New Balkans and Europe – Peace Development Integration

Transcription

New Balkans and Europe – Peace, Development, Integration
Proceedings of The Tenth ECPD International Conference
New Balkans and Europe
– Peace, Development,
Integration
Reconciliation,
Tolerance and
Human Security
in the Balkans
Proceedings of
The Tenth ECPD
International Conference
New Balkans and
Europe – Peace
Development
Integration
New Balkans and Europe
– Peace, Development,
Integration
Reconciliation,
Tolerance and
Human Security
in the Balkans
Proceedings of
The Tenth ECPD
Proceedings of The Tenth ECPD
International Conference on
Reconciliation, Tolerance and
Human Security in the Balkans
Editors:
Negoslav P. Ostojić / Jonathan Bradley / Akio Kawato
Editors:
Negoslav P. Ostojić
Jonathan Bradley
Akio Kawato
Editors:
Negoslav P. Ostojić
Jonathan Bradley
Akio Kawato
EUROPEAN CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
ISBN 978-86-7236-092-9
UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE EST. BY THE UNITED NATIONS
New Balkans and
Europe – Peace
Development
Integration
Reconciliation, Tolerance and
Human Security in the Balkans
Proceedings of the Tenth ECPD
Belgrade, October 24–25, 2014
Editors:
EUROPEAN CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE EST. BY THE UNITED NATIONS
Published by:
European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD)
University for Peace established by the United Nations
Terazije 41, 11000 Beograd; phone: (+381 11) 3246-041
fax: 3240-673 • e-mail: [email protected] • www.ecpdorg.net
For the Publisher: Negoslav P. Ostojić, ECPD Executive Director
Editorial Board:
Ljubiša Adamović / Jonathan Bradley / Arthur Dahl /
Jeffrey Lewett / Akio Kawato / Tauno Kekäle /
Budimir Lazović / Todor Mirković / Negoslav P. Ostojić /
Nataša Ostojić Ilić / Darko Tanasković / Don Wallace /
Branislav Šoškić / Boris Shmelev / Pasquale Baldocci
Editors:
Design:
Nataša Ostojić-Ilić
Copy editing:
Vera Gligorijević
Circulation:
1 000 in English
ISBN 978-86-7236-092-9
Printed by:
Belgrade, 2015.
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INTERNATIONAL Conference Reconciliation, Tolerance and Human Security
and Human Security in the Balkans (10 ; 2014 ; Beograd) New Balkans and Europe :
peace development Integration : Proceedings of the Tenth ECPD International Conference Reconciliation, Tolerance and Human Security in the Balkans, Belgrade, October
24-25, 2014 / Editors: Negoslav P. Ostojić, Jonathan Bradley, Akio Kawato. - Belgrade :
European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD) of the University for Peace est.
by the United Nations, 2015 (Belgrade : Graficom Uno). – XIX, 310 str. : graf. prikazi,
tabele ; 25 cm
"The Tenth ECPD International Conference on 'National and Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation, Inter-Religious Tolerance and Human Security in the Balkans'" --> Introduction.
– Tiraž 1.000. – Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. – Bibliografija uz pojedine
radove.
ISBN 978-86-7236-092-9
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Introduction
Reconciliation, Tolerance and Human Security in the
Balkans – New Balkans and Europe – Peace, Development,
Integration
Proceedings of the Tenth ECPD International Conference
Belgrade, October 24–25, 2014
The Tenth ECPD International Conference on “National/Inter-Ethnic
Reconciliation, Inter-Religious Tolerance and Human Security in the Balkans”, focusing on the topic “New Balkans and European Union – Peace,
Development, Integration” (hereinafter: the Tenth Conference) was held
in Belgrade, October 24‒25, 2014 and represented a continuation of the
implementation of the ECPD international research and educational project under the same name, initiated in 2005 and realized through the organization of annual conferences and the work of the ECPD International
Permanent Study Group (IPSG).
Since this was a jubilee conference, the participants took the opportunity to closely deliberate on the past, current and future ECPD activities
related to the reconciliation, tolerance and human security in the Balkans.
The Conference was attended by over 200 participants – prominent
scientists, politicians, diplomats and high-ranking officials of international, regional and national institutions from Europe, USA, Canada, Japan,
China, Australia and other countries worldwide. It should be noted that
among participants there were, inter alia, high former and current government officials (seven at ministerial level and several former heads of
state), representatives of national academies of sciences and arts (eight
members and one president), professors from numerous prestigious European, American and Asian universities, directors and members of several
research institutes and centers, chiefs and/or representatives of diplomatic
missions in Serbia – the ECPD host country and neighbouring states (five
chiefs of missions and twelve chargé d'affaires, counsellors and secretaries), as well as representatives of major religious communities across the
region, about 50 observers and mass-media representatives. Many journalists, from almost all major news agencies from the region followed and
widely reported on the work of the Conference.
The Tenth Conference was chaired by distinguished diplomat, H.E.
Akio Kawato, President of the ECPD Council and H.E. Erhard Busek,
Introduction
iii
Former Austrian Deputy Chancellor. The President of the ECPD Honorary Council, H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Former UN Secretary-General
sent a Special Message to the Conference, while H.E. Federico Mayor,
long-standing Director-General of UNESCO addressed the participants
through a video link. H.E. Erhard Busek, as a keynote speaker, focused
on “Peace in the Balkans and Everywere”, while professors Wolfgang Wolte
and Darko Tanasković referred to the past, current and future ECPD activities.
Most of the presented papers and speeches are included in the Proceedings of the Conference and arranged in the following thematic order:
–– Opening Remarks, Messages and Keynote Speeches;
–– Globalization: New Processes and their Macro and Micro Implications;
–– Post-Global crisis, European Union and its Surroundings;
–– New Balkans on the Way to Stable Peace and Sustainable Development;
–– Closing Remarks.
Presented Messages, Papers, Speeches
1. Opening Remarks, Messages, Keynote Speeches
Ambassador Akio Kawato in his Opening Remarks introduced himself in
his capacity as Chairman of the Conference and President of the ECPD
Council, referring briefly to the various ECPD activities devoted to the
promotion of peace and stability through reconciliation, tolerance and
human security in the Balkans. At the same time, Ambassador Kawato
emphasised that in spite of the notable results, there “still a lot remains
to be done” in many fields of operation. H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali in
his Message congratulated the ECPD on its excellent and valuable work
on the promotion of peace and development in Europe, especially in its
south-east region.
H.E. Erhard Busek, as a keynote speaker, presented his views on
peace in the Balkans and asserted that the economy is very important, but
the international environment is even more important, pointing out to
some major developments of regional and global impact. H.E. Wolgang
Wolte in his Statement affirmed that the European Union is going through
a period of stormy weather. That might be a reason for the apparently
slow accession of the Western Balkan countries into the Union. He is of
the opinion that the European Union should be more flexible and sofiv
ten its enlargement policy, but “the first addresses are candidate countries
themselves”.
Prof. Dr. Darko Tanasković in his speech referred to the unfavorable
world situation in which the Tenth ECPD International Conference was
taking place. He noted that the promotion of reconciliation and tolerance
contributed to short-term cessation of violence, but many long-term scars
of conflict remained. Therefore, the Tenth Conference should tackle these
and other problems of actual regional, European and global dimensions.
H.E. Federico Mayor attached special attention to the importance of education for culture of peace. For more information, see link:
https://drive.googl.com/file/d/0BOKwAhAKfyPNjJFUUpXN1E3bWc/
view?usp=sharing
2. Globalization: New Processes and their Macro
and Micro Implications
The Conference was held at a time of immense changes and turbulences
all over the world while global financial and economic crisis continued to
hamper social and economic development in most countries. All this has
led to the beginnings of a new Cold War which represents, together with
the armed conflicts and terrorist actions and operations almost all around
the globe, a serious threat to regional and international peace and security, as emphasized by numerous participants in their discussions.
Academician Oleg Bogomolov, a distinguished Russian economist,
in his report on “Cardinal Shifts in Human Civilization” asserted that contemporary mankind is on the treshhold of profound changes. According
to his view, unprecedented scientific and technological progress brings
about significant shifts in social structure, while the most recent events
in Ukraine could have dramatic consequences for peace and economic
cooperation in Europe. Their outcome is hardly foreseeable, but they do
influence Russia, Balkan countries and their relations with the Russian
Federation. Speaking of the importance of economic diplomacy, Prof. Dr.
Jožef Kunič referred to the reverse tendency in globalization, a tendency
of de-globalization bringing many uncertainties. In his opinion, the world
is now in the middle of a Cold War and deep economic crisis. In such
circumstances, economic diplomacy on the global scale as well as development of the Balkan countries is of utmost importance.
Prof. Dr. Pavle Bubanja, in his paper, expressed his view that the
UN Charter can hardly endure the test of modern times. Within the last
seventy years revolutionary changes in geo-politics, technology, economy
and other spheres of human life occurred, resulting in a decline in moral
Introduction
v
standards and social values. Contemporary mankind is faced with direct
and indirect threats to its very existence, asserted Prof. Bubanja, who believes that it is high time for a new approach to peace and prosperity.
Prof. Dr. Nano Ružin, deliberating on Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, emphasised that his theory deals with the clash among macro
civilizations, while in the Balkans there have been clashes among micro
civilizations. After the 1990s armed conflicts and the establishment of new
nation-states, the threat of new clashes has not disappeared; this arises
from new iconographies and the effects of national pride.
In his paper, “1914‒2014: From the Clash of Imperialisms to the Soft
Power of the European Union”, Prof. Dr. Pasquale Baldocci referred briefly
to the causes and aims of the imperialistic Great War and considered new
potential processes of European integration, calling for further economic
and political integration. Speaking about the “Winds of War in Europe”,
Ms. Lisa Romero pointed to the threats to peace, stressing that “In Terra
Pax” has been preached by all religions and most politicians, but peace
is nowhere. She referred to the situation in and around Ukraine with the
“Crimea case” in particular and demanded that the fighting should end
immediately; otherwise the peaceful future of Europe will inevitably be
jeopardized.
Presenting her view on the position and roles of women in Islam,
Dr. Nora Repo reminded that five percent of the European population is
Muslim, especially in the Balkans where Islam as a tradition has a longstanding history. She thinks that the process of feminism is breaking into
the Muslim world and believes that in the coming years we will witness a
major change in promoting gender equality.
3. Post-Global Crisis: European Union and its Surroundings
The European Union continues to struggle with the consequences of the
global crisis, lagging in development and weighed down by the deep indebtedness of some of its member states, as well as the appearance of disorder in its surroundings, all of which are the factors that imperil the stability of the Union. Most of the Conference participants tackled these and
other issues facing the European Union and the Balkans.
Prof. Dr. Silvo Devetak in his paper stressed that the European Union’s neighbourhood (the Balkans, the Mediterranean area, the Middle
East, Ukraine, and the Caucasus) in recent years has been transformed
into an area of disorder with an unpredictable future. He thinks that the
European Union should conceptualize its common, autonomous, foreign
policy based on the interests of all its member states, as well as current
vi
and potential candidates, building thus a common space for stable peace
and sustainable development. In his paper, Prof. Dr. Jovan Manasijevski
analysed the influence of the external (European Union neighbourhood)
crisis upon the European Union, as a regional and global actor, noting,
however, that the European Union has to confirm itself as a key regional
security factor; otherwise it would not be seen as a strategic actor.
According to the opinion of Prof. Dr. Roberto Belloni, euroscepticism in the West Balkan countries is increasing. Reflecting on public
opinion surveys conducted in those countries, he stressed that the mid
and long-term consequences of such shifts in public opinion could hardly
be compatible with the aspirations of candidtate candidate countries for
EU accession. Speaking about the values of the European Union, H.E.
Prof. Reinhard Priebe referred to Winston Churchill's 1946 speech on
the “common inheritance Europe should share, once united” and cited
twentynine values built into the policy and practice of the Union. At the
end, Prof. Priebe mentioned that it is not only a question of values. Enforcing them efficiently is very much a question of credibility of the Union
towards its citizens, its member states, its candidates and neighbours, and
the world as a whole.
Prof. Dr. Boris Shmelev referred in particular to the Russian – European Union relations and closely elaborated three phases or periods of
the relations between the two sides; the first, the process of advancement
(1994‒1999); the second, a period of stagnation (2000‒2013) with ups
and downs, and the third, entry into a new cold war (Ukraine crisis). In
conclusion, Prof. Shmelev emphasised that the relations with the European Union would remain a top foreign policy priority for Russia. Talking
about good practices in cultural cooperation between the European Union
and the Balkan countries, Prof. Dr. Melita Richter, illustrated that practice
through two examples: the first is related to the EU IPA multi-beneficiary
program in the field of culture, specifically concerning Women's Heritage,
and the second one granting the Italian prestigious cultural award – the
International Carlo Scapia Prize, to two Bosnian villages.
According to Dr. Nikola Gjorgon, 2014 marked the centennial of the
First World War, which proved to be a mere prelude to the second one.
The two World Wars and new Cold War on the horizon should serve as
a catalyst for a new European paradigm: peace and development through
integration. In her paper, Dr. Myrianne Coen analysed the changes in
the geo-political order. The simultaneous emergence of more and more
non-state actors: politico-religious extremist movements, violent criminal organizations, drug traffickers, dealers in weapons and human beings
Introduction
vii
and the like, might jeopardize international peace and stability. Dr. Aleksandar Protic highlighted several points which attracted the increasing
interest of UNESCO in the New Balkans. He elaborated those points, including the policy of gender equality and preservation of Serbian Medieval Monuments in Kosovo, stressing the fact that the ECPD’s activities on
reconciliation and tolerance have also been noticed in UNESCO.
4. New Balkans on the Way to Stable Peace and
Sustainable Development
Deliberations on the New Balkans, its actual and/or future development,
were simply unavoidable. Most of the participants presented their papers,
tackled or discussed various aspects relevant to the Balkan countries and
their peoples. Integration of all Balkan countries in regional, European
and wider international associations was particularly emphasised.
Academician Vlado Kambovski suggested that the economic and
cultural cooperation of the Balkan countries is a precondition for stable
peace and sustainable development and pointed to the means leading to
the achievement of that goal. Academician Paskal Milo expressed in his
paper an optimistic view on the perspective of cooperation among Western Balkan countries and peoples. Political cooperation, according to his
opinion, comes first. However, without complete and sustainable SerbAlbanian reconciliation it could hardly be achievable. Speaking about balanced and evenly developed Balkans as a peace project, Prof. Dr. Dmitar
Mirčev referred to the disputes among Balkan countries and peoples –
disputes which still have not been overcome. Starting from such estimation, Prof. Mirčev stated that “there is no guarantee that conflicts in the
region, even within individual states, will not appear again”. He cited elements for a strategy leading to peace and development.
Prof. Dr. Nobuhiro Shiba in his paper stated that writing and teaching common, regional – instead of national or state, history is necessary
for effective national reconciliation and tolerance in the Balkans. He also
pointed at the efforts which are being made in writing and teaching regional history of the East Asian states. According to Prof. Dr. Nikola Popovski, recovery of the economies of Balkan countries is slow and relatively
inefficient. He further analyzed the status of the economies of the Balkan
countries and concluded that the future of their development depends on
the knowledge-based economy. Prof. Dr. Zahari Zahariev considers the
Balkans as a European trouble spot, or the “European Apple of Discord”.
He listed six reasons which underpin such an assessment.
viii
Prof. Dr. Miodrag Vuković in his paper “Responsibility for Protection” considers the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional structure of Montenegro and the intentions of some of its neighbouring countries to interfere in its internal affairs through their ethnic groups. Nikifor Milović,
Archimandrite, referring to the disputes between the Serbian Orthodox
Church and official authorities of Montenegro, emphasised that the Serbian Orthodox Church remains open for dialogue carried on in the spirit
of mutual trust and deep mutual appreciation, while Prof. Dr. Vjekoslav
Domljan in his paper focused on the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina
until its full independence, underlying the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina, being a small state, should strive towards and explore all possibilities
for the establishment and promotion of regional cooperation.
Dr. Zoran Petrović-Piroćanac considered the reality of the notion
“New Balkans”. Referring to the richness of regional and Kosovo natural
resources, he stressed that Serbia should not accept a solution that does
not envisage common exploitation of those resources by both Serbian and
Albanian peoples. Prof. Dr. Timi Ećimović made considerable efforts to
define the meaning of globalization and to portray briefly the previous
evolution of Homo sapiens. He further considered various natural and
human phenomena, including the sustainable future of mankind.
Concluding Remarks
Ambassador Akio Kawato, Chairman of the Conference, presenting the
Closing Remarks, summarized the work of the Conference and suggested
numerous activities that should be undertaken by the ECPD, together
with its strategic partners, in the near future.
More details about the above expressed views, suggestions and
recommendations can be found in the papers presented in these Proceedings. However, the views expressed in these papers are solely the
views of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the European
Center for Peace and Development as the organizer of the Conference
and the publisher of the Proceedings.
Editors
Introduction
ix
Contents
INTRODUCTION
iii
xv
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
I. OPENING REMARKS, MESSAGES, KEYNOTE SPEECHES
Akio Kawato
OPENING REMARKS
3
Boutros Boutros-Ghali
GREETINGS MESSAGE TO THE TENTH ECPD
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
5
Erhard Busek
PEACE IN THE BALKANS AND EVERYWHERE
7
Wolfgang Wolte
STATEMENT AT THE 10TH ECPD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON RECONCILIATION AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE BALKANS,
BELGRADE, OCTOBER 24–25, 2014
12
Darko Tanasković
ON THE TASK AND OBJECTIVE OF THE
TENTH ECPD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
15
II. GLOBALIZATION: IMPACT ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Oleg Bogomolov
CARDINAL SHIFTS IN HUMAN CIVILIZATION
AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS: RUSSIA AND NEW BALKANS
19
Jožef Kunič
IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES
22
Pavle Bubanja
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CAN HARDLY ENDURE THE TEST OF TIME
33
Nano Ružin
HUNTINGTON AND CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
AND BALKAN ICONOGRAPHY?
37
Contents
xi
Pasquale Baldocci
1914–2014: FROM THE CLASH OF IMPERIALISMS
TO THE SOFT POWER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
52
Lisa Tassone Romero
WINDS FOR WAR IN EUROPE:
55
RUSSIA AS THE INDEX OF BALANCE POINT
Nora Repo
ISLAM AS A POTENTIAL FORCE OF CHANGE
58
IN QUESTIONS RELATED GENDER ROLES
III. POST-GLOBAL CRISIS: EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS SURROUNDINGS
Silvo Devetak
EUROPE ON THE CROSSROADS: COLD WAR OR CREATION
OF A COMMON SPACE OF PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
69
Jovan Manasijevski
87
EXTERNAL CRISES AND EU STRATEGIC ACTORNESS
Roberto Belloni
104
THE GROWING EUROSCEPTICISM OF THE WESTERN BALKANS
Reinhard Priebe
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S VALUES – THEIR RELEVANCE
FOR MEMBER STATES, CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP
114
AND THE WIDER WORLD
Boris Shmelev
124
RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS
Melita Richter
EAST-WEST RELATIONS – EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICES
IN CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN EU AND THE
134
WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES
Nikola Gjorgon
ENTROPY OF A PARADIGM?
140
Myrianne Coen
HOW FAR IS CRIMINALITY A THREAT TO PEACE,
144
DRIFTING THE WEST OUT OF CONTROL?
Aleksandar Protić
SIGNIFICANT UNESCO FOCUS ON THE NEW BALKANS
IV. N
EW BALKANS ON THE WAY TO STABLE
PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Vlado Kambovski
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION
OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES – PRE-CONDITION
FOR STABLE PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
xii
158
165
Tihomir Domazet
SHIFT EU’s BALKANIZATION – BUILD MODERN
175
BALKAN ECONOMIES
Paskal Milo
PERSPECTIVES OF COOPERATION AMONG
204
WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES
Dimitar Mirčev
THE BALANCED AND EVEN DEVELOPMENT OF
212
THE BALKANS AS A PEACE PROJECT
Nobuhiro Shiba
WRITING REGIONAL HISTORY FOR RECONCILIATION
226
IN THE BALKANS AND EAST ASIA
Nikola Popovski
BALKAN COUNTRIES ON THE TRANSITION TOWARD
230
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY
Zahari Zahariev
THE BALKANS – THE OLD/NEW EUROPEAN APPLE OF DISCORD
Miodrag Vuković
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTION
246
252
Nikifor Milović
OPEN QUESTIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS IN MONTENEGRO
264
Vjekoslav Domljan
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA’S JOINING TO THE EU
270
THROUGH A ROUNDABOUT
Zoran Petrović – Piroćanac
REALITY OF THE NEW BALKANS: SERBIAN POSITIONS
275
Timi Ećimović
THE PEOPLES OF THE BALKANS – PEACE, RESPECT,
REASON, MORALITY, WISDOM AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
285
Boško Bojović
DE CAUSE À EFFET LES GRANDES PUISSANCES,
LES BALKANS ET LE DÉCLENCHEMENT DE LA GRANDE GUERRE
289
V. CLOSING REMARKS
Akio Kawato
CLOSING REMARKS
309
Contents
xiii
List of Participants
Abdulsada, Falah Abdulhasan
Acanfora, Paolo
Adamović, Ljubiša
Ahmadi, Behrooz
Ahmia, Mourad
Al Daheri, Juma Rashed
Al-Jaf, Burhan
Andreevska, Elena
Apostolova, Biljana
Arifi, Bashkim
Arsenijević, Nebojša
Arsenijević, Slobodan
Asiel, Isak
Asp, Christer
Atanasovska, Evdokija
Baldocci, Pasquale
Banoob, Samir
Belloni, Roberto
Benedetti, Ezio
Bogomolov, Oleg
Bojović, Boško
Božović, Ratko
Bradley, Jonathan
Brendel, Sabrine
Bubanja, Pavle
xiv
Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to Serbia
Professor, International University for
Languages and Media, Milan, Italy
Dean, ECPD Postgraduate and Doctoral Studies
First Counsellor, Embassy of the
Islamic Republic of Iran in Serbia
Executive Secretary of the Group 77, New York, USA
Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Serbia
Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to Greece
Dean, PAPS Management,
South East European University, Tetovo, FYR Macedonia
Owner, MIT University
ECPD Research Fellow
Director, Clinical Center of Kragujevac, Serbia
Professor, Rector, University of Kragujevac, Serbia
Rabbi, Jewish Community, Belgrade, Serbia
Ambassador of Sweden to Serbia
Ambassador, Professor of the Faculty of Diplomacy,
Gorizia, Italy
Professor of Health Policy and Management, Florida, USA
Professor, University of Trento, Sociology and
Social Research Department, Italy
Professor, University of Trieste, Italy
Academician, Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow, Russian Federation
University Professor, School of Higher Education
for Social Sciences, Paris, France
Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia
President, ECPD Executive Director, Professor,
University of West England, UK
Second Secretary, Embassy of Germany in Serbia
Professor, University of Niš, Association for Peace,
Culture and Tolerance, Kruševac
Busch, Stephan Truly
Busek, Erhard
Carić, Slavoljub
Chudoska, Irina
Clesse, Armand
Coen, Myrianne
Čukalović, Ivan
Cvetanovski, Nebojša
Cvetković, Danijela
Ćurović, Dragan
Dahl Lyon, Arthur
Dašić, David
Dayoub, Antoine
Delova, Gabrijela
Devetak, Silvo
Dimitrovski, Robert
Dinic, Biljana
Domazet, Tihomir
Domljan, Vjekoslav
Due, Peter N.
Đukić, Srećko,
Ećimović, Timi
Eigner, Johannes
El Samawi, Ahmed
Feeney, Julia
Gasimov, Mahur
Georgieva, Genka Vasileva
Gjorgon, Nikola
Gjuladin Hellon, Teuta
Gošović, Branislav
Grachev, Andrey
Professor, Ansted University,
British Virgin Islands, Malaysia
Former Vice-Chancellor of Austria a.d.,
Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact
for South–Eastern Europe
Ambassador, Head of Legal Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia
Assistant Professor, FON University,
Skoplje, FYR Macedonia
Director, IEIS, Luxembourg
Counsellor of Embassy, Rome, Italy
Professor, Faculty of Law, Kragujevac, Serbia
Managing Director, Intereuropa Skopje Ltd.,
FYR Macedonia
RTV Serbia, Foreign Affairs Department, Belgrade
Former State Secretary, Ministry of Religion, Serbia
Professor, UNEP University of Geneva, Switzerland
Professor, ECPD UP UN
Former Minister of Health of Syria
President, Institute for Ethnic and Regional Studies of
University of Maribor, Slovenia
Professor, FON University, Skopje, FYR Macedonia
Political and Economic Analyst,
Embassy of the United Arab Emirates
Professor, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Ambassador, Professor, University of Sarajevo,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Representative of the Secretary–General,
United Nations Office in Belgrade
Former Ambassador of Serbia to Belarus
Chairman, School of Environmental Sciences,
Ansted University, Malaysia
Ambassador of Austria to Serbia
Counsellor, Embassy of Egypt in Serbia
Ambassador of Australia to Serbia
Second Secretary,
Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Serbia
Deputy Head of Mission,
Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in Serbia
Adviser to the President of FYR Macedonia
ECPD Expert, Geneva, Switzerland
Chairman of the Scientific Committee,
The New Policy Forum, Italy
xv
Guillermo-Ramirez, Martin
Association of European Border Regions, Gronau,
Germany
Hočevar, Stanislav
Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Belgrade
Hrebičkova, Janina
Ambassador, Head of OSCE Mission to Montenegro
Íñigo Ramírez de Haro Valdés Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Spain in Serbia
Issyk, Tatyana
Professor of IAB,
Almaty Management University, Kazakhstan
Jazairy, Idriss
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of Algeria to UN in Geneva
Jeftić, Zoran
Professor, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, Serbia
Jerotić, Vladeta
Academician, Professor, Faculty of Theology, Belgrade
Jevtić, Miodrag
Lieutenant General, Rector,
University of Defence in Belgrade, Serbia
Jovanović, Tomislav
Professor, Medical School, University of Belgrade,
Former Minister of Education, Science and
Technological Development, Serbia
Jovanovski, Vera
Ambassador of FYR Macedonia to Serbia
Jurukova, Eli
ECPD Adviser for European Integration and Media
Jusufspahić, Muhamed
Mufti, Islamic Community of Serbia
Kaftandjiev, Christo
Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences,
Sofia University, Bulgaria
Kambovski, Vladimir
President, Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts,
Skopje
Kanjuh, Vladimir
Academician, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Kariš, Andrej
Intereuropa, Global Logistic Service Ltd., FYR Macedonia
Kawato, Akio
President of the ECPD Council
Keita, Almamy Kobele
Chargé d’Affaires,
Embassy of the Republic of Guinea in Serbia
Kekäle, Tauno
Rector, VAMK University, Finland
Kekenovski, Ljubomir
Professor, St. Cyril and Methodius University,
Faculty of Economics, FYR Macedonia
Kirilov, Kamen
State University of Sofia ‘Kliment Ohridski’, Bulgaria
Konjovod, Martin
Secretary, Embassy of Croatia in Serbia
Kornilov, Aleksandar
Nizhny Novgorod National Research University, Russia
Kostovska, Teodora
Coordinator for Humanitarian Projects, FYR Macedonia
Kožuharov, Sašo
Dean, University of Tourism and Management in Skopje,
FYR Macedonia
Krasniqi, Fadil
Krstevski, Aleksandar
Counsellor, Embassy of FYR Macedonia in Serbia
Kuburić, Zorica
Professor, Faculty of Philosophy,
University of Novi Sad, Serbia
Kunič, Jožef
Honorary President of Slovenian Association
for International Relations
Kuroki, Masafumi
Ambassador of Japan to Serbia
Kuzmanović, Rajko
Academician, Academy of Sciences and Arts
of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka
xvi
Lang, Slobodan
Lazarević, Nebojša
Lazović, Budimir
Lecaque, Patrick
Levett, Jeffrey
Lopičić – Jančić, Jelena
Lopičić, Đorđe
Lučić, Novak
Luedemann , Werner
Lvova, Marina
Mahr, Horst
Manasijevski, Jovan
Manović, Irena Sara
Maresca, John
Martinović, Slobodan
Matejić, Vlastimir
Mayor, Federico
Mercy, Sandrine
Mesdoua, Abdelkader
Milićević, Vukašin
Milinović, Momčilo
Milo, Paskal
Milosavljević, Mirjana
Milošević, Ljiljana
Milović, Nikifor
Minch, Kevin
Mirčev, Dimitar
Mirković, Todor
Miyake, Shota
Mtintso, Thenjive Ethel
Nader de El-Andari, Dia
Professor, Member of the European Council,
Croatian Parliament, IPU, Croatia
Director, European Policy Centre – CEP, Belgrade, Serbia
Ambassador, Vice Dean,
ECPD Postgraduate and Doctoral Studies
Director, Center for International Education,
Truman State University, USA
Professor, National School of Public Health, Athens, Greece
International Association for Human Values,
Geneva, Switzerland
Professor, University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA
President, Foreign Affairs Association of Munich, Germany
Former Minister of Social Studies and Minister of Defence,
FYR Macedonia
Former Rector UPEACE
President, Center for Policy Research Argument
Foundation for a Culture of Peace,
Ciudad Universitaria de Cantoblanco, Madrid, Spain
Economic Perspectives & International Congress,
Lorient, France
Ambassador of Algeria to Serbia
Presbyter, Diocese Bačka, Serbia
Professor, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering,
University of Belgrade, Serbia
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania,
Professor, University of Tirana, Albania
Director of the Diplomatic Academy,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia
ECPD UP UN Health Department,
UNESCO Chair in Bioethics – Serbian Unit
Archimandrite, Serbian Orthodox Church,
Diocese Budimljansko-Nikšićka, Montenegro
Director, Institute for Academic Outreach,
Truman State University, USA
Adviser to the President of Macedonia,
Professor FON University, Skopje, FYR Macedonia
ECPD Special Adviser
Deputy Director, Japan Foundation, Budapest, Hungary
Ambassador of South Africa to Serbia
Chargé d’Affaires,
Embassy of Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Serbia
xvii
Nedeljković, Yves
Nikolić, Jelena
Norouzi, Abdollah
Orpana, Pekka
Ostojić, P. Negoslav
Paino, Troy
Pap, Endre
Petrović-Piroćanac, Zoran
Podobnik, Janez
Popović, Vitomir
Popovski, Nikola
Priebe, Reinhard
Protić, Aleksandar
Rakić, Ljubiša
Redžić, Ana
Repo, Nora
Richter, Melita
Ristanović, Elizabeta
Roes, Ewoud
Ružin, Nano
Savio, Roberto
Shiba, Nobuhiro
Shmelev, Boris
Sijerić, Nataša
Simić, Predrag
Solomin, Julia
Solomou, Emilios
Škrbić, Ranko
Šoškić, Branislav
Štrbac, Čedomir
Tanasković, Darko
Tassone Romero, Lisa
Teruuchi, Akihito
Tomić, Aleksandra
xviii
Professor, Director of ECPD Postgraduate Social Studies
Judge, Basic Court, Veliko Plantište, Serbia
Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Bulgaria
Ambassador of Finland to Serbia
Professor, ECPD Executive Director
President, Truman State University, USA
Professor, President, National Committee for Accreditation,
Ministry of Education, Science and Technical
Development, Republic of Serbia
Institute for Political Studies, Serbia
Director, International Center for Promotion of
Enterprises, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Professor, Dean, Faculty of Law,
University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Former Minister of Finance in the Government of
FYR Macedonia
Director, Crisis Management and Internal Security,
European Commission, Brussels
President of UNESCO Club in Sorbonne-Paris University
Vice President, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Embassy of Australia in Serbia
Freelance Lecturer and Writer, Finland
Professor, University of Trieste, Italy
Professor, University of Defence, Belgrade
First Secretary, Royal Belgium Embassy in Serbia
Dean, Faculty of Political Sciences,
FON University, Skopje, FYR Macedonia
President Emeritus, IPS, Italy
Professor, University of Tokyo, Japan
Academician, Director, Center for Political Research,
Russian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Moscow, Russian
Federation
ECPD PR Officer
Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia
Professor, University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA
Executive Vice President, Center for European and
International Affairs, University of Nicosia
Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia
Rector, ECPD International Postgraduate and Doctoral
Studies
Ambassador, Professor, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Ambassador, Professor, Faculty of Philosophy,
Member of World Society of Victimology
First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in Serbia
Member of Parliament, National Assembly of Serbia
Trifunović, Milica
Visinska Buzarovska, Irena
Stamate, Vlad
Vllasi, Azem
Vojvodić, Marija
Vukomanović, Zorana
Vuković, Simo
Vulić, Duško
Wallace, Don
Wolte, Wolfgang
Zahariev, Zahari
Zarić, Siniša
Zirdum, Dženita
Zlatković, Gorana
Žunić, Svetlana
Public Relations Officer, Embassy of Germany in Serbia
First Secretary, Embassy of FYR Macedonia in Serbia
Research Fellow, St. Paul’s University, Canada
Lawyer, Prishtina
Representative of International Project Resources Inc.
Sales and Marketing, ALZOLI, Belgrade, Serbia
ECPD Coordinator for Health Programmes
Professor, Medical Faculty, University of Banja Luka,
President of the ECPD Academic Council and President of
International Law Institute, Georgetown University, USA
Ambassador, Austrian Society for European Policy,
Vienna, Austria
President, Slavyani Foundation, Sofia, Bulgaria
Professor, Faculty of Economics,
Federal TV, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Minister of Justice, Government of the Republic of Srpska,
Professor, Medical Faculty, University of Belgrade, Serbia
xix
i Opening Remarks,
Keynote Speeches,
Messages
Akio KAWATO
PRESIDENT OF THE ECPD COUNCIL
Opening Remarks
Dear participants, honourable guests, ladies and gentlemen
I, Akio Kawato, the newly appointed President of the ECPD Council, have the honour and pleasure to open the Tenth Jubilee International
Conference on national Reconciliation, Religious Tolerance and Human
Security. When my predecessor, H.E. Takehiro Togo – whose exceptional
intellect and empathetic nature I believe most of you are well aware of
– unexpectedly passed away, I was offered to take over his duty. I was
honoured but at the same time I was not quite certain whether I would
be able to perform these duties as efficiently and successfully as my friend
and mentor Takehiro Togo did. I am availing myself of this opportunity
to show my due respect.
The previous nine conferences were dedicated to the same goal: contribution to the promotion of peace and development in this turbulent
region through inter-ethnic reconciliation and religious tolerance. The issue of the contribution to reconciliation and tolerance in the post-conflict
Balkan region was imposed at the Ministerial meeting in Tokyo in 2005.
This task was endorsed to the European Center for Peace and Development which in turn, with the support of the Government of Japan and the
Governments of the countries where the previous Conferences were organised (Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia), invested great efforts for the promotion of peace, development and international cooperation. Besides the
nine large international conferences, the European Center for Peace and
Development also organised other numerous international gatherings,
and through its educational and research activities vigorously promoted
peace and security in the region and beyond.
These activities have given certain results “but still a lot remains to be
done”, as the late Takehiro Togo stated in his speech at the Eighth ECPD
International Conference. Namely, the decade long fratricidal conflicts
in the region of former Yugoslavia ended about fifteen years ago, but –
as I understood – it is difficult to say that stable peace and sustainable
Opening Remarks, Messages, Keynote Speeches
3
development have been achieved in the Balkans. Strained relationships
between ethnic and religious groups continue, and ethnic reconciliation
and religious tolerance slowly improve, while the UN Concept of “Human
Security” barely reaches the Balkans. The hate speech in mass media and
from officials of individual countries can still be heard occasionally, while
there are also certain groups which would wish to solve the problems by
use of force. In the Balkans, especially in its Western part, sensitive regions do exist and threaten to escalate into an open conflict.
Out of ten, five Balkan countries (excluding Turkey) have full EU
membership, while another five eagerly tend to join the EU. Thus, it could
be said that the Balkans have become a part of the European Union and
an integrated part of it which has a great economic and security importance. However, the Balkans still lags in economic development and it is
not only the most undeveloped part of Europe, but the degree of developmental disparities between the Balkans and the rest of Europe are wider
than ten, fifteen or twenty years ago.
The European Center for Peace and Development of the UN mandated University for Peace through its mission of promoting peace, development and international cooperation seems to have been deliberately
and consciously established in the center of the Balkans, where the development of peace and security is more than needed. In the forthcoming
period the ECPD will, inevitably, focus its attention on the Balkans, intensifying its activities in the fields of education, research and dissemination
of knowledge, aiming to promote peace and development – two interdependent notions, because without peace there would not be sustainable
development, and vice versa.
4
Boutros Boutros–GHALI
FORMER UN GENERAL–SECRETARY,
PRESIDENT OF THE ECPD HONORARY COUNCIL
Message to the tenth ECPD
Once again, on account of other obligations, I regret deeply to be unable
to take part in this tenth ECPD annual conference. I would have liked to
be again in Belgrade and in this region, which I am attached to and familiar with its problems which I experienced during my term as the UN
Secretary-General.
I welcome and congratulate ECPD on its excellent, highly valuable
work over the last three decades, and encourage it to continue and expand
its significant activities.
Problems besetting the West Balkans today are similar and often
identical to those experienced by developing countries in different parts
of the world, namely those arising from the interrelated challenges of: a)
attaining development objectives and aspirations; b) maintaining peace,
including domestic peace; c) protecting national sovereignty and dignity; and, d) playing a role and having an influential say in the conduct of
world affairs. It is important to recall that some 50 years ago, these very
objectives brought together leaders of developing countries from Africa,
Asia and Latin America in our host city Belgrade, objectives which, to
the present day are shared by all developing countries and which they
promote jointly through their group action in the United Nations and in
the global arena.
Lessons learned and experiences in this region are of relevance to all
developing countries and especially to the Arab countries, to the United
Nations, and also concern multilateralism and global governance. Here,
I single out the need to manage and respond to realpolitik practices of
contemporary geopolitics, which have resuscitated some ghosts from the
recent and more distant past. Today, they continue to affect and are felt
acutely in the West Balkans, as well as in the Arab world, both well-known
for their turbulent histories, especially in the 20th century.
5
How your countries and peoples deal with and confront these multiple, interrelated challenges of peace and development is thus of wider,
global significance.
I insist that in these efforts it is essential to transcend bigotry, religious and political fundamentalisms and populisms, and jointly to address
the root causes of old and new problems, in search for solutions through
common efforts, solidarity and enlightenment. ECPD, as an institution
established under the UN mandated University for Peace, has been trying
to contribute to this goal through its unique activities.
It is my sincere wish that in this manner it will also contribute to
rebuilding, on new foundations, a community of peoples and nations that
existed in the region during the era of SFR Yugoslavia, by promoting economic cooperation, mutual trust, and solidarity in the quest for common
welfare in the West Balkans.
As someone who comes from Egypt, today facing social, economic
and political upheavals, and wars in the Arab world, I also wish to salute
the efforts by ECPD to revive its important earlier work on development
and South-South cooperation, domains which can help Arab countries to
solve and overcome their internal problems.
I wish you success in your deliberations and proceedings.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations
President, ECPD Honorary Council
6
Erhard BUSEK
PROFESSOR, FORMER VICE-CHANCELLOR OF AUSTRIA A.D.
AND SPECIAL COORDINATOR OF THE STABILITY PACT
FOR SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
Peace in the Balkans and Everywhere
One of the characteristics of our time is that the changes are quicker and
obviously more fundamental as we are sometimes aware of it. That is the
tremendous request not only in politics but also in education. It is important, that we are able to handle them to find the right reactions and not to
loose the perspective of our work. I may say even visions are necessary on
this because otherwise we are not able to fix the role of Europe. Changing Europe does not mean only changes in the economy. For sure the
economy is very important, because it is a basis nearly for everything, but
what is going on, is even more impressive. I only want to fix some points:
–– The importance of Europe will diminish. The reason for this is that
other parts of our world are coming up. Always the BRIC-states
are mentioned, but it is not only this. It is in general Asia, South
America and Africa. In comparison to some states like India and
China Europe is smaller than them. The philosopher Peter Sloderdijk is saying that Europe is only a peninsula or an appendix
of Asia. On this the vision Eurasia is sometimes mentioned as our
future. I think, it is a very serious and interesting concept, because
real borders between Europe and Asia are extremely difficult to
define. The most outstanding example is Russia. If you are standing on both sides of the Ural Mountains you cannot recognise in
which continent you are.
–– Another argument are the changes concerning the population. We
are becoming, especially in Europe, an aging society. Further, there
is a migration trend that brings notable changes. The current economic situation is moving it forward, if you take into account the
fact that Germany is looking for a labour force in Spain where the
young generation is highly unemployed.
7
–– Also the cultural impact of these developments is very important.
We only know the clashes and conflicts and define them. Islamophobia is appearing and a kind of new nationalism. By that I think,
the changes are going deeper and deeper.
–– The economy has changed, not only concerning the different
crises, but also concerning resources and the competition looking to the resources. The engagement of China in Africa is only
one example, but it should not be forgotten, that technology has
a real great impact, which we are sometimes not really aware of.
Especially the so called information society has a great input, not
only on democracy, but in general on the economic development.
Prosperity rights are under pressure and are changing the rules of
competition.
–– Last but not least: it has to be mentioned that we have a lot of crises: economic crisis, banking crisis, Europe crisis, crisis in Ukraine
and Middle East and so on. Personally I am convinced that these
are crises on politics and politicians, but that is no reason to be
desperate, because a crisis by the original word in the old Greek
language is a time where we have to judge and to decide. This
might move us forward in the right direction.
–– The reaction happening now is very ambivalent. On the one side
there is a campaign for less Europe. Furthermore, especially if you
are also looking at the banking and financial questions, the economy will need more Europe.
For “more Europe” there is no alternative. What do you want instead
of the European Union? Great Britain can be the 51st state of the United
States, the French can try to build up something in the western part of
the Mediterranean Area, in Central Europe we can look for a follow up
of the Habsburg Monarchy and so on. But these are all no solution for
the presence and for the future. We have to position Europe and all its
parts – also the Balkans – in the context of the global world. For sure it
will take some time to move in this direction, but let us face it: the nation
state is loosing importance. The nation state is still necessary, because we
are organised on this basis, but we have to develop the right instruments.
Until now international organisations are not fitting in to solve problems.
You can see it for the United Nations concerning the crises in the Middle East and so on. But on the other side we have some international organisations like OSCE wich are very necessary. This is a great challenge
for the Balkans, because we have to fit into the right situation. So far a
new “regionalism” is developing. Concerning the Balkans, it means that
8
the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) which was founded in 2007,
needs to be taken seriously. I think, this Council is not able to solve the
political problems, but it can create a lot of arrangements and institutions
for better regional cooperation. It was already done with CEFTA (Central
European Free Trade Association) with fighting crime with its centre in
Bucharest, with RACVIAC (Centre for Security Cooperation) concerning demilitarisation, e-Cooperation, which is done by Slovenian Centre
and so on and so on. There is a lot to do. For example there is no Balkan airline system that is relly working. The transport cooperation on the
railways and especially on the River Danube is still missing. The EUSDR
(European Union Strategy of the Danube Region) is a big challenge and a
real change not only for water management and transport, but also for the
economic development, tourism and competition.
Why is this regionalism necessary? For the Balkans and especially
concerning the environment, it is essential what was done in the Middle
East by the Arab Spring, but also the connections towards Russia, China,
India and so on and so on.
The chances exist, because the Balkans is at the moment really stable.
For sure governments are changing, but the problems in Europe are elsewhere and not in the Balkans alone.
There is a stable economy at a low level, but the debts of the countries
are not as high as for example in South Europe or even in more developed
countries in the western part. The EU enlargement is moving a little bit
forward with Croatia and also with opening of the negotiations with other
countries. This has to be pushed forward, because otherwise we are loosing time. The real danger for the Balkans is to be forgotten! The Balkans is
not the periphery of the periphery of our world.
The Balkans is the real chance for the economy to offer opportunities for recovery. There are a lot of needs concerning infrastructure, investment, consumer goods and so on and so on. That is the reason why
a lot of enterprises are not even in the economic crisis, not moving out
of the region, because they are expecting a real push forward. It is also
necessary for example concerning the different identities and the necessary reconciliations. In the Balkans we have a European Islam. It should
be used, because otherwise more extremist positions will come up here.
What is missing is a real understanding in other parts of Europe, because
otherwise we would have better handled the situation of the Bosnians,
Macedonians and so on. Also practically a lot remains to be done. The
second bridge over the river Danube between Romania and Bulgaria is
opened, which is for sure necessary because on 470 km borderline there
9
was only one bridge. This is a symbol. We need a bridge over troubled waters and I think that is also the function of ECPD to be a contributor on
this subjects. So far we have to look very positively to the changes around
the Balkans wich is offering us a lot of chances.
Some additional remarks, giving hope in the current development:
The new European Commission is more political than the past one.
So far it is to expect, that Jean Claude Juncker and his team might move
things in the right direction. I think, it is not necessary to be shocked
by the comment that in the next five years there will be no enlargement.
We shall push the countries of the region to fulfil the conditions anyway.
If they are doing so, nobody can say no. At the moment the candidate
countries are giving arguments to be against them. They have also to do
more campaigns in the member states of the European Union in order to
be better understood.
It will be of great importance how Serbia will conduct chairmanship
in OSCE. Are they able to do the same as the Swiss did? I think, with
some success. I think it is really necessary. But we also have to focus on
the fact, that after the football game between Serbia and Kosovo some
new old difficulties appeared. Thez are overestimated by the media, but
thez do exist. So far we have to be very careful, that the speech of hate and
lack of reconciliation do not revamp.
Another problem is Bosnia-Herzegovina, because the election result
is not helpful for the future of this country. So far it is necessary to press
especially the member states and the United States to start real negotiations on a new constitution. It is not to expect, that it will be initiated
insidethe country. So far it is necessary to do pressure from the outside.
Another chance is regional cooperation: so far the Regional Cooperation Council has to gain more concrete results down on the ground.
Maybe they can take the Visegrád Cooperation as an example, maybe establishing funds like the Visegrád Funds and also to be more engaged in
the context of the Danube initiative.
Plenty of exercises of cooperation like Central European Initiative,
SEECP, Adriatic Ionian Initiative and so on. I think, every country, if it
is in the chair, is fighting for visibility instead of results. So far it is quite
necessary. Why? We have a lot of critical situations. At the end I want to
name it: we are getting more authoritarian figures and maybe even politics
in different countries, which is not helpful for the development of democracy and human rights. Also press freedom is under pressure. The last
reports are more horrible than ever. We are returning to the situation in
the beginning after the Dayton Agreement. Another point is to focus on
10
immigration, because here capacity in different countries is lost. I think,
we have to create brain circulation instead of brain drain. At last, but very
important point is the role of religion in the region, but also in Europe.
It does not only concern Islam, it also concerns Christian churches. We
have no real cooperation on the subject, but there is a demand for values
by common citizens. So far sometimes the wrong values are accepted. We
have to do research on the subject where we are getting better results.
In general: it is depending on us, that we are reaching consolidation
in the region further on. It makes no sense to ask always outside – it has
to be done internally and it is a responsibility of all those living in this
region. Future is possible, but we have to do it by ourselves.
11
Wolfgang WOLTE
AMBASSADOR, AUSTRIAN SOCIETY FOR EUROPEAN POLITICS,
VIENNA, AUSTRIA
Statement at the 10th ECPD
Reconciliation, Tolerance
and Human Security in the Balkans
It is an honor and pleasure for me to take part in this year’s Tenths ECPD
International Conference “New Balkans and the EU: Peace, Development,
Integration”. As in the past, the conference promises to provide a most
valuable forum for stock- taking and charting the path of the six Western
Balkans countries into the future.
The European Union is going through a period of stormy weather.
The European media, also in their role of loudspeakers for the opinion of
European citizens, do not tire of criticizing the European Union in general
and the work of their institutions in particular. The Brussels Commission
is a favorite target of comments, not least for their alleged tendency to
rule and regulate our lives to a degree that many people consider unnecessary. The high rate of unemployment, especially amongst young people,
the lack of progress in seeking a solution to the Ukrainian crisis and a settlement of the relations with Russia are some of the most frequently cited
reasons for the present unsatisfactory state of the European Integration
– Peace – and Development Process. In this picture marked by uncertainties falls a ray of hope: the report entitled “EU – Enlargement in 2014 and
Beyond: Progress and Challenges”.
There is little point in even trying to summarize its main conclusions, commentaries and recommendations. Its primary value lies in an
objective and future – oriented description of the present situation in candidate countries on their road to membership in the European Union. The
documents before us have been drafted by the Commission Services with
great care, competence and “Fingerspitzengefühl”, obviously taking into
account information provided by each country under scrutiny.
The result of this careful constructive approach is a series of documents that should serve as guideline for future efforts. The basis continues
to be the Declaration of Thessaloniki and the Declaration of Salzburg in
which the European perspective for the countries of the Western Balkans
is firmly anchored. Considerable progress has been achieved. At the same
12
time, the list of problems that will have to be tackled and ultimately solved
is long and presents a challenge to government and citizens. And the decision makers will want to act in accordance with the findings and recommendations of the Commission, in this way furthering the interests of the
entire region.
This state of affairs should be seen against the background of the
statement of Commission President Jean Claude Juncker to the effect that
no accession should be expected during the coming five years. The European Union, too, needs some time for self reflection and reform. Thus the
years ahead will hopefully be put to good use by all European decisionmakers. Understandably, the first addressees of our hopes and assistance
are the candidate countries themselves. The road map into the future is
clearly defined. We are all called upon to walk this road together.
Given this agenda the present members of the Union are ready to
help along the way. I hope that at our next conference a year from now
will have before it a report from the Balkan countries themselves as they
assess the assistance they have received from both multilateral and bilateral sources. A concise, brief report on these issues would undoubtedly be
appreciated by those funding the various programs. Success and failures
in the efforts of candidate countries are being watched attentively across
Europe.
When everything is said and done, it is evidently up to each candidate country to shoulder the main burden of preparing itself for the
future. The peoples of the region can look back on a proud history. Consequently, there is no reason why, with the indispensable political will and
joined physical and intellectual forces, they should not be able to master
their destiny.
At this juncture we would do well to recall the Final Declaration by
the Chair of the Conference on the Western Balkans, Berlin 28. August
2014. Under the heading “2014–2018: Four years of real progress” the
most important issues are being addressed:
“Just fifteen years ago, the news from the region was dominated by
war, expulsion and destruction. It is now apparent that the region has already made great achievements as regards creating stability, developing
good neighborly relations, and modernizing government, society and the
economy”.
“The European Union’s enlargement policy has played a crucial role
in these achievements. All the countries in the Western Balkans firmly
believe that their future lies in the European Union”.
13
Following these key pronouncements, the Final Declaration deals
with all questions facing the countries of the Western Balkans.
The Berlin Conference is considered an important step on the path
into the future. It will be succeeded by another conference dealing with
the same issues in 2015.
This second conference will be held in Austria, upon the invitation of
the Austrian Government.
I do not want to conclude these brief remarks without referring for a
moment to the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty can be legitimately called the
Constitution of the European Union as it contains all the necessary principles, objectives and values to ensure the political, economic and social
development of the continent. It is true that a good number of important
decisions since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 had to be taken outside
the constitutional framework of the Treaty. This phenomenon has triggered off the call for a wide – ranging treaty reform, more precisely for a
Convention to discuss an amended treaty, involving all strata of decision
makers as well as public and private organizations. It goes without saying
that this politically highly sensitive question is still in a state of discussion – and I hope it will remain so for quite some time. There is no hurry
to venture into a process the outcome of which is uncertain as in the end
everything depends on the political will of those in charge.
Yet the final paragraphs of my statement should again be devoted to
our present conference in Belgrade:
The former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros
Ghali, in his message to our deliberations has circumscribed the main
challenges lying ahead:
1. attaining development objectives and aspirations
2. maintaining peace, including domestic peace
3. protecting national sovereignty and dignity
4. playing a role and having an influential say in the conduct of
world affairs.
Boutros Boutros Ghali rightly insists that it is essential to transcend
bigotry, religious and political fundamentalisms and populisms. And this
is an appeal to the world at large!!
While the conference mourns the passing away of the outstanding
diplomat and admired President of the conference over the last years, Ambassador Togo, we welcome Ambassador Akio Kawato as his successor.
In the future, too, we look forward to seeing Negoslav Ostojic at the
helm of ECPD supported by his able staff.
Thank you for your attention and best wishes to all of us!
14
Darko TANASKOVIĆ
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE, SERBIA
On the task and Objective of the Tenth
ECPD International Conference
The Tenth ECPD International Conference on Reconciliation, Tolerance
and Human Security in the Balkans is this year as well thematically devoted to the mutual relationship between an objectively emerging “new”
Balkans and the EU in its dynamic stage of development, marked by numerous internal controversies and external challenges. Maintaining stable
peace, creating conditions for a balanced and versatile development and
accelerating the integration processes on the whole continent based on
the fundamental European values are carried out in volatile and uncertain
circumstances which bring gradual, but also rapid shaping of the multipolar future world.
In such a global and regional context and amid growing tensions recalling even the atmosphere of the Cold War, despite notable successes,
there are growing concerns questioning the efficacy and utility of the actual reconciliation approach as a conflict prevention and peace-building
mechanism. It has been noted that while reconciliation processes may
lead to short-term cessation of violence, many of the long-term scars of
conflict remain which allows deep divisions to persist. In some instances,
the reconciliation processes have simply delayed the next wave of violence
and failed to address the fundamental conflict drivers with a particular
country.
At the moment which may for many reasons be considered historic,
it is becoming ever more clear that debates and conclusions of the previous ECPD conferences vocally announced the present global and regional
processes and anticipated their direction. They repeatedly warned of the
necessity to overcome any individual or group interest-motivated narrowmindedness, disintegration and closing in international political, economic and cultural relations in order to promote the fundamental ideas
of ECPD since its foundation and which can only ensure moving ahead
steadily towards the goals of peace, development and integration.
15
The Tenth ECPD International Conference should tackle these and
other problems of the actual regional, European and global agenda with
new ideas and courageous concrete proposals and initiatives. In that respect, the complex and multifaceted problematic of Global South will be
thoroughly examined.
In that respect, this year’s Conference should focus on the problems
and concretise debates among competent experts from the Balkans, Europe and worldwide in order to contribute, from the present crossroads
of the international community, through argumentative critical views, to
promoting positive and stopping negative political, economic and cultural processes in the Region and in broader European and global context.
With that goal, changeable and partly worrying dynamics in the relations
between the East and West should be acknowledged, whereas actual situation and prospects of the economic development should be realistically analysed, outlooks and paths for reconciliation should be re-examined in the regional situation which has been referred to as “post-conflict”
for far too long. Furthermore, it is necessary to speak up openly of the
weaknesses in the area of education which is ideologically burdened with
ethnocentric myths and culture-centric dictates of exclusive nationalisms
and to stand up for true pluralistic overcoming the model of unilateral
“tolerance”, behind which dialectics of domination and subordination are
hidden.
In line with the decision adopted at the last Conference, it would be
especially important to open up boldly room for active and equal participation of the youth in the debate on the future of the Balkans and Europe,
because it is primarily their future to which they are entitled and which
they certainly wish to shape productively by their own ideas and abilities.
16
ii Globalization:
New Processes and
their Macro and Micro
Implications
Globalization: New Processes and their Macro and Micro Implications
17
Academician Oleg BOGOMOLOV
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS
Cardinal Shifts in Human Civilization
and its Repercussions: Russia and new
Balkans
Mankind is on the threshold of profound changes. Changes affect the economic sphere which is in a state of transition to the new technological
set-up. It is characterized by the radical new role of information, computerization, nano-and biotechnology, automation, peaceful uses of atomic
energy, space activities and so forth. All of these changes have revolutionary impact on human life, its social organization.
Unprecedented science and technology progress bring about significant shifts in social structure. The dictatorial regimes crumple, opening
way for democratic transformation. New social-economic models are arising. Production, trade, cultural and political life undergo the process of
globalization, which makes all countries interdependent. Significant shifts
in the global geopolitical situation are under way. The unipolar world in
which the US had hegemony is giving way to multipolar one, which demands equality, respect for mutual interests and concord among a greater number of countries. America’s political standing has tarnished. The
pole of political and economic attraction is displacing even more from
the West towards the East, where China and India demonstrate their increasing power. The influence of BRICS countries, their specific weight in
world economy and international relations is constantly increasing.
The global crisis has revealed flaws of modern capitalism, largely tailored in accordance with the canons of neo-liberal ideology, professed and
advocated by the United States of America. Imperfections have been clearly exposed not only in the economy, but also in the way how the Western
democracies are functioning. In various regions of the planet symptoms
of spiritual, social and moral crises are accumulating. This gives reason
to doubt the conformity of the world’s dominant ideology and political
practice to the challenges of the 21st century.
The humankind is now experiencing a transition to a new understanding of the world system and way of life.
19
According to the American philosopher Ervin László, “The process
of social evolution on our planet has approached a crucial phase of macro/shift. This is accompanied by social and cultural disarray”. Some people
adhere to the established beliefs and values, while more and more people
are in deep thought of alternatives. Many politicians, scholars and civil
society groups are involved in search of ways to overcome destructive aspects of the macro-shift in order to ease transition to better social-economic models. However, it is obvious that the advancement of scientific
and political thought and the formation of public opinion are not keeping
up with the events. It is not accidentally that Davos forum in 2012 in Switzerland worked under the slogan “Great transformation and formation of
new models”. In 2014 the slogan was a little bit modified: “The Reshaping
of the World: Consequences for Society, Politics and Business”.
The changes in the geopolitical situation in Europe are especially
sensitive and indicative. I don’t have to remind you what has happened
in the postwar period. You are aware enough. The last events in Ukraine
could have particularly dramatic consequences for peace and mutually
advantageous economic cooperation in Europe. Their outcome and their
long-term repercussions are not yet clear. But they do influence Russia, as
well as the New-Balkan countries and their relations with Russia.
After the coup d’état supported by the USA, Ukraine is experiencing
chaos and civil war. Its economy has collapsed. The country turned out
to be a token money in USA geopolitics. The United States made a stake
on the Ukrainian nationalists, neo-fascists and Russophobes to bring to
power American amenable politicians. To fulfill their plan USA has spent
$5 billion to assist pro Western and anti/Russian movement in Ukraine.
In view of the fact that American hegemony in the international affairs
is compromised Washington attempts to temper Russia’s role in changing geopolitical configuration. It uses NATO to control European countries and involve them, against their interests, in American adventure in
Ukraine. As to the fate of Ukrainians people and their well-being, their
future is to be sacrificed to American ambitions.
Despite all facts Washington and members of EU and NATO blame
Russia for unleashing civil war in Ukraine. This war turned out to be even
more barbarian and immoral, violating the rules of international law, than
was the fascists occupation of this region 70 years ago. Despite massive
anti-Russian propaganda and economic sanctions against our country, the
real causes of this disaster and who was behind it would be inevitably
known. Already many people in different countries are aware of it.
20
My country highly appreciates Serbia for its refusal to introduce
sanctions against Russia. We are grateful to Serbia for its willingness to
increase considerably the export of agrarian products to Russia. Contrary
to Bulgaria, Serbia and some other South European countries support the
construction of the “South Stream” gas pipeline, which can improve economic situation and cooperation in the Balkan region. But Americans try
to torpedo this project.
Today the dominant ideology in the Western World, as well as the
ultraliberal market praxis and moral degradation are the object of increasing criticism. The search for new life and international relations is on the
agenda. Challenges of the new time urge problem solving, posed by the
ongoing “great transformation”. It seems that new socio-economic models should incorporate with national specific, humanitarian and democratic values, social justice, conditions for durable peace and sustainable
scientific and economic progress. Of course, such models do not come
into being in the near future. But mankind needs an attractive dream.
In any case, some countries already try successfully to integrate the increased regulating role of state in economy and in maintenance of social
justice with advantages of market relations. I hope that mutual advantages
of Russia – New Balkans relations could contribute to go forward in this
direction.
21
Jožef KUNIČ
HONORARY PRESIDENT OF SLOVENIAN ASSOCIATION FOR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Importance of Economic Diplomacy
for the Development of the Balkan
Countries
Abstract: Beleaguered by evidence that showed global poverty and inequality increasing, even most poor countries experienced little or no economic growth, globalization
has been terminally discredited. Internationally speaking, the overriding trend of economic globalization has not changed, but the number of factors leading to protectionism in trade and investment and constraining globalization has increased.
The recent recession has led all countries to focus on the need for more cooperation
in global trade and financial regulation. Without adequate resources earmarked for
this type of diplomatic activity, any country`s effective participation in international
exchanges would be seriously jeopardized. The proliferation of formal and informal
groups reflects the fragmentation of major country blocks into small constituents,
sharing common positions.
Countries of the South-Eastern Europe (mainly countries that were formed after
the collapse of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) were on a tough and
bumpy road that leads them to full membership in the European Union even before the global economic crisis began. Now that the most influential members of the
EU are preoccupied with their economic, social problems and global problems, with
the problem of Ukraine and Middle East problems, the Balkans consequently moved
away from their focus. This makes the situation for the so-called Western Balkan
countries even more difficult.
Taking into account historical reasons, countries of the Balkans, especially countries
in the region of ex-Yugoslavia, should cooperate in order to improve their economic
and political position. Economic diplomacy as a tool for enhancing inter-state economic cooperation, is of utmost importance.
Key words: Alliances, interests, multilateral diplomacy, cooperation, bilateral, negative economic diplomacy
World today
After the end of the Cold War there has been intense process of globalization, which is a “form of westernization” of the world. (Milardović,
2009:25) The Cold War took place between the two blocs, which have
had a crucial political and economic role, where the so-called Third
22
World, which combined the Non-Aligned Movement, played more or
less the role of a statist. Huntington’s view is worth mentioning that in
the age of globalization our planet was divided to the West and the rest
of the world. “The winner of the Cold War was (neo)liberalism, which
since 1989 has proved to be an ideology with the character of monism”.
(Milardović, 2009:15) We were the witnesses of an era of globalization. The world, with relatively few exceptions, began to be open, the
boundaries of the economic cooperation were vanishing. Of course,
many countries retained the visible barriers that prevent the real full
movement of goods, capital and people, yet the world became very different from that at the time of the bipolar regime, when the two blocks
excluded each other.
However, there are tendencies in the inverse process, the tendencies of deglobalization. “The current global downturn, the worst since
the Great Depression 70 years ago, pounded the last nail into the coffin
of globalization. Already beleaguered by evidence that showed global
poverty and inequality increasing, even most poor countries experienced little or no economic growth, globalization has been terminally
discredited.” (Bello, 2009:1) “Internationally speaking, the overriding
trend of economic globalization has not changed, but the number of
factors leading to protectionism in trade and investment and constraining globalization has increased”. (Chen, 2012) Some scholars use
even stronger words. “Our contemporary empire and its supporters
disintegrate political order, states and alliances between states. In the
name of ideology of freedom, free trade, democracy they bring political expropriation.” (Mastnak, 2014:5)
Some scholars argue that the world entered in the new tensions,
the Cool War. “We are now in the midst of what could be called the
Cool War. This successor to the Cold War shares the trait that it does
not involve hot conflict on the battlefield, but is different in the nature and expectations surrounding the sub-rosa thrusts and parries by
which it is conducted.
This new war is “cool” rather than “cold” for two reasons. On the
one hand, it is a little warmer than cold because it seems likely to involve almost constant offensive measures that, while falling short of actual warfare, regularly seek to damage or weaken rivals or gain an edge
through violations of sovereignty and penetration of defenses. And on
the other, it takes on the other definition of “cool,” in that it involves
23
the latest cutting-edge technologies in ways that are changing the paradigm of conflict to a much greater degree than any of those employed
during the Cold War – which was, after all, about old-fashioned geopolitical jockeying for advantage in anticipation of potential old-school
total warfare.” (Parks-Pool, 2013)
We are coming to an era when even an additional technological development can not more significantly improve our lives. On the
deterioration of the quality of life all too often affect the relationship
among people, ethnical tensions or cultural intolerance or, according to
Huntington, clash of civilizations. We do not need a new technological
revolution, its historical role has already been acted out in most cases,
what we need, let me allow to use a modern neologism, is a “revolution
of human relationships”. As Black points out: “In the coming century
there may come again to a state as it was in Europe between 1550 and
1650 when there were the religious wars ... and it is possible that in this
century religious antagonisms will have a leading role in civil conflicts.
(Black, 2004:50) Very likely we are entering into a period, an era, when
the relations among people are getting increasingly important, an era,
we must strive to be an era of exemplary human relations and nondiscriminatory relationship among nations. (Kunič, 2012)
Terrorism is an important phenomenon of the world today. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is not a new phenomenon. It reached
great dimensions several times in history. Our forefathers already faced
that problem at the end of the nineteenth century. As Pirjevec comments on the actions of the authorities at that time: “Unable to change
the established social and ethnic situation they dully insisted in defending them and proclaimed terrorists as criminals that should be
isolated and liquidated. The consequences of such short-sighted political strategy were terrible: the First World War, the October Revolution,
post-war totalitarian regimes, the Second World War. Having in mind
the modern political situation which is so similar – mutatis mutandis
– to the situation a good century ago I can not avoid thinking that the
short-sightedness of the present masters of the world is leading us into
a similar precipice.” (Pirjevec, 2005) Special attention should be paid
to the conflict of values. Strengthening intolerance and disrespecting
other values merely increase the probability of terrorism.
24
At the global level we can notice increasing tensions between civilizations. We should not forget the fact that it is possible to negotiate
and reach an agreement on the interests. (Kunič, 2013)
The Westphalia system of sovereign states enabled relative peace.
However, it is not possible to negotiate on the values promoted by religions and extreme traditionalisms. “The international politics based
on interests is not necessarily perfect but its advantage is that it can
limit the conflicts, negotiate on the differences and find compromises, unlike the politics based on social, economic and religious values.
Conflicts can no longer be limited since the values can no longer be
negotiated – the values of one society have to prevail over the values of
another society.” (Gilpin, 1990)
Recent recession has led all countries to focus on the need for
more cooperation in global trade and financial regulation. Cooperation
countries are practicing is based on interests and not on values. “Without adequate resources earmarked for this type of diplomatic activity,
any country`s effective participation in international exchanges would
be seriously jeopardized. The proliferation of formal and informal
groups reflects the fragmentation of major country blocks into small
constituents, sharing common positions.” (Woolcock, Bayne, 2013:192)
The Balkans
In the countries of the Balkans there has been a lot of incomprehension
and intolerance of the other groups where other language or religion is
practiced. The memories of some events in the history, which had the
effect of dividing peoples, are often overestimated but the time periods
when the Balkan people cooperated and lived in peace together are
rarely mentioned.
Countries of the South-Eastern Europe (mainly countries that
were formed after the collapse of the Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia) were on a tough and bumpy road that leads them to full
membership in the European Union. Now that the most influential
members of the EU are preoccupied with their economic, social and
global problems, the Balkans consequently moved away from their focus. This makes the situation for the so-called Western Balkan countries even more difficult. (Togo, 2011)
25
A single EU market of 500 million consumers remains a powerful economic attraction for most European countries. However, it
no longer seems as evident as it once did that Europe brings steadily
growing prosperity and welfare to all its citizens. (Ash, 2012) Without economic stability there is hardly to expect the influence on the
neighboring countries. In the period of crisis of euro the EU invests
the most of its energy and power to the solution of its currency. It is
hardly to expect that the EU would intensify its activities in the Western Balkans. We can not expect neither an intensive help to the Balkan
countries, especially a financial one. The Balkan countries will have to
solve their key problems by themselves. We should not forget that one
of the main reasons for the wars at the end of the pervious century
in Yugoslavia was the “leopard skin” of the ethnic groups, which prevented those groups from the consensual solution. Te “leopard skin” in
the majority of regions does not exist any more, and this fact (which is
deplorable) makes the cooperation easier. Let me remind the position
of Austria. The Austro – Hungarian empire collapsed almost hundred
years ago (in terrible blood-shed), but Vienna is intensively using the
links, based on culture and memories. (Kunič, 2012)
Mastnak emphasizes: “If we compare the Balkans with Europe, the
Balkans were in longer historical perspective much more peaceful and
cohesive area, as the Europe”. (Mastnak, 2014:6)
Economic diplomacy
There are many definitions of economic diplomacy. In this paper we
use the double definition:
–– Economic diplomacy is a tool of the foreign policy, which has the
task of aiding and encouraging economic activities outside the
country.
–– Economic diplomacy is diplomacy, using economic tools to achieve
other, non-economic goals.
Some scholars regard export and investment promotion as commercial diplomacy (Berridge, James, 2003) but we prefer to regard it as an integral part of economic diplomacy. Business diplomacy is an international
activity of private companies, with the task of promoting and achieving
economic results. We agree with the authors (Woolcock, Bayne, 2013:4)
that it is not a part of economic diplomacy, because it is executed by private sector on both sides, domestic and abroad.
26
Multilateral economic diplomacy is economy oriented activity within
multilateral organizations. Like UN Economic and Social Council, WTO,
OECD, World Bank, etc. It means active participation in regional organizations, like South-eastern Europe Initiative, Euromed, etc. It means also
active participation at plurilateral meetings, like EU-Latin America, EUUSA, etc. The active economic diplomacy is especially important in relation with all important international organization which regularly issue
the reports about economic situation in different states. Definitely, such
an activity is of highest importance in relation with credit-rating agencies,
especially with the most known and most influential ones.
Bilateral economic diplomacy means state to state economic activities: agreements, delegations, meetings, propositions, persuasion, etc. It
means also state activities towards big foreign companies, influenced by
state, like oil companies, nuclear power plants construction companies,
pipeline projects, etc.
Commercial & Trade economic diplomacy is the activity, performed
by state, in order to help private companies to do better their business
abroad.
When dealing with the Balkans, we should mention negative economic diplomacy, sometimes described as economic warfare. Negative
economic diplomacy means the decisions by one state, aimed to harm the
economy of another state.
Multilateral economic diplomacy
& the Balkan states
When reading the articles about economic diplomacy we find out that in
many cases the multilateral economic diplomacy is practically not mentioned. Reading the article about the Successful Model of Economic Diplomacy we read: “Effectiveness could be measured by new market entries, with the expansion of existing business and with the overall increase
of volume of trade investments – ideally, when contacts turn into contracts”. (Drofenik, 2013) Unfortunately, the great importance of multilateral economic diplomacy is underestimated.
Let me quote two Slovenian and one Bosnian example. In May 2014
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development issued the forecast
of the growth of Slovenian GDP with the prediction of zero level growth.
In the first half of 2014 the growth was cca. 2.5%. The president Suma
Chakrabarti expressed his happiness with this result. (Jenko, 2014) The
27
effect of such wrong prediction was diminished confidence in Slovenian
economy, diminished confidence in The Slovenian banking system, more
expensive credits and more difficulties by contracting business agreements. The task of multilateral economic diplomacy should be to inform
EBRD in time about Slovenian reality, of course using correct diplomatic
ways. If economic diplomacy would have been successful, the prediction
for Slovenian GDP would have been better with the positive effect on the
Slovenian economy.
On May 5, 2013 Die Welt issued an article, talking about corruption,
quoting the Ernst & Young study. Among all the countries, corruption in
Slovenia was estimated as the most intensive. (Die Welt, 2013) We know
that this fact is extremely overestimated. Such information is damaging
Slovenia`s reputation and has definitely negative impact on business opportunities and on credit cost. Economic diplomacy should have been active within such institutions like Ernst & Young.
A Bosnian diplomat wrote: “The main activity of the effective economic diplomacy abroad is the organization of business forums where
business from Bosnia and Herzegovina can come into direct contact with
the business of the receiving state”. (Pašič, 2014) De facto he is talking
about commercial & trade diplomacy. But can be such diplomacy successful, if well known and reputable international think tank writes: “There is
a limit to how long a human being can deal with Bosnia.”…“The ship of
state lacks a captain and a pilot”? (Crisis Group, 2014) Bosnian economic
diplomacy should be active by contacting organizations, issuing economic
and political reports to achieve a better description of their state.
Credit rating agencies are major players in today’s financial markets,
with rating actions having a direct impact on the actions of investors, borrowers, issuers and governments. For example, a corporate downgrade can
have consequences on the capital a bank must hold and the downgrade of
sovereign debt makes a country’s borrowing more expensive. (Commission, 2011) To diminish the dependence of credit cost on credit rating
agencies, EU decided that credit rating agencies will have to follow stricter
rules which will make them more accountable for their actions. Credit
rating agencies will have to be more transparent when rating sovereign
states. (Commission, 2013)
“Credit-rating agencies are not some neutral, objective and nonprofit institutions but powerful private companies, thinking only on their
profit.”…“Credit-rating agencies as the most powerful private institutions
can without any limits blackmail and harm states. Their political power is
unlimited.” (Štefančič, 2014) Concentrating the activities of the econom28
ic diplomacy only on commercial & trade activities is far from enough.
Subtle diplomatic approach to multilateral and international organization
with the aim to make a rosier picture of the state and its economy is of
utmost importance.
Multilateral economic diplomacy is very important, although its importance is underestimated by departments responsible for foreign economic relations. We should not forget that every Balkan state influences
the reputation of the whole region. Economic reputation of every state has
an impact on the reputation of its environment. The Balkan states could
find a common interest in influencing the multilateral and international
organizations to better estimate the region as the whole. In the future, it
might be an example of the proliferation of an informal group sharing
common positions, based on common interest.
Bilateral Economic Diplomacy in the Balkans
Almost all Balkan states have problems with their neighbors. The roots of
these problems are the result of collapse of Yugoslavia. The problems of
succession and division are not easy to resolve. Many of them are symbolic and have no significant impact on real life, but politicians often abuse
them to get political influence and power. Some problems have financial
consequences, but in no case should be used to diminish necessary good
relations among Balkan companies and citizens.
