JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN COMMUNITIES AND TOURISM INVESTORS: EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN COMMUNITIES
AND TOURISM INVESTORS:
EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Caroline Ashley* and Brian Jones**
Accepted for publication in the International Journal of Tourism Research, special issue on fair
trade in tourism, Vol.3, No.2, March 2001.
* Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute, Stag Place, London SW1E 5DP, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 171 393 1642 Fax: +44 (0) 171 393 1699
Email: [email protected]
** Environment and Development Consultant, PO Box 9455, Eros, Windhoek, Namibia
Tel. and Fax: +264 61 236 186
Email: [email protected]
Joint ventures between communities and tourism investors:
Experience in southern Africa
SUMMARY
Tourism joint ventures between communities and private investors are an emerging trend in
Southern Africa. In each country they take different forms. This paper reviews experience in
Namibia, within the wider regional context, to identify some key principles and challenges.
Several lessons can be learnt from the eight Namibian negotiations, and three operating ventures
concerning the long process of establishing joint ventures, and about the positive and negative
impacts it has for both parties, which cover a range of commercial and livelihood concerns. The
analysis suggests several critical factors influence JV success including: committed individuals,
company philosophy, facilitation, time and trust, local institutions, national policy context, and
tourism market trends. Regional comparison indicates that critical factors need to be present in
some – but widely varying – form. JVs should become easier to develop as lessons are shared.
Although they will remain a niche market, due to high transaction costs, further policy and
practical support can help develop this promising potential.
KEY WORDS
Joint ventures
Tourism
Community–private sector partnership
Southern Africa
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Tourism joint ventures between communities and private investors are an emerging trend in
southern Africa. The term ‘joint venture’ is not used in the strict legal sense used in commerce,
when two companies form a joint venture. We define community-private sector joint ventures as
a contractual partnership between a community or local institution and a private investor, to
work together in establishing and operating a single tourism or hunting enterprise. While they
may not both own the company assets in legal terms, both have rights and responsibilities to
contribute to and benefit from the enterprise. There are two common forms: one is where a
tourism lodge is established by an investor on communal land, under a formal agreement with
the resident community or its representatives. Usually, the operator pays a lease fee or bed night
levy, but in some cases the community has an equity stake. The other common form is where a
community institution has control over a hunting quota for wildlife in its area, which it leases to a
trophy hunter.
Joint ventures are emerging for several reasons:
•
In most parts of the southern African region, the wildlife and/or land in areas populated by
rural communities are owned by the state. But thanks to a trend of devolving rights over
wildlife, land, or other natural resources to residents, communities are now gaining rights
over assets such as wildlife and tourism concession rights.
•
It is difficult for communities to develop their assets on their own, as they lack access to
capital, tourism expertise and marketing skills. So many view a partnership with a private
operator as a way to tap into the market value of their assets.
•
In a context where tourism is growing in the region, private investors need access to new
opportunities, and hence to the assets owned by communities.
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•
Tourism companies are also responding to changing trends in the market, which demands
greater sophistication and variety and not just daily sightings of the ‘Big Five’ (lion, leopard,
elephant, rhino and buffalo). Joint ventures add cultural and ethical components to the
product.
•
Given the changing political context (the end of white rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South
Africa in the last 20 years), there are also long-term strategic reasons for tourism companies
to demonstrate their commitment to local development, and to justify what has been seen as
an elitist industry.
•
Tourism is increasingly being seen as a livelihood option by communities and by
development organisations that support them. There are many initiatives to support
community tourism, including promotion of joint ventures.
•
Both non-consumptive and consumptive tourism1 are also seen as important among
conservationists as an appropriate form of sustainable use of wildlife, and a way to create
incentives for community conservation. Several facilitators of community tourism are
therefore motivated by a conservation agenda.
This paper explores experience in Namibia, compares it with experience in other southern
African countries, and seeks to identify implications for the further development of such ventures
within the tourism industry. The paper first looks at the regional context in which joint ventures
are developing and then documents some Namibian examples. A Namibian case study is
described and analysed drawing comparisons with experience elsewhere. Some critical success
factors are identified and their broader relevance to the industry considered. The paper concludes
that many factors that affect the likelihood of success will be context specific, but the critical
success factors identified to date point to the emergence of some key principles that can be
applied in different circumstances. These are summarised in the conclusion.
1
Non-consumptive tourism in southern Africa is mainly wildlife-viewing or photographic safaris. Consumptive tourism is mainly trophy hunting
and sport hunting, plus some fishing and bird shooting.
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This paper is based on practical involvement and research by the authors in Namibia’s
Community Based Natural Resource Management Programme (CBNRM). Both were involved
in facilitating the emergence of tourism joint ventures and have conducted research on the issues
involved (for example, for IIED’s Evaluating Eden project, Manchester University’s wildlife and
people research, action research for development of DFID-Namibian project on wildlife and
livelihoods (WILD) and for a UK Department for International Department (DFID) assessment
of pro-poor tourism issues). Both have been based in Namibia, while doing work in the broader
region. Details of the Damaraland Case study are based, in particular, on research interviews at
the lodge in April 1999, action research on pros and cons of tourism plans with community
members in 1997, joint venture planning workshops with the community in 1994–96, and
opinions expressed in presentations made by community and non-governmental organisation
(NGO) staff at workshops.
2. APPROACHES TO JOINT VENTURES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
2.1. Regional approaches
Within southern Africa a number of different approaches to developing tourism joint ventures
have emerged. In Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia joint ventures between rural communities
and the private sector have been developed within the context of national CBNRM programmes.
These programmes aim at linking conservation and rural development by giving rural
communities rights over wildlife and tourism. It is argued that if rural communities have
sufficient authority and control over wildlife and if the benefits from wildlife management
(including income from tourism) outweigh the costs, then communities will manage wildlife
sustainably. In South Africa joint ventures have developed where National Park authorities have
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sought ways to increase the legitimacy of conservation areas through providing benefits to rural
neighbours. Another major impetus is now being given to joint ventures by the Strategic
Development Initiative which seeks new ways to develop sustainable local economies and has a
strong focus on tourism. Tourism joint ventures in South Africa are also developing in East
Africa, supported by both conservation and development-oriented institutions.
