Vasile Goldiş - society and politics

The Center for Social Research,
Politics and Administrative Sciences
SOCIETY AND
POLITICS
Biannual interuniversitarian journal
Volume 5, Issue no. 1 (9), April 2011, semester I
“Vasile Goldiş” University Press
2011
The Purpose and Goals of the
SOCIETY AND POLITICS Review Board
SOCIETY AND POLITICS is a biannual publication issued by the Center for Social
Research, as part of the Research Institute within the “Vasile Goldis” Western University of Arad –
being the successor to the STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS “VASILE GOLDIS” – SOCIAL AND
HUMAN SCIENCES SERIES, started in 1994.
The main topics of the journal are focused on research in the area of sociology, political
science, public administration, social and community psychology, public policies, European
construction, political ethics and related subjects. The research results proposed for publication –
whether theoretical or applied, make use of the specific methodology of multi-, inter- and
transdisciplinary approaches, correlated to “top” knowledge in the field.
The journal is intended not only for experts in the academic environment and in
specialized research institutes, but also for staff in public institutions, high officials in public
administration and young persons interested in these fields of research, in the prospect of training
for a future career (university students, master and doctoral candidates).
The approval for publication is subject to an objective and impartial selection procedure,
based on a rigorous assessment of each article. Thus, the scientific board encourages high-level
scientific research, which may contribute to an increased thoroughness of theoretical and practical
knowledge, to the development of the analytical, synthetic, comparative and creative capacity of
potential readers, but also to the formation of convictions, abilities, and competences that the topics
of the articles aim at.
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Research in Higher Education since 2007 and is registered in the CEEOL International Database
(2009) in Germany, Index Copernicus Internaţional – Poland (2010) and DOAJ – Sweden (2010).
The responsibility regarding the content of published material pertains exclusively to authors
/scientific referents.
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(CNCSIS): Category B +, code CNCSIS 834 (www.uvvg.ro/socpol), and indexed in International
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ISSN print: 1843-1348
ISSN on-line: 2067-7812
Editorial Office:
„Vasile Goldiş” University Press, biannual journal,
94-96 Revolution Blvd., 310025, Arad, Romania
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SOCIETY AND POLITICS
Editor-in-chief: Marţian Iovan, “Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad, Romania
ISSN: 1843-1348 (print version)
ISSN: 2067-7812 (electronic version)
Editorial Board
Aurel Ardelean, “Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad, Romania
Mihai Aniţei, University of Bucharest, Romania
Anca Duţu, Free International University of Chisinau, Moldova
Letiţia Filimon, University of Oradea, Romania
Adrian Gorun, “C. Brâncuşi” University, Târgu Jiu, Romania
Marius Grec, “Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad, Romania
Harry Grosmann, University of Frankfurt-Hanau, Germany
Calciu Rodica Hanga, University of Lille, France
Nicolae Iuga, “Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad, Romania
Vovkanych Ivan, University of Uzhhorod, Ukraine
Ilona Máthé, Szent István Gődőllő University, Hungary
Patrizia Messina, University of Padua, Italy
Adrian Miroiu, SNSPA, Bucharest, Romania
Basarab Nicolescu, Paris VI University, France
Delia Podea, “Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad, Romania
George Poede, “Al. I. Cuza” University of Iaşi, Romania
Viorel Prelici, University of Timişoara, Romania
Emanuel Socaciu, University of Bucharest, Romania
Tanguy de Wilde d' Estmael, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium
Lucia Maria Vaina, University of Boston, USA
Liviu Zăpârţan, “Babeş-Bolyai” University of Cluj, Romania
Consulting Editors
Clemens Clockner, University of Wiesbaden, member of the German Academy; Alexandre
Dorna, University of Caen, France; Vincenzo Milanesi, University of Padua, Italy; Roseann
Runte, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; Răzvan Theodorescu, member of the Romanian
Academy, Bucharest, Romania; Cătălin Zamfir, corresponding member of the Romanian
Academy, Bucharest, Romania
Editorial office
Executive Editor: Lecturer Cristian Benţe, PhD, Lecturer Oana Matei, PhD
Editor: Associate Professor Roman Regis, PhD
Issue manager: Lecturer Sorin Bulboacă, PhD
Translations from Romanian were revised by: Lecturer Stăncuţa Laza, PhD, lecturer Narcisa
Ţirban, PhD, Emilia Rus
Word processing: prof. Daniela Dumitrean
CONTENTS
IOVAN, M., The Use of Religious and Political Rituals in Contemporary
Communication.......................................................................................................
5
GÖDÖR. Z., Characteristics of the Hungarian and Romanian Labour
Market.....................................................................................................................
25
ŞTEFANACHI, B., The Foundations of Knowledge Decentralization –
A Condition for Freedom........................................................................................
33
DIMA-LAZA, S.R., A Dystopian Society or the Moral Decay of
Humanity.................................................................................................................
40
PORUMBĂCEAN., C., The Uninominal Vote and its Effects on the Romanian
Electoral System.....................................................................................................
54
MIHUŢ, A., The Respect for Human Dignity Throughout Life as Reflected
in the New Civil Code…………………………………………………………….
67
BULBOACĂ, S., The Institution of Banat in the Banat of Lugoj and
Caransebeş in the XVIh-XVIIhCenturies.................................................................
88
BENŢE, C., The OSCE and the Problem of Human Rights...................................
98
MATEI., O., The Machiavellian Concept of Civic Virtues………………………
106
MUSTEA. A, BABA, T.C., NEGRU, O., Personal Goals: A New Approach in
Studying Religious Motivation……………………………………………………
115
VAŞCA. C., Sacrul tradiţional în poezia creştină a lui Vasile Militaru................
124
BALACI, G., L’importance du symbole et du symbolisme dans le
developpement psychique………...........................................................................
143
DUMA, R., Agricultural Policies and Competition in World Agriculture…….....
158
THE USE OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL RITUALS
IN CONTEMPORARY COMMUNICATION
Ph. D. Marţian IOVAN
“Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad, Romania
Department of Philosophy and Social – Political Sciences
Phone: 0040 / 257284899
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. This article identifies the main characteristics and
trends in the development of media power in the context of increasing its
connection with the other powers in the society, especially with the political and
ecclesiastic power. The development of communication technologies, especially
during the last half of a century, has led to the improvement and increase of the
efficiency of communication functions at all levels, regardless of the distances
between those who manage communication and the target public. The
sacerdotal and political powers of our days have taken over the results of mass–
media development in order to use them intensively in the attainment of their
own mission and strategies, seeking to be as successful as possible. An essential
way for fulfilling the goals of political and ecclesiastic power is the intentional
use of specific ceremonies and rituals in the communication exchanges with the
public. The “directors” and “screenwriters” involved in the organization of
such spectacles and their media coverage all over the planet have so perfected
this art that the powers receiving extensive media coverage have become
seductive celebrities, increasingly capable of manipulation, for an increasingly
wider public. The author taps into a comprehensive historical, philosophical,
sociological and practical documentation in order to demonstrate the increase
in the functions of audiovisual, verbal and nonverbal communication in our
days, and some perverse effects of this evolution.
Keywords: conversation, communication society, media power, religious and
political rituals, globalization
Current dimensions of communication
It has been argued since the second half of the 19th century that the
development of communication means would remove the barriers among
peoples, would facilitate the transfer of material, scientific, cultural and spiritual
values, so that it would come to unify life on Earth. This caused J. Ortega y
Gasset to state, more than seven decades ago, that:
“over these last years, each people has been receiving, every hour
and every minute, such an amount of news, which are so recent
about what is going on with the other peoples, that an illusion was
created, that they are actually in the middle of the other peoples or
in their immediate proximity…for the effects of universal public
life, the sizes of the world have suddenly shrunk. The peoples
have swiftly become dynamically closer”.(Oretega y Gasset 2002:
117-118)
In his theory of the noosphere, Pierre Theilhard de Chardin foreshadowed
the emergence of the infosphere, of a planetary consciousness generated by the
interactions among the billions of individual consciousnesses, reaching a new
stage in the development of humankind – a new specific layer of the Terra –
called the Omega point (Teilhard de Chardin 1970).
The road to cyberculture, to the cyberspace spirit – as the noosphere is
called in our days, has its origins in oral, verbal and nonverbal communication, of
the “face-to-face” conversation type, over 500,000 years ago. Written
communication, with its specific iconic, linguistic, logical and semantic
components, was invented more than 5,000 ago. The advent of printing
(Gutenberg, 1450) was followed by the invention of the telephone (Graham Bell,
1876) and the radio (G. Marconi, 1899), whereas the second half of the 20th
century witnessed the strong development of television, the Internet, mobile
telephony, satellite communication, multimedia as a whole. Thinkers
(philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, futurologists, economists etc.)
enthused by the global-scale development of new communication technologies,
digital culture and their effects on individuals, groups and peoples, established a
diagnosis on the new realities: some called the new stage – the information and
communication society (cyberneticist Norbert Wiener was convinced, in 1949,
that information and communication were factors of global transformation of
society, of superior organization and management of shared life, so that it will be
possible to prevent / eliminate anomic states and conflicts, and to increase the
degree of order in the society); the knowledge-based postindustrial society or the
knowledge society, which eliminates ideologies (Daniel Bell – the end of the
1950s) by enthroning reason and transparency; the society of information
globalization (M. McLuhan, in 1962, in his work The Gutenberg Galaxy,
anticipated the formation of a sort of “global village”, of a single world in which
the individual can communicate at any time and with anyone on the planet,
instantaneously, through images, sounds and texts, as a consequence of the
explosion of the information culture, including telecommunications); the
teledemocracy society (of which Alvin Toffler wrote, in the sense that in
advanced societies there is an abundance of remote information and
communication sources, owing to which all citizens have access to culture, to
decision-making, in a democracy effected in a virtual plane, “directly”, thus
increasing the autonomy of the individual); the technotronic society (Zbigniew
Brzeziński foresaw it as a society of cyberspace networks regulated by ideas,
values, norms, laws and moral principles); a society regulated by “universal
consciousness” (philosopher Pierre Lévy made the prophecy that, through digital
networks, a universal consciousness, a universal sphere of knowledge would be
formed). Other thinkers used the expression mass society (S. Moscovici), which
specializes in broadcasting, directly and instantaneously, news and opinions to
the entire planet.
Thus, a current of thought was constituted, materialized in the
communication society ideology, in the myth and mystification of the infosphere
society, emerging in the 1980s. Essentially, the statements of the followers of this
ideology were:
- the communication society eliminates boundaries, barriers among
individuals, social and ethnic groups, peoples, social classes;
- universal access to global, generalized and transparent communication;
- the democratization of social life;
- an increase in the people’s degree of autonomy and freedom;
- the diseases of liberal societies will be healed by generalizing welfare,
cooperation, dialogue;
- it is possible and feasible to reach a consensus in establishing the order
and advance of the society;
- the globalization of information broadens knowledge and guarantees the
equality of chances for individuals and collectivities.
For another category of intellectuals (philosophers, anthropologists,
political scientists, sociologists etc.), the new information and communication
technologies have generated not only advantages, transferring lifestyles,
practices, traditions, customs, values from one part of the planet to another, but
also alienation and disillusions associated to and in line with the prophecies of
prior theorists. In other words, the information and communication society is a
myth, a utopia that must be submitted to critical analysis (Philippe Breton,
Lucien Sfez, Erik Neveu etc.). Ph. Breton states that “the communication society
utopia” cultivates the illusion of harmony and order in the society, the leveling of
knowledge, human estrangement, social tribalization and the collapse of the
system of values. The alienated individual, isolated from society, finds a
palliative in the sphere of virtual communication, losing the sense of his/her
existence. The globalization of information and communication levels out
knowledge and culture, generates an artificial consensus, devoid of substance.
The globalization of information does not increase the degree of
understanding of the world by the people. The abundance of information, for a
large part of viewers, listeners or readers, may lead to disorientation, loss of
value criteria, limitation to an average, commonplace threshold of understanding
and knowledge. Communication through images on a monitor or screen limits
intelligence, reflection and critical thought. This is a general characteristic of the
iconic means of communication. The image may entice and produce a direct
pleasure. The reception of images presupposes a lesser effort for understanding
the significations and the message, in comparison with understanding a text or a
logical – linguistic communication. The culture of the public generally privileges
the iconization of the message, the image producing pleasure, enticement, a more
rapid formation of convictions and increasing situations of dependence. All these
limit critical thinking, depth of thought, reflection and creative intelligence.
Moreover,
“the perfectly transparent communication is a myth. Messages are often
ambivalent, the receiver selects the data, but the real stakes are often hidden”.
(Dortier 2010: 11-22)
Another critical observation targeting the “information and
communication society” model consists of the fact that most real Internet users
and television screen “addicts” may, partly, become a virtual community, but are
in fact estranged people, isolated from society, who, in spite of physically
residing in their homes, are attached to some cultural values that make up a
fundamentally artificial, imaginary community, based on the fascination induced
by the Internet and the “tyranny” of pleasures triggered by the images on the
screen / monitor. The aspiration of building a virtual community, involving the
participation of all members of society, of the entire humanity – contemplated by
some prophets, is a new myth, just as the “teledemocratic society” is a new
ideology a new illusion of reality.
Another criticism refers to the identity of cultures and civilizations, of
the different communities, in the sense that telecommunication and multimedia
development can alter this identity, can generate an eclectic mix of cultures, by
bringing remote individuals and peoples together. The promotion of
multiculturalism is naturally based on the respect for identity, for the specificity
of each culture. As such, the new information and telecommunication
technologies, the process of information globalization should be oriented in this
direction. This very idea was held by D. Wolton, who believed that:
“alongside communication, we must strengthen cultural identities, in
order for people to not feel deprived and threatened by their opening
to the others. Otherwise, the risk is casting them into what I call a
“refuge-identity”. (Wolton 2010: 295)
Likewise, other authors (such as Manuel Castells, A. Bressand, C. Dister,
N. Maffesoli) point out to the increasing inequalities between those who are
connected to the networks and those that do not have access to them. Hence, an
increase in social discrepancies, inequities, the formation of centrifugal,
conflictual groups, a democracy that generates social fragmentation and
“tribalization”. Such real trends reveal the weaknesses in the myth of information
and communication society. The mass-media standardize the frameworks of
thought and behavior only for those who receive their messages. Those who are
not connected (individuals, groups, communities), those who cannot or do not
want to receive it, will adhere to other values then the ones being disseminated,
second by second, by the “cultural industry” based on new communication
technologies. On the other hand, in a great deal of cases, the mass-media do not
equidistantly reflect the opinions and currents of opinion held by the public. The
most disadvantaged one are those who are not connected to the networks. Most
of them are not part of the public to whom the mass-media are addressed, directly
or indirectly, or whose opinions are adopted and expressed. For this reason, the
new cultural and communication industry often creates and maintains a limited,
superficial and artificial consensus; it is an agent of cultural and social leveling
only on the scale of a specific public, but not on the scale of the entire public, nor
to that of the crowd that is not part of the viewership, audience or readership.
As compared to original communication –“face to face” conversation,
having developed for hundreds of thousands of years as a source of public
opinions, collective attitudes, influencing and forming collective mindsets,
causing the direct contagion of individual thoughts and feelings, communication
at the infosphere level estranges people from one another, transforms them into
separate viewers, readers or listeners, each being isolated in their own room,
connected to the Internet or addicted to the television program. As Serge
Moscovici observed,
“the television intervenes, separating individuals, locking them up in
their homes, making them stiffen in front of the screen, and contact
becomes as limited as possible, even within the same family”.
(Moscovici 2001: 19)
As the mass-media develop, a marginalization will follow, an
overthrowing of the role of communication and direct connections among people.
To this background, certain effects will appear with respect to alienation, to a
new form of human estrangement. In this context, opportunities for public
reunions, debates and public events decrease. It is more difficult today to
convince people to step out of their homes, to leave the screen or the Internet in
order to participate in a political meeting, a public reunion or a religious
celebration.
With all the pros and cons to the information and communication society
myth, we can ascertain the steady growth of the functions of the media power,
the enhancement of the role of mass-media in contemporary society. The media
power presents itself not only as a means and a partner for the other powers
(political-administrative, sacerdotal, military, judiciary, economic etc.), but also
as an entity that can counteract, threaten, convince, shatter, manipulate, distort
the functions exercised by the other powers in society, delimiting itself from
them, sometimes arrogantly and perfidiously, sometimes assuming a position of
equality and transparency. The increase in the role of media power in society
occurs through the development of its relations of communication with the other
powers and, most of all, with the public whose interests, options and values it
tries to assume through a competition, much greater than in the past, with the
other powers. It is clear that in these last few years of economic and financial
crisis, which is gradually added unprecedented social, cultural and moral crises, a
wide scope is open for the growth of the role of media power, of influencing
public opinion, as in the case of other crises, wars or natural disasters. Generally
speaking, when people face a grave danger, a war or even a crisis with intolerable
“sacrifice curves”, they turn into very motivated viewers, readers or listeners. In
such situation, communication can become an “opiate of the people” – preparing
the ground for the media power to maximally increase its functions.
The position of some religious institutions regarding the role of
communication in the era of globalized information
Spiritual leaders, hierarchs of the great religious institutions of today and
of all times, have been aware of the role of communication in the growth and
development of adherent communities; they have used media coverage tools, as
much as the level of technological advancement of each era allowed them to, in
order to attain their goals. In its essence, religion gathers people and communities
together, around the same values; Christianity teaches the love of God, as a
supreme value, by people, and of people by each individual. The formation and
development of spiritual communities are not possible without communication,
in all its forms, which is meant to unite people into a solidary community.
The Holy Christian Apostles used communication by letters with a
maximum intensity, specific to the level of civilization; likewise, the Fathers of
the Christian Church brought innovations, in the sense of increased efficiency of
communication, with elements that are well integrated in the audiovisual system.
Christian images are found in catacombs, whereas liturgical hymns appeared in
the 2nd and 3rd century A.D., being the first elements of audiovisual
communication. The Holy Scripture notes the importance and extraordinary
power of words; they can unite people or, on the contrary, they can divide them.
Saint James’s Epistle mentions that “Out of the same mouth come praise and
cursing. My brothers, this should not be.” (James 3:10).
Throughout its entire history, Christianity has used written and
audiovisual communication to full extent, so that the Church approaches the
history of human communication as a long road covered by humanity from the
Babel project – generator of reciprocal confusion and misunderstanding, to the
use of the gift of languages, which led to the restoration of communication
among people, centered on Jesus, finding its supreme ideal, the model of
perfection, in God, who became a human and a brother. The first Epistle of John
the Evangelist emphasizes the spiritual valences of communication:
“We proclaim to you what we have seen and heard, so that you also
may have fellowship with us. And our fellowship is with the Father
and with his Son, Jesus Christ”. (1 John 1:3).
According to the classic teachings, Christian institutions, especially
Orthodox and Catholic ones, assign a central, privileged importance to media
coverage. Thus, Orthodoxy in general and the Romanian Orthodox Church, in
particular, have launched public policies, throughout the last 20 years, for the
development and intensive use of a proper media power, being aware of the
pastoral, missionary and cultural importance of the mass-media, especially that of
iconic communication, including the Internet. In this sense, the Romanian
Patriarchy created the Basilica Press Center, with the following components: the
TRINITAS TV television station, the TRINITAS Radio, the publication Lumina,
the BASILICA News Agency, the Press Bureau, having an editorial policy
adequate to accomplishing the spiritual mission of the Church in society. Apart
from these, over 100 daily and periodical Orthodox publications are currently
edited in Romania.