Although The Austro – Hungarian empire collapsed in terrible bloodshed, some members of this empire use the links, based on culture and
memories. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria even
formally call this group as “Central Europe”. (CE Policy Institute, 2014)
They actively enhance their economic cooperation in order to improve
their economic situation. But not only economic situation; their aim is
to strengthen their political situation as well, of course in the matters of
common interest.
The Balkan states should follow this example. In the countries of the
Balkans there is a lot of incomprehension and intolerance. The memories
of some events in the history, which had the effect of dividing peoples,
are often overestimated. Nevertheless, companies are more and more intensively cooperating and individuals from the Balkan countries as the
tourists like to visit other Balkan places of interest.
As citizens and companies clearly show interest to cooperate more
closely, bilateral economic diplomacy should be much more active to enGlobalization: New Processes and their Macro and Micro Implications
29
hance this cooperation. It would not only improve economic situation in
the Balkan countries, but it would also make possible to support each other
in some multilateral organizations, of course, if there is common interest.
Unfortunately there were many cases when politics took the opposite
direction. There were even cases of negative economic diplomacy, when
companies had interest for cooperation, but politics tried to play economic warfare. An example of such negative economic diplomacy is the
Kosovo`s embargo on the import of goods from Serbia. (STA, 2011) The
interest of economy of course always prevailed, but there was some damage. Such short sighted policy had no success because the reason for it was
ideology or battle for political power and not the interest of the nation.
The interest of the companies is clearly seen in the case of Slovenia.
Trade volume against non EU members by the companies, which exported towards non EU markets, is the highest with Croatia. Trade volume
represents 26% of all trade volume with the non-members of the EU. 37%
of the companies, which exported their goods against non EU members,
exported towards Bosnia and Herzegovina; 31% towards Serbia, 16% towards Macedonia and 11% towards Montenegro. Among the companies
which exported towards non EU members there are 89% of them, which
exported at least towards one ex Yugoslav country. It is evident that for
the companies, doing business abroad, the economic cooperation among
Balkan states is very important. (Statistični urad Slovenije, 2011)
Conclusion
One of the cornerstones of the economies of the EU is single market with
the freedom of goods, services and people. Although there is a single
market with even single currency, many member states cooperate within certain groups more closely. There is fragmentation of EU block into
small groups, sharing common positions. There are Baltic states, there are
states of “Central Europe”, there is the EU driving engine (Germany and
France). States simply need friends. Of course, Balkan states have good relations with Germany and with France, but, as the proverb says, you cannot sleep in the same bed with the elephant. The reason for establishing
smaller groups is interest. When there is common interest, they cooperate
more closely to achieve common goal.
A group of Balkan states can not be created by a political decision
and by creating some common institutions. Such a group should be created by slow, natural process, based on economic and lately, may be also on
30
political interest. Nobody dreams of restoring Yugoslavia, but it is not impossible to follow Austrian example with Central Europe. The way, how to
accelerate this process, is economic diplomacy. The economic diplomacy
has in the Balkans higher value comparing to the majority of other states.
It is important to understand that a very important part of economic
diplomacy is establishing subtle diplomatic contacts with those who have
significant influence on reports, which are reporting data about economy
and political stability, security of investments, etc. Especially the reports
issued by eminent companies and institutions can make more help than
all the activities of commercial & trade diplomacy.
Companies understand that economic cooperation between Balkan
states is very important. Institutions, responsible for economic diplomacy
should understand it as well.
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urad Slovenije, October 2011; http://www.stat.si/doc/pub/Blagovna_%20menjava.
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Togo, Takehiro (2011): National and Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation, Religious Tolerance
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Brioni: ECPD Conference, October 21–22, 2011.
Woolcock Stephen, Bayne Nicholas (2013): The New Economic Diplomacy. London:
The LSE, ASHGATE, 2013.
32
Pavle BUBANJA
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ, ASSOCIATION FOR PEACE,
CULTURE AND TOLERANCE, KRUŠEVAC
The Charter of the United Nations
can Hardly Endure the Test of time
Dear Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me say that we live in a confused age. The confusion arises from the system of great contradictions
and oppositions which have come into effect, especially since the adoption of the Charter of the UN that was signed in San Francisco on June
26th, in 1945 upon the ending of the founding Conference of the UN
as the international organization, and coming into operation on October
24th, in 1945.
We believed that the survival of human world was waken with the
adoption of the Charter of the UN, but many very thoughtful people on
the Planet Earth are not satisfied with what the Charter proclaimed in its
goals and principles. Why did this happen and why in this fashion? Our
modest powers find it hard to name the real causes, but the grave consequences of these deeds are very visible for many nations and are often
visible in a tragic mode.
So, the issue is in human factor. We were not active enough in the
letter and spirit of the Charter, the main principles of positivism in our
lives and in the standards of the international right.
May we wonder, what is the meaning of the Christian love and other
religions’ love which preach love and solidarity among people, nations
and states?
Academically recorded, paragraph 2 of the memorandum of the UN:
“To save the future generations from the horrors of the war which twice
in our lives inflicted the mankind with the indescribable suffering”, did
not endure the test of time. Wars flame all around the world and a single
individual simply resembles an object upon the bloody human scene of
battle. Wars, in their essence, free a great amount of wildness in a man
and divine human nature push towards menagerie.
Mankind is trying hard to leave as much civilazational heritage as
possible to the future generations, as well as hope and belief in better and
more just life worthy of a man.
33
Did we do enough to make principles and goals of the UN enter the
system within which hopes and ideals of human world will be going, of
all of us, ordinary people? Certainly, we did not. But, on this spot, at the
general Assembly of the IAPMC, we must wonder seriously: where is our
world going? The dilemma is being set here and resolved, in general. Does
the powerlessness in certain sectors of activities undermine philosophy of
hope, deprived of philosophy, of love, as the very basis of our own lives.
It seems to us that the Christology of Saint Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, depicts our age and on the journey through towards the future: “As
far as it depends on you, may you have peace with all the men”.
Here, on the land of Hellenic and Roman civilazations we should
repeat the words of a great clergyman and peace-maker Martin LutherKing: “not the wounds inflicted by the evil people hurt me, but do the
wounds inflicted by the silence of good people hurt me”. Saint and good
man, Grigorije Bogoslov, said: “Speak only when you have something better than saying nothing”. So, our century should hush up, respected ladies
and gentlemen, because of the evil deeds done by people on the Planet
Earth, done to nations and states, and in that way building out of our
Planet one big and bloody scene of a battle. The forgery of the principles of great religions, discovered and natural, for the sake of wrong goals
aimed against the lives of people and goods in the human world.
Great personage of the history of Serbian people, the first Serbian
archbishop and founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Saint Sava said:
“All the goods, my Lord, that I received from you, I gave to the others”.
How many great things within history, we wonder. One politics heavily
forges the ideals of natural and discovered religions, when it names wars,
killing, robbery and occupation, “the merciful angel”. Such a contradiction
is not sustainable within the system of the elementary logics: “the merciful
angels are not peace-makers in the 20th century, they are in the Christianity and other religious peace-makers, and no murderers”.
It is difficult to gain a high mark for our age for peace-making and
peacefulness, when it comes to facing the factual truths on our time living
parts of the men’s bodies got torn off and that one makes the outrageous
market place out of them.
Certainly, they won’t need to read Dante’s Hell or the sayings of the
holiest Christian book of the Bible, on Heaven and Hell. This looks a lot
fiercer. By these wrong doings the history of peace shall not begin so
soon, since it has been subdued by the history of wars, and the history
of wars wholly covers the history of mankind. My country, the Republic of Serbia, ladies and gentlemen, respected friends, is wearing the hard
34
burden of deprivation and keeps hoping for some better and more just
days and times. Its shortage happened because of war operations of occupational nature. Old Serbian Tsar of Prizren in Kosovo and Metohy,
was left without its own people, and in Kosovo and Metohy there is room
for all the people, all the nations that abide there or used to-Serbs, Albanians, Romanies, Turks, Egyptians, so the members of various religions,
and we need only that the justice be not selective, but equally good for all
the people who want to live there in peace and in dignity, without hatred
and barbarism of any kind, and from any side. These precedents must be
stopped, if we are truly interested in peace and dignity of a man and people, Serbs, Albanians and all those living in Kosovo and Metohy, on the
state territory of the Republic of Serbia.
For example, Kruševac, the city awarded with the two peace-making
decorations The Peace Messenger and The Peace Medal, took under its
wing several thousand people who left with no home because of the operations of the Merciful Angel. All the precedents which violate the International Law and the Charter of the UN must be stopped with the aim
of the protection of the principles and goals of the Charter of the UN
and the equity of all the people, nations and states of the world must be
guaranteed.
The stay of God on Earth was lifesaving for peace, tolerance and love
among all the people on the Planet: “I give you my Peace, I leave peace to
you”. The main task that God put on the soul of people is the building of
peace, tolerance and love cut to a man’s measure.
The powerful Old Testament prophet Jeremija and other prophets of
the Old and New Testament agree upon: “All shout peace, and peace is to
be found nowhere”. The best ideals and ideas of peace nowadays and in
all the religions and philosophies are faced with the fact: “The Earth can
be left without men, some twenty times, testimony scientists for peace
and tolerance in our times”. So, a different age is what is important, when
one might think of greater and lesser sacrifices, devastations, killings. We
are faced with direct and indirect danger to disappear. The messengers of
our modesty before this big cosmos of peace and tolerance, the hope for a
better and more magnificent justice than outgoing, might be summed in
the vision of the world, better, nicer and more just. Let us forgive one another the sins and evil deeds, but let us try to make then fewer. Let us try
to unite the best contents of all the religions and civilizations for the sake
of the beginning of the history of peace instead of the constant history of
wars. Let us abolish wars and snatching of other people’s territories, as the
biggest evil that can be done by a man to aman, by a nation to another
35
nation, by a state to a state. Let us build the conditions for true peace and
love in our nations and institutions. There is no greater philosophy, theology and history of peace than the one that God Jesus Christ founded:
“Those are blessed who build peace, because they shall be named the sons
of God”.
Let us do everything to leave to the future generations as little pain
and injustice as possible, so that they would be aware that they would
not reach for gaining back of stolen and occupied territories, sanctuaries
of national importance, the cradle of their civilizations and cultures. The
wrecked monuments of the nation, churches, monasteries and other recognizable holy spots, testify all the wildness demonstrated over the spirit
and letter of the Charter of the UN, over the civilization and culture of
one nation.
Let us not allow that the example of pulling down the Christian Orthodox Temple of Holly Archangels in Prizren, testifies the call of Satanism, wrecking and so-called building of “its own sanctity” upon the ruins
of the culture and spirituality of other people.
36
Nano RUŽIN
DEAN, FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCES, FON UNIVERSITY,
SKOPJE, FYR MACEDONIA
Huntington and Clash of Civilizations
and Balkan Iconography?
The recent incident at the Partizan Stadium when during the football
match between Serbia and Albania a nationalistic flag carried by a helicopter drone shook all nations in the Balkans reminded of the sentence
of Samuel Huntigton and his capital work Clash of Civilisations in which
he points out: in the post-cold world, flags are becoming the most important
symbol, together with other symbols of cultural identity, such as the cross,
moon, even hats, because culture is a determinant and cultural identity is
very important to most citizens... The Balkans revealed new identities to
the world or rather re-discovered old identities. Whether new or old identities all over the world they march with flags, ready to start war with new
or old enemies. Pessimistic vision of the Balkans, coupled with nationalism, demagogy and populism, expects new excitements, confrontations
and changes of the borders in the region in the days ahead. Optimistic vision is connected with European integration, good neighbourly relations
and regional solidarity. Though we support optimism, European values
and integration processes, we cannot disregard that in the Balkans there
are two processes: first, intensive search for own identity is still under way,
and second, many ethnic identities are needed due to the existence of the
enemies. It seems as if Balkan people wish to prove at any cost the thesis of
Michel Dibdin that “you cannot have true friends unless you have true enemies” (quotation according to S. Huntigton-Le Choc des civilsation, Paris:
O. Jacob, 1997, page 16)
On the global level, states – nations remain major players on the international scene. According to the opinion of Henry Kissinger,” ..in the
21st century the international system will include at least six big nations
– USA, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and probably India.” In that modern
world, local and regional levels will be dominated by ethnic politics, while
on the global scene, according to Huntington’s doctrine, politics will be
civilisational, that is the rivalry between great powers will be replaced by
the clash of civilisations. (S.Huntington, Ibid.20) The following clashes will
37
not be the confrontation between social classes, the poor and the rich, but
between the nations belonging to different cultural entities. In his doctrine, Huntington does not exclude tribal conflicts and ethnic wars within
a given civilisation. Inter ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia confirm
that thesis. Were the wars in the former Yugoslavia essentially conflicts of
Balkan microcivilisations? What are the present and future like after several peace agreements? Is the inter-ethnic war from the nineties now continued by using peaceful means, through rivalry of symbols and iconographies? What does mobilization of young Bosniaks and Albanians in the
ranks of Islamic state indicate? To which extent can interethnic relations
in Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina be degraded?
Will the rivalry between Skopje and Athens about who will build a bigger
monument and show greater idolatry and kitsch towards Alexander the
Great seize? Will Croats allow the use of Cyrillic script in Vukovar?
In an attempt to give a more specific answer to the questions, at the
beginning it was necessary to clarify the question of belonging of Yugoslav
nations to different civilisations. Despite their co-existence in the Yugoslav
Federation, this country represented a mixture of different civilizations.
The most simplified criteria of identification of belonging to different civilizations, as quoted by the ancient Greeks are blood relations with a certain
group of nations, language, religion and lifestyle (customs, social organization of the family and broader community, etc.). In that context, except
for Albanians from Kosovo (not taking into account other minor ethnic
groups) who substantially belong to other nations and if we exclude other
quazi theories of non-Slavic origins of Croats, Bosniaks or Macedonians,
all nations of the former Yugoslavia belong to the group of South Slavic
nations. Ancient Athenians considered religion to be the most important
of these factors of identification of civilizations. Generally, major civilizations in the course of history were identified through religious affiliation.
Within one religion, there may be more than one religion. Christianity
includes Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants, etc.
The Balkan mosaic of nations shows that in its melting pot practically there are no national states, but multinational, multiethnic states with
more than one religion and faith. These nations who live in one country
and speak similar or the same language, but practice different religions or
faiths may potentially confront one another or wage bloody wars. As the
wars in the 90s showed, the main protagonists may be referred to history
and epic heroes, invoke some fragments of the past when their ancestors
were powerful and territory greater, insist on their uniqueness and superiority through iconographies and symbols. According to the French-Amer38
ical author Jean Gottmann, iconography is defined as a sum of symbols or
icons which people must believe in for maintaining the unity. (Gottmann-La
Politique des Etats et leur Geographie, 1955, fasc. II pages 174–175).
Iconography is a concept which marks the strengthening of the perception of the world by a certain group (nation) which finds its Raison d’
etre in the need for cultural solidarity and identity of its own community.
Iconography which is identified with belonging to one group is defined
through the transfer of symbols, values and ideas of the past and present
generations. Iconography serves as a solid link between members of one
community, but also between the community and territory. Finally, Gottmann stresses that in each nation there are three constitutive elements of
the society. These are religion, political past and organization of the society
which all possess a network of spiritual and material symbols. Combination of these three spheres represents complex and successful iconography.
All mentioned paradigms are totally natural, if not subject of demagogy,
manipulation and rivalry at minimum three levels. Firstly, at the national
level, in order to strengthen and homogenise the nation in certain historical or crisis moments, secondly at the level of interethnic relations within
one country which can create rivalry and confrontation between the opposed ethnicities and, thirdly, at inter-state (inter-neighbour) levels when
the iconographic rivalry and confrontation between states are manifested
through extremely confronted iconographies (mainly in confronted religions) or when neighbours blindly believe and compete against the same
iconographies such as was the case of Macedonia with Greece and Bulgaria.
1. Great demagogists and nations
In the ancient times, Greek aristocrats coined an ironical expression demagogist for a special political race who always spoke in the name of people -demos and addressed the crowd in a mellifluous, populist manner. A
great French mass psychologist, Le Bon, stresses that «To master the art
of impressing the mass means mastering the art of dominating it (Gustave
Le Bon-La Psychologie des foules, page 66). This is how Napoleon explains his success in the battles: ...I behaved like a Catholic when we won in
Vandee, I behaved like a Muslim in order to establish order in Egypt, turned
into an ultra brave highlander to seize the ghosts of Italy ... (Yves RoucauteLes demagogues, Paris: Plon, 1999, page. 9). A hundred and fifty years later
similar ideas are imposed in a more sophisticated manner by Adolf Hitler:
The art of propaganda lies in making it understandable where imagination
is at work, respectively in great masses dominated by instincts, it finds a
39
way to their hearts in a psychologically adaptable form. (Serž MoskovisiDobaGomile-Beograd: Čigoja, Bibl. XX vek, 1996, page 177) Therefore
Hitler and Goebbels preach the use of iconography, either in pictures,
posters, monuments, or in the form of religious or political symbols, flags,
historical relicts, short texts, music … so that one’s reasoning would be
least involved. It is sufficient to watch and refer to tradition, history, religion, language of one’s people-(volk) one’s state/nation (nationalstaat), or
state(Staat) to make an iconography influential.
Thanks to the widespread belief, people of all age groups are surrounded by a network of traditions, views and customs that unavoidably
shape their mindset and due to which they always slightly resemble each
other. The only true tyranny is the one that keeps souls in unconscious
slavery against which it is not possible to fight. Genghis Khan, Napoleon,
Hitler, Stalin or Sadam and Gaddafi were undoubtedly notorious tyrants,
but despotism to which Moses, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed or Luther gave
their souls from their graves, goes far deeper. A tyrant may be removed by
conspiracy, but what can it do against firmly rooted belief. (G. Le Bon-La
Psychologie des foules, Ibid. page 85). On the other hand, crowds influenced by propaganda and iconography lose a considerable part of their
critical judgment, either for fear or in the need to adapt, either out of
desire for utopia and imagination. Awareness of the crowd is weakened
under the burst of illusions, people start daydreaming. The only language
they understand is the language which bypasses reason and which directly
touches the heart and embellishes reality or makes it even bleaker. (Serge
Moskovici, Ibid. Volume I, page 56)
When the crowds are strongly filled with iconographic emotions and
firmly convinced of their belief, they become noncritical and intolerant
towards any different opinion or other iconography. The result of such
dogmatic and utopian feelings is that people grow more intolerant as their
belief in their own iconography deepens and strengthens. This thesis has
been accepted by all demagogues and populists since the ancient times
until the present day. National and religious iconography played an important role as well as the rise and homogenisation of their nation. They
led people into war against other nations, iconographies, civilisations,
religions and faiths. Religious iconography played an important role in
cementing the unity of the nation, but it was not the only element of the
national networking. Thus people are not religious only when they worship a deity, but also when they put all capacities of their spirit and body,
all passion of their own fantasy into the service of a specific being, symbol, iconography, idea which has become the goal or target of the masses.
40
One of the greater demagogues of the more contemporary era was
Napoleon. He presented himself to the French in a false light, imposed
the iconography of the tricolour, mistifisized his imperial dreams, brought
sculptures and obelisks from Egypt, introduced new iconographies, emblems and decorations and homogenized the French nation to believe in
these icons. He was crowned in Notre Dame by the Pope but at the time of
his crowning he bespoke to the Pope: Sovereignty is not given by God but
by the people and I am the greatest representative of the people! On leaving
the cathedral he was welcomed with 20 000 torches, a gesture which will
be copied by the Nazi 135 years later, when they celebrated their Holiday
in Nurnberg. (Yves Roucaute-Les Demagogues, Ibid. page 111).
From all demagogues Hitler was the most monstrous. He captured
the German nation through the rhetoric of love. It was the love for the
people, ethical love towards the German nation, brotherhood and unity
of the German nation. Hitler transformed the religious cord into his personal goals to achieve a better bond with the German nation. He does not
propose a new Universal church like Stalin or a Latin one like Mussolini
does. He is strictly national as Bonaparte was. He takes into consideration
the original organisation of Lutheran churches presenting it as the State
Church with anti individualistic tradition. He regards his Germany an empire where everyone is subject to eternal religious legitimacy, as preached
by Luther: Serving the Prince (Furher) with all one-s being. Hitler knew
how to present himself as the shepherd of national/socialism, the modern
Luther. He assigned himself the task to create a modern state where two
authorities, the Church and the Party are subject to his doctrine and state,
ideas presented in his Bible of that period Mein Kampf. In order for his
ideas to function he created a powerful iconography inspired by ancient
Greece. His trade mark became the Swastika.
Benito Mussolini is the creator of one of the greatest demagogies –
fascism. This is a type of national-socialism which is referred more to Catholicism than to Italy. His skills in populist wooing the nation brought
him the epithet the leader of the nation, Dux, Duce. His power did not
only derive from managing political games, elimination of his competitors
or successful games with Western diplomacies but also from his demagogy. He develops a particular fascist picture book, neo-classic style of architecture, traditional Catholic culture which he would redirect from God
to the State-nation. Beginning with Rome, this Black Pope sends his fascist blessings, attacks and excommunication. He designed an organisation
with Latin vocation, strong hierarchy, believers singled out from the people, traditions and dogmas. He refers to the doctrine of Carl Schmitt on
41
the total state, strengthened with hyperboles on the Ancient Roman Empire and limitless imperial symptom on the Roman iconography adapted
to the new fascist era.
Stalin was the most loved demagogue during his lifetime.When he
passed away a billion people wept for him. He invented the mirror image
of demagogy, transforming the world into a gigantic falsehood with the
impregnation of the Russian soul through threefold religious dynamics:
similarity-identification-mystification. Through the magic of words, pictures, monuments and gestures, sculptures, the Soviet reality was painted
as a revert to the West. Stalin himself became an iconography as well as
his most significant expressions which were materialised in a soc-realist
style: working class, revisionism, comrade, communism, hero of work,
Stakhanov. In the political picture books and posters he was portrayed as a
peaceful father of the nation smoking his pipe, sitting in a modest armchair,
clad in a military uniform, with leather boots, military khaki coat buttoned
in the middle. Always the same uniform and the same pose.In the summer
season he is clad in a white military suit, glowing with purity and simplicity. Instead of the pipe the white Marshall is smoking a cigar, decorated with
red shoulder straps and golden buttons. He lives in the Kremlin, an old
Orthodox religious center. The Basilica of the Nativity of the Virgin Mary
with multicolour domes associates the Moscow of 1555 since its aspiration to become the Third Rome. While communist parades and processions passed by, Stalin like a new Patriarch watched peacefully and philosophically. In communication with the people he prefers posters rather
than radio due to his Georgian accent. In order to better play the role of a
wise Patriarch, he is presented on posters as a quiet genius who is in communication with God for the good of the people. There is not one city in
the USSR where giant sculptures or posters of Stalin were not put up. Like
in the Orthodox doctrine, God is everywhere, his icon is everywhere, He
sees and hears everything. The iconography of Stalin homogenized the
huge Soviet multiethnic society. Willingly or unwillingly, through blackmail or fear, gulags and correctional camps and iconographies and ideologies, fascism and anti fascism, Homo sovieticus, according to the work of
Alexander Zinoviev, put up with the red Orthodox leader of the people
– Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin.
Josip Broz-Tito began to build his own iconography and the iconography of the future Federation during the People’s Liberation War. During the Fourth and Fifth Enemy Offensives, known as the Battle of the
Neretva for the rescue of wounded (January 1943) and the Battle of the
Sutjeska (summer of 1943) where Tito was wounded, he was presented as
42
a brave, decisive and intelligent leader who outsmarted the more powerful enemy and educated generals. In the same year the Second meeting of
the AVNOJ in Jajce 1943 where new iconographic symbols of the future
state were promoted, above all the Crest of Yugoslavia with five united
torches, one for each nation. Later another one was added for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Tito was aware that in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multireligious, multi-lingual community such iconography was needed which
would unite this Yugoslav melting pot.
In the beginning under the influence of Soviet iconography, Yugoslav
iconography was practically a copy of that of Moscow and Stalin with its
soc-realist style especially in the development of the cult of Marshal Tito.
Tito was a soft dictator, he himself was the iconography. In the Yugoslav patriot mythology Tito was presented as the creator and salvor…if it
were not for you comrade Tito we would not exist (Vjekoslav Perica-Balkanski idoli, Beograd: Oxford University Press, 2006, page 26) On behalf
of his name in each Republic and Autonomous Province one city gained
the prefix Tito’s (Titovo Užice, Titovo Velenje, Titov Veles.. etc). Simultaneously in all Republics and Autonomous Provinces factories, schools,
streets, sqaures, military barracks and various toponyms gained the name
of the Marshal. His portrait, sculptures, monuments, busts with the image
of the founder of the Socialist Federation of equal nations and nationalities decorated all schools and institutions. The Relay of Youth which carried a baton through the whole country for several months ending with
a Youth day celebration each year at JNA Stadium on May 25th, Tito’s
official birthday, also presented an expression of the united Yugoslav iconography. Other sgnificant symbols of unification were brotherhood and
Unity, later on self-government, non-alliance, fostering legends of fallen
heroes like Sava Kovačević, Boško Buha, Ivo Lola Ribar, incarnated in the
stories about Mirko and Slavko, the legend of the kosovar Serb Boro and
the Albanian Ramiz, heroes of work like Alija Sirotanović, who surpassed
the record of Strakchanov. The image of Alija Sirotanović appeared on the
banknote of 20 000 dinars and the one of Alija Heralica, a metalworker
from Zenica was on the banknote of 1000 dinars.
After the separation from the IB and the USSR, Yugoslavia under
J.B. Tito was marked as a revisionary creation which opened to the West
and allowed for the import of products of the modern consumer society. One could see vespas on the streets, pointed shoes, nylon raincoats
and Western-films, from polivinil records with contemporary rock stars
to Marlboro, Levi’s jeans, Coca-cola and finally the most wanted universal
Yugoslav passport. This type of socialism which criticized the rotten capiGlobalization: New Processes and their Macro and Micro Implications
43
talism but at the same time allowed the import of the consumer manners
of the West, some metaphorically named Coca-cola socialism. During its
existence this system was functional and answered to its primary purpose:
it sustained the rigid and artificial federal formation which could not find
a waz to adapt to the spirit of the new era and desintegrated under the
gust of new iconographies created after the demise of JBT and the Fall of
the Berlin wall. All iconographies of the mentioned leaders had the objective to hastefully and solidly unify and homogenize the nations they lead
and to strengthen their own authority and power. This was accomplished
by each one although the methods ranged from brutal to extremely sophisticated ones.
2. Demagogues who have harmed the inter-ethnic relations
After the fall of communism and other doctrinarian elixirs that gave
power to ideological iconography, when the end of the Marxist utopia,
Titoism, self-management system and Yugoslav hood was felt, an ideological gap was obvious with the peoples of the former federation. The
behaviour of people was similar to that when one with diopter lenses finds
the glasses missing and turns in panic searching for them in order to be
able to have clear vision again. Some turn to history, myths, nationalism
and religion, others to the West and European Union, the third are in a
dilemma, the fourth are scared and in retreat. The Church and nationalism have competed in the formation of new iconographies. At the beginning the Church had an advantage being aware that the historic moment
arrived for revenge of religion against Marx’s doctrine and Broz’s utopia.
The religious renaissance was seen as a return to the roots and God, and
the Church as the promoter of democratization of society and anti-communist forces which carried out the velvet revolutions in Poland and other
states having real socialism.
In all former Yugoslav republics and AP, religion became the main
social and cultural hit. The masses of young and old flocked to churches and mosques and in the multi-cultural societies a silent rivalry set off
expressed in decibels between church bells and mullahs leading prayers
from the mosques. Processions, religious holidays and customs have become an integral part of political marketing of the parties and state leaders. The sad side of this renaissance church and religion is that they, along
with nationalism and historical mythology, became the main factor of the
conflict in former Yugoslavia. It seemed that people couldn’t cope with
the reality of growing poverty and uncertainty. People in cities were even
less tolerant to such a limbo situation. The consciousness of masses gave
44
way under the influx of illusions. Masses were inspired under the magic
wand of some leader who assumed leadership and delighted them with
his paternalistic, populist and nationalistic authority. This authority surely
knew how to use the iconographies and simple speech, his image, history, nationalism and religion. He knows, as Freud writes, that the mass
needs authority to make decisions instead of them, and to which they are
in most cases subjected unconditionally. (Sigmund Freud-Why War? The
Standard Edition. V. XXII, p. 212).
In this way politics and politicians behave rationally in order to make
use of the irrational essence of mass. Politicians refer to the emotions of
individual and the mass and impose upon them suggestively causa, great
ideas, materialized iconography, turning mass into collective and uniform
material. The problem with leaders in such slippery times is that they are
burdened with the great idea, nationalism, chauvinism and new frontiers.
Thus they lose the sense of reality and lead their people irrationally and
into ruin. To them every other civilisation, religion, nation and politics is
the enemy that should be destroyed, or as Shakespeare said what unfortunate times when madmen lead the blind….
Bitter experience of former Yugoslav people with Milosevic, Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Karadzic, H. Tachi, but also with the institutions, political parties, certain intellectuals, media, para-military formations, have created out of the Yugoslav space an example – model of Huntington’s clash
of civilizations. In these wars newly-created or renovated iconography of
religious, epic national-centric, historic, geopolitical or cultural nature
are considerably used. Huntington defines the conflicts of civilisations as
conflicts between the states or groups belonging to various civilizations (Le
choc des civilizations, ibid. p. 279). They may outbreak between states and
non-government groups, as is the case with a group of Islamic states and
anti-terroristic coalition. The conflicts of civilizations may be manifested
within one country, between the groups that are geographically located
in the distinctive geographic zones and where groups fight for independence, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Ruanda, Nigeria. Huntington highlights the example of the war in the former
Yugoslavia as a typical micro-civilisational clash between ethnic, linguistic
religious groups. Given that the religion is the mightiest characteristic of
identity, the war almost always outbrakes between peoples of different religions. (Huntington, Ibid. p. 281). At the same time these wars are always
the wars for territory, i.e. their real cause is to control the territory and
later, influenced by other subjects, they can evolve into a war for respect
of human or collective rights of the given ethnicum, as was the case with
45
crisis in Macedonia in 2001. The wars in former Yugoslavia and the parties involved in these clashes respected one principle. There had never
been an open armed conflict between members of the same religion or
faith. In Croatia, Serbs from Kraina, of Orthodox faith clashed with Croatian Catholics. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian
Serbs fought against Bosniaks, Muslims, near Mostar Croatian Catholics
fought against Bosniaks and there were collisions between Serbo-Croatian
Christians and Bosniak Muslims. In Kosovo war was fought between Orthodox Serbs and Albanian Muslims which was in the background of the
collision between NATO air operations against SR Yugoslavia. Finally, in
Macedonia in 2001, there was a collision to a lesser extent due to prevention of international community, occurred between Orthodox Macedonians and Albanian Muslims from Macedonia and Kosovo. Even today, after
great peace agreements, the rivalry between ethnic groups and the people
of different religions is still present. This is the case with the Republic of
Srpska and other parts of BiH, then in Kosovo between Kosovo Serbs and
Kosovo Albanians, in Macedonia between Albanians and Macedonians,
in Serbia between Muslims and Albanians and Serbs in the South of the
country. Regardless of pacification, the clashes of civilisations of iconographic logic are still current.
3. Clash of iconographies at the state level –
Example of Macedonia and Greece
At the time of demolition of the Berlin wall, the breakdown of communism and the beginning of acquiring independence of the republics of
former Yugoslavia, the political elite had realized before all the importance of national identity. The Century of ideologies concluded, the Balkans stepped into the era of identity. Identity is an emotion, a sort of social
awareness that a person belonging to a nation senses. Yugoslav people led
by their own identity and policy of demagogy entered internally into severe wars resulting in international peace agreements and in recognition
of their state sovereignty and integrity. When the EU arbitrage headed
by R. Badinter prepared the report on constitutional and legal and political eligibility of the states for acquiring and recognition of independence, the commission had no objection to Macedonia. However, although
Macedonia was not involved in clashes, it was promoted as an oasis of
peace and rightly expected quick recognition and admission to the OUN,
this aspiration was disputed by its neighbours, primarily by Greece. Athens disputed the use of the name Macedonia which is, according to the
opinion of Greek politicians a part of historical heritage, then the state
46
flag with the symbol of the sun painted on the sarcophagus of Philip II
found in Vergini also a part of antique heritage of Greece, and finally Athens had objections to constitutional provisions of the new constitution of
the Republic of Macedonia, emphasizing that Skopje will take care of the
Macedonian minority in the closer neighbourhood. Athens has imposed
a condition that if RM wants to be recognized by OUN, EU and Greece, it
should change the name of the state, flag, two iconographic contents and
to withdraw the mentioned constitutional provisions. The then ruling duo
Gligorov-Crvenkovski, faced with time-constraint, accepted the temporary reference “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, as a substitute
to the constitutional name RM, also accepted the new flag and changed
the Constitution. By this act RM became a member of OUN in 1993 and
in 1995 it signed a Temporary Agreement with Greece on regulation of
bilateral relations. Both countries also pledged to respect this Agreement
particularly the provision that Athens will not block the membership of
Macedonia in international institutions if it is running under the reference.
Temporary “detente” of two neighbours was respected but Skopje
and Athens and the public opinion have not ceased identifying themselves
with their personal iconographies which were a stumbling block from the
very beginning. Both states have fostered the same iconography galvanized around the image and name of Alexander the Great and Macedonia
as the most important iconographies of the two neighbours. Iconographic
clash and rivalry gradually deepened, particularly after the recognition of
the constitutional name of Macedonia by USA and Canada in 2004. By
then, it seems that the conception of the Macedonian president Gligorov,
that time is on our side, proved correct as the impression was gained that
the Greeks came to terms with iconographic defeat. The negotiations on
the name under the auspices of OUN have become routine and without
greater ambitions for finding the right solution acceptable to both sides.
However, frustrations on both sides grew and each state in its own way
endeavoured to outwit the other by highlighting the constitutional name
or blocking the use of such a name.
Iconographic war received various forms. At the border Greek customs officials pasted stickers with the name FYROM over stickers RM on
Macedonian vehicles, the groups of fans from Macedonia appropriated
the flag with the sun from Vergine and exposed it particularly at international matches, Greek authorities and nationalists have exposed at public
places signs: Macedonia is Greece, also on numerous products, souvenirs,
scarves, socks, hats, umbrellas, even on toilet papers the symbol from
47
Vergine was used as a trademark symbol of authenticity. The Macedonian side, according to the decision of the RM Government deployed in
front of the government building about thirty statues originating from
ancient epoch. Also, the new right-wing government of Nikola Gruevski
undertook more determined steps, beginning with renaming the airport
in Skopje called Petrovec into Alexander the Great, the football stadium of
the Vardar into Philip II which Athens considered as great provocations
and used its veto power on the occasion of admission of Macedonia into
NATO membership, during the Summit of Alliance in Bucharest in 2008.
This move, which was contrary to the spirit of the 1995 Temporary Agreement of the two states, got the epilogue at the International Court of Justice
in The Hague which Macedonia appealed to and got the case. However,
this legal trump of Skopje proved insufficient because Athens between
2009 and 2014 six times blocked Macedonia in starting negotiations for
the accession to the EU. Time stopped working for Macedonia as it was
affected directly in its Euro-Atlantic integrations.
These events have intensified war of iconographies. Skopje continued
with renaming of toponyms so that the highway and corridor 10 were
named Alexander the Great, numerous streets have been got, instead of
the names of former heroes of the 20th century, their names from the dynasty of Philip II and Alexander of the IV century B.C. Macedonia hosted
he king of Pakistan’s Hunza tribe, who were allegedly successors of the
former Alexander’s phalanx who remained living in Asia. In most cities
throughout Macedonia the statues of ancient kings have begun to sprout.
However, a real explosion in architectural and iconographic terms was
created by the project Skopje 2014 which, according to some estimates,
had cost between 600 and 800 million Euros.
The basic idea of the project was to build a new historic look of
Skopje in order to get closer to the rest of European centers and also that
Macedonians become aware of their own history and identity, so that they
would be more respected for the updated macro-iconographic product.
(Brochure, Skopje 2014, www.opstinacentar.gov.mk).
Why did someone find it so important to create and actualize, instead of the century-old and proven identity values of Macedonians, the
new ones? Some authors such as James Petiffer (the New Macedonian
Question, Palgrave, 2002) already at the time of overcoming the crisis of
2001 have considered that the problem with a denial of Macedonian territory is over and that room is made for the beginning of denial of identity
that encourages interest in cultural and ideological manipulation with historical artefacts. Experiences and human communications have a spatial
48
dimension, and this is a well known and imaginatory world where human
activity is converted into empires of signs and performances with geographical reality. This geographical reality represents a privileged support
to the process of symbolization, iconography and conversion of specific
elements of human life into symbols. The room is the place where all these
ideas, values and symbols can be materialized by urbanization. Starting from the construction style, baroque and neoclassicism, the choice
of monuments, their size and symbolism and the whole creation evolves
into national iconography. In this way an important space for materialization of the national idea is fulfilled, along with other iconographic creations, such as: ideological and political iconography, literary creation, the
educational system, anthems, flags, symbols. Therefore, the project Skopje
2014 by transforming the space of the capital imposes at least one triple
function: first, the project Skopje 2014 in the perception of its authors is
intended to revive the national identity in a way desired by the authors;
secondly, the new Macedonian urban iconography will receive the role of
a connective tissue to impregnate the members of the community under
the same political authority, independently of the quality of produced iconography, as Jean Gotman wrote it. Thirdly, the material iconography of
Skopje 2014 will create quasi-aesthetic assumptions for further development of material and non-material dimensions of new Macedonian identity and iconography in the society.
Considering that the project Skopje 2014 has treated the national
iconography without taking care about aesthetics, tastes, styles, urban
balance or architectonic semantics, three statements are imposing per se:
first, thanks to new antique figures, baroque and neoclassical style, the authors and political visionaries of Skopje 2014 have showed an uncertainty
in the actual identity elements of Macedonians. Secondly, the author seeks
to prove that Skopje 2014 in the municipality Canter goes beyond the centar of the capital and that this space represents transcendentally the whole
of Macedonia and its biblical familiarity with history. Thirdly, in the circumstances of social misery and poverty the project Skopje 2014 with numerous statues and baroque buildings looks like a new Levijatan and as a
luxurious response to the lavish misery.
Finally, there is an additional dilemma: Isn’t Skopje 2014 a kind of response to the Greek nationalism? In addition to the numerous statements
in media that the project was primarily designed as a kind of revenge, this
project is more than a simplified answer to Athens. Nothwithstanding its
internal or external function, Athens prepared, also, an urban-architectural response to the provocation of Skopje. Athens started its war of monuGlobalization: New Processes and their Macro and Micro Implications
49
ments against monuments, its war of iconographies against Macedonian
iconographies, only to prove that it is entitled to what the neighbouring
politicians are trying to convince their people to believe in. On an area
of 30 hectares near Thessaloniki a Recreation Park was built – Alexanderland, a kind of Disneyland, devoted to the works of Alexander the
Great. According to the opinion of Donie Kantiskaki … Alexanderland
from Thessaloniki is even greater pap than Skopje 2014 (Greece: a Thessaloniki un Alexanderland encore plus kitsch que Skopje 2014 – Agelioforos, 26.02.2013). A central issue is: Who may have a greater monopoly
on individuals (and events) who lived 2500 years ago and why after such
a long time after the ancient era personalities that have long disappeared
can control the fate of one or more people? Perhaps the key is still in politics, demagoguery, manipulation and iconography as a necessary adjunct
to the clash of civilizations.
Epilogue
It is unpopular today to say that Huntington was right when he explained
the phenomenon of the clash of civilisationsand argumented a possible
clash of great civilisations in the near future. In the former Yugoslavia
wars were waged between micro-civilisations, nations, cultures and different religions before their segmentation and independence. Today most
of the Western Balkan nations increasingly believe not only in their own
national iconographies, but also in the new European iconographies. By
definition, national flags are attached to the flag of the European Union,
European ideas are spread across the Balkans, while the termination of
visa regime allowed the young people from the Balkans to familiarise
themselves more directly with the European values. However, within the
Balkan society rivalry between national iconographies continues. It is
manifested either as an open clash between different micro-civilisations
and iconographies such as the event at the statium of the football club
Partizan in October 2014 or as a silent rivalry which occurs in multiethnic
communities, such as for example a rivalry between different fan groups
or a rivarly between religious institutions or believers or a rivalry between
states or nations about belief in the same iconography, as it is the case between Macedonia and Greece or Macedonia and Bulgaria. If the Balkans
were Scandinavia, these rivalries would be only a platform for stronger
friendship and cooperation. However, it seems that Homo Balkanicus is
still not dead in this region.
50
LITERATURE
Samuel P. Huntington – Le choc des civilisation, Paris: ed.jakob
Bertrand Badie – Le fin des territoires, Paris: Fayard, 1995
Yves Roucaute – Les Demagogues, Paris: Plon, 1999
Serž Moskovici – Doba Gomile I i II, Beograd: Čigoja – XX vek, 1997
Nano Ružin – Evropska ideja i Balkanske ikonografije
51
Pasquale BALDOCCI
AMBASSADOR, PROFESSOR OF FACULTY FOR DIPLOMACY, GORIZIA, ITALY
1914–2014: from the Clash of
Imperialisms to the soft Power of the
European Union
The ongoing celebrations of the First World War centennial have resumed
once more, among historians and politicians, the long lasting debate on
the responsibility of the conflict. Political implications from various sides
still prevent an objective approach of the question: along a procedure of
fair analysis of the origin of the war, historians must admit that, beyond
evaluations inspired by opposed nationalisms, uncontroversial responsibilities are shared by the fighting clans in a measure hard to define and
detail.
The fast deployment of a heavy military power by the German Empire, threatening in particular the British naval supremacy; the aspiration
of the Austrian Double Monarchy to dominate the Balkans against the
old Russian influence, the growing collapse of the Ottoman Empire on
one side; on the other colonial rivalries between the great powers; French
revanchism and Italian irredentismo had spread germs of deep antagonism for decades.
The unfair treaties of Versailles, Saint Germain, Trianon and Sèvres,
as well as the end of four continental empires upon which the European
balance of power had laid for a century had opened the way to a second
conflict, after a truce seriously troubled by the aggressive impact of dictatorships and a devastating economic crisis as a consequence of political
instability.
The disasters caused by some eight years of a sort of continental civil
war and a strong demand of a long and stable period of peace to overcome the ruins and face the danger of an impending Soviet expansion
brought the main support to the movement towards a European unification, originally based on a progressive integration in the economic field:
the treaty founding a European Community for Coal and Steel, signed at
Paris in 1952, marks a major turning point for the survival and upsurge of
a group of 6 States involved in the wars of the first half of the century. Under the wise and creative leadership of statesmen inspired to an attractive
52
vision of a political union, the “European project” realized unexpected
performances in the second half of the century.
Through the implementation of the Common Market and the Euratom, followed by the creation of a Common Currency, the first 6 members
of the European Community extended their partnership to 28 members,
associated in an upgraded European Union. These developments were
not always successful: a Defence Community, as well as a Constitutional
Treaty were not ratified by some members and never entered into force.
And yet the assets of the movement are evident and probatory: peace and
stability, free circulation of persons, capitals and manpower, opening of
the borders, increase in trade and productivity, contribution to a growing
world wealth.
The serious economic crisis which reached the EU in 2008 from
the United States raised an increasing opposition among groups fighting
against a further integration of Europe, either to perpetuate the obsolete
dogma of State plain sovereignty, or for less defendable reasons like backwarded nationalism, conservatorism, or the worst racism or anachronistical fascism.
The hardest danger of the present stop-over is the weakness of the
common currency, deprived of a political stable background to stand
against economicand financial crisis. Instead of bold European minded
statesmen of the height of Schuman, Adenauer, De Gasperi or Spaak, with
Mitterrand, Schmidt, Moro and Kohl as followers, the rulers of the third
generation, dramatically lacking of a sound unitarian spirit, did not share
the same vision of Europe. The pause is still dangerously lasting for 22
years: facing the ambiguous hesitations of the French socialists and the
European ineptitude of the other leaders, the German Chancellor, who
could be more in favour of a political Europe than she normally appears,
believes that an increasing predominance of her country represents the
only safe and wise behavior.
The next duties of all believers in a European Union politically integrated in a federation of nation-States will be to press leaders and parties
to resume all efforts to complete and fully implement the unification of
the Union at a continental scale: such program implies a further enlargement to the Western Balkans countries – Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro,
Macedonia and Albania – to reach as a pre-requisite the full geopolitical
unity.
At the same time, concrete steps forward to a preliminary political
integration must be performed in the frame of the Eurozone, already committed in a more advanced stage based on the monetary union, which has
53
to fulfill its unavoidable task to merge in a federal union. At a first stage
of such a radical reform a dynamic “Vanguard” of members of the zone
must negotiate a federal treaty, as an open-ended constitutional scheme
aimed to extend the supranational power of the union to the fundamental
fields of economy, finance, taxation, foreign and defence policies, justice
and internal affairs. European ministers for each department should be
appointed, as members of a European government, responsible to a parliament composed of representatives of the European as well as national
assemblies. The decisional procedures should abandon the paralysing
principle of unanimity and adopt a qualified majority system.
The relations with the States unwilling to join the “vanguard” should
be accurately settled to avoid conflicts caused by contrasting national interests and competition in economical fields. If a global European vision
prevails within the whole EU, such a transitional association of States
could lead to a factual reliance of the Union.
It is generally agreed that the European project is presently confined
in a deadlock by a deep political crisis mainly due to a lack of historical and constitutional identity. From this dark and long lasting scenery
it clearly appears that the only strategy to proceed ahead on the long and
uneasy ground of the European unification is a foundational leap accomplished by young leaders sharing the vocational energy and inspiration of
the creative years of the European movement. Among teachers, researchers and students in many universities and cultural centers of Europe a
federal vision of the Union is already considered and supported in studies,
conferences and programs. Most Italian faculties of political science and
economy are regularly debating the issues of a concrete federalism which
will inevitably affect the circles of politicians in charge. Completing the
economic union with a full political integration, gradually implemented
by a limited number of member States followed by the whole Union seems
to be the logical and historical development of the European project.
54
Lisa Tassone ROMERO
PSYCHOLOGIST, MEMBER OF WORLD SOCIETY OF VICTIMOLOGY
Winds for war in Europe:
Russia as the Index of Balance Point
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I am here as a Representative of the
World Society of Victimology (www.worldsocietvofvictimology.org) and the
Association “End of Fear Community Project” (www.endoffear.weebly.com).
First of all, I want to have a humanitarian approach to the issue of
Peace.
If we, members present at this debate, are at all serious, then we must
understand the fact that each debate on religious tolerance, inter-ethnic
co-existence, reconciliation and human security should be pivoted around
a serious, intelligent, individual and collective observation of the very
roots of human conflicts, not only through the proposal of mere political
actions limited to the establishment of new separative regulations.
The atrocious events which took place in the recent conflictual history of the former Yugoslavia should be observed as a collective European
and Global keystone, so to inquire, as human beings first of all, and not as
members of this or that certain pattern of identification, whether religious,
ethic, cultural or sociological.
“Pacem in terris” (“Peace on Earth”) has been preached by all religions for thousands of years: it has been the motto of christianitv, the
mantra of the hindu religiosity and the buddhists people. “Islam” means
peace...
But all along these thousands of years man has lived in conflict; and
where are we now?
This is a fact and this debate must see this fact for what it is.
Therefore, this debate and this speech are inexorably tied up with the
immensely relevant question which is:
Why?
So, we are here, all together, as human beings, wondering and interrogating ourselves about:
Why does a man kill another man in the name of God?
Why do men kill men in the name of Peace?
55
Why?
We assume that this is the only serious “starting point of analysis”
necessary to activate a serious discussion, considering the issues of this
debate, then right actions perhaps will take place.
Now, to turn to consider facts happening in this world nowadays, I
would like to mention the “Crimea case”, because what happened and what
may happen in the near future will affect not only the destiny of the European Union, but also that of the Balkans, I believe.
Crimea is for Russia the outlet to the Meditteranean Sea. Therefore
Russia, just like the tzaristic empire before 1917, never would have renounced to that outlet for good: it puts them in contact with the Balkans
and the Middle East, energetic and political link.
The decision to аnnех, via referendum, the Crimea to Russia and the
will to open a “passage State” to link Russia to Crimea, is probably the
consequence of insecurity that Russians live, fearing that Ukraine could
suddenly detach itself. I would like to know who is blowing on this fire!!!
It’s true that Ukraine is the European side of the ех Soviet Republics
and therefore is somehow natural an approach to Europe, so the best thing
would be that Russia does not create hassles. But this needs time, time
to make them understand that Europe is there and that its decisions are
autonomous and oriented to build a good neighborhood relationship and
commercial exchanges with Russia. It is not necessary for Ukraine to enter
immediately the EU. Therefore, a longer transition period could reassure
Russia that the eventual admission of Ukraine in the EU is not an antiRussian function, neither from our part nor to please the United States.
But the first and most important of these actions is NOT to give entry
into the NATO to Ukraine. NATO is the military alliance that first established the Western Block against the Soviet Republics. So, if that happens,
should be considered a sort of revival in anti-Russia mode. Peace would
be at stake. Moreover, that would probably put an end to the dream of a
stable European Union. To whose profit?
What to do then? Well, this is a game that Europe could play “at
home”, directly with the Russians. First, as we said, Ukraine should not enter the Nato because there would be “action obligation” in case that one of
the members is attacked. Second point: Ukraine could enter the EU later
on, without adhering to the Nato. I suggest that for the moment a “Free
Trade Zone” would be ok. This could be done under the label of “favourite
country for trade”, but this Free Trade Area should be also established
with Russia.
56
For what concems the “bonding belt” to Crimea, which is in the
mind of Russian politicians, I suggest the immediate establishment of an
autonomous region in Ukraine, which could sign bonding agreements
with Russia, thus giving them the guarantee for a permament passage to
Crimea.
So, the fighting should end immediately, followed perhaps by a Peace
Conference in Bruxelles, between EU, Russia and Ukraine.
That is my point of view, anyway. Thanks for your attention.
57
Nora REPO
FREELANCE LECTURER AND WRITER, PHD IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION
(FROM ÅBO AKADEMI UNIVERSITY, FINLAND) FINLAND
Islam as a Potential Force of Change
in Questions Related Gender Roles
It is my view there is no magical instant cure for the painful wounds of the
past and present, but there is always a way to begin to address them. We must
learn the art of addressing the past without being its victims. For me it is here
that feminist voices and scholarship in Islam have something to offer.
(Mir-Hosseini 2012)
Islam not only as religion, but also as a political and social force is globally very topical in today’s world due to many reasons. Approximately 1.6
billion people, or almost one-fourth of the world population, confess Islamic faith. More than one-fifth (20%) of the world’s Muslim population
live in countries in which Islam is not religion of the majority. In Europe
approximately 5% of continent’s population is Muslim. This means around
40 million people who represent 2.4% of whole world’s Muslim population. In Western Europe majority of Muslims often have some kind of
immigrant background, while in Eastern Europe live Muslim populations
that are centuries old. Actually approximately 60% of Muslims living in
contemporary Europe are indigenous, many times having their origins in
the regions of Eastern or Southeast Europe.1 Among the European countries with most significant Muslim populations, one can find five Balkan
countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.2
Islam as religious tradition has a long history in the Balkans. Islamic
heritage has been part of local cultural heritage for more than 700 years
and in the Balkans reside today at least around 9 million Muslims adhering to different ethnic and linguistic groups and theological traditions3,
58
1
In this count are included Muslim populations living in Russia (Pew Research Center 2009).
2
e European countries with most significant Muslim populations are Russia, Germany,
Th
France, Albania, Kosovo, United Kingdom, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Netherlands, Bulgaria and
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Pew Research Center 2009).
3
ainly Sunni of Hanafi tradition, Bektashi and Alevi, but also other smaller communities as
M
well as some groups interpreting Islam in a stricter manner are present. In the Balkans, as it
and living in diverse demographical, societal and institutional realities.
(Cf. Öktem 2010) That is, they represent approximately one fourth of
European Muslim population. The cohabitation of religious traditions in
the Balkan Peninsula has meant conflicts and huge challenges, but it has
also been possible regardless of many times difficult circumstances. In
today’s context these circumstances are influenced for instance by economic situations, political alignments, history and inequalities of different
types within the states’ societal and social structures. It is a fact that in the
Balkans there have been many conflicts justified with religious grounds.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that religion in itself would have
been the genuine fundamental reason and justification for the conflicts.
It would be important to remember that in history there have also been
periods of peace. When we now live in times of global tensions between
cultural and religious spheres, Eastern and Southeast Europe might actually have something precious to give to others, because of this historical
experience of religious cohabitation.
In the Western world one many times tends to have relatively onedimensional image of what Islam as religious tradition consists of. When
it comes to public discussion in the foreground are often questions how
Islam defines gender roles and relationships between these roles. The way
in which the rich Islamic tradition is interpreted has a major significance
when one observes different manifestations of Islam in a certain context.
From the Islamic point of view gender roles may for instance be seen as
complementary, or the gender equality can be considered as one of the
fundamental core values of Islam, or both statements can be considered
equally adequate. That is, the scale is wide. Islam, or what is or can be justified with it, often offers a wider frame of reference than possibly culturally narrower gender roles, which might give less variety of options as for
interpretation and implementation of these roles. Also, when patriarchal
cultural heritage and religious tradition define their mutual relationship,
religious values may represent a more important moral denominator and
be placed somewhat deeper in an individual’s set of values. Religious values might therefore offer a tool against unpleasant or dissatisfactory cultural conventions and patterns.
occurs also more generally, one often uses rather loosely different terms for Islamic radicalism naming groups representing it for instance as “Salafist”, “Wahabist”, “Jihadi terrorist” or
“takfiri Islamist”. (Öktem 2010)
59
Perceptions of gender and Islamic law
In the minds of many, Muslim women are placed only in the role of a
passive and submissive victim. However, Muslim women often are much
more aware and acknowledging than those who observe the situation from
outside would assume. Also the realities they live in reflect a huge diversity.
Mainstream interpretation of Islam in the Muslim world tends to understand genders as complementary. That is, genders are equal but different
and therefore have different duties and rights. Generally speaking this interpretation of Islamic tradition is considered to give women for instance
a right to study, to work outside their homes and earn and use in the way
they choose their own revenues as well as to be financially in a secure position in the family. Meanwhile men should be responsible for providing for
the whole family and treat their spouses in a caring manner.
These features seem to make Muslim women relatively independent
and secured, but they are not implemented in all cases and contexts within
the framework of the whole Muslim world. Muslim woman is considered
to be exempted from some of her religious obligations in some physiological states. Women can perceive this as both relief and restriction.
Nonetheless, gender roles and how they are understood among Muslims
are not categorical. Despite recommendations and opinions of Muslim
scholars, cultural conventions and traditions, and possible social pressure,
what types of forms these roles take can vary a lot in everyday contexts,
because they are materialized in behaviour and lives of ordinary people.
That is, in a human, constantly changing and fluid context.
Some scholars speak about religionization of Muslims and refer with
the concept to the phenomenon in which Muslim populations are perceived and understood mainly as representatives of one particular religious tradition. That is, for instance cultural, national, social, economic
and educational features are placed in a secondary position when a person is considered to be first and foremost a Muslim. Thus, according to
this view, being a Muslim means having a certain type of behaviour and
determine opinions regardless of cultural background, level of education
or social class, for example. It is a fact that Muslims are united by several
common dogmas, shared by all of them. But how much emphasis is put
on religious values and what kind of role religion actually plays in everyday life and choices of an individual are already other questions. Women’s
status and their opportunities to have an impact on it depend also very
much on the family network they are part of and the type of society they
live in. If they for instance can be economically secured by the state in a
60
difficult situation, or backed up by their family members in their choices
that the surrounding environment might socially condemn, women can
be able to take very independent decisions.
Islamic law, Sharia, often represents a divine ideal in the eyes of many
Muslims. However, what is understood with the concept of Sharia and
how it should be implemented in the contemporary contexts are issues
that Muslim populations perceive in a variety of ways. Thus, understandings, interpretations and implementations of the law manifest themselves
in different ways in different contexts. Only God is considered to have a
full access to Sharia as a complete entity, and the mankind can obtain information regarding it through Islamic scriptures and tradition, as well as
through the reflection and decisions of Islamic scholars. This means that
at least partly decisions and recommendations within the Sharia corpus
are influenced by human reflection.
It can also be stated that the tradition according to which Islamic scriptures are interpreted has traces of patriarchal culture for instance from the
Middle East region where Islam firstly was revealed. (Cf. Armstrong 2001;
Esposito 2001; Wadud 2012; Wadud 1999) Others for their part might consider that any deviation or attempts of reinterpretation of Sharia as it is
understood in contemporary context is a heretic act. Some can have the
opinion that Sharia corpus as it is currently perceived and implemented,
carries significant traces of western legal reforms, which influenced legislation in many Muslim countries during the more recent centuries. Thus, the
nature of Sharia before these recent developments could be understood as
more dynamic and flexible. There are also opinions according to which the
interpretation of Sharia that we know today puts too much emphasis on
the meaning of early Islamic jurisdiction. Question of gender in the Islamic
framework is in many matters tied to question of Islamic law and how it is
read, understood and implemented.
Islam in the Balkan scenery is a complex phenomenon. In addition
to ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, Muslim communities live in
differing societal and institutional frameworks. They can represent a majority or a minority in the society, live under secular regimes or under
regimes that favour some other religious community. Attitudes people
have towards Islam may also vary from generally positive connotations
to more Islamophobic ideas. The more visible presence of Arab and Iranian influence in Southeast Europe, which emerged particularly during
the period of relatively recent conflicts in former Yugoslav sphere in the
1990s, has ever since been shifting away. This presence and the aid and the
reconstruction programmes that were brought with it were welcomed in
61
post-conflict contexts. However, the type of Islam that did not take into
account local conventions, religious syncretism and interfaith traditions,
which these foreign foundations often tried to import, could not flourish
long in the Balkan scenery. In contrast to this diminishing impact, Turkish actors and cooperation have become more important. Attitudes of the
Muslim populations towards Turkish presence and influence however
vary greatly in different Balkan states from high levels of sympathy and
intimacy to general dismissal. Additionally in the Balkan states questions
are raised related to their “national” and “European” forms of Islam. (Öktem 2010) Islamic radicalism in the Balkans is a predominantly marginal
phenomenon. Research fellow Kerem Öktem (2010) estimates that there
might be around few thousand potential extremists in the whole region,
most of whom have abandoned violent struggle and withdrawn to “radically conservative but often quietist lifestyles”.
Perceptions of Sharia law vary in the Southern and Eastern Europe.
According to an American nonpartisan fact tank Pew Research Center’s
recent statistics (2013) in Russia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina slightly more
than half of the Muslim population consider Sharia as divine word of
God. However, only 30% or fewer share this opinion in Albania and Kosovo. Even though many Muslims tend to favour a single interpretation of
Sharia in Southern and Eastern Europe, the support for making Sharia the
actual official legal code of the state is relatively weak. Also enthusiasm to
allow religious judges to decide matters in the domestic sphere, in family
and property issues, is not so accentuated among Muslims in these countries. Muslims also many times tend to favour woman’s right to choose if
she wants to wear a veil in public. In some countries of Southeast Europe
(e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) this comprises even more than
90% of Muslim population. In Southeast Europe one can also find more
moderate views than elsewhere in the Muslim world, as for questions such
as should a woman obey her husband or not, or should she be able to initiate a divorce. There is a high percentage of Muslims that support equal
inheritance rights regardless of gender. Nonetheless, important differences
can be perceived between the opinions of those who support implementation of Sharia in the country they live in and those who oppose it. (Pew
Research Center 2013)
62
I slam and feminism – opposites to each
other or components of dialogue
Even though the issues related to position of women within Islamic framework have been raised already since at least 100 years, they have become
more perceivable and emphasized particularly since the late 1980s and in
the 1990s. In the history of Islam there have been strivings for an egalitarian interpretation of Sharia conducted by Muslim jurists and reformers,
but the rise of critical voices and scholarship from within the religious
tradition that acknowledge feminist analysis and places gender as a category of thought into religious knowledge is a more recent development.
(Cf. Mir-Hosseini 2011)
To speak about feminism in a religious context can by some be considered as contentious and contradictory and may in the case of Islam
and feminism displease both; often secular feminists who have negative
perceptions of religion as well as Muslims. Muslims can see references
to feminism as western ideas, or even conspiracy of some kind, that for
instance diminish the meaning of family and role of a man, focuses too
much on individual and is a deteriorating element for religious life. However, as British writer Shelina Zahra Janmohamed notes in her relatively
recent article:
Stuck in the middle of this furore are Muslim women themselves – who may
or may not label themselves as Muslim feminists – but who nonetheless are working tirelessly to improve the conditions for (Muslim) women.
(Janmohamed 2014)
Iranian legal anthropologist and a long-term activist Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2011) points out that both of the debatable concepts Islam and feminism can have different meanings for different people in different contexts. This means that even the use of the combination of terms, “Islamic
feminism”, as such can be a source of diverse attitudes and opinions, confusion and debate.4 Mir-Hosseini (2012) nonetheless considers that in the
4
iba Mir-Hosseini describes the situation in the late 1990s in the following manner: “[M]ost
Z
of those defined by academics and journalists as ‘Islamic feminists’ rejected either the ‘Islamic’ or the ‘feminist’ part of the term. If they came from a religious background and addressed
women’s rights within an Islamic frame of reference, they wanted to avoid any kind of association with the term ‘feminism’; their gender activism was a mixture of conformity and defiance. If they came from a secular background and addressed women’s rights from within
broader feminist discourses, they rejected being called ‘Islamic’, even although many of them
located their feminism in Islam. Those associated with political Islam took contradictory positions and made confusing statements with respect to gender equality. (Mir-Hosseini 2011)
63
quest for justice for women there was a need to bring these two perspectives, Islamic and feminist, together. In order to materialize a meaningful
dialogue between these two, one however needed to establish a respectful
mutual approach between the two concepts as equals; neither one should
dominate the other. In such a manner one would be ready, as Mir-Hosseini emphasizes, to, “first to listen to the other’s arguments, and secondly to
change [one’s] […] position if appropriate.” (Mir-Hosseini 2012)
The most easily discerned orientations that aim at enlarging Muslim women’s space and making dominating interpretation of Islam more
gender inclusive succeed in it each in their own ways. Those who wish to
place religious matters more in private sphere make space for women in
shared public sphere that is common for all. This orientation is often considered as secular feminism. Ideology and thoughts that promote the idea
of gender complementarity in such a manner that women’s rights, which
are considered to belong to them according to the mainstream interpretation of Islam, actually would be implemented are known with many
names for example as Islamist, modernist, neoconservative or neotradionalist. This ideology implies that the currently dominating patriarchal way
of interpreting religious tradition would be rectified to the direction in
which women could also claim their Islamic rights that are already mentioned in and part of the existing interpretation of religious tradition. For
both of these orientations materializing and combining both Islam and
human rights ideals is difficult, when the use of these types of interpretations tend to exclude one or the other. (Cf. Wadud 2012)
Notably those who perceive themselves as Islamic feminists want to
see both human rights and Islam materialized through a new interpretation and rereading of Islamic scriptures and traditions. The ideal of equality of all people regardless of their gender cleaves through the Quranic
texts, but it can remain in the background in everyday life contexts. That
is why a change, especially according to this orientation of Islamic feminism, based on Islamic scriptures becomes a necessity. Women, and men,
who speak for the new gender inclusive interpretation of Islamic tradition
can be met all over Islamic world, but often their voices remain unheard
or are covered by emphasis put instead on flagrant grievances, which may
concern materialization of gender equality in Muslim communities or
violent acts justified with Islam. Women’s strivings for gender equality are
present, but they can be positioned in diverse manners and for instance be
locally tied, multiple and altering views on the issue. The diversity of opinions is for instance due to that women do not necessarily agree on what
64
concepts such as “justice” or “equality” comprise, and how they could or
should be reached. (Cf. Mir-Hosseini 2011)
Islam is in no way sole religious tradition, when it comes to tendencies of creating patriarchal interpretations of religious cultural heritage and
scriptures. In order to compare, one can for instance reflect on works of
some theologians and clergymen in diverse Christian churches. Furthermore, according to appreciated British religious historian and scholar
Karen Armstrong (2001, x): “In all three Abrahamic religions [Judaism,
Christianism and Islam], the more conservative believers have responded
to the emancipation of women in modern culture by overstressing traditional restrictions.” Armstrong considers that the religious oppression directed to women is the major deficiency of these monotheistic religions in
which this tendency to oppress actually goes against fundamental principles of each of these faiths (Armstrong 2001, vii-viii). As American Professor Emerita of Islamic studies and a specialist in Quranic exegesis Amina
Wadud notes, patriarchy in Islam as such should be perceived as a human
and not a divine institution. One cannot find a divine justification for its
very existence. (Wadud 2012) Mir-Hosseini is convinced that competing
interpretations of Islam’s sacred texts most likely will continue to exist, but
it is important to notice that the power an interpretation might have depends not necessarily “on its correctness, but on the social and political
forces supporting its claims to authenticity” (Mir-Hosseini 2011). Thus,
Muslim women’s current strivings for more justice and equality have at
least theological, social and political dimensions, and it can be very challenging to draw a precise line between these elements (cf. Mir-Hosseini
2012).
Conclusions
In the current circumstances it might be wise to remain cool-headed when
it comes to issues that are related to different manifestations of Islam and
Islamic cultural tradition in different parts of the world. Instead of letting
threat images, fear and distrust undermine bridge building between different groups, one would need to observe more the details so that the nuances become more visible and stigmatization of a whole group of people
less emphasized. Gender roles, regardless if they as such are considered to
be necessary or not, are in an important position when it comes to how all
of us perceive and structure the world. The change emerging from within
Islamic tradition as for dominating interpretations of gender roles most
65
likely has and will have an impact that radiates outside the whole religious tradition and influences the relations it has with other cultural and
religious spheres and entities. The period of an important transition has
already started, a visible progress has already happened and one speaks
about it out loud. I believe that in the coming years we will witness a
major change that in an even more emphasized manner promotes gender equality on Quranic grounds also in the Southeast Europe, where the
generally moderate views on religious issues Muslim populations have can
offer a fertile ground for this development.
SOURCES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Armstrong, Karen (2001): Foreword, Daughters of Abraham. Feminist thought in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, (eds.) Haddad, Y. Y. and Esposito, J. L. Gainesville:
University Press of Florida. pp. vii–xiii.
Esposito, John L. (2001): Introduction. Women, Religion and Empowerment, Daughters of Abraham. Feminist thought in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, (eds.)
Haddad, Y. Y. and Esposito, J. L. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. pp. 1–11.
Janmohamed, Shelina Zahra (2014): British Muslim women don’t need the West’s version of feminism, OK? Http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/10702454/
Islam-and-feminism-British-Muslim-women-dont-need-the-Wests-version-offeminism-OK.html (accessed 18 November 2014).
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba (2012): Feminist voices in Islam: promise and potential.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/ziba-mir-hosseini/feminist-voices-in-islam-promise-and-potential (accessed 18 November 2014).
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba (2011): Beyond ‘Islam’ vs. ‘Feminism’. Http://www.zibamirhosseini.com/documents/mir-hosseini-article-beyond-islam-vs-feminism – 2011.pdf
(accessed 18 November 2014).
Pew Research Center (2013): The World’s Muslims: Religion, politics and society.
Http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/# (accessed 13 November 2014).
Pew Research Center (2009): Mapping the global Muslim population. Http://www.
pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/ (accessed 13
November 2014).
Wadud, Amina (2012): Amina Wadud on Feminism in Islam. An interview. Http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGH-01KQB_A (accessed 21 February 2014).
Wadud, Amina (1999): Qur’an and Woman. Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Öktem, Kerem (2010): New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans. Http://balkanmuslims.com/pdf/Oktem-Balkan-Muslims.pdf (accessed 19 November 2014)
66
iii Post-Global Crisis:
European Union and
its Surroundings
Silvo DEVETAK
PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES OF
UNIVERSITY OF MARIBOR, SLOVENIA
Europe on the Crossroad: Cold War
or Creation of a Common Space for
Peace, Security and Development
Foreword
The present article is the reflection of my academic activities dealing with
the external relations of the EU and good governance in Eastern Europe
countries in recent ten years. In this time I have been the coordinator
(and grant holder) of number of projects co-financed by the EU dealing
with different aspects of the EU cooperation with Eastern Europe. Two
have been the most relevant:
The first was the EuropeAid Project “BRIDGE – Fostering mutual
understanding and cooperation between the EU and Belarus, Moldova,
Russia and Ukraine” (2008–2012). Within this project a great number of
actions were organised analysing the EU relations with Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, the role of civil societies in the relations of those
countries with the EU, the migration problems, cross-border cooperation
along the EU external frontiers, the cooperation in the fields of education,
culture and science, the inter-ethnic relations and protection of minorities in BRIDGE partner countries and so on. More than 600 academics,
leaders of civil societies and minority organisations, civil servants, students, etc. took active part in the BRIDGE deliberations. The critical assessments, view-points and final proposals adopted at BRIDGE meetings
have received a positive response of the leading personalities of the EU.5
The second is TEMPUS JP Regional Master Programme “European
Neighbourhood Policy Law and Good Governance – EUNEG” (2012–
2015), which aims to develop and introduce a new Master study programme on European neighbourhood topics at 8 universities in Moldova,
Russia and Ukraine.6 I am also Head of the Master program at the Faculty
of Law of the University of Maribor “European studies and EU external
5
See: http://www.project-bridge.eu/
6
See: http://www.tempus-euneg.eu/
Post-Global Crisis: European Union and its Surroundings
69
relations”, which is also dedicated, from the academic point of view, to the
topics related to this conference.7
What is now going on in the region is in the complete contradiction
with our endeavours to improve the relations between the EU and Eastern Europe, including Russia and to improve the culture of understanding
and mutual respect of people in Europe. Therefore I fill o moral duty to
raise the voice against the spreading of the “new version” of the cold war
in Europe.
The new geopolitical situation of the EU space
The EU neighbourhood has been in the recent years transformed in an
area of disorder and unpredictable future. This is also the result of the
inadequate interventions of the USA and its allies (or Russia on the other
side), aimed at supporting the domestic rebellion against the unwanted
regimes. The EU is thus far from achieving one of the main goals enshrined in the revised strategy of common security policy in 2008 – that
is “the establishment of security in the EU neighbourhood and in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean area, in Middle East and Caucasus.”8
As to the Balkans the stability of this part of Europe remains an unfinished business in spite of remarkable progress over the last decades.
The recent outburst of nationalism in Serbia and Albania has shown the
fragile stability in the region.9 In the Mediterranean area is the EU after the “Arab revolutions” confronted with unstable political and security
situations. The Palestinian-Israeli problem “dangles” as a time bomb over
Middle East. The civil war in Syria is continuing. The spreading of the
jihadists Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), which emerged from the
extremist groups supported by some of Arab monarchies and USA, put
in question the territorial integrity of at least Syria and Iraq. The well or-
70
7
See: http://www.pf.um.si/index.php/en/european-studies-and-eu-external-relations
8
e 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy was written to upTh
date the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU’s overall foreign policy strategy. It is
a Comprehensive document which analyses and defines the EU’s security environment, identifying key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU. See: http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/. The European Security
Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council on 12–13 December 2003, provides the
conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including what
would later become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). See: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/index_en.htm .
9
Nationalism gaining strenght in Serbia, Albania, DW, 19. October 2014.
ganised worldwide spreading of the “jihadists’ ideology” through internet
and the number of volunteers fighters from some of European countries
represent a serious security danger for the EU and its member states.10
The failure of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (EaP), which has
been dramatized with the violent change of power in Ukraine, with the
referendum and subsequent annexation of Crimea and the pro-Russian
rebellion in Eastern Ukraine (and the creation of ones more “frozen conflict”), pushed on the surface elements of the new cold war confrontations
in Europe, now within the borders of ex-USSR.
The EU neighbourhood policies towards the three EU partner countries in the southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have
been curtailed as Armenia opted for joining the Euro-Asian Economic
Union (EAEU).11 In spite of the EU endeavours, the “frozen conflicts”
(Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia) continue to be a source
of instability of the region. Hence they hamper also the EU projects of
cooperation with this region, mostly concerning supply of energy to Europe. The recent agreement concluded between Russia and Abkhazia on
strategic cooperation, which includes also the military sector, contributes
further to the division of the region.12
The symbol of the cruel reality is the fact that are the three EU neighbouring countries which are the “front runners” in the EU “association
policy” – Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – the poorest countries of Europe. Their Gross National Income per head was in 2012 far behind that
of Bulgaria (the poorest EU country) and a little less behind Macedonia
and Kosovo! In addition Ukraine has been transformed in the frontline of
the emerging cold war confrontation between the West and Russia.
Elements of the cold war confrontation could be found also in the
rivalries concerning the presence of neighbouring countries in the Arctic
region and the dividing of the huge natural resources that supposedly lay
bellow it.
10
ita Katz, Air strikes won’t disrupt Islamic State’s real safe haven: social media, DW, 24
R
September 2014; Andrea Dessi, Dario Cristiani,Wolfgang Mühlberger,Giorgio Musso, Africa and the Mediterranean evolving security dynamics after the Arab uprisings, Mediterranean Paper Series 2014, The German Marshal Fund of the United States and Istituto Affari
Internazionali, Rome.