The joint ventures that have developed in the region reflect the specific political, social, cultural
and economic contexts of each country, but also demonstrate similarities.
Zimbabwe
The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) has
promoted joint ventures particularly in the safari hunting sector. Rural District Councils (RDCs)
have been given rights to manage wildlife including the sale of hunting quotas allocated to the
councils by government (Metcalf, 1994; Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). The hunting quotas are put
out to tender and bidders are asked to quote in US dollars. The income is either distributed to
residents in the area where the hunting takes place or is used for community projects or a
combination of both. Sometimes responsibility for wildlife management and negotiation with the
private sector is devolved by the councils to a lower level of administrative unit, the Ward. A
Zimbabwean development NGO, the Zimbabwe Trust, builds the capacity of the councils and
wards for negotiation with the private sector, assists in developing greater accountability by these
bodies to residents, and facilitates the development of transparent income distribution. In recent
years, some joint venture photographic tourism lodges have been established.
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Botswana
As part of Botswana’s CBNRM programme, large blocks of land, particularly around game
reserves and national parks are designated for lease to either the private sector or local
communities for hunting or photographic safaris or a combination of both (Jones, 1997; Steiner
and Rihoy, 1995). Communities that form representative and accountable management groups
may obtain 15-year leases from tribal land boards for hunting or tourism activities. They may
then sub-lease to the private sector if, as is most likely, they do not have the capital and skills to
run the operations themselves. The Botswana Government has developed a series of formal
guidelines for the establishment of joint ventures. These guidelines provide for a formal role by
various government agencies in advising and assisting the community in negotiating with the
private sector and evaluating tender bids.
Namibia
In Namibia, the Government devolves limited ownership over some species of wildlife and use
rights over others to local communities that form a natural resource management institution
called a conservancy (Jones, 1997; Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). A conservancy must have a
registered membership, legal constitution, representative management committee, and defined
boundaries. The first four conservancies are registered and have each embarked on joint venture
negotiations. Other conservancies and negotiations are developing. Conservancies are beginning
to integrate wildlife management and wildlife-based tourism with other land uses. Namibia has
the strongest legislation in the region that devolves authority over wildlife and tourism directly to
community-level institutions.
South Africa
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Under South Africa’ Strategic Development Initiative, a wide range of joint ventures are
developing on communal land, inside protected areas, and on land that residents have reclaimed
(through the land claim process) from within protected areas, and which the communities choose
to keep under wildlife use. A range of structures have developed that are more complex than in
the other countries, including equity and lease arrangements for both development and operating
companies. The ‘community’ is normally represented by a tribal authority and in many cases
partnerships are tri-partite as they include a local government authority. This is particularly true
inside protected areas where government has an inalienable stake. For example, Rocktail Bay
and Ndumo Wilderness Camp in Maputoland are tri-partite ventures between the commercial
wing of KwaZulu Natal’s Department of Nature Conservation (Isivuno), a South African tourism
company (Wilderness Safaris), and the relevant Tribal Authorities neighbouring each protected
area (the Mqobela Isigodi and Matenjwa Tribal Authority, respectively) (Elliott, 1999).
2.2. Namibian examples
Namibia, at the south-west tip of Africa, is the most arid country south of the Sahara (MET,
1994). Since Independence from South Africa in 1990, Namibia’s international tourism industry
has grown rapidly. While mainstream tourists focus on the national parks, and trophy hunters on
the commercial farms, more adventurous tourism to the Northwest (Kunene Region) and
Northeast (Caprivi Region) communal areas has taken off. Both have stunning scenery and
wildlife, with desert-adapted species in the dry west (including ‘desert elephants’ and rhino), and
more typical African game in the central savannah and wetter north-east. The main land uses are
subsistence livestock production and agriculture, which residents combine with off-farm income
and migration to survive. Over recent years, several initiatives to develop ‘community tourism’
have emerged. The first tourism joint venture negotiations began in 1994, but the trend was given
much greater impetus with the passing of conservancy legislation in 1996. As conservancies are
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legally registered community institutions, which receive concession rights over wildlife, they
form the basis for communities to enter tourism joint ventures.
The eight initiatives to develop tourism joint ventures in Namibia so far are summarised in Table
1. One photographic tourism and two hunting joint ventures are operating. One tourism
enterprise is under development. The other four negotiations stalled and are not proceeding. In
addition to these eight, there are other ideas developing in emerging conservancies.
Table 1: Initiatives to develop joint ventures in Namibia
Enterprise and partners
Damaraland Camp
Torra Conservancy and
Wilderness Safaris
Poachers Camp
Torra conservancy and S.
African investor
Torra Conservancy and a
Safari Hunter
Salambala Conservancy
and Peddie Safaris
Nyae Nyae Conservancy
and a Safari Hunter
Grootberg Conservancy
and a Safari Hunter
Lerato Company,
negotiating with a number
of conservancies
Emerging Mayuni
Conservancy and tourism
investor
Tourism or hunting
Up-market tourism lodge
Location
Kunene Region, Northwest
Namibia
Status
Negotiated 1994-96.
Operating since 1996
Very exclusive tourism
lodge
Kunene Region, Northwest
Namibia
Negotiated 1994-6. Didn’t
proceed.
Trophy hunting
Kunene Region, Northwest
Namibia
Caprivi Region, Northeast
Namibia
Otjozondjupa Region,
Eastern Namibia
Kunene Region, Northwest
Namibia
Kunene and Caprivi
Regions, Northwest and
Northeast Namibia
Caprivi Region
Negotiated 1998-99, being
implemented
Negotiated 1995-6.
Investor withdrew
Negotiated and operated
1998
Negotiated and signed in
1998. Cancelled.
Negotiations started and
halted in 1998.
Sport hunting and fishing
lodges, plus tourism
Trophy hunting
Trophy hunting
Tourism lodges
Tourism lodge
Negotiated 1998-9. Being
implemented.
