the government, since
when the 2 were restarted in July, 2012, the government had assured
to the public that they were safe enough to be restarted. If their safety
is debatable, then the 48 other reactors do not have much chance of a
restart.
The summer of 2012 posed an interesting situation: by early May,
2012, all 50 existing plants had one by one been shut down mainly due
to regular inspection required by law and other reasons. The government was sandwiched between the business community, which insisted that plants should be rebooted as soon as regular maintenance
has been completed, and the public, which vehemently opposed that
idea. Ever before Mr. Noda proclaimed the restart of the 2 reactors, a
large group of ordinary citizens have gathered around the prime minister’s office every Friday evening throughout the summer and into
autumn of 2012. This is considered highly exceptional in Japan, even
unprecedented since the students’ movements in the late 1960s. This
shows the sentiments of Japanese citizens vehemently opposed to
nuclear generation.
Not a small number of scientists in Japan have started coming out
of silence by voicing their criticism of nuclear power generation. Until
March 11, those nuclear scientists critical of the safety of nuclear power
generation had been deprived of proper academic status, as well as research funds.
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Since March 11, scientific debate has focused on 2 aspects: containment of nuclear pollution at Fukushima, and effects of low-dose radiation on human health. The first issue poses questions which are difficult
to answer, since Fukushima is unprecedented even compared with the
experiences of Chernobyl (former Soviet Union) and Three Mile Island
(United States). Four reactors in a critical condition simultaneously –
this alone is unknown in history, and TEPCO’s daily endeavor is based
on trial and error, makeshift temporary solutions, which is not unlike
groping in the dark. Radiation levels inside the 4 reactors forbid humans to observe what is happening now. We still do not know what has
happened inside the reactors. Today, there has emerged a more or less
shared notion that the containment process will be longer, involve far
more people, necessitating much more resources and financing than
once predicted. We reckon the process will last at least 30 years, involving 10,000 staff at any moment, requiring 3 to 5 trillion yen (around 35
to 60 billion US Dollars) per year. Staffing will increasingly become difficult since their individual actual radiation dose levels will exceed the
legally permitted dose levels within a relatively short period of time,
when they cease to be able to work in high radiation areas.
The second issue, of low-dose radiation, causes an even larger national problem. During the 1st year, the national research laboratory declared that they were not interested in health effects of low-dose radiation, but was subsequently obliged to take back its initial decision and
start researching this at Fukushima following a loud public outcry. Expert opinion is divided on this point: some closer to government assert
low-dose radiation is not a health issue, while some medical doctors
and grass root researchers have observed health abnormalities already
prominent in thyroid gland among children in Fukushima (thyroid
cysts among 35% of children, and at least 1 case of thyroid cancer in a
child). Internal radiation, due to inhaling of contaminated particles, as
well as consumption of contaminated food, are topics still talked about
among lay people. Even though vegetables, meat and all other food stuff
go through legal and voluntary inspection, foodstuff produced in Fukushima, and other prefectures nearby, sells at a much lower price. Some
products including rice, Japan’s staple crop, cannot be sold because of
high radiation levels. Within an extended family in farming areas with
low-dose contamination, it is not uncommon that grandparents consume locally or home grown vegetables with high dosage, while grandchildren eat foodstuff transported from non-contaminated regions.
One other issue related to low-dose radiation is decontamination of
residential and urban areas. General constructors have organized de-
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contamination troops to be dispatched to Fukushima. A close friend of
mine working for a major constructor is currently leading such a group
of 600 part time workers within the 20 km radius of Fukushima. The actual work they do include washing off walls, roofs and ground of deserted towns and villages so that residents can eventually return. They
also remove surface soil which shows radioactivity. Large amounts of
soil thus removed need to be stored away from residential areas.
As a side note to this section, it should be noted that radioactivity
can be used in a positive way, as seen in the fields of medical science
and engineering. We depend on radioactivity to find out what is happening inside our body, in order to detect illnesses. Treatment of cancer sometimes involves radiation. In manufacturing related research
laboratories, non-destructive inspection is conducted by radioactivity.
Radiation is widely utilized in scientific research. It is estimated that in
Japan radioactivity for scientific purposes produces 8 trillion yen (100
billion US Dollars), which is larger than 7 trillion yen produced by nuclear power generation.
Furthermore, the future of green energy, including solar, wind, geothermal, wave and hydrogen produced from electrolysis of water, is hotly debated. Currently they contribute very little to Japan’s power supply,
but even the Ministry of Economy and Industry has seriously started
reinforcing them (besides ordering TEPCO to privatize and diversify its
business model).
III. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
HISTORICAL FACTORS
Third, with at least seven prime ministers in less than six years, Japan’s
political leadership today is unable to show any kind of resilience either domestically or internationally. Citizens have become vocal in an
unprecedented manner, especially in conjunction with the nuclear
disaster.
Japan’s inherited cultural strengths will cease to be strengths unless it seeks to globalize its values and systems. This section explores
the roots of Japan’s political agenda setting, both at the national and
regional levels, then the overview of the current crisis.
Since Meiji Reformation in 1868, Japan’s national consensus was
to catch up with the west. To achieve this goal, Japan went through industrialization, colonization, and post WWII reconstruction, to lead
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the Asian (non-western) miracle. The educational and bureaucratic
systems were geared towards attaining such a goal: raising obedient
children to become diligent farmers, merchants and paid employees
at companies and government offices. Japan’s Ministry of Economics
and Industry promoted the well-known post WWII industrial policy
and guidance regime, which functioned remarkably well as long as the
target was clear.
After the 1980s, when Japan on the whole reached the economic
levels of the west, it started to struggle: there was no longer a national
consensus, and innovation in various aspects of the society became a
requirement. Instead of following in the footsteps of the west, Japan was
in a position to lead, and offer goals and targets to the world. In trying
to meet this challenge, the society has exposed its weaknesses: it has
limited creative or innovative human resources because its education
has not adapted to changing social requirements, nor was its rigid bureaucratic system capable of setting national goals.
CHALLENGES FACING POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS TODAY
Challenged by such a shift in the social playing field, Japan’s politics
has struggled. Politicians, whether at the national or local levels, are still
selected largely in a traditional manner: instead of being chosen for his/
her competency and values, they are picked for being loyal to a certain
faction or influential politician, or else for bringing benefits to their local constituency. They are not interested in how the world sees Japan.
They are not considered the top notch elites to represent the country.
Voters’ awareness is a related concern. Turnout of voters at general
elections remains low, and there is a deep rooted cultural aversion to
discussing politics among the general public.
Japan’s national civil service is crumbling. Until the 1990s, this country’s civil service boasted policy making power and elitism. However,
with the popular criticism of perks and authority concentrated in the
civil service and administrative sectors, both conservative and liberal
political parties moved to dismantle the structure. Today bureaucrats in
“Kasumigaseki”, the area where the national government offices are located, no longer enjoy the luxury of second or third jobs after they retire,
which guarantee a high salary from their offices in their mid-fifties. As a
result, graduates of highly competitive universities, notably the University of Tokyo School of Law, are no longer interested in pursuing a career in civil service and flock to seek a more lucrative, if unstable, career
in the private sector, often with non-Japanese companies. Scores of civil
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officials in their late twenties and thirties in Kasumigaseki seek to leave
their offices with similar hopes and aspirations, a hitherto unheard of
landscape. Female participation in society is another serious issue. Japan is not taking advantage of their talents.
Not everything is in shambles. As far as politicians are concerned,
we witness more female candidates blooming in regional politics, even
if they are not so influential yet at the national level. We see many lawyers, civil service officials and medical doctors aspiring to start new,
more grass root oriented, politics, especially now that they know that
the once invincible conservative party (Liberal Democratic Party) establishment can be interrupted. Kasumigaseki, the civil service administrative sector, can now offer jobs to a wider range of university graduates, instead of being filled by efficient, but narrow minded elites. Civil
society is slowly becoming more influential, especially after the earthquake and tsunami induced disaster.
IV. IN CONCLUSION: REGIONAL INTEGRATION?
The three regional security challenges, of geopolitics, Fukushima and
leadership briefly outlined above, succinctly show that Japan needs to
reinvent itself to tackle the current challenges. This concluding section
seeks to explore the reality of regional integration in East Asia as seen
from Japan.
Regional integration can be measured by various criteria covering
connections and interactions. These can include ties at the political,
economic, cultural, and information levels. These can be anything from
formal, institutional, and governmental activities, to informal, ad-hoc,
and non-governmental activities.
Formally, the so-called East Asian Summit is the closest to the ideal of a regional integration body. Held mostly every year since 2004 to
talk mainly about economic integration, it currently encompasses 18
nations: all the 10 ASEAN nations, plus Australia, China, India, Japan,
(South) Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and United States of America. China prefers to limit the number of countries, suggesting that ASEAN plus
3, to include China, Korea and Japan with ASEAN, is the most promising regional framework. This is in order to maintain China’s voice in a
smaller network. Japan and ASEAN prefer to involve all the 18 member
states of the East Asian Summit, so as to dilute China’s presence. The
US, a non-regional member of the Summit, continues to voice its presence in the integration process both politically and economically.
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There are other attempts and ongoing formulations of regional integration, including but not limited to:
East Asian Community [concept]
East Asian EPA [Economic Partnership Agreement, concept]
FTA: US and South Korea (current)
FTA: Japan, China, South Korea (first official negotiation: June 2013)
ASEAN plus 3 [current: ASEAN, China, South Korea, Japan]
APEC [current: Asia Pacific Economic Conference]
TPP [being negotiated: Trans Pacific Partnership]
Currently the most contested regional issue for Japan is whether to
join the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Currently 11 nations are ready to discuss the details of this agreement: US, Canada,
Mexico, Peru, Chile, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Australia,
New Zealand and Japan. It is seen that signing this agreement will hurt
Japan’s agricultural sector, because farmers in Japan are destined to
lose the protective tariff on many agricultural products, including rice
(777% tariff under the WTO tariffication agreements).
Even though today Japan’s agricultural sector comprises a mere 3%
of the population, i.e., a little over 2.5 million people, rural constituencies are still abundant. Political parties, especially conservative parties,
still depend on such farmers’ votes. Mr Abe in support of this TPP has a
difficult job of steering, who insists that Japan will sit at the negotiation
table, but retain the freedom to opt out if necessary and to leave some
agricultural products out.
Japan’s participation is important for geopolitical reasons, too.
South Korea, Japan’s rival, is not participating in the TPP, since Korea
already has an FTA with the US since March 2012. In addition, many of
Korea’s major manufacturers and banks are already jointly owned by
the US, whose companies actively intervened during the Asian financial
crisis in 1997.
China, which overtook Japan in terms of GDP in 2010, has recently
shown keen interest in sitting at the negotiating table for the TPP. China,
under Premier Xi Jinping, reversed its earlier policy to stay aloof. It decided to negotiate in order to influence the outcome of the TPP, rather
than sit and wait until its members agree on a framework which may
adversely affect China’s own trade.
In order to increase its presence in global trade, and to reenergize its
manufacturing and service industries, Japan needs to open its markets
under the TPP. On the other hand, there is a strong opposition among
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farmers and nationalists to the TPP, as well as among environmentalists, consumer groups and other civil society groups. The former, more
conservative, sectors propagate that globalization under the TPP will
hurt Japan’s traditional culture and values. These values include Japanese dietary habits rooted in domestic agriculture, manufacturing
of products by Japanese companies in factories located in Japan, and
Japanese language and human relations based on traditional customs.
They all point to fewer imports and lower labor migration.
The latter, more liberal, civil society environmental sectors insist the
importance of food mileage, energy efficiency, environmental and safety standards, non-genetically modified (non-GM) and organic foods,
Japanese workers’ living standards, as well as of dealing with the widening income gaps both globally and locally as a result of globalization:
these latter groups can be called non-violent anti-globalists. Though
consumerism is not fully fledged in Japan, this sector’s activism is not to
be underestimated.
However, if Japan decides to walk away from the negotiating table
scheduled for the second half of 2013, TPP signees will increase trade
among them, outpacing Japan further in terms of intra-regional trade.
On the more informal fronts, there are fewer signs of nationalism
against regional integration under the process of globalization. Some
typical figures can highlight the integration process.
Visitors coming to Japan rose by 40% in February 2013 over previous
year chiefly because of the cheaper yen. This is in continuation of the
recent trend with some fluctuations. 85% are visitors from Asia, including South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Visitors from China declined
because of the political friction over territorial issues, but China still
ranks third after South Korea and Taiwan70. Nearly 17 million Japanese
travelled abroad in 2011, a constant trend.
Non-Japanese non-residents have bought 157 hectares of land in Japan in 2011, 3 times as much as previous year. This includes houses and
mansions, but also water fountains and forests71. The number of nonJapanese students is steadily increasing, registering 141,000 in 2010.
Asians constitute 93%, including China, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam
and Malaysia as the top senders72.
The issue of identity in East Asia continues to be of interest. In terms
of language, mainland China and Taiwan share the language totally
with some phonetic differences rooted in dialects. Japanese can, to a
70 Visitors arriving by Country/ area and purpose of visit, available online: http://www.jnto.
go.jp/jpn/reference/tourism_data/visitor_trends/2013_february_zantei.pdf
71 http://www.h-yagi.jp/00/post_230679.html
72 http://www.jasso.go.jp/statistics/intl_student/data11.html
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certain extent, communicate with Chinese by writing, but not verbally.
Korean and Japanese languages share only some grammar and vocabulary, but not script. All the four East Asian countries share some vocabulary rooted in Chinese, some ethics and social values through Confucius and other classical literature. Mongolians may share some genetic
traits as Asians. 10 ASEAN nations have 10 different national languages.
English has become the lingua franca in North-east/South-east Asia.
There is a recent survey on East Asian identity based on a questionnaire of four East Asian countries, i.e., China, Taiwan, South Korea and
Japan73. Those people who identify themselves as East Asians tend to
be proficient in English (a common language in East Asia), to travel
more often to countries in the region, to have wider cultural contacts
with neighboring countries through the media and to be wealthier in
respective societies except South Korea. When asked whether respondents feel affectionate about East Asia, South Koreans tend to feel more
East Asian, with 41% responding either strongly or fairly affectionate.
32% of Japanese also respond similarly, while Taiwanese and mainland
Chinese fair significantly lower, at 11% and 10% respectively.
The regional challenges are deep rooted and Japan needs a thorough
review of the social fabric and leadership, which will take time. This includes reform of education to promote globalization of the country.
A general approach is to promote communication at all levels within
the Japanese society, and across national boundaries. Is it worth going
to war on small islands which lie between Japan and its neighbors? How
can Japan learn from the disasters, both natural and manmade, to be
once again a trustworthy neighbor in the region? Why do we desperately need leaders with a global perspective? Such questions are being
addressed in certain sectors of the society, hopefully to lead to promising results.
REFERENCES
BBC News (2010), Russian president visits disputed Kuril Islands, Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11663241
Park, Cheol-Hee (2012): Gains and Losses of Japan-China-Korea Territorial Conflict (Japanese), Tokyo Newspaper, 23 September.
AVAILABLE ON-LINE
73 http://jgss.daishodai.ac.jp/research/monographs/jgssm13/jgssm13_09.pdf Abstract in English.
203
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/content/20130618_hinansha.pdf
http://www.city.fukushima.fukushima.jp/uploaded/attachment/8900.
pdf
177 of the 194 observation points in the city of Fukushima give at least
1.00 micro Sievert/hour, some showing 2.00 to 3.00 and above. Data collected between 17 and 20 June, 2013.
http://www.jnto.go.jp/jpn/reference/tourism_data/visitor_
trends/2013_february_zantei.pdf
http://www.h-yagi.jp/00/post_230679.html
http://www.jasso.go.jp/statistics/intl_student/data11.html
http://jgss.daishodai.ac.jp/research/monographs/jgssm13/
jgssm13_09.pdf
Integration In The South Caucasus:
Opportunities And Challenges
Beniamin Poghosyan
RESUMEN
El colapso de la Unión Soviética cambió radicalmente el panorama
geopolítico de la región del Cáucaso Sur. La aparición de tres Estados
independientes reconocidos internacionalmente - Armenia, Azerbaiyán, Georgia- así como de las repúblicas parcialmente reconocidas de
Abjasia y Osetia del Sur, y la no reconocida Nagorno Karabaj, han creado un equilibrio geoestratégico totalmente nuevo.
El Cáucaso Sur está geográficamente ubicado en uno de los cruces
más importantes de Eurasia, actuando como puente natural entre Europa y Asia Central. Esta ubicación, así como la creciente interdependencia en las relaciones internacionales, crea enormes oportunidades
para la integración regional siempre y cuando ésta materialice su potencial actuando como una región unificada. Mientras tanto, los conflictos étnicos con raíces históricas continúan siendo graves obstáculos
para la integración regional, frustrando cualquier progreso significativo
hacia la cooperación entre los Estados de la región.
Este artículo sugiere que el camino hacia una integrada, estable y
próspera región del Cáucaso Sur se encuentra a través de la intensificación de los contactos entre las sociedades y los aparatos institucionales.
La cooperación e integración económica y cultural deben ser percibidas como herramientas para la resolución de conflictos y no al revés. El
enfoque opuesto que considera la resolución de conflictos como el único medio eficaz para fomentar la integración regional solo perpetuará
la actual situación de estancamiento sin perspectivas positivas para los
Estados del sur del Cáucaso.
ABSTRACT
Collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus. Emergence of the three internationally recognized independent states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia- as well as
partially recognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh, created totally new geostrategic balance.
