BERLIN, 10 Nov 1937 3 on the Conference in.tue Reichskanzlei on
Transcription
BERLIN, 10 Nov 1937 3 on the Conference in.tue Reichskanzlei on
BERLIN, 10 Nov 1937 3 on the Conference i n . t u e Reichskanzlei on 5 Nov 37 froa 1Ü15 - üüiSö hours ^resent: The ifuhrei* end Kelch Ghaneeilor The Heiohsministar for ,«ar, G-oneralfeldiafcrschall v. Bloaberg The o- in-OAnay, Generaloberst F r e i h e r r von FAXTääCH The G-iuaG Navy, Generaiedaii-al o r . h.c« IIU13 The C-inG Luftwaffe, Generaloberst G©SBIx»G The iieicheiainister for jjoreißa a f f a i r s x^reiherr v. MUHATH Oberst H0Ö2BACH The Führer s t a t e d I n i t i a l l y t h a t the subject n a t t e r o f - t o d a y ' s conference wcs of such high lac ortan o«, t h a t i t s further d e t a i l e d discussion would prob&Uly talcs : lace i n (tobluet s e s s i o n s . However, h e , the Fahrer, hod decided HOT to discuss t h i s matter i n the l a r g e r c i r c l e of the Bel oh Gabinet, because of i t s importance. Ills subsequent statements were the r e s u l t of d e t a i l e d d e l i b e r a t i o n s and or the experiences of h i s 4« years i n government; he desired to explain to these prwsent h i s fundajaantel i d e a s on the ; o s s i b i i i t i e s and n e c e s s i t i e s if expending oar forMga policy end in the i n t e r e s t s of e f a r - s i g h t e d policy he requested that h i e statemente be looked upon in the- ct-to of i&x h i s death as h i s l a s t w i l l and testament« *"IB .iihrer then s t a t e d ; i n c r e a s e in production, A rurt-ner increase m p r u u u o n u u . «. m - u n w i n crease in production by making g r e a t e r demands on the s o i l i s NOT p o s s i b l e because i t already shows signs of d e t e r i o r a t i o n , due t o the use of a r t i f i c i a l f e r t i l i z e r s , and i t i s therefore c e r t a i n t h a t , even with the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e Increase in production, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the world merket could NOT be avoided. The considerable expenditure of foreign currency t o seorue food by import, even in periods when h a r v e s t s t>re good, i n c r e a s e s c a t e s t r o p h i c a l i y when the harvest i s r e a l l y poor. The p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s catastrophe i n c r e a s e s correspondingly to the increase i n p o p u l a t i o n , end the annuel 560,000 excess in b i r t h s would bring about an increased consumption in breed, because fcKe child i s a g r e a t e r bread e a t e r than the edulto permanently t o counter the d i f f i c u l t i e s of food supplies by lowering the standard of l i v i n g and by r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i s impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of l i v i n g . £s the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into e f f e c t the complete powere of consumption, some small c o r r e c t i o n s in our a g r i c u l t u r a l home production w i l l be p o s s i b l e , but HOT a wholesale a l t e r a t i o n of the stenderd of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, s p e c i f i c a l ly in the sphere of food s u p p l i e s as well as g e n e r a l l y . P a r t i c i p a t i o n in world eoonoay There are l i m i t a t o t h i s which we are unable to t r a n s g r e s s . The market f l u c t u a t i o n s would be an obstacle t o t secure foundation of the Qerraan p o s i t i o n ; interna t i o n a l eom,ier':Lc)al agreements do £jOT offer any guarantee for p r a c t i c a l execution. I t must be considered on p r i n c i p l e that since the world v.ar 11914 - 18} an i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n has taken place in countries which fonaerly exported food. ««£ l i v e in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonise again : approaches the condition which o r i g i n a l l y motivated c o l o n i s a t i o n ; i n JAPAfi 3- and ITALY economic aotivee are fchi • •:..