11
ussia backs Armenia’s involvement into Eurasian integration – S. Lavrov, Itar-Tass,
R
23 June 2014.
12
n the round table “Russian-Abkhazian relations: the contours of a new level of integration”
O
– See more at: http://mfaapsny.org/en/information/?ID=2857#sthash.pzRjlcgi.dpuf
71
Europe and the division of power in the world
multipolar system
The geopolitical situation in the EU neighbourhood is the reflection of the
global confrontation of the USA with China and Russia (and with other
BRICS countries) for the new distribution of power and influence on the
world wide level.
This confrontation involves elements of new cold war. For instance,
Russia and China are both under the USA attack by methods intended to
weaken, destabilize, and in the limit-case destroy a targeted government
without the need to engage in direct military warfare. These methods include threats against the targeted country, economic sanctions, military
encirclement around its borders, cyber-warfare, drone warfare, and USA
use of proxy forces from within or from outside the country for political and/or military action against the local government. This concept of
confrontation includes propaganda campaigns against the targeted governments waged by media conglomerates which are directly through various means linked to the USA foreign-policy establishment. The president
Obama, Nobel Peace Prize winner speech, held on 28 May 2014 to the
students of the West Point reflects this philosophy.
Russia and China, had, of course, developed adequate »counter-attack« strategies. This year’s meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club held in Sochi on October 22–24, 2014 was a good occasion for
summing up the elements of the Russian approach to the current global
division of power. The meeting brought together many of the world’s top
Russia experts to debate the changing needs of the global security system. Participants discussed key issues related to Russia’s future role in this
global security architecture.13 President V. Putin in his speech on the conclusion of the meeting admitted that there is a need to change the systems in place within international relations, but according to him “the US
has been destabilizing the world order of checks and balances for its own
gains.« He added that the US, as perceived winners of the Cold War, is
trying to create the world “for their own gains,” which has weakened global
and regional security. Any country that does not agree with Washington’s
view of affairs is all but blacklisted.14
72
13
I n illustration see: Dominic Basulto, How Russia views the post-Cold War global order, Russia Direct, November 3, 2014
14
See: http://rt.com/news/199028-putin-speech-best-quotes/
Michael Roskin from the USA Army College thinks that the ‘New
Cold War’ will be long and deep only if the USA pushes Russia and China
into an alliance.16
In all these scenarios is Europe driven to the frontlines of the “new,
contemporary version” of cold war confrontation.17 It is much more dangerous than the “classic” cold war as the bearers of it are not in the position to ensure the control over the consequences of their actions. It is thus
the urgent question of paramount priority how to avoid the renewal of the
cold war in Europe which would be a disaster not only for the Union and
its member states but for the international community as a whole.
This is the main reason why should the new EU structure begin without delay the discussion on and the elaboration of fresh strategies for Europe and of innovative policies as well as measures for their realisation,
aimed at avoiding such catastrophic development of the situation in Europe.
The general long term objective of these fresh strategies and policies
should be the aim to create, step by step, the “European Common Space of
Peace, Security and Development” spanning from Lisbon to Vladivostok.
As a first step it will be commendable to elaborate – through the dialogue
with all interested European countries, including, of course, Russia – the
security, political, economic, and cultural and other elements on which
this “European Common Space” should be built up. It seems to me that
Europe needs a contemporary Conference on security and cooperation as
was the case nearly 40 years ago, which was honoured with the Helsinki
Declaration in 1975.
15
The USA and its European allies – Russia
confrontation in Ukraine
The basic pre-condition for the step by step building of “European Common Space” is the solution of the Ukrainian crisis. In order to understand
this problem of strategic importance for Europe it suffices to quote three
15
S ee the academic view of the official policy: Ivan Timofeev, Program Director at Russian International Affairs Council, Why Russia wants a change to the contemporary world order,
Russia Direct, Oct 30, 2014. The author elaborate what should be Russia’s strategy for guaranteeing its security and access to global resources in a new multipolar world; Dominic Basulto, How Russia views the post-Cold War global order, Russia Direct, November 3, 2014.
16
Michael G. Roskin, The New Cold War, Parameters 44(1) Spring 2014.
17
s illustration: NATO plans to deploy five bases in Eastern Europe. The bases are planned in
A
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania and Poland, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung,
quoted from ITAR-TASS, August 31, 2014.
73
basic points from the article of Henry Kissinger which was published on
5 March 2014 in Washington post:
First, “far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown:
whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive
and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other – it should
function as a bridge between them…”
Second, “the West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country; Russian history began in what was called
Kieavan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been
part of Russia for centuries and their histories were intertwined before
then…” and
Third, “the EU must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and
subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turn negotiations into
crisis”.18
As to the latest point the EU, among other, put Ukraine before the
Vilnius summit in November 2013 in the “take or leave” position. After
the haste signature of the AA and DCFTA in June 2014 and when the
dramatic civil war situation in the eastern Ukraine was already created the
EU postponed the realisation of the trade agreement until 2016 in order
to consider its consequences on the Ukrainian trade with Russia (sic!).
International financing has played a significant-although not always
reported-role in the current conflict in Ukraine is stated in the study
“Walking on the West Side The World Bank and the IMF in the Ukraine
Conflict” published by Oakland Institute from USA.19 The study reveals
also some shortcomings of the AA. Whereas Ukraine does not allow the
use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture,20 article 404
of the EU agreement, which relates to agriculture, includes a clause that
74
18
Henry A. Kissinger, How the Ukraine crisis ends, Washington Post, 7 March 2014.
19
S ee: [email protected] . A major factor in the crisis that led to deadly protests and
eventually President Yanukovych’s removal from office was his rejection of an EU Association agreement that would have further opened trade and integrated Ukraine with the EU.
The agreement was tied to a $17 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Instead of the EU and IMF deal, Yanukovych choose a Russian aid package worth $15 billion plus a 33% discount on Russian natural gas. This deal has since gone off the table with
the pro-EU interim government accepting the new multimillion dollar IMF package in May
2014. See also: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-ukraine-eu-idUSBRE9AR0CL20131129 .
20
grochart website, http://www.agrochart.com/en/news/news/061113/ukraineagriculturalA
biotechnology-annual-aug-2013/.
has generally gone unnoticed: it indicates, among other things, that both
parties will cooperate to extend the use of biotechnologies.21 There is no
doubt that this provision meets the expectations of the agribusiness industry. As observed by Michael Cox, research director at the investment bank
Piper Jaffray, “Ukraine and, to a wider extent, Eastern Europe, are among
the “most promising growth markets for (American) farm-equipment giant Deere, as well as seed producers Monsanto and DuPont.”22
In May 2014 a handful of gunmen began taking over administrative
buildings in several eastern cities. Since then, the Ukrainian army and volunteer battalions have fought a bloody war against rebels backed with Russian firepower in a conflict that has claimed well about 4,000 lives, many of
them civilians. With the elections in self-proclaimed Donets and Lugansk
republics on November 2, 2014 a new de facto reality was created.23
The EU has to work intensively on the building up of the road to
the solution of the Ukrainian crisis, which seems to be long and thorny
and full of uncertainties. In this moment are of paramount importance
the following issues: 1) the realisation of Minsk agreements of 5 and 19
September 2014 on the ceasefire and disengagement of military forces,
2) the beginning of the reconciliation process, which could be supported
with the objective investigation of the responsibility for killing of civilians
and police members in Maidan square, for the massacres in Odessa and
Mariupol, for shooting down the Malaysian plane and for other crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed in eastern Ukraine (accession of Ukraine to the International criminal court will be in this regard
commendable !), 3) the beginning of sincere political dialogue on the future constitutional arrangements of Ukraine, including as it was said in
the statement of the EU-USA Summit of 26 March 2014 “the governmental structure that will reflect regional diversity and provide full protection
of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities”24 that will be a
21
rticle 404 of the Association Agreement March 21, 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/
A
pdf/6_ua_title_v_economic_and_sector_cooperation_en.pdf (accessed June 26, 2014).
22
ited in “Cui Bono’ Over Ukraine: Monsanto Setting Up GMO Seed Corn Business in
C
Ukraine.” Before Its News, May 1, 2014, http://beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2014/05/cuibono-over-ukraine-monsanto-setting-up-gmo-seed-corn-business-in-ukraine-2948628.
html (accessed June 26, 2014).
23
s illustration see: Shaun Walker, Ukraine: Donetsk votes for new reality in country that
A
does not exist, The Guardian, Monday 3 November 2014.
24
is process could not be successful without the dialogue of the Ukrainian government
Th
with the political power holders elected on November 2, 2014. In addition the low turnout
in other eastern regions -- Odesa (40 percent, compared with 50 percent in 2012), Kherson
75
great challenge for the new government having in mind the Russian firm
support to the dialogue with Donetsk and Luhansk, 25 4) the continuation
without delay of the economic reforms, the fight against corruption, the
diminishing of social differences, the revival of economic activities and so
on; to push Ukraine simply in the clutches of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank mechanisms without a sufficient financial
and policy engagement of the EU could produce a “social time bomb” in
Ukraine as a whole and stimulate the pro-Russian movements in eastern
and southern part of the country in particular26, the low voters turnout
in eastern regions combined with support for a Party of Regions offshoot
should be worrying for Kyiv, which has pinned its hopes on these regions
resisting any further Russian-supported separatist military advances27 and
5) the beginning of dialogue with Russia in order to establish the pattern
of future relations between the two states.28
(41 percent, compared with 51 percent), and Mykolaiv (42 percent, compared with 52 percent) -- combined with support for a Party of Regions offshoot should be worrying for Kyiv,
which has pinned its hopes on these regions resisting any further Russian-supported separatist military advances (see: Glenn Kates, Ten Takeaways From Ukraine’s Vote, DW, October 27, 2014).
76
25
S ee: Mikhail Japaridze, Constitutional reform involving all political force needed to settle
Ukrainian crisis. Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov said it’s important to launch a dialogue between representatives from Kiev, the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics. ITAR-TASS,
October 09, 2014. See also: James Marson, In Ukraine’s East, Low Voter Turnout in Election
Signals Kiev’s Challenges. Wary of Poroshenko’s Government, Few Voters Head to Polls in
Eastern Town Controlled by Kiev, Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2014.
26
e Oackland Institute concluded its study: With the acceleration of structural adjustment
Th
led by the international institutions following the installation of a pro-West government,
there has been an increase in foreign investment, which is likely to result in further expansion of large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land by foreign companies and further corporatization of agriculture in the country. Whereas it is feared that the structural adjustment program will increase foreign control of the economy as well as increase poverty and
inequality, the financial institutions have failed to demonstrate how such programs will improve the lives of Ukrainians and build a sustainable economic future. See also: Luhn, Alec.
“Will the IMF Bailout Turn Ukraine into Another Greece?” The Nation, April 7, 2014: http://
www.thenation.com/article/179212/will-imf-bailout-turn-ukraine-another-greece and Danny Hakim, Ukraine Faces Hurdles in Restoring Its Farming Legacy, New York Times, May
27 2014.
27
See: Glenn Kates, Ten Takeaways From Ukraine’s Vote, DW, October 27, 2014.
28
is will be a great challenge for the new coalition government composed probably by PoTh
roshenko Solidarity Party (supported by Klicko’s Udar), the People’s Front of Yatseniuk (who
will probably remain the prime minister) and by surprisingly strong “Self Help” party headed by the pro-Western mayor of Lviv (57 percent of votes altogether). The winner of elections, Yaseniuk, for instance, supported the building of electronically protected wall allong
the 2.2965,04 km border with Russia (the cost 83,5 million USD) that begun on September
Two wrong presumptions for the
new EU strategies
The new EU strategies could not be based on two wrong presumptions:
the first is that are the strategic interests on both sides of the Atlantic identical and the second is that are the strategic interests of the EU and Russia
divergent and that it is possible to create stability, security and prosperity
of the EU through policies of “sanctions” and confrontation with Russia.
The security, economic and strategically interests of the EU and US are
not identical at all. In developing new strategies concerning its external relations and its position in the world affairs EU should be not sub-ordinated to the global interests of the USA in its confrontations with Russia (and
China) in the process of the re-distribution of power in the contemporary
multi-polar word. The constructive trans-Atlantic partnership with the
USA should be based on equality and mutual respect of particular interests of both partners. The conclusions of the EU-USA Summit held on 26
March 2014 could be a solid framework for elaborating further this goal.
The EU and Russia have developed a very big inter-dependence of their
economies. EU is for Russia the biggest trading and investment partner
with the turnover in 2013 of 308,24 billion €, followed by China (68.24
billion €), Ukraine (29.52 billion €), Belarus (28.22 billion €) and Japan
(24,98 billion €). In the same year was Russia the third trading EU partner, after USA and China. Nearly half of the EU export was machinery
and transport. European countries import 84% of Russia’s oil export and
76% of its natural gas.29 Most of the EU members’ states show trade deficit
with Russia. The largest was in the first nine months (Jan-Sept) of 2013
that of the Netherlands (16,3 billion €), followed by Poland (7,8 billion €).
2014. The “oposition” ultra-populist Oleh Lyashko Radical Party (7,5 percent of the vote)
and Tymoshenko’s once-powerful Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party (slightly more than 5
percent) will not for sure support this orientation. But it is not to neglect that the Opposition Bloc (former energy minister Yuri Boiko), largely made up of former ruling (pro-Russian) Party of Regions members (10 percent of the vote) appears to have won substantial victories in eastern regions, including Dnipropetrovsk, which has put on an outwardly strong
pro-Ukrainian face under the leadership of billionaire governor Ihor Kolomoisky. It may be
weaker than it once was, but the so-called East-West divide still exist, confirmed by the low
turnout in Ukrainian eastern regions (see: Glenn Kates, Ten Takeaways from Ukraine’s Vote,
DW, October 27, 2014 and. James Marson, In Ukraine’s East, Low Voter Turnout in Election
Signals Kiev’s Challenges. Wary of Poroshenko’s Government, Few Voters Head to Polls in
Eastern Town Controlled by Kiev, Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2014.
29
S ee: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/. For more statistics: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf
77
The highest surplus were recorded by Austria (1,2 billion €) and Slovenia
(553 million €).30
On the opposite is the USA much smaller trading partner for Russia,
as its trade turnover with Russia was in 2013 “only” about 24,03 billion
€. In 2013 was the value of the USA imports from Russia at about 13,17
billion €, while the export came to about 10,85 billion €. This makes the
USA only the seventh Russian trading partner, after EU, China, Ukraine,
Belarus, Japan and Turkey. USA imports only about 5 % of Russian oil.
Further, the EU Common Foreign and Security policy – CFSP refers
to the UN Charter as a source of values when speaking of defence and the
maintenance of peace. Moreover its security strategy of 2008 put forward
the goal to create an international order based on efficient multilateralism
based on fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles
and commitments.31
On the opposite the USA is much more inclined to enlarging NATO,
spreading its military presence and creating the anti-missiles systems in
Eastern Europe, towards the borders of Russia. The EU stand in this regard cannot not be motivated only by the demands of the Baltic States,
Poland and Romania but must take into account the interests of all 28
member state! The White House fact sheet on USA Efforts in Support of
NATO Allies and Partners released on 26 March 2014 includes a large list
of activities that remind USA of the military deployments and adjacent
political actions in the times of cold war in Europe (the conclusions of the
recent NATO Council held in Wales confirmed this orientation).32
In the context of the USA-EU Summit held on 26 March 2014 president Obama put forward first of all two points, that is 1) the necessity of
concluding as soon as possible the EU-USA treaty on “Transatlantic trade
and investment partnership” (TTIP), which will supposedly contribute
also to diminishing the dependence of EU on Russian gas (with opening
78
30
See:
http://www.enpi-info.eu/eastportal/news/latest/35927/Eurostat:-most-EU-memberstates-recorded-trade-deficit-with-Russia-last-year. For statistics: http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_STAT-14-13_en.pdf .
31
See: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/ and http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.
32
In illustration: NATO’s moment of truth on Ukraine.By Kelly Ayotte. CNN, September 4,
2014;US, Europe at odds over NATO expansion, The thought of Ukraine or Georgia as
NATO members constitutes a horror scenario for most European states. But for many in the
US, it’s both conceivable and desirable. DW commentary, September 15, 2014.
the market for the import of U.S “shallow gas”)33 and 2) the necessity that
the EU / NATO member states increase their military budgets (and thus
contribute more efficiently to their defence and to NATO military actions
in different parts of the world). 34
Nevertheless the strategic priority of the USA remains Pacific no Europe. In these USA concepts has the EU in fact the role of frontline in
confrontation with Russia with all the negative security, economic, financial and political consequences emanating from this subordinate position.
The subordination to the USA strategic interests and the renewal of the
cold war in Europe will, among other, strengthen the alignment of Russia with China (and other BRICS countries).35 A hypothetical new G7,
comprising the BRICS’ Brazil, Russia, India and China and three of the
so-called MINT economies Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey – has a combined GDP of $37.8 trillion (at purchasing power parity) compared to
$34.5 trillion for the old G7 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
UK and the US.36
The EU policies (and some of its members in particular) are nevertheless notoriously subordinated to the American priorities in spite of the
fact that are the interests of USA and EU in many areas quite dissimilar.
In fact the EU is not only subordinated it is frequently clearly disdained
from the side of its biggest ally. Observing this state of affair one could
come to the conclusion that the EU doesn’t have its own foreign policy but
is following the policy of NATO (that is USA).
Having all these facts in mind there is no need to say that all political
interferences in the economic relations with Russia – as a consequence
of Ukrainian crisis - hits first of all the economies and the financial systems of the EU member states (and of Russia) and not at all those of the
USA The attempts to isolate Russia from international economic – political structure will cause additional damage as she was in 2012, according
33
J. Buzek Chair of the European Parliament’s Industry, Research and Energy Committee
(ITRE) supported this demand, Interview with Huighes Belin, European Voice, 22 September 2014.
34
SA pressed member countries to follow through on commitments to spend 2 percent of
U
their nations’ gross domestic product on defence. Only four NATO nations meet that threshold: the U.S., Britain, Greece and Estonia.
35
S ee : Vladimir Putin, It is time to raise the BRICS’ role to a new level, ITAR-TASS, 15 July
2014; Russia, China negotiate over 30 joint projects worth over $100 billion – official, ITARTASS, September 19, 2014; http://theconversation.com/brics-keep-supporting-russia-in-bidto-rebalance-world-power-31122
36
New G7 with Russia emerges, Financial Times, 9 October 2014.
79
to the United Nations (UNCTAD), the eight biggest investor economies in
the world (the USA came at top) producing about 3% of the world gross
national product.
Also the above mentioned data confirms that is Russia the “natural”
strategic partner of the EU. Certainly it is impossible to create the “European Common Space” without the cooperation and involvement of the
greatest power – the Russian Federation. The EU has to find a way to
begin a dialogue with Russia on common strategic and pragmatic issues
in order to get Russia to take the “European Common Space” from Lisbon
to Vladivostok seriously and not only as a theatre for the realisation of its
national interests.
It is necessary to test the Russian political willingness as expressed
at different occasions. President Putin, for instance, devoted almost half
the time of his speech to Russian diplomats on 1 July 2014 to various aspects of relations with Europe, with no negative connotations whatsoever.
Respectfully referring to Russia’s “colleagues from Europe,” Putin tried to
convey to his audience the essential idea that is likely to become a key
component of the Kremlin’s foreign policy efforts in the very near future.
The essence of this idea is that Russia is part of Europe. Russia and Europe
need each other to achieve stability and prosperity, but normal relations
between the two “are being destabilized by USA policy”. The task of Russian diplomacy is therefore according to Kremlin to “help Europe free itself of this external pressure and open up new prospects for cooperation”.37
The Euro-Asian Economic Union (EAEU) established by Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Russia will with 1 January 2015 become operational. Armenia already joined the EAEU and Kyrgyzstan is for the time being a
potential candidate for its membership. The cooperation of the EU with
the EAEU could be in the interest of the EU and its member states and
could stimulate the interest of Russia for the “European Common Space”.
This organisation has the similar structure as the EU but is confined only to economic issues. According to Vladimir Sharichin, deputy
director of the Kremlin-associated of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) institute, the EAEU is definitely not an attempt to restore
37
80
resident Putin about main tasks for Russian diplomats at conference with ambassadors,
P
1 July 2014. See: http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_07_01/President-Putin-to-namemain-tasks-for-Russian-diplomatic-service-at-conference-with-ambassadors-3232/; Moscow
will cooperate with West along with Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Africa – S. Lavrov. ITARTASS, October 28, 2014; see also: Guidebook to Russian Foreign Policy, Russia Direct, September 2014.
the Soviet empire.38 Each country involved is on its way toward a market
economy, and together they seek to create as large and efficient a common
economic space as possible. He stressed that the existing customs union
and the upcoming EAU were not created to seal the countries off from the
EU, but rather to be compatible and cooperative with it.
Fresh, innovative EU strategies and
policies are needed
The new cold war on the EU external borders will, should it develop further, push Europe 25 years back and cause unpredictable damage not only
to the interests of the Union and its member states (and Russia) but also
to the political and economic stability in the world. The EU could not obtain its interests and the interests of its member states just by merely following the NATO policies. The newly elected EU structure should analyse
carefully the present geo-political situation and without delay develop adequate fresh, innovative strategies and policies in order to avoid the negative consequences of the present situation for the EU interests.
In operational terms, should the new EU structure develop without
delay at least six new strategies:
First, the EU should without delay elaborate the concept of common,
autonomous, foreign policy based on the interests of all member states.39
First of all the present very bureaucratic and “time-spending” system of
elaborating and adopting decisions concerning the common external relations on the fields of foreign policy, security and defence must be improved, starting with the adopting of the needed treaty norms for its functioning.40
38
or opposite opinion see: Marek Menkiszak, The Putin doctrine: The formation of a concepF
tual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. The statements made in recent weeks by Russian officials, and especially President Vladimir Putin, in connection with
Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine, may suggest that the emergence of a certain doctrine of
Russian foreign and security policy is at hand, especially in relation to the post-Soviet area.
OSW Commentary, 27 March, 2014.
39
In illustration: Elmar Brok, the former Chairman of the European Parliament Committee
on Foreign Policy (member of the EP since 1980), EU lacks unified foreign policy strategy.
The said that is he European Union in desperate need of a unified foreign policy as well as a
strong foreign minister, DW, October 20, 2014.
40
s illustration see: http://www.ies.be/files/documents/JMCdepository/Cameron,%20
A
Fraser,%20An%20Introduction%20to%20European%20Foreign%20Policy,%20The%20
EU%20Foreign%20Policy%20Machinery.pdf
81
Second, the new team should initiate a broad discussion of the parameters of a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP II) and launch the
renewed policy in 2015.41 The aims of new policy should be attractive
for the partners and would create, as result, a substantive pro-European
political body among people in the countries concerned. The new ENP
should not be Eurocentric in conception; it should take into account also
the roles that outside actors play in the EU’s neighbourhood.
The ENP II towards the Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus
should pay attention also to the interests of Russia, Turkey and Iran in the
region. The constituent part of ENP II should be the elaboration of fresh
political, economic, cultural and security approaches toward the Southern
Mediterranean (and Middle East) region while taking an active part in
the corresponding international initiatives regarding this area (the EU interests in the fight against ISIL, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Syria, Iraq,
Iran, etc.).
Third, it is commendable to prepare a more detailed program concerning the realisation of the EU “association policy” towards the Western Balkans and especially concerning the countries in that region with
“special characteristics” (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Albania). The “integration” process of Serbia could be an example for how
to realise the association policy with the EU and maintain good relations
with Russia.42
82
41
ichael Emerson, After the Vilnius fiasco: Who is to blame? What is to be done?, CEPS esM
say, No. 8 / 21 January 2014. He stated that it will require a major recalibration of policies
to get this unstable new status quo back onto sound strategic lines, and proposals are advanced along three tracks in parallel: for rebuilding the remnants of the EU’s neighbourhood
policy, for attempting to get Russia to take Lisbon to Vladivostok seriously, and for promoting a Greater Eurasia concept fit for the 21st century that would embrace the whole of the
European and Asian landmass; Stefan Lehne, Time to Reset the European Neighbourhood
Policy, Carnegie Europe, February 4, 2014. He said that the new EU team should initiate a
broad discussion of the parameters of an ENP II and launch the renewed policy in 2015. See:
http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=54420 .
42
ndrew Rettman, Serbia refuses to join EU sanctions on eve of Putin parade. Serbia has
A
promised not to impose EU-model sanctions on Russia and to go ahead with South Stream
on the eve of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Belgrade See: http://euobserver.com/foreign/126078;
Opinion: The ‘bad guy’ knocking on the EU door. European Union accession negotiations
with Serbia begin on January 21 2014. They won’t be easy not least because Germany is
growing tired of EU enlargement, says DW’s Dragoslav Dedovic, 20.01.2014; Serbia’s balancing act between Russia and EU. By Guy De Launey BBC News, Belgrade, October 17, 2014.
Serbia needs to manage that relationship (with Russia) so that it doesn’t undermine its aspirations and progress towards EU membership” said Michael Davenport EU ambassador to
Fourth, it is necessary to elaborate the concept of the future EU relations with Russia and to begin the dialogue with Russia on its realisation.
Commendable “incentives” for achieving the positive Russian interest for
the “European Common Space” could be such matters as are – in illustration: a) elaboration of a concept on how to renovate the dialog with
Russia in the frame of the “strategic cooperation” structure and continuation of the fruitful economic cooperation based on common interests,43 b)
the justified elimination of mutual sanctions,44 c) continuation of dialogue
with Russia on the solution of different aspects of the Ukraine crisis,45 d)
the consultations of Russia regarding the consequences of the association
agreements of neighbouring countries with the EU as it was organised
already in the case of Ukraine and on the elaboration of ENP II,46 e) the
elaboration and promotion of the concept of Euro-Asian cooperation fit
Serbia. The country is equally divided between those who are for the EU, led by the prime
minister, and the Russophiles led by the president” said Bosko Jaksic, Serbian journalist.
43
ormer Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for instance, bemoans the isolation of Russia in the Ukraine
F
crisis. The West would have to act smarter, Kohl writes to a report in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” on his new book “Out of concern for Europe”. In it he criticizes in particular
that the leading industrial nations had met in June 2014 as G7 without Russia. He continues to write: “As a t must as well as Russia and the Ukraine careful that we do not lose everything we had achieved before.” Read more: http://german.ruvr.ru/news/2014_11_02/Kohlkritisiert-Isolation-Russlands-5306/ .
44
I n illustration to the topic see: Dave Keating, EU prepares for more bad news on GDP, European Voice, 13.08.2014. Economists fear that tension with Russia and the crisis in the Middle East is taking its toll on the European economy and destroying chances of an economic recovery. Previous forecasts had predicted accelerating growth for the second quarter, but
recent news suggests tomorrow’s figures will show some deceleration.
45
e Ministry of foreign affairs of Russia evaluated the election held on November 2 in the
Th
self-proclaimed republics of Donets and Lugansk as 1) giving to authorities legitimation for
solving practical questions regarding the economy and badly destroyed infrastructure and
2) urged Kyiv to begin a dialogue with the representatives of the two self-proclaimed republics. But in fact it is expected that will Russia “transform” these entities in a special kind of
frozen conflict and as a tool for carrying out its influence on Ukraine.
46
I n the Common Declaration of the “Weimar Triangle” meeting on March 31, 2014 the ministers of Germany, France and Poland noted that the Eastern Partnership doesn’t mean
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia need to choose between Russia and the EU. They even proposed that “EU-Russia talks with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia about the consequences of the EU-Association Agreements with Eastern European Partners for both sides.” The
German media explained that Steinmeier’s plan for Eastern Europe aims to include Russia in the discussions. Der Spiegel noted that free trade agreements should be compatible to those already existing with Russia, to avoid a situation where the eastern countries
have to choose between Russia and the EU. T-Online (http://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/
ausland/id_68039220/frank-walter-steinmeier-deutsch-russische-beziehungen-brauchenneue-impulse.html ) mentioned a “partnership for modernization” of the Eastern Europe-
83
for the 21st century, including the EU strategy regarding the Russia sponsored Euro-Asian economic integrations, that is the “Custom Union” and
the “Euro-Asian Economic Union – EAEU”,47 f) the declaration on the
“demarcation line” regarding the spreading of NATO activities towards
the Russian borders and g) amelioration of the civic and minorities rights
of the numerous Russian minorities in the three Baltic states and especially in Latvia.48
Fifth, the constructive trans-Atlantic partnership with the USA
should be based on equality and mutual respect of particular interests of
both partners and not on the subordination of Europe to the USA strategic interests. The conclusions of the EU-USA Summit held on 26 March
2014 could be a solid framework for achieving this goal.49 In addition the
an countries, where there exists a “positive agenda” in which Russian and EU interests can
be bundled.
See: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2014/140331_Gemeinsame_Erkl%C3%A4rung_zur_Ukraine.html .
84
47
e Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union is to enter force on January 1, 2015. It defines
Th
the structure, powers and work procedures for the union’s bodies that comprise the Higher Eurasian Economic Council composed of the heads of state, the Eurasian Inter-Governmental Council composed of the heads of governments of the union’s member states, the
Eurasian Economic Commission and the Eurasian Economic Union Court. The agreement
formulates the principles of forming the union’s budget, which will be made up of rubble
contributions by the member states. The size of the contributions will be determined by the
Higher Council. The Treaty stipulates customs and technical regulation, foreign trade policies and measures to protect the internal market. The agreement envisages the transition to
common customs tariffs. It stipulates the principles of coordinated macro-economic and foreign exchange policies, financial market regulation, interaction in the energy and transport
sectors, the development of a common gas, oil, petroleum product, medicines and medical
equipment market. The Treaty covers such areas as intellectual property and state purchases, industry, agriculture and labour migration. The document also regulates information interaction within the union. Russian language is the union’s working language. The Eurasian Commission will be headquartered in Moscow, the Eurasian Economic Union Court
in Minsk and the financial regulator in Almaty. The union is open for accession by any state
sharing the union’s goals and principles on the terms agreed by the member countries. Members have 10-year period for fully harmonizing their national legislatures.
48
It is interesting that the Russian-speakers political party Soglasiye wins (again) the parliamentary elections in Latvia (getting support by 23.13 % of voters), TASS, October 5, 2014.
But on the other side it is well known that about 320,000 people – Russian-speaking noncitizens – were not allowed to take part in the elections again. These people were deprived
of Latvia’s citizenship after independence and have not enjoyed the right to vote ever since.
49
ouncil of the European Union, EU-US summit joint statement, Brussels, 26 March 2014,
C
8228/14, (or. en), Presse 190. See also: Philip Everts, Pierangelo Isernia and Francesco Olmastroni, International Security Across the Atlantic: A Longitudinal Comparison of Public Opinion in Europe and the United States, Transworld The Transatlantic Relationship
and the future Global Governance, WP 29, May 2014; Pierangelo Isernia and Linda Basile,
EU should elaborate its specific interests within NATO giving priority to
peace, stability and progress in the “European Common Space”.
Sixth, the success of the EU in creating the “European Common
Space” of peace, security and development will be the main pillar on
which the position of the EU as the “third world factor”, besides USA
and China, could be based. The EU could be a decisive factor in the USA
– China – EU triangle if it develops the relations with USA as has been
already said on the basis of factual equality and constructive partnership.
In the context of more polycentric structure of the international community should the EU elaborate adequate responses and capabilities to
the demands emanating from the “new security challenges” as are terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction arms, regional conflicts, organised
crime, whether changes, financial disorder and the similar. The EU should
also “deepen its role” in considering the increasing gap between the developed and underdeveloped part of the world.
Domestic preconditions for the EU
external policies
In concluding it is necessary to put forward two EU “internal issues” that
are conditio sine qua non for realising the above mentioned EU challenges
in foreign politics:
First, it is necessary to develop further the EU common identity anchored in diversity.50 The development of common identity will be, among
other, supported by finding the necessary solutions for the accumulated
financial and economic problems within the Union and for social stability
within the members’ states and the Union as a whole.51
Second, it is commendable that the European Council consider and
approve adequate actions concerning the up-grading of the Petersberg
tasks from 1992, which formed an integral part of the then European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – now Common Security and Defence
To Agree or Disagree? Elite Opinion and Future Prospects of the Transatlantic Partnership,
Transworld, The Transatlantic Relationship and the future Global Governance, WP 34, June
2014.
50
S ee in illustration: Transnational identities. Become the European in the EU. Ed. By Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse and Marilynn B. Brewer, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing
Group, 2004.
51
urozone growth at zero as Germany slumps, France stagnates, DW, 1.11.2014. For EU reE
sponse to the crisis see: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/crisis/index_en.htm
85
Policy (CSDP) – and defined the spectrum of military actions/functions
that the European Union can undertake in its crisis management operations.52 The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) incorporates the Petersberg tasks
and the Lisbon treaty (2007) added the possibility to conclude a common
defence agreement for the EU if and when the European Council resolves
unanimously to do so “and” provided that all member states give their approval through their usual constitutional procedures.53
In this context will be also necessary to narrow the gaps of the military capabilities of EU countries. EU members have to cooperate to acquire and maintain capabilities in order to be able to fulfil the tasks of
CSDP. The EU Council held on 19–20 December 2013 underlined that
Europe needs strong military capabilities and a healthy, innovative and
competitive European defence technological and industrial base. Because
of the rising costs of major defence systems, coupled with the on-going
squeeze on defence budgets, no single member state is able alone to have
the full inventory of capabilities.54
86
52
See: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm
53
See: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm
54
uropean Council 19/20 December 2013 Coclusions, Brussels, 20 December 2013, EUCO
E
217/13.
Jovan MANASIJEVSKI
PRESIDENT, CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, SKOPJE, MACEDONIA
External Crises and EU
Strategic Actorness
Abstract: The paper analyses the influence of the external crises upon the EU as a
regional and global actor. The external crises, especially those in the most imminent neighbourhood of the Union, beside being the serious threats for its security,
at the same time create an opportunity for further development of the Union as a
relevant international actor in all its dimensions. The influence of the external crises
upon the Union is analysed on several levels: upon the Union’s integration in the area
of foreign, security and defense sphere, upon building the Union’s strategic culture
and upon the creation of the new instruments and new policies within the CFSP.
The analyses is done based on the EU’s experiences in dealing with the crises in its
neighbourhood, as well as the latest conceptualizations of the criteria for effective
and global strategic actorness of the Union.
Key words: external crises, strategic actorness, Common foreign and security policy,
EU strategic culture, crisis management
The crises in the EU’s neighbourhood have always had a strong influence
upon the further development of the Union. They are an important part
of the dynamics of the Union’s development, especially after the end of the
Cold War. The influence of the external crises can be detected on several
levels: on the integration of the Union in the part of external, security
and defense sphere, on the building of its strategic culture, as well as on
the creation of new instruments and new policies. Despite their serious
threats, the external crises actually always create an opportunity for further development of the Union as a relevant international actor in all its
dimensions.
Despite numerous criticisms for slowness, indecision, tactics, so far
the Union has successfully used these opportunities and has managed to
get out of every security crises with strengthened capacity. It would be
more correct to say that the EU has learned from each of its failure and
has managed to transform learned lessons into the strengthened institutional capacity and enhanced capability for joint action. It was realized
through further expansion and deepening of the scope of integration, inPost-Global Crisis: European Union and its Surroundings
87
troducing new policies and new institutions, as well as new instruments
for their realization, reorganization, grouping and sharing its resources.
According to the latest conceptualizations, the EU’s capability to play
the role of key regional and relevant global security actor depends on several criteria - the extent of the integration in the area of CFSP and CSDP,
available capacities and capabilities and recognition of that role and status
of the EU from other international actors. The degree of fulfillment of
these criteria is what determines the global influence of the EU as an international security actor (Kaunert and Zwolski, 2013).
In such analysis, it is very important to distinguish the capability for
global acting of the Union in the case of traditional and non-traditional
security issues. Taking into consideration the previously mentioned criteria, it can be noted that the EU is much better prepared and equipped
to deal with non-traditional security threats. But what happens when the
Union is facing classic, traditional security threats? Does the EU have
enough capacity to resist? Is the EU formatted for suitable treatment of
such threats at all? Or, the only acceptable approach for the EU is to work
persistently on their interception, as i.e. by the strength of its soft power
and smart preventive action not to allow the emergence and escalation of
such classic threats?
Returning to the scene of traditional threats puts the EU in a position to solve the dilemma that does not tolerate delay any more – whether
the EU is going to wrap up and appropriately adjust its system for quick
and efficient response to the traditional threats, establishing itself as a key
regional and relevant global actor, or, faced with the traditional threats,
it shall further tend to rely on non-European, US security and defense
protection, while using its economic instruments for medium and longterm structural action in a direction of protection and promotion of its
interests.
External crises and the EU integration in
the area of the foreign, security and defense policy
Based on the historical development of this sensitive domain, it can be
concluded that all significant advances towards the integration of the external, security and defense policy are inspired or directly provoked by
the external crises. Such external influence is not an isolated and unique
factor, of course, because it always materializes in the given, wider international context and under the influence of traditionally understood
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national interests of member-states, additionally filtered through a complicated intergovernmental decision-making process.
During the period of the Cold War, the need of more systematic way
of cooperation between member-states began to be perceived timidly, regarding the treatment of issues in the area of foreign policy. Thus, through
the Davignon Report in 1970, the European Political Cooperation (EPC)
began (Report by the Foreign Ministers, 1970). This cooperation, in the
given period and in the overall security circumstances of severe bloc division, as well as imminent threat to the borders of the European Community (EC) at that period, gave solid results. Through this mechanism, the
member states have created a practice of mutual consultations and cooperation in the sensitive spheres of foreign and security policy which are
exclusively under the national jurisdiction. The significance of the EPC, as
a predecessor of CFSP, is great, considering the fact that in its framework
most of the procedures and practices have been developed, which later
have been overtaken in the functioning of the CFSP either.
But EPC was inadequate, limiting and even frustrating in the new
international circumstances after the end of the Cold War. With the end
of the bipolar system and change of the security environment, the member-states have established a clear need of far greater and more serious
coordination and need for joint action in the treatment of foreign and security issues. In the new security circumstances internal, as well as external expectations have arisen for EC to overtake the role of a key regional
and relevant global actor. But, unfortunately, in the very first opportunity
that emerged, the EC failed to act as a unique, coherent actor. The disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation and unilateral recognition of the new
states by the most powerful member of the EC – Germany, clearly showed
the absence of common policy towards the security crises and greatly underlined the need of creating a system for building a common foreign
policy and mutually coordinated operation in dealing with the crises in
its most imminent neighbourhood (Nutall, 2000). Such flow of things has
made the member states strengthen their efforts for deepening and further
institutionalization of the cooperation in the field of foreign and security
policy. In fact, considering the real danger of a repetition of such similar
unilateral acts in the future, that would completely undermine the efforts
for EU’s formatting as an important international actor, the member states
have decided to develop a common policy and common action precisely
in order to prevent such unilateral behavior of a certain member-state in
the future (Sjursen, 2003:44).
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The Yugoslav crisis posed as the EU’s baptism of fire and had a strong
influence upon the flow of European integration because of the fact that
the member-states became completely aware about the limitations of the
civil diplomacy unless it is supported by real military capabilities ready
to use for prevention and stoppage of conflicts (Ginsberg, 2001:57–87).
In fact, the Yugoslav crisis clearly showed that the EC is not an effective
international actor in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and real impact on the events (Hill, 1993:306). The Yugoslav crisis
clearly demonstrated the serious limitations of the EPC in the coordination of the foreign policies of the member-states. By doing so, it has made
the member-states determine themselves towards building a common foreign European policy instead of the previous coordination that they had
had. Thus, unexpectedly, the Yugoslav crisis became a key catalyst of difficult intergovernmental negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty in the area
of foreign and security policy, which, on the other hand, has showed the
real danger from security issues in postbipolar world and the need for the
EU to respond appropriately to them and to undertake the responsibility
for its own security and defense, as well as for the security crises in its
surrounding, especially in terms when the US clearly stated that the Europeans have to engage themselves more in ensuring the European security.
Thus, as a result of the failure of the confrontation with the Yugoslav crisis, the CFSP was born and developed.
Several years later, in 1999 the Kosovo crisis put the CFSP on a hard
test. This time the focus was put on the EU’s general unpreparedness and
lack of capacities. Just prior to the intervention in Kosovo, the BritishFrench summit in St. Malo had reached the key progress in tracing the
European security and defense policy (ESDP), which was immediately
followed by its imminent launching. Thus, the institutional building and
development of the common European defense dimension has begun,
which has led to creation of preconditions for the EU to be formatted as
a key regional and relevant global actor with all necessary prerogatives.
The Macedonian crisis of 2001, i.e. its imminent post-conflict phase
created an opportunity for another large step of CFSP and ESDP. It was in
Macedonia that the first military operation was launched. This first military operation, despite numerous deficiencies and problems, represented
a significant step for the EU as a military security factor versus its previous perception as exclusively civilian factor. By successful execution of
this operation the EU has already portrayed itself as a security actor with
broader ambitions and desire for more significant role in the regional
and global security. The experiences from the operation have helped the
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Union in the practical realization of its concept for comprehensive crisis management as well, which implies effective combination of different
types of instruments.
The Georgian crisis of 2008 confronted the EU with a new situation
and development of a new context in which the Union should act. It indicated some considerations for emergence of a new strategic bipolarity
in Europe which opposed the expansionist, revisionist Russia and democratic, integrative Euro-Atlantic community. However, the Union chose
to act very carefully and in accordance to its doctrine of effective multilateralism. The EU’s approach and performance in that crisis situation is
best reflected in the attitude of the director of the EU Institute for Security Studies of that period, Vasconcelos: “Russia’s excessive use of force
and subsequent unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although in violation of international law, has not recreated the Cold War in
Europe. Nor has it rendered obsolete the EU strategic concept as it stands
today… The best option for the EU remains to try to find solutions with
Russia, not against Russia, for European crises, including those waiting to
happen in the common neighbourhood.” (Vasconcelos, 2008:1–2).
External crises and building the EU’s
strategic culture
The key strategic document of the Union, the European Security Strategy
(ESS), was brought as an immediate consequence of another external crisis – the Iraqi crisis. This document should overcome the consequences of
the large differences between member-states regarding the intervention in
Iraq, which threatened to compromise the CFSP completely. At the same
time, ESS should create a stable base which will prevent repetitions of
similar unpleasant experiences in future, such as divisions about the treatment of the Iraq crisis.
ESS is the first completed effort for building common European strategic culture. Namely, among EU’s member states there was and there still
is expressed heterogeneity with respect to their national security cultures
and military doctrines. Those numerous divergences are precisely catalogued on multiple levels (Howorth, 2002). In the light of very different
historical experiences, traditions and cultures, the attempt for developing
common strategic culture is a real challenge. Especially because of their
own tragic historical experiences, a large number of member-states featured national strategic cultures that actually reflect the security environPost-Global Crisis: European Union and its Surroundings
91
ment characteristic for the first half of the last century rather than the
strategic context of modern times (Hyde-Price, 2004). But, developing a
common strategic culture is necessary if the EU wants to position itself
as a real global actor and that capital knowledge is clearly stated in ESS,
where it is said that “we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters
early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council, 2003:23). Not only that, but also “we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously” (European Council, 2003:24). Hence, the
strategy projects more active engagement of the Union. Such engagement
requires larger capacities and bigger capabilities, too. Therefore, the strategy requires transformation of military forces towards greater flexibility,
mobility and ability to deal with the new threats. It requires improvement
of the intelligence cooperation as well as civilian and diplomatic capacities. ESS projects greater coherence between different instruments and capacities, such as aid programs, development funds, trade policies, diplomatic efforts, civilian and military capacities of member states (European
Council, 2003:26–27).
In the process of following the development of a common European
strategic culture, particularly interesting are the analyses done upon the
work of the central institution of CFSP, the Political and Security Committee (Meyer, 2006; Howorth, 2010; Biava, 2011). These empirical analyses show the key role of this body in the convergence of the strategic cultures of the member states and its role as a multiplier in the integration
processes of this sensitive area (Meyer, 2006). This is confirmed by the
research which proves that the process of institutional socialization within
the Political and Security Committee creates common standards, common
expectations and common visions, which is essential for the emergence of
the European strategic culture (Biava, 2011). In this way „they have used
intergovernmental procedures to achieve supranational outcomes“, i.e. as
it is concluded, “a supranational culture is emerging from an intergovernmental process” (Howorth, 2010:1,20).
Performed EU missions and operations, their character, scope and
engaged resources have significant importance for building and developing the European strategic culture. They actually constitute it in the most
direct, experiential way. On the other hand, in order to perform its operations in the field successfully and suitably, the EU must have a strategic
framework which will appropriately explain and set the perspectives of its
missions and operations. In a way, by adopting the ESS, the EU tries to
codify the existing strategic culture and experiences gained so far (Biscop,
2007).
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Two experiential cognitions are crucial: first, by performing military
missions the EU has exceeded the limitations of a “civilian” actor; second,
by the approach of integrating civilian and military instruments while
performing its missions the EU has created the basis for formulation
and implementation of a new, comprehensive and integrated approach, a
model which is becoming more and more attractive.
In the ‘Report on the Implementation of the ESS’ an evolution towards a new, more comprehensive concept of security is already anticipated. It is said: “We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity” (European Council, 2008:453). Namely, in the function of thorough
analyses of the major challenges of the European security and successful
implementation of the ESS, the High Representative Solana has formed
a special team. The team prepared a report entitled “A human security
doctrine for Europe”, which advocated a thorough transformation of understanding the European security by suggesting that it must be based on
the principle of human security. “A human security approach for the EU
means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of the Union’s borders, as
was the security approach of nation-states”, says the report (Study Group,
2004:9). For this effect, the report proposed the EU to adopt the Doctrine
of Human Security which would contain defined principles for conducting the EU’s operations, both in terms of the objectives of these operations and in terms of the means used, where the focus would be placed
on the protection of human rights, then the formation of special forces
for establishing human security, as well as a new normative framework,
which will regulate the process of decision-making for intervention and
performing the operations themselves on the field (Study Group, 2004:5).
Three years later the team prepared another report which required the
EU to operationalize the doctrine, which means the principles of human
security to be transformed into concrete and practical actions in the field
(The Madrid Report, 2007:7).
In the function of further codification, standardization, development
and expanding the EU’s strategic culture, among other things, several important European organizations have already been established – EU Institute for Security Studies, European Defence Agency, European Security
and Defence College, European Police College.
In this context it is important to note the utilization of the processes
of securitization as a way of building the common European strategic culPost-Global Crisis: European Union and its Surroundings
93
ture. In recent years there is a visible attempt by securitization of certain
questions to ensure their addressing through CFSP. An important example
is the defining of the security threats in ESS, especially their updating in
the ESS’ review, together with new, non-traditional threats such as energy
insecurity, climate changes and electronic insecurity. In this direction the
securitization of the immigration is also more emphasized. By addressing
such threats through CFSP, conditions for gradual creation of common
strategic culture are provided, especially when it comes to coping with
non-traditional security threats. As they are new phenomena, the member-states haven’t got an opportunity so far to establish their own national
approaches towards such threats and are free from previous loads and inertia. Therefore, the creation of common awareness and common approach
towards such threats should be going in a faster and simpler way.
External crises and building the EU’s capacities
for crisis management
The establishment and rapid development of the EU’s crises management
is the most visible consequence of the influence of external crises. The Union has managed, over the years and experiences gained in dealing with
the crises, to build up its own complete system of crises management.
The sources of the most visible and fastest growing component of
ESDP – its crisis management operations – are in Petersberg tasks. These
tasks were originally defined by the Council of Western European Union
in June 1992, by which the WEU’s member-states expressed their readiness
to put their military forces available for carrying out the different types of
defined military tasks that WEU could undertake. They could be engaged
in: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (Western European Union, 1992:II.4.). Provisions defined in this way, without any changes, were overtaken by the EU, after the integration of the WEU into EU,
and incorporated in the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Council, 1997:
Article J.7) and later in the Treaty of Nice (European Council, 2001: Article
17). Then, over the years and operative experiences gained, the objectives
and methods of conducting the crisis management operations were successively refined, creating the characteristic European doctrine of combined
civilian-military crisis management. Guided by the experiences gained
from numerous operations that the EU conducted in the past period, the
Lisbon Treaty significantly enlarged these tasks, and today they refer to:
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“joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks,
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and
post conflict stabilization” (European Council, 2010: Article 43(1)).
What does the European doctrine of civilian-military crisis management mean? It advocates overcoming the rigid opposition of civilian and
military instruments, their gradual convergence and final integration into
a new quality, which is not only the hybrid or mechanical set of civilian
and military components, but a new comprehensive approach for crises
management.
Of course, the successful conduction of crisis management operations requires suitable military and civilian capabilities and capacities.
The process of building the military capabilities started immediately
after the launching of the ESDP. Thus, in December 1999, in Helsinki,
the European Council adopted so-called ‘Headline 2003’, which defines
the EU’s necessary military capabilities. This document anticipated the
EU’s ability to deploy its forces for rapid reaction in the extent from 50
to 60 thousand soldiers within 60 days of the decision. These forces can
be deployed at a distance up to four thousand kilometers of European
soil and should sustain on the ground at least a year (European Council,
1999). A year later, in November 2000, the Ministers of Defense of the
EU’s member-states adopted the ‘Force Catalogue’, a document which defines the extent of declared participation of each member-state in the European forces for rapid reaction, in terms of military personnel, weapons,
military equipment, as well as appropriate logistic support (Capabilities
Commitment Conference, 2000). Five years later, in June 2004, in Brussels, the European Council adopted ‘The 2010 Headline Goal’. It made
complete revision of the previous concept of military capabilities. Namely,
it adopted a new concept of Battlegroups, which anticipated much faster
and more flexible deployment of smaller military formations. The Battlegroups are formations of 1.500 soldiers who should be deployed no later
than 10 days of the decision and to sustain on the ground up to 3 months
(European Council, 2004a). Since January 2007 this concept has become
operative with two battlegroups in a state of permanent readiness for operational deployment in a mission.
The EU began to build its civilian capabilities shortly after the initial
definition of the military capabilities. In June 2000, in Feira, the European
Council developed the civilian components for crises management in four
priority areas - police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. The determination was to provide
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up to 5 thousand policemen and up to 1.000 of them to be able to be deployed within 30 days of the decision (European Council, 2000:134–135).
Several years later, in December 2004, in Brussels, the European Council
adopted ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2008’, which incorporated the ability for
complex missions in order to reform the security sectors and support the
processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in crisis regions (European Council, 2004b). Later, in November 2007 a new ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2010’ was adopted, aimed at achieving larger synergy
between civilian and military instruments of ESDP (Civilian Capabilities
Improvement Conference, 2007).
The evaluations about the true meaning and weight of the ESDP’s
operations are divided. From completely uncritical exaltation to extremely
strict criticism which sees them as “a triumph of improvisation” (Witney,
2008:39). However, the experiences from these operations are very carefully analyzed in Brussels. Then, some very important conclusions are
derived which rationalize the debate between member-states and led to
a series of innovations in the Lisbon Treaty, primarily in the area of enabling large flexibility in the domain of defense and military cooperation.
The strong dynamics of the EU’s operations – in ten years (from 2003
up to now) has launched 31 operations and missions (of which 15 are
completed and 16 are still going on) – undoubtedly indicates the strong
ambition of the EU to impose itself, using this own new instrument, not
only regionally, but also globally as a relevant factor. By launching these
operations, the EU expresses its determination to support and enhance its
declarative commitments with a clear readiness for field operating. With
its operative hyperactivity the EU has begun to impose a new perception of itself as completely encircled regional and global power that has
to be relied on in the international order. Of course, as it could be expected, these operations have brought to light some weaknesses. Above
all, in terms of the necessary more extensive preparation for operations,
in terms of providing integrated command of operations and, definitely,
in terms of an significant improvement of military capabilities.
The Ukrainian crisis and limitations
to the EU strategic actorness
The current Ukrainian crisis opens serious issues: the issue of EU’s capacity and limitations to formulate an effective common foreign policy,
the issue of CFSP’s coherence, the issue of strategic partnership of the
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EU with Russia, the issue of European neighbourhood policy, and on the
most imminent level, the issue of EU’s energy security.
But the Ukrainian crisis in its essence is a direct threat to the key
principles of the European project – integration, compromise, the rule of
law. It is an attempt for returning to the old paradigms – the balance of
power, the spheres of influence, the military conquest as a legitimate political instrument.
The case with the Ukrainian crisis once again has shown that the
possibilities and capabilities of the EU to face and respond to the traditional security threats are limited. In this context it should be clarified that
the choice of economic and diplomatic instruments in addressing this crisis is not disputable at all. What is disputable is whether these instruments
can be effective if their implementation is not supported by credible threat
for using the military instruments as well.
An upsetting indicator is that the EU member-states, especially those
who feel that are most directly affected – the states of the latest enlargement, despite their ten-year-membership in the Union, haven’t done the
addressing of their security concerns, no matter if they are real or oversized, in the EU, but through the NATO. This itself is a failure of the CFSP
because the CFSP precisely should have been a primary media for articulation of the European security issues, because of its comprehensiveness
and multidimensionality in treating security threats.
Therefore, the conclusions are inevitable. The EU doesn’t posses sufficient readiness to conduct deterrence of the military intervention in its
closest European neighbourhood. The Union is powerless to provide sufficient security guarantees to its member-states.
What is going to happen now? What effects is the Ukrainian crisis going to cause? Are they going to be similar to those that we have seen in the
recent past, in terms of additional encouraging and accelerating of building the EU strategic actorness? Whether after this confusing situation,
with dissonant tones within the Union and emphasized patronage and
interference by the US, the EU will follow the pattern of previous crises
– initial failure in confronting the problem, reflection of the reasons, consolidation, and then launching new mechanisms and instruments which
will lead to further integration and strengthening of the overall common
capacities for Union’s operating as a coherent and effective international
actor? Or the crisis will lead the EU towards weakening and revision of
the integration efforts in these sensitive areas, abandoning ambitions to
develop itself as autonomous and comprehensive international actor, and,
for the purpose of providing its long-term security in a context of antagoPost-Global Crisis: European Union and its Surroundings
97
nization with Russia, finding sanctuary under the transatlantic umbrella?
Is the Union able to produce its own approach towards the Ukrainian crisis, an approach that would be based solely on its own interests or it will
follow the US again? And how will the Union manage to remain entire,
coherent and preserve its distinctiveness in this bizarre triangle with two
traditional powers – the US and Russia?
The EU decided to bypass quietly the war in Georgia in 2008, continuing its strategic partnership with Russia as if nothing had happened.
Can the similar scenario be expected now, in the case of Ukraine?
In this context, it should be noted that for our analysis, the way in
which the EU will confront the crisis is secondary – whether it will decide on a tough approach towards Russia or it will go into a process of
compromise with Russia, with full respect of the Russian interests in a
way Russia itself perceives. What is important for our analysis, what is a
key for evaluation of the EU’s strategic actorness is the following: whether
the Union acts as an effective international actor in terms of its capacity
to produce collective decisions that the member-states will stick to them
disciplinary and in terms whether the Union has actual impact on events.
The Ukrainian crisis has shown the competition between two strong
international actors, between two strategic actorness of different types
– Russia as a traditional power based on military power and natural resources and the EU as a postmodern power based on normative and economic power.
The Ukrainian crisis has also shown the limitations of the EU’s
Neighbourhood Policy as an instrument of pacification, adaptation and
directing the development in its closest neighbourhood. It is especially
evident in the subpolitics of the Eastern partnership which essence rests
on contradiction - at the same time to avoid institutional enlargement of
the EU with the states from the post-Soviet space and to implement the
same mechanisms and same logic of normative and economic hegemony
as in the accession process (Haukkala, 2008:1618).
The effects of the Ukrainian crisis upon the
Balkans and its process of European integration
If the observations are correct that according to its internal consolidation
and recovery during the last decade Russia no longer acts as status quo
actor in the European and international policy but as a revisionist power,
then we can expect a period of uncertainty and increased confusion on
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the Balkans. Russia’s attempt for revision of the European security order
has begun since the Putin speech at the Munich security conference in
2007, followed by the initiative of the former president Medvedev for a
new European security architecture and cold European response to it. In
the case with Georgia and now Ukraine, Russia has clearly demonstrated
its determination to defend and restore its strong influence and presence
in the post-Soviet space with all available resources. From Russian point
of view, that space has already been marked as a sphere of its influence
and as a part of Euroasian community in creation. That community, with
Russia in its center, is to be established as a strong pole of influence in the
new multipolar world and a new bipolar Europe.
It can be assumed that for Russia, the Balkans’ settling in the EU or in
its sphere of influence is not disputable. But in a context of slow European
integration of the region and still very fragile democratic institutions, a
very likely possibility remains for Russia to use this space and numerous
unsolved conflict issues in it as a testing ground for its installations and
security positioning for defending its own spheres of influence from European and American interference. Such approach is not only probable,
but is also expected in a context of the new Russian European and international realpolitik of geopolitical balancing. Some recent analyses and
observations have already warned about such possible development of the
events (Bugajski, 2013; Clark and Foxall, 2014; Balkans in Europe Policy
Advisory Group, 2014; Lasheras, 2014).
In this context it is reasonable to consider the successes and limitations of the enlargement as an instrument of CFSP. The enlargement is
also, among other things, an instrument for successful crisis management.
We are witnessing that the clear perspective for full membership in the
Union has played a crucial role in overcoming the conflicts. This is especially the case with the Balkans. Maybe that’s why the enlargement is
considered as the best EU’s foreign and security policy - it solves the crises
and increases the EU’s power and resources simultaneously. The enlargement policy has proved to be indispensable for the EU’s aspirations to gain
weight and power of a global actor, because with the enlargements of the
last decade the EU has nearly doubled the number of its member-states,
as well as its total population and territory. But, we should be aware for its
limitations, too. Namely, with new member-states, as well as with some of
the original member-states, some serious cracks are visible through which
non-European influence, whether Russian or American, penetrate and
undermine the process of building a Common European Policy.
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Nevertheless, the Balkan states as the EU applicants will have to stick
to the common attitudes of the Union harder. Their space for so-called
neutral or independent policy regarding the common established policy
of the Union will be lower. They will have to strengthen their ability to articulate their interests appropriately through the given framework of their
relationships with the Union. Of course, the real European pressure on
them will be as big as long the EU’s approach towards particular crisis is
more coherent. The more evident differences within the Union between
its member-states leave bigger space for maneuver in a certain situation,
but exclusively for an operation of tactical character.
Concluding remarks
So far, the external security crises have had a significant effect on the constitution and development of CFSP. The wars in Yugoslavia, Kosovo and
Iraq have caused big strides in its development, enlarging and deepening
the integration in the domain of foreign policy, security and defense.
The crises in its imminent neighbourhood have shown that the EU
has to continuously, without exception, confirm itself as a key regional security actor. Without it, we cannot talk about the EU’s strategic actorness.
Each crisis on the EU’s borders represents a big challenge for affirmation
or problematisation of its strategic actorness. It is also confirmed with the
most recent issue in this context – the Ukrainian crisis. Similar to the
cases of the previous crises, it can be assumed with great probability that
the Ukrainian crisis will have a significant influence upon further development of the EU’s strategic actorness.
Above all, it can be expected that one self-reflexive process related to
the Union’s self-perception and self-conceptualization and its place in the
international order. Especially regarding the issue which seems determining for its future – the way of dealing with the increasing multipolar order
in a more realistic way that will support and strengthen its unquestionable
normative power with a real capacity of hard power to deter and intercept
the threats.
In terms of further integration in the area of CFSP, further strengthening of the efforts for greater coherence can be expected, both horizontal
and vertical. It doesn’t mean at all that that process is in contrast to the
enhanced role of the national governments. On the contrary, the national
governments of the member-states themselves, taking into consideration their more limited opportunities for efficient individual action in the
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growing multipolar order, tend to build common policies and joint actions as the most efficient way for protection of their national interests.
In terms of building the EU’s strategic culture, a process of further
convergence can be expected. Along with political and institutional logic,
this process will be driven more by economic motives. Namely, in the recent years, by the emergence of the economic and financial crisis, the reduction of their national security and defense budgets member-states are
clearly trying to compensate by enhanced cooperation in using the limited
military resources through so-called Pooling and Sharing approach. Pooling and Sharing approach is based on liberalization of the defense market within the EU and enhanced europeanization of the national defense
budgets by conduction of joint procurements of weapons, equipment and
services, further integration of force structure and increased specialization. Will this process of convergence lead towards the emergence of an
authentic, distinctive strategic identity of the Union, or it will be met by
providing appropriate place within a broader transatlantic strategic culture, is still too early to be seen. However, in the coming period it can be
expected that the Union will continue constantly to develop its civilian
and military capacities for crisis management in terms of its foreign policy, reinforcing its profile as the only organization which posses a whole
spectrum of necessary resources and instruments – economic, financial,
humanitarian and military - for efficient crisis management.
In terms of creating some new instruments and new policies, an accelerated movement towards constitution of an Energy Union can be expected. It is a fact that since the revision of the ESS in 2008, the energy
insecurity has been defined as a new security threat. By securitization of
the energy dependency, the EU has created a foundation for its more urgent addressing. Serious advances of the integration in this domain, i.e.
creation of an Energy Union will have to occur, because further extension
of the policy of individual energy coping of the member-states and leaning to bilateral agreements, undermines the Union’s capacity to create and
implement an effective common foreign policy.
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103
Roberto BELLONI
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO, SOCIOLOGY
AND SOCIAL RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
The Growing Euroscepticism
of the Western Balkans
Over the last two decades or so, most citizens in western Balkan states55 have
held the belief that increasing integration into the European Union (EU)
would bring about considerable benefits. Such a belief has contributed substantially to sustain difficult post-socialist and, even, post-war transitions. In
many cases the “European perspective” gave meaning, sense and direction to
both political elites and ordinary citizens in their attempt to take control of
and shape the new and challenging post-Cold War environment.
Since the beginning of the global economic and financial crisis in
2008, however, this perception has begun to change, opening the way to
a diffuse sense of euro-fatalism or even euroscepticism. Lack of enthusiasm for “Europe” was confirmed at the 2014 elections to the European
Parliament, which went largely unnoticed in most western Balkan states.
While there exist in the western Balkans deep-rooted negative perceptions
about Europe (and “the West” more generally) that precede the outbreak
of the economic and financial crisis, as further explained below, the crisis
severely undermined the main supposed advantages of EU integration –
economic development and prosperity – and thus intertwined and reinforced lingering negative attitudes about Europe.56
Opinion polls demonstrate that the EU’s popularity in the region is
progressively declining, even if it remains relatively high.57 In Serbia, sup-
104
55
e western Balkans include Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of MacedoTh
nia, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and, before 1 July 2013, when it acceded to the
EU, Croatia.
56
I use “EU” and “Europe” interchangeably both to make the prose more readable and in recognition of the fact that the EU has effectively occupied the identity space of Europe as a political community. My choice of terminology, however, should not obscure the fact that there
are other international organizations (such as the Council of Europe, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, etc.) competing with the EU in representing Europe.
57
Unless otherwise noticed, data is drawn from European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 80, Public Opinion in the EU, Autumn 2013, available at:
port for Euro-Atlantic integration has reached its record low. For the first
time since the democratic changes in 2000, parliamentary elections held
in March 2014 led to a National Assembly composed by political parties
all in favour of EU integration and membership. At the same time, however, while in 2011 the percentage of citizens in favour of joining the EU was
about 60%, in 2013 supporters of Serbia’s entry into the Union dropped
to little more than 40%. Even states with a strong pro-European tradition
such as Macedonia and Montenegro have registered significant changes.
Since the beginning of the global financial and economic crisis, support
to entry into the EU has diminished by about 15 points in both states.
In Macedonia, only 50% of citizens believe that membership into the EU
would be a “good thing” for the country. Macedonians are frustrated and
disappointed by the continuing stalemate in the process of integration
into the Union. The country became an official EU candidate in 2005,
but has not yet entered into accession negotiations because of a dispute
with Greece over the country’s name.58 The long-standing confrontation
with Greece has contributed to radicalize the position of Macedonian citizens, 80% of which prefer maintaining the official name of “Republic of
Macedonia” rather than entering into the EU. The name dispute has been
obscuring the profound political crisis the country has been experiencing,
including recurring episodes of parliamentary boycotts. Meanwhile Montenegro began accession talks (in June 2012) but the chapters concerning the fight to organized crime and corruption and that involving the
protection of freedom of expression are quite problematic. EU’s criticism
of the Montenegrin government in relation to these issues has elicited
widespread discontent within both the local politico-economic elite and
ordinary citizens. Only two months after the opening of accession negotiations, support for EU membership fell to a record low of 59.9%.59 This
drop became a free fall by late 2013, when the Eurobarometer registered
only a 44% of support for EU membership.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_first_en.pdf; Institut für Europäische Politik, EU–28 Watch, No. 10, July 2014, available at: http://www.eu-28watch.
org/?q=node/1147; Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2008–10 Survey Reports, available at: http://
www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/reports
58
is is why the EU adopts the provisional name of “Former Yugoslav Republic of MacedoTh
nia” instead of its constitutional name – “Republic of Macedonia.”
59
amir Nikočeviċ, “Euroscepticism is on the Rise in Montenegro,” European Pulse, no. 84,
D
2012, pp. 4–6.
105
A Fractured Region
In general, support for EU integration is highest where the prospect of
accession is more distant.60 In Albania, which was recognized as an official
candidate only in June 2014, about 90% of citizens are in favour of EU
accession. In Kosovo, where the process of developing closer ties with the
EU is, at best, in its initial stages, the support for Europe is almost universal. The Kosovar (Albanian) population has some reasons of resentment
towards Europe – above all the lack of a common European position in
relation to the recognition of Kosovo after the 2008 declaration of independence.61 However, Kosovo honours “Europe Day” (9 May) with activities celebrating peace and unity in Europe. Unlike all EU member states
where May 9 is a working day, however, in Kosovo this day is a holiday.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is not still in a position to apply for membership, surveys indicate that pro-European sentiments range between 60
and over 80% – although respondents from the Croat-Bosniak Federation
are significantly more supportive of EU accession than those from Republika Srpska.62
By contrast, while those states most behind in the EU integration
process are euro-enthusiasts, those more advanced experience the highest
levels of Euroscepticism – as in the case of Croatia. This country became
the EU 28th member on 1 July 2013 – a day celebrated by Croat elites as
the final exit from the dangerous and unstable “Balkans” and the return
to the “European Home” after a long period of forced exile. It is since the
beginning of the process of dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation that
Croatia has been nurturing its European roots and traditions, while attempting to make its identity increasingly less “Balkan” and more continental.63 After achieving independence in the early 1990s Croatia began to
associate itself to Central and East European states, while at the same time
106
60
onversely, countries with more concrete prospects of accession are more critical towards
C
the EU. See Corina Stratulat (ed.), EU Integration and Party Politics in the Balkans, Brussels,
European Policy Centre, September 2014.
61
Dimitris Papadimitriou & Petar Petrov, “Statebuilding without Recognition: A Critical Perspective of the European Union’s Strategy in Kosovo (1999–2010),” in Arolda Elbasani (ed.),
European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans: Europeanization or Business as Usual? London: Routledge, 2013, p. 122.
62
oreign Policy Initiative, “BiH Public Opinion on the EU Integration Processes 2009–2012,”
F
available at: http://www.vpi.ba/upload/documents/eng/BiH_Public_Opinion_on_the_EU_
integration_process_2009-2012.pdf
63
John E. Ashbrook, “Croatia, Euroskepticism, and the Identity Politics of EU Enlargement,”
Problems of Post-Communism, 57 (3), 2010, pp. 23–39.
rejecting associations and comparisons with other “Balkan states.” This
strategy, described in a different context by Edward Said with the concept
of “orientalism,” is widely followed in the region. As the process of Yugoslav dissolution unfolded, Croats (as well as Slovenes) increasingly identified themselves as “European,” in contrast with Serbs who were described
as “oriental” and “Balkan.” On their part, Serbs attempted to distinguish
themselves from the “true” Orientals, that is, Kosovars. This widespread
discursive framework based on stereotypes and prejudices served to created new regional hierarchies. Former members of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire such as Slovenia and Croatia managed to reduce the symbolic and
political distance between them and Europe while the rest of the region
once dominated by the Ottoman Empire did not. In addition, the invocation of “Europe” also served to marginalize critics of the integration process who were de-legitimated as “anti-European,” “politically reactionary”
and even “nationalists.”
During the process of European accession, however, Croatia has lost
much of its Europeanist zeal, thus confirming how the EU is most attractive when it is distant. When Croatia applied for EU membership in 2003
support for Euro-integration was about 85%. Ten years later, while the
political elite remained strongly pro-Europe and Eurosceptic parties disappeared from the political scene, the majority of Croat citizens remained
quite aloof, if not sceptical or critical. Two communication strategies in
2001 and 2006 attempted to inform citizens on the progress towards integration and to improve the quality of the discussion about the pros and
cons of accession, but they garnered little interest. The conditions for EU
membership – including facing the past, dealing with war crimes, and
removing immunity for high profile politicians – were often perceived as
insulting to Croatian national pride. As a result, at the 2012 referendum
on EU accession 66.1% of citizens voted in favour, but only 43.5% of those
having the right to vote actually cast their ballot. This turnout was the
lowest ever recorded in a referendum on EU membership. Interest for European issues continued to decrease in the following months. At the first
elections for the EU Parliament held in April 2013 only 20.8% of citizens
voted and chose, among others, the fervent euro-sceptic Ruža Tomašić.
Voter turnout improved somewhat for the May 2014 EU Parliamentary
elections but remained significantly low (25.2%).
This increasing disenchantment towards Europe intertwines with the
deterioration in the economic conditions and outlook for Croat citizens.
Croatian entry into the EU will allow the country to access significant
communitarian funds – more than 11 billion euros between 2013 and
107
2020 – but in the short-term may bring about a worsening in the standard
of living of most citizens. Unemployment rate is about 20% and may grow
further. According to the Minister for transport and telecommunications,
Siniša Hajdaš Dončić, the restructuring of state companies will require
the firing of 10,000 workers. Further job losses are expected as a result
of the privatization of the shipbuilding industry. While this economic restructuring proceeds, compliance with Maastricht criteria (including the
EU’s deficit limit of 3% of GDP) may require additional cuts to the welfare
state.64 In a country where about 60% of all citizens receive a salary from
a public institution, and where about half a million of them (out of a total
population of 4.4 million) collect a pension as a result of the wars in the
1990s, cuts may increase social tensions considerably. In addition to exacerbate social conflict, Croatia’s entry into the EU has brought about new
limitations and constraints. Restrictions have been placed on both fishing
and agriculture forcing the country to important products available locally, such as milk. In sum, on the first anniversary of Croatia’s entry into
the EU Croatian citizens have few reasons to celebrate.65
Croatia officially became an EU member in July 2013, but the perception that European institutions are not entirely ready to open Europe’s
door to citizens from the western Balkans remains. Since the end of 2009
Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians and, since late 2010 Bosnians and
Albanians, started to enjoy visa-free travel to the Schengen zone. This visa
liberalization, achieved after decades of isolation and years of requests by
western Balkan states, has been interpreted as a concrete step to bring the
region a step closer to the European fold. Citizens received the news about
their newly found right to travel to the EU with excitement and thrill.
Since then, ten of thousands have taken advantage of visa liberalization
in order to enter the Schengen area and many have applied for political
asylum, in particular in Germany, Sweden and Belgium (where, however,
only 3% were granted the status of refugee). In order to block with movement of people in mid-September 2013 the European Parliament adopted
a “protection clause,” which was later endorsed by the European Council,
which allows both member states and the Commission to suspend the
visa-free regime in case the number of arrivals is judged to be a “threat
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64
Barbara Matejcić, “Croatia: Painful Lessons in Market Economics,” European News, 1 (6),
2013, pp. 1–6.
65
Christoph Hasselbach, “Disillusionment on Croatia’s first EU Anniversary,” Deutche Welle,
2 July 2014, available at:
http://www.dw.de/opinion-disillusionment-on-croatias-first-eu-anniversary/a-17753326
to the public order or security” of any EU state, or of the EU as a whole.66
The suspending mechanism entered in effect in early 2014, and has not
yet been activated. The practical implications of this clause may be minimal, but not its symbolic consequences, as citizens from western Balkan
states may interpret it as a sign that European institutions are aloof or
even hostile.
Why Euroscepticism?
Initiatives aimed at limiting the possibility of travelling to the Schengen
area are symbolically important, but remain relatively inconsequential
for most citizens in the western Balkans. Besides contingent decisions or
events, there are at lest three underlying reasons explaining the growing
level of Euroscepticism in the region.
First, the economic and financial crisis that broke out in 2008 has severely damaged the economic development path adopted by western Balkan states. From an economic point of view the region is very integrated
into the EU. Almost two thirds of all of the region’s commercial exchanges
take place with the Union. Both Montenegro and Kosovo have unilaterally
adopted the euro as their currency, while Bosnia has de facto given up its
monetary sovereignty in favour of a currency board guaranteed by institutions in Frankfurt. While this economic integration has contributed to favour growth and development since the late 1990s, at the same time it has
increased the region’s vulnerability to external shocks including, above all,
the repercussions due to the weakness and instability of the Euro. Central
among these repercussions is the growth of unemployment. In Kosovo
and Bosnia-Herzegovina about half of the population does not have a job,
while in Macedonia the unemployment rate has surpassed 30%. In Serbia,
the country strategically most important in the region from both a political and economic point of view, unemployment is about 27%, the average
salary for those who have a job has declined to 380 euros a month, and
70% of people below the age of 35 continue to live at their parents’ home.
In Croatia unemployment is about 20%, with peaks of 40% for young people between 15 and 24 years of age. This difficult economic situation and
the lack of job opportunities undermine support for those reformist policies the EU has been asking to implement in the western Balkans as part
of the integration process.
66
e Council of the European Union, Council Amends EU Visa Rules, Brussels, 5 December
Th
2013, 17328/13.