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The South Caucasus is geographically located in one of the important crossroads of Eurasia serving as a natural bridge between Europe
and Central Asia. This location as well as the growing interdependence
in international relations creates huge opportunities for regional integration as the South Caucasus can fully materialize its potential only
if acting as a unified region. Meanwhile the ethnic conflicts with historical roots are serious impediments for regional integration thwarting any meaningful progress toward mutually beneficial cooperation
between the states of the region.
This paper will argue that the path to the integrated, stable and prosperous South Caucasus lies through intensified contacts between societies and apparatus. The economic and cultural cooperation and integration should be perceived as a tool for conflict resolution and not vice
versa. The opposite approach that considers the conflict resolution as
the only effective mean for fostering regional integration will only perpetuate current impasse without any positive prospects for the South
Caucasian states.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we will try to examine the integration processes in the
South Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union, to identify challenges for those processes as well as possible ways head. We focus
mainly on ethnic conflicts, the different perceptions of national security priorities among regional states, the role of energy diplomacy and
means to facilitate regional integration.
II. SOUTH CAUCASUS IN 1991-1994. ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND DOMESTIC TURMOIL
The Collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the creation of 15 independent states with different levels of social-economic as well as political
development. All newly entities faced some similar challenges: managing orderly transition from totalitarian political system into the Western
model based on democratic government; economic reforms aimed at
establishing liberal market economy; difficulties connected with disruption of functioning economic ties. Meanwhile, in some regions there
were additional problems as a result of ethnic conflicts rooted in pre
Soviet history and stifled during Soviet period under the slogans of in-
Integration In The South Caucasus: Opportunities And Challenges
207
ternationalism and friendship between people.
The South Caucasus was perhaps the most volatile region emerging
over the ruins of the Soviet Union. Three South Caucasian republics Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - have declared their independence
in 1991. All of them were facing serious challenges toward the road of
independent state building. Azerbaijan and Georgia were indulged in
domestic political instability, as well as military conflicts with ethnic
minorities who had enjoyed different levels of autonomy during the Soviet Era and later declared their independence in 1991-1992.
Political instability in Georgia resulted in the ousting of the first
Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia just months after his election. In Azerbaijan there were several coupes resulted first in ousting
President Mutalibov in 1992 and then President Elchibey in 1993. The
relative political stability returned to Azerbaijan and Georgia only after
the Soviet period leaders Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev reclaimed the power in 1992 and 1993 respectively.
Both Azerbaijan and Georgia launched military activities in order
to regain control over their former dependences Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh (which had overwhelming Armenian population) but
within several years they both had been defeated and lost control over
those territories.
The main difficulties faced by Armenia during the first years of independence were caused by the 1988 devastating earthquake which
destroyed about 30 percent of Armenia’s territory and the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey due to the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. Several bordering regions of Armenia were attacked by Azerbaijani forces during hostilities in Karabakh in 1992-1994.
Therefore, the first years of independence in the South Caucasus
were marked by domestic political turmoil, intra and interstate wars,
and creation of both internationally recognized and de facto independent political entities. In these circumstances the notion of integration
and cooperation was not popular a one within states struggling to ensure their basic needs of security (King, 2008: 2012-220).
III. SOUTH CAUCASUS AFTER 1994. EFFORTS TOWARD
INTEGRATION
The year of 1994 marked a significance threshold for the South Caucasus. The armed phase of ethnic conflicts had come to an end with ceasefire agreements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh
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which resulted in creation of three new de facto independent, though
internationally unrecognized, states in the region. At the same time, the
tumultuous period of domestic instability in Azerbaijan and Georgia,
marked by several coup d’états, has finished with former leaders coming
into power and bringing at least some level of stability.
IV. MEMBERSHIP TO REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS; UNREALIZED OPPORTUNITY FOR REGIONAL
INTEGRATION
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENTS STATES (CIS)
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been members of the Commonwealth of Independents States, the loose body created at the end of 1991
by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and joined by other post soviet states
except three Baltic republics. The CIS was established mainly as a tool for
preventing rapid disintegration processes in the Post Soviet World and
contributing to establish connections between new independent states.
Nevertheless, and for diverse reasons, CIS was not able to implement its
role as an integration facilitator. Some post Soviet states perceive CIS as a
tool for Russia to maintain its influence over the former Soviet Republics.
Despite around thousand agreements and treaties CIS was mainly, and
continue to be, a formal union with little possibilities to implement inclusive regional integration projects, particularly in the South Caucasus.
ORGANIZATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (GUAM)
Another regional organization which included two South Caucasian
republics was GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova).
Its goal was to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these
former Soviet Union republics though it was perceived by many observers as a tool for countering Russian efforts to regain its influence
over Post Soviet territory. GUAM was established in 1997 and for some
period (1999-2005) included also Uzbekistan74. In 2006 the organization changed its name to Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development – GUAM. Membership to this organization facilitated in
some level economic and political cooperation between Azerbaijan
and Georgia. Yet, it should be stated that the absence of Armenia from
74 Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM, official website, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/guuam.htm
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GUAM was a serious obstacle for that organization to trigger inclusive
regional cooperation.
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(OSCE)
OSCE was created at the beginning of 1970s as a Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. With the signing of Helsinki Final Act in
August 1975 it was transformed into OSCE by December 1994 Budapest
summit decision. All three South Caucasus republics became CSCE
members in 1992.
CSCE, and later OSCE, were actively involved in Nagorno Karabakh
conflict resolution process through OSCE Minsk group which was established in 1992. Currently three Co chair countries, the US, Russia and
France, are the main mediators of the conflict organizing meetings between high level representatives of conflicting sides and suggesting different approaches for the resolution75. OSCE is actively involved also in
election observation processes in the South Caucasus through its Office
for democratic institutions and human rights.
However, as OSCE is dealing mainly with hard security issues, it has
limited capacity to foster regional integration in the region and mainly
is concentrating its efforts over the preserving volatile stability in the
South Caucasus.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
Georgia was the first South Caucasus Republic which achieved Council of Europe membership in 1999. Armenia and Azerbaijan followed
in 2001. Council of Europe is dealing mainly with soft security fostering reforms in member countries aimed at strengthening Rule of law,
securing freedom of speeches and gatherings. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is the main channel for parliamentarians to discuss and address different problems facing the member
states. However, the Council and its Parliamentary Assembly often
becomes a place for mutual criticism with little positive impact on regional integration.
V. DIFFERENT SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND PRIORITIES AS A
MAIN OBSTACLE FOR ROBUST REGIONAL INTEGRATION
75 See more details on Minsk group in http://www.osce.org/mg
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The main challenge for inclusive regional cooperation is the different
threat perceptions and national security priorities for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. For Azerbaijan, Armenia is the main source of
threat due to Karabakh conflict and Armenia’s support to the second
Armenian independent state established in Nagorno Karabakh which
was former autonomous oblast in Soviet Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, in
close partnership with Turkey, is pursuing a strategy to isolate Armenia
from any regional projects thus trying to compel both Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh Republic to make unilateral concessions on the Karabakh negotiations process.
Armenian–Turkish strained relations due to Turkish unwavering
support for Azerbaijan and economic blockade imposed by Turkey on
Armenia since 1993 are also burdened by the fact of Armenian Genocide of 1915-1917, committed in Ottoman Turkey, and the denialist approach of Turkish government toward the fact of Genocide (Dadrian,
2003; Akcam, 2012). Azerbaijan – Turkey strategic alliance, which was
officially entrenched with the notion of “One nation two states”, contributed to the feeling in Armenia of somehow being squeezed between
Turkey and Azerbaijan. In this geopolitical juncture, number one national priority for Armenia is guaranteeing its basic security. In 1990s
and at the beginning of 2000s, when other power centres such as the EU,
the US and NATO were not actively involved in the regional geopolitics,
Armenia was considering Russia as its only strategic ally. Hence, it
signed the Collective security treaty among with Russia and four Central Asian republics in May 1992 thus being engaged in military alliance
with Russia as well as an agreement to hold Russian military base in
Armenia for 25 years term in March 1995. In October 2002, Armenia
signed the charter establishing Collective Security Treaty Organization,
which institutionalized the military alliance launched in 1992 (source:
Collective Security Treaty Organization).
Contrary to the Armenian position, Georgia and Azerbaijan have
perceived Russia as a main threat to their vital interests. They were condemning Russia for its alleged support to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Karabakh during hostilities, as well as for Russian efforts to undermine
their independence and territorial integrity. Azerbaijan and Georgia for
a short period joined Collective security treaty (1994-1999), hoping to
use their membership as a tool for using Russian influence to resolve
Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Nagorno Karabakh conflicts.
Since the end of 1990s, Georgia has started to more loudly express its
willingness to join EU and NATO. This process gained momentum after
Rose revolution in late 2003 which brought to power President Mikheil
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Saakashvili. As for Azerbaijan both late President Heydar Aliev, as well
as his son Ilham elected President in 2003 and re-elected in 2008 were
more cautious regarding their NATO aspirations. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan was implementing energy policy aiming at creating new export
routes toward Europe for its oil and gas bypassing Russia.
Thus Georgia and Azerbaijan have overlapping perception of Russia
as a spoiler state in the region, they had shared interests in their struggle
for retaking control over former soviet autonomies as well in the joint
energy projects which would allow Azerbaijan to become important
source of energy and Georgia to play a key transit role for oil and gaz
transportation to Europe (Nichol, 2012).
VI. ENERGY GEOPOLITICS AS A DRIVER FOR AZERBAIJAN –
GEORGIA ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
At the second half of 1990s and at the beginning of 21st century, one of
the main tools for facilitating integration processes in the South Caucasus were the energy projects aiming to transfer Caspian oil and Gas
to Europe bypassing Russia. Diversification of energy supply routes
and sources were among top priorities for newly formed European
Union. Simultaneously both the EU and, especially, the United States
perceived these energy projects as a tool for fostering Post Soviet states
independence and preventing Russia to retake influence over its former
peripheries. Thus new energy projects have both economic and political dimensions.
The first step toward implementation of these projects was the signing
of “Contract of Century” by Azerbaijan and a consortium of oil companies on 20 September 1994 (Azerbaijan International, 1994). After several
discussions on possible oil pipeline routes which should bring Azerbaijani oil into World markets, the route Azerbaijan –Georgia – Turkey was
chosen and the construction of 1768 km length Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan
pipeline was launched in September 2002 and finished in May 2005. The
pipeline travels from the Sangachal terminal near Baku through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Ceyhan marine terminal on the Turkish
coast of the Mediterranean. The first oil reached the Ceyhan terminal on
May 28, 2006 (SoBP Caspian). Another energy project was implemented
in the region and concerned in the construction of 692 km Baku – Tbilisi –Erzurum gas pipeline (also called South Caucasus pipeline) which
brought Azerbaijani gas into world markets bypassing Russia. SCP has
annual capacity of 7 billion cubic meters and it was build along with BTC
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route. First gas deliveries to Turkey began on September 2006 (source: BP
Caspian). One of the main factor behind Azerbaijani decision to choose
Georgia as a route for its energy exports was Azerbaijan’s strategy to isolate Armenia from all regional projects trying by this way to compel Armenia to make concessions on Karabakh issue.
These two energy projects became a strong instrument for promoting integration between Georgia and Azerbaijan. Georgia since Rose
revolution in 2003 explicitly has stated about its intention to be fully
involved in the EU and NATO and thus Georgia perceived this projects
bypassing Russia and promoting European energy diversification as a
one more step to secure its Euro Atlantic credentials.
VII. ARMENIAN - TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT. LOST
OPPORTUNITY FOR FOSTERING REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Officially started by the visit of Turkish President Abdullah Gul to Yerevan on September 6, 2008, the Turkish Armenian rapprochement was
aimed at establishing diplomatic relations between two neighbors as
well as at opening Turkish – Armenian border, closed since 1993 (BBC,
2008). In the case of success, this could mark a new starting point for
regional integration as it would create conditions for Armenia’s involvement in several regional projects. At the same time, it could facilitate
the confidence building process also between Armenia and Azerbaijan
thus contributing to regional peace and stability. Armenian – Turkish
normalization process was backed by international community and by
main geopolitical actors in the region such as Russia, the US, and the
EU. It should be mentioned that Russian, US and French Foreign Ministers as well as the EU High representative for Foreign Policy have participated in the signing ceremony of two Turkish – Armenian protocols on
October 10, 2009 (BBC, 2009). The protocols envisage establishment of
diplomatic relations and opening of borders. However those protocols
had to be ratified by the parliament before entering into force.
Turkish – Armenian rapprochement had a potential to significantly
fasten integration processes in the South Caucasus. In the long run perspective, it could also contribute to the Karabakh conflict settlement as
Turkish Armenian normalized relations would lessen Armenian mentality of being under siege thus facilitating the process of finding mutually acceptable compromises. It should be emphasized that Turkish
– Armenian reconciliation process, as well as protocols themselves had
no connection with Karabakh negotiation process, and it was perceived
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by Armenia, as well as by mediators as a separate issue. Meanwhile,
Azerbaijan saw in this process a direct threat to its long run strategy to
isolate Armenia and weaken it economically thus compelling Armenia to unilateral concessions. Official Baku perceived any steps toward
Turkish – Armenian rapprochement prior to Karabakh conflict settlement as “treason” by Ankara, claiming that conflict resolution should
be a prerequisite to any developments in the region aiming at starting
genuine integration process with inclusion of all three internationally
recognized South Caucasian republics. Azerbaijani authorities were
afraid of the possibility that Armenia will lose any incentive to solve
Karabakh conflict if it has open borders with Turkey thus bolstering
economic growth. Since mid 2009 Azerbaijan launched concrete steps
to thwart Turkish – Armenian normalization process threatening to cut
natural gas deliveries to Turkey and starting to activate contacts with
Turkish opposition as well as involving Azerbaijani community living in
Turkey in protests against protocols ratification.
Baku pointed out that ‘losing Azerbaijan’ would not be worth it for
Turkey, and that it would be far from possible for Ankara to compensate
for this damage relations with Armenia and Russia, neither of which
would ultimately be reliable partners for Ankara. Even if borders were
to open, the strength of Russia’s hold on Armenia would allow only
marginal economic and political gain for Turkey. Ultimately, Ankara’s
objective of an ‘open region’ integrated with trade, would hardly be realized as long as Armenia and Azerbaijan remained locked in the Karabakh stalemate. Turkey’s other objective of becoming a regional energy
hub would be adversely affected, as Baku would have less incentive to
offer Turkey favors in natural gas pricing or transportation routes.
Azerbaijan subsequently delivered strong messages about its national interests being at stake. In parallel, negotiations over gas agreements between Baku and Ankara were ongoing. Baku demonstrated
what Turkey could risk losing if it were to overlook Azerbaijan’s interests
by proceeding with normalizing relations with Armenia under the existing conditions (the stalemate in the Karabakh resolution process) both
in terms of Turkish public opinion sensitivities and in terms of Turkey’s
energy interests (Goksel, 2011). Solidarity towards Azerbaijan quickly
swelled in mainstream press and public opinion in Turkey. Turkish authorities scrambled to underline that they had no intention of normalizing relations with Armenia until progress was made between Armenia
and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Another obstacle on the road to successful rapprochement, was
the Turkish assumption that normalization of relations with Armenia
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would contain “Genocide diplomacy” (or the advocacy against recognition of the term “genocide” as a label for the 1915 massacres and deportations of Armenians under Ottoman Turkish rule), which consistently
drains Turkey’s strategic and political capital. But Armenia put it very
clear that normalization process has nothing to do with Genocide recognition and can not compel either Armenia or Karabakh to make any
unilateral concessions in Karabakh negotiation process76.
Since the beginning of 2010 Armenian-Turkish normalization process has been stalled as Turkey overtly connected the ratification of
the already signed Armenian-Turkish protocols with a breakthrough in
Karabakh negotiations. Armenia as well as other international actors
reiterated that Armenian-Turkish process shouldn’t be based in any
conditions and that Armenian - Turkish relations and negotiations on
Karabakh are two separate problems. Due to Turkish rejection to ratify
the protocols, Armenia also freeze the ratification in April 2010 officially
stating that the country was ready to move forward as soon as Turkey
drops its policy of preconditions and cease its efforts to link ArmenianTurkish relations with negotiations on Karabakh issue (President of the
Republic of Armenia, 2010).
The failure of Turkish – Armenian normalization process precipitated the reinforcement of Turkey – Azerbaijan and Russia – Armenia
strategic alliance. The first two signed a treaty on strategic partnership
and mutual assistance on August 16, 2010 thus symbolizing the end
of disagreements caused by Armenian-Turkish normalization process
(News.Az, 2010). Almost at the same time on August 20, 2010 Armenia
and Russia signed a protocol, which prolonged the dislocation term
for Russian military base in Armenia from initial 25 to 49 years (RFE/
RL, 2010).Thus at the end of 2010 South Caucasus geopolitics turned
to its origins with Turkey and Azerbaijan reinforced strategic cooperation aiming at isolating Armenia, and Armenia relying heavily on Russia
for its security. The Georgian decision to ban Russian military transit
through its territory to Armenia, further complicated the possibilities
of any inclusive regional integration, as many in Armenia had seen this
decision as an overtly unfriendly step (Kucera Joshua, 2011).
