Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

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Nationalism and Ethnic Politics
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The political transformation of the Maronites of
Lebanon: From dominance to accommodation
Simon Haddad a
a
Notre Dame University, Lebanon
Online Publication Date: 01 June 2002
To cite this Article: Haddad, Simon (2002) 'The political transformation of the
Maronites of Lebanon: From dominance to accommodation', Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics, 8:2, 27 - 50
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The Political Transformation of
the Maronites of Lebanon:
From Dominance to Accommodation
SIMON HADDAD
The aim of this article is to examine the shifting trends in Maronite social and
political behaviour in the context of Lebanese politics by drawing on a number of
recent surveys. The examination focuses on six dimensions related to feeling
towards sectarian leaders; perceived self-identity; political estrangement and
political efficacy; intra-group attachment; propensity for inter-group cooperation;
and preferred political arrangement. The findings suggest positive intra-group
attachment, strong preference for Maronite leaders and at the same time dislike for
some of them, with a feeling of pride and distinctive Lebanese nationalism.
Respondents manifested unfavourable attitudes towards cooperation with other
Lebanese religious groups, particularly the Muslims. Finally, the answers point to
low support for a Christian autonomous entity and overt preference for a unitary
political system.
Western group theorists coined the term 'protracted social conflicts' to
denote cultural or identity-bound conflicts. According to Abraham,
'These confrontations are also called "people wars" in which groups of
people attempt to destroy each other for land and power in a nation'.1
What they all have in common, however, is a minimum of ideological
content that can cut across their differences and unify a nation.2 Examples
of this type of conflict3 are extremely common in multi-ethnic or
developing societies where nation-building has been largely unsuccessful
because of three factors.4 First is the dominance of parochial political
loyalties over national ones: parochial ties may be racial, ethnic, religious,
sectarian, linguistic, tribal or clan - or any mixture of the above. In this
case, attachment to the nation and its political institutions seems alien,
foreign or irrelevant to oneself. In many nations, the loss of parochial
identifications may seem extremely threatening because it appears to
destroy one's social identity.
Simon Haddad, Notre Dame University, Lebanon
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.8, No.2, Summer 2002, pp.27-50
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
28
NATIONALISM and ETHNIC POLITICS
Second, there is a lack of widely accepted and operating civil procedure
for conflict management. In many developing nations, the failure of civil
procedures in conflict resolution stems from a widespread inability to
concede that political conflicts should be resolved according to abstract
rules that are enforced through national political institutions and based on
impersonal standards rather than traditional modes of conflict resolution.
Third, the prevalence of political distrust between social groups, in
fragmented political cultures, is often endemic to inter-group relations.
Thus a clash between tradition and modernization results in communal
strife. All protracted social-ethnic-religious conflicts possess common
features, which involve issues of identity, possession of 'historic lands',
racial/ethnic exclusiveness and religious prejudices.
Group theory literature provides insight into the emergence and
consolidation of groups, their functions and inter-group relations. Several
conflict-group theorists directly relate the rate of inter-group conflict to the
extent of group cohesiveness.5 Members of a cohesive group desire to
remain in their group, have positive attitudes towards their group and enjoy
a great level of communication among group members. In this context,
Deutsch proposes that in-group cohesion causes out-group hostility:
In-group cohesion is fostered or preserved by displacing internal
conflict and internal frustration onto other groups, thus reducing
internal dissention. Group leaders may deliberately foster antipathy to
another group as a ploy to maintain or increase in-group loyalty to
their leadership. Also antipathy may be employed to discredit internal
opposition by identifying the opponents with the hated group.6
Fielder7 asserts that inter-communal hostility enhances group cohesiveness
and that reduced external threat tends to loosen group cohesion. Intense and
unresolved conflict between groups exacerbates out-group hostility.
The elite or leaders of the group serve also as a vehicle for strengthening
group cohesiveness. More likely, the elite believes that its particular
grievances or aspirations are congruent with the group as a whole. By
pressing its preferred political strategy on the entire group and mobilizing
group solidarity behind its recommendations, the leadership is confident
that the group is also served best. It is far better for both leadership and the
group that the elite raises itself through improving the group's general
political and social position while simultaneously using, maintaining and
strengthening its links to the group. And the ethnic group's lower classes are
persuaded that their security welfare and expectations are best served and
enhanced by such intra-ethnic cohesion than by trans-ethnic class solidarity.
The extent of cohesion is a function of a group social, political and
economic organization, past and present. It tends to be greater among groups
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF LEBANON'S MARONITES
29
that are concentrated in a single region rather than dispersed.8 Groups with
traditional authority structures are intact and relatively cohesive. Political
movements and parties constitute agencies of communal political fiction, but
it is rare for one political organization to incorporate most or all members of
the group. Religious organizations provide strong networks that form the
basis for political mobilization. A person's potential for political mobilization
varies with the scope of pre-existing organizational networks.8
Foreign sympathizers can contribute substantially to a communal
group's cohesion and political mobilization for collective action by
providing material, political and moral support. Mordechai Nissan9 suggests
that external intervention on the side of the community may contribute to
the strengthening of such a group. Foreign assistance can inject new
aspirations, self-confidence and a national dream for collective struggle.
Perceived threats to the dominance or to the established interests of a
group can also act to spur mobilization. Groups may demand greater
representation, group autonomy, economic empowerment, hegemony or
recognition and protection as a distinct cultural entity.
In this case primordial loyalties, i.e. ethnicity, become effective tools of
mass mobilization. This is especially true when social relations are
structured around patrimonial models, and resource distribution is
subsequently essential to maintaining patron-client relationships. Social
forces attach themselves to the state through vertical networks and by
incorporating local institutions. This serves to strengthen primordial
identities on one hand and, on the other, to make the state a battleground for
the interests of communal groups. Most importantly, many scholars argue
that ethnic conflicts are mainly attributed to collective fears of the future.10
'As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve
strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for
tremendous violence and often involve the possibility of one side's
extinction.'" Political struggles consequently take place either within the
framework of the state or outside the legitimate political sphere.
The purpose of this study is to examine socio-political values pertaining
to members of Lebanon's Maronite community in relation to the theoretical
setting presented in this introduction in order to provide a better
understanding of Lebanese Maronite attitudes towards their environment.
The next section describes the normative values of the Maronites, the
historical evolution of the community and the roots of the confessional
divisions within the Lebanese political system. The article will deal then
with Maronite basic political orientations, which will be assessed relying on
a number of variables. The study is conducted by drawing on a number of
recent surveys and, to the degree they permit, comparing Maronite
responses to samples of Lebanese communities.
