Freirean critical pedagogy’s challenge to interfaith education:

Transcription

CBRE_A_523524.fm Page 47 Thursday, November 11, 2010 3:54 PM
British Journal of Religious Education
Vol. 33, No. 1, January 2011, 47–60
Freirean critical pedagogy’s challenge to interfaith education:
what is interfaith? What is education?
Cathy Byrne*
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Centre for Research on Social Inclusion, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
(Received 12 August 2009; final version received 22 February 2010)
Taylor and Francis
CBRE_A_523524.sgm
British
10.1080/01416200.2011.523524
0141-6200
Original
Taylor
102011
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[email protected]
CatherineByrne
00000January
&
Journal
Article
Francis
(print)/1740-7931
of
2011
Religious Education
(online)
Interfaith education has been boosted recently by the imprimatur of current
and previous political world leaders. However, a critical analysis of what
makes good interfaith education is yet to emerge. Indeed the attention may
distract from the effort needed to ensure positive outcomes. This paper
questions whether the uncritical nature of some interfaith education
initiatives encourages the continuation of cultural and theological bias.
Critical social theorist Paulo Freire viewed education as an opportunity for
social evolution. His pedagogy of freedom relied on the idea that no
knowledge is out of bounds and that such freedom nurtured the security to
greet difference with humility. This paper examines some Australian
approaches to interfaith education in light of Freire’s challenge. It
questions the persistence of an Abrahamic skew and calls for a more
critical approach to differences of belief.
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Keywords: critical education; Australian interfaith; Paulo Freire; hegemony
A note on terms and context
By ‘interfaith education’ I mean learning about any position of faith – its
beliefs, practices, cultures, philosophies, cosmologies and institutions – in
relation to one’s own perspective (religious or not). This is similar to the
academic ‘studies of religion’ but emphasises the duality (of mine and other),
highlighting the opportunity and responsibility of the educative process to
create a bridge to understanding difference.
In Australia, secular government (public) schools account for 66% of
students (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008). The remaining 34% attend
private schools which are generally (if only historically) religiously affiliated
and largely Catholic. There is very little multi-faith study of religions until
senior high school. Both religious and government schools emphasise singlefaith instruction. Elective studies of religion courses can be taken by senior
students from public or private schools for matriculation. In New South Wales
*Email: [email protected]
ISSN 0141-6200 print/ISSN 1740-7931 online
© 2011 Christian Education
DOI: 10.1080/01416200.2011.523524
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(NSW), popularity of this subject has grown by 70% since 2004. It was the
fifth most popular subject in the Higher School Certificate in 2009 (ahead of
physics, chemistry and history) with 20% of students (NSW Board of Studies
2010).
This recent popularity raises the question of how teachers are trained to
deliver perspectives of religious otherness. For the past half century, schools
of education in Australian universities have been either extensions of religious
institutions or focused on delivering secular, distinctly non-religious subjects
(Bouma 2007). Teachers specialising in religion have mostly been trained in
Christian institutions. Despite the subject’s popularity, religion is not considered a teaching major by the NSW Institute of Teachers. Only one of the 12
public universities in NSW has a dedicated school of religious studies and it is
not pedagogically focussed. Students wishing to learn about and teach religion
from a non-Christian-centric perspective are somewhat restricted to training
and careers within the Christian system.
Freire’s education – a conscious, critical, construction praxis
Paulo Freire saw education as the heart of civil society. Inextricable from
social justice, he claimed education as a tool for social construction and human
evolution, since it both formed and transformed social character, values and
ideologies (Coleman 2007). Freire entwined theory and reflective practice as
praxis. He claimed that a society’s potential for ethical development lay in the
degree of awareness of education’s potential to recreate rather than merely
replicate society. He noted that educators either maintain or challenge the
dominant ideology and that this stance should be conscious. He called for an
approach to education that recognised its political, constructive nature.