VIII. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
In recent years the South Caucasus has witnessed some developments
which may create more favorable conditions for fostering regional in76 The Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia… (2010), Non-Official
Translation, available at: http://www.concourt.am/english/decisions/common/pdf/850.pdf
215
tegration. Armenia has been gradually involved in EU and NATO programs trying to diversify its foreign policy portfolio. Its relations with
NATO are based on Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) the first
of which was signed in 2005. Now third IPAP is underway covering period of 2011-2013 (IPAP, 2012-2013). Armenia is participating in NATOled operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
Armenia is also developing its relations with the EU. In 2009 it was
involved in EU Eastern Partnership programs along with Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Now negotiations are in progress to sign Armenia – EU Association agreement as well as to create
Deep and a Comprehensive Free Trade Area which, among other advantages, will facilitate Armenian products export to the EU countries
(European Commission, 2012).
Another development in the region is linked with October 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia which resulted in the defeat of President Saakahsvili’s party and the voting of Georgian opposition leader
Bidzina Ivanishvili as a Prime Minister (Reuters, 2012). Domestic
changes in this country may have significant impact on region geopolitics especially in the context of possible thaw in Russian - Georgian relations. Ivanishvili argues for better relations with Russia and has already
appointed special representative to deal with that issue (Civil Georgia
News, 2012). The main thorny issue in Georgian – Russian relations remains the recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence
by Russia after 2008 Russia – Georgia war. However, personal changes in
Georgian leadership, especially taking into consideration the fact that
at the end of 2013, and due to constitutional changes, the Prime Minister will become the most powerful figure in Georgia, may create conditions to start of negotiations to normalize relations at least starting from
culture and economy. The main issue for Ivanishvili is to re-open Russian market for Georgian wine and mineral water exports, which were
banned by Russian authorities in 2006.
Another major development in the region was the June 2012 Turkish - Azerbaijan agreement to construct the new gas pipeline (TANAP)
which will transport Azerbaijani gas available from Shah Deniz Phase 2
field to Europe starting approximately in 2018 (RFE/TL, 2012). The line
is planned to run from Georgia – Turkey border to Turkey-EU border.
This agreement has opened up Azerbaijan perspectives to increase its
importance as energy supplier for Europe. In the meantime, it raised
to a new level the significance of the South Caucasus as a potential energy hub, especially taking into account long nurtured plans to build
Trans Caspian gas pipeline which may bring Turkmen gas to Europe
216
via Azerbaijan. Nevertheless it should be emphasized that successful
implementation of new energy projects in the region requires stability
and security which is impossible to achieve by continuing to isolate Armenia and threatening it by resumption of hostilities.
New energy projects envisaged in the region, Armenian efforts to
rebalance its foreign policy and foster its relations with Euro Atlantic
community, as well as domestic political changes in Georgia which may
result in the launch of Russian - Georgian rapprochement or at least
trigger steps toward normalization of bilateral relations, may create
conditions for revitalized, and which is more important, inclusive integration process in the South Caucasus.
IX. PERSPECTIVES FOR INTEGRATION; THE WAY AHEAD
The South Caucasus still represents a region with a lack of mutual trust
and with significant persistent threats to its security and stability. The
number-one danger for the region is the resumption of hostilities in
Nagorno Karabakh. Taking into account qualitative changes in the armed forces of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno karabakh, a new war
will certainly have devastating affects not only for parties directly involved in the conflict, but also for the whole region. The possible spillover
effects of the new war could also not be excluded, especially in the light
of August 2010 Turkey – Azerbaijan strategic partnership agreement
and Armenian – Russian treaties in the defense sphere. New war over
the Nagorno Karanakh will also undermine the region’s role as a potential energy hub, as hostilities will inevitably involve the territories adjacent to the oil and gas pipelines.
In this context, the rhetoric of Azerbaijani leadership about its readiness to solve Karabakh conflict through military force cannot contribute
to the process of mutual state building, which is cornerstone for every
inclusive integration process. Azerbaijan is frustrated with the lack of
progress in the negotiation process, which is continued under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk group. However, it should be emphasized that
preservation of ceasefire since 1994 without any peacekeeping forces
deployed in the region is an evidence of negotiations success.
It should also be stressed that Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s strategy to
isolate Armenia from regional economic projects and thus compel it
and Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) to make concessions in negotiation process proved to be fruitless. No one can refute that blockade put
some pressure on Armenia’s and NKR economy, but Armenia has been
217
managing to balance its economy fostering the developments of sectors
such as IT, tourism and agriculture. The role of 7 million Armenian Diaspora, which has strong positions in Russia, the US, France as well as
in some Middle Eastern countries, should also be taken into account.
Meanwhile, efforts to isolate Armenia are thwarting any meaningful
integration processes in the region, as it is obvious that genuine integration is possible only through participation of at least all internationally
recognized states in the South Caucasus. The region could realize its
whole potential and become more competitive in economic terms only
acting unified, with open infrastructure and transport lines. International community also perceives the South Caucasus as a one entity. It’s
not a coincidence that almost all international programs, among them
EU Eastern Partnership, include all states in the region.
This mindset could be projected also on Georgian situation. Obviously, any military action by Georgia to retake Abkhazia and South
Ossetia will immediately trigger Russian military involvement as Russia has agreements on mutual defense with these two entities. The
new Georgian – Russian war will have strong negative impact on entire
South Caucasus and will jeopardize Georgia’s credibility as a secure energy transit route.
The Georgian new Prime Minister willingness to normalize relations
with Russia may serve as a good base for starting confidence building
measures with Abkhazia and South Ossetia by developing joint projects
in the sphere of culture, science and economic cooperation at least at
the regional level. These steps will definitely have their impact on societies’ perceptions on each other; will alleviate the grievances of past
conflicts and create necessary conditions to start meaningful negotiations for finding mutually acceptable modus vivendi.
The South Caucasus has two strategic visions to move forward. One
is based on the assumption that no genuine integration is possible
without final settlement of regional conflicts. This vision excludes the
possibility of any regional cooperation or any steps toward mutual trust
building. Moreover, taking into account the historical roots of regional
conflicts and the polarization of society’s views, it is hard to predict any
breakthrough in negotiation process in foreseeable future. Thus, this
vision contributes to the growing alienation between people in the region, as each year without any relations and under the constant threat
of war resumption, puts societies further away from each other and
makes any possible compromises over the ways of conflict settlement
even less likely.
The second viewpoint is based on the premise that integration
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should pave the way for conflict settlement and not visa verse. This approach cultivates the idea of small steps toward cooperation in various
fields such as culture, science, economy, which will contribute to the
confidence building process among societies, alleviating tensions and
creating conditions for conflict settlements.
This perspective is based on European post WWII experience, when
economic and cultural cooperation facilitated the dialogue and reconciliation between former enemies such as France and Germany. The
same can be argued for post the Soviet Yugoslavia states which had
been torn by civil war and mutual destruction but now are competing
for achieving the EU membership.
We believe that opportunities may be raised for the South Caucasian
states to start inclusive integration if the radical approach of no relations
until everything is settled is put away. Only through confidence building
measures, societies in the region can overcome deep entrenched negative perceptions, which themselves will contribute to conflicts resolution. The other possible way will only deepen tensions and doubts and
will make resumption of hostilities either in Abkhazia/South Ossetia or
Karabakh more likely with catastrophic effects for the whole region. In
this subject the role of international community should be highlighted
as well. State-actors as well as international organizations and NGOs
should support the development and implementation of joint projects
in the region involving both international recognized and unrecognized
entities of the region.
REFERENCES
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(2010), Non-Official Translation, available at: http://www.concourt.
am/english/decisions/common/pdf/850.pdf
Tercera Parte
Europa Oriental
The prospects of european integration
Constantinos Koliopoulos
RESUMEN
La Unión Europea (UE) es por mucho el caso integración internacional
más paradigmático en la historia reciente. Desde sus comienzos, la integración europea ha estado fuertemente influenciada por las circunstancias políticas. Actualmente, la UE se enfrenta a una severa y multifacética crisis económica que no solo presenta una amenaza para la
Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM), quizás el aspecto más importante de de dicho proceso de integración, sino que además pone en juego
la propia continuidad de la propia UE. En este artículo se sostiene que
el clima político actual, tanto al interior de los Estados miembros de la
UE como en el ámbito internacional, no es propicio a los efectos de que
la UE pueda hacer frente a la crisis y profundizar el proceso de integración. En todo caso, los intentos que se hagan en este sentido posiblemente sucumban ante poderosos obstáculos: los defectos inherentes
de la UEM; la falta de una identidad común y las consecuentes divergencias entre los Estados miembros; y el relativo declive de la UE como
unidad económica. El escenario más probable es el de una UE que, aún
en suspenso y relativamente próspera, irá tanteando el rumbo sin demasiada visión e irá menguando su influencia internacional.
ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) is by far the most successful case of international integration in recent history. Since its very inception, European
integration has been heavily influenced by political circumstances. Currently the EU is facing a severe and multifaceted economic crisis that
not only threatens its Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), arguably
the most important aspect of European integration, but also jeopardizes the very survival of the EU itself. This chapter argues that at present
the political environment, both inside the EU member states and internationally, is not propitious and the EU will be hard pressed to cope
with the ongoing crisis, let alone deepen its integration. The relevant
attempts are likely to founder on a number of powerful obstacles: the
inherent defects of the EMU; the lack of a common European identity
224
and the consequent divergence among member states; and the relative
decline of the EU as an economic unit. The most likely scenario is that
of an EU which, although still in abeyance and relatively prosperous,
will be muddling through with no grand vision and will be wielding ever
waning international influence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing is, or has ever been preordained about European integration.
Ever since the original Schuman Plan of 1950 European integration has
been a heavily political project throughout, always depending on political circumstances. The entity that is now the European Union (EU) has
weathered many crises so far, without disintegrating; on the contrary, it
seems to be gathering strength in the process (Kühnhardt, 2009). However, all those crises have crucially shaped the enterprise of European
integration. Thus, whereas the founding fathers of European integration
basically aspired to the federation of Europe (Schuman, 1950), nowadays this federalist logic has been subdued and it is explicitly declared
that European integration is a journey with no clearly defined destination (Cameron, 2010). In the same vein, the intergovernmental elements of European integration have been generally in the ascendancy
relative to its supranational elements – even though this has not been a
linear process and does not negate some spectacular supranational arrangements such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
These basic parameters of European integration are not likely to
change: European integration will remain open-ended and crucially
dependent on political forces operating within the EU member states,
within the EU as a whole, and within the broader international system.
The present chapter will attempt to highlight the prospects of European
integration in the light of the present and the likely future challenges
faced by the EU.
II. THE CHALLENGES
According to the oft-quoted quip of former European Commission
President Jacques Delors, Europe is like a bicycle; if it does not move, it
will fall. In other words, European integration has to keep deepening or
it will fall off track. European integration has gone a very long way indeed since its beginnings in the 1950s. The corpus of the EU regulatory
225
texts, the famous acquis communautaire, runs into thousands of pages.
This has created a powerful institutional momentum that, up to a point,
further enhances integration. However, the EU is currently facing two
substantial challenges that can definitely derail the integration project.
The first challenge is how to overcome the defects of the EMU. The second is how to deal with the lack of a common European identity and
the consequent divergence among member states. The first challenge,
though undoubtedly very serious, is so to speak incidental, whereas the
second one is of a more fundamental nature.
The current crisis in the Eurozone cannot be attributed to a single
factor (Dadush and contributors, 2010). For instance, Ireland was afflicted with greedy banks that became too big to fail and had to be rescued by the state. In Italy and Greece the problem was government
corruption, clientelism and profligacy, exacerbated in the Greek case
by a woeful shrinkage of the productive sectors of the economy. In any
case, the crisis has brought to the forefront a number of problems that
perceptive analysts had pointed out long ago (Marsh, 2009). First, the
export surpluses of the dynamic German economy could not go on
indefinitely hand-to-hand with the structural deficits of the southern
European countries and France. Second, the application of the same
interest rates throughout the eurozone could not cope with the different economic circumstances and performances of the various member
states. Third, although the EMU is a project of enormous political significance, it has been characterized by a relative lack of political coordination and a heavy reliance on essentially technocratic arrangements.
This lack of political governance goes a long way to explain why the EU
was unprepared to meet the current economic and financial crisis (Sapir, 2011).
In principle the crisis is not insoluble (Jones, 2012), although in the
end some member states might prove unable to remain in the eurozone. The measures adopted were the creation of the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The
ESM possesses a bailout fund of 500 billion euros that, together with
funds of the European Central Bank (ECB), will be used in order to buy
potentially unlimited bonds from the eurozone countries, subject to a
formal request for aid and strict domestic policy conditions. This will
go a long way toward alleviating fears of bankruptcy and undercutting
speculation. The SSM, effective from 1 January 2013, will allow banks
throughout the EU to have direct access to capital from the ECB without involving their host-states. This way, bank liquidity will be ensured
without piling up sovereign debts. Moreover, the ECB assumes the pow-
226
er to intervene in any of the eurozone’s banks (BBC News, 2012). Currently these measures do seem to have restored some confidence on
the viability of the euro (IISS, 2012). Nevertheless, the crisis may leave
behind a legacy of high structural unemployment, reduced investment
and high debt levels that, in a low-growth environment, may put fiscal
sustainability in jeopardy (Padoan, 2011).
Still, even if the EU manages to deal successfully with the eurozone
crisis, a far more fundamental challenge is looming. There is no common European identity, either extant or in the making, to offset the
marked heterogeneity of the EU-27. In turn, this leads to an increasing
“renationalization” of the member states’ policies.
Already in the late eighteenth century Jean Jacques Rousseau had
proclaimed that there were no longer Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards,
Englishmen, but only Europeans (quoted in Waltz, 1959: 174). In the
same vein, more than two centuries later, Dominique Strauss-Kahn
claimed that the anti-Iraq War demonstrations in various European
cities in 2003 signified the birth of a European nation (Strauss-Kahn,
2004). Today, both those assertions sound equally wild. The economic
and financial crisis has driven home the lack of a common European
identity, as pointed out by politicians (Fischer, 2010), political scientists
(Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009) and philosophers alike (Spiegel Online International, 2012). The EU flag does appear proudly next to the
national flag in state buildings throughout the EU. However, although
national flags can still provoke strong positive emotions in many Europeans, it can be confidently asserted that the EU flag does not provoke
anything similar. There are still people who would die for their national
emblem but it would be a very great surprise if one encountered people
who would willingly sacrifice their lives in order to protect the EU flag.
The fact that the nation (or, in some cases, the region) has remained
the prime point of reference for the people of the EU has had a number
of consequences. One of these is the aforementioned strengthening of
the intergovernmental elements of the EU vis a vis the supranational
ones. Especially after the massive enlargement of 2004, the center of
gravity has been shifting inexorably toward the national capitals and
the European Council, overshadowing the European Commission, let
alone the European Parliament (Barysch, 2010; Cramme, 2011: 43-44).
Moreover, the EU member states have been extremely reluctant to relinquish their prerogatives in the fields of “high politics,” that is foreign and
security policy. Thus, recent research suggests that, when dealing with
crisis situations, the most important member states were much more
“national” than “European” in their outlook (Gross, 2010). The clear-
227
est indication of this tendency is the Treaty of Lisbon. Although this
treaty introduced important innovations in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its language is full of conditions and
escape clauses, thus making it clear that the member states are chiefly
concerned with retaining their sovereignty in the field (Verola, 2010).
Another consequence of the primacy of the nation in the EU is what
has been aptly named the “renationalization” of political life (Fischer,
2010; Kupchan, 2010; 2012). The political discourse in the member
states is becoming increasingly national, as opposed to European. It
has been said that at times the national political leaders do not play fair
in the process. Thus, they enact policies in the EU in order to promote
the national interest of their countries, but then they put the blame on
the EU when these policies go awry or simply when they provoke reactions at home (Menon, 2008; Matlary, 2009; Fischer, 2010:3). Overall, euroscepticism is on the ascendancy throughout the EU (Taylor,
2007; Fuchs, Magni-Berton and Roger, 2009). This can be attributed to a
number of factors. To start with, the EU has always been an elite-driven
project, conspicuously lacking in democratic accountability. However,
in the course of time this has created a big problem of legitimacy (Hix,
2008). Another factor contributing to the rise of euroscepticism is the
bewildering complexity of the institutions of the EU that makes it hard
for people to identify with it (Menon, 2008; Fischer, 2010: 2). This goes
some way to explain the very low turnout in the elections for the European Parliament; even though this is the most democratic institution
of the EU, its functions do not correspond with the familiar functions
of national parliaments, making people wonder what exactly it is doing. Finally, another factor is the generational shift that has brought into
power a new set of European leaders (Kupchan, 2010; 2012). The previous political leadership of Europe was still haunted by the memories
of the Second World War. For those leaders European integration was
literary a matter of life and death, hence they would go to great lengths
to ensure its functionality. The present generation of political leaders,
freed from the specters of the past, views European integration more
nonchalantly, relatively speaking. All those factors point to one conclusion: compared to the nation the EU loses out.
In turn, this makes it more difficult to deal with divergence among
member states in the heterogeneous EU-27. The days of the old, homogeneous European Economic Community comprising six or nine members are long gone. Currently, there are seven member states of the EU27, that is one out of every four, whose GDP per capita in Purchasing
Power Standard is less than 70% of the EU-27 average, with Bulgaria and
228
Romania standing at less than 50% (Eurostat, 2012a). Some EU countries, notably the Baltic States, see their economies booming with rates
of growth more than 5% for the year 2011; the majority registers sluggish
growth of around 1%; and the Greek economy is contracting fearfully
(Eurostat, 2012b). Population discrepancies have always been present
in what is now the EU, with tiny Luxemburg always skewing statistics.