30
Background of the Maronite Community
The Maronites represent the largest and most strident Christian group in
Lebanon. They are the followers of Saint Marun - from whom they take
their name - an ascetic monk born in north-east Syria in the seventh century
who adopted the Monothelite heresy, which grew out of an effort by
Emperor Justinian I to find a compromise between Orthodoxy and the
Monophysite heresy.12 Since their appearance, the Maronites have organized
themselves as a separate church after breaking away from the Melchite
church13 and distinguished themselves from other Arab eastern minorities.
In this sense, Salibi14 viewed their emergence as 'a revolt of rural Syrian
Christians against the urban ecclesiastical control'. Seeking refuge from
religious persecution, the Maronites inhabited the northern region of
Lebanon where a Maronite (Mardaite) state had existed between the seventh
and the tenth century. As attested by Phares 'this constituted the first
attempt to establish a Christian enclave in the Arab-Muslim Middle East'.15
In their new sanctuary, the Maronites' relations with the various
neighbouring sects (Druze, Shi'ites) were mostly hostile and violent and
they soon acquired the enmity of the conquering Muslim Arabs by
associating themselves with the Crusaders in the thirteenth century - they
were the only eastern Arab community to support the Crusaders' campaign
against Muslim adversaries.16 Accustomed to independence, the mountaindwellers were willing to use any ally to help weaken their Sunni ruler. Over
time, the Maronites would pay a huge price for their cooperation with their
religious brothers from Europe.17 By 1305, as a result of the Mamluk
expedition, the Maronite indigenous presence in Lebanon was terminated,
and the free Christian state disappeared.
One important outcome of the Crusades was a gradual Maronite alliance
with the West. In 1182 the Maronite hierarchy accepted the papal authority
of Rome, thus becoming the first Uniate Catholic church in the Middle East,
an alliance formally confirmed much later in 1736 at the Synod of Luwanza.
Several factors helped to develop a tradition of political autonomy among
Maronites. A strategic factor has to do with the geography of the country
and its mountains (natural elevations), which played a part in the formation
and preservation of a Christian haven in the midst of surrounding Arab
Muslims.18 The Lebanese mountains had traditionally provided shelter for
two heterodox Muslim communities, the Shi'ites and the Druze, who were,
as much as the Maronites, interested in safeguarding their separate identity
from the ruling Sunni leadership. Thus Mount Lebanon became the home of
religious minorities coexisting in juxtaposition. The Maronite sense of
peoplehood and dynamism first coincided with the Druze during the
Emirate rule (1516-1842), despite serious limitations on this dual
31
cooperation by the Caliphate. This political autonomy created a proper
framework for Lebanese identity-oriented politics, a sense of belonging to a
political entity, a political elite and a working relationship between Druze
and Maronites.
Constant Western intervention in the Mount Lebanon area, coinciding
with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, resulted in a number of
political, religious and economic capitulations by the Ottomans to several
European countries, namely, France, Britain and Tsarist Russia. France,
referred to as 'the nourishing mother', took on responsibility for protecting
the communal interests and the physical existence of the Maronites. The
status of the Oriental Christians as 'proteges' of Europe enabled them to
survive in the midst of the Islamic Ottoman Empire.19 French intervention
helped promote Maronite cultural, religious and political interests, but cut
the Maronite community off from all other local communities and affected
their relations with various neighbouring sects.20 Western intervention, in
the aftermath of the Maronite-Druze civil war in 1860, resulted in a political
arrangement that transformed the Maronites to 'rulers of Mount Lebanon'
as explicitly acknowledged by a British notable: 'After that date, religious
belief had been convened into a geographical expression and the Maronite
crowned victory.'21 This solution satisfied the political aspirations of the
Maronites, who regarded themselves culturally and ethnically distinct from
the Arab Muslim majority in the region. The First World War set the
historical stage for further Maronite political success, since it brought
Lebanon under a direct French mandate. The amicable French-Maronite
relationship was rewarded in 1920 when French authorities proclaimed the
establishment of Greater Lebanon, in which the Maronites formed the
largest single community.
Conceived under the exclusive aegis of religion, the new entity was no
more than a forced association of opposed and individualistic communal
nations.22 From its inception, the new state, which was constituted within
what the Maronites considered their social and historical boundaries, was
marked by deep divisions over its legitimacy: the Maronites, who feared
absorption in the Arab world, perceived Greater Lebanon as a guarantee for
their existence in the midst of Arab Muslim majority. The Muslims, on the
other hand, who made up nearly half the population, were against arbitrary
incorporation in a Christian-dominated state and sought to strengthen their
ties with their Arab neighbours, demanding union with Syria .An attempt
was made to overcome this division over the nature of the Lebanese
Republic with the proclamation of Lebanon's independence in 1943 - the
National Pact, which, despite some impediments, lasted until 1975. This
tacit agreement defined the internal and external political orientations of the
new state. Consequently the Lebanese groups, in spite of their
32
dissimilarities, succeeded in producing an inter-communal entente, with all
religious communities sharing in the different aspects of political authority
in the state according to their demographic and political weight. Lebanon
tried to shun conflict by freezing differences over identity and by defusing
external meddling in Lebanese affairs. Nevertheless, the Lebanese
communities continued to display different ideals and loyalties because of
their different historical backgrounds. As a result, the Lebanese were never
able to reach consensus on fundamentals, and each sect held its own
independent institutions and political aspirations.
Within three decades, the Maronites rejected any concessions to Muslim
demands for greater participation in political power commensurate with
their increased demographic weight,23 claiming that 'a leading Maronite role
is the only guarantee to preserve the security of the community'.24 In this
regard, the leading Maronite party, the Phalange, defined Lebanon as a
historical political community with Maronitism at its basis. Pierre Jumayil,
its founder, equated patriotism with Maronitism.25 Maronite domination of
key political and military positions was seen as an important guarantee
against pan-Arab nationalism and served to calm Maronite worries
concerning the country's independence. Meanwhile, the continuing proWest versus pro-Arab divide contributed to the aggravation of tension
between the Lebanese communities and thus led to the civil strife of 1958.
Muslim and Christian communities had initially become polarized in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, when the leadership of the former supported
Palestinian military presence to enlist their help in changing the existing
order, while the leadership of the latter opposed the very presence of the
PLO on Lebanese soil. The Muslims coined the term 'isolationists' to
describe the Maronites, who strove to cut Lebanon off from its Arab
surroundings. The divisions among the Lebanese prompted foreign, namely
Syrian and Israeli, intervention.
In 1976, Syria's intervention in Lebanon was made upon formal request,
or at least with the tacit approval of the Christian leadership. Since
Christians had always been wary of Syrian ambitions in Lebanon,
particularly regarding the notion of Greater Syria, their decision to let Syria
into the country was one of forced acquiescence. It was the result of the
Christian fear of defeat and frustration with America's refusal to intervene
in the country, as it had in 1958, despite persistent Christian requests. It was
at this stage that some Maronites began to entertain close cooperation with
Israel as a hedge against the Syrian intervention. Closer ties between the
Jews and the Maronites had their origins in the 1930s, continued in the
1940s and reached their peak shortly after the state of Israel was established.
