The EU-US Sanctions Regimes: Practical Implications for Dispute

Transcription

Reading Materials for the Panel Discussion
The EU-US Sanctions Regimes:
Practical Implications for Dispute Resolution Lawyers and Their Clients
Table of Contents
Marian Dent’s Materials ....................................................................................................................... 2
Presentation Notes on Economic Sanctions Basics.......................................................................... 2
OFAC SSI List with Directives I through IV....................................................................................... 30
Federal Register /Vol. 79, No. 89 /Thursday, May 8, 2014 containing Office of Foreign Assets
Control 31 CFR Part 589 Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations................................................. 44
Matthew Saunders’ Materials ............................................................................................................ 54
DLA Piper Information Letter: Overview of Economic Sanctions Introduced Against Russia ........ 54
DLA Piper. EU Economic Sanctions and Trade Measures Targeting Russia ................................... 57
ICC Insights. The potential impact of the EU sanctions against Russia on international arbitration
administered by EU-based institutions ........................................................................................... 65
Maya Lester’s Materials ...................................................................................................................... 73
Brick Court Chambers Brochure...................................................................................................... 73
World ECR Reports. Brussels lists, Luxembourg de-lists? Sanctions de-designation cases in the
European Court ............................................................................................................................... 85
Judicial Review of Sanctions Decisions (2013) Judicial Review of Sanctions Decisions: “The
Wrong Point in the Wrong Court with the Wrong Defendant”? .................................................... 89
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in
view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine ....................................................... 95
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in
respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence of Ukraine.............................................................................................................. 107
Marian Dent’s Materials
Presentation Notes on Economic Sanctions Basics
PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS SLIDESHOW WAS CREATED FOR A PRESENTATION IN NOVEMBER 2014 AND HAS ONLY BEEN CURSORILY UPDATED LISTS OF PARTIES MAY HAVE CHANGED
2014 AND HAS ONLY BEEN CURSORILY UPDATED. LISTS OF PARTIES MAY HAVE CHANGED AND REGULATIONS MAY HAVE BEEN ADDED SINCE IT WAS CREATED.
NOTHING IN THIS SLIDE SHOW IS INTENDED AS LEGAL ADVICE IN ANY PARTICULAR MATTER. SANCTIONS ARE COMPLICATED AND QUICKLY CHANGING. I am Marian Dent, an American lawyer, professor and Dean of Pericles Center for International Legal Education, Moscow. My contact info is [email protected]
(Trivial Pursuit Information) Coincidentally, Pericles, the historic figure that my law center is named after, is credited with enacting the first ever recorded sanctions regime, the Megarian
Decree in 432 BC. Megaria was a city state in Greece, at that time allied with Sparta, which, as everyone knows, was generally an enemy of Athens, so relations were generally tense. The Megarians
supposedly trespassed on land that was sacred to Demeter, the Athenian god of the harvest, which of course was considered cause of a bad harvest in Athens, and then they killed the Ath i h ld h
Athenian herald who was sent to the city to complain. Aristophane’s
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’ comedy, The Acharnians, d Th A h i
also states as a reason the kidnapping of 3 ladies of the court by the Megarians. It may also have been a deliberate provocation by Pericles towards Sparta. This was near the end of a 30 year “peace” that was really more of a cold war, and Sparta was acting more and more aggressive towards Athens as Athens expanded its territories. The plan might have been to show Spartan Allies that Athens could hurt those who chose to align themselves with Sparta, even without breaking the truce with Sparta. In the end they succeeded in harming the Megarian economy and in warning Sparta’s allies, but this was one of the triggers of the second Peloponnesian war g g
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and it didn’t succeed in bringing the kidnapped women home. Thus, I would deem it an unsuccessful sanction.
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So sanctions are not new. They are a very common economic weapon, used mainly by the United States and the United Nations but increasingly in the last few years by the EU
and the United Nations but increasingly in the last few years by the EU.
The above statistics are updated from a compilation by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, that was made in 2006. Peterson is a think tank in Washington, D.C. that specializes in researching sanctions. See http://www.iie.com/research/researcharea.cfm?ResearchTopicID=31
The U.S. has imposed by far the most sanctions of any country: Approximate 111 times since WW1.
The United Nations has used them approximately 25 times (20 in Peterson book, which covers through , y
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2006 + since then Somalia 2009, Libya 2011, 2012 Guinea‐Bissau, 2013 Central African Republic, and 2014 Yemen. These do not include sanctions against non‐state actors such as Al‐Qaida, the Taliban and most recently ISIS.
The third most frequent sanctions sending country (second if you don’t count the UN in the same position as a country) has been the – USSR/Russia 19 times (16 through 2006 and then 3 times since then—on Moldovan Wine, Byelorussian Dairy Products and the recent US/EU Agriculture ban) The European Union has passed a startling number of sanctions, especially when you realize (1) that the E.U. has really only passed sanctions as a single entity in the very few years since the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in 1999 that brought about the Common Foreign & Security Policy, (2) that guidelines and b
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best practices were only worked out in the past decade, and (3) that the EU has only seriously been acting as a sanctioning body since the guidelines were last amended in 2009. See the Council of the European Union, Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 15579/03, PESC 757 FIN 568 (Dec. 3, 2003), amended 15114/05 (Dec. 11, 2005) amended again 16967/09 PESC 1656 FIN 551 (Dec. 15, 2009). Given this, we can probably infer that Europe is the sanctions leader today.
The sanctions listed above are not considering national laws put in place to implement UN Sanctions. For example, when I looked at the issue in the early fall of 2014 Canada had 21 Sanctions programs in place, example
when I looked at the issue in the early fall of 2014 Canada had 21 Sanctions programs in place
but half of them were to implement UN sanctions. England also had 21 in place altogether, but only 14 were separate from the UN.
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It’s common to say that sanctions are not successful, and it really depends on who you talk to and what you mean by success. For the purpose of changing policy or for generating positive publicity f
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for a cause in the sending state, they can be very successful. Of course success depends on a lot of other factors: the size of sending economy versus target economy, the presence of white knights or black knights who are willing to enact similar sanctions or break sanctions, how much the target country’s populace is behind the government or the target government can drum up patriotism against the sender, and how much domestic business of the sender is hurt by the sanctions. Sanctions are less likely to be successful against countries with a y
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controlled press and non‐democratic country than they are against countries with a free press or semi‐democratic regime.
The Peterson Institute has advised that on the whole targeted sanctions are much more successful than blanket sanctions, and that sanctions that slowly increase are much more successful than those imposed all at once. Also that sanctions should not be entered into for a short time, but senders should expect to be in them for several years—2‐3 years at least is when they start to hurt.
Regime change was a more popular motive in the cold war than today. The USSR tried it in Yugoslavia in 1948, Finland, China in the 1960s, and Albania for example. The US tried it in Panama, Cuba, Brazil, Chile and Nicaragua. The main post cold‐war incidence has been Iraq. More modest policy changes include changes in trade policy, human rights policy, drug policy etc. Human Rights efforts have mixed results. Note that disrupting military “adventures” into other countries has been one of the least successful use of sanctions.
In the United States, demonstration of resolve or moral outrage is almost always a partial reason for imposing sanctions. US presidents Carter, Clinton, Bush and Obama have seemed willing to impose sanctions even when there was little objective likelihood of them changing a targets actions, as could largely be the case now. Sanctions could merely be intended to show the target that the sender is upset, to show the target that there is enough domestic political will to back up upset with actions, and to play to the domestic audience in the sender’s country. 3
When we talk of sanctions we basically mean several different things that a state can do, which you see here.
In the US, export controls have habitually been the favored form of sanction because the U.S. has so much high tech and military hardware that other countries would like to purchase and that the US is loath to have eventually used against it. Russia, on the other hand, has formed a habit of import bans, often in the guise of health and safety restrictions. This makes sense given that Russia is often attempting to persuade its close neighbors with sanctions, whereas most U.S. sanctions have been directed to enemy regimes far away rather than friendly regimes close by. Also the US has seldom used these because of WTO obligations. Impeding financial flows of course only works for countries that control large financial flows like the U.S. or like the E.U. when operating as a single block. These have the advantage of being easy to enforce compared to import‐export sanctions, since banks are highly regulated industries and have incentives to comply. There is profit to be made in blockade running (smuggling goods in violation of import or export sanctions) but violating financing sanctions is likely to cause the bank to lose money rather than gain it, thus banks tend to comply.
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This list goes from the most mild sanctions at the top, to the most severe sanctions at the bottom.
Targeted Transactions are what are imposed by the current sectoral sanctions against Russia: preventing long term financing of banks or companies, or preventing transactions in strategic industries, in this case the energy and military sectors.
Blocking sanction are those that block the assets of the target, but do not dispose of the assets of the target. When sanctions end, the targeted individual, entity or country gets the assets back. In the United States, blocked funds must be held in interest bearing accounts, so the target actually gets the funds back with at least some modest bank‐rate interest.
Vesting sanctions are the most severe. These occur when the assets of the target are actually seized and sold rather than just blocked. An example would be when the U.S. seized and sold the funds of Saddam Hussein.
Thus far, no vesting sanctions have been imposed in the Ukraine dispute, although some rhetoric in the Russian press might lead one to believe that they have been enacted. Contrary to popular belief, when sanctions end, blocked industrialists should be able to get their blocked property back. Sanctions can also be imposed via Lists, which is when the sending country publishes a list of specific persons or companies whose assets are affected, or against an entire country or region. Obviously, h
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sanctions via lists are less severe.
As you see on the next slide, the bright side: In terms of seriousness then, the current sanctions aren’t that severe. They are only targeted and blocking transactions, and they are for the most part against people placed on lists, not against the whole country, with the except ion of the region wide block on Crimea that affects almost all business in Crimea that would interest major E.U. companies. The downside to seeing that sanctions are mild compared to what they could be is seeing that sanctions could be rendered much worse without much difficulty. For ease of reference in this presentation, when I mention sanctions related to Crimea, I mean sanctions related to both Crimea and Sevastopol. 5
Although we hear a lot of crying about the European sanctions, because more trade takes place between Russian and Europe than between Russia and the U.S., in reality the main sanctions concern is the US because the US tends to impose its laws rather broadly on companies that have only minimum contacts with the United States. On August 10, 2014, the U.S. amended the 50% rule, which has made it much more difficult for companies and banks to determine when a company falls under the sanctions. The amendment makes the 50% now cumulative among owners. So if a parent who is sanctioned owns 25% of a company and another sanctioned parent owns 25% , those percentages are aggregated to block the child company. Moreover, the 50% resets to 100% at each level of the subsidiary relationship. Thus, imagine if a grandaughter company is owned 30% each by two companies that are in turn 50% owned by persons on the SDN list and 40% by a company that has no SDN list connections. Even though altogether the SDN ownership in the grandchild is far less than 50%, the grandchild is also blocked because each of those 50% owned parents are considered as if they were themselves blocked entities for purposes of determining the status of the granddaughter.
The EU technically has “Restrictive
The EU technically has Restrictive Measures, Measures “ not sanctions but the term means the same thing. not sanctions but the term means the same thing The EU The EU
has a “controlled by” test—it is concerned about , not just percent of ownership, but ability to control the company. But how that specifically works is not clearly set out and different member states can interpret it differently.
In US you can write to OFAC or BIS for guidance. Contrarily in the EU there is no administrative body to provide guidance and instead the Council has to meet and vote to change anything. Plus, each member state has different implementation regimes. This is what I call the “Who ya gonna call (ghostbusters) problem.”
Implementation left to member states and it can be a matter of looking at 28 different regimes to solve a problem. There is no single administrative body to whom you can write in the way that you can write to OFAC in the United States to request a license allowing your company to act. In a way that might arguably be subject to sanctions.
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The current sanctions are very complex. I’m not going to go into this in detail because numerous law firm bulletins have been written and numerous conferences have discussed them. This list is only current through 2014 and even then doesn’t contain everything, but it gives you an idea just how complex it is. I taught a 12 hour course outlining all these, and was pushed for time. Since this slide was written for that course, I have sent my students 15 separate updates when sanctions have been amended, parties have been added to the sanctions lists, termination dates have been extended or questions have been clarified. 7
US sanctions were passed in 3 executive orders. 2014 E.O. 13660, 13661 and 13662 the first two E.O.s are related to specially designated nationals, persons whose assets are completely blocked. The latter one imposed the sectoral sanctions, in other words the long term financing restrictions and export restrictions that affect a much sanctions, in other words the long term financing restrictions and export restrictions that affect a much
broader section of the economy. In December of 2014, a fourth executive order was passed, 13685, prohibiting certain transactions and blocking property of certain persons connected with Crimea. Regulations are passed by the Department of the Treasury to implement those orders are contained in the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
Four Directives were passed by OFAC (the US Office of Foreign Assets Control, which is a division of the Department of the Treasury) designed to implement the sectoral sanctions. OFAC has also issued nine General Licenses. A General License is kind of a blanket exception that companies can follow and be safe in understanding that they are not violating sanctions. For example, the first license allows companies to continue to deal in d i ti
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Directive 1. The most recent ones , which some people have been calling the “Facebook licenses,” allow certain exports and transactions related to telecommunications, courier services and internet for Crimea.
As of last fall, OFAC had published 47 answers to frequently asked questions, and I know more have been added and some have been amended since then. I think there are now about 49 or 50 of them. These deal with very specific questions. For example they explain that it’s OK to extend credit to a third party or issue a letter of credit to a third party to buy goods from a party on the sectoral sanctions list (SSI List). Another FAQ says it’s OK to advise and confirm a letter of credit with an SSI List entity as the beneficiary. Another says it’s OK to deal in depository receipts of SSI listed companies. Another explained that the restriction on exports related to shale oil exploration do not include restrictions on exporting to projects that are drilling down through shale to reach oil underneath,
do not include restrictions on exporting to projects that are drilling down through shale to reach oil underneath, but only to those trying to extract oil from shale.
Blocking and Sectoral Sanctions are administered by OFAC in the US. The Department of Commerce administers export regulations, so it has its own entire set of regulations called the “EAR” (Export Administration Regulations). Several Russian companies have been added to the EAR , meaning that US exporters must obtain a license to export, reexport, or transfer within a country goods subject to the EAR when these companies are the end users and the goods are intended for certain prohibited activities. There is a presumption of denial on all these licenses. Finally, Congress passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which President Obama signed into law on December 18, 2014. This act which calls on President Obama to, among other things, continue and extend the sanctions as needed to achieve the Congressional objectives.
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In the EU, the process is for the Council to unanimously pass a Decision and then for the Council’s staff to work on implementing regulations which the Council also passes. There are 13 Decisions and over 20 Implementing p
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Regulations, so EU sanctions are every bit as complex, if not more complex, than US ones. In the current sanctions regime the Decisions and the Regulations often come out the same day, or the Regulations come out within about one day of the Decision. They can all be found on the EU’s website. What confuses many people is that most people look mainly at the Regulations because they are more detailed; but the end dates of the EU sanctions are contained in the Decisions, not in the Regulations. So look to the Decisions to determine when various sanctions may end. On June 19, 2015, the EU extended sanctions against goods originating in Crimea and Sevastopol (which were set to expire on June 23) for another year. (Council Desicion 2015/959/CFSP of June 19, 2015, amending amending Decision 2014/386/CFSP). So now the expiration in June 23, 2016. On June 22, the EU extended its main sanctions against Russia (sectoral sanctions on 5 Russian banks, prohibition of exports for deep water oil exploration, actic oil exploratin, shale oil projects, various military and dual use exports which were expected to expire on June 30) for another six months which were expected to expire on June 30) for another six months (Council Decision 2015/971/CFSP of June (Council Decision 2015/971/CFSP of June
22, 2015, amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP). So now the expiration date is January 31, 2016. EU member countries can have varying penalties and varying legal details. Member countries get no financing assistance from the EU to impose their sanctions, thus they have varying abilities to enforce them, and varying political will. There are also varying speeds of implementation (although not by months but only perhaps hours or a day when one country will have blocked assets of a particular individual and another member country might not have done so yet). This doesn’t mean there is absolutely no guidance: The Guidelines mentioned in the notes to Slide 2 are aimed at EU regulators and set out definitions for technical assistance, funds, freezing, economic resources, dual use goods, etc., th t
that apply to all restrictive measures. There is also a “Best Practices” guidance 8666/1/08, aimed at member states l t ll t i ti
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to help them implement sanctions more uniformly. And at the end of 2014, the EU published additional guidance, which, taking a page from OFAC, were issued in the form of 26 FAQs. To add to the complexity of the sanctions regime, although the EU recently moved to bring the sanctions more into uniformity with those in the US, the language used in the EU and the guidance given in the EU, isn’t exactly the same as in the United States, nor the same as sanctions from other European allies. So each jurisdiction really has to be analyzed separately to solve any particular legal problem.
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Stepping back from Russia‐specific sanctions for a moment, this slide explains the questions you have to think about in all sanctions issues Who must stop doing What with Whom and How much must
to think about in all sanctions issues. Who, must stop doing What, with Whom, and How much must you know?
I have a slide on who must comply in a second, but just keep in mind that subsidiaries of US or EU companies need not comply but it’s a false distinction because of the control issue. A subsidiary failing to comply with sanctions could cause the parent to be in violation.
Targets are individuals and companies that the respective governments consider responsible for or p
or the unrest in Eastern Ukraine , high officials of Russian , g
complicit in the annexation of Crimea
Government, or businesses owned or controlled by these high officials, or operating in the arms sector, and specified operators in financial services, energy, metals & mining, engineering and defense that are particularly close to the state or particularly likely to be capitalizing on events in Ukraine. Also targets are companies investing in infrastructure development and resource exploitation in telecommunications, energy and military sectors in Crimea. So far the restriction on these specified operators is is only restriction on long term financing and export controls. When looking at What actions are sanctioned, you have to look not only at the scope of the sanction itself, but at what actions may be considered to be facilitating the prohibited action. For example, it
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giving general legal advice to an individual on the SSN list requires a license from OFAC. A recent case involving an insurance company settled with OFAC for over $100,000 in fines for facilitating the insurance of a person on the SDN List. Even secretarial services can be facilitation. You need also to be careful to avoid transactions that could be considered conspiracies to evade the sanctions or to have the purpose of evading the sanctions. For example, if a US company tries to avoid a breach of contract suit from a blocked company by finding the blocked company a non‐US company that can perform in its place, this could be both conspiracy and a transaction with the purpose of evading the ,
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sanctions, and thus the US company could be liable for sanctions violations. As another example, a US “person” can’t pay a foreign company to do what US “person” can’t. Finally, as with any criminal law you need to think about what is the mental state that will cause you to violate the sanctions. 10
There is not much to say here apart from what is on the slide. Basically in the US the requirement to comply with sanctions apply to anyone the US can get jurisdiction over, with the exception of foreign subsidiaries of US companies.
Thus, if you, as a Russian citizen, go to the U.S. and agree to pick up the suit at Ralph Lauren that an individual on the SDN list is getting tailor made, and you return it to that individual in Russia you might be violating the sanctions. You are findable and acting in the US. The issue would be whether the action of violating the sanctions occurred when you pick up the suit in the US or when you give it to the SDN individual in Russia. But there is at least a good chance that this would all be considered part of one continuing transaction, so you could be found in violation.
The good news is that OFAC doesn’t usually go after small violations like this. OFAC likes to prosecute big violations that will bring in large fines for the government, or cases where the conduct of the US party is really egregious. It has actually not prosecuted many very small cases in recent years. BIS is more likely to prosecute small export violations. 11
The Key to understanding the current sanctions regime is in the lists
Blocking Sanctions are imposed by adding individuals to the OFAC list of Specially Designated Nationals in the US, or the Designated Persons List in the EU. These lists are not specific to Russia. There is one master list. Financial Sanctions include sanctions against over 30 days debt or equity financing for banks, over 90 days debt financing for the energy sector, and over 30 day debt financing for the defense sector. (You’ll see this better in a later slide.) In the US this is a separate list than the SDN list. In the European Union the list of individuals subject to sectoral sanctions on financing is contained in the particular regulation implementing the sanctions. I believe that these individuals are also listed in the Designated Persons list but with a notice that the sanction is under the particular regulation that indicates that it is only a sanction on financing.
OFAC also lists companies for whom there are limits on exports, but for the most part these restrictions are OFAC
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managed by the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). BIS administers all US dual‐use export control regimes. A great many items are considered dual‐use and are thus subject to licensing with BIS. In the EU, I’m not sure but I believe the member states maintain their own export controls enforcement. BIS maintains three separate lists: The Denied Persons List is the list of parties that are prohibited from exporting from the US, and if a US company exports to someone who is sanctioned, then they are likely to be placed on this list and lose their ability to export. The Entity List is the list on which sanctioned individuals are placed, and which means that no US exporters will be able to export to that person, or export certain items to that person, or items deigned for certain purposes, depending on how the particular sanction is phrased, without first obtaining an export license. The regulations contain a presumption that the
sanction is phrased, without first obtaining an export license. The regulations contain a presumption that the license will be denied, so the exporter will have to prove that the goods are, for example, not going to be used for specified purposes Finally the Unverified List is a list of foreign companies or individuals that BIS thinks might be involved in transshipping goods to people on the Entity List. BIS has a representative in Moscow whose job it is to investigate Russian importers and check to ensure that they are legitimate. If he can’t do this, then the importer might be placed on the unverified list and imports to him will be denied also.
Finally, Arms Controls are administered by the State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which administers the US Munitions List, which is separate from the list of civilian and dual use commodities maintained by BIS. Basically, no items on the Munitions List are being exported to any entity in Russia right now, which actually makes this easier to understand than other parts of the sanctions, and I’m not going to cover it any more.
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Above is a picture of the US SDN List, showing when particular individuals and companies were placed on the list. The haz‐mat suit cartoon is designed to indicate that persons who must comply with the sanctions must treat SDN list persons as radioactive. SDN list persons have their assets blocked. The US basically does not allow any dealings with these individuals and companies unless you first obtain a license (permission) from OFAC. AS YOU CAN SEE, THIS LIST IS NOT UP TO DATE. IT ONLY CONTAINS ADDITIONS THROUGH SEPTEMBER 12 OF 2014. SINCE THEN NUMEROUS OTHER ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN ADDED, MAINLY THOSE DOING BUSINESS IN CRIMEA OR SUBSIDIARIES OF ALREADY LISTED COMPANIES.
The EU List contains somewhat different persons and entities of course.
US completely blocks doing business with SDN list persons. Contrarily, EU Decision 145 and Reg
269 and amendments thereto, which impose asset freezes and travel bans for these designated persons (SDN List Equivalent) are not a complete ban on doing business but a ban on providing any funds and economic resources “benefitting directly or indirectly” to these persons. So it’s a bit more flexible. At least you can talk to the people, whereas in the case of US SDN’s many attorneys will advise their clients not even to be seen in the same room with them
attorneys will advise their clients not even to be seen in the same room with them. Remember that “directly or indirectly benefitting” a target is presumed in the EU if
your company that must comply with the EU sanctions is dealing with a company or an asset more than 50% owned (note difference from US‐the US says “50% owned” but the EU says “more than 50% owned”) or “controlled by” target (again , the US does not have a separate control test). This is an important difference when a person is on the SDN list but a company that this person directs is not on the SDN list. (eg: Igor Sechin and Rosneft). It seems the US would allow you to do business with the company but not if the individual is involved in the transaction. The EU might not allow you to do business with the controlled company. 13
Now we are moving away from the SDN list and into the Sectoral Sanctions. PLEASE KEEP IN MIND THAT THE COMPANIES AND BANKS LISTED WERE CURRENT AS OF LATE 2014 AND SOME MAY HAVE BEEN
THE COMPANIES AND BANKS LISTED WERE CURRENT AS OF LATE 2014 AND SOME MAY HAVE BEEN ADDED SINCE THEN.
These are the US Sanctions. The European ones differ slightly. The four OFAC directives are summarized above. Directives Numbers 1, 2, and 3 affect the financing of companies in the banking sector, energy sector and defense sector respectively. Note that the 90 days is scratched out in Directive 1, because this was originally 90 days but then was changed to 30 days when the US tightened sanctions this summer. Note that in the case of the infamous banks, both NEW debt and equity financing for longer than 30 days h
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are prohibited. The other Directives contain no equity prohibitions.
Directive 2 for the Energy Sector companies is exactly the same as Directive 3 for the Defense Sector, with the exception that Directive 2 only prohibits financing over 90 days, whereas Directive 3 contains the 30 day limit. Note that in the EU, the 30 day limit applies to both energy and defense sector companies.
OFAC FAQ 371 defines Debt to include bonds, loans, extensions of credit, loan guarantees, letters of credit, drafts, bankers acceptances, discount notes or bills, or commercial paper. Equity includes stocks, share issuances depositary receipts or any other evidence of title or ownership Also prohibited are all share issuances, depositary receipts, or any other evidence of title or ownership. Also prohibited are all
financing in support of prohibited new debt or new equity; and any dealing in, including provision of services in support of, such new debt or new equity.
Directive 4 prohibits exports to the 5 companies listed, provided the exports are in support of the Deepwater, Artic Offshore and Shale Projects that have the possibility of producing oil. The exporter has the burden of proving that oil production is not the aim of the exploration. I’ve been told that in the beginning stages of oil exploration, it’s not known whether the project is going to produce oil or produce gas, so essentially this directive prohibits export of technologies to these companies for any new Deepwater, Artic Offshore or Shale Projects. In actual fact the whole point of Directive 4 is a bit moot though, because BIS took the initiative of creating a presumption of denial on all dual use exports to any h
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destination in Russia, which would include many of the items listed in Directive 4. Compared to BIS’s actions, Directive 4 is small potatoes.
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This slide illustrates the export control sanctions that are targets of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). It should be current now.
BIS automatically places on the Entity List all persons on OFAC’s SDN list. This is fairly obvious since US companies can’t export to anyone with whom they aren’t allowed to do any business at all.
Plus BIS has added all the Directive 4 Companies for exports in support of DWAOSP (Deep Water, Artic Oil and Shale Projects) with the possibility of producing oil. Most recently, on September 2, 2015, BIS added 14 Rosneft subsidiaries to this list.
BIS also lists certain defense contractors that are prohibited end users for US exports, no matter what the purpose. Apart from that list, BIS has imposed what it calls the “China Rule,” meaning that all dual use exports to any military end user or end use are prevented.
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The mens rea required for convicting an individual or company of an OFAC sanctions violation is “knowingly violate or should have known of a violation.”
This basically means that to avoid liability an entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States has to have a compliance program in place that ensures “Reasonable Due Diligence” to avoid violations. An effective sanctions compliance program has to target the particular risks, use a computerized database to check contracting partners and transactions, train personnel, and penalize personnel for non‐compliance.
But note that BIS does not use a knowingly or reason to know standard. Instead they apply a strict liability standard, meaning that if an export violation occurred they can fine an exporter no matter how careful that company was. In reality, BIS tends not to go after companies that have made reasonable efforts not to violate export controls and were fooled by a particularly adept foreign buyer, but they could. The EU has a similar standard to the US, but uses a bit looser standard when it comes to liability for facilitating sanctioned transactions or entering into agreements to circumvent sanctions. It requires an intentional violation. 16
Finally the cost of non‐compliance can be extremely high in the US. You see the amounts above. Keep in mind that amounts can be per transaction, which, in the case of exports can mean per item or per shipment. Plus, an exporter can lose the right to export, which can mean loss of the exporter’s entire business.