Nowadays, fifteen member states of the EU-27 had populations of less
than ten million people in 1 January 2012, compared with about eighty
million in Germany and about sixty to sixty five million in France, the
United Kingdom and Italy (Eurostat, 2012c). Apart from these differences in size and economic performance, there are important political differences as well. The EU member states operate at different international
political environments. Some of them have wide-ranging international
commitments (United Kingdom, France); some do not (Austria, Malta).
Some live a relatively peaceful and risk-free existence (Denmark, Czech
Republic); some live in tough neighborhoods (Greece, Baltic States).
Instability in, say, Libya is felt far more acutely in Italy than in Hungary.
Latin American affairs definitely concern Spain, but leave Romania all
but indifferent. Managing these differences to create a workable EU is a
formidable task, even with the best of good will and in a benign political
milieu. With the nation proudly reasserting itself as the prime actor in
the EU, that task becomes well-nigh impossible.
Weather the EU will overcome these tough challenges it is currently
facing will depend to a great extent on the constraints and opportunities present in the broader international political environment. It is to
this issue that we now turn.
III. THE ENVIRONMENT
The success of European integration can easily make us forget how unlikely it was in the first place. The very fact that, despite numerous efforts at regional integration, nothing similar to the EU has been created
anywhere else in the world testifies to the enormous difficulties of the
enterprise.
The international political environment in the aftermath of the Second World War looked decidedly bleak. Europe was devastated and it
barely escaped starvation during the late 1940s. It bears testimony to
the political genius of the founding fathers of European integration that
they could still discern the silver lining in all those clouds. To start with,
the major European states had ceased to be great powers. Although
229
initially they did retain illusions of grandeur and desperately tried to
cling to their colonies, it was very obvious that they could not compete
in terms of power with the United States and the Soviet Union. It has
been empirically demonstrated that great powers are more warlike than
middle and small powers (Wright, 1965: 220-222, 848-849). Thus, the
loss of great-power status by the major European states paved the way
for the peaceful integration of Europe (Waltz, 1979: 187). Integration
was further assisted by the fact that there was a rough balance between
the major states of Western Europe, namely France, West Germany and
Italy, with the United Kingdom joining in later on (James, 2006: 131132).
Still, probably nothing would have happened if the two superpowers had not taken a hand, each in a different way. The Soviet Union was
the first to assist European integration, albeit inadvertently. According
to Paul Henri Spaak, one of the early protagonists of European integration, it was the Soviet threatening stance (or what the West construed
as a Soviet threatening stance) that provided the chief incentive for
the creation of both NATO and what today is the EU. Spaak famously
added that the true “father of Europe” is none other than Josef Stalin
(quoted in Ifestos, 2001: 306). In other words, Soviet aggression made it
abundantly clear to the Europeans that without some form of integration they could not stand up to the superpower in the east. Precisely the
same analysis was made in the United States, hence Washington began
to push actively for European integration already since the late 1940s
and kept doing so for the next few decades (Winand, 1996). Apart from
this direct assistance, the United States supported European integration
in an indirect, though no less crucial way. Washington provided an essentially unilateral security guarantee to Western Europe, a guarantee
covering not only Soviet aggression, but also a possible German one.
This eliminated any security concerns on the part of the Western Europeans, leaving them free to concentrate on their integration project
(Joffe, 1984).
It was because of this unique combination of favorable circumstances that European integration managed to flourish. It is very difficult to
find, let alone create, similar conditions elsewhere in the world, which
explains why the European success story has been so unique. Furthermore, the good luck continued with the end of the Cold War and the
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. These developments enabled
the European integration project to expand eastwards and cover the
greater part of the continent. However, it seems that the good news have
come to an end.
230
One of the most important international developments, currently
taking place, is the shift of the center of the world economy away from
the West and toward East Asia and parts of Latin America. This shift is
accompanied by a marked population increase in developing countries
relative to the developed ones. The trends are fairly clear and point at
an EU that, although will continue to comprise significant aggregates of
power resources, will have lost out to China, India, and possibly Brazil as
well, while proving unable to catch up with, let alone overtake, the United States (Gnesotto and Grevi, 2006; Hamilton, 2011). The comparison
with the United States is particularly depressing, because the American
and the European economy are on similar stages of development and
thus more directly comparable than, say, the European and the Indian
economy. The list of the US comparative advantages reads almost like
a list of what the EU economy lacks: “continuing population growth, in
combination with high-quality human capital, flexible labour markets
and high labour productivity; a strong culture of innovation, combining high spending on research in key sectors for the future (IT, biotechnology and nanotechnology) and the capacity to quickly translate new
technologies into commercial applications (low level of regulation, a
big domestic market, access to venture capital, etc.)” (Gnesotto and
Grevi, 2006: 37). The demographic dynamics are also worrisome, with
an ageing and relatively wealthy European population surrounded by
youthful and relatively poor populations in Western Asia, Middle East/
North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa – a situation bound to cause all
sorts of security problems- (Langton, 2010).
The shift in the locus of the global production has been largely the
result of the reduced competitiveness of European (or Western) producers compared to their opposite numbers from other parts of the
world (Hamilton, 2011). With about two billion low-cost Asian workers
having entered the job market during the last few decades, the Western
workforce has been facing stiff competition – and it should be remembered that the American economy still enjoys a number of comparative advantages that the European economy lacks, thus adding to the
latter’s vulnerability. Large-scale workforce-replacement immigration
is politically undesirable in Western Europe, since most of the likely immigrants are perceived as culturally alien and very hard to assimilate.
Consequently, the combination of a shrinking productive base and an
ageing population has been putting the European-style welfare state
under severe pressure. With Europe having been conceived as a new
form of social organization that, among others, provides an alternative
to the market (James, 2006: 126-129), the unsustainability of the welfare
231
state brought about by the new international environment threatens the
very foundations of the European model. It should never be forgotten
that, although “the European project in the 1950s did have a whiff of
the Holy Roman Empire about it” (James, 2006: 135), i.e. it represented,
at least subconsciously, a grandiose vision of a pan-European community, nowadays it is first and foremost “a project designed for mutual
economic progress” (Fischer, 2010: 8). This is the yardstick according to
which it will be judged; failure may spell dissolution.
Last, but not least, the shift in the global balance of power toward
East Asia could conceivably remove, or at least weaken, one of the fundamental pillars of European integration, namely the active US involvement in and support of the European integration enterprise. Of course,
given the enormous importance that Europe still possesses and will in
all probability retain in American eyes for the foreseeable future, a complete US withdrawal from Europe is not to be expected. Nevertheless, if
President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” is anything to go by, the trends point
toward a reduction of Washington’s commitment to European affairs.
This is certainly a far cry from the situation prevalent when the project
of the European integration began, and it cannot be inconsequential.
IV. THE PROSPECTS
In view of the preceding analysis, one can discern three broad scenarios
regarding the prospects of European integration: i. substantial strengthening; ii. breakup; iii. incremental changes.
The substantial strengthening of European integration would involve the creation of fully federal European institutions like those to be
found in, say, the United States (Heisbourg, 2012: 27-28). It has been
pointed out that the crisis could, or even should, provide the catalyst for
Europe’s deepening its collective identity, in the same way as the United
States emerged from the Civil War with a stronger federal government
and ultimately with a stronger national identity (Kupchan, 2012: 116117). Still, this scenario remains unlikely for Europe at present. As a
general observation, one can point out that although the EU has managed to ride out and emerge stronger from a number of crises, crises do
occasionally prove fatal, as the Soviet and the Yugoslav case testify. The
present crisis need not be fatal for the EU, but there seem to be potent
reasons why the integration project will not be substantially strengthened any time soon.
In an environment where the nation remains paramount, federal ar-
232
rangements will not be enough to obscure national differences. For instance, the establishment of a fiscal union will stop neither the outflow
of German taxpayers’ money to less fiscally disciplined member states,
nor the resulting resentment in Germany (Jones, 2012: 234-235). It is
also quite possible that in such a case the British (or at least the English,
should the Scottish opt for independence in 2014) will have had enough
with the European integration project and leave the EU (Heisbourg,
2012: 27).
In any variation of the federal scenario, Germany is bound to play
the leading role in the EU. Regional dynamics may also enhance this
role further still, by leading to the fragmentation of a number of EU
member states. Currently independence is being intensely debated not
only in Scotland, but also in Catalonia and Flanders; Italy’s North might
also be tempted to join in (Dempsey, 2012). Such developments will
make Germany stand out even more clearly than the rest. In any case,
Germany will hold the key to the creation and the success of any federated EU. And this is where the project is likely to founder.
In common with other Europeans, the Germans’ commitment to
European integration has been reduced (Balmer, Jeffery and Padgett,
2010). The present crisis has demonstrated the reluctance of Berlin to
assume the mantle of European hegemony and the burdens associated
with it. Perhaps, though, one should not hasten to accuse Germany of
indecisiveness in a crucial historical moment. The Germans are all too
aware of the raw nerves that an overt German hegemonic stance would
touch throughout Europe; there is already plenty of reaction as things
stands right now, when Germany does little more than insisting on fiscal discipline and austerity as conditions for lending money to indebted
member states. Hence it should come as no surprise that Berlin does
not seem to have the taste for a substantial deepening of European integration along federal lines. The preceding pages showed why the same
applies to the other European capitals as well. A federal scenario would
really be a last resort, when everything else would seem to fail or to be
unacceptable (Heisbourg, 2012: 28).
The breakup scenario pertains to both the EU in general and the
EMU in particular. In principle these are two different things, though
the Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti famously declared in November
2011 that the European Union project cannot survive if the monetary
union fails (Dinmore and Segreti, 2011). As regards the EMU, the breakup scenario may take the form of either an exit of peripheral countries
from the euro, but with the latter surviving, or a complete collapse of
the EMU. As was pointed above, it is still early to make predictions on
233
this issue. Nevertheless, at the time of writing (November 2012) it seems
that the first of these two scenarios is more likely than the second. Such
an eventuality would lead to instability in the regions of the member
states that chose to or were forced to exit the euro, with a Greek exit
being particularly pernicious for stability in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean (Heisbourg, 2012: 28-29). The obvious economic
consequence of a complete collapse of the euro would be depression
in Europe and recession worldwide; other than that, there are way too
many incalculable factors into play, such as whether the EU itself would
survive (Heisbourg, 2012: 29-30). Overall, it is no exaggerated to say that
the consequences of a collapse of the EMU would range from grave to
horrific.
The same could be said about the consequences of a more or less
complete breakup of the EU. However, this is a very remote possibility. Although it is fashionable for Europeans to nag about the EU’s “encroaching” on their national sovereignty, it has been plausibly asserted
that, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom (actually England), a majority favoring withdrawal from the union would be found in
no EU member state in case of a referendum on that question (Fischer,
2010: 3).
This is not surprising, given that the EU confers a great many benefits on its member states and their citizens. To start with, there are economic benefits. The defects of the EMU notwithstanding, the EU have
undeniably fostered prosperity. Moreover, in a world economy dominated by mega-states like the United States, China, India, Russia and
Brazil, no single European state (Germany included) stands a chance of
making a global economic impact by going alone. In such an environment, retaining the EU makes excellent economic sense.
Political benefits are also appreciable. The EU has fostered democratic stability in its member states, something that could not be taken
for granted in the south and the east of the continent. It has also increased the political clout of every single member state, simply by virtue
of its belonging to the EU. This is especially important for smaller member states that face or could potentially face international problems (e.g.
Cyprus, Finland). These sets of benefits go a long way to explain why
accession into the EU is still viewed as an attractive prospect in many of
the European countries that are still outside the union.
Finally, there are everyday-life benefits for the citizens of the EU
member states, although not all of those citizens partake in them in the
same degree (Fligstein, 2008). Nowadays millions of Europeans consider it very natural that they can freely travel, stay, study and do business
234
throughout the EU; they would not want to lose that. Despite the complaints and puns about the mass of EU paperwork, it is precisely these
regulations that provide the citizens of the EU member states with high
standards of, say, product safety or environmental protection.
All in all, when the push comes to shove, there is a broad consensus
on the necessity of the EU. Add to this the powerful vested interests that
have been created during more than five decades of European integration, and it becomes obvious why the complete disintegration of the EU
is highly unlikely. There is no absolute guarantee against such an eventuality, but the disincentives are definitely very powerful.
This leaves the last and most likely scenario, that of incremental
changes. The EU will continue more or less along its current trajectory,
dealing with problems as they occur, lacking grand vision but also surviving well into the future (Patrick, 2010; Heisbourg, 2012: 26-27). This is
how the EU has coped with the present crisis so far. In a sense this scenario is a euphemism for muddling through, although it need not have
the negative connotations sometimes associated with that term. As the
former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has pointed out, the
task of the EU is to assume those parts of traditional state sovereignty
that the common market has rendered obsolete, and those needed to
secure a lasting peace in Europe without internal hegemony; the EU has
accomplished that task (Fischer, 2010: 4-5). With its mission basically
accomplished, the EU can arguably afford to merely float along.
An EU of this kind will sooner or later become two-speed (or even
multi-speed) with extensive opt-outs, thus enabling the further integration of those who can proceed with it, without depriving the rest of the
other benefits they enjoy (Fischer, 2010: 9). In the field of high politics
there will be some high-sounding institutions and projects (Common
Defense and Security Policy, External Action Service, etc.), but their
impact will remain limited (Koliopoulos, 2007; Bindi, 2010; Giegerich,
2010b; Spiegel Online International, 2012) and the member states will
continue to jealously guard their relevant prerogatives.
One potentially serious problem inherent in this scenario is the waning of the international influence of the EU. This has already been going
on for some time; for instance, in the decade from 1997/8 to 2007/8 the
EU has been receiving reduced support for its human rights position
in the United Nations General Assembly (Giegerich, 2010a: 14). All in
all, the EU has not managed to establish itself as a global power and
seems increasingly content with scaling down its once grandiose ambitions (Toje, 2010; Youngs, 2010). To be sure, the EU is popular around
the world and quite successful in setting global norms and standards.
235
However, it is unable and reluctant to back up its production of standards with hard-power tools, while also being unable to translate its
norm-setting potential into something tangible in the power arena of
the major international actors (Heisbourg, 2010: 19-20).
The aforementioned shift of global power away from the West is
bound to further reduce the international influence of the EU. Judging
for the care the EU shows for human rights and the environment, this
is bad news globally. On the other hand, the fact that the EU may be
slowly withdrawing from the conflictual great-power arena and leave
the existing and emerging mega-states to fight it out among themselves,
may not be entirely without benefits as far as the Europeans themselves
are concerned.
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The Wedding Rings of Europe: Some Military
Aspects of Euro-Atlantic Integration
Polina Sinovets
RESUMEN
Usualmente, los procesos de integración suelen estar asociados al desarrollo cultural, económico y político de los Estados y a las posibles
convergencias que ellos puedan tener en esos campos. A diferencia
de los enfoques clásicos, el rol de las armas no es usualmente definido
como un factor de union. De hecho, hasta cierto punto se subestima
la influencia de las armas en la política internacional, especialmente
cuando se trata del rol de armas estratégicas. La OTAN tiene una larga
historia como elemento de convergencia. Desde comienzos de la Guerra Fría, el paraguas nuclear de los Estados Unidos estableció fuertes
vínculos entre Washington y sus aliados europeos, fundados en una
amenaza común y en la dependencia del Viejo Continente hacia su socio americano. Más allá de las armas nucleares estratégicas, estos lazos
fueron reforzados por las armas nucleares no estratégicas de los Estados Unidos (NSNWs por sus siglas en inglés), desplegadas en Europa
como garantía del compromiso americano para con la seguridad europea, y aprestadas para disuadir una invasión soviética. Hoy en día,
la retórica sobre el desarme nuclear global plantea preguntas sobre la
renovada conveniencia de las NSNWs en Europa. Por un lado, el significado que tiene para la seguridad del continente es más simbólico que
real, mientras que, por otro lado, muchos miembros de la OTAN ven
aún en las NSNWs una suerte de garantía de defensa de los Estados Unidos en caso de una agresión externa. Este capítulo, buscar acercar una
prospectiva sobre el futuro de las NSNWs estadounidenses en Europa,
analizando su rol en el proceso de integración Euro-Atlántico, así como
dar cuenta de las posibilidades de que una Defensa Misilística Europea
pueda convertirse en un nuevo factor aglutinador para las relaciones
transatlánticas.
ABSTRACT
Traditionally the process of integration is associated with economic,
political and cultural development of states and their further conver-
242
gence in the mentioned fields. Unlike this classical approach the role of
weapons is not usually defined as the uniting one, the fact that to a certain extent underestimates the influence of weapons on international
politics, especially speaking about the role of strategic arms. NATO has
a long history of this type of unification. Since the beginning of the Cold
War the United States’ nuclear umbrella established strong ties between
Washington and its European allies, the ties resulting from the common
threat and common dependency on the strongest partner of the Alliance. Besides the strategic nuclear arms these ties were strengthened
by the US nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), deployed in Europe
and served as the guarantee of the American engagement in European
security affairs, ready to deter Soviet invasion. Today the discourse of
global nuclear disarmament raised up the question of further expediency of the NSNWs in Europe. On one hand, their security meaning for
the continent is more symbolic than actual, on the other, the range of
NATO members still regard NSNWs as a certain guarantee of being defended by the United States in case of external aggression. This chapter
is to give the prospective on the future of the American NSNWs in Europe, analyzing their role in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and
also regarding the chances of European Missile Defense to become a
new “glue” for the transatlantic relationship.