In an effort to empower the marginalised, Freire challenged the industrialage view of education as a preparation-for-work factory and aimed to move
beyond the ‘banking model’ of education which delivered socially acceptable
information from teacher to student (1993, chap. 2). He claimed this model
gave the appearance of political neutrality and indemnified both teacher and
institution from their roles in the construction and protection of accepted
norms. Instead, in the footsteps of Mann and Dewey (Cohen 1998, 446), Freire
(1998) argued that education must challenge entrenched ideas and values to
expand the realm of knowledge and urged educators to be conscious of their
roles as gatekeepers in the dominant social order. He argued that replication
is a limiting, unethical imposition, since it robs the student of the freedom to
examine information impartially.
For Freire, the construction of knowledge required that teacher and student
(in partnership) approach learning by making comparisons, doubting and criticising. He elevated ‘the right to question’ (Freire and Faundez 1989, 89)
above the provision of mere answers and listed the virtues of a teacher as:
‘respect, tolerance, humility, openness to what is new …, love of adventure,
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nurturing of curiosity, [and] honouring disciplined, methodical enquiry’
(Freire 1998, 108).
The location of knowledge – in self and other
Freire’s pedagogy contained the notion that knowledge is historically, culturally and politically bound to points of reference. These points may be
summarily described as ‘self’ and ‘other’. He saw education as a life-long and
repeating journey between the two. Importantly, he did not equate ‘self’ with
the ‘known’. Freire saw the discipline of education as including an essential
self-criticism as a precursor to learning and he charged educators with the
responsibility to interrogate their own assumptions, especially if they stood in
a privileged position.
Such preparatory reflection requires diligent honesty, so that the journey to
the ‘other’ may be seen in relationship to the ‘self’ and any privilege that self
may hold. Without such introspection, Freire noted the ethical limitations of
education. He spoke of the irony of liberal colonialist educators who ‘proselytise about empowering minorities while refusing to divest from their class and
whiteness privilege – a privilege that is often left unexamined and unproblematized and that is often accepted as a divine right’ (1998, xxx). In Australia,
Christianity is similarly privileged (Kameniar 2005; Byrne 2009).
Freire argued that dialogue can only be achieved when educators are ‘ideologically committed to equality, to the abolition of privilege’ (1998, x). He
claimed that awareness of conditioning is a ‘pre-cursor to living an authentic
life’ (53), since this awareness brings the hopeful idea that we can make
choices, and have the capacity ‘to evaluate, to decide, to opt to break with …
habit, tradition or dominant notions’ (90).
Black feminist educator bell hooks, a Freirean theorist, took this idea a step
further when she argued that the location of privilege be explicitly ‘deconstructed by collective critical practice’ (1994, 84). She noted that issues of
difference require both theoretical and practical interventions and that a democratic approach is not enough when representation is limited. hooks placed
responsibility on the teacher to raise non-present voices as a way to interrogate
otherness. She noted that, ‘when unexpected perspectives are heard, this
subverts the tendency to focus only on the thoughts, attitudes and experiences
of the privileged’ (185). In addition, it is in discovering their lack of knowledge
that privileged or unquestioning students are taken aback. hooks claimed that
‘the moment of not understanding, [the moment] of difference … [is] a space
to learn … when boundaries are crossed, differences are confronted, discussion
happens, [and] solidarity for the learning process emerges’ (130, 172).
If these boundaries are not exposed, Freire theorised that ‘the dominant
culture, associated with economic and political power, tends to impose its
superiority on other cultural expressions [by trying to] make everyone believe
that its ideas are the ideas of the nation’ (Freire and Faundez 1989, 74). In so
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far as ideology has a theological component, Freire’s analysis may explain
why Australians believe that ‘our’ values are ‘Christian’ values and the broad
acceptance of the idea that Australia is a Christian nation (Ahmed 2006).
hooks also noted that representatives of the dominant culture may ‘essentialise and misrepresent the perspective of the other in a monolithic, exclusionary and perhaps even naively mischievous way’ (1994, 90). She highlighted
these concerns when courses on black history and literature in the USA were
being taught solely by white people, ‘not because … they cannot know these
realities but … they know them differently’ (90). She noted that ‘white people
have yet to get a critical handle on the meaning of whiteness and [can be] …
ignorantly complicit’ (104). Similar concerns may be raised when interfaith
education develops from within the dominant tradition. As purveyors of the
dominant theology in Australia, Christians may not be best placed to identify
a Christian agenda.