In reality, as mentioned OFAC tends to go after the biggest, most egregious violators. This is especially the policy of OFAC’s current director. According to an article published in Georgetown University Law Review, in 2008 there were 99 different companies and individuals sanctioned with a total of $3.5 million in fines. But by 2009 there were 27 different enforcement actions with total penalties of $770 million, and in 2012 there were 16 enforcement actions with penalties and settlements exceeding $1 billion. The main change is that OFAC is going after the big banks, and particularly foreign banks: HSBC ($375 million settlement in 2012) Standard Chartered Bank (S. Africa, India & Australia $132 mil settlement), ING ($619 mil settlement in 2012) , BNP Paribas settled for $8.9 BILLION dollars in 2014, for omitting information from the Swift payment system that allowed it to hide the fact that payments were to SDN entities. Bank of Moscow got off lightly with its $9.5 million dollar fine in January 2014.
Contrarily, in the EU, sanctions vary from country‐to‐country. In some EU member states sanctions can be quite light compared to in others.
17
This slide is mainly self explanatory. Compared to the United States, the EU sanctions are much more focused on government officials and on Crimea, and companies doing business with Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The EU, as stated above, prohibits investment in and exports to anything related to telecommunications, transportation, or energy infrastructure or exploitation. Those aren’t the exact words of the prohibition, but it’s close.
As mentioned in previous slides/notes, the 50 % rules is slightly different between the US and the EU.
Finally, the US is stricter than the EU about what can be done with someone on the SDN list. In the US, any transaction at all, from legal work, to secretarial work, to picking up a suit at the tailor, needs to have a license (formal permission) from OFAC. There is a regular procedure for applying for this. The EU on the other hand, doesn’t have an EU wide licensing procedure, it’s done on an individual member state basis, but the EU as a whole allows collection of payments for contracts entered into and performed before sanctions began. Actually, OFAC would probably allow a license to collect money owed by an SDN also, but in the EU you don’t need special permission for that. 18
The first item above is talking about the SSI list financial controls. The remaining items are all talking about export controls. controls.
Just like the US and EU having slightly different lists of SDN and SSI sanctioned persons, US and EU export sanctions also have slightly different “Entity Lists” and slightly different lists of prohibited goods. For example the EU has an exemption for non‐military aerospace technology, which the US does not have.
The EU also has a very valuable grandfathering clause, allowing exports of otherwise prohibited goods in conjunction with finishing the performance of existing contracts, and the continuing performance of framework agreements and ancillary contracts. The US is not so generous.
Regarding deemed imports, in U.S. export control law, giving information in the United States to a person from a country of company to whom exports are prohibited is considered a “deemed export” and is also prohibited. t
f
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t
hibit d i
id d “d
d
t” d i l
hibit d
Thus, if an American company with an office in Moscow were to call, for instance, Kalinin Machine Plant, JSC, an entity for whom exports are prohibited for defense sector controls, and show Kalinin’s director plans for a piece of equipment they are hoping to sell Kalinin in the future, the American company would be violating U.S. export control laws, even though they never actually export any equipment. The European Union does not have this rule, but does prohibit the formation of service contracts involving the production of equipment that would be prevented by export controls.
The US controls transshipments, which means that the exporter is responsible for knowing not just the immediate consignee of goods, but the end user. Thus, if goods are purchased for export to Turkey, for example, but the Turkish buyer ships them on to Russia, the US exporter will have violated export controls. BIS publishes a
Turkish buyer ships them on to Russia, the US exporter will have violated export controls. BIS publishes a guideline for compliance with the transshipment rules and offers training for exporters: http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/compliance‐a‐training/export‐management‐a‐compliance/transshipment‐
best‐practices
The US also controls reexports—which includes the export of goods that were previously exported from the United States but then brought back in (this is particularly important in the case of dual use goods returned to the US for servicing) and also goods that are sent to a third country and then later sent on to a prohibited country. Using the Turkey example again, if the Turkish buyer indeed ships the goods to Turkey, and even if they sit in Turkey for a little while before the Turkish buyer ships them on to Russia, the US exporter could have violated US export controls. There is an “inventory exception” that will help in many of these cases, but still it’s something that the US company must be careful of. h h US
b
f l f
Individual EU member states may or may not care about transshipments and reexports.
19
When sanctions began, the oil industry noted that the statement of what oil technology exports are prevented did not quite carry over in exactly the same way from the E U to the U S As
are prevented did not quite carry over in exactly the same way from the E.U. to the U.S. As shown above, the US prohibits technology “in support of” the listed activities, whereas the EU says “necessary for” thus possibly creating a narrower list. Contarily, the EU prohibited export for Arctic oil projects, not just Arctic Offshore projects. However, recent EU clarifications have brought the EU and US definitions into line. Clarifications show, for example, that by “Arctic” they mean north of arctic circle, and by “Deep Water” they mention the US 500 foot definition. The US prohibits exports to projects with the potential to produce oil, whereas the EU says “oil projects.” I was told that this is a more important distinction than you might think because in y g
p j
p
p
,
p
the early stages almost all projects have the potential to produce oil, but the developers don’t know whether they will actually produce oil or gas until the project is far along. Thus, the US definition essentially prohibits all new development projects since the developers won’t be able to prove the project does not have the potential to produce oil.
The EU exempts exports intended for the maintenance & safety of existing civil nuclear capabilities in the EU, and services to help in case of events threatening health, safety, or the environment. Th US
The US controls exports that have 25% or more US content, whereas the EU has no blanket rule t l
t th t h
25%
US
t t h
th EU h
bl k t l
on this. States may have their own rules.
Finally, EU sanctions have set expiration dates stated in the Council Decisions, and it requires a unanimous vote of the 28 member states to extend them. Such an extension was granted this Spring, as noted in a previous slide. The US President’s authority to enact sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act limited sanctions to one year after being formed, but this could be extended by the President very easily. In addition, the Ukraine Freedom pp
p
y
y,
Support Act that passed in December contains no such one year limitation. Theoretically, in the U.S. we could have a situation like the one that existed with the Jackson‐Vanik amendment in which sanctions or the ability to maintain the threat of sanctions could exist for decades.
20
I just have short information on some other major jurisdictions. Besides the U.S. and the E.U., sanctions have also been imposed on Russia by (i) Albania; (ii) Australia; (iii) Canada; (iv) Iceland; (v) Japan (vi) Liechtenstein; (vii) Moldova; (viii) Montenegro; (ix) Norway; (x) Ukraine; and (xi) Switzerland. Plus keep in mind that UK offshore territories, such as the BVI and the Caymens, fall under the UK implementation of E.U. sanctions.
Please keep in mind that I’m not trained to practice law in these jurisdictions, so this is just very basic information.
21
Canadian sanctions apply to Canadians, Canadian entities, and people & entities in Canada.
The slide above outlines the general Canadian sanctions regime. Canada has been very vocal in sanctioning Russia, and I’m told that the sanctions are being vigorously enforced. The SDN list is quite large, it focuses mainly officials, companies and individual businesses within Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. I noticed several Crimean wineries on the list, hence the wine glass in the picture. But also on the list are a diverse array of banks, investment firms, technology companies and manufacturers such as Bank Rossiya; Volga Group; Radio‐Electronic Technologies and United Shipbuilding Corporation. Like the EU designated person sanctions, Canadian p y
g
p
p
Schedule 1 sanctions allow payments from the designated person’s funds to third parties. At least as of the end of 2014, Rosneft, Sechin and Chemezov and were not sanctioned in Canada. Rosneft owns some 30 percent of a Canadian oil field, while Rostec has an aircraft assembly joint venture lined up with Bombardier Inc. that has a $3.4 billion aircraft sale deal tied to it. Thus, there were very practical reasons for skipping them. I understand that at least Rosneft was added to the Canadian Schedule 3 list in February 2015. I haven’t checked to see whether the others have been added to the list now.
Th
The mens
rea for sanctions violations is knowingly or reason to know, but wilful
f
ti
i l ti
i k
i l
t k
b t ilf l violators can be i l t
b
fined any amount and imprisoned up to 5 years. Transactions assisting or promoting violations are also prohibited.
What’s missing from the lists above are export controls. As far as I can tell, Canada does not include any restrictions on Canadian exports among its sanctions tools.
The full text of the consolidated Canadian law can be found here p //
j
g
/ g/ g
/
/
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR‐2014‐58/FullText.html
22
Switzerland seems to like making clear that it doesn’t “sanction” Russia but instead has “anti‐
circumvention measures” designed to stop companies using Switzerland to get around sanctions circumvention measures
designed to stop companies using Switzerland to get around sanctions
imposed by the EU and US, and thus to avoid invoking the anger of its neighbors. Switzerland has published several lists of individuals who cannot enter into new business relations with Swiss intermediaries to transfer assets through Switzerland. The list is regularly updated to match EU designated persons.
Authorization from SECO (Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs) is needed to undertake financial instruments with a duration of over 30 days with several Russian banks. The European, over 50% rule applies. Authorization will be granted “if the contemplated loan does not cause the total value of the financial instruments held by the applicant to exceed the average value of that total during the preceding three years.” In other words, the transaction will be authorized h
ld
h
d
h
”
h
d h
ll b
h
d
as long as its in the normal range of business and doesn’t appear that the Swiss bank applying for the authorization is taking advantage of the EU sanctions by allowing the Russian bank to reroute all their prohibited EU financing to Switzerland. Swiss anti‐circumvention measures also prohibits financial intermediaries from establishing new relationships with the named entities.
Switzerland also imposes some export controls. Exporters much notify SECO for export of certain goods that fit the European definition (ie Deep Water Oil, Arctic and Shale Oil Projects). Military goods exports to Russia and Ukraine are prohibited Dual use goods require a license
Military goods exports to Russia and Ukraine are prohibited. Dual use goods require a license, and licenses are only restrictively granted. Like everyone else, Switzerland does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It is stricter on transactions related to Crimea than on other transactions. Switzerland prohibits creation of joint ventures as well as the granting of loans or credit for infrastructure projects in the transport, energy or telecom industries in the area, especially if the projects are exploiting oil, gas or mineral resources of the area. Exports are also prohibited if end user is in Crimea or Sevastopol.
S i
Swiss penalties are high‐
li
hi h up to 1 million Swiss francs and 5 years in jail for willful violations.
1 illi S i f
d5
i j il f
illf l i l i
23
It was hard for me to find out much about Japanese sanctions because I don’t speak Japanese, and less was available in English than I had hoped for. It’s difficult to find the correct website, so I’ve written it in the slide above.
Japanese sanctions are actually fairly mild. They have imposed a lot of visa restrictions, but compared to Canada, for example, the number of people whose assets are blocked is quite low. At first it included only 40 people and two entities‐Chernomorneftgaz and Feodossia. In December 9, 2014, the Moscow Times reported that Japan had frozen the assets of an additional 26 persons and 14 legal entities, but I have been unable to find additional confirmation of that.
On September 25, 2014, Japan announced that it will tighten export controls and impose financing sanctions against the usual 5 banks, but I also have not found confirmation that this actually happened. The Economist posited, on Sept 29, 2014 that Japanese sanctions are so mild and Japan is unlikely to impose strict sanctions on Russia due to its concern for energy security after the Fukushima disaster in 2011. 24
Surprisingly, Australia proved the most problematic for EU business of any regime outside the EU and US but this was mainly because of uncertainty
EU and US, but this was mainly because of uncertainty. On September 1, 2014, Australia announced that it would begin strict restrictions, as noted above. In November 2014, the Australian Government had at least released draft regulations and specification instrument to implement the expanded sanctions, but opened the issue for public comment until December 9. Actual sectoral type sanctions were not implemented until March 2015. While one might think this meant Australia was an easy place for Russians to get financing, the actual result was the opposite. During that long period of uncertainty, many Australian banks were unwilling to loan to Russian banks or companies at all, because of fear about what might ll
l
b k
ll b
ff
b
h
h
happen in the future. . Experts posited that this effect might have been intentional because Australians were particularly concerned about the downing of MH17. In any case, this “shadow sanction” regime was very effective at blocking trade without the government actually doing anything to risk Russia’s ire until March.
The Australian regulation appears to be very close to the EU regulations. It prevents projects in the telecommunications, transportation, energy , oil and mineral resources and infrastructure of Crimea; prevent sexport to Russia of goods necessary for Deep Water Oil, Arctic, and Shale Oil production projects; target the oil military and financial sectors; and contains an EU‐style
production projects; target the oil, military and financial sectors; and contains an EU
style over
over‐
50%‐owned‐or‐controlled test. Setting the specific persons or entities named was left to the “Specification” which is within the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, making targets fairly easy to change. The draft Specification names the usual 5 banks targeted by the EU, OPK Oboronprom, United Aircraft Corporation, Uralvagonzavod, Rosneft, Transneft and Gaspromneft. Plus it lists 30 goods for which exports to Russia are controlled, 32 controlled for Crimea, and 202 different Crimean mineral resources about which transactions will be prohibited. Existing contracts appear to be given 30 days to wind down or complete their exports.
O
One thing to note though, is that the Australian sanctions appear to apply a negligence standard, hi
h
h i h h A
li
i
l
li
d d
which is a bit lower mens rea than in the EU or the US.
25
Unfortunately the future of the situation in Ukraine, and thus of Ukraine related sanctions against Russia, is as foggy and uncertain as our little hedgehog. f
All I can do is “guestimate” based on how sanctions are passed and repealed in the EU and the US. If things continue along the political status quo, my best guess is that European sanctions might not get much worse and might end in 2016. The EU government likes to reach a full consensus, and, although some minor steps could be taken without full agreement, scholars doubt that they ,
g
p
g
,
y
will move in any direction on sanctions without approval of all 28 states. Plus, trade between Russia and Europe has been much more extensive than trade between Russia and the U.S. Thus, the economic reasons for ending the sanctions are higher. I’m not completely convinced that EU countries are really afraid of an aggressive Russia, and really 100% behind Ukrainian ambitions to join the EU. So one scenario is that, barring further escalation in Eastern‐Ukraine, sanctions may be allowed to expire when their mandate ends. On the other hand, pressure from the US to stay coordinated on sanctions may lead them to be continued longer. Contrarily, American sanctions could potentially get worse, become more solidified and, unfortunately, continue well into the future. Under the IEEPA, Presidential sanctions had some limitations, but Congress has no such restrictions. Unfortunately, there is a presidential and congressional election coming up in the U.S., with very little public support of Russia in the US, and lots of media support for Ukraine. Plus, the business lobby in the US is not as concerned about Russia as in the EU. Thus, US politicians have very little to be lost by coming down hard on Russia (or at least talking tough about Russia), and in fact they have a lot of domestic political capital to be gained from it. In short, while its possible that US sanctions against Russia will be dropped, I’m not optimistic that sanctions won’t get more severe before they get better. 26
Notice that I turned my warning sign picture upside down. This is probably wishful thinking at the moment. I suppose it will be 2016 before we are able to predict whether the up arrow might actually happen.
27
OFAC SSI List with Directives I through IV
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List
September 12, 2014
The Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (the
whose property and interests in property are
[email protected]; alt. Email Address
“SSI List”)
blocked under E.O 13662 or other authorities will
[email protected]; BIK (RU) 044525219;
appear on OFAC's SDN list with program tags for
Executive Order 13662 Directive Determination
relevant blocking authorities.
- Subject to Directive 1; Registration ID
This publication of Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control ("OFAC") is a reference tool
providing actual notice of actions by OFAC with
respect to persons that are identified pursuant to
Executive Order 13662. The latest changes may
appear here prior to their publication in the
Federal Register, and it is intended that users
rely on changes indicated in this document.
Such changes reflect official actions of OFAC,
and will be reflected as soon as practicable in the
Federal Register under the index heading
"Foreign Assets Control." New Federal Register
notices with regard to identifications made under
Executive Order 13662 may be published at any
time. Users are advised to check the Federal
Register and this electronic publication routinely
for additional names or other changes to the
listings. Entities and individuals on the list are
occasionally licensed by OFAC to transact
business with U.S. persons in anticipation of
removal from the list or because of foreign policy
considerations in unique circumstances.
Licensing in anticipation of official Federal
Register publication of a notice of removal based
on the unblocking of an entity's or individual's
property is reflected in this publication by the
removal of an identified name from the list.
Description of the SSI List:
This Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List
includes persons determined by OFAC to be
operating in sectors of the Russian economy
identified by the Secretary of the Treasury
pursuant to Executive Order 13662. The
prohibitions on dealings related to the persons
identified on this list are described in the
directives below. Persons identified pursuant to
each directive will appear under the
corresponding directive on the SSI List.
The property and interests in property of persons
identified on the SSI List are not blocked, but
persons sanctioned under E.O. 13662 and on the
SSI List may also be persons whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
E.O 13662 or pursuant to other authorities
administered by OFAC. Persons on the SSI List
_________________________________
Directive 1 - The following activities by a U.S.
person or within the United States are prohibited,
except to the extent provided by law or unless
licensed or otherwise authorized by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control: (1) all transactions in,
provision of financing for, and other dealings in
new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new
equity of persons determined to be subject to this
Directive (listed below), their property, or their
interests in property; and (2) all activities related
to debt or equity issued before the date of this
Directive 1 (as amended) that would have been
prohibited by the prior version of this Directive 1.
All other activities with these persons or involving
their property or interests in property are
permitted, provided such activities are not
otherwise prohibited pursuant to Executive
Orders 13660, 13661, or 13662 or any other
sanctions program implemented by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control. Except to the extent
otherwise provided by law or unless licensed or
otherwise authorized by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control, the following are also prohibited:
(1) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the
purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a
violation of, or attempts to violate any of the
prohibitions contained in this Directive; and (2)
any conspiracy formed to violate any of the
prohibitions in this Directive. For information on
the original Directive 1, please visit the following
URL: http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/eo_13662
_directives.pdf
AKTSIONERNY KOMMERCHESKI BANK BANK
1027700159497; Government Gazette Number
29292940; For more information on directives,
please visit the following link:
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx
#directives. [UKRAINE-EO13662].
BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
(VNESHECONOMBANK) STATE
CORPORATION (a.k.a. BANK RAZVITIYA I
VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKOI
DEYATELNOSTI (VNESHEKONOMBANK)
GOSUDARSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA;
a.k.a. VNESHECONOMBANK; a.k.a. "VEB"), 9
Akademika Sakharova prospekt, Moscow
107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC BFEA RU MM;
Website http://www.veb.ru; Email Address
[email protected]; BIK (RU) 044525060; Executive
Order 13662 Directive Determination - Subject
to Directive 1; For more information on
directives, please visit the following link:
BANK OF MOSCOW (f.k.a. AKTSIONERNY
KOMMERCHESKI BANK BANK MOSKVY,
OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE
OBSCHCHESTVO; a.k.a. JOINT STOCK
COMMERCIAL BANK - BANK OF MOSCOW,
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY), 8/15 Korp.
3 ul. Rozhdestvenka, Moscow 107996, Russia;
Bld 3 8/15, Rozhdestvenka St., Moscow
107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC MOSW RU MM;
Website www.bm.ru; Email Address
MOSKVY, OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE
OBSCHCHESTVO (a.k.a. BANK OF
MOSCOW; a.k.a. JOINT STOCK
COMMERCIAL BANK - BANK OF MOSCOW,
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY), 8/15 Korp.
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
3 ul. Rozhdestvenka, Moscow 107996, Russia;
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx
Bld 3 8/15, Rozhdestvenka St., Moscow
107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC MOSW RU MM;
Website www.bm.ru; Email Address
BANK RAZVITIYA I
a.k.a. VTB BANK OAO; a.k.a. VTB BANK,
OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY), 29,
GOSUDARSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA
Bolshaya Morskaya str., St. Petersburg 190000,
(a.k.a. BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND
Russia; 37 Plyushchikha ul., Moscow 119121,
FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
Russia; 43, Vorontsovskaya str., Moscow
109044, Russia; SWIFT/BIC VTBRRUMM;
CORPORATION; a.k.a.
Website www.vtb.com; Executive Order 13662
VNESHECONOMBANK; a.k.a. "VEB"), 9
Directive Determination - Subject to Directive 1;
Akademika Sakharova prospekt, Moscow
Registration ID 1027739609391 (Russia); Tax
107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC BFEA RU MM;
ID No. 7702070139 (Russia); Government
Website http://www.veb.ru; Email Address
Gazette Number 00032520 (Russia); License
[email protected]; BIK (RU) 044525060; Executive
1000 (Russia); For more information on
to Directive 1; For more information on
BANK VNESHNEY TORGOVLI ROSSIYSKOY
BANK VNESHNEY TORGOVLI, JOINT-STOCK
BANK VTB OAO (f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
TORGOVLI ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII,
COMPANY (f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
CLOSED JOINT-STOCK COMPANY; f.k.a.
FEDERATSII, CLOSED JOINT-STOCK
BANK VNESHNEY TORGOVLI RSFSR; f.k.a.
COMPANY (f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
TORGOVLI RSFSR; f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
COMPANY; f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
TORGOVLI, JOINT-STOCK COMPANY; f.k.a.
BANK VNESHNEY TORGOVLI, OPEN JOINT-
TORGOVLI, OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY;
STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. BANK VTB OAO;
a.k.a. BANK VTB, OPEN JOINT-STOCK
COMPANY; a.k.a. JSC VTB BANK; f.k.a.
VNESHTORGBANK; f.k.a. VNESHTORGBANK
ROSSII, CLOSED JOINT-STOCK COMPANY;
BANK VNESHNEY TORGOVLI RSFSR (f.k.a.
BANK VTB, OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
(f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY TORGOVLI
STOCK COMPANY (f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, CLOSED JOINT-
BANK VNESHNEY TORGOVLI ROSSIYSKOY
STOCK COMPANY; f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
FEDERATSII, CLOSED JOINT-STOCK
COMPANY; a.k.a. BANK VTB OAO; a.k.a.
BANK VTB, OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY;
a.k.a. JSC VTB BANK; f.k.a.
a.k.a. JSC VTB BANK; f.k.a.
September 12, 2014
-2-
GAZPROMBANK OJSC (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK
more information on directives, please visit the
GAS INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a.
following link: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
GAZPROMBANK OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a.
GAZPROMBANK OTKRYTOE
AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a.
INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK
GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB, OJSC), 16, Building 1,
OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OJSC; a.k.a.
Nametkina St., Moscow 117420, Russia; 63,
GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT STOCK
Novocheremushkinskaya St., Moscow 117418,
COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK
Russia; SWIFT/BIC GAZPRUMM; Website
www.gazprombank.ru; Email Address
OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OJSC), 16,
[email protected]; Executive Order
Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow 117420,
13662 Directive Determination - Subject to
Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya St.,
Directive 1; Registration ID 1027700167110;
Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC
Tax ID No. 7744001497; Government Gazette
GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru;
GAZPROMBANK OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK
Number 09807684; For more information on
Email Address [email protected];
OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT
STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK
1027700167110; Tax ID No. 7744001497;
OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a.
Government Gazette Number 09807684; For
GAZPROMBANK GAS INDUSTRY OJSC (a.k.a.
GPB, OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St.,
GPB, OAO (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS
Moscow 117420, Russia; 63,
COMPANY (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS
GAZPROMBANK OTKRYTOE
AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a.
GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB, OJSC), 16, Building 1,
Nametkina St., Moscow 117420, Russia; 63,
OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO), 16,
Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow 117420,
Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya St.,
GAS INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a.
GAZPROMBANK OJSC; a.k.a.
1027700167110; Tax ID No. 7744001497;
GAZPROMBANK OAO (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK
OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a.
GAZPROMBANK OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE
GPB, OJSC (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS
GPB, OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St.,
OBSHCHESTVO (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS
Moscow 117420, Russia; 63,
COMPANY; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB,
MOSCOW, OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY
OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow
(f.k.a. AKTSIONERNY KOMMERCHESKI
117420, Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya
BANK BANK MOSKVY, OTKRYTOE
St., Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC
AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHCHESTVO; a.k.a.
BANK OF MOSCOW), 8/15 Korp. 3 ul.
Rozhdestvenka, Moscow 107996, Russia; Bld 3
8/15, Rozhdestvenka St., Moscow 107996,
Russia; SWIFT/BIC MOSW RU MM; Website
1027700167110; Tax ID No. 7744001497;
www.bm.ru; Email Address
September 12, 2014
JOINT STOCK COMMERCIAL BANK - BANK OF
-3-
Gagarinsky Pereulok, Moscow 119034, Russia;
Russia; 3 Gagarinsky per. , Moscow 119034,
3 Gagarinsky per. , Moscow 119034, Russia;
Russia; SWIFT/BIC RUAG RU MM; Website
SWIFT/BIC RUAG RU MM; Website
http://www.rshb.ru; Email Address
[email protected]; Executive Order 13662
Registration ID 1027700342890; Government
Gazette Number 52750822; For more
information on directives, please visit the
JSC VTB BANK (f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
ROSSELKHOZBANK (f.k.a. OTKRYTOE
RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK OAO (f.k.a.
OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE ROSSISKI
AKTSIONERNOE ROSSISKI
SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNY BANK; a.k.a.
ROSSELKHOZBANK; a.k.a. ROSSIYSKI
ROSSIYSKI SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNY
SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNY BANK OAO;
a.k.a. BANK VTB OAO; a.k.a. BANK VTB,
BANK OAO; a.k.a. RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL
a.k.a. RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK), 3,
OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY; f.k.a.
BANK; a.k.a. RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL
BANK OAO), 3, Gagarinsky Pereulok, Moscow
119034, Russia; 3 Gagarinsky per. , Moscow
119034, Russia; SWIFT/BIC RUAG RU MM;
Website http://www.rshb.ru; Email Address
ROSSIYSKI SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNY BANK
SBERBANK OF RUSSIA (f.k.a. OTKRYTOE
AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO
OAO (f.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE
SBERBANK ROSSII; a.k.a. SBERBANK
ROSSISKI SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNY
ROSSII; f.k.a. SBERBANK ROSSII OAO), 19 ul.
BANK; a.k.a. ROSSELKHOZBANK; a.k.a.
Vavilova, Moscow 117997, Russia; SWIFT/BIC
RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK; a.k.a.
SABRRUMM; Website www.sberbank.ru; Email
RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK OAO), 3,
Address [email protected]; Executive Order 13662
SBERBANK ROSSII (a.k.a. SBERBANK OF
For more information on directives, please visit
RUSSIA; a.k.a. SBERBANK ROSSII; f.k.a.
the following link:
SBERBANK ROSSII OAO), 19 ul. Vavilova,
SBERBANK ROSSII; a.k.a. SBERBANK OF
the following link:
RUSSIA; f.k.a. SBERBANK ROSSII OAO), 19
ul. Vavilova, Moscow 117997, Russia;
SWIFT/BIC SABRRUMM; Website
OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO
RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK (f.k.a.
SBERBANK ROSSII (f.k.a. OTKRYTOE
www.sberbank.ru; Email Address [email protected];
SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNY BANK (a.k.a.
- Subject to Directive 1; For more information on
a.k.a. RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK; a.k.a.
a.k.a. RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK OAO),
RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK OAO), 3,
3, Gagarinsky Pereulok, Moscow 119034,
September 12, 2014
-4-
SBERBANK ROSSII OAO (f.k.a. OTKRYTOE
SBERBANK ROSSII; a.k.a. SBERBANK OF
VNESHTORGBANK ROSSII, CLOSED JOINT-
RUSSIA; a.k.a. SBERBANK ROSSII), 19 ul.