Lessons can be learnt about the process of negotiation from all eight. Only the first, Damaraland
Camp, has been operating long enough to reveal insight on implementation and impacts of the
partnership. We therefore focus on Damaraland Camp in detail, while bringing in comparisons
and contrasts to the other initiatives in Namibia, and the other approaches in the Region.
3. ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF DAMARALAND CAMP
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The Damaraland Camp is an up-market 16-bed tented lodge on the fringes of the Namib Desert
in Kunene Region, north-west Namibia. It is situated in the Huab River Valley in an area, which
is home to desert-dwelling elephants, black rhino, giraffe, springbok, oryx and a number of other
species of large game. The area is sparsely inhabited by a mixture of people, living a harsh
existence from small stock farming, some cattle herding and the tending of small-scale vegetable
gardens. Few people have permanent jobs. Elephants damage water points and raid gardens,
while the livestock is vulnerable to predators such as jackals and hyenas.
The joint venture was negotiated between a southern African photographic safari company,
Wilderness Safaris (WS) and the residents of the area. For many years the residents have
appointed their own community game guards and the reduced poaching in the area has
contributed to a significant increase in wildlife (Durbin et al., 1997). The product marketed by
WS is desert wilderness with spectacular landscapes with the possibility of seeing desertdwelling elephants and other wildlife. The company also emphasises the links to the local
community.
Construction of the camp was completed in 1996 following lengthy negotiations with the local
community over a two-year period. After realising that WS was interested in developing a lodge
in the area, the community sought legal assistance and were told that if they wanted to enter into
a contract with the company they needed to form a legal body. The result was the establishment
of a Residents’ Trust with a legal constitution and an elected management body.
The negotiations led to the development of a written contract between the company and the
Residents’ Trust. The contract included the following provisions:
•
a commitment by WS to local recruitment of staff and training up to management level
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•
WS to pay 10% of the net daily rate to the community in the form of a levy per bed-night
•
WS to pay an additional flat fee of GB£ 300 a year for ‘rent’ of the site of the lodge
•
WS to present its books to the Trust every quarter for inspection
•
WS to ensure an annual audit is carried out
•
an option for the community to purchase the assets and continue alone after 10 years or an
option for the community to renew the contract for a further five years 20% of the acquired
fixed assets each year and to take over fully at the end of the extended period. In the case of
both options the company to continue to bring tourists to the camp
•
provision for the lodge to buy wood and procure other services such as washing of laundry
from the community
•
establishment of a Joint Management Committee of WS and community representatives to
discuss development of the lodge and wider area
•
the community provides WS with exclusive use of the lodge area (i.e. no livestock in the
immediate vicinity), tourist access to a much larger mixed-use area, and a guarantee not to
engage in tourism ventures with other companies in the larger area;
•
other community commitments including environmental management, respect for the
security and safety of clients and business needs of the lodge
•
clauses on termination, dispute resolution, etc. Any changes to the contract have to be agreed
by both parties
Significantly, the company agreed that the income would be paid directly to a community
account and that the use of the income would be entirely up to the community.
The camp has proved successful in attracting tourists, beginning with a 40% occupancy in its
first year, and projections that occupancy would rise to 65–70% by 1998. The lodge won second
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place, the Silver Otter Award, in the British Travel Writers’ Guild Award for 1997 for ecotourism
destinations worldwide. Part of the criteria for this award was the service to the community.
Once Namibia’s conservancy legislation was passed; the Residents’ Trust was transformed into
the Torra Conservancy following widespread community consultation.
4. KEY ISSUES
4.1. Developing the partnership
Clearly in the development of the Damaraland Camp there were a number of factors not
normally present in the establishment of the average tourist lodge. Usually the investor would
secure the land through rental from the government, gain approval (in a rudimentary way) for the
type of development, and then go ahead with construction. In this case, however, the investor
spent two years negotiating an agreement with local residents, the people who depend upon the
land and resources the lodge wanted to use.
Time and style of negotiation
The two-year negotiation period was a learning experience for both the community and the
company, as they both had to adapt to different negotiating styles and paces of decision-making.
The company was not dealing with a small group of individuals who could take decisions on
their own or quickly refer important issues to their backers. The elected members of the
Residents Trust had to discuss issues amongst themselves and then refer them back to the
broader community whom they represented. Although the community is relatively small it is
spread out over a large area of land at isolated settlements and cattle posts. To organise a
community meeting is time consuming for the leadership and residents. Attendance at such a
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meeting also means time away from the farm and more productive activities necessary for trying
to eke out a living in such a harsh environment. Time is clearly also a factor for investors, who
want to see a return on their investment. Delays cost money. For example, a similar negotiation
process occurred at Salambala conservancy in Caprivi. However, at the end of two years when
the investor withdrew, he blamed delays in registering the conservancy and formalising the deal
for his departure. There is a clear tension here between securing the deal, and ensuring a good
deal and an empowering process for the community.
Table 1 illustrates that trophy-hunting contracts have generally been negotiated and implemented
much more rapidly. The same trend is observed in Zimbabwe. This is generally because they are
shorter and simpler contracts. This suggests that some communities may do better to focus on
trophy hunting joint ventures first, while building up capacity for tourism negotiations. However,
the risk of this is that tourism opportunities will be seized by others meanwhile.
Defining the community
A substantial part of the two years was taken up with formation of the Residents Trust: defining
membership, agreeing a constitution and acquiring legal recognition. The existence of the
Residents Trust is deemed crucial by the Managing Director of WS, as it provided him with a
body of community representatives with whom he could negotiate, and whom he could trust as
representing wider community views.
A common question in all CBNRM initiatives including joint ventures is ‘who is the
community?’ In Zimbabwe and South Africa easier answers are found, by using government
authorities – local councils in Zimbabwe – and traditional authorities – Tribal Authorities in
South Africa. In Botswana, there is more opportunity for communities to define themselves, as in
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Namibia, when applying for leases from the Land Board. At Damaraland Camp, the process of
institution building meant that negotiations were delayed, but on the other hand it brought the
joint venture closer to grass-roots level.