- *J :. eir *111 to expand, öüd economic need will also drive Germany tu i t . üöutries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties iu expanding economical! y. to upward tendency, which has been c&usea in V»Ol .ti eeonomy, une to armament competition, can never form Bat b* r a n ec ^uomi e settlement, and this l a t t e r i s also b aruption ad by liolsiiQvisLi. I t ia a pronounoeu military as oi' t ho ae states who base their existence on expoot. . i and imports t»re carried out over tuase sea lanes which ere raled bj ..-., i t i s mure a question of securi ty of transport rather t] -ritgn currency, this explains th gre< t ess in uu' IJUU si an in wartime;' The only ^ay out, and one which ... . ,inarj, i - securing of greater living sr;ece an endet.vour which at a i l ti m the cause of the formation of state« and of movements of m tions. t i s explicable that t h i s tenae cy finds no Ltereat In • and in satisfied statess. ohould i Ltion bo our fore0ioat thought, then the opece the security of our im„y ba sought 1:; SURGES, but we v,lll not CO] y »r t h i i requu ilch rely^ JB exploiting colonies. I t i s »iteli 11ber> ' ,0 1' 1 c .»nquering agriculturally .useful p e o p l e , but be üor< .. L e to seek re* material producing * in rec fiel oh ot oversea a. aj SC.iut -ion nro Ulu ... Uli 6 Oi t »»o g en erfe11 on e. ffect La b b o v e th i 8 .; u a t b e i e f t ..-..<. t . be x' :•),ul La tejC u at ;roat a or Id wide national to ient ge ueri 2 ievelu bouies JLly eo le with i t s strong na bura +• V r <• ~.r- « « . '• » « • > , . ,i •' •p. ir, v I T » « h i o fr « . r • J t. 4 O r R 1 M t". if» u t l ü ö o the a on-fulfilment or OOQSUTIUUUUS,!. ^ V - . « , V „ ~- .. weapon against PRITAII*. c} The weakening of the jbritieh p o s i t i o n in the . • &AST by JAPAK. dj The opposition in t h e aCEDITBRRAiiEAh to ITALY which - by v i r t u of i t s h i s t o r y , a riven b„, n e c e s s i t y I i d by a genius - expands i t s power p o s i t i o n and uust consequently infringe B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s to an i n c r e a s i n g e x t e n t . . She outcome of the ABHo^liil/.p i»er i s e t l o s s pf p r e s t i g e for BRITAIN which IT/.^Y i s endeavouring to i n c r e a s e by s t i r r i n g up discontent i n tee atoHASAiiEDAi« uvtUJ). I t taust be established in conclusion that the -umpire cannot be held permanently by power p o l i t i c » by 45 Million B r i t o n s , in «] i t e of t i l the s o l i d i t y of her i d e a l s . The proportion of the populations i n the empire, compered. with t h a t of the Motherland i s 9 s i , end i t should a c t t s e warning to us t h e t i f %e -wxp&nd in space, vve taust NOT a l i o * the level of our population to become too lov», FRANCS* s p o s i t i o n i s more f e v o u r e p l e t h a n t h a t of rKGLANL; The French empire i s b e t t e r pieced geographically, the population of i t s c o l o n i a l .possessions represents e p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y i n c r e a s e . But 1RAKCB i s ' füoed v«ith d i f f i c u l t i e s of i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s , i.i the present t i . e only 10 per cant approximately of tae n a t i o n s have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them he?a t o t a l i t a r i a n governments, n e v e r t h e l e s s we have to take the following i n t o our p o l i t i c t i consideration e s power factors» , :,,., ad the ad joining smaller s t a t e s . The German question can be solved only by way of force, end t h i s i s ns' ver without r i s k . The b o t t l e s of FREDERICK Til*: GREAT for SILESIA, s «5and B l i RCJ ' s • .