109
Second, the difficult situation neighbouring EU member states have
been experiencing represent a loud alarm bell for aspiring new members.
To begin with, the devastating effects of the economic and financial crisis
on Greece have deepened scepticism towards the Union. Until recently
Greece was identified by countries in the region as a model to imitate because of its apparently irreversible achievements in moving from a condition of relative backwardness and underdevelopment to the stability and
prosperity followed by the country’s entry into the EU.67 However, since
2008 Greece’s experience has motivated many to doubt the presumed advantages and benefits that the process of integration into European institutions brings about. Citizens from the western Balkans acknowledge the
responsibilities of the Greek economic and political leadership in the unfolding of the Greek drama but at the same time they find that the EU and
its austerity policies played a fundamental role in the worsening of the
crisis. Croatia’s economic performance as the newest EU member state is
also a troubling reminder that membership cannot guarantee prosperity.68
In addition, the deteriorating political situation in some formerly
“Balkan” states, which have recently entered the EU, provides an additional reason for caution and suspicion towards the Union. The political situation in Bulgaria during 2013 and 2014 has been tense and difficult, with
two early elections and four different governments in less than 2 years.
Meanwhile, the country has been experiencing increasing economic and
social difficulties, which have led to both mass demonstrations and an
increasing number of suicides. In Slovenia, the first former Yugoslav state
to entry the EU in 2004, the political class has lost much of its credibility.
The former prime minister has been forced to resign and was convicted
to two years in jail for corruption. Mass demonstrations have been staged
to protest against economic and social policies perceived as “imposed”
by European institutions with the goal of salvaging the banks while leaving ordinary citizens to fend for themselves. Overall, the difficult situation
in some neighbouring EU member states is observed and assessed with
growing levels of preoccupation by aspiring new members in the western
Balkans.
Third, pundits and political elites resent an attitude by European institutions and officials they consider as paternalistic. In theory the integra-
110
67
itsa Panagiotou, “The Greek Crisis as a Crisis of EU Enlargement: How will the Western
R
Balkans be Affected?” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 13, (2013), n. 1, 89–104.
68
Igor Ilic and Zoran Radosavljević, “Croatia’s Economy Sends Troubling Message to Neighbouring EU Wannabes,” Reuters, 4 May 2014.
tion process should involve two sets of actors – EU officials and democratically elected representatives of aspiring new members – both on a
formally equal plane. In practice the crucial decisions on where, how, and
above all when enlargement will take place are taken, some would say
“imposed,” by Brussels. The vagueness of the criteria involved in the assessment of the reform process in aspiring new members lies of the heart
of the matter. Criteria concerning political stability, democratic governance, and rule of law are inevitably subjected to multiple and perhaps arbitrary interpretations. More generally, the EU requests aimed at ensuring
compliance with values and principles under severe strain even within
EU member states are perceived as inappropriate, untimely and perhaps
even offensive. Indeed, EU member states are eroded from within by the
growth of extreme right political parties, by nationalist policies and by
the difficulty to adopt and implement policies favouring tolerance and
multi-ethnicity. This development, or rather regression, in policies within
the EU complicates the transition process in the western Balkans, where
governments should adopt politically costly and unpopular reforms (including on normative standards such as gay rights) in the name of values
severely under strain even within western Europe. Unsurprisingly, political elites in the western Balkans, not unlike their counterparts in the EU,
interpret with growing diffidence European requests. In some cases they
do not hesitate to indicate European institutions and officials as ultimately
responsible even for the difficult economic situation and for the lack of
future perspectives.
These reasons for scepticism towards the EU and its institutions are
intertwined with a deeply rooted diffidence towards the “West” more
generally, and in particular towards the Christian-Catholic world. While
Muslims in the western Balkans, and above all in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are
frequently Europeanist, this is not the case for Christian-Orthodox citizens, most of whom are Serbs, who traditionally hold profound diffidence
and sometimes hostility towards the “West.” Since the late Byzantine period the “West” and, later, “Europe,” has been seen as the source of existential threats for the Orthodox world, leading many Orthodox citizens to
prefer Ottoman rule to subordination to Rome. In more recent times European policies towards the region have reinforced to the eyes of Orthodox nationalists a deep sense of mistrust. For example, European members of NATO have actively participated in the bombing of Serbia in 1999
in order to protect the Albanian population of Kosovo. Later the EU has
imposed on Serbia a number of conditions in order to accept the country
as a potential EU candidate, including full collaboration with the InternaPost-Global Crisis: European Union and its Surroundings
111
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – an institution that
has tried and condemned several Serbs responsible for crimes committed
during the 1990s wars. For some Serbs the most pressing threats to Serb
identity and interest continue to come from Europe. To the extent that
Serb citizens approve of the process of European integration, they do so
because of a sense of resigned Euro-realism based largely on the lack of
feasible alternatives.
Unforeseen Developments
The global financial and economic crisis and the euro’s vulnerability have
been an important factor to deepen the gap between the EU and the western Balkans, and to favour the consideration of alternatives to European
integration. Nearly half of the Macedonian population believes that its
political elite should seek for an alternative political development outside
of the EU. Local media frequently depict Turkey as a symbol of success
without EU integration.69 Even in Serbia, where the political class is committed to Euro-integration, some scholars and pundits have been debating
the possibility of abandoning EU integration in favour with closer ties
with the Russian Federation.70
This quest for alternatives combines with greater cooperation among
former enemies in the region. According to Hido Biščeviċ, first Secretary
General of the Regional Cooperation Council (formerly Stability Pact),
the economic and financial crisis has accelerated the cooperation among
weak states in the western Balkans – which now in practice operate in
a common economic space. Paradoxically, while official, internationally
sponsored efforts at reconciliation have achieved modest results, the crisis
has contributed to overcome some of the prejudices and stereotypes held
about each other by citizens in western Balkan states. Whereas for years
the EU has attempted, with limited success, to favour the development of
economic, political and cultural ties among states in the region, a growing
cooperation has been developing from the ground-up with surprising and
perhaps unexpected vigour and dynamism.71
69
112
jupcho Petkovski, “Macedonia,” in Institut für Europäische Politik, ed., EU–28 Watch,
L
No. 10, July 2014.
70
Sena Marić, “Serbia,” in Institut für Europäische Politik, ed., EU–28 Watch, No. 10, July 2014.
71
Tim Judah, Yugoslavia is Dead, Long Live the Yugosphere, Papers on South Eastern Europe,
London: LSEE, November 2009.
The development of regional cooperation went hand in hand with a
loss of EU’s attractiveness. The mid and long-term consequences of the
growing euroscepticism in the region are hard to gauge. It is unlikely that
the process of European integration can succeed without the support, or
least the passive acceptance, of the citizens of the western Balkans. However, the revitalization of the European perspective is complicated by the
lack of enthusiasm among EU member states, which do not consider further enlargement as one of their priorities during a period of a severe
economic and financial crisis. At the same time, European efforts are necessary. Even though the region’s European perspective is frequently sustained by the idea of a “return to Europe,” as in the case of Croatia’s entry
in to the Union in July 2013, there exist less emotional motivations. More
simply, Europe cannot afford to fail in the region because a failure would
be devastating for its credibility – already frequently challenged.
113
Reinhard PRIEBE
DIRECTOR, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND INTERNAL SECURITY,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BRUSSELS
The European Union’s Values – Their
Relevance for Memeber States,
Candidates for Memebership and the
Wider World
1. In his famous 1946 speech in Zürich, which launched the idea of
Europe working together shortly after the disasters of the Second
World War, Winston Churchill referred to the common inheritance Europe should share, once united.
2. Values common to all Member States have ever since been the
foundation for carrying out the project of European integration.
Today, the Lisbon Treaty, which – although not called a constitution – now in a way is the “constitutional” basis of the European
Union, refers in its Preamble to the “inspiration” the 28 Member
States as the parties of the Treaty are drawing from “the cultural,
religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have
developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable
rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and
the rule of law”. Accordingly, Art. 2 TEU states, that “the Union
is founded on the values of respect of human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”. And Art.
2 TEU in a second sentence underlines, that “these values are
common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism,
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”.
3. It is not by accident that common values are spelt out in one of
its very first articles of the Treaty, even before it describes the aim
and the objectives of the Union. It is not only a Union of commonly agreed rules, of economic and monetary cooperation, it is
a Union of values – a “Wertegemeinschaft”, as German scholars
like to call it. The Treaty making Member States indeed wanted to
state clearly that the Union’s common values are the very basis of
a far-reaching and intensive cooperation in so many policy areas
114
in “an ever closer cooperation among the peoples of Europe”, as
the Preamble points out.
4. Referring to “values” is new since the 2009 Treaty revision, the
Lisbon Treaty. Before, Treaty makers preferred to refer just to
“principles”. This could appear as a drafting detail, and the Treaty
is not at all places systematic in making the distinction. Nevertheless, it is clear that, whereas the notion “principle” intends to
refer in the first place to a legal commitment, to which Member
States subscribe, the concept of “value” goes deeper: it is meant to
emphasise the foundation, a basic condition for countries to work
together within the Union. In this sense, the change from “principles” to “values” can be considered as a “normative upgrading”.
5. The foundation of the Union on common values contains two distinct aspects: First it means that the Union itself, its institutions,
its activities in all policy areas, has to be determined and to be
guided by the Union’s values. In this sense, Art.13 TEU requires,
that the Union’s institutional framework “shall aim to promote its
values...” Numerous specific rules in the Treaties reflect this requirement. Secondly, and maybe even more importantly, adhering
to and enforcing the common values through their own constitutional and broader legal order, is what Member States are expected to ensure; this is – as mentioned – the basic condition for
working together within the Union, the indispensable prerequisite
for mutual trust amongst the members of the Union. A certain
degree of homogeneity of the constitutional orders of the Member
States based on the common values – leaving obviously enough
space to deal with national specificities in national constitutions
– makes the partners confident, that opening towards European
integration and transferring national powers to the EU, with other
members participating in the decision making, is sufficiently balanced by a guarantee with regard to the standards to be respected
by all members of the Union. In a way, the value provision in the
Treaty can be considered as an important element of a European
“ordre public”.
6. The values Art. 2 TEU mentions could at first sight appear to be
very broad, vague, to be referred to whenever it suits, nothing really enforceable, e.g. by the European Court of Justice, just – to
say it in a provocative way – the usual “constitutional lyrics” we
so often find as an “overture” in constitutions and in the basic
instruments of international organisations, such as the Council
115
of Europe or NATO. However, underlining the European values
in the Treaty is more than simply expressing a political intention
in nice words, it is legally binding with legal consequences, if not
respected.
7. Rigid lawyers might argue, that in referring to values and (as I already mentioned) by distinguishing between values and principles,
the Treaty lacks somewhat precision and system. For example,
whereas the Preamble refers to “inviolable and unalienable rights
of human persons”, Art. 2 TEU speaks about “human dignity” and
the “respect of human rights”. Both mention equality and freedom
along human rights, whereas the Charta of Fundamental Rights
(CFR), which has the same legal value as the Treaty, qualifies all
of them – human dignity, equality and freedoms – as fundamental
rights.
8. Another doubt could arise from the fact that Art. 2 TEU is formulated as a statement – “the Union is founded” – not as an obligation, which seems to be rather the language of a preamble than
that of a Treaty article. Bearing in mind however, that the noncompliance with the Union’s values can be sanctioned under the
Treaty, it is clear that the Treaty does not intend to simply state
the foundation of the Union on values as a fact of life; it considers
Member States and itself as legally bound to those values. This is
essential for understanding the process of European integration,
beyond the technicalities of thousands of pages of the famous “acquis communautaire”.
9. The relation between the two sentences of Art. 2 TEU might cause
further headache. Clearly the first sentence mentions the values,
the Union is founded upon, and the beginning of the second sentence states that these values are (also) common to the Member
States. But then, that second sentence produces another list of elements which “prevail” “in a society” (with the interesting detail,
that reference to society is put into singular and thus does not
refer to distinct societies in the Member States, but to a “European transnational society” in the process of shaping on the basis of a Union citizenship and common fundamental rights). The
prevailing elements are not values, but they are mostly covered by
the values of the first sentence, justice as part of rule of law, nondiscrimination and equality between women and men as part of
equality. On the other hand pluralism, tolerance and solidarity are
concepts that seem to add to the values. Maybe, not too much in116
terpretative energy should be put into this. Art. 2 TEU as it stands
was a compromise. Its initial draft did not consist of two sentences. There was resistance from some Member States to overload the
list of values, especially in the direction of social rights. Therefore,
it is probably not wrong to see the list of the elements in the second sentence as those principles, which simply did not make it to
the list of values. This by no means should be misinterpreted in
a way, that the Treaty makers did not consider these principles as
important.
All this demonstrates, that the value provision of the Treaty, as a
result of difficult negotiations, is certainly not a perfect piece of
Treaty drafting, and how could it have been.
10. There is no “hierarchy” amongst the values mentioned in Art. 2
TEU, no “automatic” priority of one value in relation to another in case of conflict. However, human dignity is under the CFR
“inviolable” and is indeed the basic human right. The European
Convention for Human Rights confirms this and so do the constitutions of EU Member States.
11. Moreover, the solemn spelling out of the Union’s values could give
the wrong impression, that other principles referred to elsewhere
in the Treaties are ranking second category. It is rather that they
stem from the Art. 2 values. This is certainly true for the rights
linked to Union citizenship, to the freedoms in the internal market and to the whole range of fundamental rights laid down in
the CFR, just to mention a few examples. Therefore, Art. 2 TEU
should definitively not be understood as “devaluating” other important Treaty principles. The dimension of those principles, their
effective implementation and the judicial review with regard to
their respect are governed by the specific rules of the Treaties referring to them.
12. As mentioned before, Art. 2 TEU addresses to the Member States
and to the Union. Looking more closely at the Union level, Art. 3
TEU defines as the aim of the Union, “to promote peace, its values
and the well being of its peoples”. It is important to understand
that values should guide EU policy making when policies are implemented internally within the Union, but also when the Union
acts externally. And, last but not least, the Union’s values are particularly relevant in the context of enlargement.
13. In terms of internal EU policies, as I already mentioned, many
Treaty provisions specify the European values.
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There are provisions on democratic principles, citizens’ representation and participation, the accountability of EU institutions
and the involvement of the European Parliament as well as national parliaments in decision-making. Equal, fair and correct
elections are the very basis of a functioning democracy. General
and specific Treaty rules cover various aspects of equal treatment
and non-discrimination not only in the context of social rights.
Non-discrimination amongst EU citizens is a fundamental principle for the functioning of the internal market. And even in the
framework of the old fashioned common agricultural policy the
Treaty forbids, since 1958 by the way, discrimination between
farmers. The right to free movement of EU citizens within the
Union is an essential freedom. Many of the dramatic recent incidents of uncontrolled migration over the Mediterranean (I only
mention Lampedusa) have raised very concrete questions on how
to safeguard human dignity under very difficult circumstances.
More generally speaking, the CFR takes care of a broad range of
fundamental rights, many of which are also covered by the European Convention of Human Rights and by the general principles
developed by the European Court of Justice. It looks however a
bit odd, that the value provision in Art. 2 TEU refers to “human
rights”, whereas in our internal system we generally refer to “fundamental rights”.
Beyond such specific Treaty provisions, Art. 2 shall in general
guide political choices at EU level. And it provides orientation for
the interpretation of EU law, both at the level of primary Treaty
law as at the level of derived secondary legislation. However, promoting the Union’s values does not as such confer a power to the
Union to act, where it does not have any specific competence to
act under the Treaties.
14. Looking at the external action of the Union, both that related
to specific internal policies as that related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP), Art.21 TEU stipulates, that the
“Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world:
democracy, the rule of law, ...human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect of human dignity, the principles of equality and
solidarity, ...” The Union shall safeguard its values. Member States,
through convergence, shall ensure that the Union is able to “assert
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its interests and values at the international scene”. There is thus a
strong emphasis in the Treaty on designing foreign policy actions
of the Union on the basis of its values. This, I assume, is meant to
make a distinction to other important players on the international
scene, whose actions might be driven primarily by foreign policy
efficiency and pragmatism. Obviously, any EU action on the international scene needs some degree of flexibility and discretion
with regard to the possibility and the means to promote European
values in the rest of the world.
15. The on-going negotiations between the EU and the US on a new
trade and investment agreement (TTIP) have put on the surface
fundamental objections and opposition within the EU referring
– rightly or wrongly – to a possible selling out of European values (as part of our way of life) to the Americans. The sometimes
very emotional debates across the Atlantic on data protection and
in particular on activities of secret services are another example,
where the European position, quite opposed to that of the other
side, claims to defend European values. Obviously, data protection
is a fundamental right and it is a very important one in a time of
revolutionary digital changes. If you look at discussions currently
taking place in some of our Member States it appears however,
that data protection is about to become the “super-value” in the
European system.
16. Also the special relationship the Union shall develop with neighbouring countries shall, according to Art. 8 TEU, “be founded on
the values of the Union and be characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”. On that basis, by the way, the
Union has conducted negotiations on association with Ukraine,
which, as we all know, was not necessarily welcomed by other important players in the region.
17. According to Art. 49 TEU, the respect of the values referred to in
Art. 2 and the commitment to promote them, is one of the conditions for a country, to become member of the Union. Specific
conditions for eligibility shall be agreed upon by the European
Council, but it is important to note, that the respect of the Treaty
values is an accession condition already specified in the Treaty
itself. This basic accession condition also is reflected in (and was
by the way inspired by) the political elements of the so-called Copenhagen accession criteria, spelt out by the European Council
in 1993. It is important to understand, that, in making the Art.
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2 values a membership condition, the Treaty requires the same
from its candidates as it does from its own Member States (and by
the way its own institutions).
18. The Union’s focus on particular issues during the enlargement
process might sometimes give the impression that the Union “invents” new accession conditions ad hoc. This impression would be
wrong; it is rather that specific problems arising in a candidate
country could require specific attention, so to make sure, that a
country will entirely comply with European values once becoming a member. Always delicate to cite examples, but I could mention that the insistence of the Union, that Western Balkans countries fully respect their obligations to cooperate with international
war crime jurisdictions resulted from the obvious fact, that in the
specific historic context of the region this cooperation is an important aspect of the rule of law.
19. Let me also draw your attention to the fact, that Art. 49 TEU requires not only the – once off – respect of EU values by the adhering country but its continuous commitment to promote them.
There must be, at the moment of accession, sufficient reassurance
for that commitment to be carried out.
20. What happens, if a country does not respect the values? How is a
breach of values sanctioned?
From what I just explained, the answer is straightforward for
countries being in the enlargement process, as candidates or potential candidates for membership. In that case, one of the conditions for membership is not met, and even progress in the earlier
stages of preparing for accession (e.g. conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, moving to candidate status or
closing relevant chapters during accession negotiations) would be
put into question.
21. But also for Member States there is a mechanism: Art. 7 TEU. This
is the only rule in the Treaty, which provides for the possibility to
restrict the rights of Member States. The Council with a (unusual)
majority of four fifths of its members “may determine that there is
a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2”. By unanimity the Council “may determine
the existence of a serious and persistent breach”. If this happens,
the Council (with qualified majority) may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties...
including the voting rights of the representative of ... that Member
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State in the Council”. I will spare you from the procedural details
of this sanction clause, which has been substantially redrafted in
the Lisbon Treaty. What is important: the Treaty provides a specific procedure enabling the Union and its Member States to react
to a violation of the Union’s values by a Member State. It would
need to be a serious case of violation with an element of persistence, and the procedure to state a risk for a breach or even such
a breach is complicated, but it exists.
22. There have been, in the past, two cases, where “sanctions” against
Member States have been considered. I will not go into the details.
One case goes back to 2000, well before we had the current Art. 7
TEU sanction clause in the Treaty. It was about the participation
of a right wing party in a coalition government in Austria as a
result of elections. The case – at the time – was not uncontroversial and – as always in such situations – it was not easy to find
a way out again. Another case, which at the end did not lead to
apply sanctions proper, concerned the functioning of rule of law
and democracy principles in a country, which joined the Union in
2004. The debate about this case is interesting, because it became
clear that applying the sanction article in the Treaty is not only a
very heavy weapon, it might as such result in making a difficult
political situation even more difficult and lead – in a counterproductive way – to overreactions and radicalisation in the country
concerned. As Commission President Barroso put it: “We need a
better developed set of instruments, not just the alternative between the ‘soft power’ of political persuasion and the ‘nuclear option’ of Art.7 TEU”. This is why the Commission, in early 2014
has launched the idea of setting out a new framework to ensure
an effective and coherent protection of the rule of law in all Member States. The framework will be activated, where in a Member
States measures are taken or situations are tolerated “which are
likely to systematically and adversely affect the integrity, stability
or the proper functioning of the institutions and the safeguard
mechanisms established at national level to secure the rules of
law”. Threats to the rule of law should be addressed at an early
stage, thus avoiding a situation where the sanction mechanism of
Art. 7 TEU has to be triggered.
23. With regard to each specific value mentioned in Art. 2 TEU, I will
not be able to go into details in the framework of this short presentation; just a few remarks.
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I already mentioned the central importance of the concept of human dignity as an inviolable right. It is in a way the “key value”.
Accordingly, human dignity is mentioned in Art. 1 of the CFR; it
must be “respected and protected”. Other fundamental rights are
derived from the right to human dignity.
24. I also referred to basic elements of a functioning democracy, to
mention only free and equal elections and the central role of parliaments as the representation of the people in legislating and in
controlling the government. As we all know, there are doubts with
regard to the current democratic safeguards at the level of the EU
itself, but we have to bear in mind the particular structure of the
Union as a supranational organisation, which requires specific
mechanisms for democratic decision-making and control.
25. The respect of human rights can be implemented in different
ways according to different traditions in the Member States. At
EU level, the Charta of Fundamental Rights has set now very farreaching standards. They are all important, but maybe not each of
them should be considered as a “human right” and therefore be
part of the basic Union’s values.
26. The concepts of freedom and equality as individual rights are as old
as the French Revolution and the American Constitution. Bearing
in mind the history of the European continent, both in East and
in West freedom is and will be guiding European integration.
27. I assume, that the reference to equality as a European value does
not only refer to equal treatment of individual persons but also
to treat Member States (and I would not hesitate to add countries
aspiring for membership) equally within the EU system.
28. Rule of law has turned out to be currently the most problematic
of the values to be properly implemented. All public powers being
bound by law, the absence of arbitrary public decisions and more
concrete standards such as legal certainty, proportionality and the
efficiency and objectivity of administrative and judicial procedures, are only some elements of the rule of law or “Rechtsstaat”
principle, which have evolved in different European legal systems,
both the continental and the anglo-saxon ones, since decades or
even centuries. There is abundant jurisprudence of national courts
and indeed the European Courts with an ever more sophisticated
fine-tuning. Here again, as an EU value, rule of law does not cover
any potential breach in law, it rather refers to the basic mechanisms and principles to ensure, that a society is based on set rules,
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the respect of which will be efficiently enforced where necessary.
Full independence of the judiciary might at the end be the most
important condition for the law to rule, but some standards of
public administration – e.g. that unfavourable administrative acts
need to be justified – may be equally important. The respect of
the rule of law is not only a question of rules to be adopted and
to be implemented. It is so much also a question of administrative and judicial tradition and culture. And, being here in a candidate country, let me also underline that the full respect of the rule
of law is definitively not only a problem the EU discusses with
candidate countries. Much still needs to be done in some of our
Member States.
29. Ladies and Gentlemen, to come back to Winston Churchill’s 1946
statement I cited at the beginning: Yes, the European Union has a
common heritage of common values. Beyond solemn declarations
the Union has made its values binding for its Member States and
its own institutions. The values are relevant for carrying out the
EU’s internal policies, for guiding it’s external action and – last
but not least – for a country to become a member of the Union.
The values are the basis for detailed individual rights of citizens,
but also determine the way the members of the Union will act
amongst each other. In its external relations the values express the
way Europe wants to act in the wider world – to “export” its values; the values are however not directed against anybody.
At the end, not only talking about values, but also enforcing them
efficiently is very much a question of the credibility of the Union
towards its citizens, its Member States, its candidates and neighbours and the world as a whole. Common values are an essential
element of a European identity.
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Boris SHMELEV
ACADEMICIAN, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH,
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS, MOSCOW, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Russia and European Union Relations
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 the European
economic communities immediately declared their recognition of the new
states which emerged on the territory of the former USSR and their willingness to establish diplomatic relations with them. There arose a question
of forming a legal framework for the relations between the EU and Russia. On June 24, 1994, the Greek island of Corfu saw a regular session of
the European Council, at which the President of the Russian Federation,
heads of state and government of 12 European Union member states, the
President of the Council of the European Union and the President of the
European Commission signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
for 10 years establishing a legal framework for long-term cooperation between Russia and the EU and its member-states. The ratification of the
PCA took over three years, the agreement coming into effect on December 1, 1997. The Agreement encompasses three major areas of cooperation
– politics, trade, economy and culture. The PCA established partnership
relations between Russia and the EU and its member states. The Preamble
and Articles 1 and 2 of the PCA defined the criteria of partnership:
1. strengthening political and economic freedoms, which are fundamental to the partnership;
2. respect for democratic principles and human rights specified in
particular by the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a
New Europe, which is an essential element of partnership;
3. promoting international peace and security, as well as peaceful
settlement of disputes, and cooperation for these ends within the
framework of the UN, the OSCE and other forums.
The PCA declared a broadest program of economic cooperation
which encompassed over 30 areas, including business activity, investment,
science and technology, agriculture, energy, etc. The Agreement envisaged
developing cultural cooperation with a view to strengthening ties between
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people through free exchange of information, mutual learning of languages and cultures, access to cultural values.
From the very beginning the relations between Russia and the European Union have been exposed to two oppositely directed forces. On the
one hand, developing cooperation has been facilitated by objective and
long-term interest of both parties; on the other hand, it has been hampered by a number of processes typical of the development of Russia, the
EU and European security.
In August 1998, Russia saw a monetary and financial crisis. The government announced a stoppage on transactions with government shortterm bonds and imposed a 90-day moratorium on extinguishment of
obligations of Russian enterprises and banks to their foreign partners.
The rouble went down in value by almost four times. The EU adopted a
statement on faultiness of the economic policy of the Russian authorities,
which in its judgment undermined trust to Russia as an economic partner.
Nevertheless, in December 1998 the European Union began to develop a ‘global strategy’ with regard to Russia. The common strategy of
the European Union with regard to Russia was approved by the European
Council at its session June 3–4, 1999 in Cologne. The document proposed
that Russia should establish strategic partnership relations. Its long-term
aims were to establish a common free trade zone with further integration
of Russia into the European economic space, as well as close cooperation
with a view to strengthening stability and security in Europe and beyond.
On October 22, 1999, at the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki the Russian delegation responded by a Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the EU (2000–
2010). The document said that the main aims of the strategy were securing
Russia’s national interests and enhancing the role and authority of Russia
in Europe through creating a sustainable common European security system. The strategy envisaged building a united Europe without borderlines,
pursuing a policy of interrelated and balanced strengthening of the European Union and Russia’s standings in the international community of the
21st century. The document also answered the question whether Russia
should aspire to accede to the EU. ‘As a world power located on two continents, Russia must preserve its freedom of determination and pursuing
its own domestic and foreign policies, its status and benefits of a Eurasian state and biggest CIS state, its independence of stance and activity in
international organizations’. Formulating these two strategies marked the
end of the first stage of building partnership between Russia and the EU.
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Further development of EU-Russia relations was suspended by a military operation in Chechnya in 1999. This short-term stage of stagnation
in relations was overcome in 2000, and the cooperation began to develop
fast again. By the time, the Russian Federation had got over the aftermath
of the 1998 economic crisis and showed an upward trend in the economy.
The final statement adopted at the European Council session in Santa Maria da Feira (Portugal) in June 2000 underlined the need for a ‘solid and
healthy partnership’ with Russia. The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation approved by Russia’s President Putin in June 2000 pointed
out that Russia would seek to develop an intense, stable and long-term
cooperation with the EU, free from any market fluctuations.
In 2000–2005 the EU and Russia made several top-level political decisions and adopted a number of long-term programmes aimed at filling
the strategic partnership concept with substance. In autumn 2000 the EURussia summit initiated dialogue on energy – a major strategic sector of
modern economy. At the summit in May 2001 Russia and the EU agreed
to establish a high-level group to develop a concept for the EU-Russia
common European economic space.
The St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003 adopted a concept for four
EU-Russia common spaces – economy; freedom, security and justice; external security; science, education and culture. The Moscow Summit in
May 2005 approved road maps (common action plans) for building them.
Building the four spaces was seen by both parties as a mainstream direction of the partnership and practical cooperation between Russia and
the EU for the next 20–25 years. The roadmap for a common economic
space approved by the parties in 2005 provided for building an open and
integrated market between Russia and the EU. The parties intended to
broaden opportunities for economic actors, simplify the setup and operation of joint-stock companies, and enhance the competitiveness of the EU
and Russian economies on the basis of non-discrimination, transparency
and effective management principles. The priority areas of the cooperation were trade and investment, energy, transport, agriculture, environment protection.
Building a common economic space with the European Union demanded that Russia should solve several problems similar in terms of substance and scale to the reforms pursued by Central and Eastern European
countries before they acceded to the EU.
In the economic area Russia had to complete building market economy, to rebuild the sectoral makeup of its national economy and to carry
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out its technological modernization, to overcome monopolism, to create
congenial and stable investment climate.
In the field of state administration it was expected to reform the court
and arbitration system proceeding from the principles of independence
and transparency, to enhance the effectiveness of combating corruption
and crime. It was essential to build a stable system of democratic institutions capable of ensuring civic watch over activities of the authorities at
all levels. When implemented, the program was meant to contribute a lot
to modernizing Russia’s economy, approximating its national laws, norms
and standards to the international ones, improving the quality of management and economic policy of the state.
The road map for the common space of freedom, security and justice
defined the objectives for EU-Russian cooperation in combating organized crime. It established the principle of the internal security space – adherence to common values of democracy and rule of law, their effective
use by independent judicial systems, equality of partners and mutual respect for interests, observance of principles and norms of international
law.
The road map for the common external security space spelt out the
aims of EU-Russian cooperation in the field of external security. It dealt
with maintaining the international order based on effective multilateralism, meeting today’s global and regional challenges and major threats,
forming Wider Europe without borderlines, preventing stirring modern
forms of racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia.
A special emphasis was placed on enhancing dialogue and cooperation in the world arena, which implied agreement between Russia and the
EU that the post-bipolar world should be based on observing norms of
international law and the principle of multilateral management of international processes. The subject of this dialogue was the situation in the regions bordering Russia and the EU. After several countries of Central and
Eastern Europe acceded to the EU, there emerged a broad zone of common neighbourhood which comprised European and South Caucasian
CIS member states. For Russia the CIS is not only a historical sphere of
interest and major foreign policy priority. Russia and its neighbours have
an extensive network of multi- and bilateral cooperation in various fields
ranging from security, trade, investment and transport to culture and science. The European Union incorporated these states in its neighbourhood
policy. Therefore, there emerged a threat of competition in this region not
only between Russia and the EU, but between two independent integration processes – the Western European and Eastern European ones.
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The road map for the common science and education space contains
two major aims. The first aim is to promote economic growth and enhance competitiveness of Russian and EU economies through the rich intellectual legacy of the parties. The second one is to develop ties in education and culture, as well as stimulate youth exchange.
The cooperation between Russia and the EU had to overcome many
controversies between their interests. The dialogue on political and security issues was conducted between Russia, a sovereign state, an international actor, which has clear foreign policy priorities, and the European
Union, with a growing number of member-states, which is only on its
way to building a genuinely common foreign and security policy based
on an intergovernmental agreement. That is why the two parties failed to
move from the dialogue and consultations stage to the stage of developing a common stance and performing joint actions based on it. Nevertheless, political dialogue and cooperation between Russia and the EU were
evident. The parties were able to settle many problems which emerged in
their relations through negotiations.
One of the most burning issues in the 2000–2004 dialogue was the
European Union enlargement. In August 1999 the European Commission received a list of 15 issues which caused Russia’s concern in light of
the forthcoming accession of 10 Central and Eastern European countries
to the EU. Moscow proposed that consultations be launched on two key
points: the impact of the enlargement on trade and economic ties between
Russia and the acceding countries and the special status of the Kaliningrad region, which became a Russian enclave within the EU. The tough
negotiations on repercussions of the EU enlargement for Russia concluded by signing two documents in Luxemburg on April 27, 2004: The Protocol to the Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
extending the PCA to the new members of the European Union and a
Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations. The simultaneous signing of the two documents demonstrated another example of
a compromise – a package solution to disputes. Moscow agreed to extend
the PCA to the new EU member states. Brussels, in its turn, agreed to
increase quotas on export of Russian steel to the EU and lower some customs tariffs. The political dialogue between Russia and the EU traditionally focused on developing democracy and observing human rights in Russia. The key targets of the criticism were some aspects of Russia’s domestic
policy seen by Brussels as a deviation from common values, principles of
democracy and respect for human rights, which are fundamental to the
PCA. Moscow responded to this criticism by underlining that Russia had
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embarked upon a path of profound but peaceful reforms and would keep
on travelling its own way, not a way imposed from outside, respecting and
preserving its own centuries-old traditions.
In spring 2005 Russia and the EU set up a joint working group on
human rights to hold biannual meetings. However, they failed to iron out
differences in interpreting core values of democracy and in assessing the
situation in Russia.
One of the key aspects of the EU-Russia political dialogue is harmonizing approaches to resolving international and European security issues.
Russia and the EU agreed in their judgment of today’s global situation.
They proceeded from the premise that the world is multipolar; thus, it
must not be based on the hegemony of a single superpower but on the
concept of ‘effective multilateralism’. Both Russia and the EU argued for
enhancing the role of the UN in strengthening the international order,
as well as for peaceful settlement of regional and local conflicts. Russia
and the EU’s stances were very close in such issues as preventing nuclear
proliferation, combating international terrorism and organized crime.
Russia and the EU undertook several joint international actions aimed
at strengthening international security. Russia together with the EU, UN,
US – the so-called ‘quartet’ – participated in drafting a road map for settling the Middle East crisis, which, however, did not bring about stabilization of the situation in the Middle East. Together with the EU and the
US Russia seek to persuade Teheran to abandon its nuclear program. At
the same time, their stands differ on a range of European security issues.
Russia heavily criticised Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence,
while the majority of EU member states gave it their full support. Russia’s
compelling stand is that the disputes between the central authorities defending the territorial integrity and the authorities of a territory seeking
secession must be resolved exclusively through negotiations attended by
the two parties and international intermediaries.
One of the most acute political disputes between Russia and the EU
erupted in European and Transcaucasian regions of the CIS. The parties
in effect compete for economic and political influence in the countries of
these regions. Moscow and Brussels have different viewpoints in regard
to the domestic political situation in Georgia and Belarus. The Ukraine
crisis, which broke out in particular due to a clash of geopolitical interests
of Russia and the West – and the US in the first place – resulted in disruption of cooperation between Russia and the EU, Brussels imposing sanctions against Moscow, and putting the relations on the verge of confrontation. The two parties also differ on ways of settling the so-called ‘frozen
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conflicts’ in the post-Soviet territory: Transdniestria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the South Caucasus, Nagorny Karabakh. Despite
regular discussions of these issues, Russia and the EU failed to narrow
the gap between their stands. Moscow refused to participate in the ‘new
neighbourhood’ programme developed in 2003 on the basis of the EU’s
‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’. In its judgment, the concept and
the programme’s mechanisms were in effect elements of the EU ‘soft power’ policy in the form of ‘aid for reform’ and led to extending its influence
to the territories of Russia’s vital interests. From Russia’s point of view,
the EU ‘new neighbourhood’ policy came into collision with Russia’s national interests. Russia criticized the Eastern partnership project launched
in March 2009 at the EU summit in Prague with the participation of three
South Caucasian states, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. A new election
cycle in Russia contributed a new discord to the relations between Russia
and the EU. There also emerged sharp differences on ways of resolving
the Syria crisis. Speaking in the European Parliament in February 2012,
Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, criticized the election campaign to the State Duma and the
election outcome as not free and fair enough. Also in February the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning Russia and China’s
vetoing the draft resolution on Syria in the UN Security Council, and calling upon Russia to change its election laws.
Despite significant differences in interests between Russia and the
EU, Moscow was well aware of the importance of the cooperation with
the European Union for economic and social development of the country.
Strong evidence of this was the President’s decree ‘On Measures for Implementing Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’ in May 2012, which
placed high emphasis on relations with the EU. The decree defined the
strategic goals of Russia’s policy of developing relations with the EU –
building a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific, concluding an agreement with the EU on visa abolition for short-term mutual visits of citizens, defending principles of equal
rights and mutual benefit in developing a new basic strategic partnership
agreement between Russia and the EU, implementing the ‘Partnership for
Modernization’ programme, developing mutually beneficial energy partnership aimed at building a common European energy complex.
Russia is well aware that technological modernisation of Russian
economy and building new modern competitive productions are difficult
to achieve without attracting Western European business and manage130
ment. Western European stock exchanges are key channels for Russia’s access to the global capital market. The Partnership for Modernization initiative adopted at the EU-Russia Rostov-on-Don Summit in May-June 2010
was to contribute to modernizing Russian economy and other spheres. In
addition to it, in 2011 Russia signed bilateral Declarations on Partnership
for Modernization with 23 EU member states and implementation plans
for declarations with six EU member states.
The EU is an indispensible partner for Russia in trade and economy.
The EU accounts for about 55 per cent of Russia’s external turnover and
75 per cent of investment. Russia, in its turn, is the third partner of the
European Union after the USA and China in terms of turnover volume. It
accounts for 6 per cent of EU export and 10 per cent of import. Russia is
the leader in oil and gas supplies to the EU, as well as in coal supplies. It
accounts for about 40 per cent of the EU annual energy import.
Over the years Russia and the EU developed a fairly extensive network of market cooperation. The progress in economic relations found
its clear manifestation in the increase of trade and investment. The level
of economic interdependence of Russia and the European Union significantly increased. However, the 2008–2009 global financial and economic
crisis disrupted the upward trend of economic cooperation, especially in
trade and investment. Later it was regained, though. At the same time, the
crisis reaffirmed the high level of economic interdependence between the
EU and Russia and the need for their cooperation, including within the
framework of the G20, with a view to stabilizing the global economy.
In the field of trade with the EU Russia failed to switch from trading
commodities for manufactures to the trade based on specialization and
cooperation of industrial production. In terms of investment Russia has
to improve its investment climate and to secure by joint effort equal opportunities for market agents on the territories of both parties.
A major element of EU-Russia relations is the Energy Dialogue. Stable cooperation with the EU in the energy sector is as important for Russia as it is for the European Union, if not more important.
The Energy Charter of Russia adopted in November 2009 points out
that until 2030 energy export will be a major factor of developing the national economy. The EU is a key consumer of Russian fossil fuels accounting for 70 per cent of Russia’s oil and gas export.
The idea to create a special mechanism for constant energy contacts
between the EU and Russia was put forward by the European Commission in September 2000. It envisaged considerable increase in energy supplies from Russia in exchange for investment and technological aid from
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the EU. The strategic energy partnership with Russia was seen in the EU
as a means of decreasing dependence on oil import from OPEC and volatile Gulf states. The EU initiative was supported by Russia. The Energy
Dialogue was initiated at the Russia-EU Summit in Paris on October 30,
2000.
The situation on global markets after the Energy Dialogue was
launched and the rise of world energy prices in 2004 stimulated the EU
interest in securing stable and growing supplies from Russia. The growing profits from fossil fuels export contributed to Russia’s increasing GDP
and general economic recovery. As the energy cooperation strengthened,
Russia began to insist on changing the basic principles of the Energy Dialogue. As Russia’s President Putin pointed out after the G8 Summit in July
2006, he managed to convince his European partners that energy security comprises production, transportation and sale, and all the stages bear
equal responsibility. The Russia party proposed launching major investment projects based on assets exchange. In this case a European company
would get access to Russian deposits while Russia’s Gazprom, in its turn,
– to transportation or sales networks.
Halting transit of Russian gas via Ukraine had a huge negative effect
on developing the Energy Dialogue. As a result, 18 EU member states had
problems with gas supply. It became apparent that despite numerous statements of need for equal distribution of risks among producers, consumers and transiters, the EU countries were not prepared to take on transit
risks. Russia saw the long-term solution to the problem of securing energy
transit in creating alternative gas pipeline routes. Within a short time the
Nord Stream gas pipeline and the Baltic Pipeline System 2 were built. Russia also began to design and then construct the South Stream gas pipeline,
which was planned to be routed via the Black Sea to Bulgaria, bypassing
Ukraine. However, the so-called Third Energy Package adopted by the EU
created an insurmountable obstacle to implementing the project; thus, in
December 2014 Russia announced stoppage of all construction works on
the project. Moscow announced the closure of the project.
Despite the intense dialogue between Russia and the EU on various
issues of bilateral relations and the increase of turnover between them in
2011–2013 it was obvious that their relations were in stagnation. Their
interests increasingly not just disagreed but contradicted each other. The
‘four spaces’ concept was never implemented and in fact was forgotten.
The idea of strengthening cooperation on the basis of the ‘Partnership
for Modernization’ was not sustained by any real projects. Medvedev and
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Merkel’s Meseberg initiative to create an EU-Russia Committee on Foreign Policy and Security never worked out. An EU-Russia Energy Alliance was never established, either. There was a need for breakthrough
proposals and moves to implement them in order to propel the bilateral
cooperation to a new level.
The state and prospect of EU-Russia relations were discussed at the
Brussels summit in January 2014. Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the
European Commission, noted in his statement that one of the EU major
strategic goals was creating a common economic space from Lisbon to
Vladivostok. It could seem an empty dream but the dream might come
true. Harmonized building of a common economic space from Lisbon
to Vladivostok would mean a breakthrough in EU-Russia relations and a
totally different level of European security; it would also set a historic perspective in development of Europe and Eurasia. However, the escalating
Ukraine crisis thwarted these plans, led to EU sanctions against Russia,
rolling up the dialogue and sharp cutoff of the cooperation. A new cold
war has virtually started, with the EU playing a major part in it. Today
the prospects for EU-Russia relations are vague. However, Russia is still
interested in progressive development of cooperation with the European
Union. Russia proposes that an ‘integration of integrations’ project be implemented providing for building a common economic and humanitarian
space from the Atlantic to the Pacific on the principles of inseparability of
security and broad cooperation. In Russia’s judgment, aligning such strategic points would contribute to harmonious development of all ‘Wider
Europe’ states, both European Union members and members of the Eurasian Economic Union. The first step on this path could be launching negotiations on an agreement on a free-trade zone between the EEU and
the EU. Such an initiative, which Moscow still considers topical, was put
forward by Russia’s President Putin at the Brussels EU Summit in January
2014. Mr Barroso, President of the European Commission, supported the
idea.
However strained the EU–Russia relations are today, the relations
with the European Union will remain a top foreign policy priority for
Russia. Combining resources and competitive advantages of both partners
may in the long term bring about a breakthrough in enhancing global
competitiveness of their economies.
Successful economic cooperation requires mutual alignment of institutions, with Russia having to do most of the job, as the European Union
remains the key source of modernizing impulse.
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Melita RICHTER
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF TRIESTE, ITALY
East-West Relations – Examples of
Good Practices in Cultural
Cooperation Between the EU
and Western Balkans
My contribution will focus on two examples of good practices between
the Western Balkans and the EU countries:
The first is related to the EU IPA multi-beneficiary program in the
field of culture, specifically concerning Women’s Heritage;
The second one looks into the support from the Italian prestigious
cultural award – the International Carlo Scarpa Prize – to Osmače and
Brežani, two villages in the Eastern Bosnia.
Starting with Mr. Wenceslas de Lobkowicz’s assertion:
“It is of the utmost importance that cultural rehabilitation through
European support becomes apparent for citizens to prove that enlargement and pre-accession also deals with culture. It will confirm the importance of cultural heritage as a mean for reconciliation and contribute to
local economic development”.72
According to the above quotation I will try to illustrate one of the
European projects that have contributed to strengthen the dialogue, the
knowledge and the sharing between civil societies of different state entities in the Western Balkans area, together with those of the EU partners and their common effort in order to achieve the set objectives. I will
briefly report on one of the IPA multi-beneficiary programs in the field of
72
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I n the interview which Mr. Wenceslas de Lobkowicz, Advisor on Inter-cultural Dialogue and
Cultural Heritage, Directorate General for Enlargement, European Commission gave about
the role of the European Commission, about the Regional Cooperation Council and a newly established Task Force on Culture and Society supported by an international secretariat
located in Cetinje, the IPA projects are seen as indispensable tools to implement an important action in the field of cultural heritage in the region and to foster dialogue with the region’s countries.
See in Regional Cooperation Council Newsletter 9/2011 or http://www.rcc.int/interviews/26/interview-with-wenceslas-de-lobkowicz-advisor-on-inter-cultural-dialogue-andcultural-heritage-directorate-general-for-enlargement-european-commission
culture named “Support to Partnership Actions between Cultural Organizations” IPA 2009 – Civil Society Facility.73
The Project aimed to develop the network of NGOs active in the field
of culture in different countries of the Western Balkans together with the
civil society subjects active in the EU countries, in order to investigate in
depth the issue.
Women’s heritage: contribution to
equality in culture
Some essential data of the project:
The applicant was Centre for Women’s Studies, Zagreb, Croatia, in
partnership with four different countries of the region and the EU countries - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia and Italy. All partners
are well-known in the field of promoting inter-ethnic and cross-border
dialogue and have a long record of peace-building initiatives and transnational encounters. One of the expected outcomes of the project was as
follows:
–– good neighbourly relations that have always existed among women’s
groups from the region will be additionally strengthened and will
have bigger influence on large public, cultural and political elites.
The duration of the action was 2 years. The Project started in December 2010 and ended in December 2012.
Some of the countries involved in the Project are partially still traditionalist societies with remaining patriarchal attitudes on women’s role in
society. This was reinforced through politics of re-traditionalisation carried out in the 1990s, as well as through nationalistic tendencies in cultural policies. The isolationist tendencies of mainstream culture in Western Balkans countries are still strong. There has been a rupture in common heritage and the locking up in monumental, heroic and exclusionist
nationalistic narratives that resulted in failures to properly position its
own country in contemporary European cultural landscape. Same countries are also multireligious communities, where the need for dialogue of
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e basic information about IPA programs are visible on web-site, here just a short data: The
Th
Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EC) No. 1085/2006 on 17 July
2007, which implemented the IPA programme as an instrument for European Union assistance in countries with South East Europe and Turkey. The main goal of the IPA programme
is to provide support to beneficiary countries as a means to achieve full harmonization with
EU standards and policies prior to joining the European Union.
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Christian and Islamic believers (and politics grounded in religious identities) is rather urgent.
In such socio-political framework, women’s culture, consisting of
specific forms, actions and cultural productions created by and for women, are marked by gendered social order and stays marginalized in the
mainstream culture. It is not visible enough, does not receive equal attention of cultural institutions, and is not analysed in its proper context.
Historically, lives and works of creative women are influenced by limited
access to material, educational and symbolic resources, by systematic obstacles that sprang from patriarchal beliefs. The special case are stories of
women’s cultural, political and civic engagement, of women’s and feminist
movements, and peace-building efforts which were in nationalistic cultural policies seen as dangerous to national homogeneity. In some countries
of the region, Women’s and gender studies are still under-developed and
do not get sufficient institutional support for being able to carry on major actions and advocacy. As a consequence of lack of recognition, public
authorities and policy makers in the field of culture did not develop special programmes and support cultural actions whose goals is to overcome
marginalisation and its long-term effects.
However, for last 20 years women’s groups have built considerable
expertise in researching and promoting women’s culture, but due to the
lack of funding, those efforts have often been sporadic and unconnected.
Women’s groups as cultural actors therefore need additional support and
conditions for continuous cooperation in order to build synergies and develop strategies for achieving and maintaining high quality and sustainability of their cultural actions. That is why the EU projects as IPA multibeneficiary programs in the field of culture are particularly important in
promoting of equal opportunities among citizens and in erasing the effective differences that exist between the partners belonging to the EU countries and those still excluded from the process of European integration.
The overall objective of the Project was to strengthen the efforts of
cultural actors and promoters in the fields of cultural production, heritage research, preservation and promotion, interested in specificities of
women’s heritage, as well as to increase visibility of women’s culture, both
inherited and contemporary, in public space. The project aimed to enhance cooperation and exchange of knowledge and experience on several
axes – between peoples and countries, those from the EU and the candidate countries, between independent actors from civil society and public
authorities, between younger and older generations of citizens, between
heritage and future oriented cultural actions/initiatives. Applicant and
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partner organisations actively worked – and will continue to do so after
the conclusion of the Project – on creating social and cultural conditions
that could be pertinent for strengthening of the more democratic public memory, aiming, at the same time to oppose the practice of cultural
oblivion regarding women’s history and common heritage of countries
involved.
The activities of the Project, meetings, laboratories, conferences and
the exhibition named Dowry, produced by Sarajevo Centre for Contemporary Art took place in different cities of Croatia (Zagreb, Buje and Dubrovnik), of Italy (Trieste), of Slovenia (Ljubljana and Portorož), of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo), and of Serbia (Belgrade, Novi Sad).
Final beneficiaries of IPA Project were citizens involved with culture,
both individually and organised in CSOs; independent cultural organisations and artists that increased knowledge and developed shared strategies; professionals in cultural institutions; young generation of artists;
students and scholars; large public in all five countries involved in the
project, as well as in neighbouring countries.
The second example of ‘good practices’ which I would like to bring to
the attention of the audience, is related to the
International Carlo Scarpa Prize for Gardens
dedicate the XXV annual award to Osmače and
Brežani, two villages in Eastern Bosnia74
We are on the plateau above Srebrenica, a place where the landscape is
furrowed by watercourses, enclosed by the cut gullies of a big loop of the
Drina, a river which has played a crucial role in European history and culture, at the same time separating and connecting major civilizations in the
Balkans; an area that inevitably prompts one to reflect on the contradiction between the beauty of nature and the still omnipresent signs of war.
Osmače and Brežani together comprise one of the many places in
Bosnia and Herzegovina where, two decades ago, the life was torn from a
community, its long-established tradition of living together in a multi-cultural environment was destroyed and those who survived were dispersed.
What makes these villages a witness to a supremely significant experience
is the presence of a small group of families, farmers and stockbreeders,
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e full text of Carlo Scarpa Prize for Gardens, the award XXV to Osmace and Brežani,
Th
was published on the web site www.sarajevotimes.com/international-carlo-scarpa-prize-Osmace-Brezani
137
who for some years have been trying to find the way back to the texture of
the life they remember, to construct new relationships between people, to
renew the necessary ties binding space to be occupied, land to be tended,
houses to be rebuilt, human dignity to be recovered.
Before the interethnic conflicts and war in 1991, Osmače had 942
inhabitants and Brežani 273. No one lived there from 1993 to 2002. Today
some hundred people live in the districts comprising Osmače and several
families live in the adjoining village of Brežani.
In 2005, with the concrete support of the Langer Foundation and of
Tuzlanska Amica, a number of young people with different ethnic and
national backgrounds and from different religious traditions (they were
children in 1995) got together to organize an informal group which they
called Adopt Srebrenica; their aim, to create a context in which they could
talk about their future and about the prospects for their town.
In subsequent years some ten families first began to engage in dialogue and then, like real pioneer species, took the decisive step to return
to the villages up on the plateau in order to take in hand the land of their
fathers and mothers, to tend and cherish it. This was the background, in
2010, to the experiment of sowing buckwheat in Osmače, one the many
actions launched in several parts of Podrinje thanks to the exchange of
knowledge and practical help involving operators and technical experts
from many international bodies in various specialist sections of the agricultural, forestry and livestock economy, particularly those with expertise
in growing cereals, fruit and soft fruit, and in rearing sheep and cattle.
The role the International Carlo Scarpa Prize for Gardens aims to
play in an immense framework of reflection and action lies in trying to
achieve a more intimate understanding in ensuring wider awareness of
the profound reasons that bind individuals or families or small community groupings to the place inhabited by their memories and informed
with their plans. Reasons and ties that are so strong that, as demonstrated
by the case of Osmače and Brežani, they can confront chasms that appear
unassailable. Dialogue with those involved and their direct testimony help
us to see the most useful equipment for taking care of the physical environment, starting with the task of working the ground; they also provide
insights into what life is really like in an area in which the recent upheavals are the latest painful layer in the interminable series of geopolitical
metamorphoses laid down throughout history and in the broad context of
Euro-Mediterranean geography.
This place and these events help us to understand the sense and the
value of an experiment which is small in scale in socio-economic terms
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but of outstanding importance as a supremely civilized and tellingly symbolic example of the widespread phenomenon of the “return to the land”.
More immediately, they raise the urgent question of how best to construct
a multi-cultural space, proceeding not from the distribution of places to
the different elements but from a vision in which the different together inhabit a unitary place. In the year 2014, the Jury has decided to entrust the
Carlo Scarpa seal to two of the leading figures in this process, representatives and witnesses of their communities, their cultures and their villages
– Muhamed Avdić and Velibor Rankić. In so doing, this prize expresses
encouragement and commitment to comprehend and communicate the
difficulties and hopes that underlie their endeavours and express thanks
for their life-enhancing lesson, as topical as it is universal, that comes
from their tenacious resolve on the plateau above Srebrenica.
The international awards such as Carlo Scarpa Prize for Gardens, are
helping to raise awareness about the efforts, performed individually or by
the whole communities, to overcome the ethnic-national divisions and
conflicting memories (inevitable results of war, especially cruel in the area
of Drina valley), and to support the efforts of reconstruction of intercultural relationships, that are life forces of Bosnia; Bosnia as it could be possible place to live decently for the new generations. Without the assistance
of international NGOs their efforts would have been much higher. In the
same way, without international recognition, their visibility would be far
smaller.
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Nikola GJORGON
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF FYR MACEDONIA
Entropy of a Paradigm?
Abstract: Since its foundation, the European Union has been a peace project. The
paradigm of the EU was that of the prevention of new war, spread of peace, stability
and prosperity across the European continent. For many years and over several enlargements, the EU remained faithful to the idea of uniting the continent. Nowadays,
the EU is facing a number of diverse challenges on multiple levels. The EU’s inability
to adequately answer these challenges is an indicator that the EU paradigm is facing a
crisis. The reasons could be found in the entropy of the current paradigm. Only if the
EU manages to successfully answer the challenges can it avoid a major paradigm shift.
Keywords: European Union, Balkans, paradigm-shift, entropy, peace project, development, integration.
This year we mark the centennial of the First World War, which proved to
be a mare prelude to the Second, even more devastating World War that
left much of Europe in ruins. The wars took much of Europe by surprise,
since its paradigm could not detect the anomalies of the European system.
The new reality-check contributed to a major paradigm shift about Europe,
among Europeans and non-Europeans alike. The much romanticized image of Europe as the center of the civilized world, of wealth, power and
politics, of progress, culture and Belle Époque, was reduced to an internally
divided continent that plunged the whole world into two wars.
The two World Wars and the beginning of the Cold War served as
a catalyst for a new European paradigm: peace and development through
integration. The new paradigm was the idea of Europe as a peace project.
Among the many narratives that summarize this paradigm, one states
that “Europe is the place of freedom, tolerance and peace, conditions for
the coherence of a multidimensional society. It is the cultural treasure of
the future and for our descendants.”75 This paradigm was publicly recog75
140
“Manifest for Europe in the 21st century”, European Academy of Sciences and Arts
(EASA), euro-acad.eu, 5 December 2012 <http://www.euro-acad.eu/downloads/memorandas/502521_EN.pdf>
nized in 2012, when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European
Union “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and
reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”.76
However, what is a paradigm?77 Each paradigm, according to Thomas
S. Kuhn, has two basic functions. The cognitive function means that the
paradigm is the prerequisite to perception itself. The normative function
enables the paradigm to regulate and influence reality. By filtering the inputs and outputs, the paradigm helps us successfully navigate the sea of
challenges and opportunities of a given system.
Paradigms change along with the very reality they try to explain. In
the heart of the process of paradigm-shift is entropy as “the degree of disorder or uncertainty in a system.”78 Entropy is an inherent element of the
life cycle of every paradigm that ends either with adaptation of the existing paradigm, or its complete replacement with a new one.
How does this apply to the European paradigm? The world was
changed, but so has EU, which has grown in territory and deepened in
integration, bringing new cultures and sometimes conflicting political
and economic interests under one single roof. In this regard, there are
unresolved tensions between the Union and its members. The member
states have moved extensive decision-making powers from the national
to the European level and embrace these now jointly. However, its political system lacks democratic legitimacy and transparency, with insufficient
participation of citizens in the policy and decision making process. In the
sphere of economy, over time, the European single market contributed to
a more market opportunities and jobs, high living standard and quality
of life. However, the global economic crisis and the European credit and
debt crisis posed the EU with new challenges, such as global competitiveness and rising unemployment in many EU countries. In that process,
certain aspects of its paradigm have shifted from its original place.
76
“The Nobel Peace Prize 2012”, nobelprize.org, <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
peace/ laureates/2012/>
77
uhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Third edition. Chicago and LonK
don: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. 109
78
“ Entropy is the degree of disorder or uncertainty in a system. If the degree of disorder is too
great (entropy is high), then the system lacks sustainability. If entropy is low, sustainability
is easier. If entropy is increasing, future sustainability is threatened.” Bailey, Kenneth D. “Entropy Systems Theory.” In Systems Science and Cybernetics, edited by Francisco Parra-Luna.
UNESCO, EOLSS, 2010.
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There are three preconditions for paradigm shift 79 that could be applied to the EU.
The first precondition for paradigm shift caused by entropy deals
with the rising feeling that casts doubt in the adequate functioning of the
paradigm.
Nowadays, euro-skepticism is on the rise across the EU, both in old
and new member-states. We become accustomed with the daily articles
and analysis on the European crisis, but also with a great number of conferences on the future of Europe. The general perception is that the challenges outnumber the opportunities for the EU.80
The second precondition is related to the evidence that challenge the
ability of the existing paradigm to explain the world and propose solutions to the problems. Let us examine three elements: advancement of
peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights.
The EU has contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, first in Western and then in Central and Eastern Europe. However,
former Yugoslavia uncovered the internal weakness and limited capabilities of European Community to address armed conflicts. This is due to the
slow decision-making process inherited by the EU which fails to keep up
with the dynamics of global and local tensions. Its Common Foreign and
Security Policy has still not passed the test of time. Lacking the full commitment of its member-states in terms of its foreign policy, the EU cannot
be very effective in moments of crisis.81 The European peace project could
well function in a time of peace, but not in a time of conflict.
The advancement of human rights is problematic as well. The Union
is based on the respect of human rights, rule of law and equal principles
to all. However, these basic European values have been violated in the case
of the Republic of Macedonia. Greece blocks Macedonian EU integration
and demands not only a change of the country’s name but also a change
of people’s identity. This violates the human right of self-identification and
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79
Kuhn, op cit. 90–110.
80
U’s motto unity in diversity has been an inspiration and motivation for many diverse socieE
ties and countries striving for EU membership. In a period of crisis and euro-skepticism, the
concept of unity in diversity is challenged by the growing popularity of far-right nationalist
parties in several EU member-states, but also the rise of religious fundamentalism. A major
challenge is posed by the recent phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters from Europe in the
Middle East battlefields. It is expected that some of them will return in their native EU countries and bring with them the hatred to diversity.
81
S erageldin, Ismail, “Facing Facts: What’s Wrong with the Current World Order!”, Preparation for the upcoming III Global Shared Societies Forum, Building trust in wider Europe.
the right of human dignity. By allowing the blockage over these basic human rights, the EU is facing the following paradox: The corner-stone of
the European Union is also its stone of stumbling.
For a long period, the EU has been a lighthouse motivating aspiring
countries to become more democratic, to reconcile and reform in order to
become members of the club. Therefore, the enlargement and integration
has been a major instrument of the spread of peace and reconciliation in
the Balkans. The stabilization of the Balkans was to be followed by its full
integration. However, with the recent decision of Brussels to postpone the
enlargement and integration process until 2019 the lighthouse has slowly
begun to fade away. Instead of europeization of the Balkans, we witnessed
the Balkanization of the EU, at least in the case of Macedonia.
Here we come to the third precondition for a paradigm-shift which
implies a convincing argumentation for a new paradigm.
The proliferation of theories and the daily debates over fundamentals
of the existing system indicates the entropy of the current paradigm. That
is, of course, unless the current system manages to successfully answer the
challenges. Entropy can be balanced by negentropy. In the case of the EU
paradigm, this means several things.
Self-evaluation is needed so that the EU could re-discover itself while
preserving the essential elements and values of its initial peace paradigm,
such as the universality of human rights and rule of law.
EU should learn from past mistakes and be more decisive in dealing
with the Balkans. This could be done by continuing the enlargement process in the Balkans, by applying single standards for all candidate-countries and using the positive examples of parallel membership negotiations
and overcoming of bilateral differences, as we could see in the case of
Slovenia and Croatia.
By doing so, the EU could repair the damaged credibility and remain
faithful to the idea of its founding fathers – by building Europe, to build
peace, and this would mean peace in the Balkans.
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Myrianne COEN
COUNSELLOR OF EMBASSY, ROME, ITALY
How far is Criminality a Threat to
Peace, Drifting the West out of
Control?
Abstract: Fundamental conflicts’ drivers are persons or groups more or less structured that act outside of the social contract, for getting power or economic advantages, settling, inside formal and legal State institutions, structures that abide to their
own objectives.
If the State does not have the strength or the will to struggle against them, those
groups strengthen themselves indefinitely up to the point that the State progressively
loses any control on its territory. At this point, its credibility is lost for not being able
any more to respond to its main duty in democracy: providing simultaneously security and liberty to citizens.
For not having sufficiently cared to respond to a twenty years long enlarging deficit
of democracy, nowadays, European countries are at risk, and their people are getting
aware of it..
i. Western Geopolitical Drift
The Cold War had congealed the international relations, mainly centered
on politico-military relations between both major powers.
During the decade of American supremacy following the fall of the
Soviet empire, other powers, national and regional groupings, developed.
They firstly aimed at some regional hegemony. For ten years opening wider to the world, these economic powers rushed the balances that the West,
lost in lethargy, considered to remain for ever.
Arab Springs illustrate perfectly this increasing international anarchy, and the loss of power of the United States on planet’s zones that respected them, was it sometimes by hating them. Meanwhile, traditional
actors seem devoid of long-term project, whereas emerging actors do not
still show all the power of the strategic games they develop under the eyes
of their (voluntarily) absent minded partners.
Of a multi-polar organization, we will not soon see more than a
shade. The world hegemony (by leadership or domination) is changing.
Asia-Pacific is getting into position to become the world dominant power
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in the five or ten coming years. In this “new world order”, the position of
China, Russia and Brazil will largely be improved. On the other hand, the
position of the United States, as well as those of European States82, United
Kingdom included, will largely decrease.
More and more numerous non-state actors, powerful, rich, armed
and aggressive, are now joining these emerging powers of State nature.
Simultaneously, the sovereignty of States diluted. The borders became porous up to mutate historic characteristics of Nation States.
Politico-religious extremist movements, economic powers (multinationals, financial giants, ...), and violent criminal organizations (pirates included, Italo-South American drug traffickers, dealers in weapons and human beings arosen from the fall of the Soviet empire) raised as non State
actors, often more powerful than number of United Nations’ members
States, to impose their schedules and priorities. wearing out all modes of
violence, from the most insidious (infiltration in public institutions by
threat or corruption) up to the most open one, generally than qualified
as “terrorist”.
As an Italian former Home Affairs Minister noted: “There is an ample
picture to keep in mind: the complexity of the united and vertical constitution of Cosa Nostra and the interlacing among mafia organizations, the institutions and the politics. (...) In the history of our country there has always
been two, let’s call them,’ tendencies’. The first sustains that the mafia belongs
to the culture and must be contained but not attacked in order to be eliminated. Meaning: one divides among each other the territory and the mafia
works as an agency of services to the political power, organizes the voting
and the consent. Therefore, provided the mafia does not represent an evident
danger to the public order, it is kept into life. The other, opposite, thesis sustains instead that the mafia cannot be considered as inextinguishable and,
therefore, that all the necessary tools need to be used in order to eradicate
it (…). This means to pass to an action that doesn’t wait until crimes are
committed but having an intelligence, a system of general investigation that
allows to understand the maps and plans, that gives the judicial authority
the possibility to act in advance, that is to pass from an action of contrast ex
post to a preventive action. This is the political problem, then as today (…).
82
I rak, Syrie, Lybie, Mali, les Etats semblent reprendre le cours de leurs intérêts nationaux. Du
“service diplomatique de l’Union Européenne, on n’entend pas parler, exécutant, sans doute,
mais les décisions se prennent ailleurs, et de plus en plus rarement dans les cénacles européens (en fut il jamais diversement)?
145
We are not in favour of limiting its damages to the country, or let’s understand that this is a system that brings us to the abyss83”.
The recent history of the Balkan’s States gives an example of it (financial criminality living as parasites on the budgets of States, undemocratic
extreme right-wing movements day by day more powerful and in a more
or less narrow way connected to organized crime, …). European Union
States are nowaday fighting for not following this way.
ii. The European Union in Open Sea
“What I tell people is: when you are in the same boat, one
cannot say: ‘your end of the boat is sinking84”
Barroso, Discours sur l’état de l’Union Européenne, sept. 2013.
The European Union, supranational power called to unite a continent, a
“region of the world” under the same flag, is drifting in this context. In
this context, today, the Balkan’s States are looking for a role and for a place.
Even the relevance and the purpose of the European project in itself
are currently questioned and disputed. Since a few years, we are not any
more discussing about the enlargement of the EU (Croatia excepted), but
about the reduction of the European budget85, about “conditional” soli-
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83
“C’e un quadro più ampio di cui tenere conto, la struttura complessa della costituzione unitaria e verticista di cosa nostra e l’intreccio tra le organizzazioni mafiose, le istituzioni e la politica. (…)
Nella storia del nostro paese ci sono da sempre due … chiamandole tendenze. Una che sosteneva che la mafia facesse parte della cultura e che debba essere contenuta ma non aggredita
per essere eliminata. Vale a dire ci si spartisce il territorio, la mafia funziona come agenzia di
servizio al potere politico, organizza il voto e il consenso e quindi, purchè non rappresenti un
evidente pericolo di ordine pubblico, la si lascia esistere. L’altra tesi contraposta sostiene invece
che la mafia non possa essere considerata come inestinguibile e quindi debbano essere usati tutti gli strumenti necessari per estirparla.(…)
Cio significa passare ad un azione che non attende che si compiano i reati ma avendo un intelligence, un sistema di investigazione generale che consenta di capire le mappature, si consente
all’autorità giudiziaria la possibilità di agire prima, cioè passare da un azione di contrasto ex
post ad un azione preventiva. Questo è il problema politico, allora come oggi.… Non siamo per
limitare i danni al paese o capiamo che questo è un sistema che ci portano al barratro”
SCOTTI Vincenzo (ex Ministro dell’Interno Italiano), “E arrivata l’ora di fare i conti con la
nostra storia”, Partita truccata, Antimafia duemila, anno XIV n°1-2014 n°71, p. 84–86, passim
84
arroso, Discours sur l’état de l’Union Européenne, sept. 2013: “What I tell people is: when you
B
are in the same boat, one cannot say: ‘your end of the boat is sinking.’ We were in the same boat
when things went well, and we are in it together when things are difficult”.
85
n juin 2013, le Conseil Européen avait trouvé un accord politique pour le cadre financiE
er pluriannuel (2014–2020). La position du Conseil pour 2014 prévoyait 142,23 milliards
darities regarding public finances, the risks (curbed up to now, eg. Cyprus,
in March, 2013) of exit of States from the Eurozone, about the dictate
(budget balances, …) of larger States, the Northern ones, the rich ones
towards the Southern ones, the small ones and poorest86.
It is now acknowledged that this structural crisis, that does not intend to finish in the coming years (as the situation of the all the ex Soviet
zone87, almost thirty years after the fall of the Iron Wall, does show, seemingly ignored by most of the European governments that keep announcing year by year that “the resumption is for next year”), will make more
damages than a war.
The main causes of conflicts that for almost a century seemed to have
gone away from the Western Europe, radical ideologies, transnational
criminality, political violence, destruction of traditional economic and social tissues, poverty, illiteracy, absence of catalyst projects, re-invite themselves in our parts of the world, threatening those fundamental objectives
for whom the European Union has been created: peace and prosperity.
As observed by Professor Joseph Stiglitz, the wave of economic austerity that propagated in Europe following the economic crisis that began
in 2008 risks to damage seriously and in a permanent way this ‘social
model’ dear to Europe. As for a long time planned by the economists, the
d’euros en engagements, ce qui représentait une diminution de 6,15% en comparaison de
2013, et 135 milliards d’euros en paiements, soit une augmentation de 1,35%. Les paiements
correspondent à 1% du revenu national brut de l’UE. La position finale adoptée par le Conseil est encore sensiblement en-dessous de ce que proposait la Commission européenne.
86
iscours du Premier Ministrre Italien Letta (Bruxelles, Bruegel Annual Dinner, 9/9/13)
D
“Some national parliaments feel under pressure, for what they see as an “intrusion” that disempowers them. If we build an essentially intergovernmental system of economic coordination, the
tension with national parliamentary democracy is unavoidable. Everywhere we see signs of resurgent economic nationalism. Can we reverse this trend and deliver real open markets just by
discussing a list of new directives or regulations? I don’t think so. The only way is to build consensus for a new political approach”... anti-European feelings are common to in Southern and
Northern Europe, but for opposite reasons. In Southern Europe citizens no longer see EU institutions as better than national institutions. This is a result of a general disenchantment with
politics but also a sign that Europe is no longer seen as a solution, it is a problem. In Northern Europe, support for EU institutions has fallen below that for national institutions. This explains why many voices across the region are calling for a repatriation of competences to the
national level”.
87
lus de mille manifestants réclamant la démission du gouvernement ont manifesté devant le
P
parlement bulgare le 4 septembre 2013, jour de la rentrée parlementaire, promettant de ranimer les protestations “contre l’oligarchie”. L’ambassadeur britannique en Bulgarie, Jonathan
Allen, a appelé le gouvernement à écouter les manifestants. Les ambassadeurs de France et
d’Allemagne avaient rappelé dans une déclaration commune que “le modèle oligarchique n’a
pas sa place en Bulgarie”.
147
austerity hasn’t done anything else than paralyzing the growth of Europe,
with such disappointing progress regarding public finances. Worse, it contributes to disparities that in the longer term will weaken the economic
situation, and will contribute to the suffering of jobless and poor people
for numerous years.
In his speech on the State of Union in September 2013 the President of the European Commission Borroso observed that “one of the most
alarming and unacceptable results of the crisis is an increased fragmentation of Europe’s financial sector and credit markets – even an implicit renationalisation. (…) Ultimately, this is about one thing: unemployment. The
current level of unemployment is economically unsustainable, politically untenable, socially unacceptable. …”
By adding that “Europe was not at the origin of this crisis. It resulted
from mismanagement of public finances by national governments and irresponsible behaviour in financial markets”, the President of the EU seems
however “forgetting” the key-role of those same governments and financial markets in the development of European policies that up to now always granted more attention to the finance than to the economy and the
quality of life of their citizens.
Doubtless, only “together, as the European Union, we can give our
citizens what they aspire: that our values, our interests, our prosperity is
protected and promoted in the age of globalization”. Certainly, there is Erasmus, and European funds for youth and culture. But what percentage
of the European budget do those initiatives represent? And what fringe
of the population of the EU is their beneficiaries? Have these objectives
lately been real priority of the European policies?
From then on, the faults multiply, at the same pace than movements
of extreme opinions, Europhobe parties and other xenophobes. States
fight back, and risk in their turn to criminalize those who refuse to resign
to this long decline to whom governments fail to put an end, at the risk of
putting their own democracies in danger88.
During the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Italy lets slide the fleeting immigrants towards France, that, in its turn, threatens to close its borders.
Meanwhile, the European Union plays absent mindedness when thousands of illegal immigrants turn up on the coasts of Sicily, ignoring the
Italian repeated appeals for a common management of this common European problem. On the trail of decades of traffics, against remuneration
88
148
OEN Myrianne & MACRI Vincenzo, L’Asse del Caos, Criminalità organizzata e terrorismo,
C
ed Aracne, Roma, 2013.
and other vantages, of passports, visas, regularizations, naturalizations
and family groupings, hospitality and integration policies89, observed with
the highest indifference in most of the EU capitals, Brussels is little by little turning into the capital of Islam90.
But when victims of the civil war in Syria, who do have all the rights
for protection in the name of these values proclaimed by the European
Union, appear near the EU, national governments that have made any effort to maintain the last word within these institutions fail to find a common agreement. Germany and Sweden determine their own national
frameworks. In this cacophony, some first-line States, and among them
Bulgaria91, would have managed to deliver national passports, key for protection in all Schengen States, to these refugees as far as they afterward
leave the Bulgarian territory for other European States. Would this be the
lesser evil, considering that other States stay waiting until the refugees
surrender to criminal organizations for crossing Europe before taking a
stand when they appear on their borders?
The Schengen Agreement reserve a rude awakening to all those who
ignored history (migrations occur at first to a known State, former colonies, ...), geography (migration occur toward the closest save destination),
economy (toward the sources of wealth), sociology (the social tissue defends itself against any intrusion that deforms its values and habits), psychology (any excess of foreign characteristics is collectively perceived as
an aggression by any well-balanced individual).