STOCK COMPANY (f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
(f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY TORGOVLI
Vavilova, Moscow 117997, Russia; SWIFT/BIC
ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, CLOSED JOINT-
STOCK COMPANY; f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
the following link:
OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. JSC
VTB BANK; f.k.a. VNESHTORGBANK; a.k.a.
VTB BANK OAO; a.k.a. VTB BANK, OPEN
DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY), 29, Bolshaya
a.k.a. VTB BANK OAO), 29, Bolshaya
AFFAIRS (VNESHECONOMBANK) STATE
Morskaya str., St. Petersburg 190000, Russia;
CORPORATION; a.k.a. BANK RAZVITIYA I
37 Plyushchikha ul., Moscow 119121, Russia;
43, Vorontsovskaya str., Moscow 109044,
Russia; SWIFT/BIC VTBRRUMM; Website
www.vtb.com; Executive Order 13662 Directive
a.k.a. "VEB"), 9 Akademika Sakharova
Determination - Subject to Directive 1;
prospekt, Moscow 107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC
BFEA RU MM; Website http://www.veb.ru;
Email Address [email protected]; BIK (RU)
044525060; Executive Order 13662 Directive
Determination - Subject to Directive 1; For more
VNESHECONOMBANK (a.k.a. BANK FOR
VNESHTORGBANK (f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
VTB BANK OAO (f.k.a. BANK VNESHNEY
VTB BANK, OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
"VEB" (a.k.a. BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND
FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
CORPORATION; a.k.a. BANK RAZVITIYA I
a.k.a. VNESHECONOMBANK), 9 Akademika
Sakharova prospekt, Moscow 107996, Russia;
VTB BANK; f.k.a. VNESHTORGBANK; f.k.a.
SWIFT/BIC BFEA RU MM; Website
VTB BANK; f.k.a. VNESHTORGBANK ROSSII,
VNESHTORGBANK ROSSII, CLOSED JOINT-
http://www.veb.ru; Email Address [email protected];
CLOSED JOINT-STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a.
STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. VTB BANK, OPEN
BIK (RU) 044525060; Executive Order 13662
VTB BANK OAO; a.k.a. VTB BANK, OPEN
the following link:
September 12, 2014
_________________________________
Foreign Assets Control: (1) all transactions in,
new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of
-5-
persons determined to be subject to this Directive
117647, Russia; Website http://www.gazprom-
(listed below), their property, or their interests in
neft.com/; Email Address [email protected];
property; and (2) all activities related to debt
alt. Email Address [email protected]; alt.
issued before the date of this Directive 2 (as
amended) that would have been prohibited by the
alt. Email Address [email protected];
prior version of this Directive 2. All other
FINANSOVO-INVESTITSIONNAYA
activities with these persons or involving their
KOMPANIYA NOVAFININVEST OAO (a.k.a.
- Subject to Directive 2; alt. Executive Order
property or interests in property are permitted,
NOVATEK; a.k.a. OAO NOVATEK), 2,
provided such activities are not otherwise
Udaltsova Street, Moscow 119415, Russia; 22
prohibited pursuant to Executive Orders 13660,
A, Pobedy Street, Tarko-Sale, Yamalo-Nenets
13661, or 13662 or any other sanctions program
Autonomous District 629580, Russia; 22a
implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets
Pobedy ul., Tarko-Sale, Purovski raion,
Control. Except to the extent otherwise provided
Tyumenskaya Oblast 629850, Russia; Email
by law or unless licensed or otherwise authorized
Address [email protected]; Executive Order
by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the
following are also prohibited: (1) any transaction
Directive 2; Registration ID 1026303117642
that evades or avoids, has the purpose of
(Russia); Government Gazette Number
INVESTITSIONNAYA KOMPANIYA
evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or
NOVAFININVEST OAO; a.k.a. OAO
attempts to violate any of the prohibitions
NOVATEK), 2, Udaltsova Street, Moscow
contained in this Directive; and (2) any
119415, Russia; 22 A, Pobedy Street, Tarko-
conspiracy formed to violate any of the
Sale, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District
prohibitions in this Directive.
629580, Russia; 22a Pobedy ul., Tarko-Sale,
AK TRANSNEFT OAO (a.k.a. AKTSIONERNAYA
KOMPANIYA PO TRANSPORTUNEFTI
TRANSNEFT OAO; a.k.a. OAO AK
TRANSNEFT; a.k.a. OIL TRANSPORTING
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY TRANSNEFT; a.k.a.
TRANSNEFT; a.k.a. TRANSNEFT OJSC; a.k.a.
TRANSNEFT, JSC), 57 B. Polyanka ul.,
Moscow 119180, Russia; 57 Bolshaya.
Polyanka, Moscow 119180, Russia; Website
www.transneft.ru; Email Address
AKTSIONERNAYA KOMPANIYA PO
TRANSPORTUNEFTI TRANSNEFT OAO
(a.k.a. AK TRANSNEFT OAO; a.k.a. OAO AK
TRANSNEFT; a.k.a. OIL TRANSPORTING
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY TRANSNEFT; a.k.a.
September 12, 2014
NOVATEK (a.k.a. FINANSOVO-
GAZPROM NEFT OAO (a.k.a. JSC GAZPROM
Purovski raion, Tyumenskaya Oblast 629850,
NEFT; a.k.a. OJSC GAZPROM NEFT; a.k.a.
Russia; Email Address [email protected];
OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY GAZPROM
NEFT; f.k.a. SIBIRSKAYA NEFTYANAYA
KOMPANIYA OAO), Let. A. Galernaya, 5, ul, St.
1026303117642 (Russia); Government Gazette
Petersburg 190000, Russia; Ul. Pochtamtskaya,
Number 33556474 (Russia); For more
3-5, St. Petersburg 190000, Russia; 3-5
Pochtamtskaya St., St. Petersburg 190000,
Russia; 125 A. Profsoyuznaya Street, Moscow
117647, Russia; Website http://www.gazpromneft.com/; Email Address [email protected];
OAO AK TRANSNEFT (a.k.a. AK TRANSNEFT
OAO; a.k.a. AKTSIONERNAYA KOMPANIYA
PO TRANSPORTUNEFTI TRANSNEFT OAO;
a.k.a. OIL TRANSPORTING JOINT-STOCK
COMPANY TRANSNEFT; a.k.a. TRANSNEFT;
a.k.a. TRANSNEFT OJSC; a.k.a. TRANSNEFT,
JSC), 57 B. Polyanka ul., Moscow 119180,
Russia; 57 Bolshaya. Polyanka, Moscow
119180, Russia; Website www.transneft.ru;
1027700049486; Tax ID No. 7706061801;
JSC GAZPROM NEFT (a.k.a. GAZPROM NEFT
OAO; a.k.a. OJSC GAZPROM NEFT; a.k.a.
OAO NOVATEK (a.k.a. FINANSOVO-
INVESTITSIONNAYA KOMPANIYA
NOVAFININVEST OAO; a.k.a. NOVATEK), 2,
Udaltsova Street, Moscow 119415, Russia; 22
A, Pobedy Street, Tarko-Sale, Yamalo-Nenets
-6-
Autonomous District 629580, Russia; 22a
TRANSNEFT; a.k.a. TRANSNEFT; a.k.a.
Pobedy ul., Tarko-Sale, Purovski raion,
TRANSNEFT OJSC; a.k.a. TRANSNEFT, JSC),
Tyumenskaya Oblast 629850, Russia; Email
57 B. Polyanka ul., Moscow 119180, Russia; 57
Address [email protected]; Executive Order
Bolshaya. Polyanka, Moscow 119180, Russia;
Website www.transneft.ru; Email Address
NEFT (a.k.a. GAZPROM NEFT OAO; a.k.a.
Directive 2; Registration ID 1026303117642
JSC GAZPROM NEFT; a.k.a. OJSC
(Russia); Government Gazette Number
GAZPROM NEFT; f.k.a. SIBIRSKAYA
NEFTYANAYA KOMPANIYA OAO), Let. A.
Galernaya, 5, ul, St. Petersburg 190000,
Russia; Ul. Pochtamtskaya, 3-5, St. Petersburg
190000, Russia; 3-5 Pochtamtskaya St., St.
Petersburg 190000, Russia; 125 A.
Profsoyuznaya Street, Moscow 117647, Russia;
Website http://www.gazprom-neft.com/; Email
OAO ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OIL
COMPANY ROSNEFT; a.k.a. OJSC ROSNEFT
OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT-STOCK
OJSC GAZPROM NEFT (a.k.a. GAZPROM
Address [email protected]; alt. Email
COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a.
NEFT OAO; a.k.a. JSC GAZPROM NEFT;
ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY),
a.k.a. OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
Address [email protected]; alt.
26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment, Moscow 115035,
Email Address [email protected]; Executive
Russia; Website www.rosneft.com; alt. Website
www.rosneft.ru; Email Address
to Directive 2; alt. Executive Order 13662
Registration ID 1025501701686; Tax ID No.
alt. Executive Order 13662 Directive
Gazette Number 00044428 (Russia); For more
OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT
OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO ROSNEFT OIL
COMPANY; a.k.a. OIL COMPANY ROSNEFT;
a.k.a. OJSC ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a.
ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OJSC
ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OPEN
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL
COMPANY; a.k.a. ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT
OIL COMPANY), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment,
Moscow 115035, Russia; Website
www.rosneft.com; alt. Website www.rosneft.ru;
OIL COMPANY ROSNEFT (a.k.a. OAO
OJSC ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO
ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OIL
COMPANY ROSNEFT; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT-
STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY;
a.k.a. ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL
COMPANY), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment,
COMPANY TRANSNEFT (a.k.a. AK
OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL
TRANSNEFT OAO; a.k.a. AKTSIONERNAYA
KOMPANIYA PO TRANSPORTUNEFTI
TRANSNEFT OAO; a.k.a. OAO AK
OIL TRANSPORTING JOINT-STOCK
September 12, 2014
ROSNEFT (a.k.a. OAO ROSNEFT OIL
-7-
TRANSNEFT (a.k.a. AK TRANSNEFT OAO;
a.k.a. AKTSIONERNAYA KOMPANIYA PO
TRANSPORTUNEFTI TRANSNEFT OAO;
_________________________________
a.k.a. OAO AK TRANSNEFT; a.k.a. OIL
TRANSPORTING JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO
ROSNEFT), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment,
TRANSNEFT OJSC (a.k.a. AK TRANSNEFT
SIBIRSKAYA NEFTYANAYA KOMPANIYA OAO
(a.k.a. GAZPROM NEFT OAO; a.k.a. JSC
GAZPROM NEFT; a.k.a. OJSC GAZPROM
NEFT; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
GAZPROM NEFT), Let. A. Galernaya, 5, ul, St.
TRANSNEFT, JSC (a.k.a. AK TRANSNEFT
TRANSNEFT OJSC), 57 B. Polyanka ul.,
September 12, 2014
Foreign Assets Control: all transactions in,
new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of
persons determined to be subject to this Directive
(listed below), their property, or their interests in
property. All other activities with these persons
or involving their property or interests in property
are permitted, provided such activities are not
otherwise prohibited pursuant to Executive
Orders 13660, 13661, or 13662 or any other
sanctions program implemented by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control.Except to the extent
otherwise provided by law or unless licensed or
otherwise authorized by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control, the following are also prohibited:
(1) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the
purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a
violation of, or attempts to violate any of the
prohibitions contained in this Directive; and (2)
any conspiracy formed to violate any of the
prohibitions in this Directive.
ROSTEC (a.k.a. ROSTEC STATE
CORPORATION; a.k.a. RUSSIAN
TECHNOLOGIES; a.k.a. RUSSIAN
TECHNOLOGIES STATE CORPORATION
FOR ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT,
PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT;
a.k.a. STATE CORPORATION FOR
ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT,
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT
ROSTEKHNOLOGII; a.k.a. STATE
CORPORATION ROSTECHNOLOGII; a.k.a.
STATE CORPORATION ROSTEKHNOLOGII),
24 Usacheva ul., Moscow 119048, Russia; 21
Gogolevsky Blvd., Moscow 119991, Russia;
Website www.rostec.ru; Email Address
following link: http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx
-8-
ROSTEC STATE CORPORATION (a.k.a.
EXPORT OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
ROSTEC; a.k.a. RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGIES;
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT (a.k.a. ROSTEC;
a.k.a. RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGIES STATE
a.k.a. ROSTEC STATE CORPORATION; a.k.a.
CORPORATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO
RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGIES; a.k.a. STATE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT; a.k.a. STATE
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT ROSTEKHNOLOGII;
CORPORATION ROSTEKHNOLOGII), 24
a.k.a. STATE CORPORATION
Usacheva ul., Moscow 119048, Russia; 21
ROSTECHNOLOGII; a.k.a. STATE
(a.k.a. ROSTEC; a.k.a. ROSTEC STATE
STATE CORPORATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO
STATE CORPORATION ROSTEKHNOLOGII
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT ROSTEKHNOLOGII
a.k.a. ROSTEC STATE CORPORATION; a.k.a.
RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGIES STATE
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT; a.k.a. STATE
CORPORATION ROSTECHNOLOGII), 24
RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGIES (a.k.a. ROSTEC;
STATE CORPORATION ROSTECHNOLOGII
RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGIES STATE
September 12, 2014
_________________________________
Foreign Assets Control: the provision,
exportation, or reexportation, directly or indirectly,
of goods, services (except for financial services),
or technology in support of exploration or
-9-
production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or
JSC GAZPROM NEFT (a.k.a. GAZPROM NEFT
OAO), 11 Sretenski boulevard, Moscow
shale projects that have the potential to produce
OAO; a.k.a. OJSC GAZPROM NEFT; a.k.a.
101000, Russia; Website www.lukoil.ru; Email
oil in the Russian Federation, or in maritime area
claimed by the Russian Federation and extending
from its territory, and that involve any person
determined to be subject to this Directive (listed
below), its property, or its interests in property.
Except to the extent otherwise provided by law or
unless licensed or otherwise authorized by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, the following
are also prohibited: (1) any transaction that
evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or
avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to
(a.k.a. LUKOIL; a.k.a. LUKOIL OAO; a.k.a.
violate any of the prohibitions contained in this
LUKOIL OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. NK LUKOIL
Directive; and (2) any conspiracy formed to
OAO), 11 Sretenski boulevard, Moscow
violate any of the prohibitions in this Directive.
101000, Russia; Website www.lukoil.ru; Email
GAZPROM NEFT OAO (a.k.a. JSC GAZPROM
NEFT; a.k.a. OJSC GAZPROM NEFT; a.k.a.
117647, Russia; Website http://www.gazpromneft.com/; Email Address [email protected];
GAZPROM OAO (a.k.a. OAO GAZPROM; a.k.a.
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY GAZPROM),
16 Nametkina St., Moscow, Russia GSP-7,
117997, Russia; 16 Nametkina ul., Moscow
117991, Russia; Website www.gazprom.ru;
1027700070518 (Russia); Tax ID No.
following link: http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx
September 12, 2014
LUKOIL (a.k.a. LUKOIL OAO; a.k.a. LUKOIL OIL
COMPANY; a.k.a. NEFTYANAYA KOMPANIYA
NEFTYANAYA KOMPANIYA LUKOIL OOO
NK LUKOIL OAO (a.k.a. LUKOIL; a.k.a. LUKOIL
LUKOIL OOO; a.k.a. NK LUKOIL OAO), 11
OAO; a.k.a. LUKOIL OIL COMPANY; a.k.a.
Sretenski boulevard, Moscow 101000, Russia;
NEFTYANAYA KOMPANIYA LUKOIL OOO), 11
Website www.lukoil.ru; Email Address
[email protected]; Executive Order 13662 Directive
LUKOIL OAO (a.k.a. LUKOIL; a.k.a. LUKOIL OIL
COMPANY; a.k.a. NEFTYANAYA KOMPANIYA
OAO GAZPROM (a.k.a. GAZPROM OAO; a.k.a.
LUKOIL OOO; a.k.a. NK LUKOIL OAO), 11
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY GAZPROM),
16 Nametkina St., Moscow, Russia GSP-7,
117997, Russia; 16 Nametkina ul., Moscow
117991, Russia; Website www.gazprom.ru;
1027700070518 (Russia); Tax ID No.
LUKOIL OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. LUKOIL; a.k.a.
LUKOIL OAO; a.k.a. NEFTYANAYA
KOMPANIYA LUKOIL OOO; a.k.a. NK LUKOIL
- 10 -
OAO ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OIL
Kukuevitskogo 1, Surgut, Tyumen Region
628415, Russia; Website
www.surgutneftegas.ru; Email Address
Directive 4; For more information on directives,
OJSC ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO
COMPANY ROSNEFT; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT-
STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY;
NEFT (a.k.a. GAZPROM NEFT OAO; a.k.a.
a.k.a. ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL
JSC GAZPROM NEFT; a.k.a. OJSC
ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OJSC
ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OPEN
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL
COMPANY; a.k.a. ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT
OIL COMPANY), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment,
OIL COMPANY ROSNEFT (a.k.a. OAO
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY GAZPROM
(a.k.a. GAZPROM OAO; a.k.a. OAO
GAZPROM), 16 Nametkina St., Moscow,
Russia GSP-7, 117997, Russia; 16 Nametkina
ul., Moscow 117991, Russia; Website
www.gazprom.ru; Email Address
OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO ROSNEFT OIL
NEFT OAO; a.k.a. JSC GAZPROM NEFT;
a.k.a. OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
OJSC GAZPROM NEFT (a.k.a. GAZPROM
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY
SURGUTNEFTEGAS (a.k.a. OTKRYTOE
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ; a.k.a.
SURGUTNEFTEGAS; a.k.a.
SURGUTNEFTEGAS OAO; a.k.a.
SURGUTNEFTEGAS OJSC; a.k.a.
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ OAO), ul. Grigoriya
Kukuyevitskogo, 1, bld. 1, Khanty-Mansiysky
Autonomous Okrug - Yugra, the city of Surgut,
Tyumenskaya Oblast 628415, Russia; korp. 1 1
Grigoriya Kukuevitskogo ul., Surgut,
Tyumenskaya oblast 628404, Russia; Street
September 12, 2014
- 11 -
OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ (a.k.a. OPEN JOINT
STOCK COMPANY SURGUTNEFTEGAS;
a.k.a. SURGUTNEFTEGAS; a.k.a.
SIBIRSKAYA NEFTYANAYA KOMPANIYA OAO
(a.k.a. GAZPROM NEFT OAO; a.k.a. JSC
GAZPROM NEFT; a.k.a. OJSC GAZPROM
NEFT; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
GAZPROM NEFT), Let. A. Galernaya, 5, ul, St.
a.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE
OBSHCHESTVO SURGUTNEFTEGAZ; a.k.a.
ROSNEFT (a.k.a. OAO ROSNEFT OIL
SURGUTNEFTEGAS OJSC (a.k.a. OPEN JOINT
OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL
SURGUTNEFTEGAS (a.k.a. OPEN JOINT
ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ OAO (a.k.a. OPEN JOINT
ROSNEFT), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment,
SURGUTNEFTEGAS OJSC), ul. Grigoriya
SURGUTNEFTEGAS OAO (a.k.a. OPEN JOINT
September 12, 2014
- 12 -
_________________________________
For further information on the "Sectoral Sanctions
Identifications List," contact the:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
http://www.treasury.gov/ofac
September 12, 2014
- 13 -
Federal Register /Vol. 79, No. 89 /Thursday, May 8, 2014 containing Office of Foreign
Assets Control 31 CFR Part 589 Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 89 / Thursday, May 8, 2014 / Rules and Regulations
oil during the marketing year beginning
on June 1, 2014, shall be as follows:
(a) Class 1 (Scotch) oil—a salable
quantity of 1,149,030 pounds and an
allotment percentage of 55 percent.
(b) Class 3 (Native) oil—a salable
quantity of 1,090,821 pounds and an
allotment percentage of 46 percent.
Dated: May 1, 2014.
Rex A. Barnes,
Associate Administrator, Agricultural
Marketing Service.
Final Rule Correction
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority delegated to me, in the
Federal Register of March 4, 2014 (79
FR 12050) FR Doc. 2014–04447, the
geographic coordinates in the regulatory
text on page 12051, column 2, line 9, is
corrected as follows:
§ 71.1
[Amended]
AGL MN D St. Paul, MN [Corrected]
Remove (Lat. 44°51″2605′ N.,) and add in
its place (Lat. 44°51′26″ N., 93°01′58″ W.)
[FR Doc. 2014–10371 Filed 5–7–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on April 11,
2014.
Kent M. Wheeler,
Manager, Operations Support Group, ATO
Central Service Center.
[FR Doc. 2014–09881 Filed 5–7–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
14 CFR Part 71
[Docket No. FAA–2013–0954; Airspace
Docket No. 13–AGL–35]
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Amendment of Class D Airspace; St.
Paul, MN
31 CFR Part 589
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule, correction.
AGENCY:
Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations
This action amends a
typographical error in the geographic
coordinates of South St. Paul Municipal
Airport-Richard E. Fleming Field in a
final rule technical amendment
published in the Federal Register of
March 4, 2014, that amends Class D
airspace in the St. Paul, MN, area.
DATES: Effective date: 0901 UTC, May
29, 2014. The Director of the Federal
Register approves this incorporation by
reference action under 1 CFR Part 51,
subject to the annual revision of FAA
Order 7400.9 and publication of
conforming amendments.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Scott Enander, Central Service Center,
Operations Support Group, Federal
Aviation Administration, Southwest
Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort
Worth, TX 76137; telephone 817–321–
7716.
SUMMARY:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
History
On March 4, 2014, a final rule
technical amendment was published in
the Federal Register amending Class D
airspace in St. Paul, MN (79 FR 12050,
Docket No. FAA–2013–0954).
Subsequent to publication, the FAA
found a typographical error in the
geographic coordinates for South St.
Paul Municipal Airport-Richard E.
Fleming Field. This action corrects that
error.
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Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Treasury.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (‘‘OFAC’’) is issuing regulations
to implement Executive Order 13660 of
March 6, 2014 (‘‘Blocking Property of
Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Ukraine’’), Executive Order
13661 of March 17, 2014 (‘‘Blocking
Property of Additional Persons
Contributing to the Situation in
Ukraine’’), and Executive Order 13662
of March 20, 2014 (‘‘Blocking Property
of Additional Persons Contributing to
the Situation in Ukraine’’). OFAC
intends to supplement this part 589
with a more comprehensive set of
regulations, which may include
additional interpretive and definitional
guidance and additional general
licenses and statements of licensing
policy.
DATES: Effective: May 8, 2014.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.:
202/622–2480, Assistant Director for
Policy, tel.: 202/622–6746, Assistant
Director for Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202/
622–4855, Assistant Director for
Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation,
tel.: 202/622–2490, OFAC, or Chief
Counsel (Foreign Assets Control), tel.:
202/622–2410, Office of the General
Counsel, Department of the Treasury
(not toll free numbers).
SUMMARY:
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Electronic and Facsimile Availability
This document and additional
information concerning OFAC are
available from OFAC’s Web site
(www.treasury.gov/ofac). Certain general
information pertaining to OFAC’s
sanctions programs also is available via
facsimile through a 24-hour fax-ondemand service, tel.: 202/622–0077.
Background
On March 6, 2014, the President
issued Executive Order 13660 (79 FR
13493, March 10, 2014) (‘‘E.O. 13660’’),
invoking the authority of, inter alia, the
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
(‘‘IEEPA’’) and the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(‘‘NEA’’). On March 17, 2014, the
President issued Executive Order 13661
(79 FR 15535, March 16, 2014) (‘‘E.O.
13661’’), invoking the authority of, inter
alia, IEEPA and the NEA, to expand the
scope of the national emergency
declared in E.O. 13660 of March 6,
2014. On March 20, 2014, the President
issued Executive Order 13662 (79 FR
16169, March 24, 2014) (‘‘E.O. 13662’’),
invoking the authority of, inter alia,
IEEPA and the NEA, to expand the
scope of the national emergency
declared in E.O. 13660 and expanded in
scope in E.O. 13661.
The Department of the Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control
(‘‘OFAC’’) is issuing the Ukraine-Related
Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589
(the ‘‘Regulations’’), to implement E.O.
13660, E.O. 13661, and E.O. 13662,
pursuant to authorities delegated to the
Secretary of the Treasury in those
orders. A copy of E.O. 13660 appears in
Appendix A, a copy of E.O. 13661
appears in Appendix B, and a copy of
E.O. 13662 appears in Appendix C to
this part.
The Regulations are being published
in abbreviated form at this time for the
purpose of providing immediate
guidance to the public. OFAC intends to
supplement this part 589 with a more
comprehensive set of regulations, which
may include additional interpretive and
definitional guidance and additional
general licenses and statements of
licensing policy. The appendixes to the
Regulations will be removed when
OFAC supplements this part with a
more comprehensive set of regulations.
Public Participation
Because the Regulations involve a
foreign affairs function, the provisions
of Executive Order 12866 of September
30, 1993, and the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) requiring
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notice of proposed rulemaking,
opportunity for public participation,
and delay in effective date are
inapplicable. Because no notice of
proposed rulemaking is required for this
rule, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601–612) does not apply.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The collections of information related
to the Regulations are contained in 31
CFR Part 501 (the ‘‘Reporting,
Procedures and Penalties Regulations’’).
Pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507), those
collections of information have been
approved by the Office of Management
and Budget under control number 1505–
0164. An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information
unless the collection of information
displays a valid control number.
List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 589
Administrative practice and
procedure, Banking, Banks, Blocking of
assets, Brokers, Credit, Foreign trade,
Investments, Loans, Russian Federation,
Securities, Services, Ukraine.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control adds part 589 to 31 CFR chapter
V to read as follows:
■
PART 589—UKRAINE RELATED
SANCTIONS REGULATIONS
Subpart A—Relation of This Part to Other
Laws and Regulations
Sec.
589.101 Relation of this part to other laws
and regulations.
Subpart B—Prohibitions
589.201 Prohibited transactions.
589.202 Effect of transfers violating the
provisions of this part.
589.203 Holding of funds in interestbearing accounts; investment and
reinvestment.
589.204 Expenses of maintaining blocked
property; liquidation of blocked
property.
Subpart C—General Definitions
589.300 Applicability of definitions.
589.301 Blocked account; blocked property.
589.302 Effective date.
589.303 Entity.
589.304 Interest.
589.305 Licenses; general and specific.
589.306 OFAC.
589.307 Person.
589.308 Property; property interest.
589.309 Transfer.
589.310 Ukraine-Related Executive Orders.
589.311 United States.
589.312 United States person; U.S. person.
589.313 U.S. financial institution.
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Subpart D—Interpretations § 589.401
[Reserved]
589.402 Effect of amendment.
589.403 Termination and acquisition of an
interest in blocked property.
589.404 Transactions ordinarily incident to
a licensed transaction.
589.405 Setoffs prohibited.
589.406 Entities owned by a person whose
property and interests in property are
blocked.
Subpart E—Licenses, Authorizations, and
Statements of Licensing Policy
589.501 General and specific licensing
procedures.
589.502 [Reserved]
589.503 Exclusion from licenses.
589.504 Payments and transfers to blocked
accounts in U.S. financial institutions.
589.505 Entries in certain accounts for
normal service charges authorized.
589.506 Provision of certain legal services
authorized.
589.507 Payments from funds originating
outside the United States authorized.
589.508 Authorization of emergency
medical services.