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A note on scope and method
This paper is not a detailed critique of Freire’s work. Others, notably Taylor
(1993), Gibson (1999), Schugurensky (1998) and the exchanges between
Facundo (1984) and Mackie (1988) address such charges against Freire as:
simplistic dualism, elitist Marxism, sexism and eclectic plagiarism. In an
attempt to apply his pedagogy, Ellsworth (1989) struggled with the limitations
of the classroom. She argued that it is both necessary but impractical to extend
dialogue beyond the school and impossible for teachers to transcend their roleauthority and personal histories. She claimed Freire’s assumed interactions
between rational, autonomous individuals created an ‘illusion of equality’
(306). She did agree, however, that ‘the voice of the pedagogue [cannot go]
unexamined’ (312) and that knowledge is always only partial.
Freire’s posture of questioning has its own ideological basis which may
unfairly pressure conservative or strongly religious students. This difficult
element of Freire’s terrain requires navigation by teachers in their class
settings. Indeed Freire’s theory might be differently applied in most instances,
making teacher resources more significant as starting points in standard curricula. Freire emphasised the importance of language and literacy. The emphasis
in this paper is also textual. It examines two Australian interfaith education
texts. Teaching professionals, in reflexive interactions, may be able to use
these texts to positive effect. However, this assumes they are capable of identifying bias and interrogating the texts critically.
The Charles Sturt University’s (CSU) Graduate Certificate in Religious
and Values Education introductory unit, Teaching Philosophy of Religion,
was chosen because the course is the only pedagogically focused studies of
religion course offered by a public university in Australia. Engebretson’s In
your shoes – Interfaith education for Australian schools and universities
(2009b) was chosen because it was highly publicised on Australian national
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radio (Engebretson 2008a), launched by the Centre for Studies in Religion and
Theology at Monash University (a public university), endorsed by a prominent
Catholic interfaith scholar (Hall 2008) and carried the acknowledgement to
and implied endorsement of leading religion education scholars in England
and Australia. It has sold into Australian and New Zealand schools and is used
by the Australian Catholic University as a training resource.
This is not a detailed review of interfaith education in Australia. Other texts
(though limited in number) may provide a different picture. However, my findings echo some from the recent and far more comprehensive survey of Materials used to teach about world religions in schools in England (Jackson et al.
2010) and suggest there is a need for a similar resource review in Australia.
Can interfaith education develop from within the dominant tradition?
A hint of olde theology school baggage can be found in the current CSU
teacher training course in Religious and Values Education. The university
website (Charles Sturt University 2009) claims the course offers grounding in
‘philosophical, ethical, and multi-faith disciplines [in] world religions’
[plural]. The first unit of the course, Teaching Philosophy of Religion
[singular], draws content from a distinctly Western, rationalist and Christian
heritage. The unit Study Guide noted that ‘it is inevitable and desirable that
discussion of questions about God and God’s action [which presupposes his
existence] will draw on biblical insight’. There is limited exploration of nonbiblical and non-theist philosophies. Students are referred to the Old and New
Testaments in study exercises. However, there is not a single reference to the
scriptures of any other tradition and no Buddhist, Hindu or Taoist philosophy
readings. The course provides a very Western view of philosophy itself.
The unit presents both theist and atheist viewpoints, though one reading
describes atheism as ‘parasitic’ (Hall 2003a, 15) and claims that the entire
Eastern religious tradition is pantheist, which it describes as having ‘gotten rid
of the transcendent’ and ‘exemplified in what we call hinduism’ [lower case
in original]. Byrne (2007) examined a variety of Hindu theologies, including
a transcendent monotheism and a panentheism which combines immanence
and transcendence. The CSU course rarely steps outside of its Christian genesis and does not reflect on its limitations. Its monolithic misrepresentation and
dismissal of Hinduism is an example of what Freire and hooks voiced warning
about – where educators (perhaps unconsciously) act as accomplices to
socially structured prejudice.