And curiously, nobody notes the fact that Italy does not wear any responsibility in being a maritime border of the European Union, neither
pleads accordingly the limitation of the application of the Dublin agree89
Voir notamment les enquetes judiciaires “Roma Capitale (december 2014)”.
90
uslims now make up one-quarter of the population of Brussels, according to a new book
M
published by the Catholic University of Leuven (top Dutch-language university in Belgium).
In real terms, the number of Muslims in Brussels (where half of the number of Muslims in
Belgium currently live) has reached 300,000, which means that the self-styled “Capital of Europe” is now the most Islamic city in Europe. In practical terms, Islam mobilizes more people in Brussels than do the Roman Catholic Church, political parties or even trade unions,
according to “The Iris and the Crescent,” a book that is the product of more than one year of
field research (released on November 18 2013). The book’s author, the sociologist Felice Dassetto, predicts that Muslims will comprise the majority of the population of Brussels by 2030.
91
V investigation exposes illegal market in Bulgarian passports for migrants”, By Clive LeT
viev-Sawyer / 04/12/2013 at: http://www.balkaneu.com/tv-investigation-exposes-illegalmarket-bulgarian-passports-migrants/#sthash.Q90oTR2G.dpuf
See more at “EU citizenship for sale to non-Europeans in Bulgaria for as little as £150,000”,
Daily Telegraph, 14/03/2014
149
ments92 only to the illegal migrant customers of corrupt European administrations that issued them visas and other access documents to their territory.
Today, uncontrolled immigration is perceived as a problem of national security93, to which nowadays States don’t find any other tool than
repression, violation of public liberties up to violence when suburbs ignite
or when a group of terrorists disturbs too obviously the peace of mind of
the citizens, or of a nearby State.
Almost all the European large cities have at the moment their “districts where the police does not dare any more to enter”. The European
citizens, who regret the security they enjoyed before the fall of the Berlin
Wall, became aware of it. Their governments seem on the other hand to
continue to ignore one of their fundamental duties, to guarantee security,
fundament to any quality of life, condition that, instead of growth, has become, for the citizens in whole Europe, the primary objective of economic
and social policies.
“For years on, the European democracy became a “unilateral democracy, the one of the governments, and the democratic deficit has only been
deepening. Not only between the European institutions and the European
citizens, but between the citizens of (almost) all the European democracies
and their governments and national parliaments”94, as observed two years
ago at the conference of Milocer (2011)”.
How to wonder in front of such a picture that most of the EU governments are considered controversial, while not rejected? Everywhere,
except in Germany where Chancellor Angela Merkel came out for the second time as the election’s winner95. Fruit of a prosperous economy? They
are not rare those who criticize the Hartz laws96 to whom the German
150
92
e règlement de Dublin est un règlement européen qui détermine l’État membre de l’Union
L
européenne responsable d’examiner, dans l’Union européenne, une demande d’asile en vertu
de la Convention de Genève (art. 51).
93
“ Secondo un sondaggio elaborato dall’istituto russo di ricerca sull’opinione pubblica VCIOM,
per il 35% della popolazione la massiccia presenza di stranieri nel paese rappresenterebbe una
reale minaccia alla sicurezza nazionale... Al momento in Russia si troverebbero 10,8 milioni di
cittadini stranieri provenienti da 228 paesi (soprattutto dalle repubbliche ex sovietiche dell’Asia
Centrale e da Moldova, Cina, Vietnam e Turchia).”, CEMISS, Osservatorio strategico, July
2013, anno XV n 5, p. 27.
94
BARROSO, Discours sur l’Union, septembre 2013: “But we can remind people that Europe
was not at the origin of this crisis. It resulted from mismanagement of public finances by national governments and irresponsible behaviour in financial markets”.
95
Elections du 22/9/2013.
96
acilitation du recours à l’intérim, exonération de cotisations sociales pour les petits boulots
F
payés moins de 400 euros par mois et réduction du montant et de la période d’indemnisation
du chômage de 32 à 12 mois parallèlement à un meilleur accompagnement des chômeurs.
competitiveness premium, the low rate of unemployment and the preservation of a good standard of living are attributed. Meanwhile, Germany
also praises among the highest hourly wage costs in the European manufacturing sector. What is the key for this economic miracle? In the service
sector that occupies mainly women, and foreigners who don’t vote, applied salaries are less compatible with this social equity that, until recent
times, did characterize European democracies. This is also the real motive
why the European Commission did initiate a legal procedure against Germany “for excess of commercial surplus”. The new German government,
which goes at the moment to the installation of a minimum wage in compliance with the “European social model”, understood the message.
iii. What does Peace Mean Today, and for Whom?
Questioning the efficiency of peace processes, the ECPD Tenth Conference (Belgrade, 2014) puts an excellent, realistic and too seldom raised,
question: Hadn’t peace processes often led to short term cessation of violence, failing to address the fundamental conflicts’ drivers?
On this background, a preliminary question should be asked: what
does peace mean today, and for whom?
Do we mean peace between States? What about internal and/or transborder social, ethnic, … more or less violent conflicts? Some geographical
zones such as NATO, CHINA, and up to some point South America (still)
accepted, we need to recognize that they are very few, the States living
nowadays internally and externally in peaceful conditions. Most of them
are at least unstable if not undergoing real chaos, as most of African and
Middle Eastern countries illustrate.
Do we then mean peace for governments? Dictatorship is the most
peaceful regime, but only for the ruling class … at least in the short term.
Shall we then mean peace for citizens and people? People are affected
by interstate violence, but even more by internal violence -effects of dictatorship included-, insecurity, poverty and their social consequences, till
inside the EU that is now getting over its fifth year of austerity policies.
Consequently, is there currently peace for the occidental populations,
lack of violence and fear of violence, harmony between ethnic people, or
natives and immigrants sharing a territory, peaceful resolution of conflicts? Is there any feeling of peaceful living for the citizens of the United
State without work that are no longer registered in unemployment’s statistics? For more than 40% of the young people with no work in Greece,
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Spain, Italy? In the suburbs around French large metropolises that are recurrently getting on fire? For the citizens of Bulgaria still waiting to get
out of poverty 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall? And for other
Balkans countries that are still looking for development, twenty years after
the end of the war?
“The principal claim of the protest is the adoption by Ukraine of the
European rule of law’s standards and the struggle against corruption97”. “The
only condition able to better unify the country and perhaps to get Crimea to
return to Ukraine is to make a success story of it able to guarantee the human rights, the quality of life and the struggle against corruption98”.
Hasn’t moral violence, in our Western European countries, taken the
place of physical one, as described in the recent brothers Dardenne film
such as “One Day, One Night”? … Inside and outside any State, economic
scarceness rank among the main causes of conflicts, the main threat to
peace. Doesn’t one speak about war between poor people in our cities’
suburbs, as people who are suffering poverty or impoverishment are rarely living in peaceful places?
Some scientific literature begins to describe and put into light white
collar crimes. Fraudulent manipulations of central economic data, corruption and any kind of similar behaviors are slowly sliding from a perception of “rotten apple” to the shape of well organized criminal deals99. The
study of the impact of such large scale criminal behaviors on the actual
economic crisis remains to be written.
Let us mention at this point that the main task of States is to guarantee the conditions for security (survival and life) and liberty of their
citizens. However, in many of them, it has never been so. In others, the
democratic ones, those duties seem slowly fading. Because to guarantee
security and liberty, States need to be able to exert effectively their sovereignty, that includes the capacity of control to implement security and liberty, not only to declare it, capacities that are more and more fading too.
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97
“ La rivendicazione principale della protesta è l’adozione da parte dell’Ukraina degli standard
europei di governance e di lotta alla corruzione”, CANTONE Sergio, “Cronaca di una rivoluzione improbabile”, LIMES, L’Ukraina tra noi e Putin, “Voci da Majdan e d’intorni”, Aprile
2014, p. 118
98
“L’unica condizione in grado di rendere il paese più unito e forse di far tornare la Crimea
all’Ukraina è far si che questa diventi una storia di successo, in grado di garantire diritti umani, qualità della vita e lotta alla corruzione”, MIROSNYCENKO Jurij (député Ukrainien du
Parti des Regions) à LIMES, L’Ukraina tra noi e Putin, “Voci da Majdan e d’intorni”, Aprile
2014, p. 90
99
is process is best described in the recent article of SCARPINATO Roberto, “La legalita
Th
material ovvero il tramonto di una nazione”, in Micromega, 7/2014, pp. 11– 30.
iv. W
ho are nowadays the fundamental
conflicts’ drivers?
Under those premises, who are nowadays the fundamental conflicts’ drivers? Sometimes they act in the field of politics, sometimes in economics, sometimes in the cultural ones, and often in all those fields together
as best described by Italians magistrates in the recent investigations on
Roma Capital’s mafia (“Mondo di Mezzo”, December 2014), investigation
that could with benefits be extended to other European countries as Italy
does not have the ‘privilege’ of such phenomena.
From wherever they assault, those actors have one common point:
they threaten the social contract, this formal (in Western democracies) or
less formal contract (as in well regulated primitive tribes) through which
citizens ask their State (or tribal guides) for security and liberty in exchange to abiding to legality (whatever its form could be, provided it is
commonly shared by the people and their leaders).
Fundamental conflicts’ drivers are persons or groups more or less
structured that act outside of the social contract, for getting power or
economic advantages, settling, inside formal and legal State institutions,
structures that abide to their own objectives.
If the State does not have the strength or the will to struggle against
them, those groups strengthen themselves indefinitely up to the point that
the State progressively loses any control on its territory. At this point, its
credibility is lost for not being able any more to respond to its main duty
in democracy: providing simultaneously security and liberty to citizens.
Who are those? Where are they coming from? From where are they
digging their power, mostly not with the aid of armed forces? Let’s look at
our recent history and current trends.
During the Cold War, between the two ideological blocs, physical
borders where substantially closed. Legal groups and their legal and less
legal trans-border activities, mainly connected with both secret services,
remained under control of both superpowers. And so were criminals
when invited to collaborate.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the last freed themselves from State’s
control, and used their former connections with public servants on the
other side of the fallen Iron Wall to facilitate their lucrative activities, using
corruption where necessary, and violence along cultural tradition (Balkan
countries) or in absence of any other means (Western countries100).
100
e most quite cities do not always effectively reflects their appearances (Brussels, center
Th
for NATO and EU, is mentioned by Eurostat as one of the European cities with the highest number of murders).
153
Thirty years later, those connections not only are still in live but developed and expended their “fire capabilities” under the hood of powerful
criminal organizations, deeply infiltrated in institutions inside this large
majority of Western (and East European) States that never bothered to
contrast them effectively.
Fed with complicities guided from inside and from abroad, their
connections based on their former “foreign relations” are carefully empowered and maintained through time, contaminating simultaneously
the all country. Consequently weakened, States do not anymore have the
strength to contrast such powerful infiltrated criminality (everybody has
his example in mind).
Our Russian friends could have a lot to say about the difficulties
and the ways to control those powerful groups, with strong connections
abroad, who do not want to abide with the Russian social contract as President Putin would describe it. But also about their role in destabilizing the
policy of a country, of spreading insecurity along international, or ethnic,
borders, …
And so could Italy. Because of highest consciousness born out of violent criminal events, Italy is holding a permanent combat against organized crime. Nevertheless, results remain uncertain. Nowadays, it is ever
wider admitted that criminal groups will be defeated when the upper
world will agree with this.
Any European State with a “good reputation” as free of crime does
not mean that it is free of influence of those mafias. Actually, it has been
noted that most lucrative borders for criminal networks are also those
where “less crimes are committed” … better to say, where crime is less
visible.
By the way, international codification contributes also to this “invisibility”. For instance corruption is mostly (less than earlier fortunately)
mentioned “next” to organized crime, and not as “part of ” it. However,
isn’t this crime mostly committed by more than three people, “working”
together in time, committing serious crimes (and other instrumental
crimes) and using intimidation? This formal distinction seems to be born
out of some reluctance to incriminate as members of “criminal organizations” members of the social upper class in which corruption is often
committed.
Germany does not have yet a law on organized crime, but more than
6.000 public servants are jailed for corruption. Italy has an efficient law
on organiyed crime, but about 150 public servants are jailed for the same
crime… Would Germans be forty times more corruptible than Italians?
154
Having good laws is necessary and efficient. But it is the will to prosecute and effectively morally and concretely condemn that remains the
key to control the spreading of illegality, people and groups that do not
respect the social contract. Balkan countries made large progress with regard to legislation. They made some progress in relation to efficient and
concluding trials. This may also be said, unfortunately, about some core
European countries.
v. Crime contamination brings Western
democracies out of control
One could also put the question whether Transparency International does
measure the level of countries corruption, or only the perception of it? In
this last case, wouldn’t Italy be the worst student among Western European countries in terms of corruption, despite the best fight against organized crime and corruption included?
Actually, we could get to the point that countries where violence is
more open are also countries where mafias are less present, to this point
that those apparently quite countries would also be the ones where organized crime is better organized, and thus enough powerful to operate in
secret and silence: bringing all the continent up to a huge political and
economic crisis?
There is no illegal trafficking, petrol contraband, drugs, human beings, arms trafficking for citing the most profitable illegal activities that
could stand alone without inside help of civil servants and/or politicians
they deal in.
States administrations are closed structures, where contamination
of crimes goes first through punctual infiltration, and, while done, along
management of human resources (functions, promotions, …). Through
time, a small group of criminals wise in using intimidation and other
management tools (permanent education included), if no public law enforcement does contrast them as mostly the case, needs only one or two
decades to take over the all structure.
At a certain point, contamination gets exponential, as it becomes, for
anybody, convenient to become accomplice with those criminals arrived
up to the point to control the targeted institution.
Let’s mention that opposite dynamics is also through: for preventing
“neutral elements” to collaborate with criminal ones, it is not necessary
to eradicate the all criminal infiltrated structure. It is necessary to take
155
clear, coherent, persistent and dissuasive steps that makes collaboration
with crime not convenient any more.
Are the FIS fighters criminals? For keeping safe language, and thus
communication, better to stick to the definition that requires an institutionalized social contract inside institutionalized territorial borders, an
organized State thus, to qualify a group as “criminal”. FIS fighters are thus
excluded from this scope. Truth, they steal the Irakian and Syrian States
from their oil resources, they extort and kidnap the populations. But the
same did also Gengis Khan Armies and any other secessionist or invader
of any territory along history.
However, is this international crisis, qualified as one of the most dangerous in time for our democracies101, free from intervention of organized crime? Certainly not. However, we won’t find ‘criminals’ that feed this
conflict inside those territories. We find them inside the borders of our
own well organized countries, certainly among the indoctrinated immigrated population and some converted fanatics, but mainly among those
unfaithful employees in private societies dealing with restricted materials, and those civil servants appointed for all kind of permits and certifications, illegally furnishing weapons and documents produced in our
countries to any demanding smuggler. In doing so, they know that they
are losing control of those sensitive materials or people that, at some or
another point, will get in the dominion of rebels, terrorists and other kind
of violent groups or failed States. They also know in doing so that they
bring their own country to lose control on the security and liberty of their
own citizens.
Those are the criminals against whom our democracies have, or
should have, the power and the will to intervene. When armament is on
far or closer battlefield, it is too late. The same applies for illegal immigrants and other criminals getting inside the economic flows of displaced
persons,… as some of them become sleeping terrorists after some stay on
the Middle East combat’s fields.
In 2005 in Brussels, a young Belgian boy was murdered, hit by a Polish young boy. That one had been helped by a friend whose parents arrived in Belgium with the false visas distributed in the mid nineties by
Belgian – and other European countries- unfaithful civil servants. Ten
years later, this was one of the visible consequences of never punished,
as concluded in parliamentary public inquiry, crimes: Instead of being
101
156
As the attack against Charlie Hebdo in mid Paris (7/1/15) gave another example.
wrapped off, criminal networks transform themselves in order to continue
to operate under one or another form according circumstances.
Thirty years ago, in Western European countries, the roads where
safe, and women felt free to walk in the countryside. Woman in Balkan
countries probably rarely experienced this freedom. Trends going on, we
will soon get back to the Middle Age, when bandits were putting pitfalls
against pilgrims and messenger under their way: ask Norwegians loads
of salmons’ drivers if, at Christmas time, they do feel safe on European
highways … Still under control? But for how long?
Excess of -legal and illegal- neither planned nor integrated immigration induces racism, that revolts citizens who feel discriminated. The
Roma Capitale 2014 criminal investigation demonstrates that the same
people that economically abused the integrations’ plans for migrants are
the one that serve members of extreme right groups expanding their influence on growing racism fed by those arrivals of foreigners in poorer
neighborhood of our cities.
This same process has already been noted in the nineties when Belgian civil servant close to extreme right movement Vlaams Blok, in connection with elements of the Russian mafias, was providing false documents to illegal immigrants from Eastern European countries, feeding so
their electoral basis. Is there anything to wonder that nowadays, at the
time of the Ukrainian crisis, extreme right movements do extend their
connections together with Russia?
Once infiltrated, the State can’t react, its citizens do not feel protected
any more, and, the social contract being broken, they also begin to refuse
to abide to legality (ex. the same movements in Europe that are getting
well along with Russia are advocating fiscal strikes), at least when their
safety is concerned.
Fundamental conflict drivers in actual conflicts are those actors that
act against the social contract in favor of their own interests, under one
or another form, more or less accentuated, visible, known, recognized, but
never fought with the will and the means to gives a chance to regain control.
As Western democracies remained compliant now for decades to
those internal aggressions, the Western world is getting out of control,
helped by globalization, communications, and economic crisis. For not
having sufficiently cared to respond to this twenty years long enlarging
deficit of democracy, nowadays, European countries are at risk, and their
people are getting aware of it.
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Aleksandar PROTIĆ
PRESIDENT OF THE UNESCO CLUB IN SORBONNE-PARIS UNIVERSITY
Significant Unesco focus
on new Balkans
UNESCO’s point of paramount significance and its raison d’être is peacebuilding through education science and culture. Therefore, this topic is
quite relevant for the work of the European Center for Peace and Development. This succinct presentation, will highlight several elements
avouching the UNESCO’s increasing interest for the new Balkans and vice versa.
UNESCO women leadership impact in new Balkans?
Since the UN General Assembly adopted eight Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) in 2000 to be achieved by 2015, the action for expanded
opportunities for women’s rights was synchronously political, social and
cultural challenge. UNESCO pursued declaring as follows: “UNESCO shall accord
priority to … Gender Equality in all its fields of competence throughout the
duration of the Medium-Term Strategy” (Medium-Term strategy 34 C/4).
Thenceforth, women Leadership in UNESCO had developed, simultaneously
bringing the increased focus on new Balkans.
In the first place, Bulgarian diplomat Irina Bokova has become the first
woman, and the first eastern European to head UNESCO in 2009; in 2013
she was reelected for a second four-year term as Director-General. This symbol
encouraged significantly the Balkan countries to involve more actively in UNESCO.
Additionally, Katalin Bogyay, a Hungarian diplomat (previously represented
Eastern, Central and Southern Europe as one of the deputy chairpersons
of the UNESCO Cultural Committee) became in 2011 the President of the
36th session of UNESCO General Conference. During her mandate, she brought
a particular attention of the organisation to South-Eastarn Europe and to
new Balkans. Furthermore, the European UNESCO civil society leadership transferred to Balkans, to Romania, where Daniela Popescu (UNESCO expert and promoter) was elected as the President of the European
Federation of Unesco Clubs, Centers and Associations, in 2012, stimulating several
EFUCA-UNESCO projects in the Balkans.
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Thereupon, since 2011, many international UNESCO initiatives in Balkans
emerged parallely with the efforts of three previously mentioned ladies, such as:
UNESCO Director-General’s 2011 initiative to develop regional cultural
networks in South-East Europe; 2011 Serbia Regional Summit of Heads of
State of South East Europe -under the auspicies of UNESCO, Montenegro
2012 regional forum on management of World Heritage and other UNESCO designated sites in South-Eastern Europe; International Romaniabased annual UNESCO meeting “Youth and Museums”, 2013 UNESCO
International Council of Museums initiative “The Balkans. Identities and
Memory in the long 19th century”, 2013 Second South East Europe World
Heritage Youth Forum for peace and sustainable development held Serbia,
two years after the 2011 World Heritage Youth Forum held in Porec, Croatia; 2013 UNESCO First Regional Science Promotion Conference in South- East
Europe in Belgrade. 2014 Forum of International NGOs in partnership UNESCO in Sofia, together with many national UNESCO conferences, meetings and emerging interest for creating UNESCO civil society networks.
Moreover, in 2012, the Regional Centre for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage in South-Eastern Europe was opened under the
auspices of UNESCO. Its stated purpose is to strengthen the implementation of the 2003 UNESCO Convention from 2013 for the Safeguarding
of the Intangible Cultural Heritage and the successful implementation of
UNESCO’s programme initiatives relating to intangible cultural heritage.
Consequently, the Centre encourages and coordinates research activities
on the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage in South-Eastern Europe; establish training courses on related subjects; support networking
between relevant institutions and practitioners in the Balkans and neighbourhood region, advancing cooperation, and fostering excellence in education.
Finally, UNESCO International Network of Water-Environment
Centres for the Balkans on Sustainable Management of Water and Conflict Resolution in Thessaloniki had manifested an increased number of
activities from, particularly UNESCO-IHP expert meetings, since 2012.
The Network is important for Balkan countries because the cooperation
program promotes an integrated system of research, training, demonstration, information and documentation, offering advise and expertise to all
countries for establishing reliable intersectoral pilot projects, facilitating
the cooperation between local, regional and global levels, promoting professional development and education in the Balkans region through distance learning, etc.
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Best practices in Serbia
The host country of this year ECPD’s “Reconciliation, Tolerance and Human Security in the Balkans -The new Balkans and EU : Peace, Development, Integration” international conference currently stands as an exemplary assiduous and motivated UNESCO’s Fidus Achates. In the first place,
Serbia is presently the only Balkan country (including Croatia if Western
Balkans definition applies) being a State Party of the current World Heritage Committee. Not only the 2011 Regional Summit of Heads of State of
South East Europe -under the auspicies of UNESCO, 2013 Second South
East Europe World Heritage Youth Forum for peace and sustainable development or 2013 UNESCO First Regional Science Promotion Conference in
South-East Europe in Belgrade, all took place in Serbia, but the civil society
in Serbia manifests a great willingness to create networks for UNESCO.
Consequently, in 2013, the first University UNESCO Club in Balkans had
been founded at the Faculty of Engineering Management in Belgrade.
Several other applications had been submitted recently to the Serbian National Commission for UNESCO. Furthermore, since Serbia had included
Nikola Tesla’s Archive “consisting of a unique collection of manuscripts,
photographs, scientific and patent documentation which is indispensable in
studying the history of electrification of the whole Globe” in the Memory of
the World register in 2003, it is statistically the largest scientific archive in
UNESCO ad hoc register.
Challenges and uncertainties
Even though through the past decade, the ‘Venice process’ has been rebuilding scientific cooperation among Southeast European countries, and
notwithstanding all activities and initiatives above-mentioned, UNESCO
expresses concern over several issues such as : Serbian Medieval Monuments in Kosovo, the only place in Europe inscribed on the UNESCO’s List
of World Heritage in Danger, the problem of educated young people emigrating
from the Balkans or the UNESCO special monitoring in Ohrid through the commission of experts reviewing Plaosnik and St Naum projects.
Joint efforts, including cross-cultural communication improvement
and concrete cooperation could overcome such challenges.
In June 2014 in Ohrid- Sarajevo, “The Ministers of Culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia handed over a joint
nominations dossier to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Secretary General, Irina Bokova. The “Stećci
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Nomination Dossier” represents an unprecedented example of regional cooperation in the field of culture and is a joint official document asking for the
medieval gravestones in the region to be included into the UNESCO world
heritage list.” A year ago,UNESCO and the European Union have today
announced they will foster their cooperation on areas of mutual interest, especially education, culture, science, freedom of expression etc, after
the signing of a partnership agreement between the Director-General of
UNESCO, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy and the European Commissioner for Development to cooperate more intensively on areas of common interest.
Ultimately, in the noble mission of peacebuilding and international
cooperation, it would be commendable always to remember the Mahatma
Gandhi words: “There is no way to peace; peace is the way.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Mark Mazower The Balkans: A Short History, New York: The Modern Library, 2000
Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, UN Ideas That Changed the
World, United Nations Intellectual History Project Series, 2009
Rothschild, Joseph, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe
Since World War II , New York: Oxford University Press, 1989
Skendi, Stavro, Balkan Cultural Studies, New York: East European Monographs,
distributed by Columbia University Press, 1980
The Regional Cooperation Council, Annual Report of the Secretary General of the
Regional Cooperation Council on regional cooperation in South East Europe in
2013-2014, Sarajevo, 2014
The Regional Cooperation Council, Annual Report of the Secretary General of the
Regional Cooperation Council on regional cooperation in South East Europe in
2012-2013, Sarajevo, 2014
The Regional Cooperation Council , South East Europe 2020 strategy
Clubs for UNESCO – a practical guide 2009, Paris, UNESCO
Report, 8th World Congress of WFUCA, WFUCA, Hanoi 2011
The Executive Board meeting of the European Federation for UNESCO, Clubs
Centres and Associations Report, EFUCA, Bucharest, 2013
Reconciliation, tolerance and human security in the Balkans: “New Balkans and
European Union enlargement”; proceedings of the seventh ECPD international
conference, European Centre for Peace and Development, Miločer, Montenegro,
2011
UN General Assembly. United Nations Millennium Declaration. New York: United
Nations; 2000. (A/RES/55/2)
UNESCO’s Medium-Term Strategy for 2014–2021
UNESCO website: www.unesco.org
http://www.rcc.int/press/246/joint-southeast-european-initiative-presented-tounesco
161
iv New Balkans on the
way to Stable Peace and
Sustainable Divelopment
Vlado KAMBOVSKI
PRESIDENT, MACEDONIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS, SKOPJE
Economic and Cultural Cooperation
of the Balkan Countries –
Pre-Condition for Stable Peace
and Sustainable Development
Balkan cooperation and social development:
a hypothetical framework
1. The global topic of this discussion implies setting the following
hypothetical framework: development prospects of the Balkan
countries are necessarily connected with their integration at the
regional, European and global level. From this thesis originate a
number of open questions, which affect the substantial change in
their social beings:
–– In which way are the Balkan countries prepared to meet the challenges of the modern society: globalization, information society,
human rights, democracy and the rule of law in times of crisis?
–– Is there an agreement among all in relation to the goals of the
social development: the basic – expanding the human rights and
freedoms, the general welfare and democratization of society; and
operational – making progress in the economic and social development, expressed by the index of quality of life?
–– Is the development of the Balkan societies in the post-transition
period supported by the new social contract of “four D” – democratization, de-politicization, decentralization and de-concentration
in decision-making about governing the society, with the key impact of science and culture in defining the general objectives?
–– Is and to what extent is the concept of transition determined only with
the demands for democratization and marketization, supplemented
with the postulates of statehood and multinational integralism?
–– Do, in accordance with the European standards, Balkan societies
change in the direction of accepting the concept of inclusive, innovative and reflective society?
–– How is the democratic consolidation achieved, i.e. transition to
post-transition society, and do political and other conflicts modNew Balkans on the way to Stable Peace and Sustainable Divelopment
165
erate on the principles of democracy, dialogue and tolerance and
achieving social and political consensus?
–– Finally, can the process of post-transition as a transition to a democratic legal state and multinational integralism be led by an elite
recruited in the period of privatization of the social / state capital?
2. The answers to these questions are an argument to the claim that
for the achievement of a lasting and stable peace and progress in the
Balkans it is not enough to implement economic reform, or to promote regional economic cooperation, and thus, to achieve a certain
economic growth. In other words, the economic development and
the regional economic cooperation are one of the more important,
but not the only prerequisites for social progress, Euro integration,
lasting and stable peace and prosperity of the Balkan states.
Two arguments can be brought to confirm this thesis. One is of general
nature and relates to the conceptualization of transition, understood
as “dual transition” that consists of democratization and marketization of society, i.e. as transition to the system of western democracy
and market economy. It has been shown in all Balkan countries that
the basic contradiction of the transition understood that way consists of preserving the unchanged nature of the institutions from the
socialist system (partization of state bodies, imperial character of the
executive authorities, dependence of the judiciary, etc.) which causes
problems in the constitution of the democratic legal state, establishing a new system of values, a crisis of identity and non-recognition of
the multi-ethnic character of society with an extremely negative effect on the stability of society and gathering all its creative potentials
around the general values and goals of development.
Today there is a large consent in the east and the west that the
one-sided and truncated transition process has caused a series of
negative effects, which primarily lead to breaking the internal cohesion of society, its closure and its difficult integration with other
countries. Hence, the revision of the transition process should involve its completion with two additional components, which define it as “four-fold transition”: democratization, marketization,
legal state and multinational integralism. Exercising the complementary postulates – democratic legal state and multinational integration on civil basis, is an area of qualitative achievements of
the transition, on which are confirmed the main objectives of social reforms (human rights, equality, and prosperity for all, justice,
national equality, etc).
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3. Another argument is based on the “case with early SFR Yugoslavia”. The beginning of the transition process of the Yugoslav society at the time of the last Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic (1989–90), was supported with great optimism, based on the
following thesis: economic reform and development, with all the
elements (privatization, freedom of entrepreneurship, development of the capital markets etc.), together with the introduction
of multi-party democratic system, can resolve all inter-ethnic, social and other problems and to transform the federation of that
period into a democratic community of republics and provinces.
It is likely that such conviction was formulated under the strong
influence of the Marxist learning about the relationship between
social basis (equity, economic relations and the system) and social
improvement (awareness, ideology, politics, law, etc).
Contrary to this assumption, which would be rational in other social and historical conditions, the victory is of the aspiration for dissolution and formation of independent nation-states. The disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia through an armed conflict in the heart of
Europe, the worst since World War II, has resulted in the situation
that the independence of the former federal units occurred largely
as a chaotic process, in which the constitution of new states did not
go according to the planned, scientifically and rationally envisaged
reforms in the fields of economy, legal system and other social areas. Therefore, independence was paid with a very high price, which
was also paid by other post-socialist Balkan states: economic backwardness, closure of markets and creation of autarchic economic
systems, in whose framework could be brought the major move of
the new governing structures: rapid privatization under neoliberal
model, to be more precise, the “crony capitalism.” Thus a condition
was created in which the natural tendencies of the establishment
of regional and wider economic ties and relations were put under
control of narrow political interests of the ruling structures, which
have supported their power of ruling precisely on strengthening
the national exclusiveness, particularly in the economic sphere. Nationalism and populism, as the most suitable forms of governance
that ensure the government to constantly recycle not towards the
general state interests, but to their own perpetum mobile, involve
primarily a closed, autarchic economy, which is easier to manage
and where all economic entities are controlled, as well as the movement of capital, which is important for establishing and maintaining power of the ruling structure.
New Balkans on the way to Stable Peace and Sustainable Divelopment
167
4. The existence of identical matrix in the recruitment of new political structures in all Balkan countries affected the acceptance of almost identical patterns in the regulation of the economic, political
and legal system: partization, tribalism, populism and support to
historical myths such as: age of the peoples who are predecessors
to present day nations in the Balkans, greater states ideologies,
constantly emphasizing the historical past in which the nations
were on the opposite sides thanks to the great powers, etc. It is
forgotten, in fact, that the Balkan people lived for hundreds of
years, during the “pax romana” or “pax ottoman” in peace, understanding, cooperation and interculturalism.
The regional approach of the EU
and the Stabilization
5. The regional approach of the EU in relation to the Balkan states is
opened as a separate strategy for their Euro integration defined by
the EU Council of Ministers in 1996, with the aim of overcoming
the obstacles to the development of mutual economic and other
cooperation. The beginnings of a regional approach date from the
first Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1993, adopted at
the initiative of the French Prime Minister Balladur, inspired by
the idea that with general agreements with the SEE countries the
mutual armed conflicts can be prevented. Other Pact (1999) completes the basic objectives of the regional approach: establishment
of peace, including the collaboration with the Hague Tribunal and
the return of displaced persons; improvement of the rule of law;
economic cooperation and development. The following completion of the regional approach (1997) was performed by introducing the policies of conditionality, which links the progress of cooperation with the EU to the fulfillment of specific “general and
specific” conditions. The first include: development of democracy
and legal state and market economy, respect for human rights, return of refugees and development of good-neighborly cooperation. The specific conditions relate to respecting the obligations
of special agreements (Dayton, Resolution 1244 of the Security
Council of the UN, etc).
Improving the regional approach of the EU towards the Balkans
in 1999 (an initiative of the German Foreign Minister Fischer),
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consisted in highlighting the long-term stabilization, security
and democratization, economic reconstruction and development of the region as the basic objectives. This established the
political framework of the EU regional approach and the regional
economic cooperation, which is adjacent to the strengthening of
the democratic processes, development of market economy, improving the relations in multiethnic society, development of good
neighborly relations, fight against organized crime, prevention of
illegal migration, refugees return and integration of the Balkan
countries into the European structure. The new strategy has produced positive results, so that since 2000 have begun significant
changes in the development of the democratization process, conflict resolution and promotion of good neighborly relations. At
the European summit (Feira, Zagreb) it was pointed out that the
Balkan countries were potential candidates for EU membership,
provided they meet the Copenhagen political criteria.
6. The stabilization and association process is based on the following postulates: establishment of contractual relations through the
so called, third generation partnership agreement; development
of economic relations through the asymmetric trade liberalization
by the introduction of autonomous trade measures (ATM); and
financial help of the Community Assistance for Reconstruction,
Development and Stabilization (CARDS 2000–2006; Instrument
for pre-accession assistance IPA 2007–2013, Horizon 2020, and
other programs).
Acceptance of these strategic commitments has been legally regulated (starting from 2000) by signing bilateral agreement on stabilization and association between the Balkan states and the EU.
A special chapter in these agreements is dedicated to the Regional
Cooperation (as is the Stabilization and Association Agreement
with the Republic of Macedonia Chapter III), where it is specially
emphasized that:
In accordance with its commitments for peace, stability and development of good neighborly relations the signatory country will actively promote regional cooperation. The EU through the program
of technical assistance will also support projects that have a regional
or cross-border dimension (Article 11 of the Agreement); and
Not later than the moment when has been signed at least one
agreement on stabilization and association with some of the countries to which the process of stabilization and association refers
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to (two years after the entry into force of the Agreement), the
signatory country will commence negotiations with that country
or countries with the aim of signing the Convention on regional
cooperation whose main elements are: political dialogue; establishment of free trade zones among the countries agreed with the
relevant WTO provisions; reciprocal concessions in relation to the
movement of workers, establishment of associations, providing
services, current payments and flow of capital, at the level equivalent to that of the Agreement; provisions on cooperation in other
areas, whether they are regulated or not with the Agreement, especially in the area of Justice and Internal affairs.
7. From the clear diction of these provisions it is derived that the
obligations to develop regional cooperation between the Balkan
states are not only bilateral (state-state), but are also of multilateral nature. They require negotiations and signing of regional multilateral conventions relating not only to the areas covered in the
agreements on stabilization, but also to all issues concerning the
process of integration of the Balkan countries in the EU (cultural
cooperation, cooperation in the educational system, minority, linguistic and other open issues, etc.).
Contrary to commitments and their constant repetition in the progress reports of some of the Balkan countries in the European integration process, as well as the undisputed benefits for all parties from
concluding a regional convention or conventions in certain areas, this
process is not going at the desired level. Apart from the individual
regional agreements (not conventions) on combating severe forms
of organized crime and cooperation between institutions in the area,
mostly imposed under the pressure by the EU and the international
community, there are no initiatives for complex approach and regulation of the forms of cooperation in the economic sphere (movement
of goods, labor, capital, investments, construction of transport and
energy infrastructure, etc.) in the area of communications, science
and education, culture and other vital areas of society.
Difficulties in the approach of the
Balkan region towards the European horizon
8. The EU regional approach and regional initiatives of the Balkan
countries have made encouraging results, especially in recent years,
170
in the support to the economic development, meeting the Copenhagen criteria, improvement of the stabilization and association
process, and according to the evaluation of the individual results,
the approach of some of the Balkan countries to the EU membership. A wide network of cooperation mechanisms has been developed: the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, in whose
limits have been established: free trade zones in the region (CEFTA
2006), Secretariat to oversee the development of the regional transportation infrastructure network (Regional Balkan Infrastructure
study – REBIS), the Regional Cooperation Council, Regional Electricity Market, liberalization of the visa regime, promotion of the
cross-border cooperation and border crossing, preparation of the
Regional Programme for Reconstruction of the Environment in
SEE, development of the Strategy for Regional Water Management,
integrating the SEE research and education networks into the European research area and other forms of cooperation.
The results achieved in the field of regional economic cooperation,
however, are far from being satisfactory. So, for example (the data
of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia for 2012), the
total trade between the CEFTA countries is stagnating, or even declining. The stagnant economic trends are illustrated by the data
on the global competitiveness of the Balkan countries in the period
2005–2010 (see World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness
Report, Geneva, Internet: www.weforum.org): on the list of 134
countries only the competitiveness of the economy of Albania has
improved (2005–100; 2010–86 place), of Montenegro (2007–82,
2010–49) and Turkey (2005–71, 2010–61 place). According to a
survey from 2012, the most problematic factors for business development and higher cooperation in the regional and international
market are: corruption, inadequate infrastructure, inefficient administration, taxation, political instability and insufficiently qualified workforce (the highest percentage is of the corruption, inefficient administration and insufficiently qualified workforce).
9. The flywheel of the regional and European integration and improvement of the economic cooperation in this function can be
more strongly started by developing proven mechanisms for setting up closer and operating targets of development, and appropriate instruments for their implementation, type of activities of
the Regional Cooperation Council.
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In doing so, we should bear in mind that present day regional approach of the EU and the regional cooperation initiatives are aimed
more to the Western Balkan countries which are surrouded in concentric circles by the EU members or states from the wider area
(Turkey, Moldova). The question is whether it is the sign that it is
necessary to create a special micro-regional strategy only for the
Western Balkans, which would be, of course, a very wrong and
harmful solution, if the goal of a regional approach is based on a
wider basis of providing stability and common perspectives of all
Balkan countries. As opposed to those fears, there are a number
of positive signals to remain on the complex regional approach of
the EU, that should enable the recent phase of fragmentation of the
Balkans to be considered completed and to open a new page of its
reintegration. Such desirable development can and should be driven
by creating, as much as possible, a greater number of independent
and autonomous mechanisms and institutions of regional cooperation that are not always under the direct control of the state or the
European or financial institutions. A special role in strengthening
the process of “new regionalism” has the independent spheres of
the society: culture, science, education, sports, local government,
civil society, whose opening and connecting should be encouraged
and supported with the direct financial interventions by the EU.
10. There is no doubt that improvements of the regional economic
cooperation are directly linked and dependent on overcoming
the political, economic and social problems of individual Balkan
states. We should not neglect the current situation in society, impregnated with that past that does not go in favor of friendship
and cooperation, but of disintegration and conflict. In addition,
the presence of internal political, religious, ideological and other
differences, deepened due to pressure and interference of the great
powers, but also the involvement of the great powers, had until
today the non-overcome consequence of the stigma for which the
term is used with an extremely negative connotation – “Balkanization”. That is understood as hatred and rejection of any regional
cooperation, as well as falling into a vicious circle in which the
low level of cooperation has resulted in economic underdevelopment and political instability, and thus the difficulties in improving the European integration process. The causes of closure of not
only the national economies, but also of societies as a whole, are
more profound than the pragmatic interests of the ruling political
172
structures (economic power, arbitrary disposition of public funds,
etc.), and they reach out to the very social being of Balkan peoples, formed during the creation of nation-states in the XIX and
XX century. Their epicenter are the historical myths (the Kosovo
myth of Serbia; the medieval national and state-building myth
of Croatia; the heroism of Montenegro; the greater state myth of
Bulgaria, the myth of intellectual obligation of Europe and of the
world of Ancient Greece, of Alexander the Great and the ancient
origin of the Macedonians etc.). The ideas of greater states as a
nightmare circle over the Balkans, sometimes as a romantic projection of past to present, sometimes as a direct battle scream for
extending state borders and invocation of third Balkan war.
11. In order to understand this situation and seek a way out of the
vicious circle, the following assumption is important: the source,
and at the same time resolution of the problem is the culture.
The culture of peace, knowledge and research, tolerance, nondiscrimination, dialogue and understanding, law and legal state,
brotherhood, respecting other peoples and countries, seeking
resolutions to ethnic and other minority issues not on a territorial basis and violent change of borders, but within the state,
the constitutional guarantee of rights and their equality and
constitutional patriotism. Culture contributes to understanding, strengthening of the rational, intellectual approach towards
understanding the real needs of the individual and society and
opportunities for their accomplishment. The practical reason,
which is confirmed by human experience of living in social community, points to the fact that the needs of the individual are
best meet in cooperation with others, from which emerges the
basic life law of the society: unity in diversity. This law, which
is actually the connective tissue of the society, applies to social
groups, nations and states.
Balkan states fall behind in the development of science, education and culture, as opposed to the demands of globalization and
Europeanization of these social areas. The intercultural communication is hampered within the societies with a multi-ethnic character (which applies to all Balkan states), and thus the cooperation with other countries in adopting and respecting the general
cultural values. This directly reflects the economic development
and regional economic cooperation, because the decline in the
productive energy of society in the field of culture has resulted
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in a collective state of weakness, apathy, insecurity and distrust
toward others, and thus to the closed society and aversion toward
cooperation with other countries.
Conclusion
Together with the strengthening of the initiatives for development of the
regional economic cooperation, the focus in the coming period of Euro integration of the Balkan region should be placed on initiatives and support
to culture and cultural cooperation, which has been most affected by the
process of transition destruction, by almost falling into a complete vacuum through concentrating of public services to privatization, economic
reforms and development of the public sector. The culture sphere, understood in the broadest sense, should have a full rehabilitation through a
direct support to scientific and educational (universities), cultural and artistic institutions through the Pact of cultural consolidation, development
and regional cooperation, which will focus its activities and mechanisms
of regional cooperation in the area of science,

education, technological
development, culture and arts.
The priority goal of these activities, which are of primary importance
for the acceleration of the process of democratic consolidation of the Balkan states, is stopping the “brain drain”, especially of young highly educated and specialized personnel, whose massive leaving of the regions are
caused not only by the economic crisis, but also by the dissatisfaction with
the situation of the closed society. The most tragic aspect of young people
leaving the Balkans is the weakening of the human potential that is the
necessary for serious social changes.
In support to the initiative to strengthen the mechanism of regional
cultural cooperation, it should be emphasized that, also, other projects relating to economic cooperation, cannot achieve greater results, having in
mind that the intellectual elite of the Balkan societies is in a passive position in relation to the prevailing party-oligarch elite, which was recruited
during the period of privatization and the creation of the gross, unethical
and unjust capitalism. The transition to democratic consolidation, economic development, and higher level of Balkan integration is possible
only if there is a fundamental revision of the relation to all intellectual
and creative potential of the society.
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Tihomir DOMAZET
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF ZAGREB, CROATIA
Shift EU’s Balkanization –
Build Modern Balkans Economies
i. Introduction
The Western Balkan as defined by European Commission, consists of
Albania (ALB), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), Croatia (HRV), Kosovo
(UVK), FYR Macedonia (MKD), Montenegro (MNE) and Serbia (SRB)
South East Europe (SEE: 1. Albania, 2. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
3. Croatia, 4. Kosovo, 5. Macedonia, 6. Montenegro, 7. Serbia, 8. Bul-garia, 9. Greece, 10. Hungary, 11. Romania and 12. Slovenia) is defined by Domazet, Ostojić and Stipetić.102 SEE economies have been
hit hard by the global economic downturn, which started in 2008.
The debt crises (of Greece, but also coming in Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia and other countries) are aggravating the downturn. Taking all
that into account, it is a correct statement that region of SEE is „most
sharply affected by falling capital flows“ and „worst hit by this economic
crisis “.
In this study we well be using both terms – Western Balkan and SEE.
Followed by political and economic analytical approach, however,
the above ECPD book was practically the first, amongst a number of analysts, to predict the Greek crisis.
The crisis as the term, however, is used on inappropriate way. As for
global crisis, obviously, it is questionable to use term global, because some
countries, though, from Far East (China and others) are not in crisis. The
European Union financial and economic crisis has been called “debt crisis”, since the beginning due to sovereign debt of Greece amounting approximately 170% of GDP. It is also inadequate, because Greece GDP represents less than 3% of EU GDP, but more importantly, debt of most EU
countries comes as a consequence rather than a cause of the crisis. Local
102
Domazet, T. Ostojić, N. Stipetić, V. (2009), The Region of South East Europe, Recent economic development, Crisis – Exit strategy, Brijuni, Croatia, ECPD
175
politicians very often diagnose SEE crisis as a consequence of the Global
Recession, thus referring to it as for global crisis, but this is complete thru.
As it is previously mentioned, the SEE countries have been hit the
hardest by the crisis through economic downturn, and in general the definition of the causes of the crisis (the first point is not related to Greece,
directly) are as follows:
1. Transformation into a capitalist system and private ownership in
an inappropriate way, so called tycoon’s privatisation of the former state owned or state enterprises;
2. Inadequate economic policy based on neoliberal economic
thought;
3. Great recession spillover;
4. Corruption; and
5. Insufficient knowledge of the economic policy (2, p.57).
It should be noted that the most of SEE countries were hit by the crisis in the 1980s. The crisis was over, as most people thought, and the new
states were looking for democratic development and economic prosperity.
Today, however, more and more people are becoming aware about lost
one or two decades, because economic prosperity mostly is not achieved
as it is expected.
It seems that most SEE countries and their economies are at the new
beginning. SEE economies are facing solving the current crisis and to establish economic system with growth and sustainable development. In order to achieve wealthier status by all the people of each SEE country it is
necessary to leave the current economic model and to establish the new
one as a new economic paradigm. Economic growth as one part of new
economic model should be at least 5% of GDP annually in long term. One
of the precondition to achieve some of the above mentioned is competitiveness products that should be realized through regional cooperation.
There were a lot of people from different field of interest including
politics, economics, strategy, energy, transport, geo-economics, etc. that
stressed their willingness to boost economic and social progress of this
region.
Most of these experts, unfortunately, do not understand history, tradition, relations and other relevant and specifics of the SEE.
The traditional South East Europe represented a potential geopolitical prize in the struggle for European supremacy. The traditional SEE or
Balkans involved head-on competition among three imperial rivals: the
Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire.
There were also three indirect participants who were concerned that their
176
European interests would be adversely affected by the victory of a particular protagonist: Germany feared Russian power, France opposed AustriaHungary, and Great Britain preferred to see a weakening Ottoman Empire
in control of the Dardanelles than the emergence of any one of the other
major contestants in control of this region. In the course of the nineteenth
century, these powers managed to contain Balkan conflicts without prejudice to anyone’s vital interests, but they failed to do so in 1914, with disastrous consequences for all.
There was a number of ways promoting importance of SEE in the
world. Harold Mackinder, a leading analyst of geopolitics hence he popularized his heartland concept by the famous dictum:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the world.
Today SEE is the last developed region, which needs new complex
and appropriate economic sustainable development.
This region represents one seventh of the total European population,
but is producing only 6% of European GDP per capita – we should conclude that this region is poorest in Europe – with widening discrepancy
with Europe in the standard of living.
In 1913 the average citizen in this region has got 53% of European
GDP per capita; sixty years later (1973) it had 48% of European standard
and in 2010 only 41%.
TABLE 1. – Balkan (South Eastern Europe), 1913 – 2010 and its role in Europe
Year
1913
1950
1973
2003
2010
South Eastern Europe
Population GDP (mil.) GDP/cap.
(000)
PPP US$ from 1990
42.730
69.223
1.620
57.991
95.403
1.645
71.467
338.693
4.739
77.220
486.720
6.303
75.865
578.947
7.631
Population
12,5
14,8
15,2
15,0
14,6
% in Europe
Volume of
GDP
6,7
6,0
7,3
5,6
6,0
GDP/cap.
53,2
40,8
47,8
37,6
41,3
Source: (24, p.9)
In these circumstances, where Western Europe economies are lagging more and more from other developed economies, SEE economies
are far below of Western Europe, though, the level of development each
SEE economy in the year 2011 is at a relatively lower level than it was in
the year 1989 compared with the level of Western Europe. After years of
Euro integration, economic transition and similar measures taken by SEE
177
countries one has to conclude that economic position of these states and
SEE region as a whole are at a relatively lower level than before transition
beginning.
Economic position of European countries measured by GDP per capita related to the USA shown in the table below suggests that SEE countries like Hungary and Croatia are relatively lower level as a consequence
economic policy implemented in the last two decades, at least.
TABLE 2 – GDP per capita of some SEE countries compared to some EU countries
Country
Austria
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Slovakia
UK
USA
Croatia
GDP per capita (US$ from 1990.)
1913
1973
2005
3.465
11.235
22.135
3.485
13.114
21.554
3.648
11.986
20.521
2.098
5.596
8.612
2.564
1.672
4.921
5.301
1.398
10.634
…
12.025
16.689
5.685
19.502
10.345
22.709
30.911
8.099
1913
65,4
65,7
68,8
39,6
Indices (US = 100)
1973
67,3
78,6
71,9
33,5
2005
71,6
69,7
66,4
27,9
48,4
31,5
92,8
100,0
26,3
63,7
…
…
100,0
34,1
63,1
33,5
73,5
100,0
26,2
ii. SEE and Western Balkan countries
consequences of transition
Transition103 as a word is very often used in last period from 1990s, but it
was not clear at the beginning what it meant. Many of them thought, in
103
178
is structured list of commonly used English transition words — approximately 200, can
Th
be considered as quasi complete. It can be used (by students and teachers alike) to find the
right expression. English transition words are essential, since they not only connect ideas,
but also can introduce a certain shift, contrast or opposition, emphasis or agreement, purpose, result or conclusion, etc. in the line of argument. The transition words and phrases
have been assigned only once to somewhat artificial categories, although some words belong to more than one category.
There is some overlapping with preposition and postposition, but for the purpose of clarity
and completeness of this concise guide, I did not differentiate.
Transition or transitional may refer to:
1. Transition economy, an economy which is changing from a centrally planned economy
to a free market
2. Transition (grappling), in grappling is a move from one grappling hold or grappling position to another
3. Transitional government, an emergency or interim government set up when a political
void has been created by the collapse of a very large government
respect of economics, that it should mean transformation from centrally
planned economy to market economy, but the countries of former Yugoslavia did not belong to or use the term “centrally planned economy”.
On the other hand, those outside the region often referred to the
countries of this region as former communist countries –how ever could
it be imaginable to refer to any European country in the 1960s as a “former fascist country”.
In any case South East Europe, SEE, and Western Balkan countries
today are in very difficult economic condition mostly due to transition or
convergence failure in the 1990 – 2014 period.
Instead of providing, for the time being, usual economic data of SEE
countries in past period, it is important to use gross national income, GNI
and gross domestic product, GDP as indicators of transition period.
In order to put another more light on the current SEE economic position, table below shows the difference between gross national income,
GNI and GDP. These are highly significant relations that make difference
between available amount in any country measured by GNI and produced
amount measured by GDP. If GDP is larger than GNI, the difference that
mostly related to the interest and dividends of non-residents would outflow
from original country. This is explained in System of National Accounts
of UN: “Levels of GDP or, alternatively, gross national income (GNI) per
head in different countries are also used by international organizations
4. Transition (outsourcing), the process of migrating knowledge, systems, and operating capabilities from an outsourcing environment to an in-house staff
5. Transitions (radio show), a weekly two-hour radio show on Kiss 100 in the UK
6. Transition (roadable aircraft), a flying car (or drivable airplane) made by Terrafugia
7. Transitioning (transgender), the process of changing one’s gender presentation to accord
with one’s internal sense of one’s gender - the idea of what it means to be a man or
woman
8. Transition Towns, a grassroots network of communities that are working to build resilience in response to peak oil, climate destruction, and economic instability
9. A phase of the project lifecycle in the Rational Unified Process
10.Transitions, a brand of photochromic eyeglass lens and sponsor of the PGA Tour Transitions Championship
11.Transitions Championship, a men’s professional golf tournament on the PGA Tour
12.Transition Glacier, a glacier on the east coast of Alexander Island
13.The University Transition Program, an early college entrance program based in the University of British Columbia
14.“Shifting gears” on a railroad locomotive; see Diesel locomotive#Propulsion system operation
15.Care transition, wherein a patient changes health care provider
16.The Transitional Style of furniture and interior design, either modern or referring to mid18th Century French furniture
179
to determine eligibility for loans, aid or other funds or to determine the
terms or conditions on which such loans, aid or funds are made available. When the objective is to compare the volumes of goods or services
produced or consumed per head, data in national currencies must be converted into a common currency by means of purchasing power parities
and not exchange rates. It is well known that, in general, neither market
nor fixed exchange rates reflect the relative internal purchasing powers of
different currencies. When exchange rates are used to convert GDP, or
other statistics, into a common currency the prices at which goods and
services in high-income countries are valued tend to be higher than in
low-income countries, thus exaggerating the differences in real incomes
between them. Exchange rate conveted data must not, therefore, be interpreted as measures of the relative volumes of goods and services concerned. Levels of GDP, or GDP per head, in different countries are also
used to determine, in whole or in part, the size of the contributions which
the member countries of an international organization make to finance
the operations of the organization.” (19, p. 235).
Gross National Income accounts for these flows in and out of the
country. For many countries, the flows tend to balance out, leaving difference between GDP and GNI.
TABLE 3 – GNI and GDP per capita 2012 of SEE countries and some EU countries
Country
GNI/c
Atlas method US$
Albania
Bulgaria
Montenegro
Greece
Croatia
Kosovo
Hungary
Macedonia
Romania
Slovenia
Serbia
Austria
France
Italia
Germany
4030
4750
6840
7220
23660
13490
3600
12410
4620
8560
22810
5280
47850
41750
34640
45070
GDP/c
Geary-Khamis international US $
9403
9392
16041
14358
26041
20981
7900
22635
11834
18062
28476
11804
44122
36785
34926
42700
GNI/GDP
(%)
42,9
50,6
42,6
50,3
90,9
64,3
45,6
54,8
39,0
47,4
80,1
44,7
108,4
113,5
99,2
105,6
Source: World Bank, Golden growth; Restoring the lustre of European economic model, 2014
180
The table above suggest while all SEE economies produce a lot of income per inhabitant, GNI shows that less of it does not stay in the country, wich means GNI per capita is lower than GDP. GDP produced in the
country flows out of that country, wich means that available for domestic residents is ranking from 42.9%, in Albania to 90.9% in Greece. The
differences are related to interest, dividend etc. On the other hand all old
EU countries (except for Luxembourg) have larger GNI rather than GDP
meaning the differences are result of inflow related to the interest and dividends also from SEE countries. In addition, perhaps it may be concluded,
although currently without precise data, that the differences between GNI
and GDP before transition were not so huge, if they existed at all. One could
conclude that economic, trade and other relations between SEE countries
and the EU, primarily those which run these activities in favour of the EU
members, in these circumstance Germany, Italy, Austria and France.
Data from the above Table suggests that SEE transition under Washington consensus and EU assistance failed.
There are politicians that are the cause of the current crisis as a global
crisis called the Great Recession. This paper does not search the causes of
the Great Recession, but today it should be clear that “Bretton - Woods
collapse is beginning of this crisis: Bretton – Woods collapse in 1971 inaugurated a new stage, characterized by the development of globalised
production and the domination of an international financial market. On
the other hand, EU crisis, mostly called debt crisis, is primarily caused
by non-functionality of the EU and especially running common currency
without appropriate supportive basis. However, these crises do have impact on SEE economic and financial crisis.
What ought to be done in this remote corner of Europe, that is itself
in troubles. Something fundamental is going on the world scale, which
changes cannot be influenced by this region. The lesson is, without any
doubt that it should modernize and strengthen multilateralism, not leave
it. It must be change the old concepts and constructing labels, not multilateral commitments.
We should find in this part of the old continent our own way to get
out from the trap in which we are at the moment. No longer could old
European, or Japanese or American models be the guide; it has to emulate
now in different conditions from those in the past successful models.
It is necessary to realise that the global economy has entered a new
danger zone, with little maneuvering room as some European countries
are resisting difficult truths about common responsibilities of the common currency.
181
Credible on debts and budget deficits could restore confidence, and
with the focus on efficient, now forgotten project, could spur growth of
these economies, boost productivity, create new jobs: SEE can under these
conditions start new upturn, which will break existing tendencies.
In summary, it should be concluded that the SEE position depends
on its own economic and political powers against influence from abroad.
The lesson from all previous crises is that the later you act, the more
you have to do and the more painful it becomes.
Figure 1 – Real Western Balkans GDP growth (percent change year-on-year) 10
percent
8
6
4
2
–4
ECA
2014
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
–2
2000
0
Western Balkans
ECA = Europe and Central Asia
Government debt is very high as still is arising.
It is necessary to stipulate that the external debt of states of former
Yugoslavia today is amounting about US $ 175 billion, but at the end of
1989 it was about 22 billion US $, and foreign experts, including IMF,
assessed that it was unsustainable. Romania’s today external debt is 132.1
billion US $, but in 1989. it had zero external debt; Hungary’s today external debt is 202 billion US $. Total external debt of the SEE countries today
is 1.133 billion US $. Someone commented that this are the entrance costs
for the EU and NATO membership.
182
Figure 2 – General government gross debt
60
50
40
30
20
10
WBS
NMS
CEE5
Baltics
SEE
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Source: IMF, World economic outlook
Figure 3 – Average GDP per capita as percent of average EU 17 GDP/c
60
55
WBS
NMS
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
15
Source: Penn World Table and IMF data
183
It is easy to conclude SEE and West Balkans countries did not achieve
any significant goal. The most important, these countries and economies
and societies did not achieve expected and promised achievement.
On the other hand, International Monetary Fund very recently addressed their view on the Western Balkan results in transition period, as
follows:
„The countries of the Western Balkans have undergone a major economic transformation over the past 15 years, and many are unrecognizable compared with where they stood at the turn of the century. Following the conflict-ridden 1990s, these countries set out to comprehensively
rebuild and reform their economies. They opened up to global trade and
became increasingly export-oriented, expanded the role of the private sector, dismantled regulations that stifled business development, and began
to build institutions needed to support a market system. Banking systems
were built up—literally from scratch in some cases—with the aid of foreign capital and know-how. The result of these efforts has been robust
economic growth, a significant rise in incomes and living standards, and
enhanced macroeconomic stability.
However, the process of structural transformation began to stall in
the mid-2000s, in the face of vested interests and as reform fatigue set in,
and remains incomplete. By the time of the global financial crisis, growth
in the Western Balkans was driven more by ample global liquidity and
unsustainable capital inflows than by real progress in economic reform.
Clear evidence of the weakness in the region’s economic model can be
found in the extremely high unemployment rates, which remained above
20 percent in many countries even at the height of the precrisis boom.
Growth in the postcrisis period in the Western Balkan countries has
been lackluster. The external environment has been weak, but it is the incomplete reform process that is holding back convergence to income levels
of richer European Union economies. And faster growth, in itself, may not
be enough. The Western Balkan countries also need to generate jobs to reverse the weak labor market outcomes that are leaving so many behind.
What, then, needs to be done? Preserving macroeconomic stability
is paramount for durable growth. Previous gains in terms of low inflation
should be safeguarded. Countries that are facing high fiscal deficits and
public debt need to tackle them urgently; others should gradually rebuild
fiscal buffers. Everywhere in the region, investment in the tradable sectors is needed to boost exports and reduce large trade and current account deficits. In addition, high levels of nonperforming loans need to be
addressed so that credit can grow again and facilitate the recovery. The
184
development of nonbank financial markets would help diversify sources
of funding.
Embarking anew on deep structural reform is a key policy priority
for the region. Many inefficient state- or socially-owned enterprises remain to be privatized; competitiveness problems, including red tape and
weak governance, will have to be addressed if the private sector is to become the key engine of growth; and legacy practices that prevent the expansion of employment and distort labor markets outcomes will need to
be dismantled.
After spending much of the 1990s mired in conflict, the Western Balkan
countries have experienced a notable transformation over the last 15 years.
They have transitioned toward market-based systems, privatized many inefficient state- and socially-owned enterprises, rapidly adopted modern banking systems, and enhanced the external orientation of their economies. The
result has been a significant catch-up in living standards relative to their
richer neighbors in advanced European Union economies. However, the
pace of structural reform has been disappointing, owing to a combination
of reform fatigue, resistance from vested interests, difficult politics that have
constrained reform efforts, and delayed membership in the European Union.
And in hindsight, part of the process of catching up was driven by unsustainable inflows in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. The region
is thus still coping with the legacies of the boom period and incomplete transition. As a result, the Western Balkan countries still lag well behind the New
Member States of the European Union in terms of economic transformation
and income levels, which are around one-third of those in Advanced EU
economies. Vigorously reviving the reform momentum will be essential to
improve living standards and revive income convergence.
The Western Balkan economies have experienced a notable transformation. While the rest of Emerging Europe transitioned peacefully out of
communism and into democracy, many Western Balkan countries spent
the better part of the 1990s engulfed in a devastating conflict. Yet, while
the conflict caused widespread devastation and put the region’s economic
transformation on hold, significant structural reforms were initiated during
this decade that were then carried forward once the conflicts abated. Since
then, the Western Balkan countries have made impressive gains in rebuilding their war-torn economies and moving forward with the transition to
market economies. Vast swathes of state- or socially-owned enterprises have
been privatized, tripling the share of the private sector in economic activity. Countries have eliminated many legacy regulations, while large projects
have completely redrawn the infrastructure landscape in the region.
185
As they transitioned toward market-based systems, the region’s
economies opened up to the world. Economies have become increasingly
export-oriented, with FYR Macedonia and Serbia experiencing particularly noticeable gains. And this has been accompanied by increasing diversification of their export markets, with greater trade within the region
and with the New Member States, and, concomitantly, lesser reliance on
exports to Advanced EU economies. And just as Western Balkan firms
were discovering new markets, foreign direct investment (FDI) into the
region also took off.
One sector that has been entirely transformed by foreign investment
is banking, which has facilitated a more efficient allocation of capital. Starting in the early 2000s, foreign investment into banking, combined with increased deposit bases, boosted private sector credit. In fact, with deposits
and credit rising by more than 30 percent of GDP since the early 2000s,
financial sectors in the Western Balkans have deepened more than those in
the New Member States at comparable stages of transition. Beyond deepening, there has been an increase in financial inclusion—access to banking
services for poor and remote populations—as well as banking sector efficiency, although they remain below levels in the New Member States.
The IMF was closely engaged in the Western Balkan’s economic
transformation from the start. In addition to providing advice on economic matters, the IMF has had financial arrangements with almost every
country in the region, often more than once. These arrangements have
typically aimed at preserving macroeconomic stability in the face of major economic transformation, which the Fund was simultaneously trying
to advance. In addition, the IMF has provided significant technical assistance and training to the region. This, together with efforts from other donors, has helped the region build and gradually improve key institutions
for economic policymaking, be it public finance laws or bank regulatory
and supervisory regimes, among others.
Altogether, the region experienced significant gains in terms of
incomes and living standards, although perhaps not as much as could
have been expected. With average economic growth across the region
exceeding 5 percent per year over 2000–08, income per capita increased
significantly and partially closed the gap with the standards of living
of Europe’s richest countries. Still, income convergence of the Western
Balkans cannot be seen as entirely satisfactory. In particular, the New
Member States caught up with Advanced EU economies significantly
faster at similar stages of transition, which raises the question why the
Western Balkans did not advance at the same rate. Part of the explana186
tion lies in the closer physical distance of the New Member States to
Europe’s core, allowing some of them to integrate into the German supply chain. But another, more troubling, part of the explanation is that income convergence in the Western Balkans was slower because structural
reforms proceeded more slowly and did not advance as far as in the New
Member States, particularly in the area of reducing state ownership and
improving governance.
In hindsight, abundant global liquidity channeled into the Western
Balkan countries through equity investment in their domestic banking
systems facilitated some of the growth catch-up and masked the incomplete structural transformation. In the years leading up to the global financial crisis, the increase in capital flowing into the Western Balkans was
as significant as that into Central and Southeastern Europe. These capital
inflows were intermediated by domestic banks, and the resulting extension of credit went beyond what fundamentals would have warranted.
Indeed, according to some metrics, only half of the precrisis increase in
credit-to-GDP ratios in the Western Balkans could have been explained
by economic fundamentals. This was similar to the experience in other
Emerging European economies, although in the Baltics and Bulgaria credit expansions were both significantly greater than in the Western Balkans
(with the exception of Montenegro, and perhaps Kosovo), and significantly less driven by fundamentals. But the experience of the Western Balkan
countries did differ from the New Member states in one key respect—the
inflows into the banking systems of the former were largely in the form of
FDI and equity investment, rather than borrowing from parent banks and
wholesale funding markets.
In the years leading up to the global financial crisis, current account
deficits increased on average by more than 10 percent of GDP. Montenegro, in particular, experienced one of the sharpest current account
deteriorations in the world. While some of this reflected capital formation, much of the increase was directed into nontradable sectors, where
the scope for productivity growth tends to be lower. This exacerbated the
region’s competitiveness problems, reflected by relatively narrow export
bases and concomitant dependence on imports. The preference of most
Western Balkan countries for fixed or near-fixed exchange rates made the
needed adjustment to the competitiveness challenge more difficult.
Perhaps the biggest flaw in the Western Balkan economic model has
been the chronic underutilization of human resources. In 2008, at the tail
end of the growth spurt, the unemployment rate in the region still averaged more than 20 percent. Employment levels tell an equally disappointNew Balkans on the way to Stable Peace and Sustainable Divelopment
187
ing story, hovering between 40 and 45 percent on average since 2000, a
full 10 percentage points lower than in the New Member States. Employment is particularly low among women and the young, strikingly so in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Why has this been so? According to
available evidence, skill gaps have been particularly severe in the Western
Balkans, more so than in the Baltics or Central Europe. Moreover, in some
countries, failure to tackle the legacy of self-management and so-called
social ownership has contributed to labor market rigidity and de facto
protection for insiders. These problems have, in turn, been compounded
by the region’s heavy reliance on remittances, which tend to raise reservation wages (i.e., the wage at which people are willing to work) above what
productivity levels can sustain.
Like elsewhere, boom times came to an end, imperiling income convergence. With the onset of the global financial crisis and the associated
pull-back in global liquidity, capital flows reversed in the Western Balkans
as they did elsewhere. As a consequence, credit growth slowed sharply,
and current account deficits contracted by more than 10 percent of GDP
on average. With the exception of Croatia, these current account contractions were not mirrored by GDP contractions, as happened elsewhere
in Europe. Rather, growth simply slowed down in most Western Balkan
countries. The problem is that seven years after the onset of the crisis,
growth remains lackluster in the region, and hence income convergence
has stalled. At currently projected growth rates, Western Balkan economies will only close a small fraction of the gap with Advanced EU economies’ income per capita levels by 2030. And it is not just about incomes:
faster growth is also needed to provide employment opportunities to the
large surplus of unutilized labor in the region.
In some countries, the growth and jobs challenge is compounded by
the need to pursue fiscal consolidation. As happened elsewhere in Europe, a substantial share of the rise in tax revenues during the boom years
proved in hindsight to be cyclical, and this share disappeared once economic growth slowed or went into reverse. The boom had also prompted
some countries in the region to lower tax rates. Once the crisis hit, Western Balkan countries found it hard to scale back spending to match the
decline in revenues, not least because their share of precommitted spending is higher than in the New Member States or Advanced EU economies.
As a result, some of the countries, notably Serbia and Croatia, now have
very high public debt levels, exacerbated by ongoing fiscal deficits that
need to be brought down.
188
Important financial sector reforms remain to be done. Tackling the
large stock of nonperforming loans (NPLs) is a priority if credit is to support the economic recovery. NPLs rose significantly more following the
global financial crisis in the New Member States than in the Western Balkan countries. However, in the former NPLs have started to come down,
while in the latter they remain at postcrisis peaks, and in some countries
they are still increasing. While financial stability risks are mitigated by
comfortable levels of bank capital and provisioning, NPLs will continue
to weigh on profitability and credit growth if left unresolved. A multipronged effort is needed to tackle the problem, including better collateral
enforcement, improved frameworks for going-concern and out-of-court
restructurings, and the clearing of bottlenecks in overloaded court systems. Reforms to strengthen supervision and regulation of financial institutions have to be redoubled. Lastly, it is critical to create an environment
where nonbank financial development can take place.
The key challenge facing the region going forward is to complete
the structural transformation process that began two decades ago. The
impressive reform process born out of the ashes of socialism had largely stalled by the mid-2000s and was left incomplete, a victim of reform
fatigue, a difficult political economy, vested interests that had grown in
power and sophistication, and disillusionment with the way some reforms
were executed. The process of accession to EU membership—arguably the
main catalyst of reforms in the New Member States—remained a distant
prospect for most of the Western Balkans. But abundant global liquidity gave the illusion, albeit temporarily, that fast economic growth was
possible without reforming. Today, the region lags well behind the New
Member States in terms of structural transformation. In some Western
Balkan countries, resistance to private ownership has meant that many
inefficient state- or socially-owned enterprises have survived and continue
to impose a drag on public finances and resource allocation. Throughout
the region, red tape and corruption continue to hamper economic activity, while corporate governance reform remains a long overdue promise.
Importantly, wide political support for far-reaching reform—a crucial element in the transformation in the New Member States—has been elusive
in most Western Balkans countries. There is a sense in the Western Balkans thatreforms have underdelivered, and that the spoils of growth have
benefited only a few.
As this report will make clear, however, it is the inadequacy of reform
over the last 10 years, rather than the nature of the reforms undertaken,
that is holding the region back. Without a courageous reform push, WestNew Balkans on the way to Stable Peace and Sustainable Divelopment
189
ern Balkan countries cannot expect to attract the scale of investment flows
that is needed to finance rapid sustained growth, and they risk staying
stuck at income levels less than one-third of those of their richer European neighbors.“104
iii. Convergence Balkan countries failed
In order to make and analysis of convergence it is necessary to provide
some background. For example, does regionalization drive convergence
among integrating national economies, or does regionalization deepen existing macroeconomic inequalities? The mainstream theoretical approaches are at odds: orthodox economic theory and the political-institutionalist
approach to markets predict convergence, whereas world systems theory
and its interpretation of integration as exploitation suggest divergence.
Economic theory highlights market mechanisms, whereas the politicalinstitutional approach privileges rules and scripts of the new regional social order. Existing evidence on the convergence debate is marked by contradictory findings and a general failure to measure regional integration.
Economic theory
Many arguments that regional integration brings economic convergence
come from economic theory. For instance, economic trade theory is especially relevant to European integration because trade liberalization
is a central goal of the European Union and its forerunner, the European Economic Community. Many economists argue that regional integration should bring convergence through free trade (e.g. Ben-David
1993, 1997, 2001). Economic theory posits multiple additional mechanisms through which trade may exert convergent pressures: (1) the factor price equalization (FPE) theorem says that under completely free
trade, internationally homogeneous technology, preferences and products, factor prices in a country with free trade equal world factor prices;
(2) trade may allow for international diffusion of technology, raising the
technology levels of poorer countries; (3) trade in capital goods can raise
GDP per capita in poorer countries by increasing capital stock (Slaughter 1997); (4) trade may reduce the perceived risk of investing in poorer
countries (Slaughter 2001).
104
190
e Western Balkans: 15 years of economic transition, International Monetary Fund, WashTh
ington D.C. 2015
World systems theory
World systems theory applies to the world economy the Marxian notion that capitalist exchange is inherently exploitive: the operation of the
capitalist world economy increases inequality between core and periphery, and between elite and marginalized in peripheral countries (Boswell
and Chase-Dunn 2000; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Wallerstein
1974). Open capital markets allow multinational corporations located in
core countries to gain control over corporations in peripheral countries
through investment, repatriate profits to the core, dampen reinvestment
in peripheral countries, forestall creation of spin-offs in the periphery, and
capture peripheral states (Dixon and Boswell 1996). This exploitation of
the periphery by the core through foreign investment stunts economic
growth in the periphery (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Kentor 1998;
Kentor and Boswell 2003; cf. Firebaugh 1992).
Political-institutionalist theory
A political-institutionalist approach to convergence and regional integration can be synthesized from the political-cultural approach to markets
(Fligstein 2001), neo-institutionalist “world polity theory” (Meyer et al.
1997), and the state-centered theory of economic development (Evans
1995).
This strategy for the analysis is to begin by discussing the trends in
economic convergence, political integration, economic integration, and
economic development among the two populations of interest: the Western Balkans states (WBS), New Member state (NMS) ans South East Europe (SEE) against rest of EU member states.
Time series analysis
The impressions suggested by tables, graphs and other data are confirmed,
in part, by the time-series regression models of the unweighted dispersion
measures.105
It should, however, conclude that convergence failed. Convergence
has stalled, and without a courageous reform push, Western Balkan countries cannot expect to attract the scale of investment flows that is needed
to finance rapid sustained growth. They risk staying stuck at income levels
less than one-third of those of their richer European neighbors.
105
Jason Beckfield, Regionalization and convergence in the European union, Department of
Sociology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge MA 2006
191
SEE countries celebrate this 2015 two important anniversaries: (1) 25
years since the re-beginning new economic system (1990) and 10 years
since the first wave of EU Eastern Enlargement (2004).
In addition, one does not need sophisticated analysis to understand
how radically this region has changed during the last quarter of century – in
terms of its political and economic systems, geopolitical arrangements, living and civilization standards, infrastructure, etc. However, one can also ask
some difficult questions such as, for example, have all opportunities of economic and political progress been grasped? And what about the future?
Economic convergence may be interpreted and measured in [1] a
very simple approach – to compare GDP per capita in current international dollars, in PPP terms of each SEE country with that of Germany.