Such relations were founded on the common belief that Jews and Maronites
must forge a strong alliance to ward off hostile Muslim-Arab contact. In
33
fact, during the 1950s Israeli prime minister David Ben Gurion, who
believed that Israel could take advantage of separatist Maronite sentiments
to bring about a pro-Israeli change in Lebanon, outlined a plan towards the
creation of a Christian state in Lebanon, saying:
Lebanese Christians constitute a majority in historical Lebanon. This
majority has a distinct tradition and culture from the other members of
the Arab League. The establishment of a Christian state is a natural
matter that is historically justified, and will most certainly be
supported by the world of Catholicism and Protestantism. ... The time
might have arrived to found a Christian state that borders us. ...
Without our initiative and strong support his task will not be achieved
... we must do our utmost, utilizing all available options to bring
about a radical change in Lebanon.26
In the course of the 1982 Peace for Galilee operation, Israel even attempted
to establish a 'new order' in Lebanon, setting up a regime there that was
based on Maronite hegemony and functioned under its aegis."
During the civil war, the idea of a Christian autonomous state was
advocated as the most preferred solution. Etienne Sakr, the commander of a
Maronite political party called Guardians of the Cedars, adheres to a
chauvinistic definition of the identity of Lebanon: 'the Lebanese nation
cannot be identified by Arab, Syrian or any other attribute'.28 Al-Bustany, a
famous Maronite historian, called for 'a reduction in Lebanese territories in
order to preserve the Christian character of the nation'.29 The Lebanese
Front - a major Maronite politico-military body - issued a 'historical
document' which openly called for a federal solution in Lebanon and made
direct reference to the Christians as a national community.30 Sami Fares saw
that the civil war in Lebanon as a war to defend the Christian people so 'that
they could preserve their cultural and national identity and eventually,
through self-determination, establish a popular and democratic Christian
state'.31
However, most Christians accepted the Ta'if Agreement in order to end
the state of war in the country. This arrangement was based on the powersharing principle in order to regulate the conflict of interests between the
various sects and succeeded. Essentially, the agreement wrought a change
in the political structure to take account of the new power balance among
the communities - the decline of the Maronites and the advance of the
Sunnis and the Shi'ites.
On 20 September 2000 the Council of Maronite Bishops released a
statement from Bkirki, the seat of the Maronite patriarch, challenging
'Syrian rule' and stipulating 'that Israel has withdrawn front south Lebanon
and the time has come for the Syrian army to re-deploy in Lebanon in
34
preparation for its full withdrawal in accordance with the Ta'if accord'. The
Bkirki statement was a backlash against Syria's hegemony, meant to raise
and address the sensitive issue of Christian political power. In post-Ta'if
Lebanon, many Christians had already contended that they gave up much of
their power by signing the Ta'if accord in the interests of national
reconciliation, only to find out that Syrian hegemony and manipulation
reduced their political role in the country to insignificance.32 They felt
politically underrepresented, alienated and excluded both from the
government and from the Christian parties that had accepted the new order
but dissented on details. Syria's military presence maintained the balance of
power, which did not allow the Maronite political supremacy of the past.
Simon Karam, a former ambassador to Washington, best described the
Maronite attitude: 'The common belief in the Christian community is that
whenever this added influence is removed, the internal situation will
balance itself out naturally.'33 Not surprisingly, this belief holds with
traditional Maronite thought regarding outside influence. Simmering
complaints in the Christian community not only reinforced this belief but
also could no longer be ignored. The debate centering on Syria had been
gaining strength and thus deepening the political and communal divides
among many Lebanese. Muslims, who suddenly felt threatened by the panChristian tone of Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Butres Sfeir, began speaking
out, defending Syria - or, more specifically, defending their own existence.
In general, while they defended Syrian presence as the pillar of Lebanese
sovereignty threatened still by Zionist aggression, they charged Bkirki with
trying to fuel sectarian strife. To Lebanon's Muslim religious and political
leaders, the only balancing force keeping the Christians at bay and
preventing them from subordinating Muslims were the Syrians. Their
departure would mean a return to a Maronite dominance of Lebanon.
For the Maronites of Lebanon, the Ta'if era is one of 'decline and defeat'
according to Phares.34 The belief that defines Lebanon as a Maronitedominated state makes them uncomfortable with any power-sharing
mechanism such as the Ta'if Agreement. However, the civil wars
introduced a new order and the Maronites are unlikely to resume their
privileged position. By rejecting all political initiatives during the war (from
the Constitutional Document to the Ta'if Agreement) they incurred military
and political setbacks and had to suffer the destruction of their community
and coexistence.
Are the Maronites capable of harmonious coexistence with other
Lebanese groups within the Ta'if framework? Did they relinquish their
desire for an autonomous homeland for Lebanese Christians? Do the
political orientations of Maronite respondents surveyed during the past
decade, as suggested by the literature, follow closely the political dynamics
35
of the Maronite Community? The six political dimensions that will be
measured to achieve the objective of the study are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
feeling towards sectarian leaders;
perceived self-identity;
political estrangement and political efficacy;
group consciousness;
propensity for inter-group cooperation; and
preferred political arrangement.
There is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that the bitter civil
war has led to shift in the perceptions of Maronite respondents with regard
to the dimensions outlined above. Although writings about Maronites in
Lebanon are numerous, most of them tend to be, first, very much descriptive
or mainly concerned about their historical background and socio-political
standing.35 Second, only rarely are studies cross-national, with a concern to
discover what conditions social and political relationships. Third, and
perhaps most important, there has been little research in which the
individual Maronite is the unit of analysis, and accordingly very few
systematic data-based investigations that have focused on the link between
the social and political orientations of ordinary Lebanese Maronite
respondents towards national issues.36
A decade ago, Theodor Hanf and Hilal Khashan37 published two books
based on surveys carried during the war. Relying on a remarkably broad
sample (n=2003) of whom 25 per cent were Maronites, Hanf carried an
empirical study during the period 1981-87. A few years later, Khashan
employed the behavioural methodology of quantitative political science to
address the issue of Lebanon's viability. During the period from October
1988 to February 1989, Khashan sampled 2,300 students drawn from eight
confessional groups at six Lebanese universities. Of those surveyed, 450
were Maronites.38 The 1996 survey, carried out the post-Ta'if period,
focused exclusively on college students. The survey was administered to
917 students at five Lebanese universities, of which 13.5 per cent were
Maronites, to determine whether the political preferences; attitudes and
behaviour of members of different sects in Lebanon's Second Republic are
converging or diverging.
