BERLIN, 10 Nov 1937 3 on the Conference in.tue Reichskanzlei on

Transcription

BERLIN, 10 Nov 1937 3 on the Conference in.tue Reichskanzlei on
BERLIN, 10 Nov 1937
3 on the Conference i n . t u e Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 froa 1Ü15 - üüiSö hours
^resent:
The ifuhrei* end Kelch Ghaneeilor
The Heiohsministar for ,«ar, G-oneralfeldiafcrschall v. Bloaberg
The o- in-OAnay, Generaloberst F r e i h e r r von FAXTääCH
The G-iuaG Navy, Generaiedaii-al o r . h.c« IIU13
The C-inG Luftwaffe, Generaloberst G©SBIx»G
The iieicheiainister for jjoreißa a f f a i r s x^reiherr v. MUHATH
Oberst H0Ö2BACH
The Führer s t a t e d I n i t i a l l y t h a t the subject n a t t e r o f - t o d a y ' s conference wcs of such high lac ortan o«, t h a t i t s further d e t a i l e d discussion
would prob&Uly talcs : lace i n (tobluet s e s s i o n s . However, h e , the Fahrer,
hod decided HOT to discuss t h i s matter i n the l a r g e r c i r c l e of the Bel oh
Gabinet, because of i t s importance. Ills subsequent statements were the
r e s u l t of d e t a i l e d d e l i b e r a t i o n s and or the experiences of h i s 4« years
i n government; he desired to explain to these prwsent h i s fundajaantel
i d e a s on the ; o s s i b i i i t i e s and n e c e s s i t i e s if expending oar forMga policy
end in the i n t e r e s t s of e f a r - s i g h t e d policy he requested that h i e
statemente be looked upon in the- ct-to of i&x h i s death as h i s l a s t w i l l
and testament«
*"IB .iihrer then s t a t e d ;
i n c r e a s e in production, A rurt-ner increase m p r u u u o n u u . «. m - u n w i n crease in production by making g r e a t e r demands on the s o i l i s NOT p o s s i b l e
because i t already shows signs of d e t e r i o r a t i o n , due t o the use of a r t i f i c i a l
f e r t i l i z e r s , and i t i s therefore c e r t a i n t h a t , even with the g r e a t e s t
p o s s i b l e Increase in production, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the world merket could
NOT be avoided.
The considerable expenditure of foreign currency t o seorue food by
import, even in periods when h a r v e s t s t>re good, i n c r e a s e s c a t e s t r o p h i c a l i y
when the harvest i s r e a l l y poor. The p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s catastrophe
i n c r e a s e s correspondingly to the increase i n p o p u l a t i o n , end the annuel
560,000 excess in b i r t h s would bring about an increased consumption in
breed, because fcKe child i s a g r e a t e r bread e a t e r than the edulto
permanently t o counter the d i f f i c u l t i e s of food supplies by lowering
the standard of l i v i n g and by r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i s impossible in a continent
which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of l i v i n g . £s
the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into e f f e c t the complete
powere of consumption, some small c o r r e c t i o n s in our a g r i c u l t u r a l home
production w i l l be p o s s i b l e , but HOT a wholesale a l t e r a t i o n of the stenderd
of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, s p e c i f i c a l ly in the sphere of food s u p p l i e s as well as g e n e r a l l y .
P a r t i c i p a t i o n in world eoonoay
There are l i m i t a t o t h i s which we
are unable to t r a n s g r e s s . The market f l u c t u a t i o n s would be an obstacle t o t
secure foundation of the Qerraan p o s i t i o n ; interna t i o n a l eom,ier':Lc)al agreements do £jOT offer any guarantee for p r a c t i c a l execution. I t must be
considered on p r i n c i p l e that since the world v.ar 11914 - 18} an i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n has taken place in countries which fonaerly exported food. ««£ l i v e
in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonise again :
approaches the condition which o r i g i n a l l y motivated c o l o n i s a t i o n ; i n JAPAfi
3-
and ITALY economic aotivee are fchi • •:..- *J :. eir *111 to expand, öüd
economic need will also drive Germany tu i t . üöutries outside the great
economic empires have special difficulties iu expanding economical! y.
to upward tendency, which has been c&usea in V»Ol .ti eeonomy, une to
armament competition, can never form
Bat b*
r a n ec ^uomi e
settlement, and this l a t t e r i s also b
aruption
ad by liolsiiQvisLi. I t ia a pronounoeu military
as oi' t ho ae
states who base their existence on expoot.