Germany as a benchmark is motivated by its role as the largest EU
national economy and major economic and trade partner of most of those
economies as well as Germany on the one hand, and rate of growth in
2000s and 2010s [2], on the other.
This is an analysis of the period between 2001 and 2013, i.e. after the
end of dramatic period of transition related restructuring and related prolonged output decline (in early and mid-1990s) and the series of emerging-market crises (in the second half of 1990s) which affected part of the
region especialy Western Balkans.
Figures 1 and 2 present results of the for two country subgroups.
Figure 1 – GDP per capita in curent international $, PPP adjusted,
Germany = 100%, 2001–2013, EU new members states
80%
20%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Bulgaria
Estonia
Lithuania
Slovakia
Czech Rep.
Latvia
Romania
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2014
192
Croatia
Hungary
Poland
Slovenia
Figure 2 – GDP per capita in current international $, PPP adjusted,
Germany = 100%, 2001–2013, Western Balkan countries
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Albania
Macedonia
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Montenegro
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2014; According to IMF WEO geographical grouping Emerging and Developing Europe includes (as of October 2014)
the following SEE countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Hungary, Kosovo, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and
Turkey. In both country groups it is easy two sub-periods – until 2007/2008
with solid catching up (convergence) and after 2008 with either de-convergence or no progress in further convergence, which can embarked as
Convergence followed by de-convergence.
It is quite easy to name factors behind the rapid convergence experienced in the first sub-period: (1) post-transition growth recovery (effects
of transition related reallocation of factors of production); (2) joining the
Single European Market (or partial access in case of EU candidates); (3)
global economic boom which resulted in large-scale capital inflows to the
region (see Figure 3). The first two factors had a one-off character and the
third one – short-term effect, which was largely reversed during the following crisis.106
106
entral and eastern Europe: uncertain prospects of economic convergence – 25 years since
C
the start of post-communist transition and 10 years since the first wave of EU eastern enlargement: two anniversaries and difficult questions, by Marek Dabrowski, on 9th December 2014
193
Figure 3 – Net capital flows to Emerging and Developing Europe,
USD bn, 1990–2013
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
–20
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Direct investment, net
Portfolio investment, net
Other investment, net
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2014
It should note, when the global financial crisis hit the region in 20082009 (Hungary stopped converging in 2005) the convergence trajectory
changed for worse everywhere. However, it is possible to see differences
across region.
The four EU new member states with the highest income per-capita
level in early 2000s, i.e., Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Croatia,
have recorded a continuous decline in their relative GDP per capita levels, as compared to Germany after 2008. The Western Balkan candidate
countries (except Albania), Romania and Bulgaria although with smaller
amplitudes of changes in their convergence trajectories (especially in the
case of Bulgaria), and Poland, Slovakia and Albania have convergence vis
a vis Germany after 2008 although at a very slow pace.
It is very important to see investment possibility vis a vis national
saving.
However, even more dramatic challenges will be faced with respect
to investment. The short-term investment boom (between 2003 and 2007)
was based on imported savings (capital inflow – Figure 3 and 4) causing
large current account imbalances.
It should conclude, even if SEE economies manage to return on the
convergence path its speed will be much slower than it used to be before 2008, but the question remain how to re-establish convergence. That
194
Figure 4 – Emerging and developing Europe: saving-investent imabalance,
% of GDP, 2001–2013
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
investment
Gross national savings
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2014
means that the timetable of catching up with the richest Western European nations like Germany, will be much longer than one would have
thought ten years ago. Secondly and more importantly, in order to return
to the convergence path (even more slowly than before the crisis) several
important policy challenges must be addressed as follows:
1. The low domestic saving rate;
2. The steadily decreasing cohorts of working-age population;
3. A well-designed reform agenda could boost productivity growth;
4. In structural terms, most SEE economies tried to build their comparative advantages in manufacturing (mostly in the intermediate
stages of global production chains) and service sectors;
5. Moving up the value chain and towards more knowledge-intensive sectors (the natural market niche for higher-wage economies)
requires improving innovativeness, and higher spending on research and better education.
Above mentioned measures have to be taken very soon, immediately.
It should be noted that, according to the EBRD assessment (report)
84% of LiTS (Life in Transition Survey)respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina believe that conditions are worse today than in 1989 – highest in
the whole EBRD region, followed closely by 83% in Macedonia, 76% in
Montenegro, 75% in Serbia and 66% in Croatia. The exception is Albania,
195
where 71% of respondents believe the opposite is true – among the lowest
in the EBRD region. Hungary (75%) is on the top of the CE-8 “nostalgia”
list. Other CE-8 countries are at the bottom half of the EBRD countries.
iv. SEE and Western Balkans societies are facing
with growing populism and nationalism
It should be recognised that European Centre for Peace and Development,
ECPD, of the University for peace established by UN, managed by Dr.
Negoslav Ostojić, organises the annually conferences, aiming at reconciliation, tolerance and human security in the Balkans, with high and eminent participants from all parts of the World.
Someone would conclude the situation in the region would have
been worse without ECPD activities, but what to do and how to respond
to negative influences from EU.
In Europe, the populist Pandora’s box has been opened. From Athens
to Dresden, Paris to Madrid, it is easy to see strong signs of a people’s
revolt against the established new order everywhere, like pan-European
crisis of political trust and representation, nearly everywhere in Europe.
However, EU’s government policies are ignoring the populist elephant thundering through European societies.
The economic stance is a basis for above mentioned negative trends,
especially austerity politics, though fiscal measure without the results, unless results are undermining its social protection and collective security;
the different treatment of different interests. There are raising differences
between centre and periphery, but SEE and Balkans are far beyond. As a
result, someone stipulate, democracy seems to be for populists, but leadership for technocrats.
The fact remains, however, that even in Germany the populist Pandora’s Box has been opened. The pan-European crisis of trust in political
representation has come to Berlin as well. Even to Germany, a country
in good economic shape. And a country that, for historical reasons consists of a strong anti-populist cordon sanitaire in politics, media and the
Grundgesetz (constitution). Even that Germany has proven not to be immune to the populist revolt of angry and alienated citizens.
One would have expected that this unprecedented populist threat,
all over Europe, would have given rise to greater degrees of caution and
concern.107
107
196
ene Cuperus, Social Europe, 10 March 2015, Director for International Relations and SenR
ior Research Fellow at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation, think tank of the Dutch Labour
Party/PvdA. He is also columnist at Dutch daily de Volkskrant.
More difficult is with nationalism, which has come to be associated
with attempts by majority ethnic groups to exclude and persecute minorities. Not only is this detestable, it is quite clearly an abuse of the term:
an attempt to appropriate for one component of a society, a designation
which by definition must include the whole. In effect, exclusionary nationalism asserts ‘we constitute the nation, so you are not part of it’.
While the response of the left has been understandable, in condemning nationalism, it has inadvertently ceded what is potentially the most
potent means of building social cohesion. Without a sense of shared identity a modern society would struggle to maintain the levels of cooperation
and generosity that have made Europe so remarkable. In a democracy,
that shared identity cannot be political: the essence of democracy is division between opposing groups. It cannot be religious: a modern society
will encompass those with an infinite variety of beliefs.
It is shared national identity, not shared values, that predisposes people to generosity and cooperation. If shared identity is to be sustained in
Europe, let alone built in many societies that currently suffer from the
lack of it, there is little alternative, and it is, indeed, the only realistic basis
for a sense of shared identity available to all people living in a country.
Inclusive nationalism is admittedly incompatible with the ideal of
a common global humanity. This is the benchmark of both technocratic
utilitarian universalism and the romantic end of European youth.
Is nationalism always bad? Currently, the realistic alternative to inclusive nationalism is not a common global humanity. Without inclusive
nationalism, two forms of identity are likely to predominate. Some societies will develop the viral, exclusionary, form of nationalism. This is the
prospect feared by the European establishment. In other societies identities will become more individualized. These societies will come to consist
of alienated atomized libertarians who disparage government. Such societies, privileging individual rights over shared responsibilities, will also
be unattractive. Inclusive nationalism would not be perfect: it would not
persuade Germans to be generous to Greeks. But it would be better than
either of these scenarios. It could persuade the Greeks to be more generous to each other, which would be a considerable improvement.
While inclusive nationalism is a realistic and attractive strategy within Europe, it is far more important for the fragile post-conflict societies
which have become an acute global problem. Inclusive nationalism is a
political agenda that neither the left nor the right is capable of espousing.
197
The left lacks the will to nationalism; the right lacks the will to inclusion.
But it is an ideal agenda for the political centre.108
The populism and nationalism imported from abroad and locally
supported and developed are real danger. That is danger for all, indeed.
The new question raised again, how to protect the region of influence
from abroad. One of the answers is economic prosperity, but local governments and their political parties are far away from sustainable economic
growth and employment, and another is EU’s economic and financial assistance to the region.
v. Conclusion
First and forever, local society and their government, economy should always be in charge for any failure, as well as for any success. That is clear
or should be.
The question raised, however, how to assess the role and charge European Commission, International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other institutions, when any country follows recommendation or similar guideline
from the mentioned international community, but as a consequence there
was a failure. That is evidenced from most SEE and Balkans countries.
For example in previously mentioned report IMF stressed: “the IMF
was closely engaged in the Western Balkan’s economic transformation
from the start. In addition to providing advice on economic matters, the
IMF has had financial arrangements with almost every country in the region, often more than once. These arrangements have typically aimed at
preserving macroeconomic stability in the face of major economic transformation, which the Fund was simultaneously trying to advance. In addition, the IMF has provided significant technical assistance and training to
the region. This, together with efforts from other donors, has helped the
region build and gradually improve key institutions for economic policymaking, be it public finance laws or bank regulatory and supervisory
regimes, among others.“109 But the IMF has not recognised any failure,
missconduct, and misconception made in that.
The Hungarian economist Janos Kornai has warned the West of the
possibility of a reversal of liberalization in Eastern Europe. He advocates
198
108
Good And Bad Nationalism by Paul Collier, Social Europe, 10 March 2015.
109
e western Balkans: 15 years of economic transition. – Washington, D.C. : International
Th
Monetary Fund, 2015.
a new policy of containment aimed for countries such as Russia and China. This prompts us to investigate the truth concerning the transition in
Eastern Europe. After 1990 the West recalculated economic data from the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (FSUEE thereafter) before 1990,
for creating an illusion that “shock therapy” had made progress in FSUEE.
However, the Eastern Europeans including the Hungarians, who were enthusiastic for liberalization from socialism, soon discovered that joining
the European Union (EU) was damaging the interests of the majority of
people in Eastern Europe, while Western Europeans also came increasingly to oppose the financial burdens imposed by EU enlargement and
immigration inflows. The short-sighted transition strategy carried out in
Eastern Europe and the preoccupation with geopolitical interests have in
fact exacerbated the EU’s economic crisis, triggering a civil war in Ukraine
and causing Russia to become disillusioned with the West. Kornai’s theory
of soft-budget constraints as well as his anti-Keynesian policies during the
transition recession, is responsible for economic downturn triggered by
rapid liberalization in Eastern Europe. The reversal of the liberalization
trend in Eastern Europe and the change in the mass psychology of Eastern Europeans towards the West, together constitute an important rebuff
to utopian capitalist thinking in China. Has capitalism defeated socialism,
as Western propaganda claims? The success of China’s autonomous opendoor policy and the failure of Eastern Europe’s unilateral opening indicate
that the collapse of the FSUEE occurred mainly for political rather than
economic reasons.110
Because of current status of Greece against its debt and its relations
with EU, it should remind Germany situation after WWII (Economic history Germany Greece and the Marshall Plan, by Albrecht Ritschl from
London School of Economics, The Economist, Jun 15th 2012). So SEE or
Balkans countries need a Marshall Plan, as it was promised to them after
the fall of Berlin Wall, what has never happened, unfortunately.111
110
ing Chen, Has Capitalism Defeated Socialism Yet?—Kornai’s Turnaround on Liberalism,
P
and the Evaporation of Myths about Eastern Europe, International Critical Thought, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2015
111
t the end of World War II, Germany nominally owed almost 40% of its 1938 GDP in
A
short-term clearing debt to Europe. Not entirely unlike the ECB’s Target-2 clearing mechanism, this system had been set up at Germany’s central bank, the Reichsbank, as a mere
clearing device. But during World War II, almost all of Germany’s trade deficits with Europe
were financed through this system, just as most of Southern Europe’s payments deficits towards Germany since 2008 have been financed through Target-2. Incidentally, the amount
now is the same, fast approaching 40% of German GDP. Just the signs are reversed. Bad
199
Europe should learn from history. But it needs to learn fast. There
might be no recovery unless debts are reduced to manageable proportions. That is what ended the Great Depression in Europe in the 1930s,
and that is what in all likelihood is needed again.
Post-Keynesianism economic school of thinking as a basis for the SEE
new paradigm
Hyman Minsky, in his publications in the 1950s through the mid
1960s gradually developed his analysis of the cycles. First, he argued that
institutions, and in particular financial institutions, matter. This was a reaction against the growing dominance of a particular version of Keynesian economics best represented in the ISLM model. Although Minsky had
studied with Alvin Hansen at Harvard, he preferred the institutional detail of Henry Simons at Chicago. The overly simplistic approach to mackarma, that, isn’t it.Germany’s deficits during World War II were mostly robbery at gunpoint, usually at heavily distorted exchange rates. German internal wartime statistics suggest that when calculated at more realistic rates, transfers from Europe on clearing account
were actually closer to 90% of Germany’s 1938 GDP. To this adds Germany’s official public
debt, which internal wartime statistics put at some 300% of German 1938 GDP.What happened to this debt after World War II? Here is where the Marshall Plan comes in. Recipients of Marshall Aid were (politely) asked to sign a waiver that made U.S. Marshall Aid
a first charge on Germany. No claims against Germany could be brought unless the Germans had fully repaid Marshall Aid. This meant that by 1947, all foreign claims on Germany were blocked, including the 90% of 1938 GDP in wartime clearing debt.Currency reform in 1948—the U.S. Army put an occupation currency into circulation, and gave it the
neutral name of Deutsche Mark, as no emitting authority existed yet—wiped out domestic
public debt, the largest part of the 300% of 1938 GDP mentioned above.But given that Germany’s debt was blocked, the countries of Europe would not trade with post-war Germany
except on a barter basis. Also to mitigate this, Europe was temporarily taken out of the Bretton Woods currency system and put together in a multilateral trade and clearing agreement
dubbed the European Payments Union. Trade credit within this clearing system was underwritten by, again, the Marshall Plan.In 1953, the London Agreement on German Debt perpetuated these arrangements, and thus waterproofed them for the days when Marshall Aid
would be repaid and the European Payments Union would be dissolved. German pre-1933
debt was to be repaid at much reduced interest rates, while settlement of post-1933 debts
was postponed to a reparations conference to be held after a future German unification. No
such conference has been held after the reunification of 1990. The German position is that
these debts have ceased to exist.Let’s recap. The Marshall Plan had an outer shell, the European Recovery Programme, and an inner core, the economic reconstruction of Europe on
the basis of debt forgiveness to and trade integration with Germany. The effects of its implementation were huge. While Western Europe in the 1950s struggled with debt/GDP ratios
close to 200%, the new West German state enjoyed debt/ GDP ratios of less than 20%. This
and its forced re-entry into Europe’s markets was Germany’s true benefit from the Marshall
Plan, not just the 2-4% pump priming effect of Marshall Aid. As a long term effect, Germany effortlessly embarked on a policy of macroeconomic orthodoxy that it has seen no reason to deviate from ever since.
200
roeconomics buried finance behind the LM curve; further, because the
ISLM analysis only concerned the unique point of equilibrium, it could
say nothing about the dynamics of a real world economy. For these reasons, Minsky was more interested in the multiplier-accelerator model
that allowed for the possibility of explosive growth. In some of his earliest work, he added institutional ceilings and floors to produce a variety
of possible outcomes, including steady growth, cycles, booms, and long
depressions. He ultimately came back to these models in some of his last
papers written at the Levy Institute. It is clear, however, that the results
of these analyses played a role in his argument that the New Deal and
Post War institutional arrangements constrained the inherent instability
of modern capitalism, producing the semblance of stability.
In the current post-crisis climate, some heterodox thinkers who were
long neglected are being looked at again to inform new economic thinking. One of these thinkers is Hyman Minsky, who even in past times of
relative stability thought that there were some fundamental problems with
contemporary economics.
Randall Wray, from Levy institute (US) who studied under Minsky,
suggest about how the latter’s thinking is prompting today’s re-examination of economics. Minsky predicted financial collapse due to what he
called “speculative euphoria,” where headstrong borrowers accumulate
debt at a rate that they can’t pay back. This leads to credit tightening and
an ultimate contraction of the economy.
Since this is essentially what has been happening in today’s post-crisis world, economists are looking back to Minsky for answers. Wray notes
that we absolutely do need a new paradigm of thought that includes some
of Minsky’s ideas, but also needs to incorporate Keynes’ insights into demand-side management.
Regarding new economic model, needed for these region countries,
the first is the Keynes-Minsky vision that puts effective demand front and
center of economic analysis, and the second is the Schumpeter-Minsky
vision that focuses on innovation and competition. I would bring the two
visions together to provide rigorous and critical analysis of competition
in the financial sphere and how it interacts with competition in the industrial sphere. This will enable them to make policy recommendations
to reform finance to promote the capital development of the economy.
Finance which helps to create value rather than just extract it: finance for
creative destruction, not destructive creation.
Because this region though SEE and Balkans countries need new
economic system as new paradigm, Tihomir Domazet, professor at ECPD
201
prepared consistency, comprehensive and new model (book) titled – Economic of growth and full employment112, fully based on Post-Keynesianism
and Modern monetary theory.
Without any delay, however, the countries have to follow own responsibility and with new economic paradigm- Economic of growth and
full employment – as well as fully supported by EU to establish new economic model.
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Paskal MILO
ACADEMICIAN, ALBANIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS
Perspectives of Cooperation
Among Western Balkan Countries
There are many people in the region, but probably even more outside it,
who doubt and are pessimistic about the future of the relations among the
Western Balkan countries. However, no surveys have been conducted to
establish their accurate number but, although numbers are important per
se, the spirit and the messages they convey are of paramount importance.
The pessimism underlining the opinion of such people regarding the
perspective of cooperation in the region is rooted in the negative historic
heritage. Nevertheless, heritage is not everything, since there are other
European peoples outside our region who have had great hostilities in
their past histories, but who have reconciled and shaken hands with one
another and today, they are a model of cooperation in Europe.
Certainly the Balkans of today is not the Balkans of yesterday; it is no
longer Europe’s powder keg. There are no longer bloody and extermination wars being waged; Balkan nationalism and chauvinism have shrunk.
The Great Powers have almost withdrawn from their clientelist competition. The region has made large strides in its integration into the European and world political, security, economic structures.
This change is tangible, the tendency of progress obvious. In this
situation, the question arises: what is the source fostering Balkan skepticism when the power of the forces of the past is declining? There may
be numerous economic, social, political, and cultural reasons, including
the situation of the human rights of the minorities, and others. However,
all these can be summed up in one major reason, which might be called
development, not in the sense of a routine and slow progress, but in the
sense of a qualitative and rapid progress. Only such a progress would
shorten the time and distance to help us approach the European level and
standards in all fields.
Unfortunately, such a pace of development and integration in the
Western Balkan countries is missing. Indeed, there are facts showing
that the development gap between the region and the European Union
204
member countries tends to become greater instead of narrower. This fact
explains better the discontent and skepticism regarding the capacity of
politics and governments to lead the path of development and implement
development programs.
Politics and governments reflect and represent societies in the Western Balkan countries. On behalf of these societies and in the context of
their foreign policies, they define also the course of relations with the
neighboring countries and with the other regional countries. The level
and scope of such relations are determined by several factors, among
which are: national interest, peace and security. These are basic principles for every state. In the Western Balkans today, there are also external
factors, like the international organizations and, primarily, the European
Union, which channel state relations towards closer cooperation among
the countries of this region.
Regional cooperation is one of the basic criteria to assess the fulfillment of the standards required for a country to become an EU member.
The agenda of relations among the countries of the Western Balkans is
followed very closely by Brussels. When addressing the integration challenges, the governments of the countries of the region try to adjust their
neighborly and regional relations to the parameters of European agenda.
Political cooperation comes first on the list of things to be done.
There is a lot that can be said about this topic, not so much regarding
what has been done until now, than about our future cooperation. So far
this cooperation has consisted more in empty declarations and few little
steps ahead in real terms, having been prompted more by the circumstances, or promoted from outside. The most typical example of this situation can be illustrated very well by one fact, namely, that it took 68 years
for an Albanian prime minister to make an official visit to Belgrade.
Political cooperation cannot be promising for the future for the countries of the Western Balkans without complete and sustainable reconciliation among the Balkan societies and in particular, without Serb-Albanian
reconciliation. The agreement reached between Serbia and Kosovo with
the mediation of Brussels in April 2013 and the seven other agreements
that followed are an encouraging step in this regard. Balkan politics is still
a long way from the European cooperation standards when it can lose its
patience and balance because of a football match, a drone, or a burnt and
torn flag. Skopje and Athens have almost a quarter of century fighting
over the issue of the name of the Slav Macedonian state, failing to find a
compromise. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the fragile ethnic and religions
205
relations have paralyzed for a long time the functioning of the main state
institutions.
Reconciliation of societies is not a slogan for conferences and for
newspaper use. It remains a long term action and strategy, well defined
and realistic, which needs to be led by visionary politicians whom the
ballot boxes of the next elections do not prevent from looking towards
the future.
Prospective effective political cooperation requires departure from
the old nationalistic philosophy and practice in reciprocal relations. Those
governments and political teams that are infected by nationalism cannot
heal a chronic disease that affects societies, at least in some of their extremist segments. The difficulty to define a clear path and a guaranteed
perspective for political cooperation lies in the fact that today nationalism in all the governments and state institutions of the countries of the
Western Balkans has struck roots and has a strong influence. The thesis
that the parties with nationalistic agendas have but only small, insignificant electoral support is not a rational thesis to use. Nationalism is not
manifested only in political or electoral programs. It is found also in the
mentality, culture, habits and formation of politicians, government officials, prime ministers and presidents.
Creation of a regional environment free from nationalism may be
achieved with the opening up of societies towards one another, the intensification of reciprocal exchanges at all levels of politics, among non
government organizations, businesses, in education, science, culture, art,
and in the media. A major investment in the prospective cooperation is
especially the rapprochement of younger generations, closer knowledge of
one another, development of joint activities, organization of mutual visits
and student exchanges. The youths should be offered programs of rapprochement and education with a spirit of tolerance, textbooks promoting
friendship, respect and cooperation. The underling idea of this strategy
should be the many future interests bringing us together and not the few
dividing us. The generation of the 21st century in the Western Balkans
should draw lessons from history in the service of the future and not have
the history repeated.
In the Western Balkans today there are a number of regional initiatives that promote cooperation in various fields, political, economic,
trade, security, and others. Some of them have been operating for almost 20 years and some others are new. We cannot rule out their positive
achievements in the field of cooperation. However, the traditional manner in which some of them operate has become outdated. They have to
206
be transformed into effective, concrete instruments of cooperation, based
on well studied and not on formal decisions, merely for the sake of doing
something; they should have more specialized agendas and not overlapping programs and projects.
The governments and the think tanks have in the last two to three
years promoted new ideas and initiatives of cooperation aiming at its
further institutionalization in forms and manners that may have been
tested out in other regions of Europe. Such initiatives are “Initiative 8+1”
launched in July 2013 by Croatia and Slovenia, the proposal of Montenegro for the establishment of the Western Balkans Union, and other ideas
to create a Balkan Confederation, a Balkan Benelux or a Balkan Council.
Such proposals and projects actually provoke debates and exchange
of opinions on how to find more profound forms and ways of cooperation in the Western Balkans in the future. However, they may be merely
copies of European experiences, which are created and developed in other
historical circumstances and in regions that have different political, economic, and cultural traditions from those of the Western Balkans. Their
spirit and the philosophy may be effective and beneficial, but in the still
problematic region of the Western Balkans, they cannot find adequate implementation in the form in which they are organized and implemented.
The countries of our region have already embarked on a process of
institutionalized and escalated integration in the European Union. Their
membership in the EU depends on a fundamental condition, namely regional cooperation, peace, stability, understanding, and on the solution
of disagreements with dialogue. Brussels has given us a clear “roadmap”
on how to build our future cooperation in Western Balkans; any other
project with the same objective would be overlapping the major European
integration project.
The future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union. Having been reiterated for years by Brussels, such a prospect does not seem
to have the erstwhile appeal for the peoples of the countries of the region.
For many people, this seems an unattainable dream. Brussels and some
individual EU member states continue to assure the nonintegrated Balkan
peoples that the temporary difficulties have not attenuated their willingness to welcome them in the great European family on the basis of merits
and fulfillment of standards. It is a fact that the Western Balkans is in
greater need of the EU, but Brussels too needs the countries of the Balkan
region in its midst.
The Berlin Conference of 28 August 2014, held at the initiative of
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, which brought together all the heads
207
of states and foreign and economy ministers of the countries of Western
Balkans and the representatives of Austria, France and the EU Commission, was a crucial message for all the parties. The aim of the Conference,
as was stressed also in the document adopted at its conclusion, was to
create a four-year framework during which all the countries of this region
would step up their efforts to make real progress in the process of reforms, solving the most important issues, both internal and bilateral, and
to achieve reconciliation within and among their societies. It was decided
that in order to continue working over issues of key importance for the
future of the Western Balkans, such conferences would be held every year
until 2018. The next conference will be held in Austria.
European Union is not the only external player in the Western Balkans. There are other major international players like the USA, Russia and
China, which operate there for their own strategic or economic ends, or
for both. Each and every one of them has its influence in certain areas,
which has an impact on the developments in the region and on its future.
It is important that the presence of the great powers in the Western
Balkans produces greater cooperation, peace, stability, security and development. It is however equally important for the future of this region that
its governments and peoples make the right choices. The key element in
this regard is also cooperation in the field of security among the countries
of the region, but also with all international structures of security and
defense.
Two of the countries of the Western Balkans, Albania and Croatia,
are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since
2008. Macedonia, because of its name issue with Greece remains outside
NATO, although it has met its conditions. These three countries signed
in May 2003 in Tirana, together with the Department of State Secretary
Colin Powell, the Adriatic Charter (A-3), which would serve as a roadmap
to them on their path to membership in this international security organization. In December 2008, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina too
joined this Charter, transforming it into A-5.
The cooperation of the Adriatic Charter member states has brought
greater security to the region. It has been realized on the basis of the annual programs in the field of defense. A-5 has contributed to greater interaction and the adoption of standards through joint exercises organized
in Croatia, Macedonia and Albania.
Serbia is of its own accord at a lower level of cooperation with NATO.
This is due to two reasons: First, there is a considerable part of its population that nurtures anti-NATO sentiments, because of the actions of its
208
forces in 1999 against the Serb military and strategic infrastructure. Second, it is due to the special political, economic and military relationship
Serbia has with Russia. Nevertheless, as of December 2006, Serbia has
joined the NATO Partnership for Peace Program (PFP). Belgrade in April
2011 began the implementation of an Action Plan of Individual Partnership with NATO, which serves as a cooperation framework between them
for the implementation of reforms in the sector of defense for Serbia.
NATO has a military liaison office in Belgrade.
Kosovo has a specific form of cooperation with NATO. This is so also
because of the presence of NATO forces in its territory, serving as a security guarantee not only for Kosovo but also for the entire Western Balkans. The Kosovo Government has clearly voiced its will to be integrated
in the Euro-Atlantic structures and is in its first steps of this process.
The time has gone when the Western Balkans was a consumer of security. Now the countries of the region are at a phase of development that
produces security. Furthermore, in the context of the Adriatic Charter,
these countries have contributed to restoration of security in such hotbeds
of conflicts like Iraq, Afghanistan, and finally, also in Syria.
Regional security is closly linked with international security. The serious threats to security from the events in Ukraine and the Middle East
make regional cooperation of all the countries of the Balkans even more
indispensable. It has been quite rightly pointed out that it is urgent to
build counterterrorist regional forums, to establish practical cooperation
on a technical level, and to train and build capacities with the necessary
expertise in order to fight terrorism.
The activity of the Islamic State (ISIL), the spread of radicalism and
Islamic terrorism, the recent bloodshed in the center of Paris go to prove
the threatening spread of international terrorism. This is a major challenge for the entire democratic world. The countries of the Western Balkans have strong reasons to worry about the security of their citizens. The
Islamic State has recruited many persons from the region who have joined
its terrorist cause, along with many others from Europe, Turkey, the United States, and other countries of the world. The phenomenon of foreign
fighters has become a major concern, representing a potential threat not
only to peace and stability in the Middle East, but also to European security (for example, the terrorist acts in Paris) and to international security.
Their return to the countries of origin, hence, to the Western Balkans,
too, is fraught with consequences for the security of the citizens and of the
region, in general. Hence the cooperation of the governments and state
structures of the countries of the Western Balkans in this regard needs to
209
be intensified, strengthened and expanded to eliminate any possibility for
such terrorist “fighters” finding proper ground and support, particularly
among the social strata with various ethnic and religious compositions.
The governments of the region need to take extraordinary administrative,
legislative and security measures to prevent the incitement of their citizens to participate in conflicts and wars in other countries, and to organize and fund foreign mercenaries.
Security is linked not only with the fight on terror, but also with the
fight on organized crime and illegal regional and international trafficking.
Western Balkans is a bridge between East and West. The countries of the
region and the specialized institutions in the fight on crime and trafficking have increased their cooperation, but it is still insufficient. The criminal networks and narcotic trafficking are in many instances more organized than regional cross country cooperation fighting them. The challenge
is open. Only an elaborated strategy that is the governments’ priority may
reduce the threats of trafficking in the region and may create a safe environment for economic development and wellbeing of the citizens of the
region.
Peace and stability in the Western Balkans cannot be guaranteed over
a longer period without a sustainable economic growth. The main reforms
needed in the Western Balkans to attain such an objective should focus
on regional cooperation with the view to expand economic markets and
to absorb as many foreign investments as possible. The Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the countries of Western Balkans is approximately one
third of the European Union average or that of Portugal.
Implementation of national integration agendas, but also of regional
agenda to join the EU requires an operational economic market in the
Western Balkans. The countries of the region need to fight all the obstacles on their path towards economic recovery, such as the weaknesses in
the functioning of the rule of law, the need to reform the judiciary, to
maintain an uncompromising stand against corruption, and to improve
economic governance.
The governments of the Western Balkans countries are committed
to the creation of a new model of regional cooperation to stimulate economic growth, to fight unemployment, to promote cross border trade and
to develop infrastructure. To attain such objectives, in cooperation with
RCC, these countries have adopted the South East Europe 2020 Regional
Growth and Development Strategy. This regional goal goes parallel with
the EU 2020 Development Strategy. The regional infrastructure develop210
ment projects such as highway and railway, energy and port networks are
well known by now, along with tourism projects, etc.
Foreign investments are of major importance for the future of the
Western Balkans. The major infrastructure projects have drawn the attention of economic powers and powerful international companies from the
US, Europe, Russia, and China. The recent meeting that the Chinese prime
minister held in the middle of December 2014 with his counterparts from
the Western Balkans testifies to the growing attraction that the region has
for foreign investments. However, the further amelioration of the regional
climate and environment for international business activity remains vital.
It is linked with the consolidation of the rule of law, security, the fight on
corruption and the establishment of a functional regional market. These
are requirements well known to all governments of the Western Balkan
countries. Their ability and willingness to cooperate are the conditions to
make them possible.
211
Dimitar MIRČEV
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF MACEDONIA,
PROFESSOR FON UNIVERSITY, SKOPJE, FYR MACEDONIA
The Balanced and even Development
of the Balkans as a Peace Project
Abstract: Over the last quarter of century, the countries of the Balkan region have
experienced numerous mutual disputes, disagreements, conflicts, even violent and
extremely forceful. There have been many explanations, studies and research evidence of the ground for these disputes and conflicts: historical legacy of inter-ethnic
relations, religious and cultural differences, even the variety of mental and sociopsychological value systems. There is much truth in many of these theses. Our own
hypothesis, not contrasting the earlier, is that there have been and still exist immense
differences in rates of socio-economic development of Balkan countries and that they
represent an objective basis for disputes and differences. Even for full pacification
and reconciliation among the countries.
The policies of enlargement of EU even the policies of accelerated and more balanced
development of the regions and EU-area, have not been quite sensitive or efficient in
this sense. This contribution is supposed to give some evidence in that direction. At
least on differences in the rates of development and socio-economic advancement of
Balkan countries. Our hypothesis is that there would be no lasting peace, reconciliation and intra-Balkan cooperation without balanced and even development.
1. The region of the Balkans is today, compared with the position
and events some twenty and more years ago- pacified, peaceful,
without open disputes, conflicts, not to speak of violence and visible inter-ethnic tensions. Most of the countries have regulated
their mutual relations by inter-state agreements, their economic,
political, cultural exchange is advancing, many of them advocate
even free and single market within the EU market. This is not
only the case of the former republics and provinces on the soil of
earlier Yugoslavia but applies as well as to the rest of surrounding
countries, which have over the last years experienced also many
social, economic or political turbulences, caused by the difficult
transitional processes.
Certainly, the region is currently not avoiding some disputes or
unresolved and open questions: the internal position and relations
among cantons and federal units in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the
212
long lasting and difficult dispute between Greece and Macedonia
over the name of the state; the essential dispute over the status of
Kosovo, and perhaps some other questions. But, talks and dialogues on such questions and disputes are ongoing, with chances
to be positively resolved. The favourable factor in this respect is
that most countries in the region are either full members of the
EU and NATO, candidates for that status or associated members.
Even those that are not, due to different reasons (BiH, Kosovo),
have a clear Euro-Atlantic orientation and policies. Their common
or mutual relations could be much easier conducted or regulated
on the basis of that orientation and synchronized support of the
international community.
No doubt, there is no guarantee that conflicts and disputes in the
region, even within individual countries will not appear again in
the future period. Many studies have illustrated its extraordinarily
immense diversity of religious, ethnic and national character, of
historical past, styles of life and customs.
TABLE 1
Country
Albania
BiH
Bulgaria
Croatia
Greece
Macedonia
Montenegro
Population, religion and ethnicity in the Balkans
Population
Religion (%)
Ethnicities (%)
2.7 millions
56% Muslim;
95% Albanian;
10% Catholic;
3% Greeks;
6,7% Orthodox
2% Others
3.8 millions
40% Muslum;
48% Bosniaks;
31% Orthodox;
37% Serbs
15% Catholic
14% Croats
83.9% Bulgarians
7,3 millions
60% Orthodox;
7,8% Muslim;
9.4% Turks
21% Unknown
4.7% Roma
4.3 millions
87% Catholic;
89.6% Croats
4,4% Orthodox;
4,5% Serbs,
2,9% Agnostic
0.5% Bosniaks
11 millions
98% Orthodox;
98% Greeks,
1% Muslim;
2% Other
1% Other
2 millions
70% Orthodox;
64.2% Macedonians;
25% Muslim;
25.2% Albanians
5% Other
622.000
72% Orthodox;
43% Montenegrins
19% Muslim;
32% Serbs
3,4% Catholic
8% Bosniaks
213
Population, religion and ethnicity in the Balkans
Population
Religion (%)
Ethnicities (%)
7.2 million
84% Orthodox;
66% Serbs
4,9% Catholic;
17% Albanians
3,1% Muslim
3.5% Hungarians
Slovenia
2 millions
57,8% Catholic;
93.1% Slovenians
15,6% Didn’t answer;
1.8% Croats
10% Atheist
2% Serbs
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu and World Bank
Religion source: http://data.un.org/
Country
Serbia
In some of them, authors deeply root an unpleasant portrayal of Balkan nations, particularly in connection with the crisis
in the past quarter of century on the soil of former Yugoslavia
and broader. Painting all the developments in dark colors, these
sources strengthen the image of the Balkans as a most trembling
area and a powder keg of Europe. A body of literature had been
produced, creating an image of the Balkans as a handful of nations and ethnicities that mentally and historically incline to mutual hatred, rivalries, ethno-centrism, violence and even genocide.
Encyclopaedic definitions often explain the term balkanism or
“balkanization” in a sense of fragmentation, separate on, conflictualization, division of countries or territories onto small, quarrelsome and ineffective units.
We have analyzed a part of this body, including its conclusive arguments (Mircev, 2006). But, the British sociologist J. Allcock after quoting many sources and statements on the significance of the
violent history of the region that allegedly had recently led to the
emergence of a fanatic nationalism and hatred of “others”, quite
righteously asked: What else could one expect from an area whose
name has come to be synonym with violence, fragmentation and
disorder? (Allcock, 2000, pp. 2–5). Nevertheless, that “image” of
the Balkans still prevails in many literary, academic, media, public
and political circles in Europe and wider. It still has a considerable
impact on the policies towards the region or to individual parts
of the region. Of course, there are opposite notions to these imagined features of the communities in the Balkans. For instance,
Chomsky pointed out several times, that Western Europe, having
had such a rich history of conflicts and violence does not have any
right to object or blame the rest of Europe for conflicts. Other authors emphasize the factography that the Balkans really is located
214
in the middle of Europe, but always on the periphery of great imperia and states, remaining so backward region, a region which
was historically an object of interest of great European powers of
their own wars and influence.
The well known linguist and cultural sociologist, V. Friedman
(2001/2) defines Balknism and balkanization, not as fragmentation and conflictualization of different languages and cultures
but as their association and coegsistence, which is true if one
looks at the longest periods of the medieval and modern history.
Two prominent authors, M. Todorova and R. Guerina, in their
renowned studies “Imagining the Balkans” (1997) and “Europe.
History. Ideas. Ideologies” (2002), give strong arguments that
such a perception of the Balkans is rather distorted portray of the
reality: that western and European thinking and policies simply
needed such an image in order to prove their own superiority and
justify their intervention, or imposing sanctions or standards to
the Eastern part of Europe.
2. Regarding the past round of conflicts in the Balkans or within
former Yugoslavia a large variety of reasons and grounds could be
taken into account to explain them. Not only the historical past
of various communities or ethnic and religious divisions and disputes by themselves. Neither relations among larger and smaller
republics nor relations between majorities and minorities in the
Federation had been the main reason. The system was for a longer
time in crisis and had not produced any instruments to overcome
that crisis. On the contrary, it was giving fertilizers to the crisis
which gradually got dimensions of overall and deep disharmony
and ineffectiveness: economic, political, social, cultural, inter-ethnic.
Yugoslav political system, especially after Tito’s death was featured,
no matter of nice rhetoric and institutions of self-management
and liberal socialism, by rigid mono-party and ideological monopoly. Besides, the system, after 1974 was to a great measure decentralized while the real power being concentrated at the level of
republics. Party and Federal presidencies have been composed by
one representative of each republic, rotating the chairmanship on
annual basis and having a right to veto decisions. Quite impractical and slow decision-making bodies. But they were the skeleton
maintaining the unity of the Federation. The legitimacy of party
elites derived from the power at republican level, as the elites repNew Balkans on the way to Stable Peace and Sustainable Divelopment
215
resented the interests of “nations, ethnicities and states”. The strife
among these elites to acquire more power and to remain “in the
saddle” led necessary to the destruction of the federal bodies and
that marked the end of Yugoslavia. Hundreds of sources, foreign
and local, reports, research projects etc. were examining the death
or dispersion of the Federation, giving much evidence on causes
of the dispersion. Our own hypothesis is that the strife among political elites as a superstructure of socio economic inequalities was
the decisive factor in the dispersion (Mircev, 1993). The fabrics of
that process was visible in 1990 and the spring 1991.
Another important agent was the fall of the Berlin wall and
the great changes in Eastern Europe taking place since autumn
1989. Pluralization and privatization everywhere were on the
threshold causing an impetus on Yugoslavia as well. One can
speak on the domino effect and the wave of transformation of
old regimes on a large basis and the Balkans were not an exception. First free elections replaced the old elites by emerging new elites, by the first freely elected parliaments, governments. Somewhere manifesting disorder and violence, somewhere peacefully. Turbulences and dissatisfaction covered the
region, but gave rise also to emancipatory and creative political
energy. Directions of transformation and transition appeared
to considerably differ from country to country, but the popular
claims and expectations where the same: better life and standard,
more freedom and human rights.
The central Balkan state, the Yugoslav federation has had a rather
specific way of transformation. Republican communist elites have
been substituted by mainly nationalistic elites, joined often by
factions of converted communists (Goati, 1993; Antonic, 2002).
This caused a clear turn to nationalism and direct conflicts which
drove four republics out of the Federation, declaring their independence. Nevertheless, the real basis of all these political events
was the reality of large discrepancies in the socio-economic development of that country as well as the immense differences in the
basic economic indicator of individual republics and provinces.
Statistical evidence of the year 1989/90 clearly showed that ratios
and rates of the main economic aggregates between the most and
least developed republics and provinces (for instance- GDP, unemployment, production and productivity, exports, living standard etc.) accounted from 8:1 to 4:1. The unbalanced and uneven
216
development was crucial for the disintegration of the country.
Particularly because the underdeveloped republics and provinces
or their regions were mainly populated by ethnic, religious and
other minorities and communities. However, such discrepancies
and contrasts could have been found even among the regions of
other individual countries in the Balkans.
3. The uneven and unbalanced development or discrepancies of Balkan countries is not a phenomenon of modernity. Many authors
had observed these differences through history giving also assumptions on the reasons, M. Palairet has profoundly studied the
issue of Balkan economies 1800–1914, writing that they had experienced evolution without development (1997). Between the two
world wars some trends of industrialism, modern crafts, communications modestly appeared, particularly relying on foreign capital invested in northern parts of the region. Nevertheless, most
countries remained backward, poor and agrarian in structure. Socialist policies later, have not brought much changes, despite their
emphasizes on centrally planned economies, on more investments
in backward regions, on larger funds for education, public health
and cultural institutions. Development differences and rates, as
it is above mentioned, have not been overcome until the end of
the 80-s or till the end of the regimes. This grew stronger the demands for the regime transition but also the centrifugal tendencies in federal states. The general slogan in that was- We can do
better relying on our own resource and forces!
Twenty years later, when economists have summarized performances of the economies in the Balkans, their growth or stagnation, they found minor advancements in most, now independent
Balkan countries, but not real changes in relative rates of development or ratios of their mutual relations in growth. On the contrary, more developed countries remained more developed, underdeveloped remaind as such or in stagnation. In the year 2011,
on the 20-th anniversary of the dispersion of Yugoslavia, several
academic gatherings have been held debating the effects of the
independence. Not much progress in most of them, even in those
that became full members of EU and NATO. Secondly, altogether, regardless of the political status (EU or not), former Yugoslav
countries, Balkan and EE countries as a whole, have not overcome
or decrease the development gap among themselves and with
Western Europe or EU average.
217
This was confirmed by several reports or studies. In the year 2011,
a conference on the problems and prospects of the countries of
former Yugoslavia after 20 years, was held in Maribor in organization of the network CEPYUS and German FES. Most reports dealt
with these contrasts (particularly Klanjsek, 2011). Whether the
World and European economic and financial crisis since 2008 has
alleviated these discrepancies as countries not so much involved
in the European market have not been so hurt? In an illustrative
summary, T. Nenovski indicates that the crisis has not had a great
impact on the positive developments in the Balkans (2011). Correlations remained the same as before 10–12 years ago. Ratios of
rates of GDP growth among various countries, remain almost
the same and the same is true of the rates of general government
gross debt or net lending and current account balance. Nevertheless, countries which development was largely relied on foreign
credits are now in a much worse position.
Restructuring and development in Southeastern Europe was a
topic of a prominent conference of research-economists of the
Balkans and an edition of studies that followed. The editors, A.
Kotios and G. Petrakos (2002), in their preface emphasize that
the transformation process of the SEE countries during the first
decade was characterized by a continuous divergence. An increasing development gap can now be observed not only between EU
and the countries of SEE but also between Central Europe and
the Balkans: On the basis of one recent estimate by Petracos, the
Balkan countries will take twice as long as the countries of Central Europe to approach the level of the per capita GNP of the EU
(2002, p. 2). In the same edition, M. Filipovic argues that the basic
reason for the delays and stagnation are to be found not in economic factors but mainly in non-economic and political factors
preventing normal restructuring of economies (pp. 229–247). A
year later, Petracos, Kotios and Chionis published another similar edition of case-studies on the international and monetary aspects of transition in Southeastern Europe pointing out the same
problems preventing the faster and more equal development of
the region.
Many statistical sources (Eurostat, UNDP, IMF and WB, CIA
World Factbook) point out these facts perhaps with minor methodological variations. The following table gives an example of that
recent statistics for the Balkans.
218
TABLE 2
Socio-Economic Development in the Balkan countries
Mace- MonteAlbania
BiH Bulgaria Croatia Greece
Serbia Slovenia
donia
negro
14.3
39.7
44.1
182
7.9
3.3
32.5
35
9.5
GDP
b euros b euros b euros b euros b euros b euros b euros b euros b euros
6.649
11.537 14.260 18.907 8.654
9.535
8.895
21.954
GDP per 8.569
capita
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
Growth + 0.7
+ 0.8
+ 0.9
- 0.9
-3.9
+ 2.9
+ 1.5
+ 2.0
-1.1
Unem
15.6%
44.3%
13.0%
0,171
27.3%
29.9%
19.5%
22.1%
10.1%
loyment
64.6%
45.9%
18.9%
67.1%
175.1% 35.9%
54.5%
63.8%
71.7%
Public
debt
of GDP of GDP of GDP of GDP of GDP of GDP of GDP of GDP of GDP
434
431
722
1.650
345
727
521
1.544
Average 375
salary
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
euros
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu & National Statistical Offices of the countries
Year
2013
There are several very indicative data. GDP per capita varies
from 6.649E to 21.950E, the growth in the last year- from -1.1 to
2.9, the unemployment rate – from 10.1% to 44.3%., average net
salaries from 345E to 1544E. In addition, just to mention that
vulnerability to poverty affects 0.1% of the population in Croatia, whereas 7.4% of the population of Albania is vulnerable, 7%
that of BIH, 6.7% of Macedonia, 3.6% that of Serbia and 1.9% in
Montenegro.
4. There is no any doubt that such development discrepancies in
the Balkans and larger region cause many other unfavourable
social consequences: in size of employment and unemployment,
in considerable differences in the living standard and quality of
life, in education, health protection, cultural life and particularly
in migrations of population, especially younger. They have also a
considerable impact on inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations,
on democratic processes in individual countries and not less on
phenomena of corruption, organized crime, social deviations,
freedom of media and expression. Human development index of
Balkan countries, measured by UNDP and WB immensely differ,
ranking them on great distances.
219
TABLE 3
Human Development Index of the Balkan Countries 2014
Country
Life
expectancy
Adult
literacy
rate
GDP
(billions $)
GDP
per capita
(PPP$)
HDI
Value
Rank
Albania
77.39
96.8
29.23
9,243
0.716
95
BiH
76.37
98
35.21
9,183
0.731
86
Bulgaria
73.55
98.4
114.98
15,783
0.777
58
Croatia
77.05
98.9
85.12
19,946
0.812
47
Greece
80.77
97.3
281.66
25,319
0.853
29
Macedonia
75.2
97.4
24.65
11,707
0.732
84
Montenegro
74.82
98.5
8.72
14,039
0.789
51
Serbia
74.06
98
83.7
11,586
0.745
77
Slovenia
79.59
99.7
56.35
27,394
0.874
25
Source: www.hdr.undp.org
Nevertheless, the political factor is of utmost influence in these
processes. Both internal or domestic political ambience and the
external or outside, international ambience are not quite favourable, regardless of the Euro-Atlantic integrative dynamics. The instability, inconsistence in practices and disrespect for the constitutionality, legislation and institutions have often been observed in
Balkan countries; they are continuously being an object of monitoring and criticism of EU bodies. The same is true of the functioning of parliamentarism and electoral practices. Shortcomings are not less noticed regarding to effective operation of other
democratic institutions, regarding the full effectiveness of the rule
of law and autonomy of judiciary, eradication of corruption etc.
Apart from official reports of UN bodies, EC, CE, OSCE and others, many authors have given a fair account of the distortion of
political democracy in some of the countries, not so rarely reflected in social dissatisfaction, protests and serious demonstrations.
See more in Rupnik and Zielonka (2013), Inglehart and Welzel
(2005) or Juberias (2012).
Even in perceptions of this deficit of political democracy and freedoms, citizens and research fellows see dissimilarities among individual Balkan countries: their rank on the lists of perceptions
varies, sometimes not slightly. Freedom House reports are typical
in this sense.
220
TABLE 4
The Balkan Countries in the Freedom House Index 2013
Countries
Rank
Status
Albania
49
partly free
BiH
49
partly free
Bulgaria
37
partly free
Croatia
40
partly free
Greece
41
partly free
Macedonia
56
partly free
Montenegro
36
partly free
Serbia
36
partly free
Slovenia
24
free
Source: https://freedomhouse.org
The real question that arises at this point is whether such perceptions are only stereotypes or do have connection with traditions,
difficulties of transition or perhaps with isolation, slow dynamics
of Europeanization and ineffective accession process led by the
EU. This turns the attention to the external political status of individual countries and the region as a whole. The EU and NATO,
since long ago, since the early 90-s, have had two separate and not
always synchronized policies towards the Balkans: integration of
the region and integration of individual countries. Due to many
reasons, first policy was not fully shaped, operative or effective.
It mainly consisted of rather general appeals and declarations for
reconciliation, multilateral cooperation and regulation of mutual
relations. Several funds have been offered to the region for joint
consumption- humanitarian, education, cooperation assisting etc.
but only small part of the means had been utilized. Then, the EU
offered the Pact of Stability and Association to the countries in
the region and many of them joint and signed the Pact which was
again- specified for individual countries.
The pact was followed by the PCP in SEE, a process supposed
to be implemented on collective level, guided by the Union. The
Process, gathering the chiefs of states of SEE has some positive
implications, at least it is a forum for exchange, contacts and communications. It is focused on various topics of regional character
– culture, environmental protection, transportation, cross-border
cooperation etc. It issues declarations, but again of non-obligatory
221
nature. Besides that, bilateral relations of countries are reflected in
the documents. Often, countries in bilateral dispute do not take
part.
Meanwhile, the process of accession and integration of individual
countries into EU had advanced. Now we have a position that
some countries are full EU members (GR, SLO, CR, RO, BG), and
this is a result of the second policy of EU- that of assessing and
accessing individual countries. So, it comes out that some countries are candidates, negotiating or not for the entry (MK, MNG,
Al) while Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina do not have any status.
The same is true of the membership in NATO: the different political status of countries (out or in NATO) makes the collective
regional system of security non-existing or inoperative. The “status” places the countries in different position, complicates their
bilateral and multilateral position, exchange, flow of goods, capital
and people, not to speak of their trade, transports, technical systems etc. The Balkan region is very far from the cooperation of
the Scandinavian or Vishegrad region or even the Mediteranian
region.
A large body of research evidence had been produced on these
issues, over the recent past period. In an excellent edition of the
University of Nish on the “Balkans in Transition”, editors N.S.
Arrachige Don and L. Mitrovic have introduced and gathered a
set of studies examining the regionalization of the Balkans and
its internal social, political and cultural dynamics, arguing exactly
in this direction (2007). A year later, a very similar research edition appeared in Tirana edited by O. Eroglu on “Integration of
Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic Structures”, with the same evidence and arguments (2008). In both editions it comes out that
centrifugal forces, particularly foreign, are still stronger than integrative, centripetal forces in the region.
The role of other than EU integrative regional associations in the
Balkans, like CEI, Adriatic-Ionian initiative, the Ohrid group of
four countries etc. really contributes to the relaxation of the regional relations but does not create practical results. The states in
the region are simply in unequal position in establishing mutual
and common cooperation. An illustrative example for this is the
Greek-Macedonian dispute over the name of the latter state. They
have 20-years long talks on this issue and under the sponsorship
of UN. Unsuccessful. Why? Macedonia is not member of NATO
222
and EU and EU fully supports Greece within her Common Foreign and Security policy, while Macedonia is not member of EU
and NATО and is much smaller, landlocked country. Etc. We turn
to the point that the even and balanced socio-economic development of the region and the accelerated course of that development is a precondition for a lasting stability and peace in the
region. Such a course will certainly be dependent on the regional
strategy of relying on common forces and potentials, material,
human, geo-strategic. And secondly- integration as soon as possible of all countries in EU and NATO, equalizing so their political
status.
5. In his epilogue of De Rougemont’s book “20 Centuries of Europe”,
Jacque Delors emphasizes that the integration and unity of Europe
is an absolute prerequisite to protect and advance the basic values
of European citizens: peace, freedom and democracy. De Rougemont, writes Delors, reminds us that the European consciousness
is a synonym for peace: it advances parallel with the will to find a
salvation from the mill of conflicts and violence that from time to
time covers the continent in blood. The Congress of Europe, held
in the Hague in May 1948, without any unambiguousness adopted
that attitude. The European communities and later the Union had
begun as a peace project, indeed.
Today, the Balkans and particularly Western Balkans should be
considered as an indivisible part of that great peace project.
What strategies for change and advancement in the Balkan region
are needed? The most adequate strategies, in our analysis, could
very well be:
• To unify and harmonize the international community (EU, NATO,
USA, UN, CE, OSCE) approach towards the region, avoiding double standards, precedents, unfair compromises etc., particularly in
the field of integrity and sovereignty, of human rights civil liberties
and multiculturalism.
• To avoid unfavourable effects deriving from the different political
status and expectations of individual countries in the Balkans- for
integration. The official stance of the Union is now- no more enlargement till the year 2020. For some candidates even- no negotiations. Could at this point, the Union and why not NATO, declare,
no Balkan country out of them till the year 2022?
• To adopt policies of promotion and acceleration of uniform, balanced and faster economic development of all Balkan countries,
223
including such a development of regions and municipalities in
each individual country.
• To favor and stimulate a single, free, open, competitive market and
privatized economies in the area of the Balkans as a whole.
• To fully pacify the region and standardize the European and international values and contents of human rights and civil liberties,
including ethnic, religious, gender, cultural and other rights, multiculturalism etc. applying a consensual and authoritative mechanism of implementation and protection.
Among the priorities of this conception are certainly the resolution,
as soon as possible, in a justifiable, righteous and compromised way, remaining neuralgic issues; those, for instance concerning the status of Kosovo, the constitutional status of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Macedonian-Greek dispute.
Next is the full regulation of intra-Balkan relations and coordination
of all existing pacts, initiatives and processes. It would be a good idea to
establish a standing green table of Balkan heads of states or prime ministers.
Not less is important to work out and adopt a regional policy of collective reliance upon Balkan’s own regional resources and potentials. In
addition, EU and NATO should operatively utilize all Balkan countries
determination to join the Euro-Atlantic structures. Finally, it is equally
necessary to intensify unification and introduction of European standards
in “technical” systems-ecological, energy, communication, transportation,
monetary as well as free flow of capital, goods and people, regardless of
the political status of individual countries.
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Arrachige Don, N.S. and Mitrovic, L. (eds). 2007. The Balkans in Transition. Cambridge-IRFD, Nish: Center for Balkan Studies
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Todorova, M. 1997. Imaginig the Balkans. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press
225
Nobuhiro SHIBA
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO, JAPAN
Writing Regional History for
Reconciliation in the Balkans
and East Asia
Introduction
We have only published a Japanese version113 of Teaching the History of
Southeastern Europe: Alternative Educational Materials, Workbook I–IV
(Thessaloniki, 2005) edited by Christina Koulouri from Athen last year.
This book made by the several years’ joint works between historians and
history teachers is the common history materials shared among eleven
Southeast European countries from Slovenia to Cyprus.
After finishing of the Kosovo conflicts from 1998 to 1999, the International community again became concerned about the history education
and history textbooks in the Balkans. Because the ethno-centric history
textbooks or history education in the Balkan countries was considered to
be one of main reason why they caused a chain of Yugoslav conflicts. So
some attempts of historians to rethink the history textbooks and school
curriculum of history in the Balkans for bringing the reconciliation began
with the financial support from the International institutions like Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe and OSCE. One of such attempts resulted
in the publication of Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe on the
initiative of NGO group, CDRSEE in Thessaloniki.
But about ten years passed since then, and International community
seems to be less interested in the issue of history textbooks in the Balkans
in spite of their unfinished situation for bringing reconciliation. Now I
would like to show you the importance of these common history materials in the Balkans when we consider the difficult situation for the historical reconciliation among East Asian countries.
113
226
Christina Koulouru (ed.), Nobuhiro Shiba (supervisor of translation), History of the Balkans: Common Educational Materials on the Modern and Contemporary History of the Balkans, Tokyo, 2013.
i. Why are the common history materials important?
As I gave my presentation about CDRSEE and these common history
materials at the Sixth International Conference in 2011, I don’t dare to
mention them in detail. Although the common history textbooks for the
gymnasium pupils have been published between Germany and French up
to now, why were the common history materials published in the Balkans.
Professor Koulouri pointed out the following four points: each different
curriculum and its own nation-centered tendency in history education in
the Balkan countries, each educational ministry which has broad powers
to control, each history teacher who wants to use the alternative history
materials and change his educational method to teach, common understanding that a common history textbook about the history of the Balkans
was impossible to be made under the existing circumstances.
In case of the common history textbooks between Germany and
France, the historians between two countries made steady efforts of dialogues for making common European history for an extended period
from 1950. Moreover, two countries’ top leaders who are also now leaders
of EU backed up such attempts to publish the common history textbooks
in a European context. In comparison with this case, there was not even
basic agreement of each government to make a common regional history
textbook in the Balkans. So it was not politicians but one of NGO groups,
CDRSEE and History Education Committee consisting of historians and
history teachers who took the initiative in the attempt for reconciliation
through history education. This was an epoch-making attempt in the Balkan countries because the first voluntary attempt at a citizen’s initiative
began.
I think there are two kinds of approach for reconciliation through
the history education. One is to make a common history textbook like the
case of Germany and France. The other is to make a common alternative
history material like the case of the Balkan countries. But it may be said
that the common history textbook is not necessarily the best form for the
reconciliation through history education. We, historians maybe have to
make some compromise when we try to write a common regional history
among several countries with each national history. So the form of the
common alternative material will be very useful for East Asian countries,
that means Japan , China and Korea, where we have a sensitive issue about
the recognition of history and there is lack of concerted action between
three countries.
227
ii. Attempts to write a common regional
history in East Asia
It is clear to compile East Asian history as regional history with many difficulties. But such attempts have already started. For example, a supplementary teaching material for the general readers entitled History that Opens
the Future: Modern and Contemporary History of Three East Asian Countries was published in three languages, Japanese, Chinese and Korean, in
the three countries simultaneously in 2005114 after historians’ and history
teachers’ discussion among three countries. History that Opens the Future
is a common modern and contemporary history of East Asia. This book
was sold over 70,000 copies in Japan, 120,000 in China and 30,000 in Korea
against the backdrop of the history textbook issues among three countries.
The publication of this book is an epoch-making event, but there
have been some comments and criticism. The most fundamental criticism
on the book was about the parallel style of descriptions of the history of
three countries lacking the viewpoint of East Asia. So the editors of this
book, the committee for common history materials among Japan, China
and Korea has just published new two-volume books115 titled by Modern
and Contemporary New History of East Asia in September in 2012 after
five years’ preparing. One book is from the viewpoint of the change of
international relations and the other is from the thematic viewpoint of
some historical topics for example, constitution, urbanization, railroad,
migration, family and gender, media, war and people etc. They stop the
previous parallel description of history by three countries and one author among three countries writes each chapter. I think the publishing of
these two volumes by such an innovative way of description is a landmark
event. But there is still hardly common understanding about the colonial
rule over China and Korea by the Japanese Empire.
In Japan, the discussions about the following question continue even
now: from which framework should we consider the regional history of
East Asia and how do we reflect it in the class room?
228
114
The committee for common history materials among Japan, China and Korea (ed.), History
that Opens the Future: Modern and Contemporary History of Three East Asian Countries, Tokyo, 2005 (the second edition, 2006).
115
The Committee for Common History Materials among Japan, China and Korea (ed.), Modern and Contemporary New History of East Asia, two vols, Tokyo, 2012
While in Korea116, the their government proclaimed before Japan
and China to teach East Asian history as a required subject in their high
schools in 2006 because of the government policy about reinforcement
of history teaching. So their high school students would have to select
World history or East Asian history as a required subject in addition to
Korean history from the 2012 school years. Two kinds of the textbooks of
East Asian history were published. It seemed that in Korea they concretely
discussed about the connection between East Asian history and Korean
history or World history, and the definition of the regional framework of
East Asia. But Lee Myung-bak, the former president was negative with
teaching East Asian history and it has been changed into an optional subject from a required subject. So East Asian history seems to be less interested in Korea. Such a tendency continues even now against the backdrop
of the territorial issue between Korea and Japan.
In China, their society generally lacks a consciousness for East Asia.
Because it is difficult that China, as a country bordering on East Asia,
South Asia and Western Asia, is situated completely within the framework
of East Asia. So the concept of East Asia, which was originally so closely
fixed to Japanese modern history, cannot find its place in China, making
it difficult to obtain the goal of genuine reconciliation among the nation
states through common history education.
In conclusion, it is now almost impossible to make a common history textbook under such situation in East Asia. When we consider the
reconciliation through history education in East Asia, it is very useful to
make a common alternative history material like the case of the Balkan
countries. Politics plays a major part in the reconciliation through history
education. But I think we have to continue the dialogues among historians and history teachers without being influenced by the political situation and attempt to write various kinds of regional history based on common alternative history materials.
116
f.: Nobuhiro Shiba, “Attempts to Write Regional History: In Search of Reconciliation
C
in East Asia and the Balkans”, Nobuhiro Shiba et al (eds.), School History and Textbooks:
A Comparative Analysis of History Textbooks in Japan and Slovenia, Ljubljana, 2013, pp.
119–138.
229
Nikola POPOVSKI
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION
OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INTERNATIONAL SLAVIC UNIVERSITY, MACEDONIA
Balkans Countries on the Transition
Toward the Knowledge-Based Economy
Abstract: Balkan economies are small, liberalized, some of them land-locked, mostly
upper-middle-income economies, with traditional economic structure and low level
of diversification which narrows even more in their export structure. Their features
are very far away from the developed, high-income EU countries which economies
broadly entered in the phase of development based on the knowledge as a leading
economic factor. If Balkan countries want to progress in higher development phase
on the long ran, it must speed up the dynamics of its growth rate and changes its
basic economic structure where dominate natural resources, labor and capital based
sectors as agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction and tourism in some of
them. Those traditional sectors have significant share of GDP and on the other side
sectors as trade, transport, financial intermediation and very typical service sectors
as public administration, defense, education, health, social security still have higher,
but relatively low share of GDP. The new economic structure should rely on widely
use of new technologies, human capital and knowledge as a primal economic and
development factors and should have characteristics of a knowledge-based economy.
Currently, there are many existing constraints on that way that should be overcome.
In the first group of constraints dominated economic factors as: the level of overall development; reliance on labor and capital as factors; the competitiveness of the
economies and its structure; export performances; existing middle and long term
economic policies and others. The second group of constraints is factors of production and acquisition of knowledge as: current level of knowledge-based economy;
general technological level of the economy; the domains of generation, transfer and
diffusion of knowledge; and the level of integration in the global processes of knowledge-based economy. Overall, there are existing Knowledge-based country programs
in most of the Balkan countries which still deliver limited results. It should be reevaluated in order to identify the factors in the success or failure of programs activities
as they contribute to policy making or development outcomes. Reevaluation should
also identify areas of strength as well as areas of weakness or risk. Programs could be
more effective if it work on: specific sectors rather than broad topics; designed tasks
to address specific county concerns; customized international best practice to local
Balkan conditions; generated data to support policy making; and formulated actionable recommendations that fit countries administrative and economy constraints.
Key words: Balkan economies, knowledge-based economy, programs, constraints.
230
i. Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis shows us that the globalization process
has gone even further that we know and “world was even smaller than we
thought”117. Anyway, it helped illustrate the power of high income economies government policies to prevent a much deeper recession or a global
depression. However, these policies had important side effects on the rest
of the world, most notably on economic activities, employment and capital and financial flows in emerging market economies including Balkan.
There are some doubts that these “spillover effects” have raised market
volatility and related financial stability risks in emerging economies. Still,
“global growth picked up only marginally to 2,6 percent in 2014 from 2,5
percent in 2013.”118
Six years from the start of the crisis in 2008/2009, the slow and relatively inefficient economic recovery of the Balkan countries, which belonged to a group of upper middle-income economies, continues and
it mostly rely on state help, various incentives and accommodative fiscal and monetary policies. It remains critical in supporting the economy,
by encouraging economic risks taking in the form of increased spending
and neglecting market prices mechanisms. However, prolonged fiscal and
monetary ease also encouraged excessive financial risk taking. Although
economic benefits are becoming more evident in some economies lately
(example – Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia based on growth
rates), market and liquidity risks in the both public and private sector are
increasing to levels that could compromise existing low growth rates, slow
recovery and financial stability. Thus, accommodative fiscal and monetary
policies may face a trade-off between the upside economic benefits and
the downside financial stability risks. At the same time the “global recovery is strengthening modestly in 2014 and will continue into 2015, supported by accommodative monetary policies in advanced economies and
declining headwinds from tighter fiscal policy. However, growth is not
yet robust across the globe, and downside risks have risen. Business and
consumer confidence remains fragile in many areas, reflecting uncertain117
Jiaqian Chen, Tommaso M.-Griffoli, and Ratna Sahay: “Spillovers from United States Monetary Policy on Emerging Markets: Different This Time?”, Working Paper 14/240, IMF, Washington, DC, Dec. 2014, p. 3
118
WB Group: “Coping with Floods, Strengthening Growth”, South East Europe Regular Economic Report No.7, WB, Washington, DC, USA, January 2015, p. 8
231
ties about the recovery of private demand and concerns about incomplete
balance sheet repair in banks and corporations.”119
The IMF’s Report World Economic Outlook of October 2014 expects
slow global recovery with the strongest rebound in overall growth in
the United States, whereas the brakes on recovery in the euro area will
ease only slowly, and growth in Japan will remain modest. For emerging
markets, the scope for macroeconomic policies to support growth varies
across countries and regions, but space remains limited in many countries
with external vulnerabilities. China’s contribution to the global economic
growth will remain important.
In such an environment, the Balkan economies are becoming even
more vulnerable to shocks from outside, especially from the advanced
economies, as they now absorb a most of their inward portfolio investments and FDI from advanced economies, even more than it was a case
in 2008, before the financial crisis. Some studies even shows that “U.S.
monetary policy shocks do affect capital inflows and asset price movements in emerging market economies” but “countries with stronger fundamentals are subject to smaller spillovers. Higher real GDP growth and
stronger external current account positions, as well as lower inflation
and lower shares of local debt held by foreigners significantly dampen
spillover effects.”120 The risk of direct spillovers in the Balkan economies
directly from the different scenarios or stress in the advanced economies, particularly EU economies, continues to rise with the growth in
cross-border trade, investments and bank lending in private and public
sector. Potential spillovers may also arise through the bond market in
those states where external foreign public debt is already challenging or
actively rising (Greece, Croatia and partly Serbia and Macedonia). As a
result of many factors, for example, the SEE-6 regional economy (Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia)
started to slow down in the first half of 2014.121 Growth across the region
was decelerated to a rate of 1,4% in the first quarter of 2014 and the
economy of the region contracted by 0.03 percent (year-on-year) in the
second quarter of 2014.
232
119
IMF: “Global Financial Stability Report – Risk Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking: Curbing Excess while Promoting Growth”, IMF, Washington, DC, USA, October 2014, p. 9
120
Jiaqian Chen, Tommaso M.-Griffoli, and Ratna Sahay: “Spillovers from United States Monetary Policy on Emerging Markets: Different This Time?”, …. Dec. 2014, p. 4
121
WB Group: “Coping with Floods, Strengthening Growth”, SEE Regular Economic Report No.
7, … p. 9
With this kind of current economic and financial problems the Balkan countries do not put enough attention to risks arises from their traditional economic structure and long-term structural problems. In such
case they are not able to keep pace with their transformation toward modern economic structures. If Balkan countries, no matter of the current
economic or other kind of problems, want to change its traditional economic structure and progress in higher development phase on the long
ran, they must speed up the dynamics of its growth rate and changes its
core economic structure which should basically rely on widely use of new
technologies, human capital and knowledge as a primal economic and development factors and should have characteristics of a knowledge-based
economies.
ii. Current developments
Balkan economies are small, liberalized, some of them land-locked, with
relatively traditional economic structure and low level of diversification
which narrows even more in their export structure. Their economic performances are very far away from that of the developed, high-income EU
member countries which economies broadly entered in the phase of development based on the knowledge as a leading economic factor. So the
living standards of the population are very different too. For example in
the Table 1 are shown the differences in terms of GDP per capita at current market prices between the Balkan countries and EU-28 in the last
decade, using the Eurostat methodology of Purchasing Power Standards
(PPS).122 The data shows us that the Balkan countries in average have only
some 1/3 of the GDP per capita of that in the EU-28, and probably much
less if PPS methodology is not used.
122
urchasing power standard (PPS) shall mean the artificial common reference currency unit
P
used in the EU to express the volume of economic aggregates for the purpose of spatial
comparisons in such a way that price level differences between countries are eliminated.
Economic volume aggregates in PPS are obtained by dividing their original value in national currency units by the respective PPP. One (1) PPS thus buys the same given volume
of goods and services in all countries, whereas different amounts of national currency units
are needed to buy this same volume of goods and services in individual countries, depending on the price level.
233
TABLE 1 – GDP per capita at current market prices (PPS, EU–28 = 100)
2002*
2007
2009
Albania
22
23
28
B&H
24
29
31
Macedonia
25
31
36
Montenegro
31
40
41
Serbia
32
33
36
Turkey
36
45
46
*For Albania, B&H, Montenegro and Serbia – 2005
Source: Eurostat (online data code: cpc_ecnagdp).
2010
30
30
36
41
35
49
2011
/
30
31
43
35
52
2012
/
28
/
42
/
/
2013
/
/
/
/
/
Although both in the EU members countries and in Balkan candidate’s
countries, the service sector’s share in gross domestic product (GDP) is by
far the largest, according to the recent data available it differ a lot. The EU
share of the service sector of just over 73%123 is considerably higher than
the corresponding shares in all the enlargement Balkan countries, except for
Montenegro, which had a similar share due to an important touristic sector
in the country. The relative rise in the service sector over the recent years in
Balkan countries was compensated with the decline in the agriculture, (including forestry and fishery), and to some extent, also in the manufacturing
(industry) sector. Still, compared to the EU-28, the economies of the Balkan
enlargement countries generated a considerably higher proportion of GDP
in traditional sectors, especially in the agriculture, forestry and fishery sectors. In 2012, the agriculture sector of the EU had a 1,7% share in total GDP,
while, in the enlargement countries, these values ranged from 7,4% in B&H
to very high 20,6% in Albania (Figure 1).
On the long term, the share of primary sectors continues declining
in all the Balkan enlargement countries. Some of them more rapidly over
recent years, as in Serbia by almost 5 percentage points between 2002 and
2012, reaching a share of 10%; and in Montenegro more than 3 percentage
points between 2002 and 2012, reaching a share of 9%. On the other side,
the situation with manufacturing sector share in GDP appears to be different in different Balkan countries, with often fluctuating figures, which
could be an indication of the varying economic performance of that sector in each country. Contrary, EU–28 continue moving to a services/
knowledge-based economy illustrated by the slow and persistent decrease
of the manufacturing sector’s share in total GDP, which, for example in
2012 reach 19%, or some 0.2 percentage point less compared to 2011 and
1,7 percentage points lower than in 2002.
123
234
Data for 2012 (Eurostat)
Figure 1 – Structure of GDP in EU and Balkan enlargement countries
(basic prices, 2012, in %)
Source: Eurostat Pocketbooks: “Key figures on the enlargement countries”, 2014 Edition,
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2014, p. 61
When come to the external trade with goods the picture is slightly
different. Despite the global crisis that affected many countries beginning
from the second half of 2008 onwards, the total value of the goods exported by the EU to the rest of the world grew by more than 90% between
2002 and 2013. Considerable drop in export was registered only between
2008 and 2009, and the pre-crisis level of 2008 was basically exceeded a
year later. But in the same period of 2002–2013,124 every Balkan country,
except Montenegro which value of exported goods slightly decreased, experienced the value of their exports grows much faster than that of the
EU. Thus the value of export of Albania and Kosovo was increased for
more than four (4) times and that of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey for more than three (3) times. Serbia’s (2005–2013) and Macedonia’s
exports increase more than double. The value of imported goods in the
EU member countries increased slightly faster than that of the exported
124
The data used in this paragraph are from: Eurostat Pocketbooks: “Key figures on the enlargement countries”, 2014 Edition, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg,
2014, Chapter 7, International Trade, pp. 78–83
235
goods between 2002 and 2013. Similar relative increases were registered
for imports of both Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina (+ 87% between 2005 and 2012 and +83%, respectively between 2003 and 2012).
Serbia had increase of 61% between 2005 and 2012, which was less strong.
The other Balkan countries recorded rises of imports well above that of
EU, ranging over 140% in Macedonia and Kosovo and record 238% registered increase in Turkey’s value of imported goods.
All the Balkan economies recorded trade deficits, as well as the EU.
But the problem is that as a percentage of the total trade volume (value
of exports + value of imports), the EU deficit in foreign trade (data for
2012) was only about 3% of the total trade volume, and most of the Balkan economies recorded much higher trade deficits ranged between that
of 22% in Turkey and 80% in Kosovo.