Different documents of the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox
Church address the increase in quality and efficiency of the pastoral and cultural
mission, underlining that the general functions of the mass–media (informative,
critical-civic, educative, cultural, community binder, entertainment) must be
exercised through the spiritualization of readers, viewers or listeners in all social,
ethnical, professional and age categories. The Orthodox Church thus stretches out
a hand to those uninterested in religion, to the hesitant ones, promotes mass–
media responsibility for educating youth in the spirit of Christianity, is concerned
with the expansion of public and the increase in audience rating, with the rise in
popularity by spiritualizing the communicational act. The institutions of the
Romanian Orthodox Church, eparchies, archpriest parish districts, parishes,
monasteries, theological institutes have launched portals, sites cumulating
multimedia libraries, missionary databases, study archives and articles in Church
journals, forums etc. Communication via the Internet thus becomes the meeting
place of the Church with its members and Christians interested in the message of
the institutions of the Romanian Orthodox Church.
The force of influencing people’s knowledge, feelings and attitudes by
using multimedia communication is appreciated by today’s successors of the
Apostles, due to the instantaneous, complete and transparent way in which
information and images are broadcast and can be received by social categories
with a lesser intellectual training. Television is the most efficient means for
popularizing the wealth of the Church’s liturgical rituals, for strengthening
human solidarity in the multi-religious, multicultural and multiethnic European
area. In this sense,
“The Orthodox Church promotes an attitude of reconciliation, of
completion of the concept of tolerance through that of Christian
love, which can only be achieved when we shall have crossed the
borders of self-sufficiency, in an attempt to know and understand the
culture and religion of those who are different from us.” (TRINITAS
Television)
Mass–media foster dialog, cooperation for the purpose of renewing
Christian life and Romanian society, openness towards other spiritual values in
Europe and elsewhere. Among the objectives assumed by the institutions
responsible for the media coverage of the R.O.C., the most important ones are:
promotion of the values of Christian Orthodox life, a moral–religious education,
cultivation of the esthetic of the sacred, promotion of Christian and Romanian
culture within the country and abroad, promotion of the Church’s social and
philanthropic activities, the dissemination of environmental culture (TRINITAS
Radio).
On the other hand, the Catholic Church increased its interest in the
modern means of social communication. The Pastoral Instruction on the Means
of Social Communication “Communio et Progressio”, published in 1971,
underlined that:
“The Church recognizes these tools as a “gift from God”, meant to
unite people in a close fraternity, according to His providential plan,
in order to help them collaborate to His Redemption Plan”.
In this sense, the Pontifical Council for Social Communications reacted,
as always, during the World Communications Day, by underlining the increasing
use of the means of social communication for the accomplishment of the mission
of the Catholic Church. His Holiness addressed his messages to Catholic
believers around on occasions such as this.
The modern means of social communication are factors of cultural and
spiritual prosperity, and can contribute to the increase in the degree of order in
human society, to the widening of horizons and the intellectual enrichment of
people. The Catholic Church seeks to attain, as shown in the documents of the
Pontifical Council for Social Communications, two main objectives with respect
to the mass–media:
• The support for the development of the means of social communication;
• The correct use of mass–media for the good of the people, for progress,
justice, peace, in the spirit of solidarity and proclamation of the Gospel.
As its Orthodox counterpart, the Catholic Church has been concerned
with internal, as well as external communication. In its relations with the
exterior, the Church has engaged in dialog with the factors responsible for the
mass–media, seeking to obtain the drafting of mass–media public policies, in
order to grant support and encouragement to media institutions. At the same time,
the Church intermediates the communication between God and the people, being
the keeper and guardian of the Divine Revelation; as a communion of Eucharistic
persons and communities, the Church has an essential internal communication,
which is why the communication practice within the Church must be exemplary,
rising to the highest standards of truthfulness, responsibility, sensitivity towards
human rights.
The documents of the Pontifical Council for Social Communication have
been emphasizing, over the last years, the fact that the means of communication
are key factors for influencing the course of events in the world of today, and that
their power has become so great that they can create either positive or negative
reactions of the public to the events, according to their interests. For this very
reason of having such a great power, people who work in the media must observe
the deontological code of their profession. Its essence is to serve truth, justice,
freedom and Christian love (Pacem in terris, 167). The philosophical core of
such a code was expressed by Pope John Paul II in his address during the 37th
World Communications Day, on January 24, 2003. In this sense, the pontifical
message mentions that:
“Freedom is a precondition of true peace as well as one of its most
precious fruits. The media serve freedom by serving truth: they
obstruct freedom to the extent that they depart from what is true by
disseminating falsehoods or creating a climate of unsound emotional
reaction to events. Only when people have free access to true and
sufficient information can they pursue the common good and hold
public authority accountable”.
Consequently, the people in the mass–media must serve truth, common
universal good, peace and happiness for all, in order to live up to the highest
standards in practicing their profession.
In the last century, religious institutions have brought a greater amount of
information to believers, broadcast with enhanced effects in the plane of forming
convictions, due to the improvement of communication rituals, techniques,
methods and procedures. The high hierarchs, as well as the masters of the powers
in society, have become rulers over a world of specific signs and information,
coordinators of media coverage, succeeding in using symbols, ideas, messages in
order to promote the values of religion and accomplish the pastoral, spiritual
mission they had assumed. The current communication culture, with all its
components, has been assimilated and applied by religious institutions, which led
to the improvement of ceremonies and rituals, to the interweaving of verbal and
nonverbal communication, of logical-semantic and audio-video communication
into new, original structures. All these have led to the increase in the visibility
and audience of religious institutions, in the spiritual extension and cohesion of
religious communities, not only in Europe, but also in the remotest geographical
areas on the planet.
Verbal communication, through conversation, exposition, sermons,
catecheses, and, generally speaking, through oral or written discourse, is today
integrated into the system of audiovisual communication, which addresses itself
to millions / billions of people. In this system, persuasion methods build mostly
upon images taken over from religious rituals – icons, all kinds of objects of
worship – all of them presented in color and using techniques that emphasize,
with a greater power than that of the spoken word, the superior esthetic valences
and the sacred, solemn and persuasive character. The ingenious intertwining of
the different forms of communication during the organization and process of
religious rituals manages to amplify esthetic emotions, religious feelings, to
seduce both participants and viewers, to convince. For the mass of believers, the
power of priests has assumed a leading part, due to the development of massmedia, which broadcasts, widely and instantaneously, images of persons situated
at the top of clerical hierarchy, important religious ceremonies, special events
such as the visits of the Pope, ceremonies occasioned by the great Christian
holidays, or by the funerals of important spiritual leaders of the world, images
from the Holy Synod, the presence of the Patriarch in Parliament, meetings of the
Pope / Patriarch with politicians or prestigious personalities affiliated to other
religions or cultures etc. Thus, religious power has increased in our days, owing
also to the media coverage of the spectacular aspects of rituals, to the
broadcasting of images related to the great religious events, to the utilization of
science and art direction.
The use of rituals in political communication
The role of political events taking place in a solemn ambiance, of rites,
ceremonies or customs in the consolidation of power was intuited by the great
governors / great priests since the Antiquity, practically since the emergence of
state formations. The religious functions of rituals were taken over, through
doubling or transfer, by the lay political power for the purpose of maintaining,
strengthening or creating a certain type of order in society, of ensuring social
stability, cohesion, and coherence in the functioning and development of human
collectivities, of obtaining recognition in increasingly larger social circles, of
consolidating its legitimacy and increasing its performance as a public authority.
For this reason, the millennia of development of human culture and civilization
resulted in the improvement of the management of rites, the organization and
staging of religious and political ceremonies, the use of political spectacle at the
right time and in the right place, according to the strategy of political actors. This
is why P. Lardellier was right when he wrote that:
“The new contemporary world is still laden with rites, abounding in rituality,
fertile in myths and symbols, which the outspoken rationality of our modern
world hardly manages to conceal, or do away with.” (Lardellier 2009: 9)
In the present study, by ritual (rite or ceremony) we mean a repetitive
social activity, performed according to a set of regulations, in a solemn
ambiance, having a strong symbolic charge, implying a good “orchestration” and
the intervention of a “stage director”.
In the “New dictionary of neologisms”, by ritual is meant a certain
custom, performed according to certain rites. Another meaning consists of:
“the staging of a sacred event or myth; religious ceremony” or “magical act
with folkloric implications, having the object of orienting occult forces,
malign or benign, towards a determined action being carried out in
accordance to certain rules”. (Noul dicţionar de neologisme 1997: 1254)
Rituals and ceremonies are generally:
“assimilated to historical forms of constraint, imposing class affiliations on
the individual, as well the burden of “outdated” customs and traditions,
originating from another order, from another epoch”. (Lardellier 2009: 11).
Thus, the vigor of political rituals is an indicator of community adhesions
to a founding past, to a universe of values and a civilization, an index for the
degree of order in the communities for which ceremonies symbolically plead.
Rites, ceremonies, and their orientative myths were practiced over 6.000
ago (Eliade&Culianu 1993). In Mesopotamia, for example, around 3500 BCE,
temples were being built, and religious, political and administrative institutions
were functional. The legitimation of the first kings, the selection of chieftains and
military leaders were supported by rituals, by organizing opulent ceremonies that
were addressed to a broad public. The rituals consisted of prayers, offerings and
votive statues placed in front of the God’s altar, as well as organizing the New
Year Celebration. The ritual of sacred matrimony enjoyed particular importance
and popularity – even the king participated in it; he was joined to the goddess
Inanna in order to secure wealth for the inhabitants in the following year. The
Hebrews organized, in approx. 2.000 BCE, religious ceremonies associated to the
praising of kings and great prophets; for this purpose, during the reign of king
Solomon, the Temple of Jerusalem was built (10th century BCE), in order to
shelter the Ark and to host religious rituals. In Pre-Islamic Arabia, tribal religions
were practiced, sanctuaries were erected, offerings were given to the main tribal
deities, animals were sacrificed, and there were rituals connected to religious
holidays, fasting and pilgrimage. When, following the years of exile spent in
Medina, Muhammad received the divine revelations, then, as a result of the
Mecca being conquered by Muhammad and an his army, the above-mentioned
city became a stronghold, the focus of prayer and a pilgrimage site for all
Muslims. After the emergence of the Torah, the Gospels and the Qur’an, Jews,
Christians and Muslims had their respective fundamental practices (rites,
ceremonies etc.) of religious life fixed in writing, with the specific doctrinal
effects for the political, administrative and judicial powers. All these powers
were keepers of other rituals, blending together the sacred and the profane.
In other parts of the world, such as India, temples, places of worship,
various Vedic rituals and hymns were ubiquitous, the ceremonies being
organized by “masters”, thoroughly familiar with the formula and rules of
performance. The Vedic priests, surrounded by assistants, methodically ensured
the observance of ritualistic rules. The Vedic culture and civilization included a
wide range of rituals, among which were those of consecration, initiation, birth,
marriage, death. The Brahman guru often played an essential part in some types
of rites. In the Chinese world, a great deal of rites was based on the Confucian
canon ever since the 6th century BCE. Rituals were used by spiritual and political
rules in order to ensure order in social life, to bestow coherence upon the
activities being carried out, to secure the observance of the law or the Dao way,
meant to guarantee the equilibrium of individuals in society, and of social states
with respect to one another. Unlike Buddhism, which promoted social hierarchies
instituted by monks and laymen, Confucianism had no priests. The performers of
its rituals were prestigious, just, knowledgeable and responsible people, thought
to be capable of refereeing the most diverse rituals, including bureaucratic ones,
designed for the occupation of high positions in the imperial bureaucracy.
Other civilizations, such as the African, Aztec, Maya or US Native
American ones, also feature rituals (connecting societies to divinities) of
sacrifice, community purification, healing diseases in individuals touched by the
forces of evil, rites of passage, death- and birth-related, ancestor worship,
communication with the gods through dances likely to induce a state of trance.
The Mayas practiced sacred rituals, the nodal moment of which was sacrifice.
The Aztecs, as a people “of the Sun”, would organize periodical rituals with
primordial human sacrifices, for the Sun to follow its course, and for human life
to last until “The Fifth Age”. Ritualistic sacrifice occurred in the Templo Mayor.
It is not necessary to bring further examples, including those from DacoRoman culture, or from the medieval and modern eras, in order to understand the
role of rituals in ensuring the continuity of human communities of all kinds, in
increasing their social and organizational cohesion around some fundamental
values, in asserting their identity and their readiness to open themselves to
communication with outsiders. All these are demonstrated, first and foremost, by
the media successes and effects of religious rituals. The functions of rituals in
political life seem to have been understood and used even since the first kings or
emperors and, in our days, they are employed by the political power in a wellcrafted way, leaving aside the costs that can often amount to fabulous sums. The
relationship between sacredness and power, between the faithful/ the Church and
God, is skillfully used by various staffs, teams of experts in “image” or in media
coverage, by staging some pseudo-religious rituals, so that the functions of
religious ceremonies are being taken over through the “conversion” of religious
rituals into political rituals.
The ceremonies taking place in connection to the visits of the Pope, of
presidents, kings or emperors are prepared, staged and carried out, in our days, in
accordance to a detailed code of rules, so that no mistake would arise – being
shaped in the image of religious rituals. The same happens in the case of funeral
ceremonies of heads of state or highly influential politicians, coronation
ceremonies, the signing of treaties, the launch of the electoral campaign of some
outstanding political leaders etc.; all of these follow precise codes, preestablished sequences, so that their “live” broadcasting should fascinate the
public, persuade and entice the spectating citizens. Not only does the
organization of solemn, festive celebrations dedicated to the “National Day”, of
the several commemorations in which the head of state and other political
personalities etc. participate use the specific myths, symbols and effects of
religious life, but in many countries even priests, hierarchs of religious
institutions are attracted to the ceremonies, in order to increase their prestige,
credibility, influence and persuasive force with respect to the citizens involved in
communication as direct participants and viewers via television.
The presence of rituals in political and global media coverage is due to
the advantages brought to the power: the increase in the degree of legitimacy, the
increase of prestige and influence, the strengthening of community cohesion and
the existing socio-economic order, the internalization and generalization of
values propagated by the power, the prevention of tensions and anomic states.
The use of rituals and ceremonies and their ample coverage in the media is
explained by their persuasive force, motivating and activating the public in the
sense of strategies and programs adopted by the power, which is much greater
than that specific to the verbal media. The audio-visual political communication,
implicitly the ritualistic one, is much more complex than the verbal one and has
more efficient formative and, most of all, affective and conative valences. In this
sense, N. Frigioiu wrote:
“Through ritualistic communication, group loyalties and identities, the
values and norms of an organization and a leader’s principles of legitimacy
become visible”. (Frigioiu 2009: 20)
The modern techniques of mass-media communication increase the
efficiency of the media discourse, which is especially due to the iconic
component, the use of images, the drama being broadcast live – which set human
affectivity and attitudes in motion. Yet, at the same time, it personalizes the
power, transforming it into an enticing ‘star’. And, in our days, as R. – G.
Schwartzenberg wrote:
“The power as a star is a mobilizer, as well an integrator and a stability
factor … it makes it easier for popular masses to accept the discipline and
constraints that are necessary to common progress”.( Schwartzenberg
1995: 259)
The media coverage of the real facts of power by resorting to different
rituals staged by masters, by specialists, consultants in media-related issues,
increases the spectacularness of power, creating stars in politics. The same author
believes that the spectating citizen will evolve, as a result of the reception of this
political show, towards a state of alienation. Seduced by the political circus
presented on the TV screen, by the prettified, counterfeit or artificially created
images of the “giants” of politics, viewers become admirers of the “show
culture”, declining into a “submission culture”. In such situations, the spectating
citizens are easier to manipulate. Complacent in their adoration of screen idols,
their critical-civic spirit will diminish. This is why, following the development of
modern communication technologies, of the mass – media, the amount of
information has increased, but so has the amount of non-information and
misinformation of citizens. Such an evolution is beneficial to the power, to the
preservation of the existing social order. The symbolic universe generated by the
broadcasting of political ceremonies and rituals is ferment not for social,
organizational or decisional innovation, but rather for the reproduction of the
social order, for the conservation of the status-quo.
The political actors of today, the political agents who launch and
implement public policies, the important agencies of the state (the Presidential
Institution, the Parliament, the Government, the Ministries) have been
transformed into factories producing and reproducing diverse ceremonies: rituals
of commemoration, inauguration, awarding of titles, medals and decorations,
opening or closing ceremonies, appointment or coronation ceremonies,
fraternization banquets, hunting rituals, with the participation of the head of state
and officials, the ceremony of receiving letters of accreditation, different forms
of celebration (the queen’s official birthday, the birthday of the head of state, a
baptism in the royal or presidential family etc.). Regardless of their type
(confrontational or consensual, individual or communitarian, commemorative or
inaugurative, electoral or coronation-related, compensatory or integrative,
founding or transitional), political rituals have a spectacular form, are
symbolically charged and are efficient on the social and institutional plane, as
well as that pertaining to collective mentality. Broadcasting the spectacle of
public ceremonies focuses on the celebration of community values, marking
those moments, historical actions, important achievements that can lead to an
increase in the degree of order in the society, in the coherence of the projected
activity, and to the consolidation of political cohesion.
There is a founding paradigm for each type of ritual, which is often
correlated to a myth, to a symbolic universe meant to awaken emotions, to
captivate the attention of a wide public or to end the indifference of crowds. For
example, in the case of commemorative rituals (celebration of the Union of
Walachia and Moldavia, the National Day, Victory Day, the Europe Days etc.),
publicity is made several weeks / months in advance, by using the system of
symbols and values connected to the commemorated event; official (and
unofficial) invitations are addressed to personalities in the country and abroad,
seeking to attribute a certain grandeur to the event; as the commemorative event
approaches, its political, cultural and spiritual importance is intensely propagated
through the media, in order to attract the public into participating, directly or only
as viewer/listener; the mass-media are invited to the ceremonies, in order for
them to record and broadcast these ceremonies live, then in reruns, covering the
country and various corners of the world where there is public; mass psychology
is influenced by using some traditions related to the event, in order to motivate
people into participating, promising several offers to them (“beans and trotter”,
“sarmas and Romanian polenta (mămăliguţă)”, „mici and beer” etc.); the
announcement of the place (localities, precise locations) and time when the
rituals are to be held; preparation of the spot and the “spectacle” to take place:
tribune, flags, logos, banners, portraits of the leaders, route markings, slogans,
flower bouquets etc.; design of the protocol and its application, in the tiniest
details, regarding the order of arrival and departure of the heads of state, prime
ministers, the Patriarch, foreign guests, political leaders etc.; wreath ceremony,
conducted in accordance with the previously announced order; official speeches;
the staging of the participating public’s manifestations (applause, raising flags,
using flowers etc.) in order to maximize the efficiency of the image effect; parade
of the armed forces, accompanied by stunts performed by the military aviation,
rounds of cannon etc., with the use of specific marks; interviewing the president
or other representatives of the power, in front of video cameras; leaving the
tribune in the pre-established order; “crowd bathing”, performed by the
charismatic leader; popular celebrations; the reception given by the head of state;
observance of the departure ritual until boarding the airplane etc. The other types
of political ceremonies have similar structures and phases, but with some specific
elements.
All political ceremonies are open to borrowing elements from religious
or other rituals, so that they may succeed in maximizing the use of the psychic
dominants of the crowd, the emotiveness and the faith of the masses. At the same
time, they can promote innovation when they count on increasing the number of
adherents, electors or sympathizers. The grandeur of celebration, the ritualistic
and popular spectacle, the charismatic speeches invoking the patriotism of
ancestors, the solidarity, the almightiness of God etc., the solemnity of the ritual
make the public admire the beauty and grandeur of the event, to forget their
current, everyday problems, to abandon their feelings of contempt and distrust
towards their leaders. All these cause the force of transfiguring religiousness into
various important political ceremonies to reveal, as Al. Dorna wrote:
“an amazing fact: the revival of religion affects all social levels,
especially in Western countries: urban sectors, immigrants, young people
and intellectuals disillusioned with modernity”. (Dorna 2004: 239)
The wide public does not necessarily question the truth and rationality of
the symbolism, of the speeches integrated into political rituals, but rather the
feeling and the faith. Consequently, the reactions and attitudes of the masses,
expressed in behaviours, show the frailty of the values of science, rationalism and
materialism, and emphasize the existence of a crisis of meaning, of axiological
orientation in contemporary societies. Faced with these realities, the myth and the
entire symbolism of political rituals are going through a reinvigorating process. It
has become a crucial objective for the state power institutions to integrate
themselves into the ritualistic scene, to broadcast important events launched by
them in an atmosphere of ritualistic solemnity, with a charge of “sacredness” as
credible as possible. To the question, asked by Pascal Lardellier:
“Why are all the important moments of political life enclosed (and,
ultimately, protected and divinized, at the same time) by a protocol
and by a ceremonial?”
the given response is:
“From the very moment of its installation, power is neither accepted as
absent, nor as anonymous. Therefore, its manifestations are never
coincidental. On the contrary, they are systematically ritualized,
according to esthetic and symbolic modalities precisely established
through protocol and tradition.”(Lardellier 2009: 49).