Recent Survey Findings
A cross-sectional survey carried out by Haddad39 during November 2000
included 561 Maronite respondents. The objective of the study was to
examine the political attitudes, sectarianism and secularism, group
36
behaviour and inter-group perceptions of respondents in post-war Lebanon.
This study reviews these surveys for indicators of the traits discussed above.
The opinions and attitudes are then analysed for consistency and insights
into the questions raised by this study. Where possible these opinions and
attitudes are compared with responses of members of other Lebanese sects
to determine the relative strength of Maronite opinion.
Feelings Towards Sectarian Leaders
To achieve the Maronite aspirations, the Maronite political leadership plays
an important role in increasing the cohesion of the community. The
prospects of an independent Christian state depend on the ability of the
leadership to support the Maronite tradition of the common people, to enlist
support of foreign powers and to reject Arabism.40
Data from the 1988 and 2000 surveys demonstrated that the Maronites
were subject to enormous divisions on many political issues. The Ta'if
Agreement played a decisive role in splitting the Maronite community and
was a turning-point in the further decline of Maronite power. However,
Maronite divisions predated the Ta'if Agreement, although, after Ta'if, they
entered a more serious and damaging phase. Maronite divisions reflect
essentially a struggle for power between Maronite factions over who should
speak for the community. They were also the product of different normative
visions of Lebanon's future. An example in the context of post-war Lebanese
politics is the elevation of Elias Hrawi, a seasoned Lebanese statesman, to
the presidency in 1991. A Syrian loyalist to the end, Hrawi managed to keep
the Lebanese polity under control. Striking a delicate balance between his
Maronite origins and Syrian requirements, Hrawi appealed to disgruntled
Maronites as 'one of them' while remaining loyal to the Syrian
establishment.41 Hrawi's successor, General Emile Lahoud, was unable to
match Hrawi's achievement in this delicate balancing act. Lacking a power
base within the Maronite community, Lahoud was snubbed by his coreligionists. Unlike Hrawi, whose political career dated back to the 1960s,
Lahoud was a newcomer to the scene, and could play only by Syria's rules thereby losing any form of legitimacy within radical Christian circles.
Empirical data on this subject allow Maronite leader preference to be
measured by the answers to specific questions about political preferences,
and also to be inferred from responses to general questions. In the first case,
Haddad's data on Maronite consciousness indicate uncontested preference
and at the same time striking hostility towards Maronite leaders.42 Wartime
sectarian leaders like Samir Jaaja, Lebanese Forces commander, and General
Aoun incur the blame for confounding the interests of their community with
their own personal concerns, which led to the intra-Maronite war in 1990,
and the decline of Maronite power.43 The Christian Maronite resentment of
37
the order established under Ta'if was expressed in boycotts of the
parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996. Despite Christian participation in
the 2000 parliamentary elections, the formation of the cabinet was subjected
to a barrage of criticisms, mainly from the Maronites. This happened despite
extreme care in proportionately representing the main political forces - as
displayed by their parliamentary seats - in the new cabinet. Even the
outspoken patriarch Sfeir seemed generally satisfied with the Maronite slots.
Parliamentary deputy Pierre Gemayel, son of former president Amin
Gemayel, gave the new government a vote of no confidence.
Fully cognizant of the political environment dictating Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri's action, deputy Gemayel still insisted on describing the new
cabinet as a 'political disaster ... and a national tragedy'. Harith Shihab,
chairman of the Maronite League's Executive Council, protested against
excluding Maronites from key ministerial portfolios and charged that
'excluding Christians, and Maronites in particular, from political ministries,
is something taking place for the first time since independence and an
expression of persistence in following a policy of marginalization'.
Evidence supporting Maronite dissatisfaction with wartime militia
leaders can be inferred from other data. The need for authoritarian leaders
who are able to unify the community instead of many engaged in an internal
power struggle in order to consolidate their power are presented by
Khashan:44 93 per cent of Maronite respondents (n=540) against 53 and 48
per cent for the Shi'ites and Sunnis respectively, agreed with the statement
'What this country needs most, more than laws and political programmes,
is a few courageous, tireless and devoted leaders in whom the people can
put their faith'. Appreciation of militia and nationalist leaders is reported
also by Hanf,45 who found that as many as 62 per cent of Maronites agreed
with the statement 'The time of old politicians is finished. The new leaders
represent the basic feeling in the country and function better.' This may
explain why Haddad's respondents placed Aoun and Jaajaa on top of the list
of the most preferred leaders. The most likely explanation for these choices
is an appreciation of the Christian leaders' demands - to evict the Syrian
army from Lebanon, prevent their manipulation of the country's political
life and prohibit their siphoning off of a significant portion of its meagre
economic resources, which resulted in large-scale aversion among many
Lebanese groups and especially the Maronites. To Lebanon's Maronites, the
only force keeping the Christians at bay and preventing them from
subordinating other groups are the Syrians.
Expression of Perceived Self-Identity
The idea that Lebanon would not exist without the Maronites is a primary
expression of the determination of the Maronite population to achieve
38
political insulation from their Islamic neighbours.46 Michel Chiha47
perceives the Maronites 'not only as culturally different but ethnically
distinct as well'. Lebanon, they claim, is essentially non-Arab and belongs
in the first place to the Mediterranean, whereas the Middle East belongs to
the world of the Indian Ocean. The Maronites as such regard themselves not
only as internally different but racially distinct as well. The secular writer
Tannios Chahine introduced the Phoenician identity as a national ideology,
where both Islam and Christianity could unite into a Lebanese society
geographically and politically.48
The Maronites' belief that Lebanon belongs to the Arab East only
geographically and to the West historically and religiously and possesses a
Christian history and character is seen by scholars as an attempt to deny
their Arab ancestry:
Phoenicianism - the attempt to link the civilization of 5,000 years ago
with their own was one method used by Maronite units to distance
themselves from the Arabs, thus ignoring an era of intervening
history. They tend to forget their origin as a tribe from Southern
Arabia.49
Maronites became attached to Lebanon as their national homeland and
considered themselves an exclusive community different from all other
inhabitants. Lebanese nationalism emphasizes individualism and selfsufficiency, rejection of Islam and the Arab world, identification with the
West and insistence on the survival of Lebanon as a Christian, democratic
heartland in the Middle East.