Facilitation
An important feature of the negotiation phase was assistance to the community provided by a
wide variety of external organisations. The local non-governmental organisation, Integrated
Rural Development and Nature Conservation played the role of facilitator, helping the
community to organise, consult and negotiate. They also brought in several advisors with
expertise, including economics and legal advice. Although rural communities can be shrewd and
skilled negotiators in matters familiar to them, they are clearly at a disadvantage when dealing
with business investors in the tourism industry. They lack knowledge of the industry, of its
potential and its pitfalls, and are not used to analysing company financial statements. The
potential for them to enter into a poor deal for themselves is great. The assistance from outside
helped to redress the imbalance of power between the company and the community in terms of
knowledge and information.
However, there are tensions in the role of facilitator. To what extent should they be helping the
weaker partner, the community, to enter negotiations, and to what extent serving as an objective
broker between both parties? In the Damaraland Camp negotiations, IRDNC played both of
these roles. It was as important to help the company understand the community as to help the
community understand the concerns and needs of a business company. In assisting the
community, to what extent should facilitators ‘advise’ the community with their opinion on such
complex issues, and to what extent merely support their process of decision-making? IRDNC
were able to focus more on the latter by bringing in advisors on the former. This dilemma rose
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more strongly during the recent negotiations between Lerato and several Namibian
conservancies. A wide range of advisors were involved in the conservancies’ workshop and
found they had contrasting opinions of the Lerato offer, generating debate about the extent to
which advisors’ opinions should be offered at all.
The value of facilitation is demonstrated by the several cases where deals have been signed
without facilitation. For example, where a headman is offered some token recompense on the
spot for signing a piece of paper typed by an investor.
Ensuring a fair deal
There is no market in communal tourism land in southern Africa, so it was very difficult for the
community to judge what would constitute a fair return for their contribution to the joint venture.
Economics advice was brought in which relied on two forms of assessment: first drawing on
experience across the region. There was no published information on contracts, so personal
contacts through the CBNRM programme proved invaluable at gleaning regional experience,
although most of these were for hunting joint ventures. Secondly, using projections provided by
WS, analysis was done to assess levels of profitability for the company based on different lease
fees. This showed the limits of what was possible and not possible. It was important to show the
community how what was feasible depended on key factors such as occupancy, scale of
investment, and particularly the trade-off with the length of the contract. However, greater access
to commercial expertise within the industry probably would have helped in further understanding
what was feasible and not from the company’s perspective. As more deals develop, and
hopefully as more information on contracts becomes available, market trends should become
evident, though case-by-case analysis will still be needed.
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In Zimbabwe, a tender process has proved invaluable at securing a fair market-related price for
community contributions. By requesting investors to bid for a trophy quota, revenues earned by
the Councils have increased dramatically yet without the risk of pricing themselves out of the
market (Bond, 1995). When Damaraland Camp was negotiated, a tender was not an option,
because the initiative came from the company and the community did not yet have legal rights
over wildlife to be tendered. Tender processes are now being considered in Namibia, but even
now, a tender process would be more difficult for a similar venture. This is because tourism
lodges require a longer-term contract than trophy hunting deals, are more complex and locallyspecific, and rely even more on a spirit of cooperation than on contractual details. This places
value on personal contact, and an initiative from a specialist company who knows the area well,
and on details that might not be revealed in a documented tender bid.
Legal rights
A key issue for the Residents’ Trust, and one recognised by Wilderness Safaris as being
important for the success of the venture, was the securing of rights to the site on which the lodge
would be built. The company agreed that the Trust would take out the lease (called Permission to
Occupy or PTO) from government over the site, rather than the company make the application,
which had always been the case in the past with tourism developments on communal land. The
acquisition of the site helped redress the imbalance of power between the company and the
community in terms of what each was bringing to the partnership. It was also an implicit
recognition by the company that although the title to the land in Namibian law rests in the state,
the people who live on it and use it have rights to the land that should not be ignored.
The process and product
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The negotiation of a written agreement and contract was important as a process of developing a
shared vision of what the lodge could bring both for the company and community. The fact that
some real negotiation took place and compromises were made on both sides meant that both
could claim commitment to the agreement. Equally the product – the written agreement – has
been an important reference point for both partners in the ongoing operation of the lodge.
A contrasting example
The experience of Damaraland Camp contrasts considerably with the development of a joint
venture for safari hunting between a neighbouring conservancy and a Professional Hunter. The
conservancy was represented in the negotiations by two individuals who had little contact with
other committee members during the negotiating process, and no issues were referred back to the
rest of the community (Jones, 1999). The individuals involved in the negotiation had no external
support and the hunter wrote the agreement himself. The result was a document that the
conservancy had no ownership over, the committee did not know what it had agreed to and many
provisions were unreasonable. Once the committee realised how bad the agreement was for the
conservancy and that the hunter seemed to have no intention of carrying out safaris, they drew on
legal advice and were able to terminate the agreement. However, the conservancy had lost a
year’s potential income from trophy hunting.
4.2. Implementing the partnership
The development of a sound working partnership between the Residents Trust (later the Torra
Conservancy) did not end with the signing of the contract and construction of the Damaraland
Camp. The main forum for maintaining partnership is through the Joint Management
Committee. Although it has proved difficult to get meetings as often as planned, the functioning
of the Joint Management committee has been crucial in maintaining the spirit of the agreement
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and the trust that had built up between the company and the community during the negotiation
phase. Other informal avenues are daily contacts between management and local staff (who
included some committee members of Torra Conservancy), a new workers’ committee which
handles negotiations over wages and work conditions with lodge management, and occasional
visits to the lodge by conservancy committee members for various reasons including checking
progress.
Namibian communities involved in negotiations with the private sector have indicated that
building trust with individual managers is important to them and they would like to see
continuity of lodge management teams (this was expressed during discussions of the Lerato
proposals) (LIFE, 1999). However, the industry tends to rotate management teams for a number
of reasons and the continuity sought by communities is lost. The current manager of Damaraland
Camp suggests this can be mitigated through ensuring that agreements and decisions on new
issues are recorded and available for new management teams and the conservancy
representatives. At Damaraland Camp, continued if occasional involvement of the Managing
Director, who led the negotiations, also ensures continuity.