Subpart F—[Reserved]
Subpart G—[Reserved]
Subpart H—Procedures
589.801 [Reserved]
589.802 Delegation by the Secretary of the
Treasury.
Subpart I—Paperwork Reduction Act
589.901 Paperwork Reduction Act notice.
Appendix A to Part 589—Executive Order
13660
Appendix B to Part 589—Executive Order
13661
Appendix C to Part 589—Executive Order
13662
Authority: 3 U.S.C. 301; 31 U.S.C. 321(b);
50 U.S.C. 1601–1651, 1701–1706; Pub. L.
101–410, 104 Stat. 890 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note);
Pub. L. 110–96, 121 Stat. 1011 (50 U.S.C.
1705 note); E.O. 13660, 79 FR 13493, March
10, 2014; E.O. 13661, 79 FR 15535 March 19,
2014, E.O. 13662, 79 FR 16169, March 24,
2014.
Subpart A—Relation of This Part to
Other Laws and Regulations
§ 589.101 Relation of this part to other
laws and regulations.
This part is separate from, and
independent of, the other parts of this
chapter, with the exception of part 501
of this chapter, the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements and license
application and other procedures of
which apply to this part. Actions taken
pursuant to part 501 of this chapter with
respect to the prohibitions contained in
this part are considered actions taken
pursuant to this part. Differing foreign
policy and national security
circumstances may result in differing
interpretations of similar language
among the parts of this chapter. No
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license or authorization contained in or
issued pursuant to those other parts
authorizes any transaction prohibited by
this part. No license or authorization
contained in or issued pursuant to any
other provision of law or regulation
authorizes any transaction prohibited by
this part. No license or authorization
contained in or issued pursuant to this
part relieves the involved parties from
complying with any other applicable
laws or regulations.
Note to § 589.101: This part has been
published in abbreviated form for the
purpose of providing immediate guidance to
the public. OFAC intends to supplement this
part with a more comprehensive set of
regulations, which may include additional
interpretive and definitional guidance and
additional general licenses and statements of
licensing policy.
Subpart B—Prohibitions
§ 589.201
Prohibited transactions.
All transactions prohibited pursuant
to Executive Order 13660 of March 6,
2014, Executive Order 13661 of March
16, 2014, and Executive Order 13662 of
March 20, 2014 (‘‘Ukraine-Related
Executive Orders’’), are also prohibited
pursuant to this part.
Note 1 to § 589.201: The names of persons
designated pursuant to the Ukraine-Related
Executive Orders, whose property and
interests in property therefore are blocked
pursuant to this section, are published in the
Federal Register and incorporated into
OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List (‘‘SDN List’’) and
appear with the prefix ‘‘UKRAINE’’ in the
program tag associated with each listing. The
SDN List is accessible through the following
page on OFAC’s Web site: www.treasury.gov/
sdn. Additional information pertaining to the
SDN List can be found in Appendix A to this
chapter. See § 589.406 concerning entities
that may not be listed on the SDN List but
nevertheless blocked pursuant to this section.
Note 2 to § 589.201: The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701–1706), in Section 203 (50 U.S.C. 1702),
authorizes the blocking of property and
interests in property of a person during the
pendency of an investigation. The names of
persons whose property and interests in
property are blocked pending investigation
pursuant to this section also are published in
the Federal Register and incorporated into
the SDN List with the prefix ‘‘BPI—
UKRAINE.’’
Note 3 to § 589.201: Sections 501.806 and
501.807 of this chapter describe the
procedures to be followed by persons
seeking, respectively, the unblocking of
funds that they believe were blocked due to
mistaken identity, or administrative
reconsideration of their status as persons
blocked pursuant to this section.
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§ 589.202 Effect of transfers violating the
provisions of this part.
(a) Any transfer after the effective date
that is in violation of any provision of
this part or of any regulation, order,
directive, ruling, instruction, or license
issued pursuant to this part, and that
involves any property or interest in
property blocked pursuant to § 589.201,
is null and void and shall not be the
basis for the assertion or recognition of
any interest in or right, remedy, power,
or privilege with respect to such
property or property interests.
(b) No transfer before the effective
date shall be the basis for the assertion
or recognition of any right, remedy,
power, or privilege with respect to, or
any interest in, any property or interest
in property blocked pursuant to
§ 589.201, unless the person who holds
or maintains such property, prior to that
date, had written notice of the transfer
or by any written evidence had
recognized such transfer.
(c) Unless otherwise provided, a
license or other authorization issued by
OFAC before, during, or after a transfer
shall validate such transfer or make it
enforceable to the same extent that it
would be valid or enforceable but for
the provisions of this part and any
regulation, order, directive, ruling,
instruction, or license issued pursuant
to this part.
(d) Transfers of property that
otherwise would be null and void or
unenforceable by virtue of the
provisions of this section shall not be
deemed to be null and void or
unenforceable as to any person with
whom such property is or was held or
maintained (and as to such person only)
in cases in which such person is able to
establish to the satisfaction of OFAC
each of the following:
(1) Such transfer did not represent a
willful violation of the provisions of this
part by the person with whom such
property is or was held or maintained
(and as to such person only);
(2) The person with whom such
did not have reasonable cause to know
or suspect, in view of all the facts and
circumstances known or available to
such person, that such transfer required
a license or authorization issued
pursuant to this part and was not so
licensed or authorized, or, if a license or
authorization did purport to cover the
transfer, that such license or
authorization had been obtained by
misrepresentation of a third party or
withholding of material facts or was
otherwise fraudulently obtained; and
(3) The person with whom such
filed with OFAC a report setting forth in
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full the circumstances relating to such
transfer promptly upon discovery that:
(i) Such transfer was in violation of
the provisions of this part or any
regulation, ruling, instruction, license,
or other directive or authorization
issued pursuant to this part;
(ii) Such transfer was not licensed or
authorized by OFAC; or
(iii) If a license did purport to cover
the transfer, such license had been
obtained by misrepresentation of a third
party or withholding of material facts or
was otherwise fraudulently obtained.
Note to paragraph (d) of § 589.202: The
filing of a report in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (d)(3) of this section
shall not be deemed evidence that the terms
of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this section
have been satisfied.
(e) Unless licensed pursuant to this
part, any attachment, judgment, decree,
lien, execution, garnishment, or other
judicial process is null and void with
respect to any property in which, on or
since the effective date, there existed an
interest of a person whose property and
interests in property are blocked
pursuant to § 589.201.
§ 589.203 Holding of funds in interestbearing accounts; investment and
reinvestment.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs
(e) or (f) of this section, or as otherwise
directed by OFAC, any U.S. person
holding funds, such as currency, bank
deposits, or liquidated financial
obligations, subject to § 589.201 shall
hold or place such funds in a blocked
interest-bearing account located in the
United States.
(b)(1) For purposes of this section, the
term blocked interest-bearing account
means a blocked account:
(i) In a federally-insured U.S. bank,
thrift institution, or credit union,
provided the funds are earning interest
at rates that are commercially
reasonable; or
(ii) With a broker or dealer registered
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et
seq.), provided the funds are invested in
a money market fund or in U.S.
Treasury bills.
(2) Funds held or placed in a blocked
account pursuant to paragraph (a) of this
section may not be invested in
instruments the maturity of which
exceeds 180 days.
(c) For purposes of this section, a rate
is commercially reasonable if it is the
rate currently offered to other depositors
on deposits or instruments of
comparable size and maturity.
(d) For purposes of this section, if
interest is credited to a separate blocked
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account or subaccount, the name of the
account party on each account must be
the same.
(e) Blocked funds held in instruments
the maturity of which exceeds 180 days
at the time the funds become subject to
§ 589.201 may continue to be held until
maturity in the original instrument,
provided any interest, earnings, or other
proceeds derived therefrom are paid
into a blocked interest-bearing account
in accordance with paragraphs (a) or (f)
of this section.
(f) Blocked funds held in accounts or
instruments outside the United States at
the time the funds become subject to
§ 589.201 may continue to be held in the
same type of accounts or instruments,
provided the funds earn interest at rates
that are commercially reasonable.
(g) This section does not create an
affirmative obligation for the holder of
blocked tangible property, such as
chattels or real estate, or of other
blocked property, such as debt or equity
securities, to sell or liquidate such
property. However, OFAC may issue
licenses permitting or directing such
sales or liquidation in appropriate cases.
(h) Funds subject to this section may
not be held, invested, or reinvested in
a manner that provides immediate
financial or economic benefit or access
to any person whose property and
pursuant to § 589.201, nor may their
holder cooperate in or facilitate the
pledging or other attempted use as
collateral of blocked funds or other
assets.
§ 589.204 Expenses of maintaining
blocked property; liquidation of blocked
property.
(a) Except as otherwise authorized,
and notwithstanding the existence of
any rights or obligations conferred or
imposed by any international agreement
or contract entered into or any license
or permit granted prior to the effective
date, all expenses incident to the
maintenance of physical property
blocked pursuant to § 589.201 shall be
the responsibility of the owners or
operators of such property, which
expenses shall not be met from blocked
funds.
(b) Property blocked pursuant to
§ 589.201 may, in the discretion of
OFAC, be sold or liquidated and the net
proceeds placed in a blocked interestbearing account in the name of the
owner of the property.
Subpart C—General Definitions
§ 589.300
Applicability of definitions.
The definitions in this subpart apply
throughout the entire part.
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§ 589.301
property.
Note to § 589.305: See § 501.801 of this
chapter on licensing procedures.
Blocked account; blocked
The terms blocked account and
blocked property shall mean any
account or property subject to the
prohibitions in § 589.201 held in the
name of a person whose property and
pursuant to § 589.201, or in which such
person has an interest, and with respect
to which payments, transfers,
exportations, withdrawals, or other
dealings may not be made or effected
except pursuant to an authorization or
license from OFAC expressly
authorizing such action.
Note to § 589.301: See § 589.406
concerning the blocked status of property
and interests in property of an entity that is
50 percent or more owned by a person whose
blocked pursuant to § 589.201.
§ 589.302
Effective date.
The term effective date refers to the
effective date of the applicable
prohibitions and directives contained in
this part as follows:
(a) With respect to a person listed in
the Annex to E.O. 13661 of March 16,
2014, 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time,
March 17, 2014; and
(b) With respect to a person whose
blocked pursuant to § 589.201, is the
earlier of the date of actual or
constructive notice that such person’s
blocked.
§ 589.303
Entity.
The term entity means a partnership,
association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other
organization.
§ 589.304
Interest.
Except as otherwise provided in this
part, the term interest, when used with
respect to property (e.g., ‘‘an interest in
property’’), means an interest of any
nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.
§ 589.305
Licenses; general and specific.
(a) Except as otherwise specified, the
term license means any license or
authorization contained in or issued
(b) The term general license means
any license or authorization the terms of
which are set forth in subpart E of this
part or made available on OFAC’s Web
site: www.treasury.gov/ofac.
(c) The term specific license means
any license or authorization issued
pursuant to this part but not set forth in
subpart E of this part or made available
on OFAC’s Web site: www.treasury.gov/
ofac.
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§ 589.306
OFAC.
The term OFAC means the
Department of the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control.
§ 589.307
Person.
The term person means an individual
or entity.
§ 589.308
Property; property interest.
The terms property and property
interest include, but are not limited to,
money, checks, drafts, bullion, bank
deposits, savings accounts, debts,
indebtedness, obligations, notes,
guarantees, debentures, stocks, bonds,
coupons, any other financial
instruments, bankers acceptances,
mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights
in the nature of security, warehouse
receipts, bills of lading, trust receipts,
bills of sale, any other evidences of title,
ownership or indebtedness, letters of
credit and any documents relating to
any rights or obligations thereunder,
powers of attorney, goods, wares,
merchandise, chattels, stocks on hand,
ships, goods on ships, real estate
mortgages, deeds of trust, vendors’ sales
agreements, land contracts, leaseholds,
ground rents, real estate and any other
interest therein, options, negotiable
instruments, trade acceptances,
royalties, book accounts, accounts
payable, judgments, patents, trademarks
or copyrights, insurance policies, safe
deposit boxes and their contents,
annuities, pooling agreements, services
of any nature whatsoever, contracts of
any nature whatsoever, and any other
property, real, personal, or mixed,
tangible or intangible, or interest or
interests therein, present, future, or
contingent.
§ 589.309
Transfer.
The term transfer means any actual or
purported act or transaction, whether or
not evidenced by writing, and whether
or not done or performed within the
United States, the purpose, intent, or
effect of which is to create, surrender,
release, convey, transfer, or alter,
directly or indirectly, any right, remedy,
power, privilege, or interest with respect
to any property. Without limitation on
the foregoing, it shall include the
making, execution, or delivery of any
assignment, power, conveyance, check,
declaration, deed, deed of trust, power
of attorney, power of appointment, bill
of sale, mortgage, receipt, agreement,
contract, certificate, gift, sale, affidavit,
or statement; the making of any
payment; the setting off of any
obligation or credit; the appointment of
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any agent, trustee, or fiduciary; the
creation or transfer of any lien; the
issuance, docketing, or filing of, or levy
of or under, any judgment, decree,
attachment, injunction, execution, or
other judicial or administrative process
or order, or the service of any
garnishment; the acquisition of any
interest of any nature whatsoever by
reason of a judgment or decree of any
foreign country; the fulfillment of any
condition; the exercise of any power of
appointment, power of attorney, or
other power; or the acquisition,
disposition, transportation, importation,
exportation, or withdrawal of any
security.
§ 589.310
Orders.
Ukraine-Related Executive
The term ‘‘Ukraine-Related Executive
Orders’’ means Executive Order 13660
of March 6, 2014, Executive Order
13661 of March 16, 2014, and Executive
Order 13662 of March 20, 2014.
§ 589.311
United States.
The term United States means the
United States, its territories and
possessions, and all areas under the
jurisdiction or authority thereof.
§ 589.312
person.
United States person; U.S.
The term United States person or U.S.
person means any United States citizen,
permanent resident alien, entity
organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the
United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United
States.
§ 589.313
U.S. financial institution.
The term U.S. financial institution
means any U.S. entity (including its
foreign branches) that is engaged in the
business of accepting deposits, making,
granting, transferring, holding, or
brokering loans or credits, or purchasing
or selling foreign exchange, securities,
or commodity futures or options, or
procuring purchasers and sellers
thereof, as principal or agent. It includes
but is not limited to depository
institutions, banks, savings banks, trust
companies, securities brokers and
dealers, commodity futures and options
brokers and dealers, forward contract
and foreign exchange merchants,
securities and commodities exchanges,
clearing corporations, investment
companies, employee benefit plans, and
U.S. holding companies, U.S. affiliates,
or U.S. subsidiaries of any of the
foregoing. This term includes those
branches, offices, and agencies of
foreign financial institutions that are
located in the United States, but not
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§ 589.405
such institutions’ foreign branches,
offices, or agencies.
Subpart D—Interpretations
§ 589.401
[Reserved]
§ 589.402
Effect of amendment.
Unless otherwise specifically
provided, any amendment,
modification, or revocation of any
provision in or appendix to this part or
chapter or of any order, regulation,
ruling, instruction, or license issued by
OFAC does not affect any act done or
omitted, or any civil or criminal
proceeding commenced or pending,
prior to such amendment, modification,
or revocation. All penalties, forfeitures,
and liabilities under any such order,
regulation, ruling, instruction, or license
continue and may be enforced as if such
amendment, modification, or revocation
had not been made.
§ 589.403 Termination and acquisition of
an interest in blocked property.
(a) Whenever a transaction licensed or
authorized by or pursuant to this part
results in the transfer of property
(including any property interest) away
from a person whose property and
pursuant to § 589.201, such property
shall no longer be deemed to be
property blocked pursuant to § 589.201,
unless there exists in the property
another interest that is blocked pursuant
to § 589.201, the transfer of which has
not been effected pursuant to license or
other authorization.
(b) Unless otherwise specifically
provided in a license or authorization
issued pursuant to this part, if property
(including any property interest) is
transferred or attempted to be
transferred to a person whose property
and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to § 589.201, such property
shall be deemed to be property in which
that person has an interest and therefore
blocked.
§ 589.404 Transactions ordinarily incident
to a licensed transaction.
Any transaction ordinarily incident to
a licensed transaction and necessary to
give effect thereto is also authorized,
except:
(a) An ordinarily incident transaction,
not explicitly authorized within the
terms of the license, by or with a person
whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to
§ 589.201; or
(b) An ordinarily incident transaction,
not explicitly authorized within the
terms of the license, involving a debit to
a blocked account or a transfer of
blocked property.
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Setoffs prohibited.
A setoff against blocked property
(including a blocked account), whether
by a U.S. bank or other U.S. person, is
a prohibited transfer under § 589.201 if
effected after the effective date.
§ 589.406 Entities owned by a person
whose property and interests in property
are blocked.
A person whose property and
pursuant to § 589.201 has an interest in
all property and interests in property of
an entity in which it owns, directly or
indirectly, a 50 percent or greater
interest. The property and interests in
property of such an entity, therefore, are
blocked, and such an entity is a person
§ 589.201, regardless of whether the
name of the entity is incorporated into
OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List (‘‘SDN List’’).
Subpart E—Licenses, Authorizations,
and Statements of Licensing Policy
§ 589.501 General and specific licensing
procedures.
For provisions relating to licensing
procedures, see part 501, subpart E, of
this chapter. Licensing actions taken
pursuant to part 501 of this chapter with
respect to the prohibitions contained in
this part are considered actions taken
pursuant to this part. General licenses
and statements of licensing policy
relating to this part also may be
available through the Ukraine-related
sanctions page on OFAC’s Web site:
www.treasury.gov/ofac.
§ 589.502
[Reserved]
§ 589.503
Exclusion from licenses.
OFAC reserves the right to exclude
any person, property, transaction, or
class thereof from the operation of any
license or from the privileges conferred
by any license. OFAC also reserves the
right to restrict the applicability of any
license to particular persons, property,
transactions, or classes thereof. Such
actions are binding upon actual or
constructive notice of the exclusions or
restrictions.
§ 589.504 Payments and transfers to
blocked accounts in U.S. financial
institutions.
Any payment of funds or transfer of
credit in which a person whose property
pursuant to § 589.201 has any interest
that comes within the possession or
control of a U.S. financial institution
must be blocked in an account on the
books of that financial institution. A
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transfer of funds or credit by a U.S.
financial institution between blocked
accounts in its branches or offices is
authorized, provided that no transfer is
made from an account within the
United States to an account held outside
the United States, and further provided
that a transfer from a blocked account
may be made only to another blocked
account held in the same name.
Note to § 589.504: See § 501.603 of this
chapter for mandatory reporting
requirements regarding financial transfers.
See also § 589.203 concerning the obligation
to hold blocked funds in interest-bearing
accounts.
§ 589.505 Entries in certain accounts for
normal service charges authorized.
(a) A U.S. financial institution is
authorized to debit any blocked account
held at that financial institution in
payment or reimbursement for normal
service charges owed it by the owner of
that blocked account.
(b) As used in this section, the term
normal service charges shall include
charges in payment or reimbursement
for interest due; cable, telegraph,
Internet, or telephone charges; postage
costs; custody fees; small adjustment
charges to correct bookkeeping errors;
and, but not by way of limitation,
minimum balance charges, notary and
protest fees, and charges for reference
books, photocopies, credit reports,
transcripts of statements, registered
mail, insurance, stationery and supplies,
and other similar items.
§ 589.506 Provision of certain legal
services authorized.
(a) The provision of the following
legal services to or on behalf of persons
§ 589.201 or any further Executive
orders relating to the national
emergency declared in Executive Order
13660 of March 6, 2014, is authorized,
provided that receipt of payment of
professional fees and reimbursement of
incurred expenses must be specifically
licensed or otherwise authorized
pursuant to § 589.507:
(1) Provision of legal advice and
counseling on the requirements of and
compliance with the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the
United States, provided that such advice
and counseling are not provided to
facilitate transactions in violation of this
part;
(2) Representation of persons named
as defendants in or otherwise made
parties to legal, arbitration, or
administrative proceedings before any
U.S. federal, state, or local court or
agency;
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(3) Initiation and conduct of legal,
arbitration, or administrative
proceedings before any U.S. federal,
state, or local court or agency;
(4) Representation of persons before
any U.S. federal, state, or local court or
agency with respect to the imposition,
administration, or enforcement of U.S.
sanctions against such persons; and
(5) Provision of legal services in any
other context in which prevailing U.S.
law requires access to legal counsel at
public expense.
(b) The provision of any other legal
services to persons whose property and
pursuant to § 589.201 or any further
Executive orders relating to the national
13660 of March 6, 2014, not otherwise
authorized in this part, requires the
issuance of a specific license.
(c) Entry into a settlement agreement
or the enforcement of any lien,
judgment, arbitral award, decree, or
other order through execution,
garnishment, or other judicial process
purporting to transfer or otherwise alter
or affect property or interests in
property blocked pursuant to § 589.201
or any further Executive orders relating
to the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 13660 of March 6,
2014, is prohibited unless licensed
Note to § 589.506: U.S. persons seeking
administrative reconsideration or judicial
review of their designation or the blocking of
their property and interests in property may
apply for a specific license from OFAC to
authorize the release of a limited amount of
blocked funds for the payment of legal fees
where alternative funding sources are not
available. For more information, see OFAC’s
Guidance on the Release of Limited Amounts
of Blocked Funds for Payment of Legal Fees
and Costs Incurred in Challenging the
Blocking of U.S. Persons in Administrative or
Civil Proceedings, which is available on
OFAC’s Web site: www.treasury.gov/ofac.
§ 589.507 Payments from funds originating
outside the United States authorized.
Payments from funds originating
outside the United States. Receipts of
payment of professional fees and
reimbursement of incurred expenses for
the provision of legal services
authorized pursuant to § 589.506(a) to or
on behalf of any person whose property
pursuant to § 589.201 or any further
13660 of March 6, 2014, are authorized
from funds originating outside the
United States, provided that:
(a) Prior to receiving payment for legal
services authorized pursuant to
§ 589.506(a) rendered to persons whose
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blocked pursuant to § 589.201 or any
further Executive orders relating to the
national emergency declared in
Executive Order 13660 of March 6,
2014, the U.S. person that is an attorney,
law firm, or legal services organization
provides to OFAC a copy of a letter of
engagement or a letter of intent to
engage specifying the services to be
performed and signed by the individual
to whom such services are to be
provided or, where services are to be
provided to an entity, by a legal
representative of the entity. The copy of
a letter of engagement or a letter of
intent to engage, accompanied by
correspondence referencing this
paragraph (a), is to be mailed to:
Licensing Division, Office of Foreign
Assets Control, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue
NW., Annex, Washington, DC 20220;
(b) The funds received by U.S.
persons as payment of professional fees
and reimbursement of incurred
expenses for the provision of legal
services authorized pursuant to
§ 589.506(a) must not originate from:
(1) A source within the United States;
(2) Any source, wherever located,
within the possession or control of a
U.S. person; or
(3) Any individual or entity, other
than the person on whose behalf the
legal services authorized pursuant to
§ 589.506(a) are to be provided, whose
blocked pursuant to any part of this
chapter or any Executive order;
Note to paragraph (b) of § 589.507: This
paragraph authorizes the blocked person on
whose behalf the legal services authorized
pursuant to § 589.506(a) are to be provided to
make payments for authorized legal services
using funds originating outside the United
States that were not previously blocked.
Nothing in this paragraph authorizes
payments for legal services using funds in
which any other person whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to
§ 589.201 or any further Executive orders
relating to the national emergency declared
in Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014,
any other part of this chapter, or any
Executive order holds an interest.
(c) Reports. (1) U.S. persons who
receive payments in connection with
§ 589.506(a) must submit quarterly
reports no later than 30 days following
the end of the calendar quarter during
which the payments were received
providing information on the funds
received. Such reports shall specify:
(i) The individual or entity from
whom the funds originated and the
amount of funds received; and
(ii) If applicable:
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(A) The names of any individuals or
entities providing related services to the
U.S. person receiving payment in
connection with authorized legal
services, such as private investigators or
expert witnesses;
(B) A general description of the
services provided; and
(C) The amount of funds paid in
connection with such services.
(2) In the event that no transactions
occur or no funds are received during
the reporting period, a statement is to be
filed to that effect; and
(3) The reports, which must reference
this section, are to be mailed to:
Licensing Division, Office of Foreign
Assets Control, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue
NW., Annex, Washington, DC 20220.
Note 1 to § 589.507: U.S. persons who
receive payments in connection with legal
services authorized pursuant to § 589.506(a)
do not need to obtain specific authorization
to contract for related services that are
ordinarily incident to the provision of those
legal services, such as those provided by
private investigators or expert witnesses, or
to pay for such services. Additionally, U.S.
persons do not need to obtain specific
authorization to provide related services that
are ordinarily incident to the provision of
§ 589.506(a).
Note 2 to § 589.507: Any payment
authorized in or pursuant to this paragraph
that is routed through the U.S. financial
system should reference § 589.507 to avoid
the blocking of the transfer.
Note 3 to § 589.507: Nothing in this section
authorizes the transfer of any blocked
property, the debiting of any blocked
account, the entry of any judgment or order
that effects a transfer of blocked property, or
the execution of any judgment against
property blocked pursuant to any part of this
chapter or any Executive order.
§ 589.508 Authorization of emergency
medical services.
The provision of nonscheduled
emergency medical services in the
United States to persons whose property
pursuant to § 589.201(a) or any further
13660 of March 6, 2014, is authorized,
provided that all receipt of payment for
such services must be specifically
licensed.
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08MYR1
Subpart F—[Reserved]
Subpart G—[Reserved]
Subpart H—Procedures
§ 589.801
[Reserved]
§ 589.802 Delegation by the Secretary of
the Treasury.
Any action that the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized to take pursuant
to the Ukraine-Related Executive
Orders—with the exception of the
determination of sectors of the Russian
Federation economy under Section
1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13662 of
March 20, 2014—and any further
13660 of March 6, 2014, may be taken
by the Director of OFAC or by any other
person to whom the Secretary of the
Treasury has delegated authority so to
act.
Subpart I—Paperwork Reduction Act
§ 589.901
Paperwork Reduction Act notice.
For approval by the Office of
Management and Budget (‘‘OMB’’)
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507) of information
collections relating to recordkeeping
and reporting requirements, licensing
procedures (including those pursuant to
statements of licensing policy), and
other procedures, see § 501.901 of this
chapter. An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information
unless it displays a valid control
number assigned by OMB.
Appendix A to Part 589—Executive
Order 13660
Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014
Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States of America, including the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et
seq.) (NEA), section 212(f) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C.