Political ceremonies, regardless of the type to which they pertain, the
ritualistic channels through which they are broadcast to the public, are the most
efficient means of the power in order to impose itself, and cultivate respect,
attachment, fear and submission. But rituals, taken per se, are not the only key to
attaining success in realizing the strategies of certain policies. On the other hand,
the ritualistic failure may be a sign for the degradation of a policy. We remember
all too well how the organizers of the last meeting of Nicolae Ceausescu, in
accordance to the traditional rite applied to the great popular assemblies, meant
to legitimate, to praise and to sustain a communist regime, had contradictory
effects to the purpose desired by the authorities; these happened due to the
intervention of some unforeseen elements, with a role of “psychological bomb”
transmitted to the collective mentality. The failure of that ceremony
foreshadowed the end of a political system, of a totalitarian regime.
Generally speaking, both political rituals, and some of the religious ones,
may influence the march of politics in a state or that of a political actor in three
different ways:
• That of legitimacy, consecration, solidarity and cohesion of the
existing political system. The Orthodox Church has often oriented
important rituals, throughout history, in the sense of legitimizing the
existing regime, of preserving the status-quo; the Catholics in
Germany have always endorsed the Christian Democratic Union
party etc.;
• That of contesting politically directed movements and processes. For
example, the Church has contested the taking of some political
initiatives, of some legislative projects involving the infringement of
human rights, the discrimination of women, immigrants or other
social categories, it has submitted to critical analysis certain
freedoms assumed by the mass – media, by which human dignity
was debased, or the education of youth and children was negatively
affected etc.;
• That of expressing an attitude of protest with respect to the
organization of certain events and to the implementation of projects
contravening to the canons of religions, such as the organization and
propagation via mass-media of rituals belonging to unnatural sexual
groups, the legalization of same-sex marriage, the legalization of
prostitution, the legalization of medically-assisted death (euthanasia),
the launch of policies with destructive effects for the biosphere, and
the environment in general.
Instead of conclusions
In this era of globalized information and communication, anticipated and
evaluated by many great thinkers of modernity as being built on the values of
science, rationalism and humanism, the issue of ideological dominance
constitutes an essential stake. The media power as a whole, the political and
sacerdotal powers involved in the media propagate their creeds, values and
systems of symbols, sometimes forming alliances, resorting to new technical
means of communication, perfecting both their discourse and, especially, the
iconic, nonverbal communication, implicitly by means of intensively using
rituals on all communication channels, in all directions and places on the planet.
In contemporary societies and states, legitimation obtained by having
recourse to the sacred, to religious values, to the affective and persuasive
valences of sacred rituals, both old and new, to myths and symbols, has invaded
political life. The phenomenon is very visible in former communist countries, but
not only. Through their spectacular force, through solemnity, grandeur and
influencing capacity, the great political rituals are addressed to an increasingly
wide public, dispersed not only throughout one country, but also in different
parts of the planet, exercising multiple functions on viewers, listeners and readers
– not only associating and integrating them into the community, and this includes
virtual communities, but also promoting the identity of their culture and
fundamental institutions; in order to do so, they might steer the organizations to
which they belong in contrary or even antagonistic directions.
The ceremonies organized in our days by states, by the high hierarchs of
religious life, assume the form and drama of impressive, pompous, grandiose and
sumptuous shows, of “profane liturgies”. The real political life, the existing
political institutions are clad in an artificial cloak, a “façade”, prettified so that it
might fascinate the public, attract it and turn it into its ally. Truth, reason and
arguments become secondary. The purpose is to fascinate and convince crowds,
to cultivate fears so that, in the end, the strategy of power could be carried
through, and that the public would comply with the social hierarchies and the
desirable order. Thus, a new type of human estrangement is produced, a human
addicted to media culture, a virtual conformist or, if not, one who is easier to
manipulate by the stagings of the political power.
In periods of crisis, wars or natural disasters, the public has a greater
inclination towards receiving the ritualistic message. The functions of ritualistic
communication find it easier to attain the performances anticipated by the power,
provided that they make use of specific ceremonies, adequate to the historical
situation. The secular experience of political leaders emphasizes the fact that,
from the stock of myths and rituals of humanity, it is most appropriate, in such
historical contexts, to give media coverage to the specific spectacular form of
those connected to the cult of ancestors, heroes and, last but not least, the dead.
Commemorative ceremonies are replacing the inaugurative ones, community
ceremonies have much greater effects in the plane of ensuring cohesion than
individual ones, the efforts of the political power to attract the sacerdotal power
on its side, as an ally, are becoming much greater than in those historical stages
that were based on balance and calm. Rites of celebration are being replaced by
those that will succeed in distracting the attention of crowds (victims) from the
everyday hardships they face and to orient it towards a sacred universe, towards a
prosperous future or towards the “life after death”. In other words, the political
power manages communication, the messages being transmitted, the use of
rituals, symbols, myths and values, according to the historical stage – which
implies not only a good mastery of communication sciences, but also of the art
and philosophy that decides what must be transmitted to the public, in what way,
how much and to whom exactly.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HUNGARIAN AND
ROMANIAN LABOUR MARKET
Assistant Professor Zsuzsanna GÖDÖR
Szent István University
Hungary Faculty of Economics
Phone: 0036 / 66524700
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. After the fall of communism serious changes occured
in the field of employment in the post-communist countries. These changes
happened simultaneously with significant turns in the European Union’s labour
market and employment strategies. The accession into the Union meant both a
chance and a challenge for the actors on the labour market in the
transformational countries, because they had to make great changes within a
short time in a socioeconomic environment where the relations on the labour
market had been extemely rigid. This paper aims to describe this process
through the example of Hungary and Romania.
Keywords: labour market,
European Union statistics
employment rate, social security, crisis, the
The institutional changes of employment in the transition
The fall of communism brought drastic and dramatic changes in the
employment of the former Eastern bloc countries. The rigid employment model
of industrial societies had had strong structural and ideological support in the
centralized economies that dominated the Eastern part of the continent (Szabó
2004:18). The reason for it was in close connection with the operation of the
shortage economy. There was no need for the actors on the labour market to
make flexible adaptations, because the consumers bought anything, so production
patterns became set for long periods. Full employment and social security were
constitutional rights declared by the state for which individuals did not have to
work and fight for. The result of this was overemployment and unemployment
within company’s gates.
At the beginning of the transition period after the fall of communism
those changes that had taken place for decades in the developed countries
happened very quickly, during a few years. First there was a significant drop in
employment and with this the until then unknown unemployment and social
insecurity entered the scene. In the surviving and newly-formed companies
working hours and work intensity significantly increased compared to previous
experiences. Employees had to abandon the illusion of full, unconditional and
life-long employment, and they had to accept the changed demands of the labour
market, the instability that came with this, and contingent employment.1 Further
challenges were the changes in the nature of work and structure of jobs that
needed adaptable, versatile labour force (Szabó 2004).2 The situation was made
even worse as in the aspiring countries these processes were connected with and
strengthened by some other products of the fall of communism, such as the great
technological change, which was rather a pressure than the consequence of
organic development.
Characteristics and transformation of the employment pattern
The employment pattern of industrial society has now been replaced by a
new model of employment that is radically different from the previous one, and
which can compensate for the limited resources and the effect of the saturation of
the markets. The model and its changes significantly affect the conditions of
economic growth, the developments on the labour market, and competitiveness.
The post-industrial employment pattern
The appearance of the new employment model is the consequence of the
changes in the world’s economy. The resources of extensive growth are running
out, the extension of markets does not follow mass production. The information
revolution and acting on the opportunities created by the information
technologies are almost impossible within the framework of the former model.
The spread of the new employment model is helped by the world economy and
the globalization of competition. The place of material resources is taken by the
dominance of knowledge and information. A new notion emerges: knowledgebased economy. In the rapidly changing economic and business environment risk
multiplies, and it becomes crucial in the life of companies if they have a chance
to reverse their originally irreversible investments (Szabó-Négyesi 2004). This
reversibility is unimaginable in the framework of the earlier model. The
1
Contingent work: the individual has neither explicit nor implicit contract for long-term
employment. Definition of the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1989.
2
Versatile employee: they treat their own knowledge capital as a sort of investment portfolio and
change it continually (based on Szabó 2004).
precondition of reversibility is the flexibility of the labour market, instead of
rigidity, and the developed state of the inner labour market within the company.
It is also important what explicit and implicit liabilities companies have. The
former increases rigidity (e.g. lump-sum settlement), while the latter can be
regarded as a moral commitment (Foote-Folta 2002).
The essential feature of the new employment pattern is the creation of a
flexible labour market with adaptable employment forms, which literature calls
atypical and contingent employment.
The transformation crisis and its consequences
An important aspect of transformation is that some special features
stemming from the difference of historical and cultural traditions showed up
quite emphatically, while the legacy of the previous system also remained strong
for various periods of time. The countries involved had to at the same time
transform their economies completely and to build up a state that would meet the
requirements of the new conditions. They had to set up a democratic, lawgoverned state, and its institutional and structural framework. They set out to do
this with the dominance of state ownership, and market coordination was also
lacking. As regards this János Kornai has proven that the recession in connection
with the transformation of the Soviet model had a different content than crises
generally have. This transformational recession or crisis (Kornai 1993:571) is the
price of the fall of communism and of stepping onto the path of durable growth,
the cost of transformation that has to be paid. Despite the fact that for the
transforming countries there were no “proven recipes”, the particular countries –
although running different courses – have achieved EU membership.
Table 1
Some important statistics about the Visegrád Four and Romania, 2006
Country
Area
thousa
nd
km2
Midyear
populati
on,
million
persons
Populat
ion
density
persons/
km2
GDP on consumer
power parity
GDP,
EU
PPS/pers
average=1
on
00
Є
Change
in
volume
of GDP
Agricult
ure
Percent
age of
GDP
Czech
78,9
10,27
130
17100
76,3
6,4
2,6
Rep.
Hungary
93,0
10,07
108
14400
64,3
3,9
4,3
Poland
312,7
38,14
122
11500
51,3
6,1
4,4
Slovakia
49,0
5,39
110
13600
60,7
8,3
4,0
Romania
238,4
21,59
91
7900
35,3
7,7
9,1
Source:
http://portal.ksh.hu/portal/page?_pageid=37,645624&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL,and
Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 2006
However, accession does not mean that their different macroeconomic
indicators show similar performance, as in the developed countries of Europe, so
convergence is not yet complete.
In this situation it can be especially interesting how human resources in the
particular countries can cope, regenerate and convert their knowledge and labour.
The labour market in Hungary and Romania in comparison with EU
figures
The activity rate
The activity rate in the 15-64 age group in the EU-27 countries in 2007
was 70.5%; this figure has slowly been rising from the beginning of the
milllenium, when it was 68.5%. Two other Visegrád countries that joined the EU
together with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia almost reaches this
figure (69.9 and 68.3%). The rate is extremely low in Hungary, in 2007 it was
61.9%, which means 4,209 thousand active persons on the labour market. Since it
only means a one percent increase to 2000, it is the second lowest rate in the EU27. This low activity is a dragging problem of the Hungarian economy, and it
also means an ever increasing burden when we take into account the high
proportion of inactive and out-of-work population that needs to be supported.
The activity rates of the Romanian labour market has shown a continuous
decrease since 2000, as opposed to the Hungarian data. The then 69.6% activity
rate, which was higher than the EU average, has dropped back to 63% by now,
and this means 9,483 thousand persons. In the EU-27 ranking this is the fourth
lowest rate.
Figure 1
Source: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int
The employment-rate
A central issue in the whole paper is the problem of how to increase
employment. The employment in the EU-15 hit the bottom in 1994, when the
rate fell below 60% (59.8%). By 2005 they had managed to raise it by 5%, to
64.8%. Hungary, joining with the Visegrád countries in 2004, is in a backward
position, as employment in 1996 was 52.1%, which it managed to raise to 57.3%
by 2007, when the number of employees were 3,897 thousand. It is worth
noticing that still today employment is below the 1994 EU-15 bottom figure and
that in the last 5 years it has almost been stagnating. The employment rate in
Romania has exceeded the Hungarian figure in each year since the turn of the
millenium, though the 2000 employment figure of 64.2% is only 58.5% in 2007,
and with this the number of employees dropped to 8,843 thousand persons.
Taking into account the data about the twenty-seven countries of the Union it is a
noticeable fact that in 2007 the employment rate is the lowest, after Malta and
Poland, in Hungary and Romania, and both countries are seriously lagging
behind the 65.4% figure of the EU-27. The figure below shows the employment
rate that generally describes the level of employment.
Figure 2
Source:http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int
In the last few years in almost all aspects there has been a less than 1%
increase or drop in employment, so the data reflect well the problems of
employment described above, the standstill of the Lisbon process, and the
stagnating or decreasing employment.
The unemployment rate
By the mid-1990s the EU-15 had managed to squeeze their
unemployment below the psychological threshold of 10%. Between 1997 and
2001 the rate fell even more, then until 2004 it rose again. Simultaneously, in the
countries joining in 2004 unemployment continually rose in the Czech Republic
until 2000, in Poland until 2002, and in Slovakia until 2001. It is rather peculiar
and worth noticing that in the same period the rate in Hungary was continually
falling, up until 2002, when it was 5.6%. A negative thing is, however, that from
here it started to rise again, resulting in a 7.4% registered unemployment in 2007,
meaning 312 thousand unemployed people. Romania’s unemployment rate in
2007 is lower than both the Hungarian and EU figure, with 6.8%, 640 thousand
persons. As opposed to the rise in unemployment in Hungary in the last four
years, here a continuous drop can be seen, which can be explained by the
country’s accession to the Union, and the growing investments that followed in
the wake. The draining effect of the European labour markets that have opened
up to the Romanian labour force is also significant.
As regards its absolute value the rate is permanently below the EU figure
in the years examined, except for one year. The reason for this is that the period
when unemployment rose drastically was the early and mid-1990s, and this
transformation in employment happened within a few years. The other reason is
not so positive, that being the high inactivity rate among the fit-for-work segment
of the population (Laky 2004).
Figure 3
Source:http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int
The spread of atypical employment in the examined countries
Both for extending employment and for flexibility on the labour market
it is becoming more important that atypical employment pattterns should gain
ground. European Union statistics group the non-traditional employment forms
according to three criteria: part-time workers, fixed-term contract employees, and
self-employed people.
Table 2
Proportion of atypical employment in the European Union
Selfemployed
EU-15
EU-25
Highest
Lowest
Hungary
Romania
1995
15,9
16,6
45,8
Greece
5,6
Sweden
17,2
40,2
Part-time employment
2005
14,7
15,6
43,7
Romania
4,8
Sweden
13,8
43,7
Fixed-term
contracts
% total employment
1995
2005
1995
2005
15,8
20,2
12,0
14,3
16,0
18,4
11,7
14,5
37,4
46,1
35,2
33,3
Netherlands Netherlands Spain
Spain
4,8
2,1
5,4
2,4
Greece
Bulgaria Belgium Romania
3,7
4,1
6,6
7,0
14,9
10,2
3,0
2,4
Source:
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_analysis/eie/eie2006_key_en.pdf
Examining the data of the Hungarian and Romanian labour market about
the non-traditional patterns and comparing them with the EU figures, we can see
on the one hand obvious differences and on the other similar trends as well.
In the examined period neither in the EU-15 nor in the EU-25 was there
significant change in the proportion of fixed-term employment, it being less than
15%. The Hungarian figure is stagnating below ten percent, and the Romanian
figures are noticeably very low. As regards the proportion of part-time
employment the lag of the examined countries is quite significant. In the EU-15
countries the rise is slower than expected, but continual: since 1995 the
proportion of part-time employees increased from 15.8% to 20.2%. Selfemployment in the examined period in the Union showed a slight decrease,
stabilizing around 15%. In Hungary it dropped from 17.2% to 13.8% in the
examined period, while in Romania in the European context the initially already
high figure of 40.2% rose even further, which is possibly due to the still large
share of agricultural employment.
Conclusions
The labour market developments and macroindicators examined in this
paper are explained by reasons rooted in past traditions on the one hand, while on
the other they are cruciallly important for the future. The arrival of the
postindustrial employment pattern and the transformation crisis, and then the
overcoming of the crisis all meant challenges for the labour force, both in terms
of quantity and quality. The notion of space and time relevant for work has
changed, which puts the demand for the flexibility of labour to the front. For the
sake of flexibility the social systems representing unsustainable burdens have to
be reformed on the one hand, while on the other employees need to be given new
chances, that is jobs have to be created. One of the main ideas of the Lisbon
process is that to achieve the desired objectives harmonized reforms are needed
simultaneously on the different markets. Naturally this comes with sacrifices and
political risks in the short run, and benefits will only show in the long run, but
without them catching up with the Union is unimaginable. For the examined
countries there was a much shorter time to reform the labour market than was
usual in the European Union. The disintegration of stable labour relations within
a few years, modernization and the simultaneous devaluation of much of
previously acquired knowledge happened at the same time and brought
socioeconomic tensions and controversies to the surface. Actors of the economy
need to adapt, because technological development enforces its suitable form of
employment, and the growth stemming from this can bring about social security
in a modern sense, in the framework of a fairer redistributory system.
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10. http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int
THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
DECENTRALIZATION – A CONDITION FOR
FREEDOM3
Lecturer Bogdan ŞTEFANACHI Ph.D.
Postdoctoral Grant Recipient
Romanian Academy, Iaşi Branch
Phone: 0740/192582
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. Within the economic space or within the social space
the knowledge is essentially a dispersed one, and through it we must understand
a practical knowledge peculiar to individual circumstances. Social knowledge is
accumulated in rules and such rules are not consciously articulated, but instead,
their obedience is vital for the efficiency of our actions; moreover, such rules
are very difficult to remove or modify, even if, in a Cartesian manner, we fail in
demonstrating their absolute truth. The fact that social sciences generate tacit
knowledge represents a crucial element for the liberal political theory because it
questions and ultimately excludes the possibility to plan. In other words, the
analysis of the human behavior within the free market is not necessary a
rational one, the scale of rationality may be applied only in the case of govern
intromission (or of any planning authority) in the (tacit) knowledge flow. The
refusal to accept the mosaic structure of the social space represents the direct
effect of the attempt to consciously (rationally) coordinate the social process
itself under the form of various social and political engineering. Therefore, the
decentralized spontaneous processes express a form of rationality impossible to
be entirely encompassed in the conceptual language which could justify the
mechanisms of a control center. This thesis of human limited knowledge is an
empirical reality or contingent regarding the human being, reality which can be
modified (altered) through technological evolution. It is more a philosophical
thesis concerning the shape in which the knowledge exists in the world and the
way in which it becomes accessible to individuals.
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: This paper was made within The Knowledge Based Society Project
supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD),
financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government under the contract
number POSDRU ID 56815.