The CSU course Study Guide recommends the texts of Kirkwood (Hall
2003b, 1–3) who argued that ‘since God is the foundation on which all values
are built, … morality (without God) is entirely negative’ (Hall 2003a, 6, citing
Kirkwood 2002). Ethical Humanists and Buddhists may find this analysis
lacking. Through the course, Eastern religious perspectives are filtered by
Christian voices. For example, to explore Buddhist ideas about identity, the
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Study Guide recommends reading Kirkwood (Hall 2003b, 71). The very
Eastern concept of reincarnation, central to the course theme of identity, is not
explored in arguments for and against – as Christian concepts had been.
Instead, the chosen reading all but dismisses the doctrine – because ‘no one
has offered a sound argument to prove that we have a soul’ (Hall 2003a, 212)
and there remain questions as to ‘what happens to the soul between incarnations?’ (216). Hall claimed these problems indicate the possibility that ‘reincarnation is a myth’ and argued that the ‘burden of proof … as to why we
should believe this doctrine’ is yet to be met (216). Perhaps spin can be
forgiven, but critical analysis is lacking.
A similarly Christian focus can be found in Dialogue Australasia Network
(DAN), Australia’s only curriculum support and in-service training organisation for public and private school teachers. This organisation aims to develop
‘Values, Philosophy & Religious Studies with intellectual rigour’ (Dialogue
Australasia 2009). It supports a ‘five strands’ model for multi-faith religion
education. The first strand is dedicated to Bible study. There is no strand dedicated to any other scripture. The organisation is yet to establish a focus for
Eastern traditions in conferences or curriculum materials. One DANpromoted seminar on the model was spent reading children’s Bible stories.
There was no exploration of their legitimacy amidst other revered texts. The
only mention of Eastern religions was tokenistic and on Christian terms; ‘the
Buddha, like Jesus, spoke of kindness and compassion’ and a picture of an
Asian monk was shown with the encouragement to ‘show children what a
Buddhist looks like’, in the context that ‘other traditions practice silence and
prayer too’ (Wills 2008). Such Christian-centrism risks engendering an
attitude of superiority.
What does ‘education’ mean for interfaith?
The challenge of critical pedagogy for interfaith education can also be found
in Engebretson’s book: In your shoes – Interfaith education for Australian
schools and universities (2009b). Echoing Freire, Engebretson (2006, 2008b,
2009b) has argued for an open, critical, constructivist model for interfaith
education. She noted that ‘critique can take place in an informed way … that
doesn’t discriminate’ (2009a).
In your shoes appears to maintain this liberal stance, stating that learning
about the other is the ‘first task’ of interfaith activity on educational, sociological and theological grounds. Engebretson encourages constructive empathy –
trying to see the world through the eyes of the other and noted that such effort
should not ‘mock’ or ‘judge’, but rather ‘seek understanding and build relationships’ (70), and that ‘good interfaith education … weigh(s) up a diversity
of views’ (63).
However, Engebretson’s intent for a ‘just classroom … and just nation’, in
which educators encourage ‘getting to know and working with [the other] for
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the common good’ (11), is undermined by an uncharacteristic closing of doors
to some beliefs. Engebretson claims that ‘the natural outcome of relativism is
agnosticism’. She equates this with atheism and brands these perspectives as
‘lazy’ (40). This equivalising dismissal needs unpacking.
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Engebretson’s approach – is it critical, is it interfaith and is it education?
Russell (1953) described an agnostic as one who ‘suspends judgement …
(and) think(s) out questions of conduct for himself’. While the atheist does not
believe in God, the agnostic does not know God and therefore does not take a
positive or negative position. As such, an agnostic need not, as Engebretson
claims, have the view that ‘God, gods, the afterlife and other belief propositions cannot be known’ (2009b, 40). There is significant difference between ‘I
don’t know’ and ‘nobody can ever know’. Similarly there is room to move
from a position of ‘I don’t know yet’.