1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United
States Code,
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the
United States of America, find that the
actions and policies of persons including
persons who have asserted governmental
authority in the Crimean region without the
authorization of the Government of Ukraine
that undermine democratic processes and
institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace,
security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity; and contribute to the
misappropriation of its assets, constitute an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the
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United States, and I hereby declare a national
emergency to deal with that threat. I hereby
order:
Section 1. (a) All property and interests in
property that are in the United States, that
hereafter come within the United States, or
that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of any United States
person (including any foreign branch) of the
following persons are blocked and may not
be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or
otherwise dealt in: any person determined by
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State:
(i) To be responsible for or complicit in, or
to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, any
of the following:
(A) Actions or policies that undermine
democratic processes or institutions in
Ukraine;
(B) actions or policies that threaten the
peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or
territorial integrity of Ukraine; or
(C) misappropriation of state assets of
Ukraine or of an economically significant
entity in Ukraine;
(ii) to have asserted governmental authority
over any part or region of Ukraine without
the authorization of the Government of
Ukraine;
(iii) to be a leader of an entity that has, or
whose members have, engaged in any activity
described in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this
section or of an entity whose property and
this order;
(iv) to have materially assisted, sponsored,
or provided financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of, any activity
described in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this
section or any person whose property and
this order; or
(v) to be owned or controlled by, or to have
acted or purported to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, any person whose
blocked pursuant to this order.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of
this section apply except to the extent
provided by statutes, or in regulations,
orders, directives, or licenses that may be
issued pursuant to this order, and
notwithstanding any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 2. I hereby find that the unrestricted
immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the
United States of aliens determined to meet
one or more of the criteria in subsection 1(a)
of this order would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States, and I hereby
suspend entry into the United States, as
immigrants or nonimmigrants, of such
persons. Such persons shall be treated as
persons covered by section 1 of Proclamation
8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry
of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security
Council Travel Bans and International
Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions).
Sec. 3. I hereby determine that the making
of donations of the type of articles specified
in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C.
1702(b)(2)) by, to, or for the benefit of any
person whose property and interests in
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property are blocked pursuant to section 1 of
this order would seriously impair my ability
to deal with the national emergency declared
in this order, and I hereby prohibit such
donations as provided by section 1 of this
order.
Sec. 4. The prohibitions in section 1 of this
order include but are not limited to:
(a) The making of any contribution or
provision of funds, goods, or services by, to,
or for the benefit of any person whose
blocked pursuant to this order; and
(b) the receipt of any contribution or
provision of funds, goods, or services from
any such person.
Sec. 5. (a) Any transaction that evades or
avoids, has the purpose of evading or
violate any of the prohibitions set forth in
this order is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any
of the prohibitions set forth in this order is
prohibited.
Sec. 6. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term ‘‘person’’ means an individual
or entity;
(b) the term ‘‘entity’’ means a partnership,
association, trust, joint venture, corporation,
group, subgroup, or other organization; and
(c) the term ‘‘United States person’’ means
any United States citizen, permanent resident
alien, entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the
United States (including foreign branches), or
any person in the United States.
Sec. 7. For those persons whose property
pursuant to this order who might have a
constitutional presence in the United States,
I find that because of the ability to transfer
funds or other assets instantaneously, prior
notice to such persons of measures to be
taken pursuant to this order would render
those measures ineffectual. I therefore
determine that for these measures to be
effective in addressing the national
emergency declared in this order, there need
be no prior notice of a listing or
determination made pursuant to section 1 of
this order.
Sec. 8. The Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, is
hereby authorized to take such actions,
including the promulgation of rules and
regulations, and to employ all powers
granted to the President by IEEPA, as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this
order. The Secretary of the Treasury may
redelegate any of these functions to other
officers and agencies of the United States
Government consistent with applicable law.
All agencies of the United States Government
are hereby directed to take all appropriate
measures within their authority to carry out
the provisions of this order.
hereby authorized to submit the recurring
and final reports to the Congress on the
national emergency declared in this order,
consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50
U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA
(50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).
Sec. 10. This order is not intended to, and
does not, create any right or benefit,
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26372
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
or in equity by any party against the United
States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.
Barack Obama
THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 6, 2014
Appendix B to Part 589—Executive
Order 13661
Blocking Property of Additional Persons
States Code,
United States of America, hereby expand the
scope of the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014,
finding that the actions and policies of the
Government of the Russian Federation with
respect to Ukraine—including the recent
deployment of Russian Federation military
forces in the Crimea region of Ukraine—
undermine democratic processes and
institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace,
security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity; and contribute to the
misappropriation of its assets, and thereby
constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States. Accordingly, I
hereby order:
otherwise dealt in:
(i) The persons listed in the Annex to this
order; and
(ii) persons determined by the Secretary of
the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State:
(A) To be an official of the Government of
the Russian Federation;
(B) to operate in the arms or related
materiel sector in the Russian Federation;
(C) to be owned or controlled by, or to have
acted or purported to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly:
(1) A senior official of the Government of
the Russian Federation; or
(2) a person whose property and interests
in property are blocked pursuant to this
order; or
(D) to have materially assisted, sponsored,
services to or in support of:
(1) A senior official of the Government of
the Russian Federation; or
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(2) a person whose property and interests
in property are blocked pursuant to this
order.
one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of
this order would be detrimental to the
in Executive Order 13660, and I hereby
prohibit such donations as provided by
section 1 of this order.
any such person.
prohibited.
(a) The term ‘‘person’’ means an individual
or entity;
group, subgroup, or other organization;
any person in the United States; and
(d) the term the ‘‘Government of the
Russian Federation’’ means the Government
of the Russian Federation, any political
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including the Central Bank of the
Government of the Russian Federation, and
any person owned or controlled by, or acting
for or on behalf of, the Government of the
Russian Federation.
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13660, there need be no prior notice of a
listing or determination made pursuant to
section 1 of this order.
hereby authorized to determine that
circumstances no longer warrant the blocking
of the property and interests in property of
a person listed in the Annex to this order,
and to take necessary action to give effect to
that determination.
person.
Sec. 11. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m.
eastern daylight time on March 17, 2014.
Barack Obama
THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 17, 2014
Appendix C to Part 589—Executive
Order 13662
Blocking Property of Additional Persons
States Code,
United States of America, hereby expand the
scope of the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014, and
expanded by Executive Order 13661 of
March 16, 2014, finding that the actions and
policies of the Government of the Russian
Federation, including its purported
annexation of Crimea and its use of force in
Ukraine, continue to undermine democratic
processes and institutions in Ukraine;
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08MYR1
threaten its peace, security, stability,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and
contribute to the misappropriation of its
assets, and thereby constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States.
Accordingly, I hereby order:
otherwise dealt in: Any person determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State:
(i) To operate in such sectors of the
Russian Federation economy as may be
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury,
in consultation with the Secretary of State,
such as financial services, energy, metals and
mining, engineering, and defense and related
materiel;
(ii) to have materially assisted, sponsored,
services to or in support of, any person
blocked pursuant to this order; or
(iii) to be owned or controlled by, or to
have acted or purported to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person
blocked pursuant to this order.
one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of
this order would be detrimental to the
in Executive Order 13660, and expanded in
Executive Order 13661 and this order, and I
hereby prohibit such donations as provided
by section 1 of this order.
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any such person.
prohibited.
(a) The term ‘‘person’’ means an individual
or entity;
group, subgroup, or other organization;
any person in the United States; and
(d) the term the ‘‘Government of the
Russian Federation’’ means the Government
of the Russian Federation, any political
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation, and any person owned
or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of,
the Government of the Russian Federation.
13660, and expanded in Executive Order
13661 and this order, there need be no prior
notice of a listing or determination made
pursuant to section 1 of this order.
person.
Barack Obama
THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 20, 2014
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26373
Dated: May 2, 2014.
Adam J. Szubin,
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Approved:
Dated: May 2, 2014.
David S. Cohen,
Under Secretary, Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, Department of the
Treasury.
[FR Doc. 2014–10576 Filed 5–7–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 100
[USCG–2014–0305]
Special Local Regulation: Newport to
Bermuda Regatta, Narragansett Bay,
Newport, RI
Coast Guard, DHS.
Notice of enforcement of
regulation.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Coast Guard will enforce
the Special Local Regulation for the
biennial Newport to Bermuda Regatta,
Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island, from 9
a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Friday, June 20,
2014. During the enforcement period, no
person or vessel may enter or remain in
the regulated area except for
participants in the event, supporting
personnel, vessels registered with the
event organizer, and personnel or
vessels authorized by the Coast Guard
on-scene patrol commander.
DATES: The regulations in 33 CFR
100.119 will be enforced from 9 a.m. to
4:30 p.m. on June 20, 2014.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Edward LeBlanc, Chief, Waterways
Management Division, Sector
Southeastern New England, (401) 435–
2351.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Coast
Guard will enforce the special local
regulation for the biennial Newport/
Bermuda Regatta, Narragansett Bay,
Newport, RI, from 9 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on
Friday, June 20, 2014. A portion of the
navigable waters of the East Passage,
Narragansett Bay, Newport, RI or its
approaches will be closed during the
effective period to all vessel traffic,
except local, state or Coast Guard patrol
craft. The full text of this regulation is
found in 33 CFR 100.119. Additional
public notification will be made via the
First Coast Guard District Local Notice
to Mariners and marine safety
broadcasts.
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\08MYR1.SGM
08MYR1
Matthew Saunders’ Materials
DLA Piper Information Letter: Overview of Economic Sanctions Introduced Against
Russia
In view of the events in Ukraine in March-September 2014 the USA, EU and some other states have introduced economic
sanctions against the Russian Federation.
The sanctions introduced provided for bans/restrictions related to the export of specific commodities to the Russian Federation. We are referring, first of all, to arms, dual-use products and oil and gas equipment components.
Below you will find a list of effective sanctions related to restrictions/bans involving the export of goods to the Russian Federation.
▪
Ban on the export of arms and related materials, including
weapons and accoutrements, military vehicles and
equipment and their spare parts.
▪
Ban on the export of dual-use products to be used in Russia
for military purposes or by Russian military final users.
▪
Suspension of the issuance of licences to export equipment
with respect to projects associated with deepwater oil
exploration and extraction, the development of Arctic
offshore oilfields development or shale oil production in
Russia.
04.08.2014
▪
Ban on the export of lamb and mutton.
01.09.2014
▪
Ban on the export of arms and oil and gas equipment.
03.09.2014
▪
Ban on the export of uranium.
31.03.2015
▪
Sanctions similar to those imposed by the EU.
UK
13.03.2014
▪
Ban on the export of arms and dual-use products.
Germany
April 2014
▪
Suspension of the issuance of licences to export military
products.
Israel
05.08.2014
▪
Ban on the export of UAVs.
Norway
11.08.2014
▪
Adoption of the EU sanctions.
EU
01.08.2014
12.09.2014
Australia
Iceland
15.10.2014
▪
Montenegro
15.10.2014
▪
Albania
15.10.2014
▪
Lichtenstein
15.10.2014
▪
▪
Suspension of the issuance of licences to export dual-use
products and goods used for defence and security purposes
to Russia.
▪
Ban on the export of equipment for deepwater extraction
(over 152 metres), the development of Arctic offshore and
shale oil and gas production, equipment for unconventional
production of energy carriers: oil platforms, horizontal
drilling components, underwater equipment, sea equipment
suitable for work in the Arctic Region, hydraulic fracturing
software, remotely operated underwater vehicles, high
pressure pumps.
27.08.2014
▪
27.08.2014
▪
Ban on the export of military goods or dual-use products,
save for space hardware.
15.10.2014
▪
01.03.2014
USA
06.08.2014
Switzerland
Ukraine
Wilhelmina Shavshina
LegalDirector, HeadofForeignTradeRegulationinRussia,
PhDinLaw
T+7(495)2214400|+7(812)4487200
E[email protected]
www.dlapiper.com
Alexey Aronov
LegalDirector, HeadofMoscowCustomsPractice
T +7(495)2214403
E [email protected]
DLA Piper. EU Economic Sanctions and Trade Measures Targeting Russia
EU ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AND TRADE MEASURES
TARGETING RUSSIA
As widely expected, the Council of the European Union
("EU") recently extended the existing EU framework of
economic sanctions targeting specific Russian
individuals, entities, and wider trade measures, which
restrict the cooperation and exchanges within Russia's
military, energy, and financial services sectors.
On 22 June 2015, EU Foreign Ministers unanimously
agreed to extend these measures until 31 January 2016.
This follows a similar decision to extend the existing
EU framework of economic sanctions and trade
restrictions targeting Crimea and Sevastopol until
23 June 2016.
The EU's decision to extend its existing prohibitions
does not alter the content, scope or application of
the EU measures. However, with no end in sight to the
EU's economic sanctions and trade measures - European,
Russian and wider companies involved in trade between
the EU and Russia will continue to undergo significant
challenges.
This briefing note examines the full range of measures
imposed by the EU and the potential impact on
commercial activity between companies incorporated and
domiciled in Russia, and their European counterparts. In
particular, this briefing note will focus on those
measures, which target Russia's military, energy, and
financial services sectors; and the practical implications
for managing relationships between companies located in
Russia and their European customers, suppliers,
consultants, financiers, and banking partners.
1
CURRENT EU MEASURES
The current framework of EU sanctions targeting Russia
covers three broad areas:
Asset freezing restrictions1
These measures target those persons alleged to have
been responsible for misappropriation of Ukrainian State
funds and human rights violations; and those persons
alleged to have been involved in actions undermining or
threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence of Ukraine ("Designated Persons"). To
date, the asset freezing provisions apply to
151 individuals and 37 entities.
The asset freezing measures result in any funds, or wider
assets owned, held or controlled by a Designated Person
(and which are either held in the EU or held by any
EU incorporated entity outside of the EU) being frozen.
These funds cannot then be accessed in any way, unless
authorised by a licence from a competent EU regulatory
authority.
EU incorporated companies and EU nationals, wherever
they are located, are prohibited from making any funds or
wider assets available to (or for) the Designated Person.
For companies located in Russia, the impact of the
EU asset freezing measures is that their EU counterparts
are increasing expecting Russian companies to provide
robust representations and warranties that are not
designated under EU sanctions measures, nor are they
owned or controlled by wider persons designated under
EU sanctions measures.
Implemented via Council Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 of 5 March 2014 (as amended) and Council Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 of 17 March 2014
(as amended).
In particular, many EU companies are requesting that
their Russian counterparts provide details of owners who
hold 20-25% (or more) of a Russian company. In
addition, many EU financial institutions are taking an
extremely cautious approach to either maintaining
accounts held in the name of Russian persons or
processing payment transactions in respect of EU-Russia
trade whilst confirmation is sought regarding their
potential exposure to EU sanctions risk.
Restrictions targeting Crimea and Sevastopol2
These measures prohibit:
■ the import (and associated financing) of goods
originating in Crimea or Sevastopol into the EU,
unless accompanied by a certificate of origin from the
Ukrainian authorities;
■ investing in or financing entities, joint ventures or
real estate in Crimea or Sevastopol, or supplying
related services;
■ selling, supplying, transferring or exporting certain
goods and technology used in the transport,
telecommunications, energy and oil, gas and mineral
resources sectors to or for use in Crimea or
Sevastopol;
■ providing technical assistance, brokering services,
financing or financial assistance in relation to the
goods and technology noted at point 3 above;
■ providing technical assistance, brokering,
construction or engineering services relating to
infrastructure in those sectors noted at point (iii)
above; and
■ providing services related to tourism activities in
Crimea or Sevastopol. In particular, European cruise
ships are prohibited from calling at ports in the
Crimean peninsula.
For companies located in Russia, the main impact of the
EU restrictions targeting Crimea and Sevastopol is that
EU counterparts, in particular service providers and
suppliers of goods, are increasing requesting that their
Russian counterparts provide robust representations and
2
warranties that EU origin goods and services will not be
re-transferred to Sevastopol and Crimea. In addition, and
in line with the extremely cautious approach taken by
EU financial institutions, many EU banks are refusing to
participate in the financing of any projects undertaken in
Sevastopol or Crimea.
Restrictions targeting Russia's military, energy and
financial services sector3. These so called "trade" or
"sectorial" or "third phase" sanctions restrict the sale,
supply or export of certain goods and technology to
specified entities in Russia's military, energy sector, and
with its major credit institutions.
In DLA Piper's experience, these measures have had the
largest impact on EU-Russian trade. Given the technical
nature of these measures, the wide scope for
interpretation and a lack of specific guidance issued by
relevant EU competent authorities. These prohibitions
have had a particularly negative impact on EU companies
maintaining positive relationships with their Russian
counterparts. Therefore, the remainder of this briefing
will focus on the detail of these measures and their
potential impact on EU and Russian companies.
FOCUS ON: TRADE SANCTIONS
Trade sanctions were initiated on 31 July 2014 via Council
Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU)
No 833/2014 ("Regulation 833/2014")4.
In summary, the measures consist of:
■ A prohibition on buying, selling or otherwise dealing
with transferable securities5 (eg shares and securities)
and money-market instruments6 (eg treasury bills and
commercial paper) issued: (i) between 1 August 2014
and 12 September 2014 with a maturity of more than
90 days; and, (ii) after 12 September 2014 with a
maturity of more than 30 days by:
■ Sberbank;
■ VTB Bank;
■ Gazprombank;
Implemented via Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014 (as amended).
Implemented via Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 (as amended).
4
On 12 September 2014, the EU amended the Decision and Regulation and adopted new measures via Council Decision 2014/659/CFSP and Council
Regulation (EU) No 960/2014. On 5 December 2014 the EU provided additional clarity on the scope of certain elements of the sanctions via Council
Decision 2014/872/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 1290/2014.
5
"Transferable securities" includes shares and other equivalent securities, bonds or other forms of securitised debt, depositary receipts in respect of shares
and bonds, and any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities.
6
"Money-market instruments" means those classes of instruments which are normally dealt in on the money market, such as treasury bills, certificates of
deposit and commercial papers and excluding instruments of payment.
3
02 | EU Economic Sanctions
■ Vnesheconombank ("VEB"); or
■ Rosselkhozbank,
(the entities listed in Annex III to
Regulation 833/2014 ("Group A Entities")).
The prohibition extends to any entity or body
established outside the EU, which is more than
50 per cent owned by any Group A Entity and to any
legal person, entity or body acting at their direction or
on their behalf. Services related to the issuing of such
securities and instruments, such as brokering, are
prohibited.
Therefore, the prohibitions do not extend to wholly
independent subsidiaries of the Group A Entities
incorporated under the law of an EU Member State.
■ A prohibition on buying, selling, providing
investment services for or assistance in the issuance
of, or dealing with transferable securities and
money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding
30 days, issued after 12 September 2014 by:
■ OPK Oboronprom, United Aircraft Corporation
and Uralvagonzavod (being Russian companies
engaged in the conception, production, sales or
export of military equipment or services); and
■ Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft (being
large, state controlled Russian energy companies)
("Group B Entities").
This prohibition also extends to any entity or body
50 per cent owned by any Group B entity and to any
legal person, entity or body acting at their direction or
on their behalf.
independent subsidiaries of the Group B Entities
incorporated under the law of an EU Member State.
■ A prohibition after 12 September 2014 on directly or
indirectly making or being part of any arrangement to
make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding
30 days available to any Group A or B Entities
(together a "Sanctioned Entity").
The prohibition extends to any entity or body
50 per cent owned by any Sanctioned Entity and to
any legal person, entity or body acting at their
direction or on their behalf.
independent subsidiaries of the Group A and Group B
Entities incorporated under the law of an EU Member
State.
Loans or credit that have a specific and documented
objective to provide financing for non-prohibited
imports or exports of goods and non-financial
services between the EU and Russia are exempted
from this prohibition (the "Trade Finance
Exemption").
For companies located in Russia this is an important
exemption. In effect, the exemption confirms that
EU companies and financial institutions are not
prohibited from providing new (or continuing to
provide existing) credit terms and financing, which
support non-prohibited activities between the EU and
Russia.
The prohibition will also not apply to drawdown or
disbursements made under a contract concluded
before 12 September 2014 provided that:
■ all the terms and conditions of such drawdown or
disbursements (including provisions concerning
the length of the repayment period, the interest
rate applied or the interest rate calculation method
and the maximum amount) were agreed before
12 September 2014, and were not modified on or
after that date; and
■ before 12 September 2014, a contractual maturity
date was fixed for the repayment in full of all
funds made available and for the cancellation of
all the commitments, rights and obligations under
the contract.
■ A prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer or export of
dual-use goods and technology whether or not
originating in the EU to any person or entity in Russia
if the goods or technology are intended for a military
use or military end-user in Russia. The competent
authorities have discretion to grant an authorisation,
eg export licence where the export concerns the
execution of an obligation arising from a contract
concluded before 1 August 2014, or ancillary
contracts necessary for the execution of such a
contract. However, our experience is that such
applications for authorisations may take some time
before any determination is made.
■ A prohibition on:
■ the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use
goods and technology whether or not originating
in the EU to certain named Russian companies
operating in Russia's military and defence sector
as listed in Annex IV to the Regulation, being
JSC Sirius, OJSC Stankoinstrument,
www.dlapiper.com | 03
OAO JSC Chemcomposite, SC Kalashnikov,
JSC Tula Arms Plant, NPK Technologii
Maschinostrojenija, OAO Wysokototschnye
Kompleksi, OAO Almaz Antey and
OAO NPO Bazalt. The prohibition covers all dual
use items included in Annex I of the EU Dual Use
Regulation. (For more information on the
EU Dual Use Regulation and recent changes to
the list of goods and technology controlled by the
Regulation, see our earlier alert here);
■ providing technical assistance, brokering services
or other services related to of dual-use goods and
technology and to the provision, manufacture,
maintenance and use of these goods and
technology, directly or indirectly to the entities
listed in Annex IV; and
■ providing financing or financial assistance related
to of dual-use goods and technology, including in
particular grants, loans and export credit
insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export
of these goods and technology, or for the
provision of related technical assistance,
brokering services or other services, directly or
indirectly to the entities listed in Annex IV.
These prohibitions shall be without prejudice to the
execution of contracts concluded before
12 September 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary
for the execution of such contracts.
■ Exports of certain energy-related equipment and
technology to Russia (or any other country if such
equipment or technology is for use in Russia) will
require prior authorisation by the competent
authorities of Member States. The restricted
technologies are listed in Annex II to Regulation
No 833/2014. Competent authorities will not grant
export licenses for Annex II items which they have
reasonable grounds to determine are destined for deep
water oil exploration and production, arctic oil
exploration and production, or shale oil projects in
Russia7.
Competent authorities have discretion to grant an
authorisation where the sale, supply, transfer or
export concerns the execution of an obligation arising
from a contract concluded before 1 August 2014, or
7
ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such
a contract.
■ A prohibition on directly or indirectly providing
"associated services" for deep exploration and
production, artic oil exploration and production and
shale oil projects8. Associated services are
specifically defined as (i) drilling, (ii) well testing,
(iii) logging and completion services, (iv) supply of
specialised floating vessels. This is a strict
prohibition without any cause to apply for
authorisation or licensing.
This prohibition shall be without prejudice to the
execution of an obligation arising from a contract or a
framework agreement concluded before
12 September 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary
for the execution of such a contract.
■ A prohibition on:
■ providing technical assistance related to the goods
and technology listed in the Common Military
List , or related to the provision, manufacture,
maintenance and use of goods included in that list,
to any person or entity in Russia or for use in
Russia;
to the goods and technology listed in the Common
Military List, including in particular grants, loans
and export credit insurance or guarantee, as well
as insurance and reinsurance for any sale, supply,
transfer or export of such items, or for any
provision of related technical assistance, to any
person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia;
■ providing technical assistance or brokering
services related to dual-use goods and technology,
or related to the provision, manufacture,
maintenance and use of such goods or technology,
to any person or entity in Russia or for use in
Russia, if the items are or may be intended, in
their entirety or in part, for military use or for a
military end-user; and
to the dual-use goods and technology, including in
particular grants, loans and export credit
insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export
Defined fully in Regulation 833/2014 as
"(a) oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 metres;
(b) oil exploration and production in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle; or
(c) Projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing. It does not apply to
exploration and production through shale formations to locate or extract oil from non-shale reservoirs".
8
As defined in footnote 4.
of such items, or for any provision of related
technical assistance to any person or entity in
Russia or for use in Russia; if the items are or may
be intended, in their entirety or in part, for military
use or for a military end-user.
These prohibitions are without prejudice to the
execution of contracts concluded before
1 August 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary for
the execution of such contracts, and to the provision
of assistance necessary for the maintenance and safety
of existing capabilities within the EU.
maintenance, or any other technical service, and may
take forms such as instruction, advice, training,
transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting
services; including verbal forms of assistance".10
The inclusion of the wording "or any other technical
service" makes the definition and corresponding
restrictions very broad. If there is any question of a
service falling within the contours of technical assistance,
authorisation in the form of a licence should be sought
from the relevant competent EU authority.
Meaning of "financial assistance"
■ Prior authorisation will be required for the provision
of technical assistance or brokering services related to
items listed in Annex II and to the provision,
manufacture, maintenance and use of those items,
directly or indirectly, to any person or entity in
Russia, or for use in Russia.
■ Prior authorisation will be required for the provision
of financing or financial assistance related to items
referred to in Annex II, including in particular grants,
loans and export credit insurance, for any sale,
supply, transfer or export of those items, or for any
provision of related technical assistance, directly or
indirectly, to any person or entity in Russia, or for use
in Russia.
PRACTICALITIES OF COMPLIANCE
Many European companies have direct commercial
relationships in Russia or with Russian companies or
indirect relationships via capital markets trading or trade
finance activities. This has led to a significant number of
licence requests for clarification from European
regulators in relation to the application, and the intended
effect of Regulation 833/2014. Both the European
Commission and a number of competent authorities in
the EU Member States, including the UK Export Control
Organisation (the "ECO") have published limited
guidance to assist companies in complying with the
sanctions measures9.
The following sections summarise the main areas:
Meaning of "technical assistance"
"Technical assistance" is defined in Regulation 833/2014
as "any technical support related to repairs,
development, manufacture, assembly, testing,
There is no definition of "financial assistance" in
Regulation 833/2014, or indeed in any wider
EU sanctions measure. Available guidance notes that
relevant competent authorities "understand[s] the term in
its broadest sense, ie involvement in any financial
transaction which promotes, enables or facilitates the
prohibited or restricted trade transaction to which it
relates".11
Therefore, financial assistance will include the provision
of payment services and the issuance of letters of credit
and associated guarantees related to restricted
transactions.
The prohibition on the provision of financing and
financial assistance related to the supply of items on the
EU Common Military List specifically refers to the
provision of "insurance and re-insurance".
If a competent regulatory authority in an EU Member
State has granted a licence to authorise a particular
transaction, eg the provision of an Annex II item to
Russia, a licence is also required to authorise the process
of payment(s), ie the financial assistance in relation to
that transaction. We would recommend that any licence
application for restricted trade and/or technical assistance
is accompanied by a corresponding licence request for the
associated necessary financial assistance.
Annex II Goods
A licence is required for export to Russia of goods and
technologies listed in Annex II regardless of intended or
actual end-use - eg even if they are not going to be used
in Russia's oil and gas industry.
9
The European Commission guidance note can be accessed at: http://europa.eu/newsroom/files/pdf/c_2014_9950_en.pdf.
The ECO guidance can be accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/384398/14-1284-sanctionsrussia.pdf .
10
Regulation 833/2014, Article 1(c).
11
See ECO guidance, as noted above.
www.dlapiper.com | 05
The requirement for prior authorisation applies to items
listed under the CN codes listed in Annex II. If the item
to be supplied to Russia, or for use in Russia, has a
CN code that is not listed in Annex II then an
authorisation is not required even if that item contains a
listed item as a component.
A licence to supply Annex II goods is valid throughout
the EU.
Loan and Credit Restrictions
Loans and credit "that have a specific and documented
objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports
or exports of goods and non-financial services between
the EU and Russia" are not covered by the restrictions. If
a company's underlying trade activity with a Russian
counterparty is therefore not restricted by wider
EU sanctions measures, any loan/credit granted to that
counterparty as part of the trading activity will not be
subject to the 30-day restriction period.