Key words: knowledge, social knowledge, scientific knowledge,
freedom
In Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman said that: “as Liberals we
consider the freedom of the individual, or family, as the highest goal through
which we judge social arrangements.” (Friedman 1962: 12) Thus, freedom
reaches meaning and becomes value only as an outcome of the interrelations set
between the members of a society. Therefore, freedom must be conceptualized
through the light of social organization which will reflect the way it is structured
and used within society. From a particular perspective, freedom will be
associated in Friedrich A. Hayek’s philosophy with the possibility of the
spontaneous order which represents the “result of the fact that individuals follow
certain rules as their answer to the immediate situations of the
environment”(Hayek 1973: 43); this doesn’t mean anything else but that the rules
which contribute to the molding of the spontaneous order do not originate in the
level of rational human construction, but that they appear spontaneously within
an (cultural) evolution process.
Therefore, when arguing the dispersed nature of human knowledge,
Hayek will not refer to the scientific knowledge (which can be centralized) but to
the knowledge which can interpret and understand “the social”. Scientific
knowledge (general rule knowledge) represents just a tiny part of the entire
human knowledge for there also exists “an area of important knowledge, yet
unorganized, which cannot be named scientific in the sense of general rule
knowledge: particular time and space circumstances knowledge.” (Hayek 1973:
80)
So, in the economic space or in the social space, knowledge is essentially
a dispersed one, and through this we must understand a practical knowledge
typical to individual circumstances. Social knowledge is stored in rules, and such
rules are not consciously articulated, but, in exchange, obeying the rules is vital
for the efficiency of our actions; moreover, such rules are extremely difficult to
remove or modify, even if, in Cartesian manner, we cannot prove their ultimate
validity: “the fact that we don’t have to believe anything from what it has been
proven to be false does not mean that we have to believe only in what it has been
proven to be valid.”(Hayek 1960: 64) What we can certainly iterate is that this
particular type of knowledge takes the shape of tacit knowledge: it refers more to
the skill knowledge than to the action knowledge.
The notion of tacit knowledge was suggested by Michael Polanyi when
in the paper The Study of Man he distinguished between tacit knowledge and
explicit knowledge: “what we often describe as knowledge, as formulated in
words or representations, or mathematical formulas, is just a particular type of
knowledge; on the other hand, the unformulated knowledge, similar to one we
have when we want to do something, is another type of knowledge. If we name
the first type of knowledge explicit and the second tacit knowledge then we can
say that we always tacitly know that we own a true explicit knowledge.” (Polanyi
1959: 12)
Also, a similar distinction was made by Gilbert Ryle, between know-how
and know-that, considering as Hayek did, the fact that “knowing-how cannot be
reduced to knowing-that, and that the predicates of intelligence are definable in
terms of know-how”(Ryle 1971: 224), or by Michael Oakeshott when suggesting
the notion of traditional knowledge (Oakeshott 1995). In this respect, of the fact
that ultimately the knowledge is practical, Hayek subscribes to the thesis of the
preeminence of the (tacit) practical coordinate in the construction of human
knowledge. Yet, this doesn’t mean that Hayek rejects the possibility of theoretic
knowledge, but that the theoretic reconstruction of practical knowledge cannot be
but an incomplete one, “the theory represents for him only the visible part of tacit
knowledge, the largest part of it being beyond our articulation power.”
(Oakeshott 1995: 15)
The explicit knowledge or, the theory in general, only represents the
form of knowledge which can be expressed throughout words, symbols or the
connections between these (the case of scientific knowledge, the knowledge
particular to exact science).
The fact that spontaneous social science generates tacit knowledge
represents a vital element for the Liberal political theory because questions and
ultimately excludes the possibility of planning. Also, we must underline that a
large part of social knowledge is ephemeral especially due to the unpredictability
of human nature of which its outcome is. Therefore, the only possibility which
would facilitate rationally design plan would be that “human action, defined in
terms of options or choices, to be a predictable one; only in this case the social
«streets» could be mechanically reproduced.” (Barry 1987: 31) This, obviously,
does not exclude certain regularities in human nature “individual tendency to
maximize pecuniary interest, facilitating economy as science but, being
insufficient to formulate precise quantitative predictions in social science.”
(Barry 1987: 31)
In other words, market analysis, the analysis of human behavior within
the free market is not necessary a rational one; the rationality scale can be
applied only in the case of government intermission (or of any planning
authority) in the demand and offer mechanism, in the flow of tacit knowledge.
So, “the price and income politics, affecting the market mechanism do not allow
an efficient allocation of resources and reduce the productivity of an exchange
economy.” (Barry 1987: 31) Therefore, the “decentralized” spontaneous
processes express a type of “rationality” impossible to fully encompass in the
conceptual language, which would justify the mechanisms of a control center: “in
the absence of the market it is imposable for a planner to exist and know the
individual demands.” (Barry 1987: 32)
The capitalization of this formula in social science, beyond the
theoretical determinations, but without excluding them, doesn’t mean anything
else but the fact that if the largest amount of used knowledge is unarticulated and
impossible to articulate, the individuals “will always know more than will ever
be able to express.” (Gray 1984:15) Thus Hayek, as he also showed in
Constitution of Liberty, will be able to extract one of the main arguments in the
favor of freedom from the human ignorance – “a free (Liberal) regime allows the
use of knowledge in an unknown manner to us today (and ever): any centralized
regime which relies only on explicit knowledge will explore only a small part of
the available knowledge – that tiny part expressible in different reasoning and
sentences.” (Gary 1984;15) Only such a type of regime allows the use of the total
amount of knowledge available in society and, throughout it, it becomes the only
one capable to offer the necessary premises to set-up freedom.
Generally, “knowledge exists only in the form of individual knowledge.
It’s not more than a metaphor to speak about society knowledge as a whole. The
sum of all individuals’ knowledge does not exist anywhere as a whole.” (Hayek
1960: 24-25) Therefore, economic knowledge (as part of social knowledge) will
never be able to exist as an organized coherent corpus, but only as an incomplete
and dispersed form among all the members of a society. According to this view,
the economic knowledge can’t be concentrated at the level of one intellect (or
institution) and this makes any attempt to centralize it impossible and absurd.
This thesis of limited human knowledge is not an empirical or contingent
reality concerning human nature, reality which can be modified (altered) by
theological evolution. It is more “a philosophical thesis concerning the form in
which knowledge exists in the world and the way in which it becomes available
to individuals.” (Barry 1979: 10)
In this epistemological context, if an economy whishes to be successful it
has to be able to handle knowledge division and fragmentation; features
particular to contemporary societies. The issue the social space confronts with
refers not only to: “ the modality of «given» resources allocation – if «given»
refers to the meaning given by each individual who, deliberately, offers an
answer to the issues caused by this set of «given» resources. It is more an issue of
the modality in which we can ensure the best use of the resources known by all
the members of the society in order to reach goals of which relative importance is
known only by these individuals. Or, in short, it is an issue of knowledge use
which is not entirely given to someone.” (Hayek 1952: 77-78)
The modern correspondent of the invisible hand of Adam Smith is
discovered by Hayek under the form of spontaneous order, which in the
economic field is expressed in the form of catallaxy, which is “the order induced
by the mutual adjustments between different particular economies. Catallaxy is
thus a special type of spontaneous order, produced by the market throughout
individuals who act obeying the laws of property, civil laws and agreements”.
“The confusion made due to the ambiguity of the economic term
is so profound that it becomes necessary to limit its utilization to its
original meaning of describing a complex of actions deliberately
coordinated, serving a single set of goals and to adopt another term to
describe
the numerous interrelationed economies system which
constitutes the market order. As the name of «catallactics» has been long
before suggested for the science concerning the market order, and has
recently been revitalized, it is normal to adopt a corresponding term for
the market order itself. The term «catallactics» derivates from the
Katallatein (or Katallasein) Greek verse which, significantly, means not
only «to change» but also «to accept within community» and «to change
from enemy into friend». Thus, the adjective «catallactic» derived in
order to substitute «economic» describing the type of phenomena the
catallactics science refers to. Ancient Greeks didn’t know this term nor
the corresponding substantive; but, if there existed one back then, it
would have been katallaxia. From this we can form the English term
catallaxy which we will use to describe the order which flows from the
mutual adjustments of individual economies within the market. (A)
Catallaxy is therefore, that special type of spontaneous order produced
by the market throughout individuals who act within the norms of
property law, of civil law and agreement. ” (Hayek 1976: 108-109)
The term economy cannot and must not be used because it implies the
hierarchy and design, being moreover specific to the type of internal organization
of economical actors. Therefore, the “confusion between «catallaxy» and
«economy» ultimately derives from the inability to understand that the order
which is the outcome of the conscious coordination – the order of the managerial
hierarchy within a corporation – is depends itself on a more comprehensive
spontaneous. The claim that the realm of human exchanges (the economy) is the
subject of planification, is basically the claim to rebuilt the social life after the
pattern of a factory, of an army or of a corporation or, in other words, after the
pattern of an authoritarian organization.” (Gray 1984: 35-36)
In a similar manner with the market economy of Adam Smith, Hayek’s
catallaxy produces the collective welfare by following and accomplishing
individual goals; similarly to Smith, Hayek argues that no mechanism – besides
the market laissez-faire system – created by the society can accomplish, more
impartially and efficiently, this goal. The impartiality of catallaxy is of a
fundamental importance for Friedrich A. Hayek as the product of the market
order offers a fair allocations of resources, as the objectives of the market can’t
be ranked or planned: “the task of every economic activity is to reconcile the
competing objectives deciding for which of them to be allocated the limited
existing resources. The market order reconciles the demand of various noneconomic objectives using the only process from which everyone benefits from –
yet, without ensuring that the most important demands will represent priorities in
regard with the less important due to the fact that within such a system there
cannot exist only a single order for needs.” (Hayek 1976: 113) Thus, the market
offers the best solution for the economic issues of the society, because only this
type of spontaneous order can provide information on the manner in which “it
can be ensured the best use of resources available to the members of society, to
accomplish objectives of which relative importance is known only by these
individuals.” (Hayek 1952: 80)
Within the free market, unlike planned (command) economies (economic
plan being itself absurdity) information, knowledge is directly transmitted and
coordinated using the price mechanisms in an unbounded competition process.
So, the fundamental epistemic function of the market is captured by Hayek when
he considers competition as “the procedure used to discover such acts (realities)
which, otherwise could not be known or used.” (Hayek 1978:191) Therefore,
this type of knowledge is “locally and temporally fragmented”. Moreover, as
already demonstrated, the knowledge which balances the economic space
allowing the cohabitation of various personal levels, is not a theoretical
knowledge but a practical one, impossible to centralize; is a knowledge “of
individuals, of (real) local conditions and of (distinct) particular circumstances”.
Thus, the knowledge division, fragmentation issue becomes “the core issue of the
economy as social science.” (Hayek 1952: 50)
Conclusions
The refusal to accept the mosaic structure of knowledge particular to the
social space represents the direct effect of the attempt to consciously (rationally)
coordinate the social process itself under the form of different social and political
engineering culminating under the form of what Saint-Simon named “ scientific
Socialism”. What the social (political) engineer lacks is, first, the total control of
the information, which he should manage and, second, placing himself within a
(scientific) theoretical diagram he refuses that particular type of knowledge about
which Hayek says that “is almost entirely a type of knowledge of the particular
circumstances of time and space or, maybe, a technique to discover these
circumstances in a given environment.” (Hayek 1995: 174-175) Therefore, the
place of the (social or political) engineer is taken, both in Hayek’s and the entire
New Right Liberal tradition’ cases, by the entrepreneur and the institution of
entrepreneurship.
The impossibility to plan derives from the impossibility to centralize tacit
knowledge, from the fact that human actions are ultimately governed by
unconsciously obeyed and impossible to verbally define rules – “ as long as
individuals act according to rules it is not necessary for them to be aware of these
rules. It is enough for them to know how to act according to the rules, without
knowing that the rules, in articulated terms, are so and so.” (Hayek 1973: 99)
These rules of the tacit knowledge allow the individual to be able to
adapt an environment of which complexity goes beyond the rational human
capacity of understanding and formalization. Consequently, “following such
rules individuals are able to use a huge amount of knowledge which would
otherwise be inaccessible to them under the shape of individual manner”
(Petsoulas 2001: 23) (these rules comprise the accumulated and transmitted
experience from one generation to the other while organizations – the constructed
order – are exclusively limited to the knowledge which can be consciously
controlled).
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A DYSTOPIAN SOCIETY OR THE MORAL DECAY OF
HUMANITY
Stăncuţa Ramona DIMA-LAZA, Lecturer Ph. D.
“Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad
Faculty of Humanities, Politics and Administrative Sciences, Arad
Mobile phone: 0740/496.114
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. The present paper analyses an anti-utopic society, emphasizing
the importance of individual liberty over doing the right thing as described and
satirized by British writer Anthony Burgess in the book entitled A Clockwork
Orange. This matter of choice and free will is characteristic to dystopian
societies which represent a futuristic universe in which the oppressive control of
the state changes people’s lives. It depicts in a shocking manner the effects a
dystopian society has over the individual. Dystopian characters make use of
human weaknesses in order to set forth and to prove the destructive power of
authoritarian rule. Dystopian societies demoralize people, deprive them of the
ability of taking decisions while their personal desires either good or evil, are
taken over by the state.
Key words: society, dystopia, imaginary future, fear, violence, control
Utopia versus dystopia
If some people have a positive view of the future and consider it a utopia, that
is, a clean place, and an era of technological developments, others regard it
as a system that “gradually unravels [and] city dwellers feel the effects in
diffuse ways. Food prices rise until many people cannot afford enough to eat.
Poor refugees appear at the edges of the city looking for a way to survive.
Diseases seem to crop up from nowhere and spread rapidly. Riots explode out
of hunger and desperation. A frightened population turns to the government
to enforce order by any means necessary.” (Tanzil 2004:1)
An anarchic and undesirable society, referring to a bleak future in which
things take a turn for the worse and which displays images of worlds more
unpleasant than our own may be called a dystopian society. The inhabitants
of such a society lead a dehumanized and fearful life; they struggle for
survival. The border between friendship and hatred is so thin and blurred,
that anyone or anything might represent a threat. It is a breakdown from
social order and it is closely-related to our present-day society. Religion is
usually absent in such societies. People tend to replace God with the
government which controls every movement of the citizens. In what concerns
the economy of such a society, they do not have too much freedom of choice
and are not given any career options. The main character in dystopian fiction
will eventually realize that something is wrong with the society he lives in and
will break the law or the rules. Human beings have been created free,
spontaneous and unpredictable, fact which endows them with endless
capabilities. Unlike machines, people must have freedom to move, to speak
and to express ideas and feelings. Any trial of mechanizing individuals leads
to the emergence of a dehumanized world, eliminating thus, all the abovementioned human traits.
The social and political scene of the 20th century determined some writers like
George Orwell or Anthony Burgess to express their fears about the dark
future of humanity. The latter depicted such a society on the edge of
destruction, with a demoralized protagonist under the mercy of the
authorities’ control. Being deprived of free will and choice the individual has
to obey and to live in this devastating environment. Dystopian literature
refers mostly to the decadence of people reflected in acts of violence, sexual
immorality and use of drugs. The protagonists indulge themselves in sin living
only in the present. The basic characteristic of the type of society abovementioned is that the authorities determined an “overall paralysis of any
aesthetic sense…everything is machine-made, mass-produced, and sterile,
and as a consequence, civilization has lost touch with the qualities that once
gave life zest, qualities of passion and vitality, of irrationality and excess that
were both its peril and its promise.”(Whissen 1992) This system destroys
human individualism, controls the information that people receive, claiming
that slavery means, in fact, freedom. When humans begin to be treated like
machines which only process information in order to obtain or to anticipate a
certain result, the so-called “end product” will be more often than not, a
dystopian society. Even if one might think that psychological control
establishes the order in a society, major drawbacks and repercussions occur.
Anthony Burgess’ book entitled A Clockwork Orange represents an attempt to
improve a decaying world, or better said, a dystopian society. “It is this
suspicion of our contemporary liberal humanism, of our willingness to reform
rather than punish, to educate rather than discipline that is seen in A
Clockwork Orange, as a traditionalist’s fear of the future. (...) Obviously
Burgess’s feeling is that there is potentially more good in a man who
deliberately chooses evil, than in one who is forced to be good. Men are what
they are, and are not forced into being so by any social conditioning or
pressures.”(Dix 1971:1-2)
The book does not reflect a true story, but a possible one. He takes an extreme
example of violence to emphasize his strong belief. It deals with alternative
realism because it is a reflection of a future society. Even if it was written in
1962, it renders the society of the years 1995-2000. Personal freedom means
to be able to act according to your own will, and not to be restricted by the
social paradigm in which you live. Burgess wrote about a future dystopia. If a
utopia is an ideal place or a perfect society, where people experience no pain,
in a dystopic future there is no goodness or peace. The society this book
analyses is a dystopic one, filled with imperfection caused by the
government’s role in society. It is a society where juvenile delinquents rob,
rape and terrorize innocent people in order to satisfy their own desires. They
represent a menace to the society. The author raises the opposition between
free will and predestination, emphasizing on Pelagianism and
Augustinianism.
According to Pelagianism all people are sinners by nature. It denies that
God has predestined our lives. Therefore, salvation is within human power,
within our control and it is a matter of free will. On the other hand,
Augustinianism defended the orthodox doctrine of predestination, rejecting the
Pelagian point of view. The position of the Roman Catholic Church is that what
man lost through the Fall, was a gift that did not belong to his being but it was
something given by God, and therefore, the Fall, left the man in his original state.
Burgess adopted an anti-Pelagian position, being closer to Augustianism.
According to him, goodness is something chosen. “Burgess’s romantic view of
violence (...) is that of an old-fashioned traditionalist who can see no good in our
levelled out, contemporary society, which leads to grey totalitarianism. These
romantic views again stem from his Catholic upbringing (…). He calls himself a
sort of Catholic Jacobite, who hates our present-day pragmatic socialism,
because, as he explains in Urgent Copy, “...any political ideology that rejects
original sin and believes in moral progress ought strictly to be viewed with
suspicion by Catholics.” (Dix 1971: 1-2)
Social disintegration in the imaginary world of A Clockwork Orange
The book opens with the image of Alex and
his three friends, Pete, Dim and Georgie who are
all wearing fashionable clothes. The author insists
on this aspect in order to emphasiye the salient
characteristics of this teens culture, of their music
and garments. He defines the youth culture as
conventional, passive violent and destructive. They
spend a lot of money on drinking their favourite
milk “improved” with drugs in it, called Korova
Milkbar. They talk about the girls in the bar and
about the hallucinogenic effects these drugs have
on the persons surrounding them. They go out on
streets at night mocking at old people and
assaulting them; they rip out their teeth and their
clothes. After that they take a break for another
drink and continue their atrocities. They rob a
shop and beat the shopkeepers and afterwards
return to the bar as if nothing had happened. They
always look for the company of women who are
used as alibis and not only. On a deeper level, they
return into their arms in the same way children
return to their mothers, that is, for protection.
Alex feels disappointed, because he does not have a
cause to fight for. He is indifferent and has no
purpose in life and the author wants to stress this
out, as he considered that this was something
typical for the British society of the time.
The society Burgess depicts is a mixture of
Soviet-style communism and American capitalism.
At the time when the book was written this seemed
very possible and realistic as the two states abovementioned were to become the world’s greatest
powers. This dystopian setting represents in fact,
an extension of contemporary conditions. There is
a powerful influence of the Russian culture in the
book, set forth by the use of the Russian-inflected
vocabulary: Korova Milkbar, droogs (word which
stands for the English term of “friends”). The
language Burgess introduces in the book is called
Nadsat. This is the language used by the
protagonists when talking about violence. This
combination of Russian words, English Cockney
and Burgess’ invented words, makes the text very
difficult to read. The reader should try to figure
out the meanings from the context and draw up
some sort of a dictionary. For example: blood is
called krovvy or tolchock means to hit.