From the company side, there are still some problems in building the partnership. The camp
manager reports that taking decisions to the JMC costs time and effort, although he does not
regard it as a burden, and is worthwhile. However, the Managing Director identifies ways in
which the partners still lack shared understanding. He indicated that community members have
unreasonably high expectations of what the lodge can deliver financially, and need to develop a
better understanding of the business side of the operation. This has been improving over time.
Staff who have often have never had a permanent job before, have to adjust to a structured
working day geared to deadlines dictated by the movements of tourists and the need for high
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quality service. Community negotiating skills are still very blunt, which could easily lead to
friction if not understood by their partner,
4.3. Is it a ‘partnership’?
What is the nature of the relationship between Wilderness Safaris and the Torra Conservancy?
Can it be called a partnership, and if so, why? In a normal business partnership the partners have
co-ownership of the business and there is joint decision-making. The partnership is formed on
the basis of each bringing assets to the business, usually in the form of capital or expertise. But
Torra Conservancy is not a formal business partner of the company. Essentially, the company has
entered into an agreement to pay the conservancy for the use of its land and other resources such
as water. This is equivalent to a rental, with implicit compensation for the opportunity costs of
using the land (i.e. recognition that the community would have been using the land and water for
other purposes).
However, the nature of the relationship between the two entities raises the arrangement well
beyond that of landlord and tenant. The provisions in the agreement for the conservancy to take
over the lodge if they wish, for the functioning of the JMC, training for community members to
management level, and the spirit in which the company are willing to operate the lodge all
encourage a sense of real partnership between the two parties. There is evidence that that the
conservancy feels ownership over the lodge. Committee members visit the lodge to check on
progress and staff issues, are keen for JMC meetings to take place, and show national and
international visitors to ‘their’ lodge. According to one of the community staff members: “People
see the camp as the future for the area. They think the camp belongs to them and feel proud
about it and they know they will take over the camp.”
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However, it is unlikely that every joint venture in the region would elicit similar responses.
Clearly a joint venture can amount to little more than a paper agreement and landlord-tenant
relationship. In the case of Damaraland Camp, a combination of factors including the process of
negotiation, the details of operation, the ambitions of the community, and the individuals
involved have probably helped to build a better partnership.
4.4. Advantages and disadvantages for the operator
Wilderness Safaris were already familiar with the Kunene area. They invested in Damaraland
Camp at a time when they wanted to move into operation of accommodation and not just
provision of tours, and the camp is a key part of the circuit that they offer tourists. The company
business philosophy embraces community participation, and it also operates joint ventures at
Ndumo Park and Rocktail Bay in South Africa’s Maputoland. While any company would expect
a good return on its investment, these factors indicate that profit-seeking was not the only
motivation.
The deal with Torra Conservancy gave WS access to a prime site in southern Kunene, at a time
when other sites were either unavailable or of uncertain status. Large tourism tracts were already
tied up in 2 large government concessions, while other sites on communal land could have been
developed with agreement of the Government, but may have been subject to growing pressure
from communities.
Discussions with the Managing Director of WS and the Manager of Damaraland Camp in
January 1997 and April 1999 have indicated four advantages to the company from operation of
the lodge. Firstly ‘it is a seller.’ Feedback from tourists indicates that for many it is the favourite
lodge on the tour. This is partly ascribed to the unusual degree of staff warmth and attention,
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which in turn can be partly ascribed to their own stake in the camp, and partly to cultural
characteristics of the Riemvaskmaker people (the majority in the area). Given the importance of
word of mouth in marketing, this is significant.
Secondly, it benefits the company and their marketing at a more general level. They gain a
‘market boost’ and ‘exposure in the tourism world’. Prizes such as the Travel Writers Guild
Silver Otter Award help draw attention to the lodge and company in a market that is highly
competitive and in which southern African safari lodges and packages need to distinguish
themselves from each other.
Thirdly, if problems arise with government or other outsiders, the company can be confident that
the community will provide support. While this has not yet been an issue, the political context
and changing land-use patterns in many Southern African countries makes it useful to have this
additional political credibility. For example, in south-eastern Zimbabwe, an up-market lodge was
established at Mahenye by ZimSun in collaboration with the local community, and the two have
worked together in dealing with problems in government (Murphree, forthcoming).
Fourthly, the tourism product is dependent upon maintenance of the wildlife and wilderness.
While local commitment to wildlife conservation had been increasing for several years, the lodge
partnership may well have given it extra momentum, because people can see visible benefits. For
example, the Company Director and Camp Manager believe that attitudes to elephants, which
cause enormous physical damage in the area and occasionally kill people, have become more
positive since the lodge began.
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Despite good occupancy rates, profit to date appears to be limited, particularly given the amount
of income that is paid over to the community. Detailed analysis has not been done of Wilderness
Camp, but commercial assessment of the two other Wilderness joint ventures in Maputoland has
been done by Africa Wildlife Foundation (Elliott, 1999) (in these cases WS operates the camps
but does not own them). Rocktail Bay Lodge opened in 1996, and generated profits for WS in
1997/7 and 1997/8. Ndumo Wilderness Camp, also opened in 1996, had not yet returned a profit
by February 1998, reflecting its more specialised market (bird-watchers), but was expected to
succeed. Given that new tourism operations are rarely expected to break even within the first five
years, this performance was regarded as acceptable. This suggests that tourism joint ventures can
be profitable, but profits can take time and other company benefits can be equally important.
The main disadvantages to WS of operating a joint venture instead of a conventional private
investment is the amount of time invested in working with the community, during both
negotiation and operation. The Director estimates that the negotiation process cost N$200,0002 in
time, flights and other resources. Now it is operational, the need to agree any changes with the
Committee can still cause delays, although the right of WS to get on with day-to-day
management without interference is recognised in the contract. As indicated above, different
attitudes to business continue to be a challenge in building the partnership.