If an EU person has extended a loan or credit to a
Sanctioned Entity before 12 September 2014, it is
allowed to sell part of, or the whole, claim with a
maturity exceeding 30 days to another Sanctioned Entity.
The resale to another Sanctioned Entity is allowed as
long as it does not involve any new loans/credit being
made available to a Sanctioned Entity.
If an EU person has extended a loan or credit with a
maturity exceeding 30 days before 12 September 2014, it
would be a breach of Regulation 833/2014 to agree to a
takeover by a Sanctioned Entity of the debt arising from
such a loan after 12 September 2014, as this would
effectively correspond to making a new loan or credit to
a Sanctioned Entity after 12 September 2014.
Deposit services are not covered by the prohibitions set
out in Regulation 833/2012. Therefore, EU persons can
place term deposits with a maturity exceeding 30 days in
Russian banks that are designated Sanctioned Entities,
eg Group A Entities after 12 September 2014. However,
the Regulation prohibits any action, which is designed to
circumvent the restrictions in the Regulation. Therefore,
if term deposits are being used to circumvent the
prohibition on granting new loans, this activity would be
in breach of sanctions.
Guidance from the European Commission has confirmed
that payment and settlement services, including through
correspondent banking, will not be construed as 'making'
12
13
See European Guidance, as noted above, paragraph 17.
See European Guidance, as noted above, paragraph 19.
or 'being part of an arrangement to make' a new loan or
credit to a sanctioned entity.12
Payment terms/delayed payment for goods or services
are not considered loans or credit for the purpose of the
loans/credit restrictions in Regulation 833/2014. The
provision of payment terms/delayed payment may not be
used, however, to circumvent the loan/credit
prohibitions. The European Commission has stated that
payment terms granted to Sanctioned Entities which are
not in line with normal business practice, or which since
12 September 2014 have been "substantially extended"
may suggest circumvention.13
Trade Finance
As per the Trade Finance Exemption, EU persons can
process payments, provide insurance, issue letters of
credit and extend loans, to sanctioned entities for
non-prohibited exports or imports of goods or
non-financial services to or from the EU after
12 September 2014.
If an EU person extended a loan or credit with a maturity
exceeding 30 days to a Sanctioned Entity before
12 September 2014 for the export or import of
non-prohibited goods or non-financial services to or from
the EU, it is possible that the payment schedule can be
modified. Account receivables can be sold to another
Sanctioned Entity, or debt from the loan (or credit) can
be taken over by another Sanctioned Entity, if the loan or
credit has a specific and documented objective to provide
financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods
and non-financial services between the EU and Russia.
The Trade Finance Exemption applies to exports or
imports of non-prohibited goods between the EU and
Russia, when the goods transit through another third
State, as long as the export or import contract clearly
stipulates that the imports or exports originate in, or are
destined for, the EU.
EU persons can confirm or advise letters of credits
issued after 12 September 2014 by a Sanctioned Entity
and not covered by the Trade Finance Exemption and
provide discounting or post financing for them, unless
the applicant of the letter of credit (the buyer or
importer) is a Sanctioned Entity and the maturity is
longer than 30 days.
Capital Market Restrictions
For more details contact:
Derivatives, which give the right to acquire or sell a
transferable security or money market instrument, such
as options, futures, forwards or warrants, irrespective of
how they are traded (on-exchange or over-the-counter
(OTC)) are covered by the prohibition set described in
points 1 and 2 above. Other derivatives, such as interest
rate swaps, credit default swaps and cross currency
swaps, are not covered by the prohibitions. Derivatives
used for hedging purposes in the energy market are also
not covered.
Depository receipts fall within the definition of
transferable securities. EU persons cannot therefore
issue or deal in depositary receipts issued on or after
1 August 2014 by Group A Entities or on or after
12 September 2014 Group B Entities in any of the
following cases:
The depositary receipts are based on equity issued by a
Sanctioned Entity on or after 1 August 2014 in the case
of Group A Entities or on or after 12 September 2014 in
the case of Group B Entities; or
The depositary receipts are based on equity issued by a
Sanctioned Entity before 1 August 2014 in the case of
Group A entities, or before 12 September 2014 in the
case of Group B entities and are issued under a deposit
agreement with that Sanctioned Entity.
These depositary receipts would constitute new
transferable securities issued on behalf of a Sanctioned
Entity.
If a Group A Entity bank is acting as a custodian for
equity issued by a non-sanctioned entity, EU persons
may deal in such depositary receipts, as it does not
constitute dealing in new equity from the Sanctioned
Entity.
This publication is intended as a general overview and discussion of the subjects dealt with. It is not intended to be, and should not be used as, a
substitute for taking legal advice in any specific situation. DLA Piper will accept no responsibility for any actions taken or not taken on the basis of this
publication. If you would like further advice, please speak to your DLA Piper contact on 08700 111 111.
www.dlapiper.com
DLA Piper is a global law firm operating through various separate and distinct legal entities. For further information
please refer to www.dlapiper.com
Copyright ©2015 DLA Piper. All rights reserved. | JUN 15 | Ref: LON/MA/21317199
ICC Insights. The potential impact of the EU sanctions against Russia on international
arbitration administered by EU-based institutions
1(7)
17 June 2015
The potential impact of the EU sanctions against Russia
on international arbitration administered by EU-based
institutions
A lot has been said recently regarding the potential impact of the European Union (“EU”)
sanctions on arbitrations involving Russian parties administered by EU-based arbitration
institutions. The purpose of this article is to offer a practical explanation of these sanctions
and their effect, if any, upon the administration of international arbitration cases by arbitral
institutions based in the EU.
1. Background
Since March 2014, the EU has imposed an array of restrictive measures targeting a number
of Russian individuals and organizations. These were in addition to other, more far-reaching
measures which the EU had taken in respect of, for example, Iran and Libya. Subsequently,
economic sanctions have been introduced, covering sectorial cooperation and exchanges
with Russia through trade bans and export/import embargoes in the financial, oil-drilling and
defense sectors. Similar sanctions apply to individuals and entities in Crimea.
The relevant EU decisions and regulations contain mandatory norms applicable to specific
individuals, organizations and sectors, which are identified in official lists published on the
EU’s website.1
1
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm#3
2(7)
17 June 2015
It is perhaps not surprising then that a debate on the sanctions’ effect, if any, on the work of
EU-based arbitral institutions has emerged in Russia, not least given the preference of
Russian parties for certain EU-based institutions and/or EU jurisdictions’ national laws.
However, in addition to questions regarding the intended scope of the sanctions, the current
debate often includes politicized arguments, many of which appear misconstrued and/or
biased against EU-based arbitral institutions. The purpose of this note is to address these
issues and to clarify the impact of sanctions on the day-to-day-activities of international
arbitral institutions within the EU.
Some European institutions have a steady and significant caseload involving Russian and CIS
parties. Others have even seen a substantial increase in the number of cases involving such
parties. In any event, the Russian sanctions – while they may result in some additional
administrative steps – do not preclude parties from referring their disputes to arbitration at
an EU-based institution. As such, it is very much business as usual for both the institutions
and the parties.
2. International trade and arbitration from a historical perspective
History teaches us that trade and commercial relations will develop regardless of political
system, priorities or even political conflict. In this context, it may be worth noting that the
preference of Russian parties to use certain Western institutions originates from the times of
the Cold War, which was an era of trade embargoes and general hostility between Western
and Soviet blocs. This was the context in which the neutral, impartial and independent
decision-making of East-West disputes by means of international arbitration developed.
Thus, nations will always trade, and nations will always have commercial relationships.
Equally, States have been in agreement for a very long time that international trade and
3(7)
17 June 2015
international commercial relations need predictable rules of law, including efficient
mechanisms for dispute resolution.
As we assess the current situation, it is worthwhile to reflect on the world as it was when
States negotiated and agreed to some of the most relevant common legal instruments for
international arbitration, for example the 1958 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In 1958 and 1976
borders were quite different, not to mention political systems. But this did not prevent a
constructive approach in providing access to justice in international trade.
In fact, from a review of the travaux préparatoires of these instruments, it may be noted
that one of the objectives of the negotiations was to enable parties from “different economic
systems” to find a common ground for their international relations, and that the new
legislation “would be a constructive step towards facilitating international trade, and
ultimately towards higher standards of living and so towards general peace and prosperity.”
These are powerful words, and, we believe, are still valid and relevant. This is particularly so
when one considers that while States during this time disagreed on a number of policy and
geopolitical issues, in defining the rules of the game for international arbitration, States were
able to find common ground. The underlying values which States agreed upon then still
matter, particularly in times of political conflict, and are reflected in certain provisions of the
EU sanctions regulations. For example, an exemption from the freezing of funds can be
obtained for “funds intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees or
reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services”.2
3. The sanctions do not explicitly target the arbitral procedure
All arbitral institutions based in EU states, including SCC, LCIA and ICC, are subject to EU law.
They are required to observe EU sanctions regulations, which often complement, or are
intended to operate in tandem with, US (and UN) sanctions. These sanctions do not result in
2
See article 4 of the EU Regulation 269/2014
4(7)
17 June 2015
a substantial change in the administration of arbitral proceedings. Arbitral proceedings
involving EU sanctions are subject to internal compliance mechanisms specific to arbitral
institutions. The institutions must ensure therefore that they have systems in place, which
are sanctions compliant and which are acceptable to both the regulatory authorities charged
with the administration of the sanctions regime and which the banks which handle the
deposit moneys lodged with the institutions likewise find acceptable. It is important to note,
however, that the EU sanctions implemented against Russian interests have targeted a
limited and defined number of entities and individuals and are of a less sweeping and
general nature than sanctions introduced against other states and their nationals.
In practical terms, however, in the case of Russian parties, there is a variety of situations
relating to procedure where the sanctions could come into play. One is where a designated
party appears as or is a controlling entity, i.e. the ultimate beneficial owner, of a party in one
of our cases. A second is where a party to one of our cases is itself an entity trading in dualuse goods and technology for military use in Russia or for any military end-user in Russia. In
such circumstances, the transfer of funds could be affected by the regulations on freezing of
assets and the financial sanctions targeting certain sectors of the Russian economy. These
are, however, situations that can be addressed by applying for an exemption under the
regulations.
The asset-freezing restrictions might thus require additional administration on the part of
the designated individuals and entities, the arbitral institutions and arbitrators. As pointed
out above, this designation is a very limited list. In essence, prior to filing for arbitration the
designated company or individual will need to obtain an exemption from the freezing of
funds by filing a request with the relevant authority. Practical information and contact
details for filing an application is available from our respective institutions.
There may be cases where sanctions have an effect on the substance of disputes. In such
cases, the dispute itself will be affected by the sanction, i.e. from the perspective of the
arbitral institution, the sanction will bite, irrespective of where the arbitration is seated,
5(7)
17 June 2015
which EU arbitral institution is administering it, the law(s) applicable to it, and where any
award is ultimately sought to be enforced. As such, moving the seat of these arbitrations
outside of the EU will not make any difference, if the dispute is subject to the sanctions
regime.
4. Addressing some of the most common questions
In the wake of the political debate surrounding the implementation of the sanctions, a
number of misconceptions have surfaced regarding the impact and applicability of the
Russian sanctions. Below, we address some of the most principal issues.

The EU sanctions apply to a limited number of persons and entities
The EU Regulations apply to a limited number of persons and entities. The sanctions do not
impose a general prohibition on trade with Russian parties. Indeed, the overwhelming
majority of Russian businesses and investors are not subject to any EU restrictions.

Parties of any nationality are not prevented from referring their disputes to European
institutions
Arbitral institutions maintain a strict neutrality vis-à-vis all parties, irrespective of their
nationalities. Subject to compliance measures that arbitral institutions are required to
implement in a case, Russian parties will not be treated differently from other parties, and
Russian parties are not prevented from agreeing to arbitration under any of the of Rules or
in any venue within the European Union including Paris, London and Stockholm.

The arbitral procedure remains the same
The arbitration procedure in Europe continues to be open for all parties, irrespective of their
nationalities. In this respect, nothing has changed. With the exception of compliance
measures. The EU sanctions do not affect the arbitration procedure as such.
6(7)
17 June 2015

Some administrative measures have been added
In practice, the EU Regulations and their implementation by national authorities have added
a limited number of administrative steps in the case management process. To this end,
additional information regarding parties’ ownership or control structure may be needed at
any time of the proceedings. For example, when a request for arbitration is filed, parties and
related entities will be checked against a list of sanctioned individuals and entities. If the
scope of the sanctions changes, institutions will take the relevant necessary steps in relation
to pending cases.

A designated party can still file a request for arbitration
A person or entity designated by the EU Regulations is not per se prevented from filing a
request for arbitration with the ICC, LCIA or SCC.
Before so doing, however, the designated person or entity is advised to inform the
institution of the dispute prior to the request for arbitration. This is to enable the institutions
to discuss with the parties of any additional administrative requirement that needs to be
fulfilled either by the parties or the institution, for example filing an application with the
relevant national authorities for an exemption under the sanction regulation.
The freezing of funds under the sanctions regulations can be exempted for “funds intended
exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees or reimbursement of incurred
expenses associated with the provision of legal services.”
5. Summary
The sanctions do not impose a general prohibition for Russian parties to seek arbitration
before European arbitral institutions, and Russian parties are not treated differently from
other parties.
7(7)
17 June 2015
The integrity of the process of our respective institutions remains the same, as does the
impartiality and independence of the procedure. We have put in place procedures to
address the sanctions and are engaging with relevant public authorities to facilitate an
efficient procedure should exemptions under the regulations be required. This is a
responsibility that arbitral institutions share with parties, and their counsel.
John Beechey
Chairman
ICC International Court of Arbitration
Paris
Jacomijn van Haersolte-van Hof
Director General
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)
London
Annette Magnusson
Secretary General
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)
Stockholm
Maya Lester’s Materials
Brick Court Chambers Brochure
A tradition
of excellence
About us
Brick Court Chambers is one of the leading
sets of barristers’ chambers in the UK. We
have a very strong reputation in Commercial,
EU/Competition and Public Law.
In addition to providing specialist expertise in each
of those areas of law, we are well placed to handle cases
raising issues in more than one field. We have 85 members
who practise full-time, including 38 QCs. We have links
in many common law jurisdictions with distinguished
door tenants and academics.
Members of Chambers are independent and selfemployed with a wide diversity of skills and practices,
but the Brick Court ethos is above all about providing a
service of the very highest quality. We pride ourselves not
only on excellence in advocacy and advisory work but on
being accessible, user friendly and team players.
SANCTIONS LAW AT
BRICK COURT CHAMBERS
Members of Brick Court Chambers are experts in
commercial law (including shipping & insurance),
European & international law, and public & administrative
law. We regularly undertake advisory work and litigation
on all aspects of sanctions regimes, for a wide range of
clients, including corporates, individuals, regulators,
NGOs, intervening governments / institutions. Members
of Chambers have expertise in compliance work,
investigations for breach of sanctions, challenges to
listings, & designations. We have acted in more sanctions
cases in the UK and EU courts than any other barristers’
chambers. Members of Chambers have advised on the
whole range of sanctions regimes, including counter
terrorism and nuclear proliferation sanctions, regime /
country sanctions, and all kinds of financial sanctions.
DIRECTORY QUOTATIONS
‘Brick Court’s success is built on a strong foundation of
star performers who have extensive expertise in all manner
of commercial litigation cases. Instructing solicitors express
unwavering confidence in the members, commenting that
“everyone there is very bright. You know you’ll be getting
an exceptionally good lawyer whoever you instruct.”
Exceptional in all they do, they prove particularly strong
on EU and competition law, where “they’ve created an
incredible centre of excellence.” They are also heavily
involved in the banking and finance market and have
had involvement in industry-critical litigation such as
Deutsche Bank v Unitech and the Guardian Care Homes
Libor test case. The members here are comfortable handling
matters of great note and complexity, and benefit from the
“charming and effective” clerking provided by Julian Hawes
and Ian Moyler, two individuals who “really understand
client service.” Hawes and Moyler attend to a number of
top silks at the Commercial Bar such as Mark Howard QC,
a man known for his “exceptional advocacy and stunning
practice.” Juniors of note include the “ formidably bright”
Maya Lester, who is praised for her “supreme knowledge”
of European and competition law, and further acclaimed
for her specialist expertise on sanctions. With such an
abundance of intellectual firepower, sources describe the
set as “the Rolls-Royce of barristers.”’
Chambers & Partners 2015
‘Maya Lester is a leading light amongst senior juniors,
particularly in the field of EU sanctions where she has a
level of experience that few can match. Clients regularly
single her out for her drafting skills and her clear thinking.”’
Chambers & Partners 2014
SIGNIFICANT RECENT
BRICK COURT CHAMBERS
SANCTIONS CASES
SANCTIONS CASES IN THE EUROPEAN COURT
include
Iranian sanctions
◆◆ Central Bank of Iran
◆◆ Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
◆◆ National Iranian Tanker Company
◆◆ Bank Mellat
◆◆ Bank Saderat Iran & Bank Saderat Plc
◆◆ Europaische-Iranische Handelsbank AG
◆◆ Iranian Oil Company (UK) Limited
◆◆ Persia International Bank
◆◆ Bank Tejarat
◆◆ Ministry of Energy of Iran
◆◆ Iran Aluminium Company
◆◆ Melli Bank plc
◆◆ Petropars Group
◆◆ Messrs Nabipour, Azizi & Sedghi, Golparvar,
Meskarian, Divandari, Meskarian, Zavvan
Russian sanctions
◆◆ DenizBank
◆◆ Sberbank
◆◆ VTB
◆◆ Rotenberg
Terrorist sanctions
◆◆ Kadi (1 & 2)
◆◆ People’s Mojahedin of Iran
◆◆ Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Arab Spring sanctions: Syria, Tunisia, Egypt
◆◆ El Materi
◆◆ El Maghraby & Gazaerly
◆◆ Al Tabbaa
◆◆ El Materi
◆◆ Khwanda
◆◆ Akhras
◆◆ African sanctions cases – Zimbabwe and DRC
◆◆ Rautenbach v Council
◆◆ Tomana v Council
◆◆ Uganda Commercial Impex Council
Burma / Myanmar sanctions
◆◆ Tay Za
SANCTIONS CASES IN THE UK COURTS INCLUDE
◆◆ Bank Mellat
◆◆ National Iranian Tanker Company
◆◆ Golparvar
◆◆ Azizi & Sedghi
◆◆ Sarkandi
barristers
Silks
◆◆ Jonathan Hirst QC
◆◆ Tom Adam QC
◆◆ Helen Davies QC
◆◆ Tim Lord QC
◆◆ Hilary Heilbron QC
◆◆ Fergus Randolph QC
◆◆ Timothy Charlton QC
◆◆ Mark Hoskins QC
◆◆ Richard Gordon QC
◆◆ Aidan Robertson QC
◆◆ Mark Hapgood QC
◆◆ Richard Slade QC
◆◆ Mark Howard QC
◆◆ Harry Matovu QC
◆◆ William Wood QC
◆◆ Jemima Stratford QC
◆◆ Stephen Ruttle QC
◆◆ Daniel Jowell QC
◆◆ Charles Hollander QC
◆◆ Simon Salzedo QC
◆◆ David Anderson QC
◆◆ Michael Bools QC
◆◆ Catharine
◆◆ Paul Bowen QC
Otton-Goulder QC
◆◆ Marie Demetriou QC
◆◆ Richard Lord QC
◆◆ Andrew Henshaw QC
◆◆ Mark Brealey QC
◆◆ Roger Masefield QC
◆◆ Michael Swainston QC ◆◆ Jasbir Dhillon QC
◆◆ James Flynn QC
◆◆ Martin Chamberlain QC
◆◆ Andrew Lydiard QC
◆◆ Kelyn Bacon QC
◆◆ Neil Calver QC
◆◆ Simon Birt QC
Junior Tenants
◆◆ Peter Irvin
◆◆ Tony Singla
◆◆ Peter Brunner
◆◆ Richard Blakeley
◆◆ Sarah Lee
◆◆ Richard Eschwege
◆◆ Paul Wright
◆◆ Edward Harrison
◆◆ Alan Roxburgh
◆◆ Thomas Plewman SC
◆◆ Alec Haydon
◆◆ Craig Morrison
◆◆ Jeremy Gauntlett SC
◆◆ Oliver Jones
◆◆ Andrew Thomas
◆◆ Daniel Piccinin
◆◆ Robert O’Donoghue
◆◆ Max Schaefer
◆◆ Klaus Reichert SC
◆◆ Michael Bolding
◆◆ Margaret Gray
◆◆ Tim Johnston
◆◆ Simon Birt
◆◆ Malcolm Birdling
◆◆ Colin West
◆◆ David Bailey
◆◆ Maya Lester
◆◆ Geoffrey Kuehne
◆◆ Nicholas Saunders
◆◆ Andrew McIntyre
◆◆ Fionn Pilbrow
◆◆ Emily MacKenzie
◆◆ Stephen Midwinter
◆◆ Joanne Box
◆◆ Sarah Ford
◆◆ Kyle Lawson
◆◆ Tony Willis
◆◆ Zahra Al-Rikabi
◆◆ Victoria Wakefield
◆◆ Hugo Leith
◆◆ David Scannell
◆◆ Jennifer MacLeod
◆◆ Gerard Rothschild
◆◆ Charlotte Thomas
◆◆ Fred Hobson
◆◆ Tom Pascoe
◆◆ Sarah Abram
◆◆ Ben Woolgar
◆◆ Sarah Love
Door Tenants
◆◆ Lord Phillips
◆◆ Mark Cran QC
◆◆ Lord Hoffmann
◆◆ John Sturrock QC
◆◆ Lord Hope
◆◆ James Wolffe QC
◆◆ Sir Oliver Popplewell
◆◆ Simon Thorley QC
◆◆ Sir Roger Buckley
◆◆ Alastair Sutton
◆◆ David Vaughan CBE QC
◆◆ Prof Peter Muchlinski
◆◆ HH Nicholas Chambers QC ◆◆ Jan Woloniecki
◆◆ Sir Sydney Kentridge QC
◆◆ Mads Andenas
◆◆ Prof Derrick Wyatt QC
◆◆ Prof Andrew Le Sueur
◆◆ Prof Richard Macrory CBE
◆◆ Prof Robert McCorquodale
◆◆ Judge Fidelma Macken SC
◆◆ Geoff Sharp
◆◆ Johnny Mok SC
The Clerks
Julian Hawes, Joint Senior Clerk +44 (0)20 7520 9803
[email protected]
Ian Moyler, Joint Senior Clerk
+44 (0)20 7520 9804
[email protected]
Paul Dennison, Deputy Senior Clerk
+44 (0)20 7520 9808
[email protected]
Tony Burgess, Deputy Senior Clerk
+44 (0)20 7520 9816
[email protected]
Kate Trott +44 (0)20 7520 9813
[email protected]
Alex Southern +44 (0)20 7520 9806
[email protected]
Luke Carvalho +44 (0)20 7520 9805
[email protected]
Jo Francis +44 (0)20 7520 9823
[email protected]
Meera Jeyaseelan +44 (0)20 7520 9807
[email protected]
Dalia Firman
+44 (0)20 7520 9809
[email protected]
Contact Chambers
Address
Brick Court Chambers
7 - 8 Essex Street London WC2R 3LD
United Kingdom
Document Exchange: DX 302 London Chancery Lane
Website
www.brickcourt.co.uk
MARKETING
Paul Gray
+44 (0)20 7520 9920
[email protected]
Renée Quarrie
+44 (0)20 7520 9919
[email protected]
Telephone numbers
Main/switchboard number:
◆◆ +44 (0)20 7379 3550
Facsimile:
◆◆ +44 (0)20 7379 3558
Emergency numbers outside of office hours are:
◆◆ +44 (0)7768 614193
◆◆ +44 (0)7768 614183
Chambers hours
Chambers and switchboard are open from 8am to 8pm
www.brickcourt.co.uk
7-8 Essex Street
London
United Kingdom
WC2R 3LD
Phone: +44 (0)20 7379 3550
Fax: +44 (0)20 7379 3558
World ECR Reports. Brussels lists, Luxembourg de-lists? Sanctions de-designation cases
in the European Court
Sanctions designations
Brussels lists, Luxembourg de-lists?
Sanctions de-designation cases in the
European Court
The European Court has recently been accused of assisting nuclear proliferators
by de-listing Iranian banks and companies, and has been criticised by some in
the U.S. government for detracting from the global enforcement of sanctions
regimes. Maya Lester explains the recent glut of sanctions cases at the Court,
and why in her view these criticisms are unjustified.
T
he European Union has a large
number of sanctions regimes
with various foreign policy aims:
attempting to prevent the financing of
terrorism, to stem Iran’s nuclear
proliferation programme, to pressurise
repressive regimes to stop violating the
rule of law and human rights (eg
Zimbabwe, Syria), to freeze funds
misappropriated from the State by a
former regime (Egypt, Tunisia).
Despite their different aims, these
measures all have the same legal form
– decisions made by the Council of the
European Union (‘the Council’), and
implementing regulations, which are
directly applicable in Member States of
law. The defendant is the Council (the
body that decides who is on and off the
lists), and sometimes the European
Commission and Member States
intervene in the proceedings to support
the Council.
There was a trickle of sanctions delisting cases between 2006 and 2010, a
steady stream in 2011, a flood of them
in 2012, and there is likely to be a
deluge in 2013-2014. This increase can
be explained by a number of factors: the
EU’s increasing use of economic
sanctions as a key part of its Common
Foreign and Security Policy, the Court’s
willingness to review listings in the
formative cases, the provision of
There was a trickle of sanctions
de-listing cases between 2006 and
2010, a steady stream in 2011, a flood
of them in 2012, and there is likely to
be a deluge in 2013-2014.
the European Union. These ‘targeted
sanctions’ all contain lists of
individuals and companies in their
annexes, that are the ‘targets’ of the
asset freezes, travel bans, and other
prohibitions they enact.
All of the people and companies
included in the annexes have standing
(locus standi) to challenge their
designations in the General Court of
the European Union (with an appeal to
the European Court of Justice) in
Luxembourg, as long as they do so
within two months of the measure’s
publication. The General Court (which
used to be called the ‘Court of First
Instance’) has jurisdiction to hear these
‘actions for annulment’ (European
judicial review), and to annul a
designation if it breaches European
1 WorldECR
licences to unfreeze frozen funds to pay
legal fees, and the feeling of some on the
lists that they have been included
wrongly or unfairly.
The basic principles
The European Court set out the basic
principles in the early cases brought by
the People’s Mojahedin of Iran (known
as the MEK in the USA) and Yassin
Kadi. The Court applies largely the
same principles today; the more recent
cases puzzle through what the
principles mean and how they should
apply to different sanctions situations.
The Court’s starting point is that
targeted sanctions are decisions made
by European institutions that impose
restrictive measures on individuals and
companies. They are therefore only
lawful if they comply with the
‘fundamental principles’ of European
law, and are subject to judicial review
by the European Court in order to
check that they do. This means the
following:
1) The Council must give adequate
‘reasons’ for an individual’s
designation at the time of
designation; reasons that are not
‘excessively vague’ but which permit
the person or company to
understand why he, she or it has
been included.
2) The Council must not rely on
unsupported allegations against an
individual or company, but must
provide
evidence
(including
incriminating evidence) in support
of a designation. There may not be
a requirement to provide evidence
before the first occasion on which a
person or company is listed,
because of the importance of
maintaining the ‘surprise effect’ and
avoiding asset dissipation, but there
is for subsequent decisions to relist, where there is no need for a
surprise.