In the same night Alex finds another old man and beats him roughly until
he vomits blood. Being too drunk to react in any way, he tells the boys that
people like him cannot live in this world anymore, because it has become a world
of the youth culture, full of violence and evil. During their night “walk” the three
thugs come across another gang fascinated by the same atrocities. They start a
fight but are interrupted by the police sirens and they have to run – moment in
which a new idea springs into Alex’s mind. He decides they need a car so he
leads the boys to a place where they can steal a Durango 95. Afterwards, tired of
the same crimes, and under the pretext of needing a glass of water and a phone,
they break into some people’s home, steal everything they can and rape the
woman. The house they terrorize belongs to a writer, F. Alexander. They mock at
him and tear his manuscript entitled “A Clockwork Orange”, defecate on the
carpet and beat them without any mercy. Obsessed by music, Alex even finds a
rhythm or a beat in what they are doing: in his sick mind, he hears that the wife’s
screams follow the rhythm of Dim’s punches. The book of this writer will
become very illustrative for our topic of discussion, as Alex is deeply impressed
by the following phrase: “The attempt to impose upon man, a creature of growth
and capable of sweetness . . . laws and conditions appropriate to a mechanical
creation, against this I raise my sword-pen.”(Burgess 1986:10) The sentence the
author uses to end the first chapter “Still, the night was still very young”
(Burgess 1986:11) is meant to inform the reader that this is only the beginning
for these hooligans. Out of sadistic acts of cruelty, Alex proves that he is only
interested in causing pain and not in having loads of money. He steals, but not
each time when he has the occasion. He regards violence as some kind of art. His
razor, for example is an object of art that inspires him and awakes his poetic side
and urging him to use metaphors from time to time. One act of violence is
compared to a masterpiece. Artists never compromise their creations and neither
does he. He likes to be elegant in his moves, gestures and vocabulary, and
therefore is bothered by his friends’ crass gestures and vulgar laughing. The
droogs’ nightlife best emphasizes the idea of a dystopian society. The first
reference to the future is the brand of the car they steal. The author uses irony
and satire to create the image of this mass market culture, by putting together
elements characteristic both to communism and to capitalist societies. And the
output is, of course a fictional world or society. Cinema and TV sets are also
brought into discussion. Alex believes that this form of entertainment is a
governmental manipulative technique, used by the authorities in order to prevent
the people from planning rebellions or from threatening the order already
established. Instead of walking at night on dangerous streets, people prefer to
stay indoors, in the coziness of their home. Therefore, if TVs are part of a
governmental plan, thugs like Alex might also be regarded in this way, as they
represent another reason while people avoid getting out. This idea is stressed out
by one of the victims: “It’s a stinking world because it lets the young get on to
the old like you done.”(Burgess 1986:23) He suggests that the government
tolerates violence and prevents people from taking measures.
Further on, as a contradiction to their behaviour so far, the boys act like
law-abiding citizens when having to pay the train fare. The presence of the
Korova Milkbar is felt again, as they keep returning there. An altercation occurs
there between Alex and Dim because of the latter one’s rudeness. Dim is very
impolite with a woman, an opera singer, fact which drives Alex mad. He hates
mannerless people. However, after having made it clear that he is the boss, the
boy drops the argument. On his way home, Alex witnesses several atrocities like,
a vandalized elevator, assaulted people, raped women.
Anthony Burgess distinguished two types of good: an aesthetic one and
an ethical one, both embodied in his protagonist. Alex commits several crimes,
but however, his favourite pastime is listening to Bach and Beethoven. On one
hand, this juxtaposition seems awkward, but on the other, there is no logical
reason why they should be in contradiction. This duality explains Alex’s
behaviour when punching Dim for being rude and impolite: he is violent, but
still, he hates vulgarity. The opera singer performs a song entitled “barred
window” which acts like an omen for Alex’s future imprisonment. The
protagonist also has suicidal tendencies. While lying in bed and listening to his
favourite music such thoughts are crossing his mind: “when the music...rose to
the top of its big highest tower, then, lying on my bed with glazzies [eyes] tight
shut and rookers [hands] behind my gulliver [head], I broke and spattered and
cried aaaaaaah.”(Burgess 1986:36) His intentions are also reflected in the phrase:
“on to the sill, the music blasting away to my left, and I shut my glazzies and felt
the cold wind on my litso [face], then I jumped.”(Burgess 1986:37)
Burgess sets forth the communist mentality of the society, by creating
some paintings on the walls that represent idealized and dignified workers. Alex
is outraged when he sees that some kids have vandalized with graffiti these mural
paintings. There is a relationship between serious art and graffiti: if the first one
represents a symbol of the state, the second one stands for hooligans. Even if
thugs are violent they are less threatening than the state. Graffiti is somehow
humanized, as it represents the individual work of independent artists.
The following morning, Alex refuses to go to school, under the pretext of
a terrible headache so he dozes off again. His friends are also present in his
dreams, which have the same violent nature as real life. When woken up by the
visit of his Post-Corrective Adviser, and when accused of certain fights and
crimes, Alex, very convincingly, denies everything. However, the Adviser does
not believe him and keeps wondering how could he turn out the way he did, with
such good parents and contradicting thus, every existing pattern that might lead
to such a behaviour: poverty, child abuse, broken families. “We study the
problem and we’ve been studying it for damn well near a century, yes, but we get
no farther with our studies. You’ve got a good home here, good loving parents,
you’ve got not too bad of a brain. Is it some devil that crawls inside
you?”(Burgess 1986:40) But Alex is not impressed by this visit at all. Moreover,
he is revolted because he disagrees with the governmental policy that denies the
citizens the right to behave badly. Therefore, he commits all sort of crimes out of
pure pleasure and there is no motivation that could stop him. His sadistic acts
have no reason at all. He even explains to the Post-Corrective Adviser: “They
don’t go into the cause of goodness, so why of the other shop? . . . Badness is of
the self, the one, the you or me on our oddy knockies, and that self is made by
old Bog or God and is his great pride and radosty. But the not-self cannot have
the bad, meaning they of the government and the judges and the schools cannot
allow the bad because they cannot allow the self. And is not our modern history,
my brothers, the story of brave malenky selves fighting these big
machines?”(Burgess 1986:41)
The newspapers are concerned with the same issue of juvenile
delinquency, and the parents and teachers should be held responsible, due to their
failure to impose discipline on their children. After this visit Alex finds an
explanation for why there is good and evil in the world: God created certain
people to be good, and others to be bad. And the government should not try to
change God’s creation.
The government depicted by the author is one that can improve things
and alter people’s behaviours through education and reform. And Alex seems to
contrast and contradict such believes. His actions apparently have no reason or
purpose, but if reading between the lines, the reader will realize that, in fact, his
entire violent character is triggered by the desire to oppose the state and a flawed
social order. The only choice given to him is that of being evil and of surviving
in that society.
After having explored the duality of goodness-evil, the author does not
hesitate to go into the opposition between intuition and intellect. Our protagonist
considers that only stupid people rely on intellect: “I viddied [saw] that thinking
is for the gloopy [stupid] ones and that the oomny [smart] ones use like
inspiration and what Bog [God] sends.”(Burgess 1986:45) For him intuition
means much more than the intellect, as it is a reflection of man’s free will. Being
committed to violence, he rejects the state’s imposed rules and behaviour.
However, intuition is not always the best ally. If in the beginning he was
underage and therefore could avoid legal problems, now he is arrested due to his
impulsive gestures. His fondness of classical music also proves to be detrimental
on the long run as he loses his concentration. The author seems to support Alex’s
crimes rather than the state’s cruelty. The state manipulates the law at its own
will – thus Alex gets beaten up by the police without any reason whatsoever.
They are similar to any ordinary thugs – the only difference is that their criminal
acts are committed under the protection of the state. He is outraged by the state’s
hypocrisy, which, on one hand beats him brutally, and on the other, wants to
redeem him and to establish a certain order, urging Alex to become an exemplary
citizen.
If in the beginning Alex was the head of the gang and acted as such, after
his imprisonment, he loses his authority and the power goes into the chaplain’s
hands. Now he has been deprived of what he loved most: freedom and the
opportunity of choice. But, the rules of a dystopian state as the one depicted in
this book, are a bit different: criminals are not punished in prison, the authorities
try to redeem them by determining them to renounce to their free will. It is some
kind of brainwashing, as the authorities make them forget about their violent
instincts, acting according to the behaviour imposed and approved by the state.
And to achieve this, they found an experimental technique called Ludovico’s
Technique. First of all, they erase Alex’s identity by giving him a number –
6655321- instead of his name. The same thing happened to all the other
prisoners. They all have numbers, fact which proves that the government has
depersonalized a lot of people so far. While in jail, the protagonist has a moment
of revelation and he feels like identifying himself with the state. And he does this
while reading the Bible and approving of the criminal behaviour of the Roman
soldiers who tortured Jesus Christ. Going back to the rehabilitation technique
above-mentioned, the Minister decides that Alex should de their main subject.
By trying to establish a new discipline he plans to “cure” the murderers
and the hooligans. If in the past, the state encouraged juvenile delinquency,
because it was convenient to them, now, it is planning to remove it as it has
grown into a threat and bad publicity for the government. Human nature has been
endowed with the freedom of choosing between good behaviour and bad
behaviour. Ludovico’s Technique is meant to eliminate free will and to turn
people into “puppets” or government –created mechanisms or “clockwork
oranges”. These are symbols of protest against the way in which the state
transforms people and turns them into clockwork oranges. The human being is
compared to an orange, meaning that the man is capable of growth and
sweetness. But unfortunately the government takes away people’s freedom of
choice. And Alex is the perfect example of such a practice as he is made to
operate like a machine. He represents the typical teenager in a society ruled by
youth violence. He regards his evil behaviour as art - which he loves very much.
The feeling he has when listening to such music is the same with the one
experienced when committing a crime. He considers that good and evil are the
two sides of human nature and by going for the latter one he expresses his inner
self. Anthony Burgess underlined the idea that no matter how evil a person is, his
or her acts should not be controlled by the government or by any other supreme
authority because this might represent a greater evil than the crimes Alex
committed. The protagonist regains his personality only at the end of the book,
when the State stops controlling him, giving him the opportunity of becoming
conscious of his errors.
As part of the Ludovico procedures, Alex is asked to watch some special
movies. As he regards himself as a unique person, he can’t imagine that his
perceptions might be affected and even changed in this way. But the project
coordinator, Branom considers him no more than a subject of his experiment. For
him, Alex is a mechanical entity, predictable and unable to make free choices.
The “special films” are very similar to Alex’s crimes and they seem so real that
the boy begins to feel pain and discomfort. It is a procedure meant to convert
incorrigible hooligans into honest citizens. The scientists studying the evolution
of society were just a few, as they were activating in a relatively new field. They
adopted this idea of reforming the criminals, that is, giving them a second chance
by removing any criminal instincts. However, there is this risk of removing other
pleasures, too. Therefore, this technique is rejected by the protagonist as it
reduces his possibility of making moral choices; it also has the side effect of
making him hate his favourite music. Ludovico’s Technique makes use of the
individual’s aesthetic pleasures and senses. The author created this method in
order to analyse the ethical implications of people’s behavior in his society. The
individual’s right to make free choices is protected by the prison chaplain.
Talking to him, Alex offers himself as a guinea pig for the Ludovico’s
Technique, in order to get out of jail and to make a so-called act of goodness. But
the chaplain is not really sure whether this technique works or not. “The question
is whether such a technique can make a man good. Goodness comes from within,
6655321. Goodness is something chosen. When a man cannot choose, he ceases
to be a man. It may not be nice to be good, 6655321. It may be horrible to be
good. I know I shall have many sleepless nights about this. What does God want?
Does God want goodness or the choice of goodness? Is a man who chooses the
bad perhaps in some way better than a man who has the good imposed upon him?
You are passing now to a region where you will be beyond the power of prayer.
A terrible, terrible thing to consider. And yet, in a sense, in choosing to be
deprived of the ability to make an ethical choice, you have in a sense really
chosen the good. So I shall like to think. So, God help us all, 6655321.”(Burgess
1986:50) If the prison chaplain supports freedom of choice, and the negative
consequences that come with the territory, the minister, on the other hand,
supports an ordered society. The Minister of the Interior, who comes to power
during Alex’s imprisonment, claims that criminals should be cured and reformed,
but not punished. Therefore, he sets up an experimental rehabilitation programme
which should destroy any criminal instincts. His idea of creating a perfect
society is for the government to rule cleanly and efficiently, maintaining order in
the streets. He thinks hooligans should use their violence in the service of the
state and therefore decides to hire them as police officers. As a consequence there
would be more space in prison for political offenders. By creating this character,
the author tried to mock at the socialist governments which tend to overlook the
needs, the principles or personal liberties of the individual. He is not interested in
studying the root of evil but to sacrifice the human individuality at any costs, so
as to obtain State security.
This imaginary procedure, adopted to examine a contemporary world is
typical for the dystopian state. This new “dislike” of classical music represents
for Alex a tragical loss. He does not condemn his friends’ betrayal or the
policemen that beat him up, but the idea of being deprived of free will and
implicitly of music represents the ultimate sin for him. Having lost his identity,
Alex becomes more and more vexed when he vomits for the first time while
listening to Beethoven and resorts to extreme acts.
By the time the procedure will come to an end, Alex will become a
martyr formed by the state with the purpose of achieving social stability. Being
now ready to return to the real world, Alex exhibits a totally different behaviour:
he is humble and submissive. The chaplain realizes that this new procedure
adopted by the government is nothing more than another embodiment of criminal
behaviour. He considers that free will should be valued and appreciated, because
once the human being becomes incapable of reasoning, he automatically loses
any intention of doing good things and of taking decisions. Alex seems that his
mind is under the control of a police force and any time he feels the urge to
commit a crime he feels sick. This is the moment when he remembers about the
manuscript he saw in the writer’s house and refers to himself as “a clockwork
orange”. He feels he has been forced to respond to certain stimuli and he can’t do
anything about it anymore. If on one hand he has become harmless and
inoffensive on the other, he is not capable of protecting himself of reacting in any
way in the tough world outside the prison walls.
In the last part of the book the reader finds a calm and quiet Alex,
passive and mocked at by the people he comes across. If in the beginning he was
the aggressor, now he becomes the aggressed one. Even in his family, when
being criticized and reprimanded and made responsible for the pain he has caused
to his parents, he has no reaction. When the people he had hurt in the past,
revenge and beat him up, he displays no violent behaviour. He feels like a
humiliated victim. Trying to find a way out, he takes some drugs, hoping that
they will induce the same state he had when listening to classical music. But,
unfortunately for him, he feels much worse, as the drugs enhance his
helplessness.
When getting out of prison, Alex finds a new world increasingly
intolerant of crime and therefore he should be safe, if considering his
powerlessness of defending himself. But the police have become the new
brutalizing force. His old friends, Dim and Billyboy, who have become law
enforcement officers stand for the moral and legal decline of the society.
However, the government’s main concern is to maintain the appearance of order
on the streets and not necessarily to reduce crime. When meeting again the writer
whose wife he had violated in the past, Alex is treated with compassion and
understanding. Hearing about her death (as a consequence of his deeds) he feels
no sorrow and he does not regret his actions. Even if his criminal impulses have
been smothered he feels no compassion for people and has no remorse. He
behaves like a robot programmed to avoid bad things and his only concern is to
avoid for his “new” friend to find out the truth about who he really is.
His friend, F. Alexander, whom he regards as a father, eventually finds
out that Alex is the one who raped and murdered his wife. Thus, our protagonist
becomes an Oedipal symbol and a rivalry develops between the two men. If in
the beginning the writer either sympathized with Alex and felt pity for the poor,
innocent child, or wanted to use him as a “tool” against the government, now, he
experiences new feelings towards Alex: he begins to hate and despise him,
looking for revenge. The Freudian son is suggested several times by Anthony
Burgess, the government being regarded as a paternal institution. Alex feels as if
he is being treated like an object. In order to reach his political goals, F.
Alexander decides that Alex would be much more valuable if dead. It will have a
greater impact and he might be regarded as a martyr in the criminal hands of the
state.
With all sort of manipulative techniques, F. Alexander drives Alex to
committing suicide. However he does not die but is seriously injured. While in
the hospital, the Minister visits him in order to inform him that he is very proud
of the man Alex has grown into, and that he even found him a job. Both F.
Alexander and the Minister use Alex for their personal political convictions. And
thus, the matter of choice is brought again into discussion. While hospitalized,
Alex regains his old psyche and is happy to listen to Beethoven again which
suggests to the reader that he is again capable of violent crimes.
Anthony Burgess claims that “there is, in fact, not much point in writing
a novel unless you can show the possibility of moral transformation, or an
increase in wisdom, operating in your chief character or characters.” The author
refers mainly, to the last chapter of the book where the reader finds a more
mature Alex, tired of violence and of his old life. The book ends with the same
image it began: Alex and his droogs are in the same bar, planning to commit a
crime. But this time, Alex is not that willing and happy about it. He just gives
orders and watches how they are carried out. The only thing he can think about is
fatherhood. He is almost sure that his future son would follow into his footsteps
and refuse to obey to society’s rules. “And nor would he be able to stop his own
son, brothers. And so it would itty on to like the end of the world, round and
round and round, like some bolshy gigantic like chelloveck, like old Bog Himself
(by courtesy of Korova Milkbar) turning and turning and turning a vonny
grahzny orange in his gigantic rookers.”(Burgess 1986: 70) This is the moment
when Alex leaves childhood behind and becomes an adult, realizing that life
follows a cyclical pattern. Alex is now ready for a new life, making plans for the
future, for starting a family.
To sum up, Anthony Burgess created a state in which, out of a burning
ambition to protect the society the government took away freedom of choice (as
such choices affect the safety of society) and replaced it with prescribed good
behaviour. So when Alex was “deprived” of his pleasure of stealing and raping
and murdering the result was a dangerous one.
Alex embodies the endless flaws of the society he lives in and the extent
to which they have affected him. Freedom of choice is a human attribute or a
birth inalienable right which distinguishes people from machines and animals.
The protagonist of the book under discussion chooses violence and wickedness
as a form of manifesting this right. When he is deprived of this inborn right, he
loses his individuality and capacity of protecting himself against evil.
Motifs and symbols of a dystopian society
Free will is the highest gift men have been endowed with, as it is the only
thing that separates human beings and animals from machines. Therefore,
Anthony Burgess created a character typical for a dystopian society. He is only
capable of wickedness, and this is somehow accepted as it represents his choice.
However, the state robs of his self-determination turning him into nothing more
than an “object”. The author also tried to emphasize a Christian conception of
morality based on the idea that it is also a matter of choice: good behaviour
means nothing if imposed on the individual; if he does not choose goodness
because he wants to. The references to Christ provide Alex with a martyr figure
who gives up his identity and self-determination in the benefit of the society. At
some point, the reader is confused and wonders which is worse: the protagonist’s
wickedness or the evil of the government. By using all sort of technological
devices, threats, mass-market culture, the state takes all necessary means to
control individuals like Alex, to make them act predictably, and thus to protect its
stability. Apathy and neutrality are two satirized features used to characterize the
average inhabitant of postwar England. Fearing of going outside at night, they
prefer to stay indoors and watch TV.
“Duality as the Ultimate Reality” is a phrase coined by Anthony Burgess.
“This phrase reflects Burgess’s understanding of the world as a set of
fundamental and coequal oppositions of forces. A Clockwork Orange abounds
with dualities: good versus evil, commitment versus neutrality, man versus
machine, man versus government, youth versus maturity, and intellect versus
intuition, to name some of the most prominent ones. The important aspect of this
theme is that, while one element of a given duality may be preferable to the other
- such as good over evil - each force is equally essential in explaining the
dynamics of the world. To know one of the opposing forces is to implicitly know
the other. The notion of duality comes into play in A Clockwork Orange
particularly during the debate over good and evil, where Alex at one point
debunks the validity of a political institution that does not account for individual
evil as a naturally occurring phenomenon.“(SparkNotes 2005:5)
Classical music represents a motif or a symbol in the book. “Alex’s love
of classical music within the confines of the novel’s repressive government
invokes Plato, who argued that the enjoyment of music must be suppressed if
social order is to be preserved. Plato identifies music with revolutionary pleasure,
an association that may easily be applied to Alex in A Clockwork Orange. Alex’s
love of classical music is inextricable from his love of violence, and he rarely
thinks of one without the other. Both of these passions fly in the face of a
government that, above all else, desires a Platonic order. It is thus no accident
that Alex’s taste for Beethoven and Mozart sours once he undergoes Reclamation
Treatment.”(SparkNotes 2005:5)
Among the symbols used to depict a dystopian society we distinguish:
the hallucinogenic milk, the image of darkness, and daylight. The milk represents
uniformity and the immaturity of the people who drink it in that bar, proving that
the teenagers are less innocent than the adults. People turn into “objects” and
become inhuman under the effect of this drug as they are urged to commit
atrocities. Darkness is a symbol of the individual’s free will. It gives him the
opportunity of intimacy and silence, necessary to make a choice. If at night the
protagonist feels relaxed, during the day he is restless and agitated because of the
police patrolling on the streets or because of the doctors all dressed up in white.