I. AMERICAN NSNWS IN EUROPE – SOME DEFINITIONS
AND HISTORY
The term “non-strategic nuclear weapons” is usually referred to the
nuclear weapons, which are not covered by any arms control treaty
(like IMF or START). Today the American nuclear weapons, deployed
in Europe are mostly tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and very often they are discussed in the literature under this name. Paul Shulte
defines tactical nuclear weapons as “nuclear devices and delivery
systems with relatively short range and low yield by contemporary
standards, which are intended for employment against conventional,
or nuclear, ground, naval, air targets or transport assets, on the battlefield, or across the theater, to contribute to total conventional and
nuclear campaign capability, yet which are not expected to inflict strategically decisive damage to enemy…, but whose use would nevertheless be an unmistakable signal that the stakes in a crisis were regarded
as serious enough to transform it into… a strategic level” (Shulte, 2012:
15). Usually the ranges of tactical nuclear weapons do not exceed 500
The Wedding Rings of Europe
243
km and yield of nuclear warheads 50kt.
Tactical nuclear weapons are originated from the Project Vista in
1952 and were specially designed to “bring the battle back to the battlefield”, meaning to be deployed in Europe to deter possible Soviet aggression, thus compensating its numerical inferiority with the awesome
increase in firepower (Dyer, 1973: 218).
In spite of their theater or battlefield function, TNWs were not introduced during the Korean War due to the fear of European NATO members that being applied at the battlefields of Far East, TNWs won’t be
effective enough, and therefore create an opposite effect on the Soviet
Union, not deterring but provoking it to conquer Western Europe (De
Groot, 2005: 187).
In Europe the first TNWs were deployed in 1953-54, the gravity
bombs, today they are the only and the last type of the American nuclear weapons still remaining at the European continent. In fact those
weapons are duplicating the role of the American strategic nuclear
arms, which according to the extended deterrence posture, are to deter
any aggressor, defending Western Europe as though it is the part of the
US territory.
Under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement the US nuclear weapons, provided to allies, remain under the American ownership, secured
in peacetime by U.S. special weapons custodial forces until, in war or
extreme crisis, a presidential order passes their command to the relevant NATO commanders and the necessary operating codes are given
to allies (Shulte, 2012: 40). Sometimes NATO was blamed in breaching
the core articles of NPT, while the Alliance always mentioned that the
nuclear weapons sharing might occur only under the extreme circumstances when actual nuclear conflict breaks up.
At the same time, it is often stated, that the European-based NSNWs
contributed to NPT regime significantly, dissuading Europeans from
the nuclear weapons programs development. Such states as Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and many others advanced in the development of their own nuclear programs, so the idea of being protected and
in fact, sharing the American nuclear weapons, kept them on the nonnuclear path.
Also, there is one more function, usually referred to the nuclear
weapons presence in Europe. The widely spread opinion supported the
idea that the most important function of TNWs, deployed in Europe is
to symbolize the relationship between the United States and the European NATO members, being a certain symbol of transatlantic military
integration.
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As for the size of the American NSNWs, deployed in Europe during
the Cold War, they were mostly tactical nuclear-capable missiles and
also gravity bombs, combined with the aviation forces, also intermediate nuclear forces were deployed in 1980th. 1965 is considered to
be the peak year of deployment, when Europe counted about 7000 US
nuclear warheads on its territory. The following years marked with the
reductions of TNWs, which was connected first of all with the security
considerations (after the conflict between Greece and Turkey US removed their nuclear bombs from Greek and Turkish fighter-bombers
and transferred the nuclear warheads from the Greeks Nike Hercules
missiles). Also significant measures for the development of the Permission Action Links (the technical impossibility to apply nuclear weapons
without the US permission) were introduced (Kristensen, 2005: 44).
In the 1987 under the IMF Treaty the United States dismantled their
intermediate nuclear forces including the ones, deployed in Europe.
During the two decades, passed since the end of the Cold War, Washington gradually reduced the number of its European –based TNWs up
to 180 B-61 gravity bombs. Today they are stored in 5 states: Turkey, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Italy. The situation, connected with
the technical ageing of the nuclear-capable aircrafts on one hand and
the current global nuclear disarmament discourse, pushed a number
of European countries to raise discussion on further expediency of the
TNWs, remained at their territory. In particular, in 2010 Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Norway proposed removing European-based U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe. This idea has started
the long discussion on the future of the TNWs for Europe. To understand it better it is worth to analyze the modern conditions of TNWs in
Europe, regarding them in the framework of the classic arguments, as
well as the key states’ positions upon this issue.
II. THE MAIN ARGUMENTS OF THE TNWS DEPLOYMENT
There are three main arguments, already mentioned above – proliferation concern, strengthening deterrence and enhancing transatlantic
linkage. Deterrence is considered to be the weakest point, so usually
the status quo criticism comes from there.
The credibility of the European-based American TNWs is very low.
On one hand the credibility of the US commitments to their European
allies was often put under doubt, in particular the question whether US
is ready to sacrifice New-York for Paris (or to attack USSR with nuclear
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weapons in exchange for its attack on the Western Europe) was one of
the incentives for France to acquire its own nuclear potential. However, the US commitment might be even bolstered by the presence of
the American nuclear weapons in Europe, serving to enhance the deterrence “from outside”. It means that in the event of the conflict with
Moscow they were supposed to play a “tripwire” function, where attacking Europe, the Soviet Union would automatically attack the US nuclear
forces, deployed on the NATO territory (Murdock, Yeats, 2009: 20). The
Japan’s attack on the Perl-Harbor military base created the case, which
still considered as being efficient to provide the US interference in case
of a European conflict. One would argue that a small conventional military contingency would be enough to perform the “tripwire” function.
Indeed, but the nuclear sharing agreement might play an additional if
not critical role in pushing Washington to engage in the conflict at the
moment when Europeans use the American weapons to defend themselves from the enemy.
At the same time the readiness of European states to use TNWs also
lacks credibility, as though any application of the nuclear weapons on
the territory of Europe would result unacceptable damage for the continent. In particular Göttingen Manifesto, published by famous German
physicists in 1957, was based on Matthias Uhl’s depiction of the potential nuclear campaign in Europe, assumed that in case of nuclear war
2,200 nuclear weapons would be applied, 1,000 by the Soviets, 1,200 by
NATO. “In their first nuclear strike, Warsaw Pact forces would attack 422
stationary targets only in West Germany, and within 30 minutes perform approximately 400 nuclear attacks on mobile targets such as troop
concentrations or nuclear weapons… Nevertheless, after this decisive
initial exchange, Warsaw Pact troops would storm on to Paris and reach
Calais on the 10th day” (Shulte, 2012: 32). Moreover, the mere application of TNWs by Europeans looked as a suicide not only due to the
reciprocity of the Soviet response, but as the result of their own yield. In
particular the missile Honest John (M-31) had a range between 5,5 and
20,4 km, while the yield of its nuclear warhead (W7 and later W31) varied between 2 and 30 kt. So, there was some ground under the popular
Cold War expression: “the shorter the (nuclear) range, the deader the
Germans”. The Healey-Schröder Report, published to Nuclear Planning
Group in 1969 stated, that NATO military doctrines on application of
nuclear weapons were politically unacceptable and military ineffective.
Therefore the main aim of TNWs were seen as political signaling to the
enemy as for the possible consequences of any aggression against Europe (Shulte, 2012: 28).
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Since that time, the whole international system has changed drastically: the Soviet Union broke up and today Russia is more regarded as a
partner, than the enemy; the number of TNWs in Europe reduced to 180
gravity bombs and their necessity for Europe is questioned more often,
supporting by the question – why not to use the Asian model of the extended deterrence for the United States and their European allies?
Generally it is possible to recognize two perspectives of the TNWs’
future in Europe.
The first one is non-nuclear way, which has become very popular
as soon as Barack Obama Administration proclaimed its “global nuclear zero” agenda. After the non-nuclear call of the Big Four (Nunn,
Perry, Shultz and Kissinger) another cross-party quartet from Germany (Schmidt, Genscher, von Weizsäcker and Bahr) called for steps
toward a nuclear-free world and for radical nuclear reductions. They
wrote that “all short-range nuclear weapons must be destroyed” and asserted that “all remaining Ameri¬can U.S. nuclear warheads should be
withdrawn from German territory” (Neuneck, 2012: 266). This idea was
supported by those who do not see any practical utility for Europeanbased TNWs, stating that in the worst-case scenario it is hard to imagine
that the United States would prefer the European-based gravity bombs,
old-fashioned, not very accurate and stored separately from the aircraft
bombers, to their strategic arsenal, deployed on the navy and ready to
launch at any moment. Adding the French and the UK nuclear arsenals to the American one, NATO would remain a formidable nuclear
alliance even if the few hundred remaining TNWs were withdrawn from
Europe. Moreover, removing TNWs from Europe would not solve any of
the security challenges in Europe, but it could set the stage for finding
such a solution, opening the door for the reciprocal steps from Russia’s
side (Sokov, 2011: 64).
The second one is the good old deterrence perspective. It is impossible to say that the potential to enhance deterrent function of TNWs
is hopeless. The refurbishment of the B-61 nuclear warheads, planning
for the nearest decade will take the three non-strategic variants and one
strategic variant of the weapon and produce a single variant, the B-6112. The new warhead would be able to combine low-yield warhead options with precision guidance to reduce collateral damage from nuclear
strikes, which in fact, is considered as an old good remedy to resolve
the credibility problem. The lower the yield of the nuclear warhead the
more credible is its application in regional operations – this might increase TNWs deterrence credibility chances, not only since the Cold
War, but even in comparison with all other types of modern nuclear
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weapons (Kristensen, 2012: 23-27).
The history counts the number of similar attempts, in particular the
Carter’s administration initiative to introduce TNW Enhanced Radiation Weapons, designed to neutralize the Soviet bloc military advantage
by eliminating tank crews through instant doses of radiation, while
causing less collateral damage. The project failed at the late 1970th,
but in 1990th the United States also attempted to develop Low-Yield
Weapon Design Program, aimed to increase the applicability of nuclear
weapons in the regional operations. Finally the project was blocked as
potentially endangering the nuclear taboo, but the idea might have a
chance with B-61-12 (Khristensen, 2011). Moreover there is a belief,
that in spite of the fact that US or UK strategic forces would be perfectly
adequate to threaten nuclear retaliation in case of aggression, from a
psychological standpoint, an adversary could judge that the use of a
United States based strategic forces would be less likely than the use
of in-theatre nuclear arms (especially the ones having a yield, closer to
conventional weapons). As for the French and British nuclear forces
combined together, they might not provide the same deterrence level
as the American forces used to (Tertrais, 2011: 15). This is a purely psychological factor, nevertheless as though deterrence is rests mostly on
psychology, it should be taken into consideration.
The Asian model is also sometimes criticized, being not a perfect
example of the deterrence efficiency. Usually fact, that the removal of
the US TNWs from South Korea was followed by the nuclear built-up in
DPRK and its gradual abandoning of the NPT, is coming to mind.
One might ask about the nature of the modern enemy, as it is still
hard to imagine using such weapons against Russia. The answer also
can be found in the face of Iran, whose military rise made a good ground
for the development of European Missile Defense today. Moreover,
Russia, who is already not an enemy, still cannot be called a full partner.
Moscow still preserves the largest NSNWs world’s arsenal (about 2000
deployed warheads and about 3000 non-deployed) and is not ready for
any reductions at the present moment; Russia’s latest Military Doctrines
(2000 and 2010) envisage the possibility to apply nuclear weapons in
the regional military operations and some rumors stated that local wars
also might be a matter of concern; more and more often Moscow openly
threatens targeting European Missile Defense units. These issues altogether make the idea of TNWs removal much less attractive. At least, the
possibility to retain these weapons as the bargaining tool in the further
arms control negotiations with Moscow might be considered as prudent enough.
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The moderate supporters of the TNWs deterrent function often argue that extended nuclear deterrence is rested not on deployment of
the defender’s nuclear weapons of at the territory of protégé, but on
the alliance obligations, taken by the defender. However, the status
quo change, caused by the removal of the nuclear weapons from the
territory of protégé, is evaluated by them as potentially undermining
deterrence “if an adversary inferred from such an event that the alliance was weak” (Sechser, 2012:3). Therefore, the removal of TNWs
from Europe is regarded to have damaging consequences for the US
extended deterrence.
Here, speaking not only on the direct deterrence consequences, or
weakening of its credibility thereat in the eyes of the potential enemies.
One of the most important issues here is the deterrence credibility in
the eyes of the protégé, the case, perfectly defined by the U.K. Defense
Minister Denis Healy in the so-called “Healy theorem”. He postulated
that it took “only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to
deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the
Europeans” (Yost, 2009:768). To some extent this problem is to be resolved by the European Missile Defense plans, but the range of the deterrence proponents regard it as an attachment or partial substitute of
TNWs at best.
That point anticipates the second argument, stating that TNWs today is more a political symbol of American coupling and the political
sign of multilateral participation in nuclear use planning and decisionmaking, the most important of Alliance functions. Elaine Bunn explains
this phenomenon with analogy: “Nuclear weapons are kind of like the
wedding ring of the marriage – there are those in cultures that don’t
wear wedding rings who are perfectly committed to their spouses, and
others who wear them who don’t really have much of a commitment at
all. But once you start wearing one, it means something entirely different to be seen without it than it does for someone who never wore one”
(Murdock, Yeats, 2009: 31).
There is an idea, that without this “linkage” function the transatlantic solidarity will start eroding as, losing their places in NPG, NATO
members will lose not only the feeling of strategic partnership with the
United States, but the interest towards NATO nuclear planning, which
is one of the main pillars of the Alliance military policy. And this, is its
turn, might cause the loss of demand for the qualified military nuclear
personal in this countries, step by step creating a gap between them and
the United States (Tertrais, 2011: 16).
A range of experts claim that TNWs should stay the symbols of moral
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burden-sharing based on common values especially today when the attention of the United States is more and more converted to the Pacific
region. The European Missile defense is sometimes presented as a possible “common strategic destiny project”, but a number of states refuse
to regard a defensive measures as the successful substitute for the offensive ones (Roberts, 2012: 385).
The proliferation concern for Europe is not really very high today,
more often it is presented as an important historical argument. Nevertheless, the rise of Turkey, considering its economic and military might
and also its geopolitical ambitions, sometimes nourishes the idea that
in case of being defended properly, Ankara might react on the Iranian
nuclear development with the reciprocal steps. It may be caused not
only by the defense concerns, but also by the idea to preserve the status
quo balance of powers in the region (Thränert, 2011: 53).
III. STATES’ POSITIONS ON TNWS DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE
Generally it is possible to define NATO’s three groups of states, whose
attitude towards further deployment of the American nukes in Europe varies according to their strategic cultures and national interests.
There are:
• Northwest Europe, or the oldest NATO members such as Germany,
Belgium, Luxemburg and Norway, who do not regard Russia as a rival, being interested in the development of cooperation and partnership with this state; also they do not consider Iran as a threat, necessary to be countered with tactical nuclear weapons (meaning that the
US strategic nuclear potential and European missile defense would be
enough). Also, the wealthiest European states are concerned with the
economic aspect of further deployment of the American TNWs in Europe. The maintenance of the credible deterrent function needs significant investments, in particular, modernization and development of the
ageing nuclear-capable aircrafts, special personal training etc. All these
measures in the times of global economic recession look costly enough,
especially considering the dubious efficiency of this kind of weapons.
As NATO Secretary General mentioned, since the end of the Cold War
the European’s commitment to the defense expenditures continue to
shrink. By the end of the Cold War, in 1991, defense expenditures in European countries represented almost 34 percent of NATO’s total, with
the United States and Canada covering the remaining 66 percent. Since
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then, the share of NATO’s security burden shouldered by European
countries has fallen to 21 percent (Roberts, 2012: 383). Also, in spite of
the fact that the requirements for a nuclear delivery capability is adding
not so much to the total cost of the aircrafts, they still cost 5-10 millions
of USD per plane (Perkovich, Chalmers, Pifer, 2012: 17).
Nuclear security and nuclear terrorism concern is becoming more
and more serious today. This issue is quite actual for Belgium, where in
2012 a group of antinuclear activists from the peace organization Vredesactie penetrated the fences of the Kleine Brogel air base which is believed to host TNWs and managed to inspect 15 from 26 aircraft shelters
before being arrested (Kristensen,2012: 17).
One of the strongest proponents of the TNWs removal is Germany.
This is quite understandable, as previous analysis showed that any application of the TNWs would have strategic consequences for this country,
therefore current government and population support the idea of the
removal. In October 2009, the new Conservative-Liberal govern¬ment
in Germany formed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the
Free Democratic Party (FDP) released its “coalition treaty,” stating that
it “will advocate within NATO and towards our U.S. allies a withdrawal
of remaining nuclear weapons from Germany.” At the Munich Security
Conference in February 2010, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle declared that “the last remaining nuclear weapons in Germany are a relic
of the Cold War” (Foradori, 2012: 281).
• Southwest and Southeast Europe, in particular Turkey and Italy,
where currently American TNWs are deployed. Both countries regard
TNWs as a symbol of the Alliance cohesion, also feeling themselves as
the main pillars of the NATO’s hard power. Here TNWs provide “much
stronger guarantee of territorial integrity than the Italian armed forces would ever be able to provide alone”, consider Italian MFA officials
(Spagnuolo, 2011). For Turkey the main importance of TNWs is reassuring Ankara’s proliferation concern, connected with the prospective of
emerging nuclear Iran, therefore Ankara would stay at the forefront of
NATO’s debates with its potential enemies.