3) The Council must respect a target’s
‘rights of defence’, which means
his/her/its right to know the case
against them and to have an
opportunity to comment on it.
4) The Council must not commit a
‘manifest error of assessment’ in
deciding whether the evidence is
sufficient to justify listing an
individual or company and whether
he/she/it falls within the listing
criteria relevant to the sanctions
regime in question (whether they
can be said to be ‘responsible for
violating the rule of law’ or for
‘misappropriating State funds’ or
‘providing support for nuclear
www.worldecr.com
proliferation’, for example). In more
recent cases, the Court has said that
the Council must check the
relevance and validity of the
evidence.
5) Restrictive measures must not be an
unjustified or disproportionate
restriction on an individual’s
fundamental rights, including the
right to respect for property and
reputation.
6) Applicants have the right to
‘effective
judicial
protection’.
Judicial review of sanctions
measures extends to the matters of
fact and law relied on by the
Council, and to the evidence and
information on which a listing
decision is based.
How have these principles
been applied?
Applying these principles, the Court
found in favour of the People’s
Mojehadin of Iran and Kadi, since
both were initially designated in
counter-terrorist sanctions measures
grounds on which it is alleged to have
facilitated purchases of goods for Iran’s
nuclear programme were sufficiently
specific. It also upheld the listing of and
its UK subsidiary Melli Bank Plc; the
Court approved the Council’s approach
of presuming that wholly owned
subsidiaries of designated Iranian
companies may be subject to pressure
to circumvent sanctions on their
parent, whereas in the case of less than
wholly owned subsidiaries, the Council
must perform a case-by-case analysis
of whether that is likely. The Court of
Justice (overturning the General
Court) upheld Nadiany Bamba’s
designation on the basis that the
Council had sufficiently explained how
she was ‘obstructing the process of
peace and reconciliation’ in the Ivory
Coast. The General Court has similarly
said that the reasons given for listing
other people on the EU’s Ivory Coast
sanctions are sufficiently specific
therefore recently rejected applications
by Simone Gbagbo and Marcel Gossio.
On the other hand, the Court
The Court has been criticised for
annulling some politically sensitive
designations and for second-guessing the
Council’s judgment as regards
discretionary matters of foreign policy.
without being given any reasons,
evidence, or opportunity for comment.
Both were subsequently re-listed, and
challenged
their
re-listings
in
subsequent
applications
for
annulment. PMOI eventually won its
case, and Kadi II is still pending before
the ECJ. In the meantime, both were
de-listed by the EU in any event, and
Mr Kadi by the UN too, following an
application to the UN Ombudsperson
of the Security Council’s 1267
Committee).
Since those early cases (ie since
2008), the Council always gives some
kind of reason for each designation in
the annex (sometimes, for example in
the Egyptian and Tunisian sanctions,
identical reasons for everyone on the
list). Some applicants have won and
some have lost their cases in
Luxembourg, depending principally on
the quality of the Council’s reasons.
The following are examples of cases
going each way.
The Court upheld the designation of
Bank Melli Iran, finding that the
2 WorldECR
annulled the designation of Pye Phyo
Tay Za on the Burmese European
sanctions list because the Council could
not apply a presumption that he was
‘associated with the regime’ of
Burma/Myanmar simply because he
was the son of a designated
businessman. More recently, the
General Court has annulled the
designations of a number of companies
and financial institutions included in
the EU’s sanctions against Iran, for
example HTTS Hanseatic Trade Trust
& Shipping, Fulmen, Manufacturing
Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co,
CF Sharp Shipping Agencies Pte Ltd,
Oil Turbo Compressor, Turbo
Compressor
Manufacturer,
Iran
Transfo, Qualitest FZE, Sina Bank,
Bank Mellat, and Bank Saderat.
In those cases, the Court has found
either that the reasons given were too
vague to justify the Council’s conclusion
that the entities were supporting Iran’s
proliferation programme (e.g. an
assertion that the entity is ‘involved in
procurement’ of prohibited goods, is a
‘front company’, or ‘acts in support of’
a company, with no explanation of how
or in what respects), or that the
allegations were factually incorrect (and
the Council had not checked the
position), or because the applicant has
refuted the Council’s reasons and
Council had not provided any evidence
to support its position (a ‘manifest error
of assessment’). Appeals to the Court of
Justice are pending against a number of
these judgments (including Fulmen,
Bank Mellat, and Bank Saderat).
Analysis
The Court has been criticised by some
(including in the U.S. government) for
annulling some politically sensitive
designations (Iranian banks in
particular) and for second-guessing the
Council’s judgment as regards
discretionary matters of foreign policy.
My view (perhaps shaped in part by
having acted for a number of applicants
in these cases) is that this criticism is
largely misplaced. The Court is
performing the vital role of upholding
the rule of law and due process in the
face of a designation process that is not
entirely transparent, and which has
far-reaching effects on the businesses,
reputations and lives of designated
individuals and entities. In its
sanctions
jurisprudence,
the
Luxembourg
court
protects
fundamental rights just as robustly as
the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg.
A number of interesting and
important issues are likely to arise in
the numerous applications and appeals
now pending before the European
courts, including the following:
1) The meaning of ‘effective judicial
review’ and the standard of review.
The Court will have to decide
whether to apply the same
principles and standard of review to
sanctions regimes with different
purposes
(counter-terrorist
sanctions, regime sanctions, nonproliferation sanctions), and to
sanctions that derive from the
United Nations or are imposed
‘autonomously’ by the European
Union. Advocate General Bot has
recently expressed the view in his
opinion in Kadi II that, at least as
regards
EU
sanctions
that
implement designations in United
Nations
Security
Council
resolutions, the Court of Justice
should apply a less intrusive review,
www.worldecr.com
and should steer clear of the ‘merits’
of a designation decision (as
opposed to its procedural fairness).
The Fourth Chamber of the General
Court (which has decided most of
the case of politically sensitive
sanctions against those alleged to
have misappropriated State funds in
Arab Spring countries (eg Tunisia
and Egypt) and against individuals
Remedies and procedural issues are the
subject of ongoing debate. Applications
for damages against the EU institutions
for wrongful listings are pending.
the Iran sanctions cases) has
recently expressed the view in the
Iran Transfo case that the Court
should apply the same intensity of
judicial review should apply
whether the sanctions are aimed at
changing the policy of a regime
(such as Iran) or at terrorist
conduct.
2) The Court will have to consider the
extent of the Council’s duty to
provide evidence and to verify its
relevance and accuracy. The Council
has said that some evidence it
receives from Member States and
from
non-EU
countries
is
confidential or national securitysensitive and cannot be disclosed. If
the Court were to diverge from its
current approach that a designation
may not be justified on the basis of
evidence that the Council will not
disclose, there may be significant
implications for rights of defence.
There will be issues about how the
Council assesses evidence (to what
standard, and from what sources) in
alleged to be responsible for
violating the rule of law in non-EU
countries (such as Zimbabwe).
3) There are pending challenges to the
scope of the Council’s competence
as regards its Common Foreign and
Security Policy. To what extent the
Council is permitted to designate
individuals who are not alleged to
be connected with the State (as it
has done in the case of Zimbabwe)
not alleged to be involved in nuclear
proliferation but simply connected
with the government of Iran, or
members of former regimes no
longer in power.
4) Remedies and procedural issues are
the subject of ongoing debate.
Applications for damages against
the EU institutions for wrongful
listings are pending; none have
succeeded so far. Where applicants
are de-listed by the Council before
the Court gives judgment on their
annulment applications, the Court’s
approach of finding that they have
no continuing interest in having
their designations annulled may
change (following an opinion by
Advocate
General
Bot
in
Abdulrahim). There are also a
number of pending judicial review
claims in the High Court in London,
which raise the issue of the extent to
which national courts may give
remedies for the role of Member
States in the EU sanctions process.
5) A final point concerns the less
‘targeted’ form of sanctions
increasingly imposed by the
Council, in particular as regards
Iran and Syria; general prohibitions
on certain types of trade or
transaction. It remains to be seen to
what extent those may be the
subject of challenge, or whether the
(ironic) result of the case law
summarised in this article is that
sanctions will become more, rather
than less, targeted, and if so
whether the Court will intervene.
Maya Lester is a barrister at
Brick Court Chambers. She has
appeared in the European courts
and in the United Kingdom in a
number of the cases referred to in
this article. You can follow her
blog on European sanctions law
at www.europeansanctions.com
(which she writes with Michael
O’Kane of Peters & Peters) for
updates on cases, comments and
amendments to sanctions
regimes.
This article is reprinted from the May 2013
issue of WorldECR, the journal of export
controls and compliance.
Visit www.worldecr.com for further details.
3 WorldECR
www.worldecr.com
Judicial Review of Sanctions Decisions (2013) Judicial Review of Sanctions Decisions:
“The Wrong Point in the Wrong Court with the Wrong Defendant”?
206
DOI: 10.5235/10854681.18.2.206
[2013] JR
Judicial Review of Sanctions Decisions:
“The Wrong Point in the Wrong Court with
the Wrong Defendant”?
Maya Lester
Brick Court Chambers
Brian Kennelly
Blackstone Chambers
Euro judicial review
1. Judicial review of decisions to include individuals and companies in the EU’s targeted
sanctions measures usually takes place in Luxembourg. The effect of being included in
these measures (Decisions and Regulations of the Council and Commission) is usually
a prohibition on holding assets or economic resources in the EU, and a travel ban, for
the individuals and companies listed in the annex to each measure.
2. The grounds for their inclusion depend on the particular common foreign and security
being “responsible for undermining the rule of law” in Zimbabwe or Burma, for example, or of “violent suppression of the people” in Syria, of “misappropriating State
funds” in Egypt and Tunisia, or of supporting Iran’s “nuclear proliferation programme”.
3. Natural and legal entities included in the annexes to these various European “restrictive measures” may apply to the General Court of the EU (formerly called the Court of
First Instance) to annul their inclusion, with an appeal to the CJEU. The European
Court’s approach to those cases, including the appropriate standard of judicial review,
is the subject of much debate in the case law (including in the ongoing Kadi saga1).
Domestic judicial review
4. The cases discussed in this article concern similarly complex questions about the appropriateness of judicial review of sanctions decisions, but in a domestic context, and
whether and to what extent the English courts will judicially review decisions taken by
process is to propose lists of people and companies to be included in EU sanctions lists,
which are discussed and voted on in the European Council. The United Kingdom has
ongoing duties to co-operate with the EU by keeping information on targets up to date
and accurate, and by requesting de-listings where appropriate.
5. The English courts are currently working out how far parties can judicially review decisions in this context. Applicants that have brought actions for annulment in the European
Courts are increasingly bringing domestic judicial review claims also. There may be a
1
See, e.g. Kadi v Council of the European Union [2009] 1 AC 1225; Kadi v European Commission
[2013] JR
Judicial Review of Sanctions Decisions
number of reasons why this is so. One is that the Luxembourg Court can take years to
reach a judgment, does not tend to grant either interim measures or damages in sanctions cases, and has not recognised that individuals have a continuing interest in establishing that their inclusion was unlawful once they have been de-listed. Another reason
may be that the English courts can give different remedies; orders requiring the FCO to
make representations to the European Council, data protection remedies, and so on.
6. The ability to bring judicial review claims is not controversial in the case of decisions
by the Secretary of State to nominate alleged terrorists for inclusion in lists held by the
UN Security Council 1267 Committee, because those lists are drawn up by national
governments, and the Secretary of State’s decisions are therefore susceptible to review
issues are government decisions relating to the various “autonomous” sanctions
State.
Initial unsuccessful cases
7.
R (Melli Bank Plc) v Her Majesty’s Treasury,
Divisional Court for an interim injunction to prevent sanctions against it from being
enforced in the United Kingdom, pending its application for interim measures being
reputational terms by having been added to the EU’s Iran sanctions on the sole basis
8. The Divisional Court held that in principle a national court has jurisdiction to grant
interim relief in order to protect a claimant’s European law rights (Joined Cases
C-143/88 and 92/89 Zuckerfabrik
because the court had no serious doubts about the validity of the EU measure listing
ties), the Bank accepted that any decision on the legality of the UK measure depended
upon the European Court ruling on the validity of the EU regulation, and the European
Court was about to rule on interim measures in any event. The court said that it would
sanctions, it had not heard from the European Council, and the Bank would not suffer
serious and irreparable harm if the domestic court did not grant interim relief before
the European Court would consider whether to do so. The court held that the Bank had
taken “the wrong point in the wrong court with the wrong defendant” (para. 82).
9. The second attempted judicial review was also unsuccessful. In R (El-Maghraby and El
the claimants argued that the UK regulations implementing the EU’s Egyptian sanctions regime were ultra vires
Rights Act 1998.
10. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the claimants’ real attack was on
the EU measures not their domestic implementation and there was an alternative
207
208
[2013] JR
(indeed, a primary) remedy, in Luxembourg, where the claimants were challenging the
EU regulation. The domestic courts could not infringe the principle in Case 314/85
Firma Foto-Frost v HauptzollamtLubeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199 that only the European
Courts can declare a European law to be invalid, and the court rejected the ultra vires
argument on the basis that the European Communities Act simply requires the United
Kingdom to give effect to EU law, which it has done; again, the real attack was on the
EU measure.
11. The court in El-Maghraby and El Gazaerly did, however, hear a judicial review of the
Secretary of State’s interpretation of funds for “basic needs” in the licensing regime (no
Foto-Frost
the Government was correct not to have regard to the applicant’s previous lifestyle.
Recent successes and pending cases
12. There are signs that claimants may have more success in recent attempts to ask the
judicial review courts to review (a) unlawful listing proposals and (b) refusals by the
FCO to request de-listings, although there are no substantive judgments yet.
13. Judicial review of unlawful listing proposal and refusals to request de-listing have
R (Bredenkamp) v
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
on the basis of a listing proposal by the UK underpinned by evidence described as
“thin” in a cable disclosed by Wikileaks. The court held a preliminary issue on whether
the Foto-Frost principle (summarised above) precluded the challenge.
14. Ouseley J held that the Foto-Frost principle is a narrow one (paras 43–45). It does not
prevent a national court from holding that an EU act is valid, or from ruling on domestic unlawfulness which also criticises EU processes or acts, nor is it an assertion by the
European Courts of exclusive “competence” in areas which concern the EU legal order.
authorities did en route to the enactment of Community decisions . . . Unless a ruling
that a Community act is invalid is the inevitable precursor to success for the Claimant,
the claim should continue”. The court held that it is not inevitable that the
Administrative Court would have to rule on the validity of an EU act in deciding on
the legality of the listing proposal or a decision to refuse to make a de-listing request.
15. Whereas the court in El-Maghraby described a refusal to request a de-listing as being “a
matter of the UK’s foreign policy and thus wholly unsuitable for judicial review”
(para. 21), Ouseley J in Bredenkamp described the refusal to request delisting as “a clear
of invalidity by the Luxembourg Court (para. 53). The case is listed for a hearing on
public interest immunity issues in June 2013, with a substantive hearing to be listed
after that.
16. Support for the reviewability of decisions not to make a delisting petition can be found
in Sayadi and Vinck
2008). The Belgian domestic court had ordered the Belgian Government to request that
the applicants be delisted, but it did not do so. The Committee found violations of Arts
[2013] JR
free movement, honour and reputation): “The State party has the duty to do all it can to
have their names removed from the list as soon as possible, to provide the authors with
some form of compensation and to make public the requests for removal” (para. 12).
17. There have been a handful of judicial reviews along Bredenkamp lines challenging FCO
listing proposals and/or refusals to delist. R (Azizi and Sedghi) v Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and R (Meskarian and Zavvar) v Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs settled in late 2012 after permission was granted by
the Administrative Court and the claimants were de-listed by the EU.
18. In both cases, the claimants had been included in the Iranian sanctions list on the sole
basis of their occupation in a bank that had not been accused of any wrongdoing (and
neither had the claimants). The claimants argued that in those circumstances, having
got the claimants into this situation by proposing that they be listed (in the Azizi/Sedghi
case, on the basis of a serious mistake of fact), the Government had a duty to assist
them in righting the wrong by requesting their de-listing (by analogy with R (Abbasi) v
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598 [2003]
19. R (Europäisch-IranischeHandelsbank) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs
FCO’s decision to propose that the European Council add it to EU Iranian sanctions.
The FCO initially argued that Foto-Frost precluded the challenge, but permission for
judicial review was granted in February 2013 following the Bredenkamp judgment on
that preliminary issue summarised above.
20.
Ayadi is challenging the implementation of the UN Al-Qaida sanction regime in
principles of natural justice, the presumption of innocence, his right to respect for his
reputation and his property rights, and is seeking damages.
21. An unresolved issue for both Luxembourg and domestic judicial review proceedings
(and for claimants and the Government) is the position of individuals and companies
who have been de-listed from EU sanctions lists. Financial and other institutions frequently continue to treat them as if they were still sanctioned (for example, their bank
accounts are automatically closed). This has been recognised as a problem by the
Government, by de-listed individuals, and by the Independent Review of Terrorist
Legislation (Second Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010,
paras 5.2–5.10). As noted above, the status of ongoing actions for annulment where the
applicant is de-listed during the procedure is an unresolved issue in the Luxembourg
case law (see, e.g. the Advocate General’s recent opinion in Case T-239/12 Abdulrahim
v Council).
Freedom of information
22. Finally, an interesting freedom of information issue. The Egyptian Government
209
210
[2013] JR
with information to assist Egypt to trace and repatriate assets that it considers have
been misappropriated from the state: R (Arab Republic of Egypt) v HM Treasury
(CO/2592/2012). At least one of the individuals targeted by the Egyptian sanctions
has been given permission to intervene.
23. Egypt asked the United Kingdom for information about funds frozen in the United
Kingdom by operation of the European sanctions against Egypt. Article 9(1) of Regulation
No. 270/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities
and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt, imposes an obligation on all “natural and
legal persons, entities and bodies” in the EU to supply to their national authorities “any
information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as accounts
and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2(1)”. Article 9(2) provides that such
information may be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received,
and on that basis the United Kingdom refused to supply Egypt with the information.
24. Before the hearing, the Regulation was amended with a new Art. 9(3) in November
information, in accordance with their national law, with the relevant authorities of
recovery of misappropriated assets”. That amendment may not provide a complete
95/46/EC.
25.
Regulation is that no personal information may be supplied to a third country unless
protection to data subjects. By way of derogation, personal data may be supplied to
third countries which do not provide adequate protection in certain limited circumstances, including where such disclosure is required “on important public interest
grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims” (Art. 26(1)(d)
and Art. 9(6)(d) respectively). As derogations from important EU law rights,
Regulation (to the extent relevant) must be strictly construed. The case remains pending.
Conclusion
26. The case law on judicial review of sanctions decisions is developing. Since Ouseley J’s
judgment in Bredenkamp, it is no longer possible to dismiss domestic judicial review in
this context as necessarily involving “the wrong point in the wrong court with the
wrong defendant”.
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive
measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine
31.7.2014
Official Journal of the European Union
EN
L 229/1
II
(Non-legislative acts)
REGULATIONS
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 833/2014
of 31 July 2014
concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 215 thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabi
lising the situation in Ukraine (1),
Having regard to the joint proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and
of the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1)
Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (2) gives effect to certain measures provided for in Decision
2014/145/CFSP (3). Those measures comprise the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain natural
and legal persons, entities and bodies and restrictions on certain investments, as a response to the illegal annexa
tion of Crimea and Sevastopol.
(2)
On 22 July 2014, the Council concluded that should Russia fail to respond to the demands formulated in the
European Council conclusions of 27 June 2014 and in its own conclusions of 22 July, it would be ready to intro
duce without delay a package of further significant restrictive measures. It is therefore considered appropriate to
apply additional restrictive measures with a view to increasing the costs of Russia's actions to undermine Ukrai
ne's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and to promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis. These
measures will be kept under review and may be suspended or withdrawn, or be supplemented by other restrictive
measures, in light of developments on the ground.
(3)
It is appropriate to apply restrictions on exports of certain dual-use goods and technology, as laid down in
Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 (4), and on the provision of related services and to apply restrictions on
certain services related to the supply of arms and military equipment, if an embargo on such goods is applied by
the Member States. This prohibition should not affect the exports of dual-use goods and technology, including
for aeronautics and for the space industry, for non-military use or for a non-military end-user.
(4)
It is also appropriate to apply restrictions on the sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of certain
technologies for the oil industry in Russia in the form of a prior authorisation requirement.
(5)
It is also appropriate to apply restrictions on access to the capital market for certain financial institutions,
excluding Russia-based institutions with international status established by intergovernmental agreements with
Russia as one of the shareholders. Other financial services such as deposit business, payment services and loans
to or from the institutions covered by this Regulation, other than those referred to in Article 5, are not covered
by this Regulation.
(1) See page 13 of this Official Journal.
(2) OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 6.
(3) Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening
the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16).
(4) Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and
transit of dual-use items (OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1).
L 229/2
EN
31.7.2014
(6)
These measures fall within the scope of the Treaty and, therefore, in particular with a view to ensuring their
uniform application in all Member States, regulatory action at the level of the Union is necessary.
(7)
In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, it should enter into force imme
diately,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
(a) ‘dual-use goods and technology’ means the items listed in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 428/2009;
(b) ‘competent authorities’ means the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in
Annex I;
(c) ‘technical assistance’ means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing,
maintenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission
of working knowledge or skills or consulting services; including verbal forms of assistance;
(d) ‘brokering services’ means:
(i) the negotiation or arrangement of transactions for the purchase, sale or supply of goods and technology or of
financial and technical services, including from a third country to any other third country, or
(ii) the selling or buying of goods and technology or of financial and technical services, including where they are
located in third countries for their transfer to another third country;
(e) ‘brokering’ means the following services and activities:
(i)
reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments,
(ii)
execution of orders on behalf of clients,
(iii) dealing on own account,
(iv)
portfolio management,
(v)
investment advice,
(vi)
underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis,
(vii) placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis,
(viii) any service in relation to the admission to trading on a regulated market or trading on a multilateral trading
facility;
(f) ‘transferable securities’ means those classes of securities which are negotiable on the capital market, with the excep
tion of instruments of payment, such as:
(i)
shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies, partnerships or other entities, and
depositary receipts in respect of shares,
(ii) bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including depositary receipts in respect of such securities,
(iii) any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities or giving rise to a cash
settlement;
(g) ‘money-market instruments’ means those classes of instruments which are normally dealt in on the money market,
such as treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers and excluding instruments of payment;
31.7.2014
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L 229/3
(h) ‘credit institution’ means an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the
public and to grant credit for its own account;
(i) ‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the condi
tions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.
Article 2
1.
It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology,
whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if
those items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for military use or for a military end-user.
Where the end-user is the Russian military, any dual-use goods and technology procured by it shall be deemed to be for
military use.
2.
When deciding on requests for authorisations in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, the
competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation for exports to any natural or legal person, entity or body in
Russia or for use in Russia, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the end-user might be a military end-user or
that the goods might have a military end-use.
The competent authorities may, however, grant an authorisation where the export concerns the execution of an obliga
tion arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014.
Exporters shall supply the competent authorities with all relevant information required for their application for an
export authorisation.
Article 3
1.
A prior authorisation shall be required for the sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of technologies
as listed in Annex II, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or
in any other country, if such equipment or technology is for use in Russia.
2.
For all sales, supplies, transfers or exports for which an authorisation is required under this Article, such authorisa
tion shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State where the exporter is established and shall be in
accordance with the detailed rules laid down in Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. The authorisation shall be
valid throughout the Union.
3.
Annex II shall include certain technologies suited to the oil industry for use in deep water oil exploration and
production, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia.
4.
Exporters shall supply the competent authorities with all relevant information required for their application for an
export authorisation.
5.
The competent authorities shall not grant any authorisation for any sale, supply, transfer or export of the technolo
gies included in Annex II, if they have reasonable grounds to determine that the sale, supply, transfer or export of the
technologies is for projects pertaining to deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration and produc
tion, or shale oil projects in Russia.
The competent authorities may, however, grant an authorisation where the export concerns the execution of an obliga
tion arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014.
6.
Under the conditions set out in paragraph 5, the competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an
export authorisation which they have granted.
7.
Where a competent authority refuses to grant an authorisation, or annuls, suspends, substantially limits or revokes
an authorisation in accordance with paragraphs 5 or 6, the Member State concerned shall notify the other Member
States and the Commission thereof and share the relevant information with them, while complying with the provisions
concerning the confidentiality of such information in Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 (1).
(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States
and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters
(OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, p. 1).
L 229/4
EN
31.7.2014
8.
Before a Member State grants an authorisation in accordance with paragraph 5 for a transaction which is essen
tially identical to a transaction which is the subject of a still valid denial issued by another Member State or by other
Member States under paragraphs 6 and 7, it shall first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial. If,
following such consultations, the Member State concerned decides to grant an authorisation, it shall inform the other
Member States and the Commission thereof, providing all relevant information to explain the decision.
Article 4
1.
It shall be prohibited:
(a) to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Mili
tary List (1), or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods included in that list, to any
natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia;
(b) to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the
Common Military List, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance or guarantee, for any sale,
supply, transfer or export of such items, or for any provision of related technical assistance to any natural or legal
person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia;
(c) to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to dual-use goods and technology,
or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of such goods or technology, to any natural or legal
person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if the items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part,
for military use or for a military end-user;
(d) to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the dual-use goods and technology,
including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such
items, or for any provision of related technical assistance to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or
for use in Russia, if the items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for military use or for a military
end-user.
2.
The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution of an obligation arising from a
contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014, and to the provision of assistance necessary to the mainten
ance and safety of existing capabilities within the EU.
3.
The provision of the following shall be subject to an authorisation from the competent authority concerned:
(a) technical assistance or brokering services related to technologies listed in Annex II and to the provision, manufacture,
maintenance and use of those items, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or,
if such assistance concerns technologies for use in Russia, to any person, entity or body in any other country;
(b) financing or financial assistance related to technologies referred to in Annex II, including in particular grants, loans
and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those items, or for any provision of related
technical assistance, directly or indirectly, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or, if such assist
ance concerns technologies for use in Russia, to any person, entity or body in any other country.
4.
Where authorisations are requested pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, Article 3, and in particular para
graphs 2 and 5 thereof, shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Article 5
It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide brokering or assistance in the issuance of, or other
wise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after
1 August 2014 by:
(a) a major credit institution or other major institution having an explicit mandate to promote competitiveness of the
Russian economy, its diversification and encouragement of investment, established in Russia with over 50 % public
ownership or control as of 1 August 2014, as listed in Annex III; or
(b) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50 %
by an entity listed in Annex III; or
(c) a legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (b) of this para
graph or listed in Annex III.
(1) Latest version published in OJ C 107, 9.4.2014, p. 1.
31.7.2014
EN
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Article 6
1.
The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and
share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information:
(a) in respect of authorisations granted under Article 3;
(b) in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.
2.
The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at
their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.
Article 7
The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annex I on the basis of information supplied by Member States.
Article 8
1.
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regu
lation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2.
Member States shall notify the rules referred to in paragraph 1 to the Commission without delay after the entry
into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.
Article 9
1.
Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in this Regulation and identify them on the
websites listed in Annex I. Member States shall notify the Commission of any changes in the addresses of their websites
listed in Annex I.
2.
Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities, including the contact details of those
competent authorities, without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation, and shall notify it of any subsequent
amendment.