Saul defended the agnostic position as part of a ‘virtuous … examined life’
(1995, 195). Freire, a Catholic sometimes criticised for being too Christian
(Taylor 1993), endorsed methodological agnosticism as a posture of openness
and maximum potential for learning. Freire claimed that understanding comes
through a process of ‘epistemological encircling’ (1997, 92) – a continual
rebuilding of perspectives, requestioning of assumptions and reinvention of
knowledge. He claimed that doubt led to an acceptance of the ‘unfinishedness’
of human knowledge (1998, 120) and saw this as the positive ‘force of education’ (1974, 137).
For Freire, respect for the process of education lay in thinking critically. He
claimed that such thinking ‘recognises not only the possibility of making a new
choice … but also the right to do so’ (1998, 39). This right, to explore without
judgement or limitation, was the foundation for Freire’s Pedagogy of freedom
(1998). hooks also highlighted ‘the need for critical thinkers to … address
diverse standpoints, to … gather knowledge fully and inclusively’ (1994, 91).
She noted that the root meaning of ‘respect’ is ‘to look again’, to re-inspect.
Supporting Freire’s thesis that teacher attitudes determine how ideas are
presented, Hobson and Edwards (1999, 171) argued that the most essential
attitude for a teacher of religion would be ‘one of openness to new perspectives and … a desire to … share one’s doubts’.
In contrast, Engebretson writes that relativists and, by her own inference,
agnostics and atheists are simply ‘reluctant’ and ‘lazy’ (2009b, 40). In a review
of teacher education programmes, Ensign (2009) noted that blaming lack of
engagement on a student’s ‘laziness’ is a common response of educators who
take a simplistic view of diversity. Ensign argued that this tactic indicates a
lack of awareness of social justice. Kung (2007), from whom Engebretson
draws inspiration, raised the issue of laziness when discussing the need for a
global ethic in interfaith education. However, he assigned blame to a lack of
institutional courage rather than to the world view of individual students.
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Engebretson’s justification for the laziness label is the claim that ‘relativism,
agnosticism, atheism and indifference removes the need to deconstruct, critique
and evaluate’ (2009b, 40). I would suggest that relativism’s emphasis on
complex socio-political constructs requires much analysis. These perspectives
are as capable of exploring religious claims as any theist viewpoint and can be
equally philosophically engaging – especially since they are unclouded with a
historically privileged sense of rightness (Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2007).
O’Grady (2005) highlighted Smart’s (1968) principle that generous understanding must precede scrutiny and assessment. Such understanding requires
effort and rules out indifference. Engebretson does not explain how exploration of religion from outside the dominant tradition promotes bad interfaith
education. Nor does she provide evidence for her claim that atheism is a
Western, minority phenomenon. Theravadan Buddhism, Confucianism and
Taoism are non-theist Eastern traditions (Harvey 1990). In addition, Mason,
Singleton, and Weber’s survey of young Australians showed that 17% did not
believe in God and 32% were unsure. Almost half ‘do not belong to or identify
with any religion’ (2007, chap. 12).
Freire warned teachers of the risk of sending students a message ‘that there
is something deeply wrong with them that needs fixing’ (1998, 68). In an
Engebretson-style class, an atheist or agnostic child might (to please the teacher
or pass the exam) dishonestly assimilate. By Freirean standards, this is replicating domination which ‘neutralises the capacity for knowledge, skirts the
problems … and encourages naivete’ (Freire and Faundez 1989, 139). Freire
argued that ‘the teacher who truncates the full spectrum of a curriculum …
hampers both the freedom and the capacity for adventure of the student’ (1998,
57). If a student’s interest is piqued by the idea of ‘no God’, then that is their
point of engagement to learning. Engebretson’s apparent bias against the
uncommitted position removes the Freirean opportunity to continue to learn.
In addition, Engebretson presents only the negative view of the contested
term relativism (Baghramian 2004). It might be argued that interfaith respect
requires some degree of relativism in which, according to Baghramian, ‘judgements are context dependent’ (4). A religious person who sincerely respects
the differently religious (in other traditions and outside tradition altogether),
must be relativist to a degree, and yet, is not at all agnostic. Engebretson does
not explore the conundrum she presents. As such, her denouncement of several
world views (in the context of critical education) is confusing.
Why is pluralism not the best approach?