The Director and Manager clearly believe that the advantages of the joint venture outweigh the
disadvantages for them. However, the benefits are of several types, which are important to WS in
their context: access to a new site, market boost, improved conservation, fitting with company
philosophy. This suggests that the benefits to other companies, at other joint venture sites, would
also depend on the context and range of advantages (not just profit) sought.
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4.5.
Advantages and disadvantages for the community
The negotiation process and comparison with other potential joint ventures demonstrates a wide
range of community concerns and desires in relation to tourism development. Cash income is far
from the main or only motivation. This is illustrated by the fact that the Residents Committee
negotiated two joint ventures but only decided to proceed with one. The other offer, for a small
exclusive lodge at ‘Poachers Camp’ was discussed for three years, but reached the point where
the company said it must be ‘yes’ or ‘no’, and the community decided not to go ahead. It would
have been possible to go ahead with both offers. Table 2 contrasts the two proposals. In essence,
the community was happy to go ahead with the Wilderness Safaris offer because they saw
tangible benefits with relatively low trade-offs in terms of loss of land for other current uses.
Poachers Camp offered significantly more money but had three major disadvantages: it was a
high risk, it involved keeping people and livestock out of a much larger area, and it involved a
much longer commitment. In addition, the negotiation was more difficult because proposals kept
changing, making it difficult for the community to assess and discuss the deal. These
disadvantages outweighed the potential benefits.
The way that Torra members negotiated for Damaraland Camp and then assessed it, shows the
importance of a range of livelihood concerns. During the negotiation, they pressed harder to
increase Wilderness Safaris’ commitments to senior-level training and to transferring ownership,
than to increasing their revenue share by another percentage point. The following year, when
assessing pros and cons of tourism as a land-use, money for community funds, elephant damage
and drought were ranked highly. But they also highlighted the importance of jobs near farm.
Even if tourism jobs are lower paid than city jobs, the fact that they are near home means that
2
Approximately £35,000 at exchange rates prevailing at that time. Currently £1 = N$9.7 approximately.
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‘farmers can continue as farmers’ instead of paying someone else to look after their livestock
(Ashley, 1997). Given that farming is not just what people do but is how they define themselves,
the fact that the lodge can complement farming is very important. Participants also emphasised
that tourism is a ‘foundation for development’. In ranking of benefits, two of the three groups
ranked this first.
Table 2: Comparison of Wilderness Safaris proposal and Poachers Camp proposal
The offer from Wilderness Safaris
Likely community income of N$ 50-70,000 per year
Exclusive use of a small tourism-only area. Access to a
larger mixed-use area. No other lodges/camps in larger
area.
Low risk – well established company
Clear on what was wanted
10 year contract with 5 year renewal
Community free to develop trophy hunting if areas
agreed with WS
Community gains ownership in years 11-15
The offer for Poachers Camp
Possible community income of N$100-200,000 per year
Exclusive use of large area: no livestock or people, nor
other tourism developments. Area included a spring
useful in droughts
High risk – no tourism track record
Plans changed, goal posts moved
Wanted 30 year contract
Wanted rights to both tourism and trophy hunting, but
plans for the latter unclear.
Unclear ownership at end of contract
Contract negotiated, signed and implemented
Adapted from Davis 1998.
Draft contracts negotiated but did not proceed
The lodge has also generated intangible social benefits, which are reported but difficult to
measure. Community members show their lodge to visitors, talk about it with a sense of pride,
and have been invited to national and international meetings to make presentations about it. The
process of conservancy formation has involved building institutions and social cohesion, and this
process has been given added impetus by the joint venture.
However, conservancy members also identify disadvantages. The main disadvantages identified
during the 1997 research were associated with wildlife: increased wildlife numbers compete with
livestock for grazing, and elephants are aggressive, often threatening lives and equipment (in all
three groups, these were ranked in the top three disadvantages (Ashley, 1997)). They perceive
these as indirect costs of tourism because their tourism plans go hand in hand with expansion of
wildlife numbers, and they perceive tourists as disturbing wildlife and making elephants more
aggressive.
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Although the benefits go beyond cash, the opportunity for cash earnings has been a major
motivation. There are minimal local employment opportunities and virtually no other ways for
communities to earn collective income. Three different types of cash income are generated by the
lodge:
i
Collective income earned by the community from lease fees.
ii
Wages earned by workers.
iii
Casual earnings for those supplying the lodge and its tourists with local products or labour.
It is important to consider each of these separately, as they are earned by different people and
have different significance, and also to consider whether earnings are different from a
conventional non-partnership lodge operating on communal land.
Community collective income has increased each year, reaching nearly N$150,000 in 1998 (over
£15,000) and nearly N$250,000 in total (over £25,000), see Table 3. It increases each year as
lodge fees and occupancy go up. Although two private lodges in Namibia voluntarily give out
bed-night levies to surrounding communities, these are generally in the region of N$15–20,000
and most lodges provide nothing. This collective income is therefore a direct result of the
partnership. However, a major challenge is that the income has not yet been distributed. Some
has been used for operating expenses and a photocopier but most is in the bank. While there are
good reasons for this – the conservancy has only just developed its revenue distribution plan in
early 1999 – it means that most conservancy members have not yet seen the tangible benefits, in
the form of either household dividends or community projects. It also means it is too early to
assess the equity impact of the joint venture.
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This contrasts strongly with the approach adopted in some CAMPFIRE areas, where great
emphasis is put on visible distribution of community income (Metcalf, 1994; Peterson, 1991).
Ceremonies are held where the private partner (e.g. trophy-hunter) hands over the cash in public,
which is then divided up into its agreed uses in front of everyone. Cash for projects is put back in
the pot while cash for families is handed out on the spot. This has been emphasised in order to
increase transparency, enhance tangible impacts, and hence boost the impact on conservation
incentives.
Table 3:
Cash payments from Damaraland Camp to the Bergsig/De Riet Community
(Torra Conservancy) 1996–98*. N$.