However, it is impossible to say that public opinion fully supports
the official position of Turkish and Italian governments. For example,
Stefano Silvestri, Chair of the Italian Institute of Foreign Affairs (IAI),
affirms that “these weapons have almost nil military value,” and analyst
Pietro Batacchi, defines the weapons as “a relics of the Cold War, a liability, unnecessary to Italy’s security” (Spaguolo, 2011).
Turkish position always favored TNWs deterrence function and
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NATO sharing defense burden principle, but all these considerations
would not allow Ankara to leave TNWs at the state’s territory in case if it
would be withdrawn from the territories of the other Alliance members
(Kibaroglu,2011:43).
•Eastern Europe states or the former socialist countries, which recently have joined NATO. In particular, Baltic States, Poland, Czech Republic are still concerned with the Russia’s threat. Such events as Moscow’s
strategic maneuvers in Kaliningrad oblast, the Russian-Georgian War,
as well as Moscow’s pledge to target European Missile Defense make
most of these countries still feeling vulnerable as Moscow’s neighbors,
who often suffered historically from Russia. However there is a slight
difference among these countries. In particular, Poles regard TNWs as
a deterrence tool against possible aggressive behavior of Russia; partially this concern was aggravated by the plans to deploy the units of
EMD at Poland’s territory, which means permanent transatlantic link
with the United States. Even the prospective of having a missile defense
unit on its territory is not regarded by Poland as a complete substitute
for TNWs. At the same time the improvement of the relations with Russia, dictated by its neighborhood sometimes makes Poland’s officials
to express the idea, that the simultaneous reductions of the NSWNs together with Russia might be useful for international security (Durkalec,
2011: 35).
Czechs and Balts, in their turn, see the main TNWs function in
strengthening the US commitment to Europe, still regarding them as
pledge of the happy wedding between Europe and the United States.
Summing up, this group stands firmly on the necessity to leave TNWs in
Europe, thus deterring Russia and reminding transatlantic partner on
his official obligation (Valasek, 2011:21-26).
Quite important is to mention the positions of the nuclear members
of the Alliance – France, Great Britain and, of course, the United States.
As Paris has always been independent in its nuclear policy, even
not being a member of the Alliance Nuclear Planning Group, France’
position today is having more recommendation character as the other
members’. However it is important to mention that in Europe France has
the largest nuclear arsenal thus might face the challenge to increase its
responsibility for NATO security in case of the US TNWs withdrawal. At
the same time, since France has acquired it nuclear weapons, it stopped
having a good faith in conventional deterrence, therefore regarding the
withdrawal of TNWs from Europe as a potential impact on NATO’s deterrence credibility. Moreover Paris anticipates that increase of France’s
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responsibility for NATO’s security, connected with partial US nuclear
withdrawal from Europe, might not coincide with its traditional nuclear
nationalism (Tertrais, 2011:11-18).
Britain, who is traditionally very sympathetic to any nuclear reductions initiatives, is also quite moderate in the issue of TNWs withdrawal
from Europe. First and foremost, as the closest US ally, London is concerned with the preservation of the transatlantic link, being anxious
that any, even symbolic, US withdrawal from Europe might influence
the general transatlantic partnership in a sense it has gained during the
previous years. Moreover, it would anyway mean that the whole European NATO deterrence would rely on the Great Britain’s strategic nuclear forces, which are today considered to be the smallest of all official
nuclear powers (Childs, 2012: 312-314).
The United States’ position toward NSNWs historically has been
that they are “valuable political tools for reassuring allies, both in NATO
and in other regions. NSNWs may be obsolete, but at this point they
still serve some modest purposes that argue against their elimination
in the short term” (Larsen, 2012:329). Nevertheless, during the understanding of the poor deterrent function of such weapons made both
Republicans and Democrats to keep solidarity in accepting the fact,
that the numbers of European-based TNWs should be reduced. During
the last two decades (starting from the Presidential Nuclear Initiative
of 1992) the United States reduced the number of their NSNWs in Europe significantly, leaving only a 180 B-61gravity bombs there. The last
big withdrawals took place - from Greece in 2001 and from Britain in
2008. The United States would definitely continue to defend Europe by
their strategic weapons in case of TNWs withdrawal, but it seems that
for Washington the later ones is having a classic symbolic meaning of
coupling Europe with America.
Anyway, since the problem of TNWs withdrawal emerged, it was negotiated that no unilateral decision would be adopted on the destiny
of the American TNWs in Europe, thus no withdrawals from a single
country takes place. So, after the number of consultations the New Strategic Concept was adopted by NATO Lisbon summit in November 2010,
stating that “de¬terrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional capabilities, remains a core element of [NATO’s] overall
strategy” (Strategic Concept for the defense and Security, 2010). At the
Chicago summit the leaders of the 28 Alliance members have also repeated their will in discussing Deter¬rence and Defense Posture Review
(DDPR) covering the right balance between nuclear and conventional
forc¬es as well as missile defense in NATO’s future defense posture.
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Therefore the destiny of the NSNWs in Europe has been defined for
a nearest years. Nevertheless their symbolic utility, the principal position of Russia on their removal from Europe, as well as the high Alliance
motivation in reducing huge Russian NSNW’s stockpiles might turn European-deployed TNWs in the bargaining tool of the mutual reductions
between the United States and Russia. It might happen during this decade, or the issue might be protracted on the indefinite period of time,
due to Moscow’s concern over the European Missile Defense (EMD),
the new defense integration project in Europe, which is promised to be
a significant obstacle on the way of global nuclear reductions.
IV. THE RUSSIAN FACTOR
Russia’s position is an important factor for understanding the environment of the current military integration processes in Europe. In
particular:
1)Russia does not regard TNWs in Europe as a threat for its security.
On the opposite, on one hand the deployment of 180 American gravity bombs on the NATO’s territory can’t be comparable with the 2200
NSNWs, deployed by Moscow to secure its borders. On the other, European-based TNWs used to create a pretext for Moscow’s firm position
to preserve its own NSNWs stockpile. On Russia’s own consideration
much more insecurity comes from the growing conventional NATO
might, meaning precision guided munitions (PGMs). Today Russian
NSNWs fill in the gap with NATO’s advanced PGMs (Arbatov, 2010). The
central focus is on the European theater, where CFE Treaty with its limits on classic conventional arms as tanks or artillery looks more than a
bit outdated. For Russia the greatest concern today are NATO military
operations in Europe with massive use of PGMs. This discourse is not
new, as Russian experts often express the idea that missiles with nuclear
warheads may be effective in blocking massive attack of PGMs. Moreover it can serve as an additional deterrence measure, against the high
precision conventional attack.
2)Also, European missile defense is evaluated by Russia as a direct
threat to its security. This is the matter of fact that the expiration of the
old Soviet ICBMs, still used by Moscow, will dramatically decrease Russia’s nuclear potential during the following decade, which might make
the country much more vulnerable to any capable missile defense,
deployed in the region. Concerning the fact that NATO is not going to
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put any formal limitations on the future EMD capabilities, Moscow expresses its serious anxiety over the capability of its deterrence credibility in the nearest years (Sokov, 2007: 139-147). Therefore more and more
often Russia puts under doubt not only the destiny of the next round of
arms control, but also threatens to target the EMD units as soon as they
will be deployed.
V. EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE: HISTORY
AND CURRENT SITUATION
Today it looks like, in spite of the danger for the future arms control process, as well as Russia’s threats, NATO is not going to change its plans as
for the EMD deployment.
2012 Chicago summit defined EMD priority for all members of the
Alliance: “It is the first step towards our long-term goal of providing full
coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory
and forces”, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told reporters (Bergmann, 2012).
These words might be easy interpreted as if NATO is faced with some
imminent threat today. To some extent the danger exists, but it can be
hardly called as the imminent one. Iran, which is actively developing its
nuclear program is usually presented as the main reason for the EMD
deployment, also it is considered to have one of the strongest military
forces in the Middle East. This includes the intermediate range missiles
“Shahab-3” and “Sijil-2”; in 2007 the later version was used as the carrier for the space launch of the Iranian satellite “Omid-2”. It means that
the ballistic missile technology is quite familiar to Teheran, so the majority of experts believe that in the nearest years the world will witness
the development of the Iranian strategic missiles (Rubin, 2012). Even
if not, some NATO members, such as Romania, Greece, Bulgaria and
Turkey are getting into the range of the Iranian “Shahab-3” already now
(Smith, 2001). Also, the fact that Russia’s military doctrines, since 2000
endorse the possibility to use its nuclear weapons in the regional conflict, as well as Moscow’s war with Georgia in 2008, has pushed some of
the new Alliance members to look for the additional assurances from
the United States. In this case the EMD, introduced at the territories
of the new NATO members, is often accompanied by the US military
contingencies, carrying the “tripwire” function, similar to the one, the
TNWs has been performing.
The other reason why the Alliance welcomes the development of
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the common EMD is the fact that by many it is regarded as a successful substitute for the TNWs as a wedding ring of Europe. Moreover, this
substitute is perfectly modified in a sense that it has a defensive character, thus won’t be attacked by the majority of pacifist movements, forming public opinion. Also, unlike American TNWs in Europe, still having
a definite owner, EMD is presented as common NATO project where
all members of the Alliance will have common rights. This is a principal thing for Europe, always feeling itself as an object of the American
defensive plans and this is one of the main secrets why the plan is accepted by almost everyone in NATO.
Before 2009 it looked differently, as the previous US administration, headed by G.W. Bush, promoted missile defense deployment as
the purely US plan, being the part of the US National Missile Defense.
It was designed for the protection of Western Europe, not covering the
Southern flank of NATO and operated on the base of GBI interceptors,
having strategic capabilities, thus being a matter of Russia’s concern. In
2008 the NATO summit of Bucharest recommended the United States to
integrate its missile defense into the common Alliance structure, where
all members would be engaged and defended equally (SSHA: PRO ne
ogranichitsisia, 2007).
This recommendation was fulfilled by the Obama administration,
who offered the new European Missile Defense plan, based on the
Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), according to which the EMD is going
to be deployed within 4 stages between 2012 and 2018. It is presented
as common NATO project and designed to be based on the theater, not
strategic missile defense capabilities (“Aegis” and THAAD technologies) (O’Rourke, 2010). Such states as Turkey, Romania, Spain, Poland
would be directly engaged, others share the financial burden. Special
place is given to Germany, where EMD Command and Control will be
deployed.
Germany, who is known as a biggest opponent of further TNWs deployment in Europe, is regarded as a special partner in EMD issue and
one of the most interested advocates of the project. Besides a significant
financial participation in the EMD development, Berlin’s special relations with Russia are very important. Germany might use its good relations with Russia to soften the Russian stance and persuade Moscow
of the need for co-operation and the possibilities this can bring about.
Here the position of Germany, arguing that, with a functioning missile
defense system created in co-operation with Russia, sub-strategic missile weapons need not to be deployed in Europe can become a starting
point for the negotiations over NSNWs reductions.
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Also it cannot be ruled out that in future Germany will decide to
make a greater contribution in the NATO system, for example by buying
and integrating the SM-3 missile systems with the German F124 frigates.
According to the development concept ‘Luftwaffe 2020’, formulated in
2011 by the Ministry of Defense, developing capabilities in the area of
missile defense is to be among the Bundeswehr’s priorities (Gotkowska,
2012).
Turkey’s attitude towards EMD is justified by the same reasons as the
TNW’s preservation, although it is one of the states, whose way towards
this project was not so easy. On one hand, after the military operation in
Iraq, the anti-American sentiments in Turkey grew stronger. On the other, the development of Ankara’s Middle East policy influenced the improvement of the Turkish-Iranian relations. Therefore during the whole
process of the negotiations over EMD Turkey demanded: a) to develop
the EMD under the auspices of NATO, not just the United States; b) not
to mention in the mutual agreement the states against which the system
is directed (Turkey Accedes to a Missile Defense Plan, 2011). Anyway, it
seems that certain concern over the development of the Iranian nuclear
program, as well as the desire to continue playing a key role in the providing Alliance security (as it used to do during the Cold War), pushed
Ankara to join the EMD project as a key partner.
The other state, whose position over the EMD is not purely optimistic, is France. This is not the case to say that Paris stands against the
project, but, it supports the approach, absolutely opposite to the German one, where common EMD is presented as a future substitute for
nuclear deterrence. A long-time critic of missile defense, France now
sees both systems as complementary to nuclear deterrence, but not a
substitute. Paris believes that EMD might strengthen deterrence with
the so-called “deterrence by denial” function, becoming a useful tool to
convince countries seeking to acquire limited ballistic missile capabilities that their efforts won’t be effective (Grand, 2011: 27-39).
Some words also should be said on Poland’s position over EMD. In
2009, U.S. President Barack Obama scrapped a missile-defense plan
drafted by his predecessor, George W. Bush, under which Poland was
to host a base near its border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. In
spite of the fact, that PAA returned Poland into the list of the states, hosting EMD, the initial decision created painful reaction in Poland’s strategic circles, which can be easily called the “abandonment syndrome”.
The fact that Poland’s strategic community has a good memory, revealed in summer 2012 when Polish president Bronislav Komorowaski
announced that Poland is going to develop its own missile defense, stat-
257
ing: “Our mistake was that, while accepting the US proposal, we have
not taken into account a political risk related to the change of the US
President,” Komorowski said. “We have paid a too high political price
for that” (Bridge, 2012). In other words the credibility of the US commitments were put under doubt by Poland, who has been considered
to be one the most loyal allies of Washington during the last decade. To
some extent it might be explained by the growing number of the threats
from Russia, continuing to say that the SM-3 II B, interceptors, planning
to be deployed in Poland by 2018 pose a threat to its strategic nuclear
deterrence. Therefore the idea, that The United States might change its
EMD configuration, leaving Poland out of it again, as well as the understanding of the growing pressure from the side of Russia made Poland
to maneuver: on one hand this is the improvement the official relations
with Russia; on the other, making public its own national missile defense plans. National EMD of Poland will contribute to the NATO, and
this is the good news (Polish missile defense will enhance NATO system
- President Komorowski, 2012). The bad ones is that to a certain extent
the EMD issue put an end to the blind belief of one of the most committed US allies in Europe into the magic power of the “wedding ring”, the
situation that used to happen after a few years of a happy marriage. To
a certain extent the last thing relates to the whole issue of transatlantic
linkage and its future.
Regarding the EMD as a certain substitute for a TNWs being a “new
glue’ for transatlantic linkage, it is worth to remind the project of common missile defense with Russia. This idea was offered to Moscow at
the Alliance summit in Lisbon and might be considered as an attempt
to persuade Russians, that the project is not directed against them. In
a year it turned out that the idea was not survivable due to the very
different vision of the project from the sides of NATO and Russia. For
Brussels and Washington it was obviously formal in a sense that the
future missile defense consist of the two parts – the NATO part and the
Russian part, connected to a reasonable extent of exchanging information, common training etc. It’s like inviting your mother- in- law to your
house, providing her with a separate rooms and exit, but never considering her as a part of your initial family. Unfortunately Russia was
not satisfied with mother-in-law role, at least in the Western sense of
understanding the independent roles of parents and children. According to Moscow’s plan it cherished the hope to live at the same rooms,
having the same exit and being the part of the family, equally responsible for all its decisions and plans. Returning to the political language,
Moscow pursued the so-called “sectorial approach”, according to
258
which it was going to defend the Eastern flank of NATO (Poland and
Baltic states) with its missile defense and also was to share command
and control functions with the Alliance authority. In practice Moscow’s plan looked a bit unrealistic due to a number of reasons. From
the technical dimension, Russia still does not have effective missile
defense it can provide NATO security with (the S-500 complex is still
a matter of future), moreover the effectiveness of hitting the missile,
coming, for example, from Iran, is quite low, considering that the two
sides consultations over the necessity to hit would start at the moment
of the missile detection (Claire, 2011).
The other reason, a political one, is the fact that sharing the EMD
with Russia would unavoidably influence NATO’s identity as the alliance between the United States and Europe. For Poland and Baltic
states it practically means the ruining of the transatlantic linkage, based
on the defense commitments from the United States, for the others, the
breaching of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, where non-alliance
member is becoming responsible for the Alliance security.
Therefore, even if the resolution of the technical obstacles for Russia’s plan might be found at least discussed, the political one seems
much more insuperable due to the successful marriage of the Unites
States and Europe as the background for NATO functioning and existence.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter discussed the role of the defensive projects in providing
the Euro-Atlantic integration in XXI century. In particular the research
was focused on the role of tactical nuclear weapons as the tool and the
symbol of the transatlantic linkage, as well as on the question whether
it can be substituted in the future with the more adequate for the new
century project such as European Missile Defense. In this connection
the following considerations are offered:
1.Being introduced in Europe at once after the beginning of the Cold
War, the American TNWs were designed to deter possible Soviet aggression, but with the time passed, managed to play a more multifunctional
role. Considering useless as the tool of waging a war, these weapons,
nevertheless, managed to gain high importance for the transatlantic
relations. On one hand they have become the symbol of the strategic
partnership between the United States and Europe, where Washington,
providing its European allies with nuclear weapons, officially took a
259
pledge to defend them as the national US territory. It could be easily said
that without TNWs in Europe, the US extended deterrence assurances
would still work, provided by the American strategic nuclear weapons
arsenal. However, the presence of the US TNWs in Europe strengthened
the extended deterrence by their “tripwire” function, providing the allies with the additional assurances from the United States. The other
dimension is that PALs mechanism, gave Europeans the feeling of partnership with the US over the use of TNWs in critical cases. This feeling
seems to be even much more important for the political reasons, than
for the military ones, as it inspired Europe with the idea of being not
just an object of the US security guarantees, but a full partner. Therefore,
staying a symbol of nuclear deterrence for the external environment,
the American TNWs in Europe gradually gained the internal function of
strengthening the defensive link between transatlantic allies.