During the day Alex loses his mysterious features and traits and is just an
ordinary man.
This paper weighs the values and dangers of individual freedom and state
control analyzing whether one is willing to give up liberty for order or the other
way around. It depicts in a shocking manner the effects a dystopian society has
over the individual. Dystopian characters make use of human weaknesses in
order to set forth and to prove the destructive power of authoritarian rule.
Dystopian societies demoralize people, deprive them of the ability of taking
decisions while their personal desires, either good or evil, are taken over by the
state. They control the citizens of society, restrict independent thought, put them
under permanent surveillance. People fear the outside world, they live in a
dehumanized state where dissent is forbidden. The whole society is in fact an
“illusion” of a perfect world, illusion which is maintained through corporate or
mass-media control, red tape or incompetent government representatives, new
technologies like robots or scientific methods and religious ideology. The
dystopian “inhabitant” constantly tries to escape this world in which he feels
trapped, he does not trust the social and political system, which, in hi opinion,
promote wrong values and ideas. Through his own deeds and words, thoughts
and feelings, this “inhabitant” helps the reader recognize dystopian societies.
Conclusions
In conclusion, Alex is a dystopic character, with a violent destiny. He
spends his youth robbing, stealing, raping or attacking people just for fun, in the
same way most of the teenagers do in a post-industrialized world. This “game of
cruelty” is interrupted when this dystopian character is arrested and sentenced to
fourteen years in prison. Out of pure naïveté and of a strong desire to get out of
jail, he accepts to become the ”guinea pig” of a governmental experiment which
turns him into a mechanism, into a shadow of the man he used to be. The nausea
he feels when trying to resume his old habits transforms him into a clockwork
orange – fact which questions his humanity. Released by any criminal instincts,
he is sent back into a society where he is deprived of any means of defending
himself, becoming a victim of brutality.
The author does not support any ethics and moral principles. In
fairytales, the good and the evil have a certain shape, while in this book, both of
them reside in the same human being. A man cannot be totally good or totally
evil. The society described in this book makes the reader reflect over the human
nature, while the image created is like a “shot” against violence, and not a
supporting argument in its favour. Dystopian worlds reflect human alienation
into an imaginary future, disclosing the fragile boundaries that separate good and
evil. According to the writer, the character he drew up does not represent the
output of social norms; his whole being and his behaviour are a reflection of his
own choices on the background of a sombre future in a hopeless world.
The dystopian issues are very appealing and attractive as they connect, to
some extent, to the harsh reality of our time, and to the violent society we live in.
There are scenes occurring during the day when the protagonist acts like a
normal teenager, and night scenes when people get killed without any reason.
This situation is similar to present-day society: we also have ghettos, criminals
and unsafe night walks. The dystopian society forces people to become aware of
their ephemeral lives in a world where appearances are no more than two relative
concepts; the human individual is a simple victim who cannot do anything else
but watch. There are no rules or laws in a dystopic environment, and a simple
walk at night might cost one, one’s life.
Good and evil are two facets of the same coin and it is questionable
whether they ever meet. The ideas debated in this paper represent a challenge or
an experiment for the reader who is forced to feel and live the cruelties of a
dystopian character. His transition from criminal to a simple “object” and later on
to a “social machine” is meant to define human nature and the influence society
has upon it. Despite the scandalous atrocities Alex has committed, the state
caused a greater damage: it interfered with people’s personal lives trying to
change them and turn them into machines incapable of ethical decisions. Beyond
the violent acts of Alex there is the tragical image of the modern man, sad, lonely
and helpless who has nothing more to hope for. It is a terrible perspective which,
unfortunately might become the reality we live in.
Bibliography
1. Alexander, M. A History of English Literature. Loondon: MacMillan
Press, Ltd, 2000.
2. Burgess, A. A Clockwork Orange. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1986.
3. Carter, R., McRae, J. The Routledge History of Literature in English.
London: Routledge, 1997.
4. Ford, B. The Pelican Guide to English Literature. vol. 7. The Modern
Age. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964.
5. Carol M. Dix, Writers & their works. London: Longman Group Ltd.
1971.
6. Newton, K. M. Twentieth Century Literary Theory. London: MacMillan
Press Ltd.,1997.
7. Sanders, A. The Short Oxford History of English Literature. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994.
8. Stevenson R. The British Novel Since the Thirties. Iaşi: Institutul
European, 1993.
9. Whissen, T. R. Classic Cult Fiction: A Companion to Popular Cult
Literature. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.
10. SparkNotes Editors. SparkNote on A Clockwork Orange. [Online]
Available via http:// sparknotes.com. cited March 8th, 2011.
11. Tanzil, E. Humanity in dystopian societies. [Online] Available via
http://www-scf.usc.edu/~morihisa/essay1.htm, cited March 8th, 2011.
12. Burgess Anthony, A Clockwork Orange. [Online] Available via
http://www.onread.com/reader/1414538, March 6th 2011.
THE UNINOMINAL VOTE AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE
ROMANIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Ph.D. Claudiu PORUMBĂCEAN
"Vasile Goldis" Western University of Arad
Faculty of Humanities, Politics and Administrative Sciences, Arad
Mobile phone: 0740/218234
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. Since 1990, after the first democratic
elections in Romania, before each election, there were debates
about the technical way in which elections should be conducted. If,
as of May 20th 1990 and till the autumn of 2004, parliamentary
elections held in Romania were conducted in the form of
proportional representation, by voting on political party lists, in
electoral districts strictly drawn by type and capital district, after
the 2004 election debates around the modification of the voting
system were approached with increased interest and very intense
discussions at the decision – making levels were initiated.
Thus, after lengthy debates in parliament and inside the civil
society, and also following the referendum on 25th of November
2007, initiated by the President under the Constitution of Romania
(in consultation with the Parliament), it was decided that the
Romanian electoral system would be modified from the
proportional party lists voting method into the uninominal majority
vote in electoral constituencies and uninominal colleges
(districts).
The decision being thus taken by the voters, the Parliament started
to discuss the suggested bills and finally Law no. 35/2008 was
passed in March 2008, this law being known as the "law of the
single vote".
Law no. 35/2008 confirms the modification of the Romanian
electoral system and the November 2008 parliamentary elections
were held under its prerogatives. The consequences of the
electoral changes are still commented upon by the most prominent
public
life
players
in
Romania.
Keywords: uninominal voting, elections, electoral system, parliament,
constituency.
Both in the past, and mainly today, political science is concerned about
how to find the best formula by which votes obtained during an election ballot
should be transferred into seats in the legislative assembly. There have been
found various mathematical formulas, electoral systems have been invented that
claim to achieve the highest representation of the voters’ will. There is no
consensus about the virtues of an electoral system: each has both advantages and
disadvantages, and not always the electoral systems recommended by political
scientists are they put into practice by the political class (Porumbăcean 2009:
145-155).
After 1990, since the democratic elections in Romania, before each
election there were debates about the technical way in which elections should be
conducted.
If, as of May 20th 1990 and till the autumn of 2004, parliamentary
elections held in Romania were conducted in the form of proportional
representation, by voting on political party lists, in electoral districts strictly
drawn by type and capital district, after the 2004 election debates around the
modification of the voting system were approached with increased interest and
very intense discussions at the decision – making levels were initiated.
Thus, after lengthy debates in parliament and inside the civil society, and
also following the referendum of November 25th 2007, initiated by the President
under the Constitution of Romania (in consultation with the Parliament), it was
decided that the Romanian electoral system would be modified from the
proportional party lists voting method into the uninominal majority vote in
electoral
constituencies
and
uninominal
colleges
(districts).
It has been said that the system of proportional representation prevailing
since 1990 is not making the political parties responsible and it rejects them from
the voters’ real will and there has been a need for transposing the Romanian
voting system applying the majority uninominal system which would lead to the
establishment of direct relations between elected representatives and voters
because of that policy to get more familiar with the problems of the colleges to
represent them and voters, in their turn, be more closely informed about the
representing qualities of the candidates to public positions.
According to data from the Central Electoral Bureau which conducted
the referendum on changing the voting system in Romania, which took place on
25th November 2007, the turnout was of 26.5%, the number of valid votes was of
4,851,470, valid votes cast to answer "yes" was of 3,947,212 which represented a
rate of 81.36% and the number of valid votes cast with the answer "NO" was of
784,640, which is a percentage of 16.17 % of the total valid votes cast.
The decision being thus taken by the voters, the Parliament started to
discuss the suggested bills and finally Law no. 35/2008 was passed in March
2008, this law being known as the "law of the single vote."
Law no. 35/2008 confirms the modification of the Romanian electoral
system and the November 2008 parliamentary elections were held under its
prerogatives. The consequences of the electoral changes are still commented
upon by the most prominent public life players in Romania.
The occurrence of the Law 35/2008, known as "the single vote law" it is
therefore the time that confirms that the parliamentary elections of November
30th 2008 to be held in a changed form as compared to those carried out since
1990.
If Chapter 1 of the law stipulates the General provisions relating to
electoral rights, Chapter 2 deals with the first major changes in the electoral
system. Following Article 10 which provides for the establishment within the
country of 42 electoral districts, one in each county, one for Bucharest and a
constituency for the Romanians abroad, a total of 43, Article 12 provides that
within each electoral constituency, there will uninominal colleges based on the
rule of representation constituencies, as follows:
a) the number of constituencies for the Chamber of Deputies,
respectively the Senate shall be determined by dividing the total number of
inhabitants of each constituency under the rules of representation provided in
art. 5. (2) and (3), plus a deputy, respectively a senator college for what exceeds
half the representation norm, the number of colleges of MP in a constituency
being less than 4, and the Senator, less than 2 (....)
Delimitation of constituencies considers the following rules:
a) an electoral college may contain only whole constituencies;
b) the territory covered by a single member college must be in one and the
same county or the municipality of Bucharest;
c) within a locality may be defined as a rule, only whole constituencies
colleagues;
d) A college may include single name, usually one or more entire villages;
e) in Bucharest, college constituencies should not exceed the administrativeterritorial boundaries of the 6 sectors. In each of the sectors, constituencies
will be designed for the Chamber of Deputies colleges and the Senate
election. (1). a), sub-paragraph. g) will be applied to colleges designed
within each sector;
f) The Special Constituency for Romanian citizens residing outside Romania
will consist of four uninominal constituency for the Chamber of Deputies
and two constituencies for the Senate election. Geographical assignation
of the four constituencies for the Chamber of Deputies and the two Senate
constituencies will be established by Government decision, as decided by
a special parliamentary commission established on the basis of
parliamentary representation proportionality within 90 days after entry
into force of this title;
g) in a constituency, the delimitation of colleges for the Chamber of Deputies
and the Senate is done so that their size is calculated by number of
inhabitants, be such that the largest single member to college,
usually, more than 30% higher than the lowest college constituencies,
under the provisions of sub-paragraphs a)-e);
h) an uninominal college for the election of the Senate always consists of a
whole number of constituencies for the Chamber of Deputies whole and
contiguous, within the same electoral districts.
The law also provides electoral thresholds. The threshold is the minimum
required number of votes cast for parliamentary representation or access to
college constituencies where candidates of political parties have obtained the
highest number of votes, at least 50%+1 valid cast. For the Chamber of Deputies
and the Senate there is a requirement for access to parliament of 5% of the total
valid votes cast in all the constituencies.
It is also this law that provides an alternative threshold for the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate, by cumulative fulfilling of the requirement of obtaining
a cumulative six constituencies for the Chamber of Deputies colleges and 3
colleges for Senate constituencies where candidates of political parties stand in
the first place, according to the order of the valid votes cast, even if they have not
fulfilled the 5% threshold.
As I have mentioned before, the legal provisions are interesting but they
are those telling us how the parliamentary seats are granted.
Mandates are distributed in a first phase, after the Central Electoral Bureau
has declared the electoral district on the political parties have passed or not
passed the threshold at the constituency level.
The single-vote (uninominal) system has been used until now in Romania
for the appointment of mayors, the presidents of county council and the President
of Romania. In those cases, however, the single-vote system was used in a
simplistic way, the one who had an absolute majority was appointed the winner
and for that respect the second round was in use as well. Candidates appointment
in this way is a simple one. An absolute majority is required and it’s easily
obtained in the second round. Seats assignment is simple and differs from the
system used in parliamentary elections in November 2008 when elections were
held in constituencies in a single round and a complicated method of awarding
the mandates was used.
These elections were therefore conducted in a completely new form in
Romania. Neither voters nor candidates nor the legislature and executive, who
decided that the elections were not coordinated very well prepared for the social
experience.
Considering that the current population is 21 million, the optimum size of
the legislature would have to be 282. Therefore, the current Chamber of Deputies
meets a population of 36 million. The current electoral law which requires a
standard representation of 70,000 inhabitants for the Chamber of Deputies
maintains this disparity. It was normal, before determination of the principles on
allocation of parliamentary seats, to decrease the norm of representation. But
which one of the MPs present in the Electoral Code Commission would be
willing to conduct such a reform? If this Commission were composed not only of
politicians, but of some experts had been recruited as well, perhaps today we
would have an electoral system that does not cause this deviation from the abovementioned rule (Carp 2008).
Here, therefore, scientists have observed at the outset that the law does not
come first to correlate the number of parliamentarians considering the Romania's
population to approach a normal average, maintaining the existing disproportion.
Since its first steps, though after extensive discussions over a long period
of time after the law 35/2008 was adopted and after a series of virtual
applications (practical tests, simulations), it was found that the law had
provisions difficult to follow and that amendments to make it enforceable.
For example, Law no. 35/2008 provided that in the delimitation between
colleges, between the highest and lowest college there should not be a difference
of more than 30%. Rightly, the parliamentary debate set out idea that should have
drawn first colleges and then to proceed with the discussion on the modalities of
distribution of seats. When it was understood that the provision is difficult to put
into practice, it appeared as necessary to adopt an emergency ordinance,
no. 66/2008, adding to the maximum difference provision of 30%, the phrase "on
a regular basis" meaning that the differences between colleges can be more than
30%.
The same government ordinance, no. 66/2008 sets up, for Bucharest, that
the borders between electoral colleges from Bucharest constituency do not have
to match those of the sectors, provision that has ruined the political parties plans
which have strong organizations in the sectors, but which had to alter their
flowcharts in an unnatural way in order to lead effective electoral campaigns.
There are lots of opinions according to which, beyond the decisions of the
Constitutional Court and of the courts relating to the electoral law itself and its
subsequent amendments, the existing legislation is profoundly undemocratic and
should be amended quickly. It is believed that proportional representation was
the best choice for Romania at the beginning and during the transition, but
currently it has produced its effects and it is time to choose a different electoral
system, but not practiced at the last parliamentary elections, in November
30th, 2008 (Carp 2008).
As I have already mentioned earlier, Law 35/2008 establishes elections
into uninominal constituencies but adds the words "under proportional
representation." This contradiction shows confusion between the two types of
polls: single member plurality and proportional representation. This combination
may be used only if it is voted on ballots mixed in two different lists in different
ways. The electoral law I am referring to does not fit this type of ballot.
The main problem was an application of this law, otherwise foreseeable,
the designation of candidates by mathematical calculations in such a way that the
preferences of voters should be properly reflected in the allocation of seats. For
example, if a competitor has obtained 90% of the votes and was elected in a
college, according to this law, the remaining 40% of the votes that he received
would be the benefit of other candidates of the party he belongs to. Normal
inference is that it does not take into account the choices of voters, in violation of
constitutional democracy rather that the parliament should be the result of the
election and not math.
Voting system practiced in the November 30th 2008, adopted with Law
35/2008 therefore detrimental to the direct and equal vote, with officials in the
stools of persons who, in fact, were not chosen.
One result of the new voting system is that it has led to the lowest
electoral disparity in Romania after 1989 elections. Only 10% of the votes cast
are not in parliament, compared to more than 20% in 1992, 1996 and 2000 and
13% in 2004. This is due to several factors:
a) Law 35/2008 requires a candidate to submit an amount of money sunk
if it fails to obtain 2% of votes at stake which made many of those who sensed
that they had chances success will not enter the electoral competition;
b) low turnout meant that those who participated in the election, voters
determined, the captive of the major parties to know exactly whom they are
voting the previous electoral experiences also having a say so that people avoid
wasted vote, useless. Score of 10% electoral disparity was obtained with all that
2% of the votes cast were white votes, given by voters who wanted to vote but
considered that none of those present candidate on the ballot is not in
preferences their election.
Any electoral system must take into account the common principles of
constitutional democracies. One such principle is equality of votes which may be
obtained either by electoral colleges in the same number of MPs elected in
colleges unequal number of inhabitants, or is an unequal number of MPs elected
in equal number of inhabitants colleagues. The current law allows an unequal
number of parliamentary election in populous mixed colleges. The difference
between colleagues may be "generally, 30%." In these circumstances, it is
understood that the principle of equality of the vote was not respected, with
consequences that we have seen with the completion of parliamentary elections
results (Carp 2008).
Normally, the democratic election of a person's vote must be made by
obtaining a greater degree of representativeness as a vote. This principle was also
promoted when he developed the law of the single vote. Here, however, that the
results of the vote there were fellow candidates who have obtained a small
number of votes and came in 4th place in the competition (for example) in their
college, they clicked on a bench while the rest of the first. Instead, over 40% of
votes of the votes cast, have missed the entry into parliament. Parliament
resulting from the application of this type of voting system is composed of 75%
of parliamentarians who have won elections in the colleges of which 27% have
candidate won more than 50% +1 of the votes, but 25% of winning a seat in
parliament parliament without actually being elected by the voters really ran the
college. Many of them were even very low electoral scores.
The Analysis of the Results Recorded in the Satu Mare Constituency
Following the 2008 Ballot
As a particular case, but showing very well the situation throughout the
country, we have analyzed the results of parliamentary elections held in
November 2008 in no. 32 constituency of Satu Mare4.
Satu Mare Constituency no. 32 included seven uninominal
colleges. Two for the election of senators and five for the election of the House
of Deputies divided among the 318 591 citizens entitled to vote (according to the
County Department of Statistics).
The electoral Results for constituency no. 32 of Satu Mare:
•
•
•
•
4
Results for the Senate:
Electoral College no. 32, uninominal college no. 1 Senate
Total number of voters listed in the electoral lists in college no.
1..................... 179,710
Total
number
of
valid
votes.................................................................................... 61,110
Minimum number of (mostly) valid votes necessary to get the mandate
............. 30,556
Total number of valid votes cast for each candidate for Senator
All the data regarding electoral outcomes were collected from the County Statistical
Institute (Direcţia Judeţeană de Statistică) and from the Satu Mare Electoral Bureau no.
32 (Biroul Electoral de Circumscripţie al Circumscripţiei Electorale 32 Satu Mare).
2. Valer Marian .................................... 16,551 votes - won the
mandate in a second phase award mandates
1. Petre Muresan....................................... 18,065
4. Ovidiu Ioan Silaghi..................................8,097
3. Stephan Ladislaus Konya.......................14,523
5. Ludmila Chiuzbaian Delia...................... 1,096
6. Teodor Gavrilaş........................................1,056
7. Pop Nicolae.................................................972
8. Finta Grigore.............................................. 287
In this college the candidate Petre Muresan obtained the greatest number
of votes. According to the method of allocation of seats, but he had to wait for
the second stage of the award of mandates that resulted into a better placement of
the Social democratic Party inside this college, therefore Mr Valer Marian,
despite the fact he was elected on the second place in the college, with 1514
votes less, won the mandate.