. i and imports t»re
carried out over tuase sea lanes which ere raled bj
..-., i t i s mure
a question of securi ty of transport rather t]
-ritgn currency,
this explains th gre< t
ess in uu' IJUU si
an in wartime;' The
only ^ay out, and one which ... .
,inarj, i
- securing of greater
living sr;ece an endet.vour which at a i l ti
m the cause of the
formation of state« and of movements of m tions.
t i s explicable that
t h i s tenae cy finds no
Ltereat In
• and in satisfied statess. ohould
i Ltion bo our fore0ioat thought, then the opece
the security of our im„y ba sought 1:; SURGES, but we v,lll not CO] y
»r t h i i
requu
ilch rely^ JB exploiting colonies. I t i s
»iteli
11ber>
' ,0 1' 1
c .»nquering agriculturally .useful
p e o p l e , but
be üor<
.. L
e to seek re* material producing
*
in
rec
fiel oh
ot oversea a. aj
SC.iut -ion nro Ulu
...
Uli
6 Oi t »»o g en erfe11 on e.
ffect La
b b o v e th i 8 .; u a t b e i e f t
..-..<. t
. be x' :•),ul
La tejC u
at
;roat a or Id wide national
to
ient ge ueri
2
ievelu
bouies
JLly
eo le with i t s strong
na
bura
+•
V r <•
~.r- « « .
'•
» « • > , .
,i
•'
•p. ir, v I T » « h i o
fr «
. r • J t. 4 O r R
1 M
t". if»
u t l ü ö o the a on-fulfilment or OOQSUTIUUUUS,!. ^ V - . « , V „ ~- ..
weapon against PRITAII*.
c} The weakening of the jbritieh p o s i t i o n in the . • &AST by JAPAK.
dj The opposition in t h e aCEDITBRRAiiEAh to ITALY which - by v i r t u
of i t s h i s t o r y , a riven b„, n e c e s s i t y I i
d by a genius - expands i t s
power p o s i t i o n and uust consequently infringe B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s
to an i n c r e a s i n g e x t e n t . . She outcome of the ABHo^liil/.p i»er i s e t
l o s s pf p r e s t i g e for BRITAIN which IT/.^Y i s endeavouring to
i n c r e a s e by s t i r r i n g up discontent i n tee atoHASAiiEDAi« uvtUJ).
I t taust be established in conclusion that the -umpire cannot be held
permanently by power p o l i t i c » by 45 Million B r i t o n s , in «] i t e of t i l the
s o l i d i t y of her i d e a l s . The proportion of the populations i n the empire,
compered. with t h a t of the Motherland i s 9 s i , end i t should a c t t s e
warning to us t h e t i f %e -wxp&nd in space, vve taust NOT a l i o * the level
of our population to become too lov»,
FRANCS* s p o s i t i o n i s more f e v o u r e p l e t h a n t h a t of rKGLANL;
The
French empire i s b e t t e r pieced geographically, the population of i t s
c o l o n i a l .possessions represents e p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y i n c r e a s e . But
1RAKCB i s ' füoed v«ith d i f f i c u l t i e s of i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s , i.i the present
t i . e only 10 per cant approximately of tae n a t i o n s have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them he?a t o t a l i t a r i a n governments,
n e v e r t h e l e s s we have to take the following i n t o our p o l i t i c t i consideration
e s power factors»
,
:,,.,
ad the ad joining smaller s t a t e s .
The German question can be solved only by way of force, end t h i s
i s ns' ver without r i s k . The b o t t l e s of FREDERICK Til*: GREAT for SILESIA,
s
«5and B l i RCJ ' s •
.- feed de en i tremendous r i s k
sad t;te spaed .
.