2.After the end of the Cold War the situation became much more
complicated. On one hand the improvement of relations with Russia
makes the European-based TNWs obsolete even as the symbol of deterrence. The understanding of this situation made the United States
to withdraw most of their NSNWs from Europe, leaving the part, potentially capable to perform only a symbolic function. Moreover, today’s global non-nuclear agenda made the expediency of this symbolic arsenal a matter of a severe discussion within NATO. On the other, a
complete withdrawal from Europe potentially might influence the internal function, the American TNWs performed, in particular, weaken
the transatlantic strategic linkage. One would argue that this weakening was inevitable in the face of diminishing the threat from Russia, and thus, the decrease of Europe’s military dependence from the
United States. But withdrawing TNWs from Europe might create much
more serious consequences than it can be imagined. Theoretically
the US assurances, provided by the extended deterrence, would stay,
as well as the states military partnership within NATO. At the same
time, the removal of the American TNWs from the European continent would influence the European’s participation in NATO’s strategic planning operations, limiting it to a few members. To some extent
this participation could be supported due to the SNOWCAT project,
intended to provide the role for NATO’s non-nuclear members in the
Alliance strategic operations, but it could hardly be a proper substitute for the TNWs strategic significance. Therefore the important component of common strategic planning and partnership between the
United States and Europe might be lost with the TNWs ultimate withdrawal from Europe.
260
3.The other thing is that, being supported with an alternative common strategic project, like European Missile Defense, the TNWs might
partially transfer this “wedding ring role” to it. However, this cannot be
done by the linear substitute of the first project by the second one, and
this consideration drove NATO’s decision to preserve the US TNWs in
Europe. Also the multiplication of the new international environment
with its challenges, such as the development of the Iranian missile and
nuclear program, Russia’s strong opposition to the EMD project as well
as China’s military rise might prolong this transitional period for indefinite time, making NATO’s strategic integration process to gain new recourses and drivers.
4.One of, if not the strongest driver is the new common strategic
project – the European Missile Defense. Theoretically it promises
much greater attractiveness for Europe, than the American TNWs due
to a number of reasons. First, is the fact that the image of these weapons is much more positive and also free of the grave burden of the
past, the nuclear weapons possess. It looks progressive, substituting
the idea of deterrence by punishment (the nuclear weapons perform)
by the idea of deterrence by denial which is defensive in its essence,
thus excludes the idea of waging an offensive war. Second, the use of
EMD is not connected with the annihilation of the whole Europe, decisively substituting the word “destruction” by the word “protection”.
Third, as the EMD is a common NATO project, the partnership incentive looks even stronger, then in the TNWs context. Here it should not
be forgotten that TNWs were provided to Europe in the times of the
United States clear leadership, when European allies were more regarded as an object, then the subject of the US defensive plans (PALs
mechanism was intended to reduce this impression). The EMD project is the alliance of the equals, reflecting the situation of modern Europe, where Germany plays the role, adequate to its current economic
and political weight, Turkey continues its Southern NATO pillar role
and the new East European members are distinguished as equal allies.
Moreover, the whole EMD system might be potentially enlarged to include more and more participants. Fourth, first time after the Cold
War the level of NATO’s strategic and military integration promises to
be as high as in its meridian, thus giving the new breath for the transatlantic linkage. It proves the opinion that all contradictions between
old NATO members were temporary and insignificant, opening the
way for the new strategic cooperation development. To some extent
the EMD continues the role of NATO enlargement, which in the times
of the Alliance functional crisis defined the direction of the Alliance’s
261
development. For some period of time this process managed to fill in
the vacuum in the Alliance missionary role, but with the multiplication of members lost its freshness, buried under the number of practical problems, connected with the economic and political problems.
Here the EMD shows the new horizon for NATO, strengthening the
transatlantic ties and giving the allies the chance to prove their participation with action.
5.There are only two black spots this context: 1) the position of Russia, considering that its strategic interests are touched with the development of the EMD project; 2) the possible challenges it can pose for the
transatlantic linkage, the Poland’s case shows. However, both problems
look tactical in relation to the holy mission of common strategic destiny, the EMD promise. Russia today plays the role of NATO during the
Cold War, compensating its military conventional inferiority with the
huge NSNWs arsenal and quite aggressive strategic posture. It’s worth
to expect that Moscow will use all its tool of influence, including energy
and military pressure, to influence the EMD development. Theoretically some concessions could be made by NATO and the United States
to reassure Russia and to reach the successful compromise in the field
to arms control. Here the TNWs might be used as the bargaining tool
for gaining Russia’s agreement to start its own NSNWs reductions. As
for the EMD deployment any concessions (in case if there would be
concessions) should be presented on the base of the whole NATO consensus. Any individual initiatives, even if useful for the arms control
process, would harm the transatlantic linkage. The Poland case is the
evidence, special, but giving a very clear sign – sometimes one disappointment might ruin the whole faith. And if this faith is the faith in the
credibility of the US commitments, a couple of actions on the sample of
the Obama’s withdrawal from the Bush’s BMD plans might be harmful
not only for Washington’s deterrence reputation, but having grave consequences for the transatlantic linkage.
6.Therefore, the visible connection between the United States deterrence credibility for Europe and the transatlantic linkage exists. The
stronger the credibility of the US commitments, the stronger is the linkage between Europe and America, which is the core of NATO existence.
The popular thought is that the common threat unites the states into the
alliance, we would say better, the common project, strategically important and engaging the key members of the organization is something
which can make this alliance survivable.
262
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Directions of Russian Political and Economic
Integration: Expectations and Implementation
Ekaterina Arkhipova
RESUMEN
Después del colapso de la Unión Soviética, la idea de la reunión o reintegración en la región se ha discutido tanto en la sociedad rusa como
por fuera de ella. Si en la década de 1990 la sociedad rusa estaba soportando la sensación de una dolorosa pérdida, las nuevas generaciones
podrían encontrar ventajas en las nuevas condiciones, sin embargo, al
margen de cualquier actividad de Rusia, el ámbito de la integración regional constantemente considerada como una amenaza para las llamadas “nuevas democracias”.
¿Qué expectativa tienen puestas la sociedad rusa y su gobierno en
el actual proceso de integración actual y de qué manera este último lo
está implementando? En primer lugar se presentará la evolución de la
idea de desarrollo de direcciones de integración implementada por el
gobierno ruso desde 1991. Posteriormente se considerarán los niveles
actuales y la geografía de la integración regional.
ABSTRACT
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the idea of the reunion or reintegration in the region has been discussed both in the Russian society,
and outside Russia. If the Russian society in the 1990-s was enduring
the painful feel of loss but then after the generations replacement could
find the advantages in the new conditions, yet outside any Russian activity in the field of integration in the region is constantly considered as
a threat for so called “new democracies”.
What expectation has the Russian society and government in the integration process today and which way is it implementing? First of all,
the evolution of the idea for developing integration directions implemented by the Russian government since 1991 is considered in the article. Subsequently, the contemporary levels and geography of regional
integration will be examined.
268
I. FACTORS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
In August 1991 Andrey Kozyrev, the first Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs proclaimed the so called “Atlantic liberal” approach to the Russian
foreign policy considering the USA and other western “democracies” as
friends of new Russia and as allies for a long term period. After the Soviet Union collapse a lot of agreements between Russia from one side and
the leading European states or the USA from the other side were signed,
including Charter for American-Russian partnership and friendship
(1992), Vancouver Declaration (1993) and others. The theoretic base of
the Russian foreign policy was called the “Atlantic liberal” approach as
its frames included popular for that period liberal foreign affairs ideas
and the hope to establish close relations with main international organizations and with NATO especially.
The cooperation between Russia and the US was considered by A.
Kozyrev as predetermined by all the historical possibilities, complementary mutual interests, but some part of the bureaucratic and military-industrial elite disputed such approach. At the same time, inside the state
the Atlantic approach was supplemented with the idea that Russia must
be considered still as a “powerful world state”. The possibility to become
an economically developed state and to stand firmly on the way of democratization avoiding the danger of extremism of any kind was connected only with the integration into the Western institutes. However
the Russian politicians insisted that the relations with Russia were to
develop only under the conditions of equal rights and mutual trust. The
paternalism towards the Russian actions as in the foreign relations so in
the domestic policy was considered as ruled out because even during
the worst of times both the politicians and the society were sure that
Russia was a great power. Russian politicians repeatedly suggested that
after the death of the communist threat, NATO was no more effective in
the foreign relations as it had lost its military enemy. B. Yeltzin and his
environment offered to include Russia into the organization in order to
improve its effectiveness. Thereby, inside Russia the future of NATO was
expected in two ways: its liquidation or the Russian integration into the
organization. This thought was declared repeatedly not only inside the
country but also during the international forums.
The circumstances around the Russian borders during this period
were challenging. Several international conflicts were flaming around
since 1989. Peacekeeping operations, carried out mainly by Russian soldiers near the Russian borderland, were considered as inevitable measures, as the conflicts were developing in the closer areas and making
Directions of Russian Political and Economic Integration
269
challenges for Russia itself. For instance the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh became the reason for a great flow of migrants. A huge amount of
refugees (mainly Azerbaijanians and mixed Azerbaijanian and Armenian families) came into Russia. In 1993 the Russian Migration Service
registered 8 thousands of such refugees. After 1994 (it was the year of
the last cease-fire agreement between Nagorny Karabakh, Armenia and
Azerbaijan) Russia accepted a new wave of refugees and internally displaced people who left Azerbaijan because they could not find a job.
According to the calculations made by the Azerbaijan researcher Arif
Yunus, more than 1,5 million migrants left Azerbailan for Russia during
1991-1997 (Yunus, 1998). According to unofficial estimates, the number
of the migrants from Azerbaijan living in Moscow in 1990-s reached 1
million, most of them came illegally. The number of Armenians-refugees from the area was about 100 thousands in Russia.
The dispute in the South Ossetia caused the conflict between Ossetians and Ingushs in Russia itself in 1992. Interethnic relations in the
Krasnodarskii kray (district) became significantly worse after the refugees had come from Abkhazia (1992-1993). The civil war in Tajikistan
(1992-1997) also had a great impact on the Russian security issues. The
Russian security services faced not only refugees, but also a damaged
drug-trafficking from Afghanistan, arms smuggling. Furthermore, almost all warlords who had some kind of war training participating in
the conflicts listed above, later became famous terrorists in Chechnya.
The ethnic dissolutions also provided the problem for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. B. Yeltzin and A. Kozyrev claimed the
Western countries to recognize the Russian special interest and responsibility within the post-soviet area taking into account the importance
of solving all the neighboring conflicts.
Still, Russian officials and deputies were of a low opinion on the New
Independent States (NIS)’ economies. They considered any financial
help provided by Russia for those countries as an indispensable burden
for the Russian economy which was going through a crisis itself. They
insisted any reintegration of the NIS must be held as voluntary and of
equal rights, following the EU trajectory. After all the economic failures,
experienced by the leaders of the NIS, Russian politicians expected
them to initiate a new integration with Russia.
Another Russian “burden” within the NIS area included “compatriots”, living in the neighboring states. Russians and Russian-speakers
citizens and in some cases “not citizens” became “strangers” in the NIS
even if their ancestor had come into these countries generations ago.
Russian politicians demanded the Russian government to take the re-
270
sponsibility for their fate: to support their migration into Russia or to
improve their rights in the states where they decided to stay. Russian
citizens in fact had a lot of relatives living in “the near abroad states”
(the term used for NIS). Under such a pressure the Russian government
had to draw its attention to the issue, to develop a program of returning migration for those Russians and then to lobby on the international
level the interests of those who had decided to stay.
Those conditions determined the first concept of the foreign policy
adopted in 1993. The Russian relations with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic states were described as the main
priority. Developing relations with the Eastern Europe states was mentioned as another important direction for the foreign policy as they
historically were in the Russian field of interests. The concept recommended supporting the tendency towards restoring of the mutual trust,
to develop the system of economical and other kinds of relations as
their destruction could damage the economic systems of the partners.
The relations with the Western Europe were recognized as another important course. The authors of the document said: the European integration without Russia could cause serious damage to the Russian vital interests. Within the Asian-Pacific area they called the USA, China,
Japan and India as important partners. The relations with the states of
the Southern and Western Asia were connected with the economic importance of the area and determined according to the influence they exerted on CIS, especially on the Central Asian and the South Caucasian
states.
According to the document and the domestic public opinion, Russian economy was considered as a locomotive for developing the CIS
economies, although mentioning them again as a “burden”. But in fact,
the Russian economy itself needed the support. “The West” was supposed to play the key role in developing the Russian market economy.
The suggested way intended the conditions of the “soft integration” into
the world economy including: «preferential terms for Russian goods
and technologies in the European and world markets», «accelerated
harmonization Russian and European integration project». According
to the claims made both by A. Kozyrev and by B. Yeltzin in 1991-1993
the image of “the West” comprised by the USA and Western European
countries, first of all Germany, France and Great Britain, was obviously
a very “significant other” for the Russian foreign policy (Kozyrev, 1994).
The flow of investments and modern technologies into the Russian
economy were expected. But in fact the real volume of the investments
did not justify the hopes. The high-risk investment in 1990-s, first of all,
271
became the reason to deter the foreign investments in the conditions of
low capital accumulations in Russia itself and secondly, the investors
acting in the Russian market preferred the short-term fields, i.e. commercial banking and mining of natural resources. The most attractive
economy fields according to the volume of accumulated foreign investments by January 1998 are presented in Table 1(Ob inostrannykh investiziyakh v economiku Rossii).
Table 1. The fields accumulated foreign investment by 1998
Share in all the
investments
Share of direct
investments in the
economy field
Financial and credit, insurance
activities, pension provision
32,5
12,8
Fuel industry
15,9
4,9
Offshore commercial banking
10,7
2,4
Food industry
9,2
7,4
Trade and public catering
4,8
3,3
Mechanical engineering and metal
working
4,3
1,9
Timber, woodworking and pulp-andpaper industry
3,6
2,3
Transport and communication
3,2
2,0
Nonferrous-metals industry
2,3
1,5
Economy fields
The volume of foreign direct investments in Russia did not exceed 1 billion USD by the end of 1996 (Problemy economicheskoy politiki, 1999).
It was less than the volume of the capital exports from Russia, which
took the shape of the capital flight.
Meanwhile the Russian officials connected great expectations with
importing western high technologies. The successful experience of Japan and the development of the South-Eastern Asian states made an illusion of a possible “rapid progress” in Russia. But only in 1999 the number of agreements about the know-how imported into Russia reached
334 with their cost about 533 mill. USD (Rossiyskii statisticheskii echegodnik, 2000: 490).
Thereby during 1990-s the Russian economy could offer the Western
market only energy resources in exchange for finished goods and only
272
after 2000-s the first joint ventures attracting innovations were established in Russia.
Disillusionment with the “West” appeared in the official speeches
since 1995 and in the papers by Ye. Primakov (Minister of foreign affairs) in 1996-1998. Russian politicians concerned about the weakening relations with NIS. A growing discontent with the NATO enlargement over the South-Eastern Europe states (former the Warsaw Treaty
organization partners) was expressed as Russia had not been invited
into this club, so the conclusions were the following: the enlargement is directed against Russia, Russia is considered as a threat for
“the West” and “the West” tries to lead the democratization in Russia,
otherwise, to interfere. Furthermore, the fact of enlargement was considered as a betrayal as in the early 1990-s “the West” had promised
not to make such steps. Those facts heightened the feeling that Russia
was taken as “a youngest partner” of “the West”, that Russia lost the
Cold War. Such understanding enforced the desire to find other political partners and to develop the equal relations in other geographical
directions.
It became clear that Russian industrial goods were uncompetitive
on the European market. Its economy received the label of “a state with
a transition economy”, which goods were imposed with tariff barriers
on the European and American markets. At the same time the goods
made by the defense establishment could form the main part of the
Russian export cost. Such kinds of goods were of interest for such states
as Iran, Libya, India and Cuba. Still the trade and any form of the industrial cooperation with them were limited by different sanctions. As a
result, Russian trade and production projects in this field were subject
to criticism by “the West”. But the western countries could not offer their
market for such goods.
Yevgeni Primakov in 1996 stated Russian interests in such areas as
CIS, Middle East, where “there are unsettled conflicts challenging the
Russian security”, Europe and Africa (Primakov, 1996). By the end of the
XX-th century, Russia became a recipient country for a huge amount
of labor migrants from NIS who sent the earned money to their home
states. This capital flow can be considered as “hidden investments”
from Russia. During 1998-2005 the third part of budgets in such states
as Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan could form on the base of such
a flow.
Yet in 1998 the main investments into the Russian economy were
attracted from “the West”, see Table 2.
273
Table 2. The volume of investments into the Russian economy,
1998, mill. USD
State
Investments
State
“Far abroad states”
Investments
“Near abroad states”
Germany
2 848
Kazakhstan
2,819
USA
2 238
Uzbekistan
3,792
Great Britain
1 591
Ukraine
1,886
Others
5096
Others
0,901
Total
9,398
Total
11 773
Source: (Finansy Rossii, 2002: P.230, 245-246)
According to the table the investments from NIS amounted only 0,08%
of the “far abroad states” investments.
At the same time, Russian investments went to the USA (785 mill.
USD), Germany, Gibraltar and Cyprus. The last two cases represent the
capital flight as the offshore banking is highly developed in those states.