Had it not been for the existence of the Maronites at the time of
Islamic rule, Lebanese national aspiration could have disappeared
forever. The Maronites see themselves as the defenders of Lebanon as
the only true democracy in the Arab World and as the only Catholic
nation in the Middle East.50
They expressed loyalty to historical and modern Lebanon as well as to the
political system emanating from it. Tabar asserts: 'The maintenance of the
political dominance of the Maronites is vital to the viability of the Lebanese
entity.'51
During the civil war, Maronite leaders saw that any reduction in their
communal prerogatives, which was a Muslim demand, was a plot to take
over Lebanon. They stressed that a leading role for the Maronite community
was the only guarantee for preserving the security of the community and
were therefore committed to the preservation of the confessional system and
its power-sharing features.52 This view was stressed recently when at a
memorial service for President-elect Bashir Gemayel, who died in a 1982,
39
Gemayel's son, Nadim, delivered a spirited speech: 'We defended our
rights, our security and our freedom, at a time the government neglected its
responsibilities towards us and allowed all the armed foreigners to attack
us.'53 Later he reminded his audience of his father's position that 'Lebanon
was a country for everyone, both Christians and Muslims, but he also noted
Christians needed 'an oasis of security and tranquility in the Middle East'.
TABLE 1
PERCEIVED SELF-IDENTITY (%)
Ql: Which of the following embodies your nationalistic feeling?
Lebanese
Arab
Syrian
International
Sunnis
Shi'ites
Druze
(n=180)
Maronites
(n=450)
Orthodox
(n=280)
(n=430)
(n=540)
4
94
2
1
4
81
11
4
9
57
33
2
84
1
2
13
26
17
40
17
Catholics
(n=180)
Protestants
(n=65)
Armenians
(n=175)
60
5
13
22
19
_
51
31
40
_
62
Q2: When you think of the history of Lebanon , from what aspects do you look at it?
Arab heritage
Islamic
heritage
Greco-Roman
heritage
Pheonician
heritage
Orthodox
(n=280)
1
6
1
1
Sunnis
Shi'ites
Druze
(n=430)
(n=540)
(n=180)
23
45
84
77
53
_
-
Maronites
(n=450)
Catholics
(n=180)
Protestants
(n=65)
Armenians
(n=175)
29
11
_
62
1
5
2
_
15
4
32
38
44
68
15
6
67
29
44
32
9
Source: Khashan survey, 1992.
Does this behaviour explain the increasing alienation of the Maronite
community, which has come to symbolize a broader process of social
estrangement? Does the Maronite community still view Lebanon as its
homeland? Asmar et al. found that Maronites favoured Lebanese
nationalism above all tendencies, giving groups such as Lebanese Forces
and the Aoun movement very low ratings and broadly rejecting Arab
nationalism. These findings, however, appear to conflict with Hanf. When
Maronite respondents were asked if they supported a political grouping,55
per cent answered no. Furthermore, Maronites did not show an
overwhelming support for any one political grouping, with as low as 18 per
40
cent favouring militant Christians. The reason for the discrepancy may lie
in the fact that the 1987 survey sampled respondents two years before the
launching of the Liberation War against Syrian troops by General Aoun
boosted a general feeling of patriotism heightened by foreign troops
presence on Lebanese soil. Furthermore, at the time of Hanf's survey the
austere political atmosphere could have possibly influenced the answers of
the respondents since no political agreement was yet concluded between the
warring parties. Conversely, the Asmar et al. survey took place after the
main Christian political forces fell under systematic Syrian and pro-Syrian
persecution: in 1991 Aoun was expelled to France, and in 1994 the former
Christian militia-turned-political party was disbanded and its chief, Samir
Geagea, was jailed. Since then the Maronite church under its patriarch,
Nasrallah Sfeir, has become vocal in raising the issue of Syrian withdrawal,
thereby re-establishing the popular legitimacy of Christian nationalism,
particularly once the Council of Maronite Bishops issued several
declarations calling for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
Political Alienation and Political Efficacy
In a modern democratic polity, political efficacy denotes the personal
affections towards, or sense of attachment to, political objects experienced
by the citizenry. A strong sense of political efficacy often generates strong
loyalties to the state, its symbols, its institutions and so on, whereas a very
low sense of political efficacy on a mass scale can seriously undermine the
legitimacy of the state. The degree of political efficacy experienced is a
product of one's sense of one's ability to participate meaningfully in
political activities. It tends to reflect a combination of one's innate ability,
social conditioning and social circumstances. The higher one's degree of
political efficacy, the greater one's political participation tends to be. The
distinction between personal political competence among citizens and their
assessment of how the political system responds is fundamental: people
may feel alienated because they feel powerless to influence government or
because they feel the outputs of government are unresponsive to their
wishes and needs.54
To what extent is the Maronites' feeling of low political efficacy behind
their sense of political alienation? Khashan's 'political efficacy scale' shows
that the Maronites - along with Druze and Protestants - display substantial
political efficacy.
For example , 41 per cent strongly agreed and 26 per cent agreed with
the statement 'I am dissatisfied with my society and I am involved in a lot
of activities to change it to the image I prefer'. These results, and those
obtained from similar questions, are striking when compared with 3 per cent
and 4 per cent for Sunnis and 16 per cent and 14 per cent for Shi'ites. The
41
Druze, on the other hand, scored higher than the Maronites on this item (46
per cent strongly agreed and 28 per cent agreed). Harik attributes this to the
fact that the Druze have defended fiercely their freedom against the
incursion of central powers and have been with the Maronites core political
actors in Lebanon. At every stage of their history the Maronites managed to
accommodate the prevailing political conditions to secure a privileged
position in the Lebanese political system. In fact, Maronite political culture,
which stresses an independent Lebanon, granted them a dominant position
in the state machinery through control of key security and political offices.
These results are discrepant with Asmar at al.'s findings in the 1996
survey. Responses to a 30-point scale labelled 'Confidence in the Political
System' revealed that Druze, Sunnis, Shi'ites and Orthodox Christians were
all significantly more confident that the Maronites in the political system. The
authors attributed these findings to Maronite disaffection from the system
while the much higher level of confidence manifested by Muslim sects
indicated a correspondingly greater sense of political trust and efficacy. With
the ratification of the Ta'if Agreement, the Maronites saw their power status
diminished from a dominant position to a more balanced one. Maronite
grievances against the Ta'if Agreement emanate from the claim that their
share in Lebanese politics is not proportional with the special role they
envisaged. Maronites perceive themselves as having lost both in war and
peace, in that the wartime suffering they endured has not been compensated
for by political gains, so that they are doubly bitter. Khazen remarks that:
Rather than broaden the base of Christian support for Ta'if, Lebanese
government authorities opted for the opposite course of action: no
national unity governments were formed, administrative
decentralization stalled, many displaced persons did not return, and
elections were neither free nor fair.55
Maronite estrangement from the body politic is also indicated by their
pronounced sense of helplessness - which describes a widespread feeling of
political impotence. As a further measure of political confidence (or
efficacy) respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how
much they shared that feeling of being unable to control their political
destiny; Maronites ranked top in this scale. Therefore, on both the
'Confidence in the Political System' scale, and on the single 'helplessness'
item, Maronites appeared to feel both less satisfied and less able to
influence their political status.