. e c t i o n in .. ! .
re vented
. ,j from
p a r t i c i p a t i n g La th< • r . IX' * e p l a c e ;
decision t.
l y f o r c e with
r i s k a t the hped ->i' t a e f o l l o w i n g e x p o s i t i o n s , then
loft to
r e p l y to t h e - H uestions "
'
,
la
r e g a r d we have t o
d e c i d e upon t h r e e d i f f e r e a t
Uese 1« p e r i o d 1^4^_ - 4 5
Fter t h i s we CJ
.. e o t e oft) n#e for
the v»orse. The r e - f a m i n g of th<
i . , th* ..<
i r i'oroe, a s w e l l
as t h e f o r a ß t i o a of tne o f f i c e r s ' ü o r p a ,
conoluded.
ou*
m a t e r i a l " :;
il
-.
uderu, with I irther delay thti danger
of t h e i r bfeoo-iia^ »at - af -•
t< w i l l I n c r e a s e , h
t i c u l a r tl
s e c r e c y jf " s p e c ! ; - ! weapons " cfinnöt alwayc be sal
eu.
tfalistoi
of r e s e r v e s - w o u l d be l i u i t e i to the c u r r e n t r n c r
1Q I
I
e d d i t i o a from o l d e r untrj : I J
»Ould be . o longei
mailable
l a oo p a r i c o n ,?itli the r o - u if.jieat, hhich w i l l aavt bey;, o e r r i e d out
a t thfat t i a e o\ th< o t h e r n
h a l l decreose i a r e l a t i v e power»
^hot
ot
a
c
t
u
a
t
i
l
i
^
v
'
4
ü
,
n
/
$
/
V
p
V
'
/
/ / t a e a , dependent ox; tiie a useixce
J r
:
.
r could
it t h e f o o d c r i s i e , f o r the countering
oi: k.ftich we du NüT p o s s e s s b]
lecessary f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y , This uust
be c o n s i d e r e d a s a " p u i a t of weakness Ln the regime"« uver and above
t h a t , ta< world w i l l a n t i c ]
•
r.ill i .
nteraieaeures yearly« w h i l s t othi
be i ,
a should ue
i j r e e d on ih^ o f f e n s i v e .
»hat the a c t u r a l p o s i t i o n wou.u, be in t h e y e a r s 1945/40 so One •: owa
western f o r t i f i c a t i o n s «
»»Ithout i /.o.,...<• £> ^, Vi .,._ . ,
be n e c e s s a r y t u take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n T6 „larcii by I - H ' . V . t h r uu
an?
......,.., w »
r—*-—YI—rH-—r^i+-r*tr----lrii v "T-naittnn-'y '.u., Liirt-T—t—rTflr"^r,—r^"*?1?n o t have t o be reo
witJ
.
; o of b c o n f l i c t w i t h r:,
, t;s
in e v r y case i t v<o ..... hr«ve . . o
ie ce the- e n t i t y of Gi:;E.'-T 13" I".
He t u " a l l y ,
Juld i n e v e r y ci s e h« vo to b a r our f r o n t i e r d u r i n g t h e
>ur e t t e e l c s u g e l n s t ;
..
I und :.ju-,:.X/.« i t .met be
a i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n iiere t h t t o... ..;...,< . ..'i.j./ f r> d e f e n c e a e s e u r e s w i l l
i n c r e a s e in s t r e n g t h f r o a year to y e a r , anc t h a t a c o n s o l i d a t i o n of t
Lnsi
••. „ues of the A u s t r i a n ( . ly w i l l e l s e be e f f e c t e d In the c o u r s « of
yet r e . /»lth,-ugh t h e p o p u l a t i o n of
LJ^LÖVA^i--- i n t e f i r s t p i e c e i s
n o t e t h i n one, the eabo<
i i of G<-i.-.Gi.v.,
- - üViKIi
sould
n e v e r t h e l e s a c o n s t i t u t e tne conquest of food for o-6 a l l l i o n people,91a
.:;!::. t h a t t c u r laoj
d e r a t i o n of L m i l l i o n fro;a G*«£GiiOwi,o\ JVX^
Mic of l m i l l i o n from 1
could be c a r r i e d o a t . The frnmixation of tie
two s t a t e s t o ,i;.:;.,t..