3.
Where this Regulation sets out a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission,
the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex I.
Article 10
Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to liability of any kind on their part, if they did
not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regu
lation.
Article 11
1.
No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or
indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any
other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension
or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever
form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:
(a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III;
(b) any other Russian person, entity or body;
(c) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in
points (a) or (b) of this paragraph.
L 229/6
EN
31.7.2014
2.
In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited
by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3.
This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judi
cial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.
Article 12
It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circum
vent the prohibitions referred to in Articles 2, 4 and 5, including by acting as a substitute for the entities referred to in
Article 5.
Article 13
This Regulation shall apply:
(a) within the territory of the Union;
(b) on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;
(c) to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;
(d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted
under the law of a Member State;
(e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.
Article 14
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European
Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 31 July 2014.
For the Council
The President
S. GOZI
31.7.2014
EN
ANNEX I
Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notification to the European
Commission
1. Information on competent authorities of the Member States
BELGIUM
http://www.diplomatie.be/eusanctions
BULGARIA
http://www.mfa.bg/en/pages/135/index.html
CZECH REPUBLIC
http://www.mfcr.cz/mezinarodnisankce
DENMARK
http://um.dk/da/politik-og-diplomati/retsorden/sanktioner/
GERMANY
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Aussenwirtschaft/aussenwirtschaftsrecht,did=404888.html
ESTONIA
http://vm.ee/et/estonian-competent-authorities-implementation-eu-restrictive-measures
IRELAND
http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=28519
GREECE
http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html
SPAIN
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/GlobalizacionOportunidadesRiesgos/Documents/
ORGANISMOS%20COMPETENTES%20SANCIONES%20INTERNACIONALES.pdf
FRANCE
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/autorites-sanctions/
CROATIA
http://www.mvep.hr/sankcije
ITALY
http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Politica_Europea/Deroghe.htm
CYPRUS
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/sanctions
LATVIA
http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539
LITHUANIA
http://www.urm.lt/sanctions
LUXEMBOURG
http://www.mae.lu/sanctions
L 229/7
L 229/8
EN
31.7.2014
HUNGARY
http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/b/3b/70000/ENSZBT-ET-szankcios-tajekoztato.pdf
MALTA
https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Government%20of%20Malta/Ministries%20and%20Entities/Officially%
20Appointed%20Bodies/Pages/Boards/Sanctions-Monitoring-Board-.aspx
NETHERLANDS
www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-vrede-en-veiligheid/sancties
AUSTRIA
http://www.bmeia.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=12750&LNG=en&version=
POLAND
http://www.msz.gov.pl
PORTUGAL
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/os-ministerios/ministerio-dos-negocios-estrangeiros/quero-saber-mais/sobre-oministerio/medidas-restritivas/medidas-restritivas.aspx
ROMANIA
http://www.mae.ro/node/1548
SLOVENIA
http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/zunanja_politika_in_mednarodno_pravo/zunanja_politika/mednarodna_varnost/omejevalni_
ukrepi/
SLOVAKIA
http://www.mzv.sk/sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu
FINLAND
http://formin.finland.fi/kvyhteistyo/pakotteet
SWEDEN
http://www.ud.se/sanktioner
UNITED KINGDOM
https://www.gov.uk/sanctions-embargoes-and-restrictions
2. Address for notifications to the European Commission:
European Commission
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)
EEAS 02/309
B-1049 Brussels
Belgium
E-mail: [email protected]
31.7.2014
EN
L 229/9
ANNEX II
List of technologies referred to in Article 3
CN code
Description
7304 11 00
Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of stainless steel
7304 19 10
Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter
not exceeding 168,3 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 19 30
exceeding 168,3 mm but not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 19 90
exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 22 00
Drill pipe, seamless, of stainless steel, of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas
7304 23 00
Drill pipe, seamless, of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, of iron or steel (excl. products of stain
less steel or of cast iron)
7304 29 10
Casing and tubing of a kind used for drilling for oil or gas, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external
diameter not exceeding 168,3 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7304 29 30
diameter exceeding 168,3 mm, but not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7304 29 90
diameter exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7305 11 00
Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having circular cross-sections and an external
diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of iron or steel, longitudinally submerged arc welded
7305 12 00
diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of iron or steel, longitudinally arc welded (excl. products longi
tudinally submerged arc welded)
7305 19 00
diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel (excl. products longitudin
ally arc welded)
7305 20 00
Casing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, having circular cross-sections and an external
diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel
7306 11
Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, welded, of flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of
an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm
7306 19
Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, welded, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel, of
an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7306 21 00
Casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, welded, of flat-rolled products of stain
less steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm
L 229/10
EN
CN code
31.7.2014
Description
7306 29 00
Casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, welded, of flat-rolled products of iron or
steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast
iron)
8207 13 00
Rock-drilling or earth-boring tools, interchangeable, with working parts of sintered metal carbides
or cermets
8207 19 10
Rock-drilling or earth-boring tools, interchangeable, with working parts of diamond or agglomer
ated diamond
8413 50
Reciprocating positive displacement pumps for liquids, power-driven (excl. those of subheading
8413 11 and 8413 19, fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston
engine and concrete pumps)
8413 60
Rotary positive displacement pumps for liquids, power-driven (excl. those of subheading 8413 11
and 8413 19 and fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston
engine)
8413 82 00
Liquid elevators (excl. pumps)
8413 92 00
Parts of liquid elevators, n.e.s.
8430 49 00
Boring or sinking machinery for boring earth or extracting minerals or ores, not self-propelled and
not hydraulic (excl. tunnelling machinery and hand-operated tools)
ex 8431 39 00
Parts of machinery of heading 8428, n.e.s.
ex 8431 43 00
parts for boring or sinking machinery of subheading 8430 41 or 8430 49, n.e.s.
ex 8431 49
Parts of machinery of heading 8426, 8429 and 8430, n.e.s.
8705 20 00
Mobile drilling derricks
8905 20 00
Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms
8905 90 10
Sea-going light vessels, fire-floats, floating cranes and other vessels, the navigability of which is
subsidiary to their main function (excl. dredgers, floating or submersible drilling or production
platforms; fishing vessels and warships)
31.7.2014
EN
ANNEX III
List of institutions referred to in Article 5(a)
1. SBERBANK
2. VTB BANK
3. GAZPROMBANK
4. VNESHECONOMBANK (VEB)
5. ROSSELKHOZBANK
L 229/11
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive
measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity,
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine
L 78/6
EN
17.3.2014
REGULATIONS
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 269/2014
of 17 March 2014
concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine
lateral mechanisms, and that in the absence of results
within a limited timeframe the Union will decide on
additional measures, such as travel bans, asset freezes
and the cancellation of the EU-Russia summit.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, and in particular Article 215 thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March
2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions
undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence of Ukraine (1),
(4)
On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted Decision
2014/145/CFSP providing for travel restrictions and for
the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain
persons responsible for actions which undermine or
threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and inde
pendence of Ukraine, including actions on the future
status of any part of the territory which are contrary
to the Ukrainian Constitution, and natural or legal
persons, entities or bodies associated with them. Those
natural or legal persons, entities and bodies are listed in
the Annex to that Decision.
(5)
Some of those measures fall within the scope of the
Treaty and, therefore, in particular with a view to
ensuring their uniform application in all Member
States, regulatory action at the level of the Union is
necessary in order to implement them.
(6)
This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and
observes the principles recognised in particular by the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
and in particular the right to an effective remedy and to a
fair trial and the right to the protection of personal data.
This Regulation should be applied in accordance with
those rights and principles.
(7)
The power to amend the list in Annex I to this Regu
lation should be exercised by the Council, in view of the
serious political situation in Ukraine, and to ensure
consistency with the process for amending and
reviewing the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP.
(8)
The procedure for amending the list in Annex I to this
Regulation should include providing designated natural
or legal persons, entities or bodies with the grounds
for listing, so as to give them an opportunity to
submit observations. Where observations are submitted,
or substantial new evidence is presented, the Council
should review its decision in light of those observations
and inform the person, entity or body concerned accord
ingly.
Having regard to the joint proposal of the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the
European Commission,
Whereas:
(1)
(2)
(3)
On 6 March 2014, the Heads of State or Government of
the Union's Member States strongly condemned the
unprovoked violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and terri
torial integrity by the Russian Federation and called on
the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its
armed forces to the areas of their permanent stationing,
in accordance with the relevant agreements. They called
on the Russian Federation to enable immediate access for
international monitors. The Heads of State or
Government considered that the decision by the
Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea to hold a referendum on the future status of
the territory is contrary to the Ukrainian Constitution
and therefore illegal.
The Heads of State or Government decided to take
actions, including those envisaged by the Council on
3 March 2014, notably to suspend bilateral talks with
the Russian Federation on visa matters as well as talks
with the Russian Federation on a comprehensive new
Agreement which would replace the existing Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement.
The Heads of State or Government underlined that the
solution to the crisis should be found through negoti
ations between the Governments of Ukraine and of the
Russian Federation, including through potential multi
(1) See page 16 of the Official Journal.
17.3.2014
(9)
(10)
EN
For the implementation of this Regulation, and in order
to create maximum legal certainty within the Union, the
names and other relevant data concerning natural and
legal persons, entities and bodies whose funds and
economic resources should be frozen in accordance
with this Regulation, are to be made public. Any
processing of personal data should comply with Regu
lation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and
of the Council (1) and Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council (2).
In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this
Regulation are effective, it should enter into force
immediately,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions
apply:
(a) 'claim' means any claim, whether asserted by legal
proceedings or not, made before or after 17 March 2014,
under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and
includes in particular:
(i) a claim for performance of any obligation arising under
or in connection with a contract or transaction;
(ii) a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial
guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;
(iii) a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or
transaction;
(iv) a counterclaim;
(v) a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including
by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an
arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever
made or given;
(b) 'contract or transaction' means any transaction of whatever
form, whatever the applicable law, and whether comprising
one or more contracts or similar obligations made between
the same or different parties; for this purpose 'contract'
includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a
financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit,
whether legally independent or not, as well as any related
provision arising under, or in connection with, the trans
action;
(c) 'competent authorities' means the competent authorities of
the Member States as identified on the websites listed in
Annex II;
(1) Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data by the Community insti
tutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8,
12.1.2001, p. 1).
(2) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31).
L 78/7
(d) 'economic resources' means assets of every kind, whether
tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are
not funds but may be used to obtain funds, goods or
services;
(e) 'freezing of economic resources' means preventing the use
of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in
any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or
mortgaging them;
(f) 'freezing of funds' means preventing any move, transfer,
alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any
way that would result in any change in their volume,
amount, location, ownership, possession, character, desti
nation or any other change that would enable the funds
to be used, including portfolio management;
(g) 'funds' means financial assets and benefits of every kind,
including, but not limited to:
(i) cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders
and other payment instruments;
(ii) deposits with financial institutions or other entities,
balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
(iii) publicly- and privately-traded securities and debt
instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates
representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants,
debentures and derivatives contracts;
(iv) interest, dividends or other income on or value
accruing from or generated by assets;
(v) credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds
or other financial commitments;
(vi) letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale; and
(vii) documents showing evidence of an interest in funds or
financial resources;
(h) 'territory of the Union' means the territories of the Member
States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the
conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.
Article 2
1.
All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned,
held or controlled by any natural persons or natural or legal
persons, entities or bodies associated with them as listed in
Annex I shall be frozen.
L 78/8
EN
2.
No funds or economic resources shall be made available,
directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural persons or
natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them
listed in Annex I.
17.3.2014
2.
The Member State concerned shall inform the other
Member States and the Commission of any authorisation
granted under paragraph 1.
Article 5
Article 3
1.
Annex I shall include natural persons who, in accordance
with Article 2 of Decision 2014/145/CFSP, have been identified
by the Council as being responsible for actions which
undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence of Ukraine, and natural or legal persons, entities
or bodies associated with them.
2.
Annex I shall include the grounds for the listing of natural
or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned.
3.
Annex I shall include, where available, information
necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or
bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such
information may include names including aliases, date and
place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers,
gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With
regard to legal persons, entities and bodies, such information
may include names, place and date of registration, registration
number and place of business.
Article 4
1.
By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent auth
orities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain
frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of
certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as
they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds
or economic resources concerned are:
(a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural or legal
persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, and
dependent family members of such natural persons,
including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage,
medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance
premiums, and public utility charges;
(b) intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional
fees or reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with
the provision of legal services;
1.
By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent auth
orities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain
frozen funds or economic resources, if the following conditions
are met:
(a) the funds or economic resources are subject to an arbitral
decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or
legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was
included in Annex I, or of a judicial or administrative
decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision
enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or
after that date;
(b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to
satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as
valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable
laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having
such claims;
(c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal
person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and
(d) recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy
in the Member State concerned.
2.
Article 6
1.
By way of derogation from Article 2 and provided that a
payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in
Annex I is due under a contract or agreement that was
concluded by, or under an obligation that arose for the
natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, before the
date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was
included in Annex I, the competent authorities of the Member
States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem
appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic
resources, provided that the competent authority concerned
has determined that:
(c) intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges
for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or
economic resources; or
(a) the funds or economic resources shall be used for a
payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body
listed in Annex I; and
(d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the
relevant competent authority has notified the grounds on
which it considers that a specific authorisation should be
granted to the competent authorities of the other Member
States and to the Commission at least two weeks prior to
authorisation.
(b) the payment is not in breach of Article 2(2).
2.
17.3.2014
EN
Article 7
1.
Article 2(2) shall not prevent the crediting of the frozen
accounts by financial or credit institutions that receive funds
transferred by third parties onto the account of a listed
natural or legal person, entity or body, provided that any
additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial
or credit institution shall inform the relevant competent
authority about any such transaction without delay.
2.
Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen
accounts of:
(a) interest or other earnings on those accounts;
(b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations
that were concluded or arose before the date on which
the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in
Article 2 has been included in Annex I; or
(c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral
decisions rendered in a Member State or enforceable in
the Member State concerned;
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments
are frozen in accordance with Article 2(1).
Article 8
1.
Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning
reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and
legal persons, entities and bodies shall:
(a) supply immediately any information which would facilitate
compliance with this Regulation, such as information on
accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2,
to the competent authority of the Member State where they
are resident or located, and shall transmit such information,
directly or through the Member State, to the Commission;
and
(b) cooperate with the competent authority in any verification
of such information.
2.
Any additional information received directly by the
Commission shall be made available to the Member States.
3.
Any information provided or received in accordance with
this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was
provided or received.
Article 9
It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and inten
tionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to
circumvent the measures referred to in Article 2.
Article 10
1.
The freezing of funds and economic resources or the
refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried
out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance
with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind
L 78/9
on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body
implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is
proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen or
withheld as a result of negligence.
2.
Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall
not give rise to any liability of any kind on their part if they did
not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their
actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.
Article 11
1.
No claims in connection with any contract or transaction
the performance of which has been affected, directly or indi
rectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this
Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim
of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under
a guarantee, particularly a claim for extension or payment of a
bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee
or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if
they are made by:
(a) designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed
in Annex I;
(b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through
or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies
referred to in point (a).
2.
In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the
onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by
paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, entity or
body seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3.
This Article is without prejudice to the right of natural or
legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to
judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of
contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.
Article 12
1.
The Commission and the Member States shall inform each
other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share
any other relevant information at their disposal in connection
with this Regulation, in particular information:
(a) in respect of funds frozen under Article 2 and authori
sations granted under Articles 4, 5 and 6;
(b) in respect of violation and enforcement problems and
judgments handed down by national courts.
2.
The Member States shall immediately inform each other
and the Commission of any other relevant information at their
disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this
Regulation.
Article 13
The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annex II on
the basis of information supplied by Member States.
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EN
Article 14
1.
Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal
person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2,
it shall amend Annex I accordingly.
2.
The Council shall communicate its decision, including the
grounds for listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body
referred to in paragraph 1, either directly, if the address is
known, or through the publication of a notice, providing
such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity
to present observations.
3.
Where observations are submitted, or where substantial
new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its
decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or
body accordingly.
4.
The list in Annex I shall be reviewed at regular intervals
and at least every 12 months.
Article 15
1.
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties
applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation
and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are
implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive.
2.
Member States shall notify the rules referred to in
paragraph 1 to the Commission without delay after the entry
into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any
subsequent amendment.
17.3.2014
listed in Annex II. Member States shall notify the Commission
of any changes in the addresses of their websites listed in Annex
II.
2.
Member States shall notify the Commission of their
competent authorities, including the contact details of those
competent authorities, without delay after the entry into force
of this Regulation, and shall notify it of any subsequent
amendment.
3.
Where this Regulation sets out a requirement to notify,
inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the
address and other contact details to be used for such communi
cation shall be those indicated in Annex II.
Article 17
This Regulation shall apply:
(a) within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;
(b) on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of
a Member State;
(c) to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union
who is a national of a Member State;
(d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the
territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted
under the law of a Member State;
(e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any
business done in whole or in part within the Union.
Article 16
Article 18
1.
Member States shall designate the competent authorities
referred to in this Regulation and identify them on the websites
This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 17 March 2014.
For the Council
The President
C. ASHTON
EN
17.3.2014
L 78/11
ANNEX I
List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2
Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
1.
Sergey Valeryevich
Aksyonov
d.o.b. 26.11.1972
Aksyonov was elected “Prime Minister of Crimea” in
the Crimean Verkhovna Rada on 27 February 2014
in the presence of pro-Russian gunmen. His
“election” was decreed unconstitutional by
Oleksandr Turchynov on 1 March. He actively
lobbied for the “referendum” of 16 March 2014.
17.3.2014
2.
Vladimir
Andreevich
Konstantinov
d.o.b. 19.03.1967
As speaker of the Supreme Council of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Konstantinov
played a relevant role in the decisions taken by
the Verkhovna Rada concerning the “referendum”
against territorial integrity of Ukraine and called
on voters to cast votes in favour of Crimean Inde
pendence.
17.3.2014
3.
Rustam Ilmirovich
Temirgaliev
d.o.b. 15.08.1976
As Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
Crimea, Temirgaliev played a relevant role in the
decisions taken by the Verkhovna Rada concerning
the “referendum” against territorial integrity of
Ukraine. He lobbied actively for integration of
Crimea into the Russian Federation.
17.3.2014
4.
Deniz
Valentinovich
Berezovskiy
d.o.b. 15.07.1974
Berezovskiy was appointed commander of the
Ukrainian Navy on 1 March 2014 and swore an
oath to the Crimean armed force, thereby breaking
his oath. The Prosecutor-General’s Office of Ukraine
launched an investigation against him for high
treason.
17.3.2014
5.
Aleksei
Mikhailovich
Chaliy
d.o.b. 13.06.1961
Chaliy became “Mayor of Sevastopol” by popular
acclamation on 23 February 2014 and accepted
this “vote”. He actively campaigned for Sevastopol
to become a separate entity of the Russian
Federation following a referendum on 16 March
2014.
17.3.2014
6.
Pyotr
Anatoliyovych
Zima
Zima was appointed as the new head of the
Crimean Security Service (SBU) on 3 March 2014
by “Prime Minister” Aksyonov and accepted this
appointment. He has given relevant information
including a database to the Russian Intelligence
Service (SBU). This included information on EuroMaidan activists and human rights defenders of
Crimea. He played a relevant role in preventing
Ukraine’s authorities from controlling the territory
of Crimea.
17.3.2014
On 11 March 2014 the formation of an inde
pendent Security Service of Crimea has been
proclaimed by former SBU officers of Crimea.
7.
Yuriy Zherebtsov
Counsellor of the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of
Crimea, one of the leading organizers of the
16 March 2014 “referendum” against Ukraine’s terri
torial integrity.
17.3.2014
EN
L 78/12
Name
17.3.2014
Reasons
Date of listing
8.
Sergey Pavlovych
Tsekov
d.o.b. 28.03.1953
Vice Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada; Tsekov
initiated together with Sergey Aksyonov the
unlawful dismissal of the government of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). He drew
into this endeavour Vladimir Konstantinov,
threatening him with his dismissal. He publicly
recognized that the MPs from Crimea were the
initiators of inviting Russian soldiers to take over
Verkhovna Rada of Crimea. He was one of the
first Crimean Leaders to ask in public for annexation
of Crimea to Russia.
17.3.2014
9.
Ozerov, Viktor
Alekseevich
d.o.b. 5.1.1958 in
Abakan, Khakassia
Chairman of the Security and Defense Committee of
the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.
17.3.2014
On 1 March 2014 Ozerov, on behalf of the Security
and Defense Committee of the Federation Council,
publicly supported in the Federation Council the
deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.
10.
Dzhabarov,
Vladimir
Michailovich
d.o.b. 29.9.1952
First Deputy-Chairman of the International Affairs
Committee of the Federation Council of the
Russian Federation.
17.3.2014
On 1 March 2014 Dzhabarov, on behalf of the
International Affairs Committee of the Federation
Council, publicly supported in the Federation
Council the deployment of Russian forces in
Ukraine.
11.
Klishas, Andrei
Aleksandrovich
d.o.b. 9.11.1972 in
Sverdlovsk
Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Law
of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.
17.3.2014
On 1 March 2014 Klishas publicly supported in the
Federation Council the deployment of Russian
forces in Ukraine. In public statements Klishas
sought to justify a Russian military intervention in
Ukraine by claiming that “the Ukrainian President
supports the appeal of the Crimean authorities to
the President of the Russian Federation on landing
an all-encompassing assistance in defense of the
citizens of Crimea”.
12.
13.
14.
Ryzhkov, Nikolai
Ivanovich
Bushmin, Evgeni
Viktorovich
Totoonov,
Aleksandr
Borisovich
d.o.b. 28.9.1929 in
Duleevka, Donetsk
region, Ukrainian
SSR
Member of the Committee for federal issues,
regional politics and the North of the Federation
Council of the Russian Federation.
d.o.b. 4.10.1958 in
Lopatino,
Sergachiisky
region, RSFSR
Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the
Russian Federation.
d.o.b. 3.3.1957 in
Ordzhonikidze,
North Ossetia
Member of the Committee on culture, science, and
information of the Federation Council of the
Russian Federation.
17.3.2014
On 1 March 2014 Ryzhkov publicly supported in
the Federation Council the deployment of Russian
forces in Ukraine.
17.3.2014
On 1 March 2014 Bushmin publicly supported in
forces in Ukraine.
On 1 March 2014 Totoonov publicly supported in
forces in Ukraine.
17.3.2014
EN
17.3.2014
Name
15.
16.
Panteleev, Oleg
Evgenevich
Mironov, Sergei
Mikhailovich
L 78/13
Reasons
Date of listing
d.o.b. 21.7.1952 in
Zhitnikovskoe,
Kurgan region
First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Parlia
mentary Issues.
17.3.2014
d.o.b. 14.2.1953 in
Pushkin, Leningrad
region
Member of the Council of the State Duma; Leader of
Fair Russia faction in the Duma of the Russian
Federation.
On 1 March 2014 Panteleev publicly supported in
forces in Ukraine.
17.3.2014
Initiator of the bill allowing Russian Federation to
admit in its composition, under the pretext of
protection of Russian citizens, territories of a
foreign country without a consent of that country
or of an international treaty.
17.
18.
Zheleznyak, Sergei
Vladimirovich
Slutski, Leonid
Eduardovich
d.o.b. 30.7.1970 in
St Petersburg
(former Leningrad)
Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian
Federation.
d.o.b. 4.01.1968 in
Моscow
Chairman of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) Committee of the State Duma of the
Russian Federation (member of the LDPR).
17.3.2014
Actively supporting use of Russian Armed Forces in
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. He led
personally the demonstration in support of the use
of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine.
17.3.2014
Actively supporting use of Russian Armed Forces in
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.
19.
20.
Vitko, Aleksandr
Viktorovich
Sidorov, Anatoliy
Alekseevich
d.o.b. 13.9.1961 in
Vitebsk (Belarusian
SSR)
Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral.
17.3.2014
Responsible for commanding Russian forces that
have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory.
Commander, Russia's Western Military District, units
of which are deployed in Crimea.
17.3.2014
Commander of Russia's Western Military District,
units of which are deployed in Crimea. He is
responsible for part of the Russian military
presence in Crimea which is undermining the sover
eignty of the Ukraine and assisted the Crimean auth
orities in preventing public demonstrations against
moves towards a referendum and incorporation into
Russia.
21.
Galkin, Aleksandr
Russia's Southern Military
are in Crimea; the Black
Galkin's command; much
into Crimea has come
Military District.
District, forces of which
Sea Fleet comes under
of the force movement
through the Southern
Commander of Russia's Southern Military District
("SMD"). SMD forces are deployed in Crimea. He
is responsible for part of the Russian military
presence in Crimea which is undermining the sover
eignty of the Ukraine and assisted the Crimean auth
orities in preventing public demonstrations against
moves towards a referendum and incorporation into
Russia. Additionally the Black Sea Fleet falls within
the District's control.
17.3.2014
EN
L 78/14
ANNEX II
Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notification to the European
Commission
BELGIUM
http://www.diplomatie.be/eusanctions
BULGARIA
http://www.mfa.bg/en/pages/135/index.html
CZECH REPUBLIC
http://www.mfcr.cz/mezinarodnisankce
DENMARK
http://um.dk/da/politik-og-diplomati/retsorden/sanktioner/
GERMANY
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Aussenwirtschaft/aussenwirtschaftsrecht,did=404888.html
ESTONIA
http://www.vm.ee/est/kat_622/
IRELAND
http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=28519
GREECE
http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html
SPAIN
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/GlobalizacionOportunidadesRiesgos/Documents/
ORGANISMOS%20COMPETENTES%20SANCIONES%20INTERNACIONALES.pdf
FRANCE
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/autorites-sanctions/
CROATIA
http://www.mvep.hr/sankcije
ITALY
http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Politica_Europea/Deroghe.htm
CYPRUS
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/sanctions
LATVIA
http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539
LITHUANIA
http://www.urm.lt/sanctions
LUXEMBOURG
http://www.mae.lu/sanctions
HUNGARY
http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/nemzetkozi_szankciok/
MALTA
http://www.doi.gov.mt/EN/bodies/boards/sanctions_monitoring.asp
17.3.2014
17.3.2014
EN
NETHERLANDS
www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-vrede-en-veiligheid/sancties
AUSTRIA
http://www.bmeia.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=12750&LNG=en&version=
POLAND
http://www.msz.gov.pl
PORTUGAL
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/os-ministerios/ministerio-dos-negocios-estrangeiros/quero-saber-mais/sobre-o-ministerio/
medidas-restritivas/medidas-restritivas.aspx
ROMANIA
http://www.mae.ro/node/1548
SLOVENIA
http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/zunanja_politika_in_mednarodno_pravo/zunanja_politika/mednarodna_varnost/omejevalni_
ukrepi/
SLOVAKIA
http://www.mzv.sk/sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu
FINLAND
http://formin.finland.fi/kvyhteistyo/pakotteet
SWEDEN
http://www.ud.se/sanktioner
UNITED KINGDOM
https://www.gov.uk/sanctions-embargoes-and-restrictions
Address for notifications to the European Commission:
European Commission
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)
EEAS 02/309
B-1049 Brussels
Belgium
E-mail: [email protected]
L 78/15

The EU-US Sanctions Regimes: Practical Implications for Dispute

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