Group Consciousness
The very common criticism levelled against the Maronites has been the fact
that they have developed demarcation strategies, be they cultural or
42
political. This vein was labelled 'isolationist' in the sense that it tends to
promote mental, cultural and political separation measured against what are
considered the canons of the cultural and political options of the prevailing
Islamic majority.56 As a rural minority they have borne in their psyche the
distrust of imperial designs and a strong sense of territorial belonging.
Lebanon as a source of patriotism and loyalty has been very compelling in
their vision. The findings on the Maronite creed or attachment to their
country are clear-cut. Khashan reported that the Maronites in pre-war
Lebanon expressed the highest level of satisfaction with their religious
community (68 per cent). This finding can be explained by the fact that the
Maronites of Mount Lebanon have always had a high level of autonomy.
They believe they have survived defiance of the numerically and politically
dominant Sunnis in the Arab East. Over the years they succeeded in
developing a high level of political articulation and an enduring political
and cultural connection with the West. Their achievement, which transcends
what their actual numbers would entitle them, has apparently become a
source of satisfaction.
In contrast, changing circumstances with the conclusion of the Ta'if
accord have modified Maronite perceptions to that effect. The following
evidence, drawn from Haddad's data on ethnic attachment, is representative.
In response to the statement 'I am particularly proud of being member of my
sect', 75 per cent strongly agreed, 17 per cent agreed, 5 per cent disagreed
and 2 per cent strongly disagreed. Another question probed this theme with
similar results: 37 per cent strongly agreed and 27 per cent agreed with the
statement 'My sect has a special mission to perform in Lebanon' as against
5 per cent disagreement and 2 per cent strong disagreement. However, only
18 per cent concurred with 'The Maronite community is currently assuming
its normal role in Lebanon'.
The Christians' resentment and frustration with the role assigned to the
community under the Ta'if arrangement are not discrepant with reality.
They feel politically underrepresented, alienated and excluded both from
the government and from the Christian parties that have accepted the new
order but dissented on details. Syria's military presence serves to maintain
the actual balance of power, which does not allow the Maronite political
supremacy of the past. Against this backdrop, Syrrieh" concludes that from
a Maronite point of view, although the reforms embedded in the Ta'if
Agreement were limited and could have been tolerable in principle,
accepting them would have amounted to giving concessions to the Muslim
community amid a challenging confrontation. For those Maronites who
were aspiring to establish an autonomous Maronite Christian entity, the
Ta'if Agreement was a setback, since it entailed the reintegration of
Lebanon into a unified state. Seen from this radical Maronite stance, it could
43
be argued that the Ta'if Agreement signalled the loss of the Maronite legal
basis for an ethnic nationalist claim.
Propensity for Inter-Group Cooperation
In multi-ethnic societies, competition for scarce resources typically lies at
the heart of ethnic conflict. Where ethnicity is an important basis for
identity, group competition often forms along ethnic lines. In typical
scenarios, leaders of a dominant ethnic group gain political power and then
use state institutions to distribute economic welfare and political benefits
preferentially to their ethnic brethren.58 Because the state sets the terms of
competition between groups, it becomes an object of group struggle.
Accordingly, the pursuit of particularistic objectives often becomes
embodied in competing visions of just, legitimate and appropriate political
orders.
Many put the blame on the consociationalist system of proportional
representation and say its application failed in Lebanon. One imminent
factor behind the political crises encountered was Maronite refusal to
undertake any power readjustment in view of the growing demographic
change favouring Muslims versus Christians and Shi'ites and Sunnis versus
Maronites. Khashan confirms this pattern in that his 'political compromise'
scale shows that Maronite respondents scores are lowest. Sixty per cent of
Maronites strongly disagreed with the statement that 'Your group should
give up some of its natural rights in order to reach a political solution
agreeable to all Lebanese groups'. Similarly, more Maronites than any other
group (72 per cent against 42 and 18 per cent scored by Sunni and Shi'ite
respondents) strongly agreed that 'to compromise is to betray one's own
side'. These responses show clearly that Maronite supremacy before the
outbreak of the war was not negotiable. Maronite unwillingness to revise
the National Pact formula in the form of a more balanced Christian-Muslim
relationship is thoroughly discussed by Sirrieh:
Having had to compromise from a previous power position of
dominance to accepting power-sharing through the National Pact
System, on the eve of the civil war the Maronites believed they had
made the maximum concession they could tolerate, in order to
preserve their ethnic and religious identity and satisfy their security
needs amidst an overwhelming Muslim population in Lebanon and
across its frontiers.59
The uncompromising Maronite position finds its practical applicability in
the post-war period. Asmar et al. asked respondents to indicate on a fivepoint scale the extent to which they agreed that confessionalism is necessary
for political stability in Lebanon, and that confessionalism was holding back
44
Lebanon's development. In response to the first question, only one-third of
Maronite respondents expressed their disagreement. Conversely, 62 per cent
of all respondents agreed with the second statement that confessionalism
impedes development regardless of sect. The authors concluded therefore
that Christians are more likely to believe that confessionalism is necessary
for stability and many of them would seek to defend it vigorously should an
opportunity be placed on the political agenda. These attitudes are confirmed
by Haddad, who found that more than two-thirds of Maronite respondents
supported the maintenance of the confessional system in Lebanon, revealing
the extent of political stratification in Lebanon and the intensity of sectarian
communalism.
TABLE2
VIEWS ON CONFESSIONALISM i
Ql: Is confessionalism necessary for stability?
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Sunnis
(n=283)
Shi'ites
(n=108)
Maronites
(n=155)
Orthodox
(n=206)
Druze
(n=S7)
25
25
50
34
13
53
33
30
37
39
19
42
35
7
58
Source: Asmar et al. survey, 1999.
Preferred Political Arrangement
In multi-ethnic societies, resource rivalries and the struggle to control state
policy produce competing communal interests. Stable ethnic relations can
be understood as based upon a 'contract' between groups60 that channel
politics in peaceful directions.
The terms of the ethnic contract reflect the balance of political power
between the groups and their beliefs about each other's intentions and likely
behaviours. However, ethnic contracts can be undermined and problems of
credible commitment created by changes in either the ethnic balance of power
or the beliefs of groups about others. The political power of groups is
determined by demography, the resources available to each group and their
capacity to organize effectively.61 However, the ethnic balance of power does
evolve over time. As in Lebanon, disparities in population growth rates will
eventually alter the balance between groups. Differing access to resources
may increase prosperity for some groups and poverty for others, also shifting
the ethnic balance. When such changes in the ethnic balance of power have
not been anticipated, or if the safeguards are overly rigid and cannot be
renegotiated easily, the ethnic contract will be at risk of collapse.