Engebretson described the basic philosophical stances people can have
towards religion and judged them as inhibiting or enhancing ‘good interfaith
education’ (2009b, 37). Engebretson presents Hick’s (1989) pluralism as a
stance in which all religious paths have the same purpose … (and) lead to the
same destination (42–3). Engebretson claims this approach denies ultimate
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differences and requires that students ‘forsake their convictions (about the)
superior Revelation of their own religion’ (44). On this basis, she dismisses the
pluralist approach as inadequate for religious schools. Skeie (2006) and Eck
(2001) point out that pluralism honours the plural, the many, the different. It
does not deny difference nor define religions as functionally similar. It is
possible that good interfaith education can operate on the pluralist premise that
diversity is beneficial, that there are different world views that we can learn
about and critically assess. A pluralist approach need not relativise or trivialise
an individual’s commitment to their own faith, it simply removes the need for
the hegemonic ‘best’ path to God.
Over pluralism, Engebretson prefers ‘hierarchical inclusivism’ (Cush and
Francis 2001, 53) and adopts Rahner’s (1975) position of anonymous
Christianity (the idea that we are all Christians but may not know it). She noted
that ‘for people who have been brought up in various religious traditions, the
redemptive grace of Christ, in some mysterious way, comes through those
traditions’ (2008a). Her demand for immersion in the home tradition and
learning about other religions as secondary (61) runs counter to critical pedagogy. For Freire, identifying too strongly with a particular stance limits the
possibility for new knowledge to emerge. The idea that interfaith education
must start with single-faith education is problematic, especially when the
student’s tradition differs from the school’s. This highlights Freire’s concern
of unethical imposition from the privileged place of dominance.
Cush and Francis (2001) raised the importance of applying positive pluralism to religious education as part of the quest for justice in a diverse society.
O’Grady (2008) concurred by noting that Freire’s philosophy reversed the
customary practice of having pupils first learn officially sanctioned knowledge.
He argued that Freire’s pedagogy was ‘counter-cultural’, that by resisting the
dominant ideology it ‘invited young people to investigate the self, freely and
intuitively’ (364).
Skeie (2002) reinforced Freire’s theory that ideology determines pedagogy
by arguing that opposition to pluralism may be hegemonic. He said that ‘we
are always … marked by our attitudes towards plurality … (particularly when)
we feel that the only way out is to choose one truth against the others’ (48–9).
Freire on pluralism
Freire, like Merton (1997) and Dewey (1956), valued diversity as an educative
tool. For him, the critical educator’s posture was in ‘knowing that I am learning to be who I am by relating to what is my opposite’ (Freire 1998, 119).
Provision of such radical perspective is difficult from within institutions used
to operating in authoritarian, hegemonic ways. Freire noted that ‘the authoritarian … imposes unity … by eliminating diversity rather than by discovering
the Other as an enriching element’ (Freire and Faundez 1989, 72). He defined
the authoritarian teacher as one who, by avoiding otherness, ‘suffocates the
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natural curiosity and freedom of the student’ (1998, 59) and noted that a
teacher ‘cannot help students to overcome their ignorance if (they) are not
engaged permanently in trying to overcome (their) own’ (89). He argued that
teachers who deliver learning within a multicultural space (such as Australian
interfaith education) and who proclaim openness (as Engebretson does) ‘must
exclude reactionary, authoritarian, elitist attitudes … (and) under no circumstances … discriminate’ (90).
Freire’s challenge as a contribution
Freire’s distinct contribution to religion education was his insistence that exploration of the unknown should not be simply an outward looking exercise, but
one which equally demanded self-reflection and the challenging of authority.
This is a difficult issue. Freire offered a positive perspective on this dilemma
with the idea that exploration of otherness is part of the journey to knowing self.
He saw opportunity in stepping outside of the known without fear of ‘losing
faith’ but with the hope of building something stronger. Such a spirit of adventure demands the courage and freedom to challenge the ‘one true God’ doctrine.