The indicator of the importance of foreign trade shows that the EU
exports of goods were equal to 13% of the GDP in 2012. Most of this due
to the fact that services that participated with more than 3/4 of EU GDP
are not or basically not tradable. In Balkan countries only Montenegro
and Kosovo did not attained this value. In all other countries the figure
for exports as a percentage of GDP was much higher with a record one in
Macedonia where it equaled 41,6% of GDP. On the other hand the value
of EU imports were equal to 13,9% of GDP (2012) and all Balkan countries registered much higher proportions – mostly in Macedonia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo, where values are over 50% of
GDP latest years.
The main trading partner of the Balkan countries is EU, although it
varies from country to country. According to the recent data available, the
highest over 70% of the total value of goods exported by Albania went to
the EU and the lowest proportions, recorded by Montenegro, amounted
to around 29%. On the import side, the EU is relatively less important.
Less than 40% of the countries’ total imports come from the EU in Kosovo, Montenegro and Turkey, while in Albania, Serbia and Macedonia it is
some 55–62% of total (Figure 2).
Due to previous problems, every single Balkan economy has a significant structural deficit on its current account which over the years fluctuates from a few percent up to 10–15% of its GDP and it generates many
problems on the Balance of payments and foreign reserves levels.
Despite some positive results in volume of foreign trade, the Balkan
countries face worrying conditions in their export structure. Contrary to
that of the EU, it is very traditional and not very modern export structure,
where dominate goods with low added value and knowledge in it. In 2012
236
Figure 2 – Foreign trade in goods with EU–27, (2012)
(% of total country exports and imports)
Source: Eurostat Pocketbooks: “Key figures on the enlargement countries”, 2014 Edition,
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2014, p. 82
goods as food and drinks (some 10–15%; EU 5,9%), raw materials (about
10%; EU 2,8%), and other products (40–50%; EU 22,7%) dominate over
export of chemicals (less than 7%; EU 16,4%) and machinery and vehicles
(less than 10% except in Serbia and Turkey slightly over 20%; EU 41,9%).
Those export structure is dominated by export of natural resources, labor
and capital distributed in sectors as agriculture, mining and traditional
manufacturing, lacking the high technology and knowledge-intensive
products.
Other problems which burden the Balkan economies are arising
from the increased General government deficits which fluctuate within 4% to 6% per year in nearly all countries starting 2009. This process
bring the General government debts ratio125 to more than 50% of GDP
and still rising with highest in EU–member countries as Greece, Slovenia
and Croatia with 176%, 79% and 78% respectively. General government
debts is relatively low in Bulgaria (23,6%); Romania (38,1%) and Kosovo
(about 10%). Others like Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina Serbia, Albania
125
According to Eurostat “News release 16/2015” of 22 Jan. 2015 on a Governmental debt in EU
237
and Montenegro has concerned public debt levels of about 50%-70% of
their GDP. Some 3/5 of the public debt in the region is external and still
increase. On the other side the prices levels are very stable with inflation
rate which do not exceed a few percent (mostly up to 3%) except in Turkey where it is significant with value of 7%–10% over the last decade.
Of course one of the biggest and most destructive economic problems of the Balkan countries is the low levels of employment and high unemployment. While the employment levels are
very low and vary between 45%–50% (EU 64%), the unemployment
is very high reaching about 30% or more in Kosovo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Greece. Other economies fluctuate at levels about 20% or slightly below (Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia) or
6%–10% (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey). Unemployment rate in EU–28
is 9,9%.126
Specific problem is youth unemployment (under 25 years) which
surged in Balkan region during the global crisis, and now is at historic highs in many countries. There are deleterious consequences of high
youth unemployment which often reaches more than 50% (EU 21,4%).
These could lead to lower opportunities of future employment and/or
lower wages. It could additionally erode present weak social cohesion and
institutions and even increase illegal activities or crime. Additionally, it
may eventually have an increased impact on relocating young work-seekers abroad looking for a job or new potential for education. The migration
of the youth combined with the ageing of the population in general, may
lower the potentials for further growth. There is relative heterogeneity
across Balkan countries in the levels of youth unemployment, especially
in the enlargement countries and Greece. Some studies shows that even it
“is more sensitive to economic growth than adult unemployment.”127
2.1. SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
Short-term prospects of the Balkan countries are determined by the development in the slower than expected global economic growth and especially European economy, as well as their own specific problems which
exist everywhere even different ones from country to country. On the
other side the region as a whole in every possible scenarios (EU, WB, IMF
238
126
Eurostat: “News release 20/2015” of 30 Jan. 2015 on an Unemployment rates in EU
127
ngana Banerji, Huidan Lin, and Sergejs Saksonovs: “Youth Unemployment in Advanced
A
Europe: Okun’s Law and Beyond”, Working Paper 15/5, IMF, Washington, DC, USA, 2015,
p. 22
and others) will grow slowly (by the World Bank not faster by 1%–1,5%
percent in 2015), “supported by a slowly recovering external demand,
especially in Europe, and stabilization of international energy prices at
around current levels”128 where external demand will remain a key driver
of growth in support of industrial activity and export growth. Domestic
demand is likely to remain subdued amidst weak consumer and business
confidence. Potential output growth remains limited by structural challenges also. Among this some limitations arise from the functioning of
the labor markets in the region which is anemic with persistently high
unemployment rates, low labor force participation rates, and sluggish formal job creation. The public sector is still large and increasing with a lot
of inefficiency in many countries in the region. Current physical and institutional infrastructure seems to be mainly obsolete and it determined
new investments, including FDI. It should be improved within necessary
fiscal consolidation in most of the countries.
Special impact on the short-term economic prospects should have
the developments in the Greek economy which trade and financial linkages with the region are important. The size of the Greek GDP, if we exclude Turkey with 618 million euro, is still the biggest with a level of some
182 million euros in 2013 or even larger of that of Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia combined together at level of
161,8 million euro. Some positive effects could be seen from the sustained
low oil prices which could support higher economic growth in Balkan
region.129 All countries in the region import significant quantities of oil
or petroleum fuel. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia for example are
importing fuel worth around 10 percent of their GDP, but net fuel imports in the region are also high, at 5 to 6 percent of GDP on average over
2012–13. A further fall or stagnant low oil prices would therefore have
significant impacts on the current accounts balance in all countries except Albania which has large oil exports, and could therefore suffer from
the current low oil prices. Thus, the main policy challenge of the Balkan
countries is to remove impediments to economic growth and development, no matter if it is a weak growth, or high unemployment (Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Hercegovina), high public debt (Greece), continuous
negative grow rates (Greece, Croatia), problems in the financial system
128
WB Group: “Coping with Floods, Strengthening Growth”, SEE Regular Economic Report No.
7, p. 43
129
According to the WB Group: “Coping with Floods, Strengthening Growth”, SEE Regular Economic Report No. 7 Chapter II, pp. 46–47
239
(Slovenia) etc. So, the policymakers should have a mandate to act when
needed and, maybe equally important, the courage to act, even when
measures are highly unpopular.
iii. Transition toward the knowledge-based economy
While Balkan countries are still fighting with traditional and current economic problems described previously, the long-term structural reforms
and changes are mostly forgotten. Modern economies, opposite to Balkan ones are functioning as knowledge-based economies where instead
of domination of classic factors as natural resources, labor and capital distributed in traditional sectors as agriculture, mining, manufacturing or
construction there is a domination of human resources with their specialized knowledge in a service and knowledge sectors as high-tech production, ITC sector, education, health, social security, including sectors of
tourism, trade, transport, financial intermediation and very typical public
service sectors as public administration, defense, justice and others.
There are a lot of reasons for the economies of the Balkan region
to project their future development toward the economies described as a
knowledge-based economies. Still, many constraints exist on that way that
should be overcome.
In the first group of constraints dominated are the economic factors
as: the level of overall development; reliance on labor and capital as factors; the competitiveness of the economies and its structure; export performances; existing middle and long term economic policies and others. The
second group of constraints are the factors of production and acquisition
of knowledge as: current level of knowledge-based economy, measured
by appropriate indicators; general technological level of the economy; the
domains of generation, transfer and diffusion of knowledge; and the level
of integration in the global processes of knowledge-based economy.
Many Balkan countries at the moment have their own active knowledge-based economy country programs but it still deliver limited results.
Those Balkan countries which already join EU (Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece,
Slovenia and Romania) have individual programs which arise and correspond with that of EU as a whole. We should remind that in the last
two decades EU produces and partly implement a few official programs
and platforms for an EU knowledge-based economy starting in the middle ’90-ies of the last century. In one of its early documents, the so called
Lisbon Strategy of March 2000 EU declared its own strategic goal – “in the
240
next decade EU should become the most competitive and most dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic
growth and new employment and better paid employment.”130 EU and its
member states today implement and monitor the programs, annually producing different group of data and indicators on a state of knowledgebased economy. One of the most important and popular is Innovation
Union Scoreboard which is the tool “to help monitor the implementation
of the Europe 2020 Innovation Union flagship by providing a comparative assessment of the innovation performance of the EU Member States
and the relative strengths and weaknesses of their research and innovation
systems.”131 Data (if exists) for a candidates countries are included. Balkan
countries that are EU members benefit from such an approach in their
future economic development. Although the results are limited, the approach is encouraging. They also report annually to the EU Commission
by a Strategic Evaluation of their performances.
Candidate and other countries are lacking behind in realization,
but give substantial efforts. They become aware that to make use of the
advantages of the concept of knowledge-based economy at the national
level, it is not sufficient to achieve the effects of market valuation of new
production factors and have spontaneous restructuring of the economy
in the direction of greater domination of the sector with greatest share
of knowledge. To achieve this concept, based on the experiences of the
most highly developed world economies, the following could be the most
significant factors: ƒ
–– Public and private funds for research and development, especially
investments in modern industries (PCs, bio-technologies, pharmacology, etc.);
–– Efficient and modern education and continued learning; ƒ
–– Adequate scientific-technological national policy; ƒ
–– Management of economic changes in line with the changes in the
world and the direct neighborhood; ƒ
–– Enforcement of macroeconomic policy, system and structural economic solutions; ƒ
–– Wide and permanent use of ICT, PC and other technical devices; ƒ
130
emosthenes Ioannou and Others: “Benchmarking the Lisbon Strategy”, Occasional Paper
D
Series No. 85, ECB, Frankfurt, Germany, June 2008, p. 8
131
EU Commission: “Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011”, EU, Brussels, Belgium, 2012, p. 6
241
–– Protection of property rights and especially intellectual property
rights;
–– Other factors.
Serbia, for example, in its National Sustainable Development Strategy of 2009 declares that “Serbian economy functions on the basis of a
still unfavorable economic structure with the given natural and financial
resources, technology and the human capital. All of these resources are
relatively weak” and “that the development of the Serbian economy in
the direction of sustainability may be seen only through generating economic growth based primarily on factors such as knowledge, information,
human capital, education and quality of links between the people and the
institutions.”132 Further on, the Strategy identifies the “knowledge-based
economy, as a dominant quality of the strategic development process”133
in the country. With the aim of implementing the above goal, priority
areas as well as general objectives that have to be achieved have been designated. The infrastructure, e-government and public services, education
and knowledge, e-business and the legal framework are the main priority
areas. An action plan has been attached to this strategy.
Formally different but similar approach has Albania which relay on a
Cross-Cutting Strategy on Information Society 2008–2013, adopted by the
national government. Although the strategy nominal title is directed toward “information society” it’s vision is to ensure the “progress of Albania
towards a knowledge based society through sustainable development, leading to a society where all citizens benefit from ICTs with the aim of increasing the level of knowledge, effectiveness and transparency in the public
administration.”134 The strategy is based on European best practices and
at the same time takes into account the specific features of the Albanian
society and economy. The growing use of knowledge and information
technology is considered the cornerstone for creating and successfully developing a knowledge-based economy and society. The objective of the
strategy is the review and coordination of the commitments related to the
creation of an information and knowledge-based economy, while at the
same time developing the necessary ICT infrastructure and relevant legal
framework.
242
132
“National Sustainable Development Strategy of Serbia”, 2009, Belgrade, Serbia, p. 17
133
Ibid, p. 19
134
lbanian Council of Ministers: “Cross-Cutting Strategy on Information Society 2008–2013”,
A
Policy Document, Tirana, Albania, 2009
Macedonia has active governmental policy arisen from the document
titled “Innovation Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for 2012–2020”. In
the document it is declared that “as Macedonia strives to continue growing economically, it is important for the country to develop the competitiveness of its private sector. Because Macedonia will not be able to compete with low cost wages over the long term, improving competitiveness
through knowledge and innovation is crucial. This strategy therefore aims
to initiate the transformation of the country into a knowledge-based economy able to compete on international markets through its skilled labor and
innovative companies.”135 The strategy recognizes that successful economic
development does not necessarily coincide with an increasing share of
production in high technology sectors. High value added activities can
also be found in traditional sectors and innovation can help firms move
from low-value added activities to high value added activities. It is:
–– Correlated and has direct relationship with other government documents;
–– Analyzing the challenges for the national innovation system;
–– Determining the vision and strategic objectives for Innovation
Policy 2012–2020;
–– Enhancing the business sector’s propensity to innovate;
–– Strengthening human resources for innovation;
–– Creating a regulatory environment in support of innovation;
–– Increasing knowledge flows between innovation actors.
The document has an Action plan for implementing the strategy,
with responsible institutions, time frame, project description, targets, expected results, activities and finally indicators for implementation.
Despite existence of the formal efforts and documents of their institutions, Balkan countries has achieved little effects in their transition
toward the knowledge-based economy due to the fact that they are preoccupied with their acute, short-term problems and existence of many
inefficiencies. If opposite, the economic and social indicators would show
noticeable improvement which is not a case. As an example of this could
be taken the situation with R&D which “is the key to the development of
an economy based on knowledge and innovation.”136 Overall levels of development, relatively unconcerned public policies and uncertainties over
135
overnment of Macedonia: “Innovation Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for 2012–
G
2020”, Skopje, Macedonia, 2012, p. 5
136
Eurostat Pocketbooks: “Key figures on the enlargement countries”, 2014 Edition, Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2014, p. 136
243
market conditions in an unstable global macroeconomic situation have
inhibited investment in R&D and innovation in most of the Balkan countries. In all enlargement countries from the Balkan region for which information is available, the share of the GDP expenditure on R&D137 remained
far below 1% or more preciously Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey 0,41%,
0,77% and 0,86% respectively in 2011 and Macedonia 0,19% in 2010. EU
target is at least 3% by 2020, but currently the share is about 2%. The
Balkan EU member countries, as a group, are slightly better but still not
very successful. Their R&D expenditure as percent of GDP in 2013138 was
as follow: Bulgaria 0,65%; Greece 0,78%; Croatia 0,81%; Romania 0,39%;
and Slovenia 2,59%). As result, the average per capita spending on R&D
in the EU (512 euros in 2011) was nearly 8 times that of Turkey in 2011
and the difference was even bigger with Serbia (15 times), Montenegro
(24 times) and Macedonia (85 in 2010). The same tendencies exist with
indicators for existence of innovative companies or the number and share
of the employed R&D personnel, number of registered patents and innovations.
Conclusion
The countries of the Balkan region are not very dynamic, upper middleincome economies characterized by traditional economic structure dominated by classical economic factors as natural resources, labor and physical capital. Their traditional economic problems were even increased with
the economic crises of 2008/2009 and some new problems occurred. On
the other side, the advanced, high-income economies of the world and
EU are entered into a new phase which is described as a knowledge-based
economy. While Balkan countries are fighting with their traditional and
current economic problems, the long-term structural reforms and changes are mostly forgotten and there is not a significant signs of transformation of their economies toward a knowledge-based. Still some efforts exist
and, at least the EU-candidates and enlargement countries have its own
strategies for a transition toward knowledge-based economies. Despite
many efforts and existence of the formal documents of their institutions,
Balkan countries have achieved little effects in their transition toward the
244
137
Ibid, p. 138
138
Eurostat: “News release 174/2014” of 17 Nov. 2014 on a First estimates of Research & Development in 2013
knowledge-based economy due to the fact that they are preoccupied with
their acute, short-term problems and existence of much inefficiencies.
REFERENCES
Albanian Council of Ministers: “Cross-Cutting Strategy on Information Society
2008–2013”,Policy Document, Tirana, Albania, 2009
Angana Banerji, Huidan Lin, and Sergejs Saksonovs: “Youth Unemployment in Advanced Europe: Okun’s Law and Beyond”, Working Paper 15/5, IMF, Washington,
DC,USA, 2015
Claessens Stijn and Lev Ratnovski: “What Is Shadow Banking?”, Working Paper
14/25,IMF, Washington, DC, USA, 2014
Demosthenes Ioannou and Others: “Benchmarking the Lisbon Strategy”, Occasional
Paper Series No. 85, European Central Bank, Frankfurt, Germany, June 2008
EU Commission: “Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011”, EU, Brussels, Belgium, 2012
Eurostat: “Key figures on the enlargement countries”, 2014 Edition, Eurostat Pocketbooks, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2014
Eurostat: “News release 16/2015” of 22 Jan. 2015 on a Governmental debt in EU
Eurostat: “News release 174/2014” of 17 Nov. 2014 on a First estimates of Research &
Development in 2013
Eurostat: “News release 20/2015” of 30 Jan. 2015 on an Unemployment rates in EU
Government of Macedonia: “Innovation Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for
2012-2020”, Skopje, Macedonia, 2012
IMF: “Global Financial Stability Report - Risk Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking:
Curbing Excess while Promoting Growth”, IMF, Washington, DC, USA, October
2014
Jiaqian Chen, Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, and Ratna Sahay: “Spillovers from United
States Monetary Policy on Emerging Markets: Different This Time?”, Working Paper 14/240, IMF, Washington, DC, USA, Dec. 2014
Mitra Pradeep, Marcelo Selowsky, and Juan Zalduendo: “Turmoil at Twenty. Recession, Recovery, and Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet
Union”, WB, Washington, DC, USA, 2010
“National Sustainable Development Strategy of Serbia”, 2009, Belgrade, Serbia
Rodrik Dani and Margaret McMillan: “Globalization, Structural Change and Productivity Growth”, NBER Working paper 17143, 2011
WB Group: “Coping with Floods, Strengthening Growth”, South East Europe Regular
Economic Report No.7, WB, Washington, DC, USA, January 2015
245
Zahari ZAHARIEV
PRESIDENT OF THE SLAVYANI FOUNDATION, SOFIA, BULGARIA
The Balkans – the old/new European
Apple of Discord
1. Since the 19th century, the Balkans have continuously been a
zone that divides and challenges the interests of the major political forces in Europe. This rivalry was sharply strengthened by
the processes of weakening of the central power in the Ottoman
Empire, and by the efforts of the Balkan peoples for national selfdetermination accompanying it. A turning point in these processes was played by the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878, and by
the subsequent San Stefano and Berlin Peace Treaties. In practice,
it was the last of these treaties that set not only the foundations
of the borders of the rivaling national interests of the different
Balkan countries, but it also formed the stable prerequisites for an
imperialist in its essence external influence.
2. This historic recourse to a significant extent explains why the two
largest world conflicts that brought about radical changes in the
political and economic map of the planet bear immediate connection with the Balkans.
3. What is it that sets the pattern for the long lasting interest of the
major geopolitical players in this peripheral European region?
–– The first and most important thing is its geographic location as
a main bridgehead to the eastern parts of Europe that had been
traditionally controlled by Russia; as a “hinterland” for Central
and West Europe; as a border zone of Europe in relation to the
Near and the Middle East; as a convenient maneuvering ground
towards North Africa.
–– Along with this, it is also significant that the Balkan Peninsula
is well known for its excellent climate for both agricultural produce and tourism and recreation. It has one of the best water
resources in the world including also in terms of mineral waters. It has at its disposal a human potential of good quality in
terms of a professional and intellectual stand point.
246
4. In addition to all these prerequisites, today there also exist some
fundamentally new ones that are directly related to the following
three circumstances:
–– the forth industrial revolution with all the accompanying it social and economic, political and ethno-cultural changes;
–– the collapse of the “Yalta Universe”, and the more and more
alarming lack of a relatively sustainable system of regional and
world security. The inability of the now existing regulatory system of international relations to meet the challenges related to
their uncontrollable fragmentation;
–– the objectively intensifying processes of globalization, and the
related to them problems of civilizational character, such as the
future of the national state, the ethno cultural originality against
the background of the internationalization of mass conscience,
the alterations in the system of moral values of the individual
and of society.
5. The disintegration of the USSR and the downfall of “real socialism” cleared the terrain of East Europe for a global invasion on
the part of the USA, EU and NATO. The major problem with
this frontal offensive against the former socialist countries, at all
“fronts” of their political, economic and spiritual life, was that
the West did not have a uniform vision about their future constitution. Quite the opposite – their future turned into a terrain
of sharp ideological and political conflicts not only between the
leading ideological schools but also between the leading western
countries themselves. Old imperialistic ambitions were awakened
to new life. The erosion of the system of state in East Europe not
only “blew the sails” of local nationalism, but it also gave a new
life to the already somewhat forgotten after the Second World
War plans for the retailoring of the borders and of the geopolitical
spheres of influence.
6. All this became particularly apparent on the Balkans. In a comparatively short period of time, and not without the help of external forces, on the map of the Peninsula appeared as many as 12
countries instead of 6. Nevertheless, the process of establishing a
new version of “Balkanization” is yet far from being over. There
are new demands for retailoring of the newly established borders.
It is sufficient to note a number of stable tendencies in the politics
of the different Balkan countries that have their impact upon both
the internal aspect, and upon their external political activity.
247
7. Today, once again, as well as prior to the past two world wars, the
Balkan Peninsula is relatively the most fragmented and multidirectional in terms of national ambitions, ethno cultural interests
and external influences region of Europe. These specifics of the
region, however, combined with the pointed out in the beginning
reasons for its significance, predetermine why the misfortunes for
the Balkan states and peoples have not yet come to an end. Quite
the contrary. In my opinion, the present day situation in Europe
and the world creates new prerequisites for the renewed manifestation of the region as a field of confrontation of the world forces
that are drawing the new spheres of influence upon the geo-political map of the 21st century.
What are the grounds for such a conclusion?
The first circumstance is connected with the deep crisis in contemporary
international relations. The collapse of the Yalta Universe that had been
supported for a decade upon the foundations of a bipolar world in terms
of a geo-political view point forced humanity to face a global “Balkanization”.
Within the frameworks of two decades, the USA turned out in a position of a global leader already not just of the so called “free world” but
also in terms of the planetary problems as a whole. Their self-confidence
of a winner in the Third “Cold” World War combined with the economic
imperial ambitions took them way beyond the boundaries of traditional
American pragmatism. Gradually, the burden of responsibilities not only
in terms of their own interests, but, in the second place, towards their Allies in the dominated by them integration communities started to develop
into an unbearable burden.
The mirages, renewed in the 90s of the last century, of the “Pax
Americana” turned out to be a life threatening “song of the sirens” in the
growing more and more stormy ocean of civilizational changes. In the
USA, there were abruptly increased both the traditional for the country
isolationist dispositions, as well as the discussions on the topic as to what
an extent they were obliged to carry on their own the burden of responsibilities as a world leader. The events in the Near and Middle East, and
North Africa, as well as the lack of adequate answers to the questions that
the present downturn raises on the agenda of modern society, objectively
place Washington under the dilemma as to how long it can continue with
its prevailing hitherto course, and to what an extent it can unload of part
of its responsibilities and financial burden at the expense of its Atlantic
248
allies. For the time being, the second option is definitely getting the upper
hand. The events in Ukraine, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and Iraq confirm
this conclusion.
The second circumstance is connected with the condition of the existing hitherto regulators of the European and world security. Most disturbing is the situation with the UN. In its present state and organization
of work the world organization with an increasing difficulty, and it could
be said also without success, copes with the stipulated in its By-laws high
objectives. The pressure for an overall change in the structure and process of decision making of the Security Council is forever increasing. The
situation with the ОSСЕ is not much better. The additionally established
“crutches” intended to balance security decisions such as “G-8” and “G20” do not function efficiently either. The only integrative structures that
function more or less successfully, but which, nevertheless, draw more
dividing lines in a geopolitical aspect than they unite the world in a civilizational one, remain “the offsprings” of the “Cold War” EU and NATO.
Yet they also require radical changes which are to liberate them from the
burden of the past, and make them more adequate to the new civilizational realities.
The third circumstance is connected with Russia and its politics
dedicated to the establishment of a new model of relations and a new
global system of security in the world. Moscow, which in the 90s of the
twentieth century, partly due to the state of affairs, partly due to the lack
of potential, pleaded for a multipolar world, is now radically changing this
position. As political practice has convincingly demonstrated, boosting
such processes not only fragments the political map, but it also destroys
one of the primary principles for sustainability of the external policy, the
predictability, but also, in practice, they appear to be antagonistic to the
natural course of globalization. They are in contradiction with the impossibility to find the only possible global answers to the ever more serious
global problems of modern times. Therefore, the efforts of Russia more
and more definitely turn towards the establishment of a new model of a
bipolar world.
Practice shows that the concept of “a common European home” does
not work. As the crisis in Ukraine has shown, the emancipation of the
EU from the USA is still more of a desire than a reality. The plans for an
independent policy of the EU in the sphere of international relations, and
of security remain a fiction. And the very future of the EU is connected,
according to the analysts in Kremlin, with a lot more queries then with
real opportunities for it to become recognized as an independent center of
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world politics and economy. Assessing objectively the American pressure
in the East, and the building of an original “sanitary cordon” around its
own borders, Moscow is looking for perspective geopolitical decisions of
its own in the East. There are sustainable efforts for the establishment of
the new geopolitical center in a future bipolar world together with China.
The Russian military potential, and the huge raw-material resources combined with the still yielding positive effects inertia momentums in its politics and international influence as of the time of the USSR, logically interact with the impressive economic potential and civilizational adaptability
of China. Should we also add to this the traditional spheres of influence
of the two countries, along with their close ideologically motivated visions
of the future, then there are, at least for the time being, sustainable links
for a sustainable strategic union. Also significant is the circumstance that
the growing anti-Americanism in the world combined with the impossibility of present day capitalism to offer whatsoever alternative paradigms
of development, drives the huge majority of developing countries towards
their geopolitical fairway.
But where does the Balkans stand in this process?
The fight for the new geopolitical division of the world provides them
with a central place in the clash of the so defined multidirectional geopolitical interests. Besides the already mentioned prerequisites for their
peculiar place on the geopolitical map of Europe, we should also add a
number of additional circumstances.
The first of them is connected with the fact that they are a border
area for the USA and NATO not only in terms of the Middle East and
North Africa, but in terms of Russia, and the post soviet region as well.
Their strong presence in the region can also have a disciplinary effect in
relation to the overly ambitious Turkish political elite that is increasingly
trying to play a geopolitical game of its own, including going deep in its
play to the detriment of the USA and their Allies in the EU, as well as of
Moscow and Beijing. With the opening of the Ukrainian front, and the
incessant play in the Caucasus, with the continuous explosive inevitable
entanglement of the knot in the Middle East, the Balkan Peninsula acquires an ever growing strategic significance.
The second circumstance is linked with the fact the Balkans, except
for the post soviet region, are the only still unassimilated by the EU and
NATO (meaning also by the USA) region on the “old continent”. This creates additional opportunities for a confrontation clash of interests in an
economic, military-political and spiritual plan. To all this should be added
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also the traditionally strong and linked to historical traditions opportunities for Russian influence. This holds true particularly for the Slavic and
East Orthodox countries. It is also a major element in the Russian politics
of “mellow power”.
And the third circumstance is connected with the economic circumstances. The Balkan countries turned out to be a primary distribution
center for the hydrocarbon supplies to Europe. Through them pass, and
is imminent to pass, the major gas and petrol corridors to Central and
Western Europe. Parallel to this, their unstable economic and social situation turns them into potential economic sites for serious economic and
political influence on the part of China.
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Miodrag VUKOVIĆ
DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF LAW, MEDITERRANEAN UNIVERSITY,
POGRORICA, MONTENEGRO
Responsability for Protection
“Serbia will do everything to improve the position of the Serbian people in all countries in the neighbouring countries, including Montenegro”. That was what the President of Serbia stated yesterday in Belgrade,
during the meeting with the leader of the New Serb Democracy (from
Montenegro). The information that appeared in all media in the past few
days. The information to which “everyone already got accustomed to”. The
usual one. Especially when it comes to the entities referred to in it. It was
like that yesterday, it was like that in previous years. Nothing new. Maybe
just less “pomp” in the media “accompanied by commentaries, giving the
reasons, explanations, messages”. A little more discretion than yesterday.
Some would say that the public got accustomed to this kind of “patriotic
contacts”, so this was no longer news, at least not for the cover, for the
peak time.
However, neither the news, nor the meeting in question, could be
left without a comment, not even this time. Mostly critical. Again there
was questioning, with the majority of those who “referred to the event”.
Why is this necessary to anyone? If it is, then why, to a good extent, recognizably old, former, especially political, nationalistic to be more precise,
connotation of the meeting and messages communicated from it? Who
is this necessary to, today, when “yesterday” was to be forgotten, and as
soon as possible? Aren’t the experiences bad, alarming? Isn’t it that any
serious subject and the factor of political and social life would be convinced by now, in any single country in the region and the region as a
whole, that such meetings, especially with such messages, no matter how
polished they are compared to previous ones, comparable, represent potential danger, realistic, we should say maybe less than yesterday, for the
new misunderstandings to emerge, to enter into new conflicts and different subsequent “clarifications”?
For 20 years now, a habit of “special concern for their own” in other
countries, in the region as a whole, “for their compatriots”, with more or
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less direct promises that everything would be done for their position to
be better, and with the effort of the “mother state”, and in accordance with
the “interests contained in the national program of the mother state”. It is
true that these kinds of meetings are rare recently, but not less intriguing.
Also, in official statements there is more often the invitation for the “effort” for “their own” in other countries to be better, will be synchronized
with policies of states where they live and be based on the highest European standards.
However, the question remains why these meetings are so important, why they are given such significance, past of what they represent
by itself? Why taking the risk to use them for taking the advantage of
the “reasonable care for their own in other countries”, if that is still not
their purpose? Serbian national community, as the biggest in the Balkans,
“is scattered” throughout the former Yugoslavia. The effort, sometimes
stronger with tragic consequences, sometimes weaker, but latent in any
case, that “all Serbs live in one state”, has mutated, assumed new political
and “programme”, even state forms. No right measure could seem to be
found. And it is not the case only with this national community – it is like
mantra, when almost all ethnic communities in the region are concerned.
In previous years, especially in the last decade of the last century,
the news would be that the President of Serbia and other officials of this
great state did not do “the expected”, that they “skipped” holding “regular” contacts and consultations with their own from the region. It began,
interestingly, after a long “dwelling” of such “state patriotic policies” in the
footnotes of political life, as was the case in the former communist federation of six republics and two provinces; it began, and led to the bloody
breakup of the community, with sudden concern for their own people,
which emerged in the forefront of all political and state agendas, early in
the last decade of the last century. Concern for the life of their own people
across the border was a litmus-paper for the rapid and (whether uncontrollable as well?) interfering in the internal affairs of the neighboring sovereign states. All that culminated with tragic elimination of any possibility
for rational and acceptable discussion about all, even these issues, with
severe suffering of the very ones and others whose interests were supposedly to be taken care of increasingly. The interests of the people were
misued. Displaced from the context of civilized relation. The care which
state and political officials showed for “their own people as a whole”, with
no exception, has overcame the interests of those people and returned to
them like a boomerang. These lessons from the especially dramatic 90s of
the last century were not enough for those who have “succeeded” those
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suddenly worried. Montenegro as the smallest social community of very
complex social structure, especially religious and national, tried to save
itself in these extremely difficult times, to save until then hardly but visible well built relations, mutual tolerance and respect for all its diversities.
Tried and succeeded in keeping misunderstandings, autochthonous and
provoked, intentionally for patriotic tyrants, at the level of the incident
and it succeeded. How ugly and alarming these images seem “from not
so long ago” from this distance, for all reasonable and rational, when the
political Serbs in particular, leaders of Serbian national and nationalist
parties in Montenegro, tribal chiefs of “the largest” Serbian tribes in Montenegro, patriotic intellectuals and everyone else, from national and nationalist corpuses from Montenegro, went to the divan with the President
of Serbia, who was particularly remmembered by the history of all, especially Serbian people. Tragic images and memories of the mockery of democracy, with legal and legitimate institutions of Montenegro, which were
“unacceptable” and which were not to be communicated with because of
the “betrayal of patriotic interests at one moment in time” are still fresh
and their alarming message will never be less intense. Mockery of democracy cannot go into oblivion, when the alleged civil political and state
structures of Serbia, the former one, with strong “national recognizability”, “cooperated” with representatives of tribal assemblies (of the Serbian
people) from Montenegro, rather than with the legitimate partners from
the state and political leadership of the neighboring country. Everything is
still fresh, everything is still fragile, prone to repeatition of mistakes, with
the Balkans as a reliable witness. Especially if we consider, and we should,
the historical truth that after the departure of that political structure their
political logic did not leave as well, and the mantra, on the basis of which
and from which originated the “national concern for their own”. On the
contrary, it continued to exist, unfortunately, with even greater intensity
in manifestations of political forms, and thankfully without dramatic consequences. New “democratic government of Serbia” continued to intensively worry about their compatriots, especially when it comes to Montenegro. Forms of manifestation of that concern were brought to the political absurdness. In previous years, the alleged democratic leaderships of
this country have regularly held samits of political Serbs from the “region
and the Diaspora.” All gathered around the partiotic leaders of the state.
The President of Serbia “presided” over these summits, because it “was
his due” to be the first to express concerns and to be the last to send the
patriotically encouraging message to everyone. Today one finds it painful
to remember the “democratic” episodes of the state of Serbia, its Govern254
ment and the Parliament, its presidents, expressed through various “platforms on the work with the Serbs in the region and the Diaspora.” One
finds it painful to remember the provoked need of Montenegro to, for
example, even through diplomatic channels, public protest, démarche, ask
the Government of Serbia to suspend “patriotic platforms” in which an
open intention to carry out nationalist policies and pursue with “its own
national interest” at the expense of other states, was directly announced,
through various patriotic structures installed in Montenegro. How can
one talk today about not only the intention, but also about the almost
final realization of the idea for Serbia to have two “equal parliaments”,
one for the internal use and the other for the promotion of the unified
national interest of the Serbs, regardless of where they lived.
Those are the years, the ones “from yesterday”, when the nationalist madness escalated, when not only one “open national question” was
resolved in a completely incorrect way. Consequences alarming. Extreme
misunderstandings when it comes to problems of functioning of countries, such as the problem of Kosovo, relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the territory previously inhabited predominantly with “Serbian population in Croatia”. The “new” political and state “configuration” has been
created in the Balkans, thanks to these preceding and during conflicts
with lasting incresed concerns of national state and political leaderships
for their own people in other countries. One alarming example that one
should not search for other reasons that these policies should be sent to
history as soon as possible. The aforementioned Kosovo has for decades
been the first news, the first information always related to the processes in
it, and in relation to it. In all of the information, political and state opinions of all involved in the problem and attempt to resolve and “resolve”
the issue, there was an syntagm “Serbs and Montenegrins”. It was said
that, without a doubt, the processes in Kosovo must be perused via the
position of Albanians and non-Albanians, “Serbs and Montenegrins and
other minority communities” in that territory. With reason. So, no one
questioned that in that part of the once state territory of Serbia live members of the Albanian population predominantly, but “Serbs and Montenegrins” and others. That was the way it was communicated with ethnic and
political realities of Kosovo, to make things more absurd, even in the time
of the Balkan dictator, denounced with reason, and the President of Serbia
and his associates at the end of the last century. Democratic changes happened, but with no progress when it comes to Kosovo. On the contrary.
New democratic, state and political structures of Serbia casted from the
political and social reality, from an official, state and political statement of
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that reality, the word, the term, one whole nation, amputated the reality,
mocked the history, ruined the future, by casting the term “Montenegrin”
from the patriotic, newfangled, and the vocabulary leaning on the previous nationalist logic. “Montenegrins” have disappeared. The serious ones
wondered what has happened to them? The war has ended, misunderstandings, conflicts have slowly, painfully to be true, given the way to dialogue. Have the “Montenegrins” been killed, “in previous years, and it was
not familiar before,” or have they fled, which would not be in accordance
with their “character feature”, or have they, and that would be the truth,
unfortunately, became victims of nationalist ambitions, programmes and
interests, which were communicated then in some other way. For the
“Serbian interests” it was superfluous to share the care any further to “two
communities” which, “in the projection and perception of nacionalistic
great-Serb operation which is still alive”, have not existed as separate, but
it was always one and the same thing. Painful birth of those who existed
as indisputable social entity even in Kosovo and elsewhere in the years
that followed has not been finished to this day. The National Union of
Montenegrins is “functioning” again, therefore it exists, de facto, now in
the independent and internationally recognized state of Kosovo, but de
jure, it will take more time “be the part of the Constitution”, to become
part of the legal reality of this neighbor of Montenegro. Why did someone
need that and what kind of supreme patriotic idea was that and the interes
that required such a political and state maneuver?
“The Serbian leadership was not the only one which – in different
packages –” have inherited the national policies of its predecessors, enriching those with new and new – as time would show – tragically nondemocratic and absolutely conflicting contents. Others also took care of
themselves. Others also implemented the same policies, but in some other
ways, less obviously, less transparently (as some people might say, while
others would say – that is more deceitful, hidden way). Therefore, in those
times happened the open, dramatic confrontations of nationalist interests.
It was a confrontation of colonialist policies, determined almost by only
one thing – concern about their own wherever they lived. The international community also had a work to do in these cases. These days, after
15 years, international judicial authorities are giving their last word “on
claims and counter-claims” of those who produced a clear surplus of history in this area. It is a verdict to one epoch, its policies, intentions, ambitions, fraudulent nationalist ideas, the alert that all of that was a twilight
and utter collapse.
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Thus, today there is a big question why something is “unlike in the
rest of the world”. Is there anyone today in democratic societies “at the
state and official political level” who accepts their own, take care of their
position in other countries and promises that they would not give up the
intention to answer their patriotic duty and tasks. Why not discontinue
the compromised practise, which brought in the recent past so many miseries and victims if there is a possibility, and unfortunately, it has escalated
in something that could be hardly controlled rationally. Why there is a
need today to recklessly or insufficiently prudently, of course if we speak
about recklessness, insist on ethical instead of civic nationalism. Why to
care only about members of your own people, and not about a citizen,
regardless of their religion and nation, no matter what kind of differences
that is. Not previous nor current president of Serbia, after all, nor president of Montenegro, Croatia, Albania or Bosnia and Herzegovina (the
truth is, in the last case there are three presidents) were not appointed as
nationalistic chiefs, and so they should not behave in that manner. In this
particular case, President of Serbia, according to the Constitution of this
state and other positive regulations, shall be elected by citizens of Serbia
on free, democratic and general elections, at which all citizens with a voting rights, have a right, and others are obliged to enable them that, to
elect freely. Presidents of Serbia, not in the past nor today, have not been
elected by “Serb people” at the national plebiscite, referendum or national
elections, what would make them obligatory to take care only of members
of one, their own nation in the same manner, regardless of the fact whether they live in Serbia or abroad. President of Serbia is, at least according
to the Constitutional proclamation, a president of all citizens of Serbia.
He/She is the president of the state which is, the truth is in a strange way,
from a legal perspective of view – defined as a civil state. (“Serbia is a state
of Serb people and other equal citizens”?! – a provision from the current Constitution of Serbia). President of Serbia, within the limits of their
constitutional powers, should take care of all citizens of Serbia, its nationals, people who have established public and legal communication with the
state and have a status of the citizen of that state. This includes those who
live in Serbia, and those who live outside of Serbia, and hold – for different reasons – Serbian citizenship. It should be a rule for all other state and
political structures when it comes to other regional states if the region intends to begin, honestly and deeply, to breathe European, democratic air.
And, honestly, what would happen today, with efforts to completely calm
the unstable Balkans, sometimes by exaggerated care of former state and
national leaders for their people outside their states, if President of Croatia
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gathered frequently representatives of “Croatian parties” from other states
on the divan in his presidential palace. Imagine the reaction of the broadest, even nationally concerned, public if President of Albania invited leaders of “Albanian national” parties from other independent states in Tirana
to brainstorm on the ways for improving the position of their compatriots
wherever they live, with a promise that those efforts cannon be completed
without a direct involvement and participation of a “mother state”. A little
digression, with everything that happened when it comes to processes in
Kosovo, how would it look like if leaders of Albanian national parties from
Prešeska dolina frequently went to Tirana and there, openly and publicly,
with benevolent attitude and open support of Albania, lamented over the
“intolerable situation and living conditions” whose other name is national
discrimination of Albanians in southern Serbia. Haven’t such behaviour
and such policies left too many scars for one generation? Wouldn’t one
consider as alarming the behaviour and policies of some politicians who
ask today the review of international positions on borders of internationally recognised states, leaning on unfulfilled national interests which they
supposedly represent? This is obviously a clear problem, which may be
opened or reopened in the old way – completely unnecessary and wrongly- by frequent or continuous meetings as the said ones. This is a different
conception or the need to understand the concerns of your compatriots.
Everything is connected with sovereignty. A sovereignty of a state, even a
sovereignty of independent and internationally recognised regional states
in the Balkans, has two key features. The first is the “authority” which every country possesses to adopt and implement laws autonomously without
outside interference, laws which regulate or by which the state may and
should loudly, without obstruction, regulate its social, political, economic,
cultural and scientific life, relations among its citizens, among the nationals of that state within undoubtedly defined state territory. The second
feature is reflected in the “accountability” which every individual state has
– precisely and exclusively – to its nationals, to enable them, as the only
one responsible to provide that, to exercise their basic human and other
rights as well as to provide them with basic public goods (safety, food,
etc.) on the basis of positive laws which are adopted and implemented in
that state. Both features of the sovereignty are materialised through formal and legal relationship between the state and its nationals. It should be
emphasised also that in contemporary definition of sovereignty the term
of a “national community” in ethical, religious or linguistic sense has lost
or is losing visibly, and as many believe incontinently, the primate over the
term “national”.
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Upon the completion of the Second World War, founding countries
of the United Nations unanimously decided to prevent social and political processes which have resulted in outbreak and escalation of conflicts
at the world level. Why? In the twenties and thirties of the last century,
before that war, fascism unfortunately was a dominant ideology of that
period, by which some states justified one very aggressive practice – their
interference in the internal issues of other states. The care for the status
of “their own people” in other states was the most frequently and very
often the only reason for the intentions. So, for example, on the basis of
this thesis, state, policy message, former Nazi Germany which had no formal or legal relationship with members of German national community
in other states, justified its military aggression and subsequent occupation
of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland by alleged concern for the rights
of German people in those countries. No one would ever forget the manner of manifesting that concern, the means of its manifestation and the
consequences it had for humanity and civilization as a whole. In order to
prevent the reiteration of such practice, the founders of the United Nations decided that sovereignty must be clearly defined as inviolable authority within the borders which may be nationally (ethnically, religiously,
linguistically, etc.) heterogenic. Therefore, the authority and accountability of a state, its political and state elite cease to be solely connected to
one national community. Hence, more than half a century ago, foundations of international legislation and acceptable international policy were
set up, in relation to which – in a more or less harsh manner – regional
states based their national and nationalistic policies during the previous
years or decades in this area. It was already then agreed that every state
must commit itself primarily to the obligation of exercising its authority and demonstrating its accountability primarily or exclusively towards
everybody, therefore towards “everybody”, her, “her own” citizens. One
should be honest and notice, since that time is mentioned, that in the first
months after the Second World War, which was the period whiles this
idea of sovereignty hadn’t still come to life everywhere and without an
exception, it proved to be difficult, serious and responsible process. Many
countries continued to implement additional policies of national frustrations, including the forced eviction of minorities (in that time, primarily
defeated national communities, wherein the defeat or victory was taken
as a main justification for such actions) in order to change the ethical
structure on its territory. Historical memories are strong, so it is the truth
that many German families were evicted from Poland, Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia, with an explanation that “… all of that was done with the
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hope that such decisions would prevent and stultify the future invasions
by Germany”. These policies, even though catastrophic, if one may say
so, lasted shortly, and back then as well as today they were in absolute
collision with complete international humanitarian law. How many “similar explanations”, since that is the topic, were given by nationalist state
and politic leaders in the Balkans, regarding the attempts of open ethnic
cleansing of territories, which evolved in genocides.
Considering the fact that the state is sovereign, that it adopts laws on
its territory and bears responsibility for their enforcement, over its citizens,
one of the fundamental legacies of the previous period was also the strict
prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of other states. Logically,
resulting from that, the term of “mother state”, as some understand it and
use it even today, and which has been regrettably used in the previous
years, becomes archaic, and formally and legally unusable. Primarily, the
state and its institutions are accountable to all of its nationals (regardless
of their national affiliation) and in no way to nationals of other states. For
nationals of other states, even if they are “compatriots”, are responsible the
states whose nationals they are. If in the territory of one country resides
a national minority which is ethnically close to a national majority in another state, that other state must respect the sovereignty of the first state,
both its authority and its responsibility toward its nationals, in accordance
with international law and dominant policies. Therefore, no state has its
“compatriots” in other states, unless they are at the same time its nationals, as an obligation to which the interests and rights, as well as obligations
of the other state could rationally and acceptably extend. If the state treats
a certain national community irresponsibly (discriminatory), in that case,
based on the existing international law, the reaction is expected from the
international community, and not by any means from the state whose
majority of citizens are “nationally close with the discriminated group”.
This arises from the document titled “Responsibility to Protect”, which
was adopted at the United Nations Summit in Montreal 2005, and which
was signed by all heads of states. The international community is therefore
the first one responsible and called out, and thus obligated, to help states
achieve a responsible relation toward its nationals. If that state is not able
or does not want to achieve such a relation, then the international community, primarily through decisions of the UN Security Council, has an
obligation to protect the threatened national communities. Then again, it
is more than clear, that the international law in no way allows the unilateral interference of other states in the home affairs of any sovereign state.
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Therefore, the meetings from the beginning of this text and the said
concern, which was publicly expressed, is on the limit of the implied, and
more than that, of obligatory conduct of any democratic state, and even
the state which has the ambition of being such. “My people”, “compatriot”,
and “care for members of our people in other countries” are remains, consciously or unconsciously exercised even today, of the past tragic times
of escalation of nationalistic and colonialist projects and must be as soon
as possible, unequivocally, replaced by dominant relations among states
based on previously said international legal standards and commitments.
Maybe national inertia or inertia in the state and national politics of some
states is objectively anticipated because it is difficult to stop the tragic
wheel that has been destroying everything in the region over the past decades, but democratic development of societies must be a process without
alternative.
And for ages not even in Europe has there been a dilemma on how
to deal with rights of any kind of collectivity, even national, ethnic. Universal rights, and thus obligations for any sovereign and democratic state,
are human rights and freedoms in the full sense of the word. Within those
rights and the efforts to exercise them, the collective rights, and even the
rights of national and ethnic groups are being exercised, on the basis of
international standards. There are three dominant practices in Europe. In
the majority of democratically developed states, in which national and nationalistic passions and ambitions to rescue and defend its own no matter
where they live and even at the cost of open interfering in sovereign rights
of other states have waned a long time ago, human rights and freedoms
have a universal and binding feature. The rights of national and ethnic
groups, language groups, are losing the attribute of absolute state obligation of the “mother state”. In France, in Germany, in Britain, in the Western Europe, and in other undoubtedly democratic social and state communities, the policy of civic nationalism has been developing for a long
time, and it is insisted upon, while ethnic nationalism is being objectively
situated and accepted. In these states, all policies are led with ambition to
increase the degree and sense of belonging to the state as such. In France
it is important for all citizens, especially the French nationals, to feel and
declare themselves as “French”, in Germany as well, and it is no different
in Great Britain. Of course, with different modalities in political and social practice. The emancipation of religious and national at the expense of
universal mankind’s and human is not a state and political issue for “state
national reaction and care”. Thus there are problems, especially lately and
in these states, but no requests to reaffirm the very risky requirements for
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domination of collective over individual, at the expense of sovereignty of
states and societies. In the most developed democratic states, collective,
national, ethnic, and linguistic heritage is being protected, fostered, aided
in affirming itself, but it stays at the need of cultural context of these issues. In France, since it was already mentioned, for decades now, there
had been no politically relevant entity with the national prefix in its name,
and thus in its programme and in its purpose. In the French Senate or
the French Parliament there is no “French” Socialist Party, “French” Conservative Party, “French” Demo-Christian party… in this democratic state
the representative bodies are made up of civic parties of the left, of the
right ideological orientation, parties of the left or the right political centre, and it is the same in Germany. In Britain as well. In other states as
well. There is no “German CDU”, there is no “German SPD”. They exist,
and with no intention to change anything anytime soon or to nationally
profile political entities SPD, CDU, Liberal Party “from or in Germany”, as
the indicator of the area in which they operate, state area, and institutions
within which they function, state institutions in Germany. Lately, at the
local level, due to integration processes in Europe and a large number of
people that come from other countries of different national, religious and
linguistic habitat, it is possible to form a local national party, but not more
than that for now. The past cautions enough not to be repeated. Protection of members of national and religious minorities is the obligation of
the central state and local authorities. Within the limits of the expected,
the implied, the national and religious identity of all “nationals of both
France and Germany” is being protected, but that protection does not include or imply any kind of care for “its own” by other states in relation to
France and its citizens or the right of the French state structures to interfere with issues that are in the sovereign jurisdiction of other states, if in
those countries live the French by origin but are nationals of those countries. The opponents of this concept of layman nationalism come forward
with extreme, religious and national demands which, especially lately,
dramatically warns with already initiated forms of escalation, misunderstanding between that which is democratic, human and that which is excessive national and ethnic, especially religious. In other states of Europe,
up to the level of state and political obligation, language differences are
recognised as constitutional. In the Scandinavian countries, for example
in Finland, in the political structures in the Parliament, in the executive
power everyone is a national of Finland, and a Finn. Even though, and
not from recently, Finland borders Sweden, and there are many Swedes
in Finland as well as Finns in Sweden, in the representative bodies of
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Finland there are no institutionalised national Swedes, instead there are
“Finns who dominantly speak Finish and Finns who speak Swedish”. Political, state and social protection of national and religious variety in these
developed and rich, in democracy and everything else, states keeps the
cultural dimension and connotation and there have been no major problems nor are they expected. The third group of states make up the states
of young parliamentary democracies. These are primarily the Baltic States,
the Middle Europe states, former members of the Warsaw Treaty, former
Yugoslav states, the Balkan states. In these states, the issue of the need
for full protection of both individual and rights of members of minority
communities, and even the very minority national communities as a collectivity, has been elevated to the level of state institutional and undoubtedly political obligation. In Montenegro for the most part, but also in
other countries in its surroundings, in the countries in the region, in the
transitional period, which objectively must last longer, because it is about
conquering new worlds, there is a constitutional and legal possibility, and
also an obligation, that the members of minority, and especially national,
communities, have an easier path toward the structures in which political
and state decisions are made. For 20 and more years in Montenegro, the
state parliament and local assemblies have been overcrowded with parties
with national prefixes in their names. So many “Serb” parties. So many
Albanian, Bosniak, Croatian national political entities. And constitutional
solutions which are not only a product of Montenegrin legal, political and
state wisdom of how to solve this political equation, but also solutions
based on what else than international standards, rules, from Lund, Copenhagen, Brussels. In other states the situation is more or less the same.
Unfortunately, the practice is not always in accordance with that which is
projected, with the norm.
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Nikifor MILOVIĆ
ARCHIMANDRITE, SERBIAN ORTODOX CHURCH,
DIOCESE BUDIMLJANSKO-NIKŠIĆKA, MONTENEGRO
Open Questions of Religious Freedoms
in Montenegro
It is of essential importance that all European nations nourish their common Christian roots. Christianity has created the European identity and
functioned as a unifying force among European peoples, regardless of
changeable political conditions. Formation of a unique European economic, political, legal, cultural and educational area should be based on
the values and ideas that affirm and protect the freedom of religion or
belief, and that also protect Christian heritage and Christian identity in all
countries that strive towards European integration.
Most of the population of Montenegro is Orthodox Christian (73%).
The Serbian Orthodox Church is not only the largest religious community
in the country – it has also played a key role in the formation, preservation and development of Montenegro’s religious, cultural and national
identity through history.
In accordance with the decision on the secular character of the state,
Article 14 of the Constitution of Montenegro (2007) separates religious
communities from the state, and says that they are equal and free to perform their religious rites and religious affairs.
All South-eastern Europe countries have regulated their relations
with churches and religious communities in accordance with modern
international and European standards on freedom of religion or belief
through enactment of related contemporary and democratic laws. On the
contrary, the Law on the Legal Position of Religious Communities of 1977
from the period of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, written in
spirit of Marxist-atheistic ideology, is still in effect in Montenegro today.
Despite the total obsolescence of the existing law, an encouraging
fact is that the Government of Montenegro has recognized the importance of enactment of a new law that will regulate the freedom of religion
or belief and the legal status of religious communities in line with the European Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms through additional protocols and other relevant and important
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international documents already incorporated into the current Constitution of Montenegro, as well as with the practice of the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg.
In order to mitigate the negative effects of the outdated law, the Government of Montenegro has recently signed the agreements on the regulation of relationships of common interest with the Holy See, and the Muslim and Jewish communities in Montenegro. The Government of Montenegro has to be complimented on the formation of mixed commissions
with each of the aforementioned communities towards the implementation of mutual agreements.
On the other hand, and in accordance with opinions expressed in the
recently passed Information on the Need for Adoption of the Draft Law
on Freedom of Religion, the Government of Montenegro is of the opinion
that ‘when it comes to the matters of Orthodox Churches in Montenegro,
the Government of Montenegro has not signed any agreements so far due
to numerous legal ownership and title disputes over cultural and historical
heritage between them, as well as of the opinion that ‘intensification of the
dialogue between the Orthodox churches should lead towards the signing of an agreement that will be a requirement for enactment of the new
law’. This document cites the experience of the Republic of Croatia as an
example of good practice, which first signed an agreement with the largest
religious community – the Catholic Church – and only then started drafting the Law on the Legal Status of Churches and Religious Communities.
Being responsible representatives of the largest religious community in
Montenegro, we must rightfully ask which ‘numerous legal ownership and
title disputes’ there are and before which court they are being brought
(such disputes do not actually exist), and how is it that Montenegro has
not signed the aforementioned agreements with the most numerous religious community in the country in the first place, and instead has ignored
the experience of the aforementioned neighbouring country and signed
agreements with all other traditional churches and religious communities.
It is also noteworthy that the Republic of Croatia did not make any discrimination in regards to making a decision on which church or religious
community the agreement is to be signed with, therefore regulation of
relations between this state and traditional religious communities is unthinkable without the signing of an agreement with the Serbian Orthodox
Church.
Furthermore, another step backwards is the decision of the Ministry
for Human and Minority Rights of Montenegro to omit representatives of
churches and religious communities from the procedure of preparation
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of the Draft of the Law on Freedom of Religion, despite the fact that the
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Mr. Dusko Markovic, had
previously informed representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church that
representatives of the churches and religious communities would also be
included in the work of the working group for preparation of the draft
law.
The constitution and the law should be the foundation for a firm
guarantee for adherence to religious rights and freedoms; it means that
the constitution (law) should not determine the identity of institutionalized religious communities, yet it is obliged to acknowledge the identity of
these communities founded upon their autonomous rights, i.e. in this particular case to acknowledge the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the
Littoral, and the Diocese of Budimlje and Niksic as the Orthodox Church
in Montenegro, which were canonically established eight centuries ago,
and whose legitimacy stems from the autonomous right of the Church
and whose identity is witnessed by the legal continuity of this acknowledgement in Montenegro.
The announcement of the introduction of the so-called Pulpit Law
(the “Kancel” Paragraph is the name for Paragraph 130 of the German
Criminal Code passed on the initiative of Bismarck in 1871, which prohibited clerics from expressing their opinions on secular issues during
sermons delivered from the pulpit) by the Government of Montenegro
‘in order to determinate the responsibility of religious communities in the
legal order due to the fact that their influence and presence in the society
and public life have been increasingly pronounced and come out of the
private sphere of the individual’ and bearing in mind European practice
on the limitation of the freedom of religion – it is best either to leave it
without comment or to take this discriminatory opinion as a relapse of
the revolutionary law created in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist doctrine
that threatens to introduce into the new law everything that should not
and cannot be introduced. Moreover, the announcement of the introduction (revival) of responsibility of religious communities for misdemeanours should be understood in the same fashion.
After the end of World War II (1945) the majority of property that
belonged to churches and religious communities was nationalized by the
revolutionary communist government. The Law on Fair Restitution (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, No. 34/02, 68/02 and 33/03)
dealt in detail with the issue of restitution of nationalized property to all
former owners, including churches and religious communities. This law
was soon declared unconstitutional and repealed. Another Law on Resti266
tution and Compensation of Property Rights was adopted later on (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, No. 21/04) and Article 8 of the
Law predicts that ‘the conditions, manner and procedures for restitution
of deprived property rights of religious communities shall be defined with
a special law’. In this manner, the issue of restitution, as well as other issues
related to the property of religious communities, remains to be regulated
more specifically with some future law. Amendments to this Law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, No. 49/07) allowed churches
and religious communities the opportunity to submit an application for
registering appropriated property in favour of national, state, social or
cooperative properties with the clear definition that the application itself
does not represent a request for the exercising of rights to restitution or
compensation (Article 8a). Later on, the state committed itself with the
Fundamental Agreement with the Holy See, and also the agreements with
Muslim and Jewish communities, to establishing a Mixed Commission
consisting of representatives of the parties, in order to define the property
that is to be transferred to church or religious communities’ ownership, or
to be adequately compensated for.
The need for regulation of restitution of deprived property rights to
religious communities through adoption of a separate legal act is also reflected in the Information on the Need for Adoption of the Draft Law on
Freedom of Religion. However, it is unclear how it is possible that the
Government has set as a precondition for the settlement of restitution and
compensation of property rights to religious communities enactment of
the Law on Freedom of Religion! Is that not an announcement of deeper
and misplaced interference by the government in the internal organization of churches and religious communities regarding such an important
issue as this?
A troubling example of violation of freedom of religion in Montenegro today is the problem of gaining permission for temporary residence
for ministers and religious workers of the Serbian Orthodox Church who
are not citizens of Montenegro but perform religious services in Montenegro. The Ministry of the Interior and Public Administration of Montenegro has issued on a regular basis temporary residence permits for these
people in accordance with regular legal documents. From July 2011, the
ministry suddenly changed its practice and started to demand ‘additional
clarification for the application with evidence that the religious community has been registered with the authorized bodies in Montenegro’. The explanation for rejection of such petitions was a tendentious interpretation
of the law from 1977 and the ministry’s claim that the Orthodox Church
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was not registered as a legal entity in Montenegro. In accordance with this
law, ‘the newly founded’ religious communities register their foundation
with the competent internal affairs authority (Article 2) within a period of
15 days from the day of its foundation. During the 35-year-long enforcement of this law, no government of that period had interpreted this law
in such a manner as to declare the Serbian Orthodox Church ‘a newly
founded religious community’.
There is a general consensus within the Orthodox Church of Montenegro, as well as within the members of the Legal Councils of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral and the Diocese of Budimlje
and Niksic, about the fact that the act of an additional, subsequent registration would not be just illegal but it would bring the Serbian Orthodox
Church to a position of being a newly founded religious community. With
such an act the Orthodox Church would give up its centuries-long legal continuity that has existed within all state formations on the territory
of present-day Montenegro. Unresolved restitution claims and property
rights would thus, of course, cease to be valid in relation to newly founded
religious communities’.
The unresolved legal status of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the
absence of a law that would regulate restitution of church property nationalized after World War II, as well as the systematic support of certain
segments of the government given to different anti-ecclesiastical associations, groups and individuals, indicate that a breach of the principle of
separation of Church and State thus occurred in this way, as well as the
infringement of the equality of religious communities proclaimed by the
Constitution of Montenegro in 2007. Such policies have led to numerous
incidents, attempts at the usurpation of church property, and personal and
legal insecurity of ministers, and has caused both mutual hatred and deep
division within society, explained away with the excuse of the ‘division
of the Orthodox community’ within the official programme of the ruling
Democratic Party of Socialists, adopted at its last party congress in 2011.
Moreover, the same programme proclaims its ‘commitment towards the
overcoming of divisions among the Orthodox population which would be
most favoured by the organizational independence of the Orthodox community with full adherence and promotion of Montenegrin state, national
and cultural identity and multiethnic harmony’. This opinion can be only
seen as the most violent form of interference by the ruling governmental
structures in exclusively internal ecclesiastical issues related to the canonical status of Orthodox churches.
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It can be concluded that the faithful of the Orthodox Church in Montenegro are confronted by numerous cases of infringement of their rights
to freedom of religion or belief; however, we are striving to find creative
and constructive ways to withstand these emerging challenges. Dealing
with such challenges contributes to the empowerment of civil society, not
only with the aim of ensuring the enforcement of the freedom of religion
or belief for our faithful in Montenegro, but also of contributing to overall
improvement of adherence to human rights in our young state. According to the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood
Policy, Stefan Füle, adherence to human rights, including the freedom of
religion, is a part of the Copenhagen criteria that must be met by all countries striving to join the European Union. In this regard, it is important
for the government of Montenegro to completely adhere to the rights related to freedom of religion of all churches and religious communities and
to provide implementation of national legislation.
In order to legally regulate relations between the state and churches
and religious communities, in a spirit of mutual trust and fruitful cooperation with the authorities of Montenegro, as well as in the interest of the
common good of the country and its citizens, it is necessary to respect five
basic principles: freedom of religion, neutrality of the state, the principle
of equality of religious communities, the right of churches and religious
communities to self-determination and cooperation between the state and
religious communities. These principles are defined in the Declaration
of Participants of the International Conference ‘The Legal Position of
Churches and Religious Communities in Montenegro Today’, held in Bar
in 2008 in accordance with the best practice of European legislation.
The largest religious community in Montenegro, the Serbian Orthodox Church, remains open for dialogue with the Montenegrin authorities in the spirit of mutual trust and deep appreciation. The willingness
expressed by the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Mr. Milo Djukanovic,
in the telegram welcoming the organizers of the conference, that he will
directly discuss this matter as well as any other with the representatives
of the Serbian Orthodox Church, obliges all participants in this process to
deal with this issue in a more responsible manner, which promotes partnership in areas of common interest.
Our participation in this event is a step in that direction. The culture
of human rights is a product of Christian civilization and, in the contemporary context, the fight for human rights represents the dissemination of
the Gospel’s timeless message of love and peace.
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Vjekoslav DOMLJAN
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRE FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND
PROFESSOR AT THE SARAJEVO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SCHOOL
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Joining
to the EU Through a Roundabout
i. A federation living along the
fault lines of three civilizations
At different times in history, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was part of
the Roman, Goth, Slav, Hungarian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. When the Austro-Hungarian empire crumbled at the end of World
War I, the country was made part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After
World War II, it became part of Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito.
Command economic systems, like former étatist systems used in the
Former Yugoslavia and other former European communist countries might
be successful for two decades. After applying the plan for two decades,
economies get complicated. Connecting too many producers to too many
consumers by the market is more precise and cheaper than by planners.
That is why the Former Yugoslavia introduced the market reform in
1965. That was the best Tito’s economic move. His best political move was
in 1948 when he broke up with Stalin. However, the economic reform was
abandoned in 1968.
Instead of introducing market reforms and having entrepreneurship
explosion, Yugoslavia got the implosion of nationalism. Consequently,
there were the Croatian spring 1969–71, constitutional reform from 1971
to 1974, foreign debts explosion from 1974 to1980, quarreling during the
1980s ending up with the civil war in 1991. This vicious circle triggered
by abandoning the market reform in 1968 ended with the dissolution of
Yugoslavia in 1991. Firstly, with the almost peaceful secession of Slovenia and then with the war ending in the independence of Croatia, BiH’s
northern neighbor, the war tore apart BiH from 1992 to 1995, ending with
the Dayton Peace Agreement signed by all parties in Paris in December
1995.
A historical atlas shows BiH criss-crossed by fault lines running from
the Baltic and Black Seas to the Adriatic. These fault lines separate three
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civilizations and converge in BiH. Along these cultural faults lines many
stresses have existed for a long time. Similar to geological faults, the EastWest fault line has existed since the ninth century. The European-Islamic
fault line has existed since the 14th century. Both have been the scene of
frequent eruptions.
BiH is located at the intersection of the Western European (Catholic
and Protestant), the Eastern European (Orthodox), and the Islamic (Muslim) civilizations. The country has served as a hotbeds of war many times.
Just as there have been centrifugal forces pulling BiH apart, there
have also been centripetal forces pulling it together. On the one hand,
differences between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs have become more acute;
on the other hand, internal conflicts have been moderated through a combination of rules to deal with inter-regional trade, united action in conducting international trade and central-state level institutions to deal with
international institutions.
ii. International value chain/
regional-based approach to development
The golden period of BiH’s economic development was 1882–1906, when
industrial growth was 12.4 % on yearly basis. In 1910, BiH’s GDP per capita
of 546 US$ was equal to Italy’s GDP pc and higher than GDP pc of Croatia,
Serbia, Greece, Russia respectively. Then “evolution without development”
(M. Pailaret) interrupted with a silver decade of 1960s.
Currently, BiH is a higher middle income country. Emerging from
the ‘middle income trap’ – being squeezed between cost-competitive and
technologically-competitive countries – asks for the government’s policy
facilitating resources reallocation from lower value-added industries to
higher value-added industries.
Being a small, two-layer federal (entites and cantons) country with
limited physical resources available, BiH can become strong global niches’
player by applying the robust international value chain/regional-based approach to economic development. Innovation policy could be attached to
chains/regions because one of the major challenges for BiH is to pave the
way for increasing the R&D expenditure, and to ensure that innovative
ideas are turned into products and services that create growth and jobs.
Government must play a constructive and catalytic role in promoting
regionally based chains/clusters, providing infrastructure, ensuring access
to education and finance, and supporting technology and innovation.
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However, governments may fail either because they do too little or
because they do too much. In order to prevent ‘visible hand’ to become
too heavy, it is necessary that government’s interventions are aligned with
a country’s comparative advantage, defined by factors endowments, primarily by knowledge and entrepreneurship.
The Export Growth Strategy 2012–2015’s vision of the 85% exports/
imports cover by 2015 are based on significant and potentially well-funded regional value chains and their potential to grow exports through joint
collaboration with universities and research institutes on research and innovation.
By ensuring that BiH can base its competitiveness on innovation,
design, quality and value-for-money rather than on price, they may contribute to diversifying the BiH export base and markets outside the RomeBerlin-Belgrade triangle, increase the number of exporters and the value
added of the BiH products.
iii. “Neretva valley” as BIH replica
of the silicone valley
The Western Balkan countries’ small size could be mitigated through regional cooperation. All of them should develop export forces, primarily
small and medium sized transnational manufacturing companies – socalled technical gazelles – capable of breaking into international markets.
That process of building up the sector of exportable high sophisticated manufactured goods may be accelerated through setting up the international development corridor that would include industrial zones and
technological parks.
An example of the Mediterranean way of the BiH to the EU is the
establishment of the Neretva Valley Development Corridor (NVDC). The
region along the valley of the Neretva River could be used for setting up a
cross-border development corridor and industrial zones. It has a number
of notable advantages: geographic proximity of EU, Southeast European,
North African and Near East markets, good transport links (highway, railroad, airline, river and sea transport), base of the best BIH transnational
companies, relatively cheap and skilled labour force, relatively numerous
and educated diaspora (emigrant community), region is relatively rich in
natural resources, and the possibility of development of many services
(tourism, transport, financial, etc.).
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“Neretva valley” provides an excellent opportunity for much-needed
reindustrialization of the region, which will, by products with higher technological content, return the region to the global map. The region has
been on the global map for non-economic matters long enough.
The NVDC would link political, economic, scientific, etc. organizations along the Neretva River from the town of Konjic to the town of
Ploče. Business will be able to develop cross-border economic linkages,
operate regionally and internationally within the natural geographical entity of the Neretva Valley, thus linking the southern part of BiH with the
Dalmatian coast of Croatia.
Regional companies in the Neretva valley region are interested in its
internationalization, while non-regional companies (companies outside
Herzegovina and Dalmatia) are interested in gaining new markets and increasing revenues, which could achieve by acting at the BiH market and a
joint performance with the BiH companies in third markets.
This region of former Yugoslavia can be changed from a place which
had been devastated by war and economic disintegration and become instead a prosperous and decent place to live.
It addition, the cross-border linkage could contribute to strengthening the negotiating position with the EU. It could also be useful for requesting better conditions from the EU: it would be less expensive for the
EU to absorb existing, albeit unstable and uncertain, cross-border entities
and revitalise links and co-operation between them, than to send its soldiers and aid to fix existing borders, or maybe establish new ones.
Results and lessons learned in the NVDC could serve as an example
for other areas and other countries in the region. Business will be able to
develop cross-border economic linkages, operate regionally and internationally within the natural geographical entity of the Neretva Valley.
This result would mean accepting new political reality, overcoming
the negative factors of fragmentation of the 1990’s, and preparing ground
for new opportunities of a prosperous, united Europe knocking at the
Herzegovinian door in 2013 when Croatia is joined.
It addition, the cross-border linkage could contribute to strengthening the negotiating position with the EU. It could also be useful for requesting better conditions from the EU: it would be less expensive for the
EU to absorb existing, albeit unstable and uncertain, cross-border entities
and revitalise links and co-operation between them, than to send its soldiers and aid to fix existing borders, or maybe establish new ones.
Industrial zones, e.g. aluminium industrial zone in Mostar could be
established within the corridor. Objective of establishing zone would be (i)
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developing the aluminum value chain by gathering a aluminum producer
to 20-odd aluminum manufacturers (car parts for which BiH was famous
and competitive before the war) and establishing energy efficiency and
other centers, and (ii) securing reliable and low cost supply of aluminum
to aluminum manufacturers (have parts poured on the spot, without no
transport costs, and big saving in energy consumption) and the possibility
to develop JIT production system. The premises for manufactures at the
port of Ploce (at the Adriatic sea) to a great extent available for manufactures (as Aluminum would be using them only for its inputs but not for
its outputs), and more productive use of land property (currently in use as
greenfield or at best vineyards and orchards).
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Zoran PETROVIĆ – PIROĆANAC
INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, SERBIA
Reality of the new Balkans:
Serbian Positions
“Democracy is inseparable fom the national souveraignty.”
General Charles De Gaulle “There is no people without territory”
Yves Lacoste
Abstract: Mining wealth attracted already the Third Reich and it attracts world capital
today. Coal reserves in Central Serbia are evaluated to some 35 years of exploitation,
and those in Obilić are evaluated in centuries. Nobody never mentions that more
than 60% of mining reserves of Serbia are in Kosovo and Metohija: coal, manganese,
zinc, cadmium etc. They represent tha base of natural ressources for our future. Let
us confess the deed - it is also the base of the future of the Albanians from Kosovo
and Metohija. This author thinks that Serbian state should never accept any final
painful solution of the Kosovo and Metohija problem which would not comprehend
just partition and common exploitation of minerals and waters between two peoples.
Western Balkans – what an unintelligent
and meaningless term
Washingtern is a wonder, it changes, without any hesitation, even sensless geogaphic non existent notions, because of their interests in the era
of the ressource wars, eneregy wars. Notion of the “Western Balkans”, as
a geographical and poilitical notion, was launched in the time of “Mister
Death”, as many people named ex – Secretary General of the NATO, Havier Solana, a man who signed the order to bomb Serbia in March 1999.
I asked many experts and politicians in the world: where this notion of
Western Balkans comes from, what is a purpose of it? Even a kid from
the elementary school should know the answer that Serbia is situated in
the Central Balkans. For me, it is a question of the wrong notion which
helped, linguistically and politically, to NATO to cripple Serbia territorially since 1999. A circle of the creators of the new security architecture and
geometry of the Southeast of Europe launched this inexact and meaningless
term, marking first of all Serbia as being in the Western Balkans. So, why
nobody ever mentions Eastern, Southern and Northern Balkans?
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Europe and a world in 2014
Most important events in Europe’ s geopolitical processes at the end of
2014 are:
1. Germany is back on the world scene and intends to become official geo – economic and geopolitical prime mover; 139 German
role in the process of the “gaining of terrain” in the Balkans was
decisive in last 20 years at least. Let us not forget that German
geo – politicologists named our region as their Southern Gate,
more than 100 years ago. Also – Grosswirtschaftsraum (“Grand
economic space”), designating for the region an auxiliary role of
the limited sovereignty. Serbia was, already during Hitler’s period
in Germany, at one of the two world main geostrategic directrices:
1. Flussingen – Vladivostok;
2. Danubian Zone – Minor Asia – Persia. And in the Ninetees,
during mentioned strategic works of Washingtern in the Balkans, Serbs become again, traditionally anarchic and troubling
factor. They are again some kind of hilfsvolkern (“auxiliary peoples”). It reminded people in this region to the German strategic notions in the Thirties of the last century, such as Kleinstaatgerumpel (the rests, the ruins of the small States); 140
3. NATO continues its aggressive moves towards Russian borders,
despite American – Soviet negotiations at the end of the Cold
War. They did agree that Americans will abstain from moving
closer to the Russian borders. There were any talks about eventual American help to neo – nazi forces in Ukraine in 2014.