•
•
•
•
Electoral College no. 32, uninominal college 2, Senate
Total number of voters listed in the electoral lists in college 2
......................... 141,648
Total number of valid votes
................................................................................. 50,639
minimum number of (mostly) valid votes necessary to get the mandate:
............25,320
Total number of valid votes cast for each candidate for Senator
1. Tiberiu Gunthner ..................... 26,332 - won the first stage of awarding
the mandate, obtaining an absolute majority
2. Viman Vasile Ioan........................8,155
3. Pop Zoltan Carol......................... 7,055
4. Valentin Macec.............................6,410
5. Crisan Ieronim............................... 937
7. Bolba Cornelio Anca......................842
6. Cotoros Daniela Dorina ................ 908
In Constituency no. 32, for the Senate, the total number of voters listed in
the constituency electoral lists 32 (Satu Mare) was of 321,358 out of which
111,749 votes have been validly cast, 1959 votes being invalid. An interesting
aspect was that many voters (2% throughout the country) preferred the blank
vote, probably trying to express that they wanted to go to the polls, but were not
convinced by any candidate, so since they had no other option they submitted the
ballot without any stamp (option) on it. The number of blank votes in this
constituency for the election of senators is 2,274.
Number of valid votes obtained by each competitor in part:
1. Democratic
Union
of
Hungarians
in
Romania
...............................................40,855
2. Liberal
Democratic
Party.................................................................................25,120
3. Political Alliance Social Democratic Party and the Conservative
Party.........24,706
4. The
National
Liberal
Party
..............................................................................14,507
5. New
Generation
Party
.......................................................................................2,361
6. Greater
Romania
Party
..................................................................................... 2,033
7. Ecologist
Green
Party........................................................................................ 1,880
8. People's
Party
and
Social
Protection.................................................................... 287
The results for the Chamber of Deputies
Electoral College no. 32, the uninominal college no. 1, the Chamber of
Deputies
• Total number of voters listed on the electoral lists in a college
1........................ 56,539
• Total
number
of
valid
votes
:................................................................................18,597
• minimum number of (mostly) valid votes necessary to get the mandate
............. 9,264
• Total number of valid votes obtained by each candidate for Deputy
1. Gheorghe Ciocan ............... 7,039 - won the mandate from the
second stage although he won the award as a place, did not garner a
majority of 50%
2. Tibil Ioan ............................... 6,432
3. Rus Ioan................................. 2,312
4. Rudolf Riedl ......................... 1,588
7. Pop George Robert .................. 161
5. Ciorba Dumitru Florin ............. 429
6. Grigore Ghere........................... 176
Electoral College no. 32, the uninominal college no. 2, the Chamber of
Deputies
• Total number of voters listed in the electoral lists in college no.
2.......................... 66,423
• Total
number
of
valid
votes...................................................................................... 22,794
• minimum number of (mostly) valid votes necessary to get the mandate
................ 11,398
• Total number of valid votes obtained by each candidate for being elected
Deputy
3. Rusu Mihaela Adriana.................. 5,339
2. Holdiş Ioan................................. 6,637 - won the mandate in the second
stage of elections despite the fact that the college winner was Kovacs Mate,
who got 161 extra-votes.
4. Zetea Silviu Gelu.......................... 2,468
1. Kovacs Mate................................. 6,798
6. Margarit Viorel Matei...................... 457
5. Coste Teodor Ioan........................... 507
7. Olar Alexandru ............................... 186
Electoral College no. 32, uninominal college no. 3, the Chamber of
Deputies
• Total number of voters listed in the electoral lists in college
3............................... 56,748
• Total
number
of
valid
votes
.....................................................................................19,668
• minimum number of (mostly) valid votes necessary to get the mandate
................. 9,835
• Total number of valid votes obtained by each candidate for Deputy
3. Viorel Pop....................................... 4,651
2. Mihalca Ioan................................... 4,983
4. Buda Viorel Vasile........................2,609 - won the mandate. Here we
are dealing with a candidate who has access to parliament, although in
his college he won the fourth seat, at a distance of 3.231 votes as
compared to the number of votes cast for the first candidate, Turos
Lorand. The other two rival candidates who won more votes than him
belong to parties that crossed the threshold so they came out of the race
due to the mechanism of allocation of seats and not because they have
not crossed the threshold with the party they came from.
1. Turos Lorand.................................. 5,840
6. Szabo Elisabeta Ana.......................... 332
5. Şuta Boariu Petru.............................. 465
7. Ignat Marius Mircea........................... 175
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Electoral College no. 32, uninominal college no. 4, Chamber of Deputies
Total number of voters listed in the electoral lists in college
4................................. 69,268
Total
number
of
valid
votes....................................................................................... 25,389
minimum number of (mostly) valid votes necessary to get the mandate
..................12,695
Total number of valid votes obtained by each candidate for Deputy
2. Mitraşca Vasile.......................... 4,288
3. Gal Florin Gabriel ..................... 3,655
4. Ciuta Ilie ...................................3,134
1. Varga Attila............................. 12,691 – got the mandate, he missed
four votes to obtain an absolute majority and mandate in the first phase
of casting. Although very close to reaching an absolute majority (four
votes were still needed in addition to the 12,691 received) and at a
distance of 8,403 votes for the candidate placed in the second position
(4,288 votes), the candidate Attila Varga had to wait for the second stage
deployment allocation of seats to know if it occupied a seat in
Parliament. According to the mandate allocation algorithm and the law,
he might as well miss the competition.
5. Barar Stelian Liviu ...................... 411
6. Garbea Alexandru Ioan ............... 407
7. Pop Delia Cosmina ..................... 148
Electoral College no. 32 uninominal college 5, the Chamber of Deputies
Total number of voters listed in the electoral lists in college
5................................. 72,380
Total number of valid
votes....................................................................................... 25,203
minimum number of (mostly) valid votes necessary to get the mandate
................. 12,602
•
Total number of valid votes obtained by each candidate for
Deputy
3. Mare Lăcrămioara Paula ............... 3,944
2. Ciobanu Adrian Victor.................. 4,696
4. Csapo Attila Csaba........................ 1,731
1. Erdei Doloczki Istvan................. 13,313 - won the first absolute majority
mandate
5. Ciul Mircea....................................... 441
6. Bogdan Grigor ................................. 334
7. Bojan Ioan .......................................... 13
The total number of voters listed in the electoral lists Satu Mare
Constituency no. 32 was of 321,358, the total number of valid votes of 111,581,
null votes, although this time, however, how the voting was simplified to the
maximum, were of 2,818, the number of blank votes: 1,583.
Number of valid votes obtained by each competitor separately:
 Democratic
Union
of
Hungarians
in
Romania
.................................................40,230
 Liberal Democratic
Party.................................................................................. 26,403
 The Political Alliance Between the Social democratic Party and the
Conservative
Party.............................................................................................................
..... 25,261
 The National Liberal
Party............................................................................... 12,254
 New generation
Party.......................................................................................... 2,142
 Great Romania
Party........................................................................................... 1,798
 Environmentalist
Green
Party............................................................................... 823
Consequently, in the County Constituency no. 32 of Satu Mare, in the
seven electoral colleges there were elected two senators and five deputies. One
should note that out of the two Senators, only one won his mandate under the
rules of the uninominal vote, more precisely the one who won over 50% +1 of
the valid votes cast, winning according to the uninominal principle - "winner
takes it all", the second candidate benefiting from an award corresponding to the
proportional representation, although the voters cast their votes on a uninominal
system.
Concerning the vote for the Chamber of Deputies, out of the five deputy
seats, only one was assigned according to the principles of uninominal majority
voting, the other two winning one seat in the first position, with the most votes in
the college, while the last two managed to enter parliament one from the second
place, the other one from the fourth place in their running colleges.
Although one cannot make an exact calculation, we can see that the
results of parliamentary elections of November 30, 2008 held in the Satu Mare
Constituency may be at least bizarre. They generally follow the whole country
pattern. Certainly there have been major exceptions. There were candidates who
were able to gain access to the parliament on the basis of only a few dozen
votes. Let us say, however, that these are exceptions and we can afford not to
consider. The mass phenomenon, however, like the shocking random results can
be noted in the Satu Mare candidates’ results.
Conclusions
We are now capable to note that in Satu Mare, in this round of elections,
we did not have any candidate imposed by the central party offices, which may
be an argument to support this theory. Everyone who ran is a part of the Satu
Mare branch and he or she is engaged in that party subsidiary of their respective
parties. It is likely that those candidates coming from other places who used to
occupy eligible seats on their party lists have been obliged by this type of vote to
understand that they are running the risk of failing in case they candidate in small
uninominal colleges where the locals are better perceived and more
knowledgeable of the local social issues, therefore bearing more chances to win.
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Legea 35/2008 publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, nr. 196 din 13 martie 2008.
THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY
THROUGHOUT LIFE AS REFLECTED
IN THE NEW CIVIL CODE
Lecturer Alexandru MIHUŢ Ph. D.
“Vasile Goldis” Western University of Arad
Faculty of Humanities, Politics and Administrative Sciences, Arad
Phone: 0744 /773151
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. During the development of social politics, philosophy
and medicine in relation to human dignity, they have been involved in the
processes of evolution and involution which unfortunately can still be felt
nowadays, both on a global and a national level. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (adopted by the General Assembly of the U.N. on December 10,
1948), the UNESCO’s Constituting Act (in its Head Note), The Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (adopted by the UNESCO on
October 19, 2005) also stress out the respect for human dignity. The Law No. 95
/ 2006 and the Code of Medical Professional Ethics focuses on the rights of the
patient, its quintessence being the right to choose one’s physician, and the
respect for the patient’s dignity appears as a corollary of these rights. The key
issue of the new Civil Code focuses on “the life, health, physical and mental
integrity of any person” which are equally guaranteed and protected. Section 61
(1) “The interest and welfare of the human being must take precedence over the
unique interest of society or science” – Section 61 (2).
Key words: dignity, human rights, civil code, medical contract, medical error,
civil liability
Introduction
The dignity of the human being is an ethical concept frequently invoked
by justice, though not sufficiently well-stated in legal texts. The doctrine defines
the dignity of the human being as a person’s affiliation to humanity, having a
superior value as compared to that of other beings. It is essentially human,
setting humans apart from other living creatures.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General
Assembly of the U.N. on December 10, 1948, mentions in its Preamble the
recognition of the inherent dignity of all members of the human race. The
preamble to the UNESCO’s Constitutive Act invokes the democratic ideal of
dignity, equality in rights and equal respect for the human being. The Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by UNESCO on October
19, 2005, mentions that the progress of research must be conducted while
respecting the dignity of the human being.
The New Civil Code dedicates its art. 61 to the guaranteeing of the
inherent rights of the human being:
“(1) Life, health and the physical and mental integrity of any person are
guaranteed and protected equally.
(2) The interest and welfare of the human being must take precedence
over the unique interest of society or science".
Eugenic practices by which the human species is affected or which tends
to organize the selection of persons are prohibited by art. 62, and medical
interventions on genetic characters that seek to modify the person’s natural
makeup, with the exception of those aimed at preventing and treating genetic
diseases, are prohibited by art. 63 par. (l). Cloning a human being, as well as
creating human embryos for research purposes are prohibited by dispositions of
par. (2) of the same article. Medically assisted human reproduction techniques
cannot be utilized for the purpose of choosing the sex of the future child, with
the exception of techniques seeking to avoid severe sex-related hereditary
illnesses (art. 63 par. (3)).
The human body is inviolable, and each human being is entitled to its
physical and mental integrity, any interference with it being only allowed in
cases and under conditions that are expressly and limitingly foreseen by the law
(art. 64).
The examination of a person’s genetic makeup, as well as their genetic
fingerprint-based identification can only be performed for medical or scientific
research, expressed within the limits foreseen by the law or, depending on the
case, only as part of a civil or criminal procedure.
The human body is sacred; it is outside the scope of the civil circuit and
has no patrimonial value, which is true for both it as a whole and for its elements
or products, with the exception of express cases foreseen by the law (art. 66).
Any patrimonial acts having these values as their object are prohibited.
No human person can be subject to experiments, trials, sampling,
treatments or other interventions for therapeutic or scientific research purposes,
except in case and under conditions expressly and limitingly foreseen by the law
(art. 67). Sampling and transplanting organs, tissues and cells from living
persons can only occur in cases and under conditions foreseen by the law, with
their written, free, prior and express consent and only following correct
information on the risks incurred by the intervention. The donor may withdraw
their consent up until the date set for the sampling (par. (1) of art. 68).
Transplanting or sampling organs, tissues and cells from minors or
mentally incapacitated persons are prohibited (par. (2) of art. 68).
The above-mentioned rights and, in general, the respect for the dignity
of the human being are ensured by the intervention of justice, which also
establishes the amounts of compensation that are owed to the victims (art. 69).
Ways in which the rights provided for by art. 61 in The New Civil
Code are protected
The patient’s freedom of choosing their physician
Dignity is an ethical concept, the content of which is not sufficiently
well-stated by legal texts, but frequently invoked by magistrates. It is doctrinally
defined as the human being’s statement of affiliation to humanity; thus, the
human being acquires a superior value with respect to other living creatures. No
official definition has been thought out, nor is it obligatory. Dignity pertains to
human essence, being a feature that distinguishes humans from other creatures
and inanimate things.
As a jurisprudential argument, human dignity has been invoked in the
decisions of the French Court of Cassation since 1942 (the Teyssier case) and
has continued to be invoked in numerous other cases in our days. The argument
was used in connection to the right to information, the necessity of consent and
the refusal of care, as well as to the doubly difficult case of knowing whether
dignity can legitimate the right to not be born with a handicap or whether the
handicap is compatible with a dignified existence. Of major importance was the
idea of human dignity in the prospect of death and end of life, as well as after
death.
In the 16th century, a French surgeon stated that the physician expected
the patient to obey them, in the same way that a servant obeyed his senior (De
Chauliac 2009:183).
In our days, a French author asserted a similar opinion. In the
confrontation between a physician and the inert, passive patient, the physician
never feels that they are dealing with a free and equal being whom they may
instruct. Any patient is regarded as a child who must be consoled or healed and
who cannot consent to what they are told, or to what they are proposed.
In this context, it is paradoxical to talk about the patient’s freedom of
choosing their physician. However, a famous 19th century character, Henri de
Lacordaire (1802-1861), a lawyer and cleric, who re-established the Dominican
Order (1843) in France and was famous for his conferences at Notre Dame de
Paris (1835-1836), elected as a member of the French Academy in 1860, made a
memorable statement: "between the strong and the weak, between the rich and
the poor, it is freedom that oppresses and it is the law that liberates". In our
days, the patient has obtained a true autonomy and a sufficient power to be
accepted as a protagonist in their relationship with the physician that cares for
their health. Ever since 1856, in France, a Treatise of medical law affirmed that
the rule giving the patient the right to choose their physician was essential.
If the patient is forced to accept a physician they do not know, there is
the very serious danger of cutting out the possibility of confidence and instating
the physician’s authority over the patient, with all its resulting inconveniences.
The idea of freedom to choose one’s physician surprises by the
complexity of the term "freedom", especially when it used in a juridical context.
A dictionary can provide over 20 meaning for the word “freedom”, among
which is the power to act or not to act, the ability to do as we please, the absence
of constraint etc. Freedom may be passive or active, allowing one to choose
between action and passivity.
The socialization of medicine leads to an increase in the physician’s role,
which is designated by society and can no longer be chosen by the patient.
Instead of staying personal, medicine is represented by a team and the patient’s
choice disappears.
The feeling of trust (Turcu 2010: 154-160) underlies the establishment
of professional relationships between the physicians and the patient who regards
the former as a competent and diligent professional. Art. 35 of the Code of
Medical Deontology institutes the obligation for the physician to be a model of
ethical and professional behavior, contributing to the increase in their
professional and moral level, to the authority and prestige of the medical
profession in order for it to be worthy of the esteem and confidence of patients
and collaborators. Here, conscience meets confidence (Swan 2008: 22). The
patient confides in their physician and entrusts the latter with their health. The
art of communicating with the patient consists of “verbal and nonverbal
language, respect and politeness, understanding and warmth, kindness and
devotion, benevolence and affection”. “Between physician and patient, there
must be an intense exchange of feelings". (Dumitraşcu 1986: 25). In exchange
for this, the physician makes all decisions that are in their patient’s best interest.
Mutual confidence presupposes the establishment of an empathic
relationship, to which the therapeutic relationship aspires. The physician shall
take interest in all aspects regarding the patient’s personality, not only their
illness, but also their personal life. This goal is never fully achieved, but it is
striven for. The best guarantee of the patient resides in the physician’s
conscience. "A jurist is, in their own way, a physician, even a clinician. The
purpose of their intervention is limited: it cannot be about improving man or
society, but releasing them from a concrete evil. Thus is explained the contempt
inspired by them in those who can only see them as a mediocre surrogate and,
primarily, in theologians, moralists or those holding the highest of views." Not
even the famous monolog of the Prince of Denmark forgives the lawyers’ trade:
"There's another: why may not that be the skull of a lawyer? Where be his
quiddities now, his quillets, his cases, his tenures, and his tricks? why does he
suffer this rude knave now to knock him about the sconce with a dirty shovel,
and will not tell him of his action of battery?” (Shakespeare1959: 688).
The mutual confidence between physician and patient must not be
exhausted during the first contact. It must be rendered permanent and, for this
reason, to avoid deception, the physician shall never, throughout his/her entire
professional life, cease to inform him/herself on the advances of the medical
science, for the purpose of improving their medical knowledge (art. 7 of the
Code of Medical Deontology). Eleven centuries ago, Avicenna maintained
that “the physician must drag the weight of an encyclopedic knowledge,
like a camel, and in spite of all this, preserve the freshness of a poet”.
(Dumitraşcu 1986: 78)
The medical act must sometimes make use of elements from the area of
showmanship. The physician renounces him/herself in favor of the patient and
adapts their behavior according to the latter’s expectations: “for each patient,
he/she picks the most appropriate tone, from a wide repertoire of resources ...
The physician always presents him/herself in a well-balanced, well-adjusted
way, for this is his/her defining feature. He/she always preserves his/her dignity.
He/she is, perhaps, solemn; if the situation requires it, he/she may become grave.
He/she knows when to be silent, by respecting and understanding suffering.
When he/she want to alleviate certain fears, he/she may radiate with optimism.
He/she may firm at one time, tolerant at another, energetic or genial, consistent
or malleable.” (Dumitraşcu 1986:79)
What is the extent of the patient’s right to information? - author Marc
Horwitz wonders (Dumitraşcu 1986: 79). The physician must inform the
patient in a complete, intelligible and loyal manner and receive the latter’s
informed consent. The limits of information refer to investigations, treatments or
other preventive actions and must comprise utility, urgency, consequences,
risks, other possible solutions and the consequences of refusal. Usually, after
conducting investigations, treatments or preventive actions, new risks are
identified. The patient must again be informed. The physician must also analyze,
together with the patient, the relation between benefits and risks, including
exceptional risks. One might say that the patient has the last word. This is false.
The responsibility falls on the physician and he/she is free to choose the
treatment, as the patient cannot impose a certain treatment. Therefore, a serious
limit of the patient’s consent appears. He/she can only turn to another doctor or
refuse care, dif he/she cannot agree with the physician’s opinion. The latter has
the duty to inform the patient on the consequences of their option and respect the
patient’s will. No medical act can be practiced without the free and informed
consent of the patient, who can withdraw his/her consent until the very last
moment. If the vital prognostic of the patient is at stake, in his/her best interest
and for legitimate reasons, he/she may be kept ignorant to the diagnosis or
prognosis, except for the case when the patient’s illness poses a risk of
contaminating others.