Belarus was at the top of the NIS list in attracting Russian investments in 1998 (103,644 mill.USD) which can be connected with the
progress of the Russian-Belorussian integration in 1996-1998. Ukraine
received 1,396 mill.USD, Azerbaijan – 0,033 mill. USD. 1998 was the
year of the financial default in Russia complicated the foreign trade for
Russia especially with NIS using the Russian ruble as a foreign currency.
In Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Russians very often invested the
petrochemical industry. Partly the Russian investments into Ukraine
and Belarus were connected with the energy supply for the European
market. Russian capital actively infiltrated the financial systems of
Ukraine and Belarus. Belarus repeatedly received the loans from the
Russian government “for stabilizing the economy” estimated at 1,6 – 6
bill.USD.
Thereby the Russian government began to use the financial instruments to support the integration within NIS, still Russia itself was in
need for investments and only highly developed European countries
could invest in the Russian economy significantly. At the same time
Russian goods were limited in the European market, but not in the CIS
markets.
In 2001 Russia exported investments into Armenia (127 074 thousUSD), Moldavia (93 480 thous.USD), Belarus (61 408 thous.USD). The
274
total volume of the Russian investments into the CIS reached 310 182
thous. USD and attracted 32 234 thous. USD from the CIS: Kazakhstan
invested 11 893 thous. USD, Uzbekistan – 8 279 and Ukraine – 7316
(Finansy Rossii, 2002: P. 245-246). “Far abroad states” invested 14 258
mill. USD.
Those data emphasize that the western states were the main investors into the Russian economy. And the investments structure did not
modify as the long-term investments still were considered of a high risk.
Such a trend concerned not only Russian economists but also politicians. Western investments were considered as rapacious, concentrated on using Russian natural resources maintaining the stagnation and
depriving the economy of the independence.
In the year 2000, the president adopted the Concept of National Security and the Concept of Russian Foreign Affairs. The documents had
something in common. The former proclaimed: “Some expectations
connected with establishing new, partner relations, enjoying equal
rights of Russia with other states were not implemented” (Concept of
Russian Foreign Affairs, 2000). The establishment of such a world order
which could promote “the development of Russia, the rise of its economy, increasing the living standards of its population” using international organizations (UN, OSCE, G8) was stated. The trend towards a unipolar world with the USA as its leader was pointed out as a threat. The
methods against such a trend included the area and subarea of integration with keeping the states sovereignty. Such an approach demanded
to consider the CIS integration as a foreground task. At the same time
the concept of “a different speed and level integration within the CIS”
was announced.
The second important direction was to develop relations with European states, raising the meaning of OSCE.
NATO was represented as an organization of highly important relations which were stated in The Founding Act On Mutual Relations, Cooperation And Security between the Russian Federation and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (1997). But NATO military operations
without the UN sanctions and out of the area mentioned in the Washington Agreement as well as the NATO enlargement was estimated as
conflicting with the Russian interests. Russia had to participate in different integration projects including Association of South-East Asian
Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) besides the
CIS to counterbalance this trend.
Thereby the list of main claims to the “significant other” was drawn
till 2000-s. They included:
275
1. The west does not support the independent Russian foreign policy, considering all the attempts to solve any vital issues as signs of “new
imperial” ambitions.
2. Still the ongoing NATO enlargement obviously has an anti-Russian direction.
3.Russian officials had to exonerate their politics in Chechnya while
inside Russia the military actions were considered both as the restoration of the territorial integrity and as “a struggle against the world terrorism”. The last explanation was supported outside the state only after
the 9/11 events.
Those claims pointed out “the turn” in the Russian integration projects. Henceforth the CIS area attracted the main attention of Russian
foreign policy and politicians started to find other areas to counterbalance “the significant other” reducing the western activities in supporting domestic non-government organizations.
The conflicts close to the Russian border area and compatriots in
NIS now were considered as two main issues for the Russian foreign
policy. The interests in the CIS area were presented now as compulsory, crystallized not as a new imperial ambition but as the only answer for security challenges (Ivanov, 2000: 3-55). The officials emphasized that “the responsibility” within the CIS area had to be carried
out not at the expense of the Russian economy as it happened with
the USSR.
According to the officials states, concepts and other important documents “the West” was still an important “significant other” for the Russian government, i.e. the membership in G7, which became G8 in 2002,
was interpreted as an important achievement. The feeling of the triumph probably was connected with the Russian officials understanding that Russia had been recognized as a world power.
Simultaneously the argue about the geographical root of the Russian civilization (whether it is an European or Asian state) was ending with the idea of the unique place (“both Europe and Asia” model),
which substantiated that Russia had equal rights, such as the right to
carry out peacekeeping operations within CIS and could create any
effective model of integration in the neighboring area. Yet bilateral
agreements in the area were more effective than a full-fledged integration project. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
Treaty of Collective Security (TCS), The Custom Union – The Eurasian
Economical – The Custom Union (again), The Community and then
The Russian-Belorussian State Union – this is the list of organizations
provided by Russia in the area. And the government decided to enforce
276
the integration within the existed groups.
Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Ivanov (1998-2004) and President V.
Putin showed also the interest towards “Asia”. They paid attention to
the integration projects in the Asia-Pacific area, their cooperation with
European states, and probably for the first time they mentioned consciously Latin America and Africa as the area for opposing to the “significant other”, first of all to the USA.
The question of the CIS effectiveness was brought up in the middle
of 2000-s. Some officials called it “the organizations for a peaceful divorce”. Russia became a donator for many CIS states: supplied armaments to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan at a low price or without any
payments according to the TCS. A Russian military base was placed in
Kyrgyzstan (Kant), Russia pays the rental (15 mill. RUR annually since
2007) and loans the Kirgizia state budget with no hope to return the
money. Repeatedly Belarus receives the loans, donations and other financial help, including low price for oil and gas, from Russia.
During 2000-s the Russian trade with NIS increased since 27,7 bill.
USD in 2000 to 110,1 bill. USD in 2008, then went down to 97,8 in 2010
(Rossiyskaya vneshnyaya torgovlya, 2012). The decrease can be connected with reducing of the CIS members after Georgia withdrawal in
2008 and with the world financial crisis (Rossiyskaya vneshnyaya torgovlya so stranami SNG, 2012). During 2000-s three main trade CIS
partners of Russia were Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The cost of
goods exported to Ukraine in 2011 was 30 510 mill. USD, to Belarus - 24
923, to Kazakhstan - 12 907 (oil and gas supplies composed the main
cost). The import from Ukraine estimated at 20 121 mill. USD, from Belarus - 13 685, from Kazakhstan- 6 859.
The trade with “Far abroad states” in 2000 reached 111,545 bill. USD.
The share of only European states amounted 66,351 bill.USD (59% of
all the trade). In 2008 the whole trade except NIS reached 626,419 bill.
USD, the European part was 376,314 bill. USD (60%). However, China
became during this term an important trade partner for Russia and the
mutual trade reached 83 505 mill. USD (10%) (Rossiyskaya vneshnyaya
torgovlya so stranami SNG, 2012).
Minerals still compose the main part of the Russian export to European states (90% of all the cost). Technical equipments, machinery,
food, consumer goods consist the Russian import (O torgovo-economicheskikh svyazyakh Rossiya-Germaniya; Rossiisko-niderlandskie otnosheniya). The structure of the Russian-China trade became very close
to the European one in 2011, see Diagram 1 and Diagram 2 (Rossiyskaya
vneshnyaya torgovlya, 2012).
277
Diagram 1. The structure of Russian export to China in 2005 (%)
Diagram 2. The structure of Russian import from China in 2005 (%)
The main investment partners in 2010 were mainly the same: the
Netherlands (10574 mill. USD), Luxemburg (10143), Great Britain
278
(5295), Cyprus (4170), Germany (4042). China was a leader among
Asian states (9606), then Japan (2817), Republic of Korea (698) and
Kazakhstan (509). In the NIS area the Russian capital preferred mainly
Belarus (6247 mill. USD in 2009), Latvia (174), Lithuania (146), than Kazakhstan (270) or Uzbekistan (75).
Obviously, in spite of the proclaimed Russian interest towards the
CIS area, the “significant other” – European states still are very important for the Russian economy development. Meanwhile the economic
growth in China followed with the growing fuel consumption made this
state an important partner.
II. CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION
The cross-border cooperation became an important part of the Russian
foreign trade in 2000-s. Independent foreign contacts, developed by
some Russian regions (subjects of Federation) since 1990-s, were taken under the state control after 2000 with the building of the “vertical
power” policy (Kobrinskaya, 2002). At the same time the laws determining the possible directions of foreign cooperation legitimizing some of
them and putting under the control by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
were corrected. The law “On Coordination Of International Relations
And Foreign Trade Of Subjects Of Russian Federation” was adopted
in 1999 establishing the possibility to make agreements only with the
equal subjects of foreign federations. All the agreements have to correspond to the norms of the Russian Constitution, international law, the
agreements signed by the Russian government. The Concept of CrossBorder Cooperation was adopted in 2001. Russia ratified the European
Convention on Transfrontier Co-Operation Between Territorial Communities Or Authorities (2002), The Council of RF governors under the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to work (2003) and the law “On The
Grounds Of State Governing Of Foreign Trade” was passed (2003).
The foreign cooperation was developing by Russian subjects so actively that officials began to estimate this progress as a disintegrating
process, and the researchers devoted a lot of papers to this issue (Rossiiskiye region kak mezhdunarodniye actory, 2000; Rossiya pered globalnymi vyzovamy, 2002; Baltiiskii region kak poluse.., 2006; Mezhdunarodnaya integratsiya rossiiskikh regionov, 2007). The researchers proved
the most active cooperation was connecting western Russian regions
with Ukraine, Belarus and with EU states. Euroregions were established
here. “Neman” connected Kaliningradskaya oblast (RF), Frodnenskaya
279
oblast (Belarus), Podlyass voevodstvo (Poland), districts in Lithuania
in 1997. “Baltica” included Kaliningradskaya oblast (RF), parts of Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia in 1998. “Karelia” united
Russian Karelia with Finland in 1998. Euroregion “Saule” has worked
since 1999 integrating Kaliningradskaya oblast (RF), Latvia, Lithuania,
Sweden. “Slobozhanschina” united Russian, Belorussian and Ukranian parts in 2003. “Pskov-Livonia” (Pskovskaya oblast, RF, parts of Latvia and Estonia) had worked since 2004. “Yaroslavna” was established
on the base of Kurskaya oblast (RF) and Sumskaya oblast (Ukraine) in
2007. “Donbass” united Rostovskaya oblast (RF) and Luganskaya oblast
(Ukraine) in 2010.
Besides Euroregions a lot of bordering Russian districts, mainly in
the Russian Far East, became active participants of international integration according to the adopted laws. The term “twin cities” now is
used for cities Blagoveschensk (RF) – Heihé (China), Narva (Estonia) –
Ivangorod (RF) as they were in close trade connection creating the base
for area development, bordering infrastructure, exchange in labor and
technologies.
Those states became the source of development for Russian boundaries as they provided Russian districts with investments, required
goods, and consume some Russian products, mainly natural and bioresources. At the same time, smuggling also became the source for living of Russian locals, from Russia to China they smuggled wood, parts
of animals, which are used in the traditional Chinese medicine (paws of
the bear, liver). In the European direction they carried cigarettes, wood,
meat, luxury.
The cross-border cooperation in the area is supported by the governments. The Chinese capital supports the economy of the Russian
Far East but generally in the raw-material sphere. The volume of this
financial support prevails over the government support that concerns
Russian officials as they anticipate the development of regional disintegration.
III. INTEGRATION WITHIN CIS
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
The agreement about this integration was signed in 1991 by the heads
of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Later the heads of Central Asian states
declared their wish to participate in this integration project supporting
280
equal rights for all the participants. The heads of Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine met in Alma-Ata and signed the
declaration about the principles and objects of the organization. They
established coordinating institutes, proclaimed the common free market zone and kept united the military-strategic forces.
Developing the economic integration Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan founded the Custom Union in 1995. The aim was to provide the free
market zone. As we can see only three states supported the economic
integration in the area, but they couldn’t work out the rules for integration and for a long period the organization had not been working. Only
in 2000 V. Putin offered to transform it into the economical organization which later became known as Eurasian Economical Community
included Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It was
aimed to establish the Custom Union and the common free market
zone intending Ukraine participation in the project. Such a union could
connect the suppliers of raw materials with the goods producers. In fact
the integration process started only in 2006. By that time the Russian
capital had already participated in many CIS companies, Karachaganak
oilfield in Kazakhstan was exploited by the Russian company LUKOIL.
In 2012 there were 4436 companies in Kazakhstan with Russian joint
capital. The electrical power system, agriculture, construction industry,
machinery and forestry became the most integrated fields in Russia and
Belarus. In both states Russian companies had to compete with world
giant oil companies (ChevronTexaco - ExxonMobil).
The Community including Russia and Belarus was proclaimed in
1996. In 1997 two presidents signed the Treaty on the Russia-Belorussian Union. Their economic integration showed some success: a lot of
joint companies, the common budget, a free circulation of currency, although the plans to introduce one currency were not implemented. But
the integration pace was very slow. None of the presidents were ready to
lose their power. They created the Supreme Council, Executive committee, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Ministers. But all these
institutes are mainly advisory. In fact the states cannot accord most
questions in their relations; i.e. Moscow expected Minsk to recognize
the South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but up to now Belarus president A. Lukashenka refuses. Since the mid of 2000-s A. Lukashenka has repeated
that he was enforced to enter into Russia, but in fact originally it was his
idea. There were a lot of disputes about the oil and gas prices, but up to
now Belarus enjoys the lower level price. So, in spite of the wish to integrate, “the union” has more contradictions than common approaches.
281
As a result the Custom Union of Russia and Belarus with a third state
(Kazakhstan) became a neutral integration project coinciding the interests and possibilities of all three parties in July 2010. The project did not
involve Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as their national economies were too
weak and they were the source for labor migrants going into Kazakhstan
and Russia. Still Kyrgyzstan was expected to enter the Union later. Instead of the Custom Union those outsiders now develop bilateral relations with China, which is actively taking the Russian place.
The full integration is impossible without projects in security. The
Treaty of Collective Security was signed in Tashkent in 1992. It was in
fact Uzbekistan President I. Karimov the person who initiated the process as he aimed to create a system of insurances for territorial integrity.
The Central Asian states had a lot of territorial disputes. The Organization “the Treaty of Collective Security” was established on the base of
this Treaty in 2002. This team included Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. The Treaty has been always criticized
by the participants. Still Russia was the only state which sponsored all
the peace-keeping operations in the area and supported the military
modernization in the states.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was another security project, established by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan in 2001 on the base of “the Shanghai Five” (the same
participants except Uzbekistan). The central aim was to provide a border security in the area (first of all the China’s interest was based on
keeping its integrity with Xinjiang – the area bordering Central Asian
states and settled with Uigurs). Later the interests involved anti-terrorist
measures, the war on separatism, extremism, the development of economic cooperation. Gradually neighboring states were involved in the
organization (Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Belarus, Afghanistan and Turkey). They either attend the meetings or received the
observer status. At the same time it is difficult to estimate this integration as effective. There are specific contradictions between Russia and
China, as they both consider the Central Asia as the extent of particular
interests. The area is an important outlet for their goods and a hydrocarbons supplier.
Many experts believe the aim to oppose the increasing USA involvement in the area is the only nexus for this organization (Andreeschev,
2008; Lukin, A. V.; Shankhayskaya organisatziya sotrudnichestva, 2008).
At the same time Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have other,
sometimes opposite interests, one way or another they cooperate with
the USA in security politics: American bases were placed in Manas (Kyr-
282
gyzstan, since 2001 up to now), Karshi-Khanabad (Uzbekistan, 20012005), Karatag (Tajikistan, now under negotiations).
Thereby SCO does not look effective, but presents a forum for the
discussion of local challenges. The main purpose of the organization –
war on terrorism – truly is under implementation: special services interact, make a search for criminals, prevent acts of terror and carry out
trainings. Still, the participants solve other problems in bilateral negotiations.
The organizations listed above do not cover all the interests of their
participants: they prefer to use bilateral relations. The Russian government usually plays the role of the main integration sponsor in the area,
but the officials have to compete with other actors, not only the USA,
but also China and even Kazakhstan.
IV. CONCLUSION
Romantic expectations to establish the relations of a mutual trust and
close integration with the Western Europe states supported by the Russian officials in the early of 1990-s were not implemented. Furthermore
the Russian government was not satisfied with the terms of economic
cooperation offered by the developed states. When the high prices for
oil and gas allowed Russia to overcome the economic crisis, it became
a sponsor for an integration area, yet the idea of “a post-soviet burden”
was always kept in mind.
Obviously the NIS markets have close relations with Russian enterprises which date back the USSR period. The target to sell its products
and to buy the mineral resources pushes the Russian government to
cooperate with CIS. But such cooperation expects a lot of investments
into the area. Furthermore, Russians since 2000-s have to compete in
the area with more powerful actors.
From the one hand the sources of Russian economic development
can still be provided by European states, from the other hand they do
not need Russian goods. The Russian establishment blames western
economies and politics in this warp, doing so few for stimulating the
diversified investments.
Politicizing the integration projects in fact became too popular in
Russia since 2000, even strengthened after the “coloured revolutions” in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kirgizstan in 2003 - 2004. But by politicizing the
CIS integration the Russian government spoils the relations with them,
marred the image and enforcing their fear of a new imperial policy. At
283
the same time, politicizing any integration the Russian government loses the feeling of real economic interests.
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