Russians and Americans didn’t agree on eventual further integration of post – Soviet countries into the Euro – Atlantic institutional structures; Serbia, as no member of NATO, is pressured by Brussels structures to join Atlantic integration. Serbia
in the same time still lacks powerful ally – protector, and is en-
276
139
S ee: German state gathered in 2013 52 prominent experts as a multidisciplinary team to
make “elements of the German foreign and security policy for the changing world”. The result was 50 pages of a study named “New Power. New Responsibility. Elements of a German
foreign and security policy for a changing world”, SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, The German Marshall Fund of
the United States G | M | F., 2013.
140
S ome fellow colleagues could disagree with the author, but let us compare the period of the
disintegration of Yugoslavia in Ninetees, with this quotation of Rauschning in Thirties: “The
eradication of Yugoslavia as a united country, the reduction to a small Serbian core, which will
belong again to Germany and Hungary.”
circled by double NATO military and geopolitical ring made by
countries like: Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and also
by future members: Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (minus Republic of Srpska).
In his message to our X ECPD International Conference in Belgrade,
Federico Mayor speaks as an authentic intellectual and launches critics
openly against the way EU is organized, and says: “We are absolutely submitted to the market”, and that “in Greece, a cradle of democracy, the government was directly appointed by this market power”. 141 Mayor asks “how
it is possible that this substituted ethical values, democratic principles as it is
so lucidly inscribed in UNESCO’ s Constitution”. Mayor also claims: “United Nations system was substituted by plutocratic groups of G-7, G-8, G-20”.
He stresses a need to build a New Balkans in Europe, “which is submitted
to the external powers”.142 Even if he doesn’t directly mention USA, Federico Mayor obviously point to them, and considers them, as this author,
a Prime mover of Europe and the world. Mayor does not avoid, as many
intellectuals and politicians do, to openly name a crisis of democracy in
today’s world. This is also historical moment to reform UN.
To protect water, food, energy and national
identity of small nations in the Balkans
Looking at the Balkans in 2014, we see clearly that small and medium
countries are facing permanent attacks of the big predator corporations
wanting to submit under their total control resources of water, food and
energy of these nations – a category of common goods. Serbia and other
small countries are a perfect example. They are under permanent attacks
of those who lead actual energy wars. We have an example of the American military base “Bond steel”, constructed on the 700 hectares of Serbian land in the middle of Kosovo and Metohija. Those 700 hectares were
not rented, but taken manu militari, and occupied by the US. Now it is a
Jumping point for America to control strategic roads to Eurasia, and to
secure future western exploitation of the Kosovo and Metohija’ s strategic
minerals and coal. This is a “New Ramstein,” because Americans continue
gradually to abandon this famous base of the Cold War and to literally
141
S ee: Federico Mayor, Video message to the European Center for Peace and Development
Conference, 24. 10. 2014.
142
Ibid.
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transfer their equipment and people on our soil, as occupiers to stay for a
long period in the future. And having that in mind, how do we imagine
Reconciliation, Tolerance and Human Security in the Balkans?
National identity is also a victim in these vulture activities of the big
capital. The pressure is especially hard through the activities of (mostly American) companies controlling world GMO market (Monsanto &
comp.) And the definition of the sustainable development of nations in
the XXI century is: if you have not a sovereign natural resources and national identity, there is not a sustainable future.
I remember an original theme of the Socialist team in France, lead
by Mrs. Ségolène Royal, during a presidential campaign against Sarkozy
of the Socialist candidate. Her strongest point was to declare a need to
build the Sixt Republic, because the citizens in France (and elsewhere)
are dramatically losing their social participation space. Power is more and
more alienated from the citizens and concentrated in a few hands of the
political class.
If we take a look into ex – Yugoslav republics, now independent
states, we see everywhere that the West implanted the same model of new
and extremely greedy and primitive neoliberal capitalism. New implanted
owners of the factories and other capitalist institutions are precisely those
who never pay their taxes to the state completely, and who mostly don’t
fulfill their social obligations. They are the pillars of the modern neo –
liberal capitalism everywhere and so is in the Balkans. And they are also
building their wild version of New Balkans. That is the main reason why
all the countries in the region are in a long and deep systemic crisis, and
their inhabitants pauperized, in Serbia and in all other countries in the
Balkans.
Why do we rarely mention Americans in our
discussions about a future of the Balkans?
Ex-minister of foreign affairs of duying Yugoslavia, Vladislav Jovanović,
made public, in 2008, an unknown detail which explains a lot about the
projects of the big powers for the Yugoslav space: “Almost nobody was for
the preservation of Yugoslavia in that moment (1991). When Milošević proposes to Jacques Delors, European Comissioner in that period, as a solution
to receive whole Yugoslavia into European Community Delors propose s a
continuation of the federalization of Federation, according to the recepies
of Bakarić and Kardelj. Total dismemberment! The decision was, there278
fore, already made. For some time, Americans kept aloof, not because they
mourned Yugoslavia, but to proof to Europeans that they were not able even
to clean their own yard.”143
The Global Cop, non – European power – Americans, changed their
global doctrine since Ninetees, installing Bondsteel base in Kosovo and
Metohija, “delocalizing” in the same time, their ideologicaly outdated base
in Germany – Ramstein. I would even say that since Dayton Ageement in
November 1995, Americans officialized the status of Serbia which resembled to Gemany’ s and Japan’s since 1945. Madeleine Albright declared in
1995 that “Clinton administration proclamed a new sort of limited soverainghty for Serbia, justyfuing the intervention of the foreign forces in the
internsal affairrs of the sovereign state. Bush and Obama administrastions
continued to apply the same policy in our region.
During the civil war in ex – Yugoslavia, Washingtern overtly helped
Muslims, Croats and Albanians against Serbs. They regularly closed their
eyes to the illegal imports of weapons despite an embargo of the UN. After the war USA continued diplomatic, media and intelligence efforts to
help Kosovo and Metohija Albanians to fight against Serbs. As a great
finale, Americans bombed Serbs for 11 weeks, mostly with depleted uranium bombs, illegal ams, by the way.
We see today an obvious absence of America in the reflections about
Balkans and Europe’s discussions. And a key question is what are Americans still doing in Europe, and especially in the Balkans? Why they always
want to teach the world democracy? In the Balkans also, as everywhere in
the world, Washingtern144 is still a prime mover, and EU only a player. We
are talking about a geopolitics of the Global players 145
143
V. Jovanović, in: „Strah između Istoka i Zapada” (Fear between East and West), Revija
B-92, Belgrade, 04.03.2008.
144
is author named one of his books “Washingtern and Serbs. From the Trumann Eggs to
Th
Depleted Uranium”. It reflects a concept of the strategic inferior position of Serbia since
1945, and especially during the civil war in ex – Yugoslavia. Washingtern bombing was
a real “brave” act, of the US first of all - nineteen countries against little Serbia. Author
forged a neologism Washingtern to accentuate shocking resemblance between the organization of Komintern in Moscow and today’s unquestioned leadership of the USA in the Western world (NATO, etc.)
145
lobal Players are big forces like USA and Russia. States like China, India, Brasil (part of
G
the powerful new world block BRICS), Japan, Germany and EU, belong to the economically and politically decisive part of the world. To this “club” also belong the big transnational
companies with an economic potential exceeding 100 billion of dollars (and euros), employing more than 100.000 workers.
279
We in the Balkans should say – US have to leave Balkans and only
then we will successfully talk about reconciliation, tolerance and human
security in the Balkans, and we will finally find a peace. From the Serbian
point of view, it is impossible to forget that in the last decade of the last
century, USA were present in Albania in form of intelligence capacities
and coordinated activities with fighters of Oussama Ben Laden against
Serbs.146 They didn’t touch in Ben Laden, according to Israeli – American intelligence expert Yossef Bodansky. And Albania never explained its
scandalous behavior towards Serbia.147
Reconciliation, yes, but just one
Washingtern controls, since 1999, a so called Cvijic strategic directrice,
by “planting” their military base “Bondsteel”, between cities of Kačanik
and Uroševac, in Kosovo and Metohija, near FYROM. From there, they
control all thed space till Danube and Belgrade in the Noerth of Serbia
and sensibly improve Washingtern strategic position in the controlling of
whole zone of Eurasia. The Alliance has also in its control another important strategic point of the Balkans – directrice Bujanovac (south of Serbia?
– Bulgarian border). It is space of some 50km2 which is, according to a
French Geographer Michel Roux, “in tha case of intersection, undefendable”.
Albanians are, since decades, in historical offensive, dangerous one.
They want to achieve, more than 120 years now, a “Greater Albania”. They
are, from the geopolitical point of view, pushing too far, because they are
also a small people, like their other neighbors. They destabilize not only
Serbia, but also Greece, and most of Macedonia (state split in two parts,
Macedonian and Albanian, since several decades now). Montenegro has
asmaller “Albanian problem,” but it groves like everywhere in the region.
Geopolitically speaking, Albanians cannot defeat all 4 nations of the Balkans where live Albanians. Even Americans cannot guarantee them this
goal. Strategic and military process of the destruction of the “belly of Ser-
280
146
rench transcription and pronunciation of the Arab names is far more reliable than English
F
one, as French, know very well Arab civilization, much longer in history since ever.
147
I sraeli intelligence expert who worked for Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare at that time. See: Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden, The Man Who Declared
War on America, Forum, 1999; Offensive in the Balkans,The International Strategic Studies
Association, Alexandria, Virginia, 1995; Josef Bodanski, Neki to zovu mir. U iščekivanju rata
na Balkanu, Z. Petrović, Jugoistok, Beograd, 1998.
bia” – Kosovo and Metohija, is a finishing phase of the works on a New
European Security Architecture and Geometry of the South – Eastern Europe. But, they are wrong. Nothing is finished there. On the contrary, if
Albanians do not give up from the creation of the “Greater Albania,“we
could even have new conflicts in the region in the near future, only this
time this would not be a conflict between Serbs and Albania, but also
the Albanians against all other above mentioned countries in the region,
where Albanian minorities live.
Let us not forget that Serbia is in a strategic position similar to Israeli
position in the Midlle East (surrounded by a double strategic ring of enemies and potential enemies). Serbia could, potentially, also decide, and
in a short period, to form its own security umbrella, concretely with Russia. We mean by that the installation on its territory, for exemple, of the
Russian excellent Topol – M defense system, similar to American security
umbrella for Israel and Saudi Arabia.148
Currently, so called frozen conflicts exist in Moldova (Republic of
Transnistria) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), but Serbian –
Albanian conflict belongs also to this category. The biggest strategic mistake of Albanians and Serbs (and Yugoslavs in the past) was made after a death of Marshall Tito and Enver Hodja. Tirana and Belgrade were
not engaged seriously in negotiations then. For me, Prishtina is not a
capital of Albanians, but Tirana. Answers are in Tirana and in the future the negotiations should start not only between Serbs and Albanians, but with all the Balkan countries having “Albanian problem”. Essential element of the Balkans is a relationship between Albania and other
4 mentioned states of the region. Neither EU, nor UN, dealt with this
problem, and they will have to do it in the future, before Albanian aggressive continuation of the theme of “Greater Albania” unite those 4 countries of the Balkans against them. The author doesn’t develop this possible
option in the future to spread restlessness, but to propose a common reflection of the experts in international relations, geopolitics, together with
politicians. Reconciliation is possible, but only if we all put on the table
all those problems and face them with a courage and honesty. Open geo
– strategic dialogue with Tirana is a road to the just solution. Tirana and
Belgrade should open a dialogue in much more active way, because a solution is in the hands of both negotiators.
148
Imagine if Serbia decided to play a Russian strategic card on a long range, this would be a
real cauchemard for Europe, as well as for Americans.
281
We have to remember also that Kosovo and Metohija means a struggle for the right to sustainable development for Albanians from Kosovo
and Metohija, as well as for Serbs, who both face multinational bloodsuckers. That is why only the common exploitation of the resources in
that region, under permanent supervision of the UN, will bring durable
peace in the region.
Renewal of Serbia: Chinese Chanel and a Free
Economic Zone on Danube, a Third Millenium river!
François Thial, French expert in geopolitics, said intelligently: “In the decades to come, geopolitical options will be more and more linked to the geography of transport, and they will exceed a simple geogaphy of ressources, or
military geography”. In the middle of the civil war in Yugoslavia, in Ninetees, turkish ambassador in Belgrade told me, with enthousiasm: “Belgrade on Danube will become extremly important in XXI century, because
of its geopolitical position. Belgrade lays at exactly half a distance between
the Rhein / Main Channel and a Black See.”
We are witnessing the absence of advancement in the strategic matters in this tumultuous and seismic region of South – Eastern Europe,
the Balkans. We need a new strategic vision which will add new preoccupations to those already collected. Serbian political class is confused
between the “Russian” and “American” option. There is no fundamental
thinking about what is the gain and is there useful solutions for Serbia out
of this context. Serbian experts are openly pro Russian or pro American.149
The position authentically pro – European is still minority.
Serbia has a historical opportunity to finish with a several decades
of economic, political and cultural abyss. It is a question of a construction of the Water Bridge, Channel Belgrade Thessaloniki, 150 and also about another offer to the Chinese (and Russians, why not) to build on the
serbian partition of the Danube flow (577 km in Serbian souvereignty) a
free economic zone. This is a time to end with a strategic inferiority of the
Serbian state, and to come out of the long crisis, and this is a sure path to
282
149
lthough the last pools in 2014 showed that only 13 percent of the population in Serbia vote
A
for membership in the NATO, and more than 80 percent voted against NATO.
150
ater Bridge, Channel Belgrade – Thessaloniki, is an old project from 1909, by a professor
W
of the Technical faculty from Belgrade, Nikola Stamenkovic, who claimed that the total cost
of the Channel will be 66.380.000$, today a sum of several billions of dollars, which is not a
big problem for Shanghai Development Bank, starting in 2015.
this goal. Why EU wouldn’t support such projects, useful to all Danubian
countries? Danube is a historic chance for Serbia, but also for Germany,
Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and, of course,
Russia and Turkey.
One of our common chance in the region of the Central and Southeastern Europe is a BRICS, as an emerging international institution which
has real chances to initiate a more just economic and political organization of the world majority, a space that wants more harmonious life for
the future. Also, we are thinking about an authentic and renewed idea of
non alignment. It is clear that the financial institutions of BRICS (Shanghai Development Bank, for example) will help with cheaper credits to the
numerous developing countries.
Common exploitation of natural resources of
Kosovo and Metohija – the only solution
Kosovo and Metohija’ s Albanians started, since June 1999, simultaneously with the occupation by Washingtern (KFOR), tough and sistemic
operations of pressures on the Serbs in the southern Serbian province.
Their aim was to definitely strenghten a compact Albanian nation. The
shameful results of UN and international community in Kosovo and Metohija are known: ruined Christian orthodox churches and monasteries
of the inestimable value and in the category of the cultural heritage of the
humanity, numerous villages set in fire and destroyed, people killed or
expelled. Ethnic cleansing is almost completed and this is irreversible and
irreparable process.
The essence behind all those crimes against unarmed Serb civilians
lays in the implantation of the multinational companies which want to exploit natural resources of Serbia. We are talking about billions of dollars of
future profit of foreign companies. There is no nation in the world which
would calmly observe this looting without reacting.151 Natural resources in
Kosovo and Metohija are precious and vital for Serbs. I insist on this point
because it is a hard core of the conflict between Serbs and Albanians. It
is a wealth of the vital energy reservoir (coal) in Obilić, as well as other
mines, such as Trepča.
151
fter the proclamation of the independence of so - called Republic Kosova, “The New York
A
Times” wrote about British geologists mission on Kosovo and Metohija, who came to verify reserves of minerals to exploit in the future. See: The New York Times, March 26, 2008.
283
Mining wealth attracted already the Third Reich and it attracts world
capital today. Coal reserves in Central Serbia are evaluated to some 35
years of exploitation, and those in Obilić are evaluated in centuries. Nobody never mentions that more than 60% of mining reserves of Serbia
are in Kosovo and Metohija: coal, manganese, zinc, cadmium etc. They
represent tha base of natural ressources for our future. Let us confess the
deed – it is also the base of the future of the Albanians from Kosovo and
Metohija.
I think that Serbian state should never accept any final painful solution of the Kosovo and Metohija problem which would not comprehend
just partition and common exploitation of minerals and waters between
two peoples.152 I am deeply convinced that a durable peace in the Balkans
will not be possible before Albanians (both from Tirana and Priština) and
Serbs negociate, with perseverence and obstinacy, the just and durable
partition of the natural ressources. EU, USA and Russia should honestly
work together on this problem. And under a command of UN, of course,
because the UN still posesses a credibility needed to solve such a problem.
REFERENCES
Yossef Bodansky, Offensive in the Balkans, The International Strategic Studies Association, Alexandria, Virginia, 1995.
Josef Bodanski, Neki to zovu mir. U iščekivanju rata na Balkanu, Z. Petrović: Jugoistok, Beograd, 1998.
Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden, The Man Who Declared War on America, Forum, 1999.
Zoran Petrović Piroćanac, Mali pojmovnik geopolitike (Little Glossary of Geopolitics),
Centar za geopolitičke studije „Jugoistok” & Institut za političke studije, Beograd,
2004.
Z. Petrović Piroćanac, Geopolitika energije (Geopolitic of Energy), Institut za političke
studije, Centar „Jugoistok”, Beograd, 2010.
“New Power. New Responsibility. Elements of a German foreign and security policy for
a changing world,” SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, The German Marshall Fund of the United
States G | M | F., 2013.
Pierre Hillard, Les Ambiguïtés de la politique allemande dans la construction européenne, thèse de doctorat de sciences politiques sous la direction d’Edmond Jouve,
université Paris – V, 2005.
Zoran Petrović Piroćanac, Vašingterna i Srbi: od Trumanovih jaja, do Klintonovog
osiromašenog uranijuma (Washingtern and Serbs: From Trumann’s Eggs to Clinton’s Depleted Uranium), Instutut za političke studije, Beograd, 2013.
152
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alestinians and Israelis, for example, have a long conflict mostly because of minerals, oil in
P
the Mediterranean, and especially of waters.
Timi EĆIMOVIĆ
CHAIRMAN SCHOOL OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES,
ANSTED UNIVERSITY, MALAYSIA
The People of the Balkans – Peace,
Respect, Reason, Morality, Wisdom
and Sustainable Future
The presentation “The People of the Balkans – Peace, Respect, Reason, Morality, Wisdom and Sustainable Future”, is prepared by Prof. Dr Timi Ecimovic et al153 and for 10th
ECPD International Jubilee Conference “Reconciliation, Respect and Human Security
in the Balkan – The New Balkans and European Union: Peace, Development and
Integration”, Serbia, Belgrade, City Hall, October 24th and 25th 2014.
Abstract: The history of peoples of the Balkans is a history of wars. In the last 20
centuries only 50 year war free was time of Marshal Tito’s leadership of Yugoslavia.
But anyhow the history of Homo sapiens has countless wars. At present “The Globalization Era” with 1 % against 99 % and global leadership by “The Master Monster
Money” is a fast advancing time of great changes within the biosphere of the planet
Earth. When reaching unbearable conditions the existence of humans will cease. Our
only hope is not to advance so far and so fast. To assist a better understanding we are
presenting a short CV of Homo sapiens.
Key Words: Balkans, Biosphere, Climate Change System, Globalization, Homo sapiens, Morality, Peace, Reason, Respect, Sustainable Development and Sustainable
Future of Humankind and Wisdom.
Introduction
Present globalization is defined at the “Global Studies Encyclopedia”,
Mazour, Chumakov, and Gay, 2003 as “Globalization is amalgamation
of national economies into united world system based on rapid capital movement, new informational openness of the world, technological revolution, adherence of the developed industrialized countries to
liberalization of the movement of goods and capital, communicational
integration, planetary scientific revolution, international social move-
153
t al – Sir Peof Dr Roger Haw, Malaysia, Ambassador Dato' Dr And Ban Siong, China, Prof
E
Emeritus Dr Raoul Weikwe, Belgium, Prof Dr Igor Kondarshin, Russia and Greece, Prof
Emeritus Dr Matjaz Mulej, Slovenia, Prof Dr Truly Busch, Germany.
285
ments, new means of transportation, telecommunication technologies
and internationalized education”.
The presented definition is a summary of scientific research of human sciences – global studies, economy, finance, ITC, and many more. It
reflects the present, which is a summary of the past.
The presented definition is lacking networking & complexity of present and connections with the nature space and environment of the planet
Earth.
The living conditions within biosphere are changing due to impact of
the climate change system.
Before the discussion we are presenting a short CV of the Homo sapiens. Humans appeared some 202000 years ago.
It is hard to accept the truth. Philosophy of humankind as the main
treasure of the humanity, is asking for consideration of the truth. The present of the global community of humankind as a whole of the Homo sapiens species with 7.000.000.000 + individual representatives within 200.000
years of coexistence has recently opened questions about the truth and
option for a long-lasting of humans within the biosphere.
Peoples of the Earth are of one kind – Homo sapiens species. There
are no races among humans, but only different looks as per evolution
within the local environment-cum-culture-nature and nurture. Humans
as species are social creatures, and are among omnivorous – meaning eating any sort of food – both animal and vegetable food. It is also part of
human heritage from the nature.
Discussing the human genome, we have to accept, that human genome as well as any part of “living nature” and the nature as a whole (living, and by present thinking pattern of humans – other non-living nature)
are permanently evolving. The major influence for evolving in the nature
comes from characteristics of the environment and social contents.
When and if genome evolves negative relationship to the environment or environment changes the living conditions to which “living nature” including humanity has to adjust, it is a critical time for continuity
or longevity. It is what is at present of the biosphere environment and
global social system of humans.
Our present global community of humankind impact to the environment of the biosphere of the planet Earth is changing the living conditions. Every year damages and loss in lives and properties are higher
due to extreme climatic happenings – drought, rains, floods, high velocity
winds and tsunamis.
286
Discussion
Upbringing and education as the only professional program & system
represents few hundred national, not contemporary and individualistic knowledge learning curricula and have an educated human as a final
product. Reality of this most professional system impact to global community of humankind is mirroring the present:
• Changes in the biosphere are changing living conditions every day
worse – meaning – every day the toll in lives and properties are higher.
• The nature, space and environment quality is changing fast from
natural to by humankind poisoned.
• Humanity’s present pollution and resource depletion of biosphere
could be described as: “Today humanity’s overall pollution and resources depletion of the Nature of the planet Earth is higher than
yesterday and growing for the last hundred years”.
We could put a very long list of like above statements but it would
mean nothing because the humanity’s upbringing and schooling systems
are obsolete by curricula, national subjects and “Money Master Monster
Leadership”. To the best of our knowledge we need upbringing and education system for present – new universal upbringing and education system.
The best individuals of humanity with gift for teaching should work for
humanity.
The present global society does not allow mothers to have knowledge
needed for upbringing their children. The mothers as first educationist of
children should have knowledge and experiences needed for upbringing
peaceful, respectful, human with reason, rich of morality and wisdom and
caring for the nature of the planet Earth.
At present times humanity (1 % against 99%) is wandering along a
suicidal path.
The contents are globalization, “Money Master Monster Leadership”,
lack of: social and individual responsibility, peace, respect, morality, wisdom, sustainable development and sustainable future.
Let us present both sustainable development and sustainable future
of humankind.
• The Sustainable Development – has been the outcome of the
“Our Common Future” report during 1987 where the definition
of sustainable development was stated as follows: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs”.
287
The Sustainable Future of Humankind – has been announced at
Xiamen, China, on 25th September 2011. The short definition is “The
Sustainable Future of Humankind is Harmonious and Complementary
Coexistence of Global Community of Humankind and the Nature of the
planet Earth”.
Today humanity needs sustainable development and sustainable future for longevity.
So as all humanity it is also on Balkans Region and we are recommending the following:
1. Upbringing and education system should have new contents,
2. The methodology of sustainable development and sustainable future should be applied,
3. Contemporary research and scientific knowledge should find a
path to be a part of peoples of Balkan knowledge,
4. New approach for a better tomorrow of peoples of Balkan should
have priority.
Closing this presentation we wish to all of you peace, respect, reason,
morality, wisdom and sustainable future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“The Anthology 2 – 2001 – 2014”, digital book, Ecimovic and Mulej 2014, ISBN978961-92378-4-7 (pdf) multilingual and displayed at www.institut-climatechange.si
288
Boško BOJOVIĆ
UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
SOCIAL SCIENCES, PARIS, FRANCE
De Cause à Effet les Grandes Puissances,
les Balkans et le Déclenchement
de la Grande Guerre
“L’histoire va devoir passer aux aveux”,
Victor Hugo
Comparé aux fronts d’Ouest et celui de l’Est qui impliquaient des forces
et des opérations infiniment plus importantes lors de la Grande guerre,
le front d’Orient était un théâtre d’opérations secondaire, voire un champ
d’action auxiliaire, notamment dans les années 1916–1917.
Le théâtre balkanique eut néanmoins une importance disproportionnée dans le déclenchement et même dans l’achèvement victorieux de
la Grande guerre, puisque c’est la percée inattendue de l’Armée d’Orient
(précédée par l’armée serbe) en automne 1918, qui précipita la réaction en
chaîne de capitulation de la Bulgarie, puis de l’Autriche et enfin celle de
l’Allemagne.
Avec l’attentat de Sarajevo, l’ultimatum et l’attaque de l’Autriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie en juillet 1914, le déclenchement de la Grande guerre
et l’aboutissement d’une suite d’événements impliquant la succession de
l’Empire ottoman, la rivalité des grandes puissances et l’aspiration des peuples (balkaniques, mais aussi ceux du Proche et Moyen Orient) issus de
cet empire tentaculaire, a une émancipation politique et culturelle.
La Question d’orient, euphémisme désignant la succession de
l’homme malade du Bosphore, fut à l’origine du Congrès de Berlin 1878.
Le concert des grandes puissances avait, à cette occasion, la ferme attention de juguler cette redoutable crise chronique sur le flanc sensible du
sud-est européen.
Entre 1878 et les guerres balkaniques, la Turquie s’avéra incapable de
remplir les obligations qui lui étaient imposées par les clauses du Traité
de Berlin154. La patience excessive des grandes puissances, autant que leur
laxisme dans la mise en application de leurs propres décisions, allait être
154
ont notamment les clauses relatives aux droits civiques, la représentation de «l’élément inD
digène» dans les pouvoirs locaux en rapport à la scolarisation des populations chrétiennes,
289
un facteur déterminant dans l’éclatement de la première guerre balkanique en 1912.
La défaite fulgurante de la Turquie, suivie de celle de la Bulgarie lors
de la deuxième guerre balkanique en 1913, allait bouleverser l’équilibre
factice issu du Congrès de Berlin et ouvrir la voie à l’éclatement du conflit
mondial auquel les grandes puissances se préparaient depuis des années –
tout à fait indépendamment de la Question d’Orient.
Un conflit mondial qui ne fut pas simplement l’expression d’un réajustement de rapport de forces à grande échelle, mais aussi et surtout un
bras de fer entre le passé et l’avenir, l’immobilisme levantin et la modernité, le féodalisme et la démocratie, les empires d’un autre âge (privés des
institutions démocratiques comme le suffrage universel) et le droit des
peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes.
Lors de ce conflit entre anachronisme et modernité les petits pays
balkaniques aspiraient à une européanisation démocratique et libérale, alors que les grands empires, ottoman, austro-hongrois, russe et allemand,
réfractaires eux réformes structurelles et aux changements en général, luttaient pour leur suprématie, afin de préserver leurs systèmes de privilèges,
érodés par le temps et les abus à toute échelle.
La croissance démographique et la capacité de mobilisation lors de
l’éclatement de la première guerre balkanique, ne sont pas seulement des
phénomènes contigus, ce sont surtout des paramètres de mobilité et de
modernité, par opposition à l’anachronisme des empires, faisant partie
des éléments délimitant deux types de société en ce début du XXe siècle.
Ainsi, en 1912 les pays balkaniques ont fait preuve d’une remarquable capacité de mobilisation (de plus de 90%) dans les délais fort performants à
l’échelle européenne, alors que l’armée turque eut toutes les peines à mettre sur pied (de l’ordre de 50%) de ses potentialités de conscription.
Contrairement à la plupart des pays européens, y compris et surtout
des pays balkaniques, la Turquie du début du XXe siècle était en pleine
déflation démographique.
En 1913 la population de la Turquie (dans ses frontières actuelles)
est estimée à quelque 15,8 millions155. Organisé par la République de
deux fois plus nombreuse que les musulmans dans les Balkans et environ dix fois moins
scolarisés que ces derniers.
155
290
“La population de l’Empire Ottoman, dans les limites actuelles de la République, est estimée à 12,5 millions d’individus en 1884 et 15,8 millions en 1913, soit une croissance annuelle moyenne sur trois décennies de 8,1 pour mille”, cf. Ceren Inan, “Population de la
Turquie. Évolutions démographiques depuis 1927”, Démographe, vol. 9, Institut d’études dé-
Turquie en 1927, ce premier recensement indique environ 13 millions
d’habitants156.
Ce recul de près de trois millions d’habitants en 14 ans ne s’explique
que par le départ forcé, la déportation et l’extermination de la plus grande
partie des populations chrétiennes entre 1915 et 1919–1922/23, perpétrés par l’Empire ottoman et la jeune République de Turquie. Alors que
l’immigration des populations musulmanes en Turquie est recensée de
manière aléatoire, encore bien moins de données officielles existent pour
les populations chrétiennes expurgées de la Turquie moderne.
L’extermination de populations entières en Turquie trouve son sinistre écho en Autriche-Hongrie dès le début de la Grande guerre, alors
que des populations civiles sont également exposées aux exécutions sommaires et aux déportations selon les critères ethniques et confessionnels,
bien qu’à une échelle moins systématique. S’ensuivent les exactions et
exécutions sommaires perpétrées par l’armée et la gendarmerie austrohongroise à l’encontre des populations civiles lors de l’occupation des pays
balkaniques. N’ayant trouvé qu’un écho très limité dans les médias, sans
aucune sanction juridique, y compris dans le Royaume de Yougoslavie
(afin de ne pas envenimer les relations interethniques), l’impunité de ces
crimes à grande échelle et à caractère ethnocide à certainement contribué
au déchaînement de la folie génocidaire à l’échelle industrielle lors de la
Deuxième guerre mondiale*.
Publié à la veille de la Grande guerre, c’est à bon escient que le volumineux rapport de la fondation Carnegie fait état des atrocités commises
notamment lors de la deuxième guerre balkanique en 1913. Il est d’autant
mographiques de l’Université Montesquieu–Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux 2007, p. 5. Comparé
au 15–18% pour dix ans, soit deux fois plus en moyenne en Serbie, ou le premier recensement est de fait réalisé en 1834 (Leposava Cvijetić, „Попис становништва и имовине у
Србији 1934 године” /Recensement de population et de biens en Serbie 1834/, suivi de: V.
Stojančević, „Копије извештаја руских конзула о стању у Турској 1964” /Copie des rapports des consuls russes sur l’état de la Turquie en 1864/, in Miscellanea 13, Belgrade 1984),
p. 9–118 et 121–135; en 1858 en Autriche.
156
“Estimée en 2005 à 73 millions d’habitants, la population de la Turquie a pratiquement
quintuplé entre les recensements de 1927 – premier recensement réalisé par la République
– et 2000 (dernier recensement organisé), passant de quelque 13 millions d’habitants à 67
millions (figure 1). En fin de transition démographique, qui pourrait intervenir vers 2025–
2030, on s’attend communément à ce que la population de la Turquie dépasse les 90 millions (Division de la Population des Nations unies, Projections de population mondiale. Révision 2006)”, cf. Ceren Inan, “Population de la Turquie. Évolutions démographiques depuis
1927”, Démographe, vol. 9, Institut d’études démographiques de l’Université Montesquieu–
Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux 2007, p. 1.
291
plus singulièrement incompréhensible que les atrocités de la Grande
guerre n’ont pratiquement fait objet d’aucune commission d’enquête internationale comparable à celle organisé par la Fondation Carnegie en 1913.
Une attitude sélective issue des stéréotypes de pacotille a largement
contribué à une interprétation erronée et de courte vue des réalités au
sein d’une partie éminemment sensible de l’Europe. Le rôle disproportionné du Sud-Est européen dans le déclenchement de la Grande guerre
est largement imputable à cette attitude d’irresponsabilité et d’incohérence
face à un baril de poudre singulièrement révélateur et déclencheur aux
dépens de la sécurité de l’espace européen.
Alors que les nations et les États de l’Europe semblent avoir appris la
mise en pratique du bon sens à l’issue de la Deuxième guerre mondiale,
la gestion de la succession yougoslave, voire actuellement l’attitude face à
la crise ukrainienne, révèle un singulier déficit de sens commun dès lors
qu’il s’agit de s’élever au-dessus d’un manichéisme partisan et simpliste
devant la complexité des conflits limitrophes qui impliquent pourtant au
plus haut degré leur propre sécurité.
Au cas où l’expérience d’un passé si peu révolu et susceptible d’avoir
un rôle ultime à la cour des grandes puissances) pourrait être sérieusement prise en compte, ce passé jalonné de marques tragiques aurait pu
avoir un sens, une signification, une valeur. À défaut, nous serions condamnés à la recopie de la leçon, cette fois-ci avec des conséquences indubitablement irréversibles.
À l’issue de pratiquement un siècle de luttes pour l’émancipation des
peuples et des pays balkaniques par rapport à la domination ottomane, les
deux Guerres balkaniques (1912 et 1913), représentent le dénouement de
la Crise d’Orient. Impliquant tous le pays des Balkans, ces deux guerres
sont l’aboutissement de la phase culminante de cette Question d’Orient
sensiblement factueuse de la sécurité de l’Europe dans une des périodes
les plus stables de son histoire, celle qui s’étale entre la fin des guerres
napoléoniennes avec le Congrès de Vienne (1815) et le Congrès de Berlin (1878), un dénouement qui était censé mettre un terme à la dite “poudrière balkanique”.
Alors que le délabrement de “l’homme malade du Bosphore” créait un vide singulièrement inquiétant pour le maintien du rapport de
forces établi entre les grandes puissances européennes, la progressive
affirmation des petites nations balkaniques se déroulait dans un imbroglio d’interférences entre les intérêts croisés et contradictoires des
plus grandes puissances du XIXe siècle. L’Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie
avaient départagé leurs zones d’intérêt entre parties orientale et occi292
dentale des Balkans avec, dans un premier temps, une ligne de démarcation théorique qui allait de Belgrade à Thessalonique. La principauté,
puis le royaume de Serbie, ayant été largement dominé jusqu’en 1903
par une sorte de tutelle autrichienne, cette ligne de partage en puissance
entre les deux empires s’établissait en pratique le long de la frontière orientale de la Serbie.
À ce rapport de forces se superposait depuis le milieu du XIXe siècle
le jeu d’influences des puissances libérales et modernisantes, l’Angleterre
et la France, qui par leurs agents comme le prince Czartorisky, favorisaient la création des jeunes états nationaux dans le but de supplanter les
anachronismes des voisinages septentrionaux et orientaux du Sud-Est européen. Il est révélateur à cet effet que les programmes nationaux des pays
balkaniques furent formulés de manière quasiment synchronisée à cette
époque157. Aussi lointaine que légitime héritière de la première civilisation maritime de l’histoire de l’Humanité, la Grèce était tout naturellement dévolue à la protection de la plus grande puissance maritime de ce
XIXe siècle – l’Angleterre. Enrayer un effondrement subit ou trop rapide
de l’Empire ottoman était le souci majeur de l’Empire britannique – de
peur qu’un tel dénouement puisse ouvrir la voie des mères chaudes par les
détroits qui rallient la Mer Noire à la Méditerranée au redoutable Empire
de Russie dont les potentialités et autres ressources naturelles et humaines
étaient un sujet de préoccupation majeure pour l’hégémonie britannique.
Encore plus redoutable était la puissance montante de l’Empire allemand dont l’Autriche-Hongrie devait devenir l’instrument de sa politique
d’expansion depuis la partie centrale du Continent européen en direction
de sa partie sud-est. C’est au Congrès de Berlin que le chancelier Bismarck
put faire sa démonstration d’arbitrage et de coordination entre les intérêts
entrecroisés des puissances rivales. Ce fut en fonction des intérêts germaniques que Bismarck procéda à un réajustement des rapports de forces sur
le Continent, alors que la Conférence de Berlin en 1884 impose un partage de l’Afrique et de l’Asie entre les empires coloniaux d’une quinzaine
des pays euro-américains, dont la Russie, la Turquie et les États-Unis.
Après le consensus de la Sainte Alliance au début du siècle, une sorte de
G5, élargi à un G-15 avant-coureur, devait régir le sort de l’Europe et du
157
D. Mackenzie, Balkan Bismarck (East European Monographs, No. 181). 467pp, Boulder,
Col. 1985; Id., Ilija Garašanin – državnik i diplomata, Beograd, 1987, p. 65; B. Bojović, “Entre convergences et disparités. Les Balkans entre ingérences et responsabilisation (XIXeXXe s.)”, Историјски записи, LXXXIII/1 (2010), p. 55–72; Id., Византија-Балкан-Европа
(Byzance-Balkans-Europe), Belgrade 2014, p. 275–277 (sous presse).
293
reste du Monde à l’aune d’un nouveau siècle, avec des événements autrement plus tragiques.
Quelle pouvait être la marge de manœuvre des petits pays et de
jeunes nations balkaniques face aux enjeux autrement plus déterminants
que leurs ambitions aussi improbables qu’unilatéralement légitimes. Ce
fut néanmoins le surcroît des rivalités des grands qui ménageait une sorte
d’hiatus qui rendit possible la création de l’Alliance balkanique qui devait
sonner le glas de la Turquie européenne, tout en servant de prélude à la
Première guerre mondiale158. Démonstration, s’il en est, du côté précurseur et révélateur des Balkans pour l’histoire des recompositions des rapports de forces et des plus grandes guerres européennes159.
Rapports de la diplomatie ottomane
(une hypocrisie consensuelle à l’échelle européenne)
Pressé mollement par les puissances européennes de remplir les obligations stipulées par le paragraphe 23 du Traité du Congrès de Berlin, la
Turquie ne s’empressait pas d’honorer ses obligations imposées par ses
protecteurs européens. La Porte misait sur la rivalité entre les “petits pays
balkaniques”160 et surtout sur les rivalités entre puissances européennes.
294
158
S . Audoin-Rouzeau, H. Rousso, Anne Duménil, Ch. Ingrau, “Les sociétés, la guerre et la
paix, Europe, Russie-URSS, Etats-Unis, Japon, 1911–1946”, Historiens et géographes, n° 383,
octobre 2003, p. 137–212, publient une bibliographie des guerres de cette époque avec un
total de 1 375 titres, dont seulement cinq consacrés aux guerres balkaniques, alors que J.J. Becker, “La guerre dans les Balkans, 1912–1919”, Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps
(2003), p. 4, reconnaît que l’historiographie française s’était “peu intéressée aux Balkans dont
les peuples avaient pourtant subi les effets de la guerre à partir de 1912, et pendant sept ans”,
cf. F. Guelton, “Les opérations militaires lors des deux guerres balkaniques de 1912 et 1913”,
in J.-P. Bled et J.-P. Deschodt (dir.), Les guerres balkaniques 1912–1913, Paris 2014, p. 19.
159
. Bojović, ”Балканы между евроатлантическими интеграциями, их препятствиями
B
и задержками – Восточный вопрос – от развязки до новых путаниц (1878–2011)”,
Зборник радова Међународног научног скупа: Россия и Балканы в течение последних
300 лет – Русија и Балкан током последња три стољећа, Москва-Подгорица 2012,
p. 127–142; Id., “The Balkans – an indicator and anticipation of euro-atlantic contradictions”, National Reconciliation, ethnic and Religious Tolerence in the Balkans. Reconciliation
and Human Security, Center for Peace and Developement of the University for Peace established by the United Nations, Belgrade 2013, p. 31–49.
160
insi, le 10 octobre, Tvfik Pacha rapporte depuis Londres (n° 1155), qu’une désignation de
A
caïmakans bulgares ou grecs dans différentes cazas selon la proportion de nationalité d la
population “comme le l’avais fait remarquer alors au Baron de Calice, n’aurait fait qu’exciter
davantage les rivalités et l’antagonisme des deux éléments hostiles bulgare et grec”, Ottoman
diplomatic documents on the Origins of World War One. The Balkans Wars 1912-1013 (First
part), ed. S. Kunarlap, G. Tokay, The Isis press, Istanbul 2012, p. 147.
Une politique qui allait trouver ses limites à l’issue d’un enlisement qui ne
pouvait rester sans dénouement dramatique. Plus de trente années s’étaient
écoulées depuis que la Porte ottomane avait mis sur pied un projet de loi
en 1880 qui devait permettre la mise en œuvre des réformes exigées depuis le Congrès de Berlin et qui était la condition première du soutien des
Européens à l’intégrité territoriale et à la souveraineté de la Turquie dans
les Balkans. Des réformes qui devaient notamment alléger les conditions
déplorables des populations chrétiennes dans la Turquie européenne161.
Alors que la remarquable diplomatie ottomane s’employait face aux puissances européennes à remettre toujours à plus tard les réformes que la
Porte s’était engagée à réaliser, les opinions publiques dans les Balkans, les
tensions sur le terrain des opérations des factions rivales en Macédoine et
ailleurs, l’anarchie et l’insécurité, ainsi que les exactions des musulmans
albanais contre les populations chrétiennes dans ce que l’on appelait alors
la Vieille Serbie, favorisaient des regains de tensions. L’incapacité du concert des cinq grandes puissances à pousser la Sublime Porte à engager des
réformes substantielles dans ses trois provinces balkaniques ne pouvait
qu’inciter les pays balkaniques à imposer une solution concertée par voie
militaire.
Après avoir conclu un système d’alliances secrètes et autres accords
militaires162, la Bulgarie, la Serbie, la Grèce et le Monténégro accomplissaient en bonne et due forme leurs mobilisations au début de l’automne
1912. Tant et si bien que les alliés ont réussi à mettre sur pied près d’un
million d’hommes appelés sous les drapeaux. La Bulgarie avec 296.000
hommes et la Serbie plus de 284.000 (en plus de 56.000 hommes des
troupes auxiliaires et 1.500 comitadjis), avec les 45.000 militaires de réserve cantonnées en Serbie, le total représentait plus de 402.000 mobilisés, la Grèce mobilise plus de 108.000 appelés, sans compter ceux de sa
marine qui était de force égale, sinon supérieure à celle de la Turquie et
qui devait remplir une tâche essentielle – empêcher l’acheminement des
renforts ottomans depuis l’Asie Mineure. Le plus petit des alliés, le Monténégro, aligna plus de 35.000 hommes, ce qui représentait le taux im-
161
u milieu du XIXe siècle les populations chrétiennes sont plus que deux fois plus nomA
breuses que les musulmans dans les Balkans (env. 10 millions d’orthodoxes et arméniens,
ainsi que 640.000 catholiques, contre 4.550.000 musulmans), cf. H. Bozarslan, Histoire de la
Turquie. De l’Empire à nos jours, Paris 2013, p. 160.
162
. Raspopović, „Velike sile i stvaranje saveza balkanskih država 1912” (Les grandes puisR
sances et la création de l’Alliance balkanique 1912), Istorijski zapisi LXXXV 3/4 (2012), p.
7–28.
295
pressionnant de plus de 16% de sa population. La Serbie et la Bulgarie
atteignent aussi des taux de mobilisation impressionnants, respectivement
14% et 12% de leurs populations. Les taux de mobilisation côté ottoman
furent en revanche particulièrement faibles, au point que les unités de ses
armées n’étaient pourvues qu’a 50% environ des effectifs prévus selon leurs
formations. Avec quelque 300.000 soldats mobilisés, l’infériorité numérique qui s’ensuivit, ainsi que, et vraisemblablement surtout, le moral des
troupes des pays balkaniques, pèseront lourd quant à l’issue des opérations de guerre. À ce chiffre il faudrait adjoindre un nombre indéterminé
d’irréguliers albanais, plus aptes au pillage qu’aux opérations de guerre et
qui joueront un rôle mineur lors des opérations militaires163.164
Bulgarie
Serbie
Grèce
Monténégro
Empire ottoman
Population
4 300 000
2 900 000
2 700 000
220 000
26 000 000
Armée en campagne164
370 000
255 000
120 000
44 000
340 000
À l’approche et lors du déclenchement des hostilités, la correspondance diplomatique entre les représentants de l’Empire ottoman dans les
capitales européennes est particulièrement révélatrice quant à l’état des esprits en Turquie à la veille des bouleversements majeurs du début du XXe
siècle. La diplomatie ottomane déploie ainsi de considérables efforts afin
de susciter une action énergique des Européens contre les agissements des
“petits pays balkaniques” dont la Bulgarie est perçue comme chef de file
incontestable. Face à une attitude bien plus réservée de l’Angleterre par
rapport à ce qu’elle fut lors de la guerre italo-turque (1911), elle évoque
même la solidarité des populations musulmanes dans l’Empire britannique avec celles de la Turquie165.
De même que la dépêche chiffrée n° 661, en date du 2 octobre, dans
laquelle Rifaat Pacha rapporte depuis Paris:
296
163
. J. Milićević, Balkanski ratovi (1912–1913) (Les guerres balkaniques: 1912–1913), BeoM
grad 2013 (sous presse). Alors que les Albanais musulmans étaient l’instrument principal de
la domination ottomane dans les Balkans et en Europe, cf. H. Bozarslan, Histoire de la Turquie. De l’Empire à nos jours, Paris 2013, p. 189.
164
Présenté
en chifres arrondis et synthèse issue de différentes sources, ce tableau est tiré de
l'article de colonel Frédéric Guelton, “Les opérations militaires lors des deux guerres balkaniques de 1912 et 1913”, in J.-P.
165
ttoman diplomatic documents on the Origins of World War One. The Balkans Wars 1912–
O
1013 (First part), ed. S. Kunarlap, G. Tokay, The Isis press, Istanbul 2012, p. 106.
“Le ministre de Bulgarie a fait à M. Poincaré une communication de
la part de son Gouvernement demandant des réformes en Macédoine166.
Le président lui a répondu que ce n’est pas au moment où la Sublime Porte
avait décrété des réformes qu’il convenait de les lui imposer. À cela le Bulgare dit que le gouvernement impérial avait fait plus d’une fois pareille
promesse sans les tenir. J’ai dit au Président que nous ne consentirons pas
à une telle ingérence dans nos affaires intérieures et que nous ferons nousmêmes les réformes.
De tout ce que j’entends, j’ai l’impression que la guerre me paraît de
plus en plus inévitable; les représentations des Puissances ne produisent
pas un effet voulu. Une seule intervention aurait pu empêcher les États balkaniques de se lancer dans l’aventure, c’est celle de l’Autriche avec la Russie
réunies sans arrière-pensée. Malheureusement, rien ne fait prévoir cela.
Dans ce cas, comptons sur nous et préparons-nous en conséquence”167.
Le 3 octobre, depuis Berlin, n° 564, Osman Nizami rapporte que son
interlocuteur allemand:
“…croit que la Russie ne voudra pas aller jusqu’à une pression matérielle sur la Bulgarie. La Russie, dit-il, tout en voulant éviter absolument
la guerre, ne voudra pas abandonner les Bulgares et Serbes au sort qui les
attend s’ils démobilisent sans avoir rien obtenu ou sans se battre” (Ottoman diplomatic documents..., cit. p. 113).
Le 4 octobre, depuis Londres, Tevfik Pacha, rapporte (doc. n° 1114),
les termes de la note soumise par les pays balkaniques aux Puissances et
dans laquelle elles exigent:
“au moins une autonomie pour la Macédoine, la Vieille Serbie et
l’Albanie, égale à celle de la Crète et du Liban, sous la protection des Puissances” (ODD..., p. 121).
Le 5 octobre, Tevfik Pacha relate néanmoins que:
“Déjà peu avant la guerre turco-hellénique, quand une conférence
des ambassadeurs était réunie à Constantinople pour examiner et étudier
l’application des réformes en Macédoine malgré l’unanimité des autres Puissances, l’ambassadeur d’Autriche-Hongrie seul s’était opposé au projet de
166
u début du XX e siècle la Turquie compte 3.217 écoles, dont 363 appartenaient aux comA
munautés non musulmanes, alors que les populations non musulmanes constituent environ
40% de la population de l’Empire (H. Bozarslan, Histoire de la Turquie. De l’Empire à nos
jours, Paris 2013, p. 178). Cette disproportion de scolarisation aux dépens des non musulmans et encore plus importante dans les Balkans et notamment en Macédoine.
167
O
297
gouvernement autonome pour les provinces de Roumélie. C’était d’ailleurs
là une conséquence des ambitions politiques de l’Autriche-Hongrie” (ODD,
p. 127).
Un exemple des divergences au sein du concert des puissances, signe
avant-coureur, s’il en est, des difficultés qui seront à l’origine de la Première guerre mondiale.
D’autant que, le 6 octobre, Mavroyéni Bey signale depuis Vienne une
divergence similaire entre Allemagne et Angleterre (ODD, p. 133).
Le 9 octobre, Fuad Hikmet Bey signale depuis Belgrade (doc. n°
399), que:
“M. Daneff aurait déclaré que la guerre était inévitable si la Turquie
n’exécutait pas un moment plutôt les prescriptions de l’article 23 du traité
de Berlin” (ODD, p. 140).
Dans le n° 406, il indique que le :
“Monténégro aurait déclaré la guerre (à la Turquie) sans consentement préalable de la Serbie, mais sur l’incitation de la Bulgarie” (ODD, p.
141).
Le 10 octobre, Moukhtar Bey rapporte depuis Athènes les propos
bien pesés de Venizélos :
“si nous sommes déçus dans nos espoirs, le peuple hellénique sait
qu’il peut avoir confiance en son armée et en sa flotte”. Paroles jugées
beaucoup trop modérées par la population d’Athènes qui allait manifester
son soutien devant les ambassades de Serbie et de Bulgarie, alors que: “les
journaux de l’opposition commentaient défavorablement le discours du
Roi qu’ils trouvaient trop pacifique en comparaison de ceux tenus par les
chefs d’État des autres pays balkaniques” (ODD, p. 146).
Le même jour, depuis Pétersbourg (doc. n° 732), Turkhan Pacha, reprend les mots de M. Neratow, disant que:
“les Puissances étant tombés d’accord sur la formule de réformes à
introduire dans les provinces de Roumélie sur la base de l’article 23 du
Traité de Berlin, ont chargé leurs ambassadeurs à Constantinople pour arrêter d’un commun accord l’ensemble de ces réformes et la manière de les
notifier collectivement au gouvernement impérial” (ODD, p. 147).
Ces démarches ultimes avaient pour effet d’afficher un consensus de
façade alors que les rivalités entre les puissances européennes auguraient
des implications autrement plus graves. Ainsi dans la dépêche émise le
13 octobre depuis Vienne, par Mavroyéni Bey (doc. n° 37 428/1192), ce
dernier signale:
“ce qui est certain, c’est que l’Autriche-Hongrie tâchera de déloger,
même par les armes, toute puissance qui réussira à s’accaparer du sandjak de
298
Novi Pazar. Le danger donc d’une guerre non seulement balkanique, mais
encore européenne, réside là, car la Russie ne manquera pas – dans le cas de
la réalisation de ladite éventualité – d’entrer elle aussi dans la mêlée” (ODD,
p. 155).
Des divergences entre les Puissances que Mavroyéni Bey signale encore plus explicitement le 17 octobre (doc. n° 1231) depuis son observatoire de Vienne:
“La grande difficulté d’un accord entre les Grandes Puissances réside principalement dans l’opposition des intérêts austro-germaniques et
slaves”168.
Ce qu’il faut situer aussi dans leur contexte des tensions intérieures
de plus en plus vives en Autriche-Hongrie peuplé en grande partie de nationalités slaves (46% contre 44% d’Autrichiens et Hongrois). Ainsi, en
Dalmatie, en Croatie et en Slavonie l’opinion publique croate suivait avec
le plus grand intérêt les opérations de guerre dans les Balkans, tout en
manifestant un soutien ascendant à la Serbie169.
La duplicité des dirigeants des puissances européennes à l’égard de
la Turquie qui se dégage des rapports de la diplomatie ottomane, reflète
une sorte de consensus tacite quant à l’abandon de l’Empire irréformable
à son sort jugé irrémédiable. Alors que le démantèlement de la Turquie
européenne s’avère imparable, l’issue de la deuxième guerre balkanique ne
pouvait qu’attiser encore plus les rivalités et les tensions entre les grandes
puissances européennes.
JUIN 1913 – DEUXIÈME GUERRE BALKANIQUE
Après la fin précipitée de la Turquie européenne avec la défaite de l’armée
turque et le triomphe des “petits pays balkaniques”, (ainsi désignés dans
la correspondance de la diplomatie ottomane), une ligne de front s’était
établie entre l’armée bulgare et les armées serbe et grecque. Cette ligne
suivait le partage des opérations entre les alliés en Macédoine orientale
durant la guerre contre la Turquie en 1912. Le gros des forces bulgares
ayant été engagé du côté de leur front oriental, la Deuxième armée serbe
dut leur venir à la rescousse pour la prise d’Andrinople, toute la Macédoine septentrionale fut libérée par les armées serbes, avec le concours
quasiment symbolique d’une division bulgare.
168
O
169
S . Matković, „Hrvatska percepcija balkanskih ratova” (La perception croate des Guerres balkaniques), Istorijski zapisi LXXXVI 3/4 (2013), p. 69–83.
299
Les hostilités entre Bulgares, d’un côté et les alliés serbes et grecs
furent déclenchées les 15 et 16 juin 1913 le long de cette ligne de partage devenant une ligne de front. Suite à la victoire de l’armé serbe lors
de la bataille de Bregalnica et après que la Roumanie s’engageât contre
la Bulgarie, la Grèce faisant barrage à toute ouverture bulgare sur la mer
Egée, la défaite de cette dernière dans la Deuxième guerre balkanique était
consommée.
Alors que la Turquie ne pouvait qu’observer de loin cette nouvelle
guerre, les relations étoffées et pertinentes de sa diplomatie sont particulièrement révélatrices des jeux de rivalité entre anciens alliés balkaniques,
ainsi que et surtout de l’évolution du positionnement des “Grandes Puissances” européennes.
Ainsi, Séfa Bey relate au 9 juillet depuis Bucarest, que le Gouvernement de Russie ne consentirait à intervenir en faveur de la Bulgarie
qu’à condition et tant:
“que la Bulgarie n’aurait pas mis bas les armes, elle ne devait attendre
aucun appui de la Russie” (ODD, II, p. 198)170.
Comprenant un système d’alliance et en fonction des implications
des grandes puissances, avec des mobilisations efficientes et des mouvements de troupes coordonnées et rapides, les guerres Balkaniques ont été
les premières guerres modernes à l’échelle régionale et européenne. Elles
ont été le prélude à la Première guerre mondiale à bien des égards, ainsi
que de la modernité du XXe siècle, y compris l’implication des considérations humanitaires.
Arbitrages, interprétations et ingérences
à l’échelle d’un siècle de conflits
Les deux guerres balkaniques ont suscité une vive attention dans les pays
occidentaux, si bien que la Fondation Carnegie (fondée en 1910), constitua une commission chargée de faire une enquête approfondie sur ses
débordements touchant aux valeurs humanitaires171: “Attribuées au roi de
Grèce, les accusations ahurissantes des atrocités bulgares nous offrent une
grande occurrence pour une action concrète” (Eliot Rothe, président de
300
170
O
1013 (Second part), ed. S. Kunarlap, G. Tokay, The Isis press, Istanbul 2012, p. 198.
171
. Simiić, „Izveštaji Karnegijeve zadužbine za međunarodni mir o balkanskim ratovima iz
P
1914. i 1996. godine” (Les rapports de la Fondation Carnegie sur les guerres balkaniques de
1914 et 1996), Istorijski zapisi LXXXVI 1/2 (2013), p. 131–150.
la fondation)172. Formée avec 8 membres issus d’Allemagne, Angleterre,
Autriche-Hongrie, France, Russie, USA, sous la présidence du sénateur
français d’Estournelles de Constant, la commission d’enquête rendit publique ses travaux en 1914. On peut y trouver des assertions relatives aux
conceptions du concert des grandes puissances d’avant l’Europe de Versailles et qui laissent à comprendre le consensus tacite qui avait laissé libre
cours à l’Alliance balkanique contre la Turquie.
“…alors qu’elle avait été jugée impossible, cette victoire collective des
alliés contre la Turquie, que nous continuons à considérer comme magnifique, devait libérer l’Europe du cauchemar de la Question d’Orient,
tout en lui offrant un modèle d’union et de coordination qui lui faisait défaut (…); nous savons que cette guerre (balkanique) était le prélude d’une
seconde guerre fratricide entre les alliés et que cette deuxième guerre était
beaucoup plus cruelle que la première”173.
Quant aux responsabilités:
“Les véritables responsables de cette longue liste d’exécutions sommaires, d’assassinats, d’incendies, de massacres et de cruautés dont fait
état notre rapport d’enquête, ne sont pas, encore une fois, les peuples balkaniques (…) Ne condamnons pas les victimes174. Les véritables coupables
en sont ceux qui du fait de leurs intérêts et inclinaisons, faisant valoir que
la guerre était inévitable, ont agi en conséquence, arguent qu’ils étaient
dans l’impossibilité de l’empêcher”175.
La conclusion de ce Rapport de 1914 est on ne peut plus édifiante:
172
e Other Balkan Wars: A 1913. Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New
Th
Introduction and Reflections of the Present Conflict by George Kennan, M. Abramowitz,
Preface, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. 1993. p. 1.
173
e Other Balkan Wars: A 1913. Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New
Th
Introduction and Reflections of the Present Conflict by George Kennan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. 1993. p. 1.
174
S ur le thème sensible de la mémoire et de son instrumentalisation, il est dans les usages près d’un siècle plus tard de porter des jugements bien plus tranchants, moins nuancés
et surtout dépourvus d’impartialité. Développant son argumentaire sur l’usage d’une “mémoire exemplaire potentiellement libératrice” et assimilée à la “justice”, (p. 31, 32), auquel
doit obéir un travail d’historien fait de “sélection et de combinaison nécessairement orienté
par la recherche, non de la vérité, mais du bien” (p. 50), ce qui ne peut manquer d’aboutir à
un choix “entre deux buts différents; non entre science et politique, mais entre une bonne et
une mauvaise politique” (p. 50), cf. Tz. Todorof, Les abus de la mémoire, Arléa, Paris 2004;
en s’impliquant dans ce “nouveau culte de la mémoire”, cet auteur semble avoir fait ses choix
de prédilection en revenant notamment presque plus souvent sur les crimes attribués à un
seul parti en Bosnie (p. 48, 26, 52, 55), qu’à ceux des nazis durant la Deuxième guerre mondiale (p. 10-12, 14, 16, 28, 34, 38-40, 43).
175
The Other Balkan Wars, op. cit., p. 18.
301
“Qu’est-ce qui est le devoir des pays du monde civilisé dans les Balkans? Il est clair qu’ils doivent en premier lieu cesser d’exploiter ces peuples pour leurs intérêts particuliers. Ils doivent les encourager à conclure
des accords d’arbitrage en insistant là-dessus”.
Le sous-entendu des Balkans à l’antipode du “monde civilisé” s’impose
ici en témoignage d’arrogance et d’aveuglement à la veille du déclenchement d’une barbarie dévastatrice sans précédent dans l’histoire du monde
et de l’Europe.
Ce qui laisse entendre aussi que la prétention aux meilleures intentions peut anticiper les pires conséquences.
Après un siècle de guerres européennes et mondiales, de guerres civiles et de guerres balkaniques qui inaugurent cette impressionnante suite
de tragédies dévastatrices, force est de constater que leur interprétation
témoigne de l’évolution d’un monde en pleine mutation. La remarquable
discrétion dans la commémoration des guerres balkaniques pourrait et
devrait sans doute susciter des études comparées et multidisciplinaires,
elle est un signe des temps dont nous avons peine à mesurer encore la
portée. Il suffirait de comparer substantiellement les deux rapports de la
Fondation Carnegie176, pour en avoir une première idée. Alors que le parallélisme de ces deux paradigmes de l’implication des grandes puissances
et de perception extérieure qui en résultent ne peut qu’être l’objet d’études
et de relectures ultérieures, force est de signaler qu’à moins d’un siècle
176
302
otation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale. Enquête dans les Balkans, Rapport, présenté
D
aux Directeurs de la Dotation par les Membres de la Commission d’enquête, Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, éditions Georges Crés et Cie, Paris 1914; Report of the International Commision. To Inquire into the Causes and Conduits of the Balkan Wars, Carnegie
Endorment for International Peace. Division of Intercourse and Education. Publication n°
4, Endorment, Washington 1914; M. Abramowitz, Preface, The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913.
Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections of the
Present Conflict by George Kennan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. 2nd edition, June 1, 1993, 418pp.; Nicholas Murray Butler (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), explains the need for the compilation of the report in the
preface: “The conflicting reports as to what actually occurred before and during these wars,
together with the persistent rumors often supported by specific and detailed statements as
to violations of the laws of war by the several combatants, made it important that an impartial and exhaustive examination should be made of this entire episode in contemporary historie” (http://archive.org/stream/reportofinternat00inteuoft#page/n5/mode/2up), cf. Vivien
Magyar, “The Two Carnegie Reports: From the Balkan Expedition of 1913 to the Albanian
Trip of 1921”, Délkelet Európa – South-East Europe International Relations Quarterly, Vol.
3. No.1. (Spring 2012) 2 p.; Nadine Akhund, “The Two Carnegie Reports: From the Balkan
Expedition of 1913 to the Albanian Trip of 1921”, Balkanologie, Vol. XIV, n° 1–2 | décembre
2012, [En ligne], mis en ligne le 06 février 2013. URL : http://balkanologie.revues.org/2365.
d’écart, l’impartialité de ce regard extérieur est loin d’avoir évolué en faveur
d’un bon sens le plus élémentaire. Une instrumentalisation idéologique et
politique avérée de l’arbitrage international, sans même parler de niveau
intellectuel et méthodologique, ne peut être un gage probant pour l’avenir
de ce point si sensible dans la géopolitique de l’Europe, exposé aux influences et rivalités toujours plus contradictoires.
Déplorant les victimes civiles de toutes les parties, le Report de la Fondation Carnegie de 1914 apparaît comme sensiblement plus impartial et
bienveillant. Il stigmatise ces crimes tout en signifiant qu’il refuse de juger
les victimes (peuples et communautés) qui appartiennent à tous les pays
des Balkans. Victimes d’une barbarie issue d’une cruauté anachronique à
la manière turque et balkanique et qui avait de quoi heurter les sensibilités
académiques des rapporteurs occidentaux. Anachronisme que la modernité
allait supplanter et centupler par des atrocités à une échelle industrielle.
Force est de constater que de tels rapports sont particulièrement
déficitaires à l’issue de la Grande guerre qui est pourtant à l’origine des
exterminations d’une ampleur autrement plus grande touchant des populations civiles, mais aussi des militaires, par des gaz mortels et autres
préfigurations des industries exterminatrices qui allaient singulariser les
pages les plus tragiques du XXe siècle européen.
Ainsi, les exécutions sommaires des milliers de civils, hommes,
femmes, enfants, notamment serbes, en Hongrie méridionale (Srem,
Bačka, Zemun) perpétrés dès les premiers jours des hostilités déclenchés
le 28 juillet 1919 par la gendarmerie, l’armée et la police austro-hongroise;
les exécutions par milliers des populations notamment rurales en Serbie
de Nord-Ouest (Mačva177, Podrinje) en 1914 et en 1915 par les AustroHongrois, encore des milliers des populations civiles en Serbie méridionale (Toplica, Prokuplje) en 1917 par les armées d’occupation austrohongroise et bulgare178; des exécutions sommaires des milliers de civils au
177
lus de 3.000 civils, hommes, femes, enfants et vieillards furent somairement executés en
P
12 jours seulement rien que dans le district frontalier de la Mačva, dès août 1914. Sens
tenir compte des conventions de La Haye, l’armée austro-hongroise avait des consignes
ecrites pour appliquer en territoire serbe la plus grande rigueur et séverité envers les populations civiles, Слађана Бојковић, М. Пршић, О злочинима аустро-угаро-бугаро-немаца
у Србији 1914–1918, Београд 1997; Id., Страдање српског народа у Србији 1914–1918
(Le calvaire du peuple serbe en Serbie 1914–1918), Историјски музеј Србије / Стручна
књига, Belgrade 2000, p. 10–11.
178
e chiffre de 8.767 victimes civiles des représailles comises par l’armée austrohonL
groise et bulgare dument recensés s’élève jusqu’à une estimation qui porte le chiffre à
20.000 victimes dans les districts de Toplica, Vranje et Kopaonik, Слађана Бојковић,
М. Пршић, op. cit. p. 17.
303
Monténégro (1916–1918) et en Bosnie-Herzégovine179, encore par l’armée
et la gendarmerie de l’occupant austro-hongrois180, ainsi que bien d’autres
qui n’ont point trouvé d’écho dans les rapports d’enquête et autres instances de publication occidentales181. Alors que ces crimes d’ampleur sans
précédent ont été relatés dans les médias182 et dûment documentés183, y
compris par les experts occidentaux les plus compétents184. Une discrimi-
304
179
. Ćorović, Црна књига. Патње народа Босне и Херцеговине за време светског рата
V
1914–1918 (Le livre noir. Les souffrances du peuple de Bosnie-Herzégovine lors de la
Guerre mondiale 1914-1918), Belgrade 1989.
180
armi les prisoniers de guerre internés dans les camps de concentration on estime à 2/3
P
de ceux aui sont morts en Autriche-Hongrie et environ ½ en Bulgarie. La délégation serbe
à la Conférence de Versailles avait soumis une liste de 1.247,435 victimes de la guerre en
tout, ce qui représente près de 1/3 de sa population et fait de la Serbie le pays avec le plus
grand nombre de victimes par rapport au nombre sa population, В. Стојанчевић, Србија и
српски народ за време рата и окупације 1914–1918 (La Serbie et la peuple serbe du temps
de la guerre et de l’occupation 1914–1918), Leskovac 1988.
181
. Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens 19.–21. Jahrhundert, Wien-Koln-Weimar 2007;
H
Х. Зундхаусен, Историја Србије од 19 до 21 века, Belgrade 2008, p. 237–241.
182
enri Barby, le correspondant du Journal de Paris, Crawford Price, celui du Times, ainH
si que le photographe russe Tchernov, ont été parmi les plus connus de ces reporteurs de
guerre, (cf. Le Miroir, n° 50, 8 nov. 1914; n° 52, 22 nov. 1914 ; The Times History of the War,
vol. II, Printed and Published by “The Times”, London 1915, p. 394–400), sans que ces reportages, ainsi que des rapports de la commision composé des universitaires serbes en février 1915 soient sérieusement prises en compte et relayés dans la autres médias occidentaux.
183
. Искруљев, Распеће српског народа у Срему 1914 и Маџари. Са маџарске границе,
Т
Бајски трокут, Сент Андрија (La crucifixion du peuple serbe dans le Srem 1914 et les
Hongrois. Depuis la frontière hongroise, le Triangle de Baïa, Saint André), Novi Sad 1936,
640 p. + 61 ph.; В. Ћоровић, Црна књига – патње Срба Босне и Херцеговине за време
светског рата 1914–1918 (Le livre noir de la persécution des Serbes de Bosnie et Herzégovine au cours de la Première guerre mondiale 1914–1918), Belgrade 1989; Ј. R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, Cambridge University Press, First published
1996, Second edition 2000; Слађана Бојковић, М. Пршић, Страдање српског народа у
Србији 1914–1918 (Le calvaire du peuple serbe en Serbie 1914–1918), Историјски музеј
Србије / Стручна књига, Belgrade 2000, 629 pp.; M. Portmann, Aspekte des nationalen
Konflikts in Bosnien-Herzegowina von 1878 bis 1945, Grin Verlag 2001; Ђ. Стоичић,
Јиндриховице – маузолеј српских заробљеника и интернираца из Првог светског рата
(Jidrihovice – mausolée des prisonniers et internés serbes de la Première guerre mondiale),
Belgrade 2006.
184
n premier rapport du criminologue et professeur à l’Université de Lausanne Archibald ReU
iss, bien qu’ incomplet et effectué en septembre-novembre 1914, alors qu’une partie de la
Serbie était déjà sous l’occupation, fait état de plus de 2.300 victimes dans la Mačva, dont
1750 hommes, 570 femmes et 87 enfants de moins de 10 ans, alors que 489 hommes et 73
femmes étaient portés disparus. Les 1.500 déportés de la ville de Šabac ne sont pas inclus
dans de décompte. Les atrocités commises lors de ces exécutions sommaires et autres barbaries de l’armée austro-hongroise sont dument décrites et scientifiquement classé par le
criminologue suisse, avant d’être rendues publiques dans une partie de la presse à Lausanne,
nation des victimes corollaire à l’impunité des exécutants et autres coupables qui demeure occultée, alors qu’elle ne peut être étrangère à l’ampleur
des atrocités envers les populations civiles, des peuples et des populations
entières, qui sévissaient dans l’Europe asservie aux nazis lors de la Deuxième guerre mondiale.
En fonction des enjeux politiques et des rivalités d’influence, comme
si aucun enseignement ne pouvait être tiré des expériences tragiques du
XX siècle, l’arbitrage de la “communauté internationale” lors du démantèlement sanglant de la fédération yougoslave et sa part de responsabilité
quant à ses conséquences est très loin d’avoir été perçue d’une manière
désintéressée et impartiale. Situant les conflits sanglants des années quatre-vingt-dix dans un contexte de barbarie entaché de stéréotypie balkanisatrice, le deuxième rapport de la Fondation Carnegie est un modèle
d’instrumentalisation politique d’un arbitrage ultra-sélectif sous couvert
des considérations humanitaires. Sous forme d’un consensus civilisateur
au sein du concert des grandes puissances, celui de 1914 est empreint
d’une certaine inconscience, autant que d’un sentiment de supériorité que
la barbarie sans précédent de la modernité n’allait pas tarder à déchanter.
Le Rapport de 1998 marque le climax d’une domination occidentale, en
même temps que l’amorce de son reflux irrémédiable, déclin et régression indissociables de mystifications que seule la responsabilisation de ses
acteurs de premier plan est susceptible d’enrayer et de dés-irrationaliser.
Paris et Amsterdam, sans pour autant connaître une plus vaste diffusion, émois ou indignation dans les médias des pays alliées. Report upon the atrocities committed by the AustroHungarian army during the first invasion of Serbia Rodolphe Archibald Reiss – Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., Ltd., London en 1916; R.-A. Reiss, Les infractions aux règles
et lois de la guerre, Ed. Payot 1918; Z. Levental, Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, criminaliste et
moraliste de la Grande guerre, Lausanne 1992; А. Рајс, Ратни извештаји из Србије и са
Солунског фронта. Необјављени текстови на српском језику, Београд 2014.
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v Concluding Remarks
Concluding Remarks
307
Akio Kawato
PRESIDENT OF THE ECPD COUNCIL
Closing Remarks
Ladies and Gentlemen
Our conference is coming to a close. This year as many as 42 people took
podium with most diversified views, which are rich in content and sincere
in intention. As a newly elected President of the Council I am now fully
convinced that this international conference plays a very important role
for peace and development of the Balkans, because this is a rare venue, in
which opinion leaders of the interested countries gather every year, compare notes and exchange views on how to facilitate reconciliation and coordination in the region.
Now this conference, which has been held under the title of “Reconciliation, Tolerance and Human Security in the Balkans”, has had the tenth
anniversary, and it is now time to explore a new horizon. In other words
the ECPD will ponder about a new theme, under which it will conduct a
new series of annual international conference from next year on.
During the conference many speeches were dedicated to the conventional issues about values and mores. But as a national of Japan, which
underwent drastic change in ways of thinking during 150 years of economic development, I may say that values and mores and sometimes even
the form of the state are not static and that they can change as economic
development changes the society. It does not mean that the old values get
destroyed simply to be replaced by vulgar and disorderly “global” values.
We Japanese have succeeded, I hope, in preserving some positive traits in
our values, while adapting ourselves to modernity.
Therefore, it is time not to stay in the same place and not to keep
lamenting about the lost niceties of the past. The modern economy is
now stepping in a new phase of ultimate paradigm change; technology
is intruding into the area, which used to be prohibited for human kind’s
approach. They are the CIT technologies, genetic engineering, nano-technology, use of brain signals and so on. They will provide the people, especially younger people, with opportunities to engage in something new and
Concluding Remarks
309
to create wealth on them. In Japan and China, too, the youth are taking
advantage of the new era, starting up numerous venture businesses.
Besides venture business foreign direct investment is the key for rapid economic development. Instead of permanently waiting for subsidies
from the EU the Balkans would be able to start utilizing their own geographical location; if they conclude free trade agreements with both the
EU and the Eurasian Union, the Balkans would become ideal place for
production for foreign companies.
During the conference many participants spoke about the advent of
a “new cold war”, but judging from their speeches one would safely be
able to say that the confrontation is not yet irreversible. Much depends
upon the Ukrainian situation. In this regard reason and restraint are required from all interested parties, and the largest and the foremost priority should be put on the safety and well-being of the local people.
As regards the Balkans, current East West tension is intensifying the
tug of war between the NATO and the EU on one side and Russia on
the other. The Balkan countries are now required to determine their position in this rivalry. The ECPD and its annual international conference
can make its own contribution in this regard, offering a valuable occasion
for free and frank exchange of opinions and coordination of positions.
For example the outspoken and insightful speech of Prof. Milo, former
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania, was one of the highlights of this
conference.
This closing remark is tentative, it later will be circulated to the participants for comments. Besides, the ECPD is always open for your advice
and proposal.
Last but not least this conference would not have been realized without the relentless efforts of Prof. Negoslav Ostojic, Executive Director of
ECPD, and his competent staff. The interpreters’ work was also indispensable. Please give them applause.
310