45
TABLE 3
PREFERRED POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT (%)
Q: Which political arrangement describes best your attitude towards the Lebanese situation?
1992
2000
Substantial reforms in a centralized framework
5
21
The National Pact of 1943
Federal state
8
23
63
The National Pact of 1943
Federal state
19
30
30
Sources: Khashan survey, 1992; Haddad survey, 2000.
Responses to this question summarize the entire political experience of the
Maronite community in post-war Lebanon, and upon this basis the
respondents are likely to reflect their future expectations. A substantial
number of respondents do believe that the National Pact of 1943 is still
workable and can serve to regulate political life in Lebanon. Central to this
belief is that the pact guaranteed for the Maronite president the position of
the sole and final political arbiter in the country. Compare this to Khashan's
findings: only 23 per cent of his respondents believed then that the National
Covenant, to which the Ta'if accord has given a new life, was still workable
aid could be revitalized. The majority of Khashan's respondents favoured a
decentralized political system in line with the calls of most Christian parties
and intellectuals. During the war, the majority of political and intellectual
circles started to conceive a project for the Christians only - a federal state
or wide decentralization - but none of these ideas has been clearly defined.
In this regard, Phares62 argues that since the Maronite elite has played its
cards badly during the war - the pact of 1943 being a major blunder, since
it undermined Maronite political hegemony and set up a bi-national state the only remaining solution would have been to split the bi-national
(Christian and Muslim) state into a federal state.
With the ratification of the Ta'if Agreement in 1989, an attempt was
made to establish a more equitable power-sharing formula between the
different confessions. This involved reducing the power of the Maronite
president, increasing the power of parliament and introducing equal
representation between Christians and Muslims within the legislature. In
view of these reforms and the selective application of the Ta'if accord, one
choice for the Maronites would be to call for political reforms that would
redress the balance of power between Lebanese communities. Other choices
reflected Maronite respondents' general disillusionment with the existing
political system and the adjustment from unitary to decentralized political
framework, but these find support only among a minority at the present time
in the absence of suitable regional and political circumstances.
46
Conclusion
As a result of reviewing empirical work conducted between 1987 and 2000,
this study has detected significant movement in Maronite political
orientations - i.e., attitudes, beliefs, values and expectations that shape
political behaviour. Perhaps the most significant finding relates to the
political order. Maronite preferences appear to have undergone different
stages of transformation: after enjoying a position of dominance until the
outbreak of the civil war in 1975; unwilling to give concessions to the
Muslim groups, the Maronites opted for an independent Lebanese Christian
entity which did not materialize. With the end of the 1975-90 war, they not
only lost their edge in Lebanese politics and were forced to accommodate
power but also emerged internally fragmented and marginalized. As Rabil
remarks:
Throughout its long history, the Maronite community has experienced
internal strife and disunity but never on the current scale, which
threatens its own political survival. Since the beginning of the civil
war in 1975, the Maronite community, led by the Phalangists (and
their military front, the Lebanese Forces), has seen its political,
economic and military fortunes gradually sink to a disastrous new low
in post-Ta'if Lebanon.63
This author identifies the central causes leading to this situation as
•
•
•
•
the leadership's inability to formulate a national political platform that
could appeal either to the overall community or to the country at large;
the leadership's naive and totally unsubstantiated assertion that the
country's problems mainly resulted from external factors and that once
they were removed the political condition of the community would
drastically improve;
the leadership's willingness to resort to excessive coercion in order to
squash internal communal dissent; and
its reluctance to examine and reassess the party's historical record and
learn from past mistakes - always blaming someone else for the ills of
the community - making it nearly impossible for it to sustain itself as a
grass-roots political movement.
Khazen64 holds that one of the most pressing problems for the Christians
is the absence of a credible and effective political leadership. The power
struggle, which took on various political and military forms among
Christian leaders during the war years, was self-destructive. Today,
politicians who either lack a power base or who have no mainstream
47
legitimacy represent Christians. Christian politicians in power in post-war
Lebanon are, with few exceptions, restricted to those with close ties to
Syria. Under different circumstances, some of the most visible Christian
politicians would not be in office. Having cleared the stage of radical rightwing Christian leaders, more moderate Christian figures were promoted for
leadership. As a result, Picard maintains,
some Christian leaders who once supported Ta'if are now critical of it
and question its utility. Lebanon today is not a reassessing place for
Christians. While disenchantment is widespread across all of
Lebanese society, the most affected, and thus most vocal in expressing
dissatisfaction, are the Christians.65
The Maronite community, more so its mainstream leadership, has not yet
come to grips with the consequences of the Lebanese civil war. The rapidity
of social and political change, as well as the complex nature of actors, both
local and regional, have produced a new political system that substantially
differs from the previous one, which the Maronites felt comfortable with.
The protracted civil war served as a milestone in the modern history of
Lebanon. The Maronites find it difficult to integrate the themes of the
drawn-out conflict, mainly because the Ta'if Agreement has not yet relaunched the Lebanese political system and provided it with the sovereignty
and self-steering capability needed for effective governance. It is hoped that
once the regional situation allows the Lebanese political system to operate
fully on its own, the Maronite leadership and rank and file would eventually
accept, and in due time enrich, the new post-civil-war social and political
reality of the Lebanese entity.
NOTES
1. Antoine J. Abraham, 'New Strategies for Third World Conflicts: The Lebanon Model,'
Contemporary Review, Vol.264, No.536 (1994), p.38.
2. In a few cases, some form of nationalism is espoused, but only to be rid of foreign forces in
a country and certainly not to maintain unity among the divergent groups beyond that
objective.
3. Examples of historical and contemporary conflicts between different ethnic, national, racial
and religious groups are abundant and serve as compelling reminders of the fragility of
peace and the tenacity of discord between groups: Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, the
Philippines, India, clan rivalry in Somalia, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Islamic
fundamentalism in Egypt, the Sudan and Algeria. Although a national initiative on race has
recently been undertaken in the United States and new, tentative peace accords have been
signed in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and the Middle East, the global threat of inter-group
conflict persists.
4. Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (London: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p.43.
48
5. See D. Cartwright and A. Zander, Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (London: Harper
and Row, 1968); Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, A Social Psychology of Group
Processes for Decision-Making (New York: Wiley, 1964); Joseph E. McGrath and Irwin
Altman, Small Group Research: A Synthesis and Critique of the Field (New York: Holt
Rinehart and Winston, 1966).
6. Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973),
p.73.