Moulin (2009) identified this doctrine as a distinct problem and paradox in
religion education. As a solution, he also focused on freedom. Moulin (2009,
157) proposed adapting a Rawlsian social contract model in which the ‘free,
equal, reasonable and rational’ citizenry (Rawls 2001, 7) nominate an
approach in which no particular theology could dominate. Moulin argued that
‘a pedagogy which is based upon only one method will … exclude other
approaches, thus limiting students’ experience’ (153). In the spirit of Freire,
Moulin argued that ‘the individual has the right to liberty of belief (which)
assumes access to different points of view’ (154).
For Freire, the idea of religious superiority works against critical education.
In his words:
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If … my thinking is the only correct (way) … I cannot listen to anyone who thinks
or elaborates ideas differently … If I view their ideas as … somehow inferior to
my own … then I cannot speak with them, only to or at them. I forbid myself
from understanding them. In which case I remove the possibility of seeing myself
from their viewpoint and of learning more about myself. (1998, 107–8)
Freire pointed out that ‘true listening (to difference) does not diminish the
right to disagree, to oppose, to take a position, but it does demand being open
to the ideas, words and gestures of the other’ (1998, 107).
In the context of interfaith education, this other cannot be limited to the
similar. The Christian’s other must include the internally diverse perspectives
of atheist Humanists, non-theist Buddhists, all variety of polytheist, monist and
panentheist Hindu, idolising animists, syncretising spiritualists, indifferent
Laodicians and ever-undecided agnostics. This requires a radically expanded
recognition of otherness and a large dose of humility to alert us to the risks of
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overvaluing our identity. Lack of humility, expressed as a false superiority,
was, for Freire, a transgression of our human vocation to learn.
Such inclusivism is difficult, especially when relying on limited input to
produce teaching resources. The culturally myopic approach is not limited to
majority Christian nations. For example, a recent Indian publication (Vaswani
2010) which aims to be a ‘companion (to the) friendly study of world religions’ favours Hinduism. The Hinduism chapter is twice the size of any other
and written in effusively romantic language: ‘India built a civilisation of light
… in this glorious land’ (82). The chapter argues that Hinduism is ‘the Eternal
Religion … rightly considered the mother of all religions’ (70–3). It notes that
while ‘other religions have their protectors and propagandists, Hinduism is
scientific in its approach’ (74) and that all other ancient religions have been
‘wiped away without a trace’ (79). It also claims that the ‘central doctrine of
Judaism (is) the promise of land’ (135), that all Christians have an obligation
to proselytise and convert (67) and that ‘no religion has ever been persecuted
here (in India)’ which is not entirely true. This example shows how, regardless
of what the majority tradition is, developing critical interfaith materials may
benefit from an outsider’s perspective.
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Conclusions
For Freire, the only authentic aim of education was to liberate. As such, he
claimed that educators have no right to prescribe, limit or impose particular
belief options for others. He equated such prescription with manipulation and
domination.
If, as Puett claims, the ultimate task of interfaith educators is ‘cultivating
and sustaining social cohesion and a culture of peace’ (2005, 265), then
respect can only be realised when it is sincerely and fully extended. A Freirean
commitment to open, critical learning would encourage interfaith educators to
examine the entire spectrum of beliefs and include authentic voices of the
other rather than the dominant culture’s representations.
Some Australian initiatives show how both interfaith and educative aims
can be undermined without critical analysis. Resources and training
programmes which aim to be interfaith should perhaps also be interfaithauthored and reviewed. This may at least move depictions of otherness beyond
caricature. In honour of Freire’s love of questioning, the aims of a just classroom and a just nation may be well served by asking: What is ‘interfaith’?
What is ‘education’?
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Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges the patient guidance and encouragement of Associate
Professor Marion Maddox, Director of Macquarie University’s Centre for Research
on Social Inclusion. This article is based on a paper presented to the Australian
44
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C. Byrne
Association for the Study of Religions Conference on the theme of Religion and
Difference, Melbourne, December 2009.
5
Notes on contributor
Cathy Byrne is a PhD scholar at Macquarie University, researching the implications
of single-faith religion classes in Australian public primary schools. Cathy is also
undertaking a Graduate Diploma of Education and Graduate Certificate in Religion
Education.
10
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Freirean critical pedagogy’s challenge to interfaith education:

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