Liy and p o l i t i c a l l y would c o n s t i t u t e a
c o n s i d e r a b l e r e l i e f , owin . to s h o r t e r and b e t t e r f r o n t ;i e r s , t h e f r e e i n g
of f i g h t l ü j
U3 1 . :.j fur - .
lirposea
b i l i t y of r e - c o n s t i t u t i n g new ip t o
bh'of about 12 d i v i s i o n s , r e p r e s e n t i n g t j
• • . , si on
r 1 lüilXio
L .1 on *
n to the removal of C^HÜuüSLOM ..\ i s e x p e c t e d on v .
p a r t of
. ; however a i t cannot be judged t o - d u y what v.oulc be h e r a t t i t u d e in th
• !.' ' . q u e e t i u n s i n c e i t would depend l a r g e l y on whether
were a l i v e a*
ti.it or not«
un
end e 1
LI
11
. - % "wxtu ,.
...
-••
v
a c t i o n «*;ulc u e c i d e w * ' . . . , ' s a t t i t u d e .
ti
yer against a victor:
•. > us r e ;
-?-
jai o p e r a t i o n s ; i t i i t ...
ertitiati .1.t t l i
In via« vx'
c itut. Lion
- • - i....
i, •.,
,
j .
... ..
j
<näiü-
>ccur
•ivii
<..
The txxhi
e x i s t l a g ten .
f i r m l y dteci< eö
of i t
following
e^t exi e r i e n c e i
in .. '::.:, tn<
•feJcing i n t o coaßi
l'Gv,
B
;
it
•U of
' 1
develo:
- tU en
ist
ted.
- tu«
rXy BO 1938*
r.ta üi the wer
Let» t n e r o .
e a r l y and
/W/W
i'al'thor
possibility.
-n
c«nt v i c t o r y b .
t i n u y t i o n of t
-*houl<.i F?r : ÜÖ fe
ena or / j ^ / ' I
Qt
I
"./..• >.' ..
In l.,Q
.
ti<
...
wtr in *-.»Ai;<( i t
Jli
in ner 1'
t i o n of I t a l i a n u i J. 11 on a on
her by FK' •.,;.' or !
S&Ql '
e>gninet ..'.. L
i'. * . ' s) none s , c JU]
s u b j u n c t i o n or I I
ctiv« ifcteriülö ooul< I
vi
W' , . . .. .
-ii'
I.U
v
'.i/ would ."ieua
: resence
.- . on 'i,u .
• '-' towards 00&I x..u.i..L: t a e
j.vJl»UI'0
str«
..ji
iVv.r h BOlidiflei
tuiex'c ted
sj de
we 11 . e .
....
• i.itioni-1
. U U U U i I.XUI1E
U«
WUUiU
U'V*:
OU
i't;xi;ntiUMl
iUü
J.CCJ » c
i.ui^au,
»uiUii
»vco
to begin an the 10 noveaber« This i n t e n t i o n was countermanded by
Fuhrer *ho gave as 8 reason tnf t j o s s i b i l i t y of the c o n f l i c t mas not
to be regarded es bein^ so imminent« In reply to the remark bj tue
Minister for foreign affafcts, t h a t an I t a l i a n - f l n g l i s h - French c o n f l i c t
be not &s near ifaif*/ as the ftthrer appeared to assume, the Führer stated
t h a t the date which appeared to tiim to be-a p o s s i b i l i t y was summer 1938«
In reply t o statements b, Generalfeldmarschsll von 'BLÜA311HG and Generaloberst von FRITSCHj? regarding .....,;..: and /';.. C] * a a t t i t u d e , the Führer
repeated h i s previous statements and said that he war» convinced of -üRi'fa.lij'8 n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n and t h a t consequently he did ^ot believe in
m i l i t a r y action b,, FR.U.CS against GKB
. should the «EDIT PJi ull
c o n f l i c t already mentioned- lead to a general mobilisation in EüflüPS, then
we should have to commence operations against C2EGiiö3LGVA._IA immediately.
I f , howeverthe p'owera v;ho are not p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the war should declare
t h e i r d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s , then GIR/J-iiY, would, for the time being , nave to
side with t h i s a t t i t u u e ,
In view or the information ^iven by the i'unrer, generaloberst G03RING
considered i t iaper* t i v e to thin... of a reduction or abanuonaent of our
m i l i t a r y unaert< icing in a AL . The Fuhrer egrBed to t h i s in so far as he
believed t h i s decision shoulu be postponed for a s u i t a b l e d a t e .
the second part of the discussion concerned material armament Eptsxiis
questions«
IT- Q V o ! ."• , r
(signed)
HttKXKlSIfK