7. Fred E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967).
8. Muzafer Sherif and Caroline Sherif, Groups in Harmony and Tension: An Integration of
Studies on Inter-group Relations (New York: Harper & Bros. Publishers, 1953), pp.185-6.
9. Nissan Mordechai, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self Expression
(London: McFarlo and Company, Inc., 1991), pp.13-14.
10. Kathleen Newland, 'Ethnic Conflict and Refugees', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic
Conflict and International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993),
p.161; Barry R. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', in Brown, Ethnic
Conflict and International Security, pp. 103-24.
11. Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of
Mediation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p.108.
12. Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), p.88.
13. Joseph Mouawad, 'The Image of France in Maronite Tradition', The Beirut Review, No.4
(Spring 1992), p.87.
14. Salibi, p.88.
15. Indeed, many Maronite historians allege that the first homeland of Middle East Christianity
was established as early as 676 CE in Mount Lebanon.
16. Salibi, p.98.
17. See Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York: Caravan Books, 1977),
pp.65-9.
18. Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p.221.
19. Pierre Rondot, Les Chretiens D'Orient (Paris: J, Peyronnet and Cie, 1955), p.87.
20. Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968),
p. 147.
21. Iskandar Akbarius, Lebanon and Turmoil: Syria and The Powers in 1860 (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1920), p. 172.
22. Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historique Du Liban Politique et Constitutionelle 1973
(Beirut: Publications de l'Université libounise), p.128.
23. Hani Faris, 'The Failure of Peacemaking in Lebanon: 1975-1989', in D. Collings (ed.),
Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1994), pp. 18-30.
24. Mahmoud Ayoüb, 'Lebanon between religious faith and political ideology', in Collings,
Peace for Lebanon?, pp.241-8.
25. See Pierre Jumayi., 'Lebanese Nationalism and its Foundations: The Phalangist Viewpoint',
in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East
(New York: Praeger, 1970).
26. M. Zuaaeiter, Al-Mashru al-Maruni fi Lubnan (Beirut, Wikalat al-Tawzii al-Dawliah, 1986),
pp.590-1.
27. See Eyal Zisser, 'The Maronites, Lebanon and the State of Israel: Early Contacts', Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.4 (1995), pp.889-919.
28. Phares, p. 126.
29. Fuad Fram Al-Bustani, De 1 'Erreur Du Grand Liban (Kaslik, Lebanon: Kaslik University
Press, 1988).
30. Phares, p. 130.
49
31. Cited by Phares, p. 131.
32. See the full Bishops' Council's statement in al-Safir, 21 Sept. 2000.
33. Susan Sachs, 'Breaking Taboo, Lebanese Prelate Criticizes Syria', New York Times, 23 Dec.
2000.
34. Phares, p.221.
35. Joseph Abou-Khalil, Kissat al-Mawarmna fi al-Harb: Sirat Zatiat (Beirut: Sharikat
alMatbouat li al-Tawsik wa al-Nashr, 1991); M. Aulas, 'The Socio-Ideological
Development of the Maronite Community: The Emergence of the Phalanges and the
Lebanese Forces', Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.7, No.4 (1984), pp.1-27; M. Moosa, The
Maronites in History (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986).
36. Hilal Khashan, 'The Political Values of Lebanese Maronite College Students', Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol.34, No.4 (1990), pp.723-44; Simon Haddad, 'A Survey of
Maronite Christian Socio-Political Attitudes in Post-War Lebanon', Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations, Vol.2, No.4 (2001), pp.465-79.
37. Theodore Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation
(London: I.B.Tauris, 1993); Hilal Khashan, Inside The Lebanese Confessional Mind
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992).
38. C.Asmar, M.Kisirwani and R. Springborg, 'Clash of Politics and Civilizations?
Sectarianism Among Youth in Lebanon', Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.1, No.1 (1999),
pp.35-64.
39. Haddad, p.465-79
40. Samir Khalaf, 'Ties That Bind: Sectarian Loyalties and The Revival of Pluralism in
Lebanon', The Beirut Review, Vol.1, No.1 (1991), pp.32-59.
41. Sami Moubayed, 'Lebanon Dodges Bullets of Another Civil War', Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs, Vol.20, No.4 (2001), p.21.
42. This is in sharp contrast to Khashan's findings that attest to Maronite cohesion on these
same items prior to Ta'if ratification.
43. Regina Sneifer-Perri, Guerres Maronites 1975-1990 (Paris: L'Harmatan, 1995), pp.181-2.
44. Khashan, p.188.
45. Hanf, p.492.
46. William Haris. Faces of Lebanon (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1999).
47. Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (Lebanon: Classes Sociales et
Identity Nationale, Garnet Editions, 1997), p.71.
48. Aulas, p.7.
49. Paul Tabar, 'The Image of Power in Maronite Historical and Political Discourse', The Beirut
Review, Vol.4, No.47 (1994), p.93.
50. Bassem Khalifa, The Rise And Fall of Christian Lebanon (Toronto: York Press Ltd., 1997),
p.2.
51. Tabar, p.97.
52. Mahmoud Ayyoub, 'Lebanon Between Religious Faith and Political Ideology', in Deidre
Collins (ed.),.Peace for Lebanon: From War to Reconstruction (Boulden, CO; Lynn Rienner,
1994), pp.241-8.
53. Lebanon Daily Star, 15 Sept. 20001.
54. J.S. House and W.M. Mason, 'Political Alienation in America', American Sociological
Review, No.40 (1975), pp.123-47.
55. Farid el-Khazen, 'Lebanon - Independent No More', Middle East Quarterly, Vol.8, No.l
(2001), p.43.
56. Charles Chartouni, 'Critical Dilemmas in a Post-War Situation: a Strategic Appraisal', paper
presented at the International Maronite Congress, Los Angeles, CA, 23-26 June 1994.
57. Hussein Syrrieh, 'Triumph or Compromise: The Decline of Political Maronitism in
Lebanon After The Civil War', Civil Wars, Vol.1, No.4 (1998), p.61.
58. Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
50
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
University Press, 1995), pp.34-7; and Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1994), p.216.
Syrrieh, pp.59-60.
See David A. Lake, 'Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,'
International Organization, Vol.50, No.1 (1996), pp.1-33.
Hardin, p.56.
Phares, p.69.
Robert G. Rabil, 'The Maronites and Syrian Withdrawal: From Isolationists to Traitors',
Middle East Policy, Vol.8, No.3 (2001), pp.23-44.
El-Khazen, p43.
Elizabeth Picard, 'The Dynamics of the Lebanese Christians: From the Paradigm of the
'Ammiyyat to the Paradigm of Hwayyek', in Andrea Pacini (ed.), Christian Communities
in the Arab Middle East, The Challenge of the Future (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
pp.200-21.

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

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