- feed de en i tremendous r i s k sad t;te spaed . . . e c t i o n in .. ! . re vented . ,j from p a r t i c i p a t i n g La th< • r . IX' * e p l a c e ; decision t. l y f o r c e with r i s k a t the hped ->i' t a e f o l l o w i n g e x p o s i t i o n s , then loft to r e p l y to t h e - H uestions " ' , la r e g a r d we have t o d e c i d e upon t h r e e d i f f e r e a t Uese 1« p e r i o d 1^4^_ - 4 5 Fter t h i s we CJ .. e o t e oft) n#e for the v»orse. The r e - f a m i n g of th< i . , th* ..< i r i'oroe, a s w e l l as t h e f o r a ß t i o a of tne o f f i c e r s ' ü o r p a , conoluded. ou* m a t e r i a l " :; il -. uderu, with I irther delay thti danger of t h e i r bfeoo-iia^ »at - af -• t< w i l l I n c r e a s e , h t i c u l a r tl s e c r e c y jf " s p e c ! ; - ! weapons " cfinnöt alwayc be sal eu. tfalistoi of r e s e r v e s - w o u l d be l i u i t e i to the c u r r e n t r n c r 1Q I I e d d i t i o a from o l d e r untrj : I J »Ould be . o longei mailable l a oo p a r i c o n ,?itli the r o - u if.jieat, hhich w i l l aavt bey;, o e r r i e d out a t thfat t i a e o\ th< o t h e r n h a l l decreose i a r e l a t i v e power» ^hot ot a c t u a t i l i ^ v ' 4 ü , n / $ / V p V ' / / / t a e a , dependent ox; tiie a useixce J r : . r could it t h e f o o d c r i s i e , f o r the countering oi: k.ftich we du NüT p o s s e s s b] lecessary f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y , This uust be c o n s i d e r e d a s a " p u i a t of weakness Ln the regime"« uver and above t h a t , ta< world w i l l a n t i c ] • r.ill i . nteraieaeures yearly« w h i l s t othi be i , a should ue i j r e e d on ih^ o f f e n s i v e . »hat the a c t u r a l p o s i t i o n wou.u, be in t h e y e a r s 1945/40 so One •: owa western f o r t i f i c a t i o n s « »»Ithout i /.o.,...<• £> ^, Vi .,._ . , be n e c e s s a r y t u take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n T6 „larcii by I - H ' . V . t h r uu an? ......,.., w » r—*-—YI—rH-—r^i+-r*tr----lrii v "T-naittnn-'y '.u., Liirt-T—t—rTflr"^r,—r^"*?1?n o t have t o be reo witJ . ; o of b c o n f l i c t w i t h r:, , t;s in e v r y case i t v<o ..... hr«ve . . o ie ce the- e n t i t y of Gi:;E.'-T 13" I". He t u " a l l y , Juld i n e v e r y ci s e h« vo to b a r our f r o n t i e r d u r i n g t h e >ur e t t e e l c s u g e l n s t ; .. I und :.ju-,:.X/.« i t .met be a i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n iiere t h t t o... ..;...,< . ..'i.j./ f r> d e f e n c e a e s e u r e s w i l l i n c r e a s e in s t r e n g t h f r o a year to y e a r , anc t h a t a c o n s o l i d a t i o n of t Lnsi ••. „ues of the A u s t r i a n ( . ly w i l l e l s e be e f f e c t e d In the c o u r s « of yet r e . /»lth,-ugh t h e p o p u l a t i o n of LJ^LÖVA^i--- i n t e f i r s t p i e c e i s n o t e t h i n one, the eabo< i i of G<-i.