Levies
Wages
Other earnings**
Training
Year 1
17,247
75,314
4,537
Year 2
78,335
135,354
19,814
Year 3
147,154
208,629
14,814
16,502
Total
242,736
419,297
39,175
16,502
* First three years of operation.
** Includes payment for laundry and wood supply services to the community.
Total local wages exceed community payments amounting to over N$ 200,000 in 1998 (see table
3). While any lodge could be expected to employ 7–12 unskilled local staff, generating aggregate
wages of N$50–150,000, the strong commitments to employ local staff in the contract mean that
local employment has been maximised within existing skill constraints. As training proceeds,
more skilled jobs should be taken by residents, although management training is reported to
proceeding more slowly than anticipated.
Casual income earned by supplying goods and services to the lodge is relatively low so far at less
than N$20,000 (£2000) per year. While tourism is often praised for its potential to generate
secondary enterprises and local economic linkages, such linkages are rare in practice. A joint
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venture should offer potential to develop more linkages because of the contact, trust and
goodwill that are built up between partners. At Damaraland Camp, so far, casual income is only
earned from wood sales, laundry, and an occasional home-dinner. The latter two are both
provided only by the nearest homestead. However, there is discussion of making dinners at
homesteads a more regular feature, developing rhino tracking with local guides, and assistance
from the lodge with vegetable gardens to provide regular supplies. More time is needed to see if
the partnership can bring these and other options to fruition.
Other experience in Namibia also indicates that impacts significant to communities cover a wide
range of livelihood issues, though the specific concerns vary from place to place. Important
issues generally include cash earnings, community control, nature of the partnership, long-term
prospects, risk, and opportunity costs. This is demonstrated by recent negotiations between
Lerato Company and a number of Namibian conservancies. Lerato was proposing to develop
several 10-bed lodges in Namibia, as well as elsewhere in southern Africa. Conservancy
representatives and advisors came together to assess the proposals. They identified many
problems, such as lack of clarity on the size and exclusivity of proposed areas, risk, no proposals
for joint management or local training, risk of environmental damage, and Lerato’s ‘domineering
attitude’. They made a counter-proposal of the kind of issues they would like to see reflected in a
contract, which offers insights on the benefits the communities seek from a joint venture and the
disadvantages they seek to minimise. The issues, summarised in Table 4, indicates major
community concerns about issues on control, partnership, environmental management, and
securing their future (adapted from LIFE, 1999).
Table 4: Elements of the communities’ response and proposals to Lerato
Issue
Objectives
Community proposal
Bring tourists, earn money from natural resources, use wildlife sustainably, protect yourself, and
have legal recourse
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Land-use and
environment
•
•
•
Nature of the
partnership
Employment
Finance
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The site, not the whole conservancy area should be rented
The area must fit with a land-use plan for the conservancy, and the site rehabilitated after the
contract
Areas sensitive for wildlife should not be used. Consultation is needed to ensure sustainable
land use
Joint management structures, including a Joint Management Committee
The Permission to Occupy (legal planning approval) must be in the name of the community
Relationships should be based on co-operation, respect of people and of local culture
A process for dispute resolution
The contract must be transparent to the community.
Training and preferential employment for local people
Conservancy should have access to financial information and a monthly update
A minimum financial performance clause
It is clear that joint ventures can generate a range of positive and negative impacts on sustainable
livelihoods of residents. In addition to cash benefits, issues on control and long-term security
need to be explored. Specific local concerns cannot be assumed but need to be explored in each
case.
5. CRITICAL FACTORS AND RELEVANCE TO OTHER PLACES
While some problems are acknowledged, Damaraland Camp is generally regarded as a success
for both parties and a useful example of a joint venture. What are the critical factors underlying
this case, and how relevant could they be to other areas?
5.1. The role of individuals
Crucial to the successful development of the Damaraland Camp joint venture was the role that
key individuals played in the negotiations. The managing director of Wilderness Safaris,
Namibia was personally involved from the beginning. He admits that he went through a quick
learning curve in dealing with local communities and that outside facilitators helped him to
understand the community perspective and the need for adopting certain compromises. He has
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since become someone that the community trusts and will continue to be involved in liaison after
retiring from WS. On the community side a key individual has been the former conservancy
chairman, who devoted a considerable amount of time and energy to making sure that the
community’s interests were represented during the negotiation process.
While such committed individuals can be found in many contexts, their role does suggest that
not every context will be an easy ground for developing joint ventures.
5.2. The type of investor
Wilderness Safaris has a company philosophy of involving local communities where possible.
The fact that there were no other tourism joint ventures developed in Namibia prior to the
passing of the conservancy legislation suggests that company philosophy is an important factor
where there is no legislative framework which forces the private sector to deal with local
communities (see below). Even with a legislative framework, the spirit of partnership will
depend on the approach of the company.
5.3. Local context: networks and facilitation
The specific local context was important in contributing to the development of the joint venture.
The area chosen by Wilderness Safaris for its lodge has had a long history of community
involvement in wildlife and tourism. Since 1982 a Namibian NGO, IRDNC, had been facilitating
the increased involvement of local residents in wildlife conservation and the increased benefit to
local people of wildlife utilisation and tourism (Jones, forthcoming). IRDNC helped facilitate the
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development of the Residents’ Trust, which was made easier by the relatively homogeneity and
small size of the community. IRDNC, in turn, was part of a broader group of organisations, both
governmental and non-governmental, that was developing Namibia’s national CBNRM
programme. The community and NGO were therefore able to access advice and expertise within
this emerging network.
Across the region, the role of facilitators varies, as does their institutional affiliation: they come
from NGOs, government agencies and park authorities, legal advisory centres, and individuals.
But invariably some kind of facilitation has been needed for a successful deal. This raises
questions about capacity and expertise – as joint ventures develop, are there enough facilitators?
If not, will this lead to fewer deals or bad deals? It also raises questions of who pays the
facilitators? At present, several development and conservation bodies recognise the contribution
that joint ventures can make to their own institutional objectives. This is fortunate, as it would be
generally very difficult for communities to pay them and inappropriate for the companies to pay
them.
5.4. The institutional context
As in all cases, the existence of a local institution to negotiate and contract with was essential at
Damaraland Camp. The type of local institutions involved – first the Residents Trust and then the
Conservancy – meant that the process was slow. In developing joint ventures, there is often a
trade-off between the need for a clearly defined body with legal status, and the need to involve
local residents and not just leaders. For example, the Zimbabwean District Councils and South
African Tribal Authorities provide clearly defined well established negotiating partners. But on
the other hand the extent to which local residents are involved in decisions and benefit-sharing is
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questioned. The approach used at Torra enabled both conditions to be achieved (legally
registered but with grass-roots involvement), though at the cost of some time and effort. The fact
that population density is extremely low in Kunene probably makes it easier to adopt this open
ended approach to development of community institutions. In densely populated areas of
Zimbabwe or South Africa, it is hard to see how an approach which leaves communities to
define themselves, rather than using government or traditional structures, would work.
5.5. National and policy context
The conservancy approach in Namibia has undoubtedly had an impact on the confidence and
ability of local communities to enter into joint venture agreements. The significance of the
Damaraland Camp example is that the investor was willing to work closely with the local
community before legislation gave communities rights over tourism. However, the new
legislation has devolved to local communities’ control over an asset that has market value, and
has strengthened the community’s rights. If the private sector want to develop tourism facilities
on communal land it now has to negotiate with conservancies. The Government is not approving
PTO applications from outsiders for tourism development in established or emerging
conservancies. The government views the conservancy approach and giving rights to
communities to control tourism developments as part of post-apartheid political transformation.
However, community control over access of independent tourists is still limited by the fact that
they do not own the land, and according to the Constitution, Namibians can travel anywhere on
communal land. This may lead to disputed interpretation over conservancies right to control nonconsumptive use of wildlife.
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In each country of the Region, a legislative or policy change has been necessary to devolve rights
over marketable assets to local level, but the form has varied enormously: devolution of
appropriate authority to Councils under CAMPFIRE, the land claims process in South Africa,
and a policy agreement between two ministries in Botswana that resident communities should
have preferential and cheap access to land leases in certain designated areas. In each case, the
policy context has generally moved in favour of communities but several policy and legal
constraints remain. Without secure land tenure, these complexities are likely to remain.
5.6. Market context
The Torra Conservancy was fortunate to have a comparative advantage over many other parts of
Namibia. The area combines spectacular desert scenery with the presence of large mammals not
normally associated with such arid landscapes. Indeed generally Namibia’s communal areas have
more big game and more interesting landscapes than the former white freehold farms, which take
up nearly 50% of the country. Many communal areas can offer a wilderness experience with the
possibility of seeing wildlife and of interacting with the local culture. This product matches that
which an increasing number of overseas tourists to Africa are seeking. If communities are in a
weak market position, any amount of facilitation, institution-building and devolution of tenure
will not stimulate joint ventures.
5.7. The CBNRM context
The fact that the Damaraland Camp joint venture took place within a broader framework of a
national CBNRM programme meant that the community could draw on a support network set up
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to provide advice and information in such circumstances. NGO and government personnel
played an important role in facilitating the negotiation process. The community could also draw
on lessons from elsewhere in the Region through the national CBNRM programme links to
similar activities in neighbouring countries. Significantly the community was aware that it
needed outside assistance and had the ability to ask for advice. A neighbouring conservancy that
had to terminate its hunting agreement with a private sector partner (described above) was
largely outside the national CBNRM network, and was overconfident in believing it could
handle the negotiation process unassisted.
In Zimbabwe and Botswana, the CBNRM programme has also provided a supportive role. The
CBNRM link has also helped to ensure that links between the joint venture and wildlife
conservation are highlighted. In South Africa’s Strategic Development Initiative, the context is
quite different – SDI is driven by economic development rather than conservation goals. But
again, it puts the joint ventures in the context of a larger programme, and builds a body of
expertise engaged in a range of joint ventures that can share information.
6. CONCLUSION
The above analysis leads us to conclude that tourism joint ventures between the private sector
and rural communities can work in different contexts. Although many factors that affect the
likelihood of success will be context specific, the critical success factors listed above point to the
emergence of some key principles that can be applied in different circumstances. Particularly
where joint ventures are being developed on communal land, the existence of strong community
institutions with legal rights over land and resources is important. Legal rights strengthen the
community’s negotiating hand, but their market power also depends on the market value of their
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assets. A problem facing communities is lack of information on market values. Communities
with legal rights over valuable assets can still be weak in negotiation compared to the private
sector, which has more capital, knowledge and expertise. Outside facilitation helps to redress the
imbalance of power that comes from a lack of experience and understanding of the industry by
rural communities. Facilitation can help both sides to develop a greater understanding of each
other’s needs, fears and aspirations. The role of individuals, whether a community member with
drive and initiative, or an investor willing to see the community perspective, is important.
National policy and legislation can play an enabling or a constraining role.
Where a combination of these factors are present, there is an opportunity for successful joint
ventures to be developed. The terms of the agreement might be different, but the nature and spirit
of the agreement are likely to be similar in successful joint enterprises. Success can be defined as
a joint venture that is sustainable, and generates more benefits than costs for both parties,
according to their perception. Experience shows that benefits are not just profits for the investor
and cash income for the community, but cover a range of commercial and livelihood concerns.
So a successful venture is likely to take these into account from the start, to maximise priority
benefits.
It is unlikely that any one joint venture will be replicable elsewhere, but lessons can be learned
from those that do succeed. As more are developed the process of developing tourism joint
ventures can become easier. It would appear, though that they will always involve higher
transaction costs than ‘conventional’ tourism. Such tourism enterprises represent a particular
niche in the tourism market, rather than an option to be promoted in all circumstances. They will
not be feasible or desirable for all companies or communities. Governments, donors, and
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industry leaders, can however, help to ensure that this particular niche in the industry can develop
by helping to provide appropriate enabling frameworks.
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