-.Gi.v., - - üViKIi sould n e v e r t h e l e s a c o n s t i t u t e tne conquest of food for o-6 a l l l i o n people,91a .:;!::. t h a t t c u r laoj d e r a t i o n of L m i l l i o n fro;a G*«£GiiOwi,o\ JVX^ Mic of l m i l l i o n from 1 could be c a r r i e d o a t . The frnmixation of tie two s t a t e s t o ,i;.:;.,t.. Liy and p o l i t i c a l l y would c o n s t i t u t e a c o n s i d e r a b l e r e l i e f , owin . to s h o r t e r and b e t t e r f r o n t ;i e r s , t h e f r e e i n g of f i g h t l ü j U3 1 . :.j fur - . lirposea b i l i t y of r e - c o n s t i t u t i n g new ip t o bh'of about 12 d i v i s i o n s , r e p r e s e n t i n g t j • • . , si on r 1 lüilXio L .1 on * n to the removal of C^HÜuüSLOM ..\ i s e x p e c t e d on v . p a r t of . ; however a i t cannot be judged t o - d u y what v.oulc be h e r a t t i t u d e in th • !.' ' . q u e e t i u n s i n c e i t would depend l a r g e l y on whether were a l i v e a* ti.it or not« un end e 1 LI 11 . - % "wxtu ,. ... -•• v a c t i o n «*;ulc u e c i d e w * ' . . . , ' s a t t i t u d e . ti yer against a victor: •. > us r e ; -?- jai o p e r a t i o n s ; i t i i t ... ertitiati .1.t t l i In via« vx' c itut. Lion - • - i.... i, •., , j . ... .. j <näiü- >ccur •ivii <.. The txxhi e x i s t l a g ten . f i r m l y dteci< eö of i t following e^t exi e r i e n c e i in .. '::.:, tn< •feJcing i n t o coaßi l'Gv, B ; it •U of ' 1 develo: - tU en ist ted. - tu« rXy BO 1938* r.ta üi the wer Let» t n e r o . e a r l y and /W/W i'al'thor possibility. -n c«nt v i c t o r y b . t i n u y t i o n of t -*houl<.i F?r : ÜÖ fe ena or / j ^ / ' I Qt I "./..• >.' .. In l.,Q . ti< ... wtr in *-.»Ai;<( i t Jli in ner 1' t i o n of I t a l i a n u i J. 11 on a on her by FK' •.,;.' or ! S&Ql ' e>gninet ..'.. L i'. * . ' s) none s , c JU] s u b j u n c t i o n or I I ctiv« ifcteriülö ooul< I vi W' , . . .. . -ii' I.U v '.i/ would ."ieua : resence .- . on 'i,u . • '-' towards 00&I x..u.i..L: t a e j.vJl»UI'0 str« ..ji iVv.r h BOlidiflei tuiex'c ted sj de we 11 . e . .... • i.itioni-1 . U U U U i I.XUI1E U« WUUiU U'V*: OU i't;xi;ntiUMl iUü J.CCJ » c i.ui^au, »uiUii »vco to begin an the 10 noveaber« This i n t e n t i o n was countermanded by Fuhrer *ho gave as 8 reason tnf t j o s s i b i l i t y of the c o n f l i c t mas not to be regarded es bein^ so imminent« In reply to the remark bj tue Minister for foreign affafcts, t h a t an I t a l i a n - f l n g l i s h - French c o n f l i c t be not &s near ifaif*/ as the ftthrer appeared to assume, the Führer stated t h a t the date which appeared to tiim to be-a p o s s i b i l i t y was summer 1938« In reply t o statements b, Generalfeldmarschsll von 'BLÜA311HG and Generaloberst von FRITSCHj? regarding .....,;..: and /';.. C] * a a t t i t u d e , the Führer repeated h i s previous statements and said that he war» convinced of -üRi'fa.lij'8 n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n and t h a t consequently he did ^ot believe in m i l i t a r y action b,, FR.U.CS against GKB . should the «EDIT PJi ull c o n f l i c t already mentioned- lead to a general mobilisation in EüflüPS, then we should have to commence operations against C2EGiiö3LGVA._IA immediately. I f , howeverthe p'owera v;ho are not p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the war should declare t h e i r d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s , then GIR/J-iiY, would, for the time being , nave to side with t h i s a t t i t u u e , In view or the information ^iven by the i'unrer, generaloberst G03RING considered i t iaper* t i v e to thin... of a reduction or abanuonaent of our m i l i t a r y unaert< icing in a AL . The Fuhrer egrBed to t h i s in so far as he believed t h i s decision shoulu be postponed for a s u i t a b l e d a t e . the second part of the discussion concerned material armament Eptsxiis questions« IT- Q V o ! ."• , r (signed) HttKXKlSIfK