The physician’s independence
Both the Law no. 95/2006, and the Code of Medical Deontology proclaim
the physician’s independence. As regards the content of this independence, it
consists, principally, of the free conduct for the exercise of the medical art,
including the choice of collaborators and, especially, the choice of technical
solutions in the situations they are confronted with. As long as he/she remains
within the limits of scientific data, the physician is free to choose his/her means.
Freedom is, nevertheless, not absolute. The physician may not propose and
administer illusory or evidently inadequate remedies or procedures, as a
charlatan would. Likewise, he/she is not allowed to subject the patient to an
unjustified risk. Moreover, the physician may not accept that the remuneration
he/she receives from the hospital depend on the hospital’s profitability.
The courts refuse to control the physician’s options from a scientific
point of view, but they do ensure that the act was performed in the patient’s best
interest and in accordance with scientific data. The physician is not allowed to
carry out useless acts or acts that are not in accordance with medical knowledge.
While it is true that obtaining the patient’s consent is a prerequisite for
the medical act, this does not mean that it is also a sufficient condition for the
validity of this act. The physician should be guided by the proportionality
between expected benefits and the risks incurred.
The European professional ethics allows the physician to refuse to
provide care, unless the patient is in danger. The refusal may be grounded on
professional or personal reason. Thus, for example, the physician may not be
forced to perform an abortion, but must inform the person involved about his/her
refusal and indicate other practitioners who can perform this operation.
The medical art also involves an aspect of technical ability, and the
increase in technicality entails teamwork and adequate equipment. This
objective approach to the medical science was expressed in concepts such as
"the acquired data of science", "the current data of science" or "confirmed
medical knowledge". While physicians strive to experiment with new techniques
for the purpose of improving their patients’ health, jurists have assumed the
ungrateful task of protecting patients against those innovations which physicians
cannot entirely master.
Involuntary errors must not lead to the inhibition of doctors from the
creative effort of experimenting with new methods or remedies, as this would
result in the physicians’ passivity and would certainly be contrary to the
patients’ best interest.
The truth is that not all physicians have the same possibilities to instruct
themselves, not all have access to specialized publications, but the requirements
of good practice also apply to those who do not benefit from these advantages.
If, however, the practitioner consciously strays from these recommendations and
good practices, he/she must prove the existence of subjective and objective
reasons for this conduct.
The mechanism of the medical contract
A. The Law no. 95/2006 and the Code of Medical Deontology
On the first phase, which may be longer or shorter, the patient addresses
the physician with the request of being informed and, possibly, cared for. This
request is often vague and does not have the meaning of a consent generating
obligations. It is based on the patient’s trust in their doctor. The Code of Medical
Deontology stipulates, in art. 21, that the physician may not treat a patient
without a prior, personal and direct medical examination. Only in exceptional
cases of emergency or in cases of “force majeure” (disease occurring on ships in
motion, on airplanes, or inaccessible places), will indications of treatment be
given via telecommunication. According to art. 24 from the same code, if,
following the examination or in the course of treatment, the physician concludes
that he/she does not possess enough knowledge or experience to provide
adequate care, he/she shall request to consult, by any means, other specialists or
shall direct the patient to them.
On the other hand, the physician’s independence and freedom to consent
to a contractual engagement, in the sense of medical intervention, is
considerably limited.
At the same time, the patient’s obligation to pay fees is not the counter
performance of the obligation to provide care.
On the second phase, the patient consents to be subject to a treatment.
The patient’s consent is of a particular nature. It must be elicited in a
personalized manner and, in all cases, it takes the form of a will which is neither
spontaneous, nor free. The consent depends, undoubtedly, on the information
obtained from the patient by the physician, to the extent where the patient
understood this information, but also on the fears tormenting the patient, on
his/her vulnerability, accentuated by suffering and fear.
Art. 649 of the Law no. 95/2006 stipulates that, in order for the patient to
be subject to potentially risky methods of prevention, diagnosis and treatment,
after having received explanations from the physician, the dentist, the
nurse/midwife, according to the provisions of par. (2) and (3), he/she is
requested to give his/her written consent.
In obtaining the patient’s written consent, the above-mentioned medical
staff has the duty to provide the patient with information at a scientific level that
is reasonable for the patient’s power of understanding (par. (2)).
In order for the patient to consent to the medical intervention, he/she
must meet three requirements:
a) have the capacity to understand what the physician tells him/her;
b) have the capacity to discern and, if applicable, opt in favor of an
alternative;
c) have the capacity to express their will on the intervention proposed by
the physician. In other words, the patient must understand and manifest his/her
will on the medical intervention.
The information must contain: the diagnosis, the nature and purpose of
treatment, the risks and consequences of the proposed treatment, the viable
treatment alternatives, their risks and consequences, the prognosis of the disease
without application of the treatment.
Thus it may be concluded, in virtue of the provisions of art. 649 and
succeeding articles in the Law no. 95/2006, that neither the information, nor the
consent shall be pre-printed and drafted in general terms, but they will be
personalized, in order not to trivialize the legal norm and its purpose, and, first
of all, the patient’s rights.
B. The application norm for the Law no. 95/2006. Mockery as a
national sport
It is with great regret and disappointment that we find that the
Methodological Norms for applying the Law no. 95/2006 have trivialized the
text of art. 649 of the law, a phenomenon which can also be found in other fields
of activity, not only in medicine. The habit of reading only thinner texts, under
the pretext of saving time, is well known. But the filiform variant of the law,
comprised in these methodological norms is particularly dangerous for medical
practice and evidently prejudices the patients’ rights.
Thus, in chapter II, dedicated to the patient’s informed consent, the
methodological norms stipulate, in art. 8, that the patient’s written consent,
necessary according to art. 649 in the Law no. 95/2006, with its subsequent
amendments, must contain at least the following elements:
a) the last name, first name and domicile or, depending on the case,
residence of the patient;
b) the medical act to which he/she will be subject;
c) the brief description of information provided by the physician,
dentist, nurse/midwife;
d) the unequivocally expressed consent for the performance of the
medical act;
e) the signature and date of the expression of consent.
We observe that decisive aspects were omitted from art. 649, such as, for
example: the diagnosis communicated to the patient, the nature and purpose of
treatment, the risks and consequences of the proposed treatment, the viable
alternatives of treatment, their risks and consequences, the prognostic of the
disease without application of the treatment.
C. The patient’s right to a personalized information
By removing these essential elements from the personalized information
communicated to the patient beforehand, his/her consent is evidently vitiated by
error or even deception by reticence (Ogien 2009: 57). The specific nature of the
patient’s consent is also expressed in the possibility of it being retracted at any
moment.
For this reason, it is a consent that is devoid of legal engagement.
A disease is more than an illness or suffering for the patient, it is an
experience that he/she undergoes. His/her consent is not free because he/she is
under the pressure of suffering, of the desire to survive, of the disastrous
consequences of illness on his/her family, profession etc. This is why the
presence of the patient’s written consent does not count as a contract in itself,
either.
The French jurisprudence established that the failure to adequately
inform the patient is a detriment to the latter. Even if the risk is exceptional, for
example, the risk of drug toxicity, the physician had to inform him/her, and by
not doing so he/she is liable for the damage undergone by the patient (The
French Court de Cassation 1999: 250). Without this information of the patient,
his/her consent will not be informed. Failure to comply with this obligation is a
grave infringement of the patient’s rights. Therefore, the obligation to inform
stems from the essential quality of the respect for the human person and its
inherent rights.
Since the patient is the beneficiary of the right to have his/her dignity
respected, he/she must be considered as an interlocutor with full rights, capable
of understanding the information and of using it to give his/her consent. As a
rule, the patient and the physician adopt the decisions regarding the patient’s
health together. After having informed the patient, the physician must respect
his/her will. If the patient’s will is to refuse or cease all medical treatment, and
this would endanger his/her life, the physician will have to use all means to
convince the patient to accept the treatment. To this end, the physician might
request support from another physician. In all situations, the patient will have to
reiterate his/her decision after a reasonable while. These episodes shall be noted
in the patient’s medical file. No medical act can be practiced without the
person’s free and informed consent, and this consent may be retracted at any
moment.
Jurisprudence has established the span of the obligation to inform and of
the evidence as to the latter. The information must be clear, honest and
appropriate. Clear information is that which the patient can understand; honest
information is that which does not hide anything intentionally, and appropriate
information is that which adapts to the specificity of the individual's condition
and does not have a generic character.
The information contains risks that are inherent to medical care,
especially for those that are susceptible to be the object of liability based on
proven guilt. The content of this obligation to inform has been gradually and
continually enlarged, first by the contribution of jurisprudence, and then through
legal norms. If, initially, it was believed that information must refer to grave
risks, it subsequently extended to grave risks stemming from suggested
investigations and care, even if risks only occur in exceptional cases, and, at
present, the information is expected to refer also to all of the operation’s
inconveniences.
The legal nature of medical contracts
The physician’s action (Turcu 2010: 178-183) has two components: 1)
diagnosis and recommendation; 2) medical caregiving.
The physician’s obligation is qualified in the science of law as an
obligation of means, which is distinguished from the obligation of result.
Jurisprudence tends to attribute to the patient the burden of the proof of
detriment, guilt and causality relation, especially in those situations in which
both the cause and the detriment remain uncertain or even unknown.
By its very object, obligations of means and those of result are mutually
exclusive.
In the case of an obligation of means, the physician will do what he/she
must do, without promising a desired outcome (Le Tourneau 2006: 735). He/she
will act competently, diligently and conscientiously.
Even the best of physicians, possessing the latest scientific information
in the field and applying high-end investigation and treatment techniques, will
not always be able to avoid the patient’s death, just as no lawyer can guarantee
that a trial will be won.
Conversely, an obligation of results focuses on the success of the
intervention, on obtaining the expected outcome. Thus, for example, the
obligation of a center for blood transfusion is an obligation of results ((Le
Tourneau 2006: 734).
Also differently is defined the failure to carry out the two categories of
obligations.
For the physician and the rest of the medical staff, the obligation of
means is not carried out whenever the procedures and techniques employed were
either inappropriate, or incorrectly applied. The terms that are used in such
situations are incompetence, awkwardness, unskillfulness, negligence or
imprudence.
The failure to carry out an obligation of result is evidenced simply by the
failure to reach the expected purpose.
In the case of an obligation of means, the burden of proof for the
physician’s failure to carry out the obligation falls on the patient. He/she will
have to prove that the physician was unskillful, negligent etc. It is a very difficult
task. Conversely, in the case of an obligation of result, it is easier for the patient
to prove that the expected result was not reached, whereas the physician must
prove that the failure to reach the expected result was due to an external cause,
which cannot be imputed to him/her. The science of law has yet to identify a
satisfactory and unanimously accepted criterion of distinction between the
obligation of means and the obligation of result. Nevertheless, the list of
obligations of means has not ceased to shrink.
Not any medical error can be constituted as guilt and not any detriment is
repairable. The physician’s civil liability is generally based on the proof of a
fault that was committed.
Cases of civil liability based on the presence or absence of guilt
from the physician
To exemplify, we shall present three cases of civil liability based on the
presence or absence of guilt from the physician.
The first case, for which the decision no. 6 of January 7, 1997 (Bull. civ.
1 no 6) was pronounced, occurred in the following circumstances of fact. Patient
J.P. manifested a simple discomfort on the left arm, caused by the compression
of vascular-nervous elements in the thoraco-brachial outlet and underwent
surgery, performed by surgeon M. Y., consisting of the resection of the first rib
on the left and the release of the vascular-nervous pack of the upper limb.
When the first rib was subject to posterior sectioning by use of an
extremely hard and sharp instrument, in accordance with the density of the rib,
the left sub-clavicular artery, which is in contact with this rib, was injured. The
consequence was a massive hemorrhage and the deactivation of the cardiac
pump, and the patient died.
The court of the first instance pronounced the surgeon guilty, believing
him to have proven himself awkward, by perforating the sub-clavicular artery.
The court of appeal, on the second instance, although it found that during
the surgeon’s intervention the artery was injured, and the consecutive
hemorrhage caused the death, concluded that the surgeon did not commit any
blamable or inadmissible awkwardness, and that the patient’s death, as a
consequence of the artery being injured, was caused by an exceptional and,
therefore, unpredictable complication.
We remark here a surprising distinction that the decision of the court of
appeal made between ordinary awkwardness and inadmissible or blamable, that
is, imputable awkwardness.
In this case, the surgery was extremely difficult and entailed a predicted
risk which was, unfortunately, fulfilled. The hardness of the rib that had to be
sectioned involved an energetic, forceful action; the instrument used for
sectioning was extremely hard and sharp, that is, appropriate to the task of
sectioning; the artery was in contact with the rib and was of an extreme fragility.
The case raises numerous questions as to the logical mechanism of the
decision of the court of appeal.
Is the surgeon automatically responsible, without a necessity for the
court to establish whether his deed, albeit not blamable, was the cause of
detriment?
Is it possible to state that the physician disregarded his contractual
obligations because the particular difficulty of intervention forbade all failure?
Must the surgeon be condemned only because he has certain obligation
with respect to the patient’s health?
In the second case, on which the French Court of Cassation, civil section
I, pronounced itself on February 25, 1997, the patient underwent cardio-vascular
surgery.
In order to perform the intervention, the surgeon introduced an intraaortic counterpulsation balloon pump in the patient’s body, which he then
removed, and the patient did not survive the intervention.
The French Court of Cassation concluded that introducing the device in
the patient’s body was an obligation of means. The technique used by the
surgeon was the most recommendable one, according to the scientific data of the
time. The device did not have any malfunctions and was verified before use. No
awkwardness was committed when the balloon pump was introduced and
removed, respectively. The intervention was conscientious, scrupulous and in
accordance to the scientific data of the time.
Consequently, the surgeon did not commit any fault in the medical act.
The third case was solved by the same court through the decision of
November 8, 2000 (Bull. Civ. 1, no. 287). The merit of this decision is that of
having emitted the principle according to which repairing the consequences of a
random therapeutic factor did not pertain to the field of the physician’s
obligations to the patient, based on the contract.
This principle is a topical one because art. 643 par. (2) let. a) of the Law
no. 95/2006 stipulates that the medical staff is not responsible for the detriment
caused in exercising their profession:
a) when it is due to work conditions, inadequate diagnosis and treatment
equipment, nosocomial infections, adverse effects, generally accepted
complications and risks associated with the investigation and treatment method,
hidden flaws of sanitary materials, medical equipments and devices, medical and
sanitary substances employed;
b) when he/she acts in good faith in emergency situations, in compliance
with the competence bestowed upon him/her.
The facts were as follows.
Patient M.Y., suffering from hydrocephaly, underwent surgery,
performed by neurosurgeon M.X.
The intervention consisted of diverting the cerebrospinal fluid by
lumbar-peritoneal shunt. Immediately after the intervention, the patient suffered
an irreversible paralysis of the lower limbs, associated to urinary and anal
incontinence.
The court of appeal concluded in this case that the patient’s post-surgery
state resulted from a spontaneous infarction of the medullar cone, directly
imputable to the surgery, any guilt from the neurosurgeon being excluded.
However, in the juridical logic of the court of appeal, the physician was
obligated to repair the detriment stemming from the random therapeutic factor,
because a physician is bound by a contractual obligation of safety since,
regardless of whether a fault was committed or not, on the occasion of
performing the intervention, he caused a detriment to the patient’s physical or
mental integrity.
This detriment possesses the following characteristics:
 it is not connected to the failure of medical
care to the result of the investigation;
 it is not connected to the known history of
the patient;
 it does not originate in a fact that is detachable from the medical
act.
Nevertheless, since without the medical act that was performed, this
detriment would not have occurred, it appears as being purely accidental.
The French Court of Cassation annulled the decision of the court of
appeal and pronounced that the neurosurgeon was not responsible, since the
detriment was the consequence of an accidental risk inherent medical act, which
could not be controlled, and the repairing of its consequences was not among the
physician’s contractual obligations.
If the physician’s obligation is an obligation of means, this means that
he/she is exonerated from liability whenever an accidental risk occurs, inherent
to the medical act and which cannot be controlled. This risk is also called
therapeutic accident. One may indicate, as examples of such therapeutic
accidents, iatrogenic artifacts or nosocomial infections. The burden of
compensating for the detriment in such situations is on the insurance agency, and
not on the physician, as it also results from the text quote in art. 643 par. (2) let.
a) of the Law no. 95/2006.
Grave medical error and simple medical error
In order to establish the liability of the public hospital service for medical
acts which caused detriment to the patients, French jurisprudence underwent an
evolution from the requirement of grave error to medical error pure and simple,
which represented a unification of the medical error regime towards a unique
error concept. The illustrious clinician Corrigan, quoted by D. Dumitraşcu in
quoted works, p. 44, said: "The trouble with most physicians is not that they do
not know as much as they should know, but that they do not see everything", and
the great clinician Chauffard, quoted by the same author, maintained that "a
physician may err by ignorance, but he must not err by negligence". A Belgian
jurist expressed his impression that medical liability somewhat escaped jurists,
for two equally wrong reasons: 1) the faith of the great public in the physician’s
omnipotence, nurtured by the immense and media-covered progresses of
medicine; 2) youth tending to deny illness, aging and death, although these are
natural phenomena. As soon as one of these natural phenomena occurs, a
tendency arises to blame the one believed to be all-powerful, the physician.
(Vilanova 2008 : 31). A French lawyer, who was also a doctor of medicine, duly
concluded as follows: "as long as physicians fail to understand that magistrates
demand to understand medicine, know their problems and see before them other
sorts of people than those who repeat ‘I did not do anything’ or ‘it is not me, but
another’, we should not be surprised that solutions are chosen for them and that
these solutions are negative; they only have themselves to blame for it."
(Lubrano-Lavadera 46).
The opinion o a neurosurgeon on the influence of jurisprudential
evolution regarding medical practice is that it is headed in the right direction,
because it makes physicians be more aware of the quality of their act. There are
also situations in which the impact has perverse effects, especially as regards the
patient’s information. It is well-known that the demand of giving an infinite list
of possible complications is impossible to begin with and negatively alters the
physician-patient relationship. This demand may incite physicians into burying
themselves in extremely voluminous documents which, however, do not provide
veritable information.
The physician’s decision must always be oriented to the benefit of the
patient, even if it always implies an analysis of risks that are inherent to any
medical intervention. The physician has a contractual obligation to provide
conscientious, attentive care to patient, in accordance with scientific data. The
physician’s civil liability is not necessarily intentional; it may also consist of
negligence, imprudence or error. At the same time, imprudence or negligence, as
well as inattentiveness, cannot engage the physician’s civil liability unless they
reflect an indubitable ignorance of his duty (Administrative Court of
Luxembourg 1972: 189). Apart from negligence or imprudence, which may occur
to any person, the physician does not respond of the detrimental consequences of
his/her acts, whether this is about the care being provided or only a diagnosis
without treatment. Imprudence, inattentiveness or negligence is imputed only if
they reflect an indubitable ignorance of his/her obligations (Administrative Court
of Luxembourg 1967: 190). Any error, including failure to perform an act
engages the physician’s liability as soon as its existence was established with
certainty (Administrative Court of Luxemburg 1972: 192). The physician will not
be held liable for the detrimental consequences of a medical act if the latter was
performed in compliance with scientific regulations, but caused damage on the
patient (Liège Court of Appeal 2004: 190).
In order to establish medical error, the physician’s behavior is appraised
abstractedly, by relating to the attitude that another physician, of comparable
training and professional experience, would have adopted in a given situation,
under similar circumstances, understanding that the importance of the
physician’s traineeship and degree of specialization only serves to lift the
threshold of prudence and attention expected from this physician (Luxembourg
Court of Appeal 2000: 133). A guilty negligence is committed, in causal
relationship with the detriment incurred by the patient, when, after a flawless
surgery, the patient is not given appropriate medical care. If the physician
abandoned all surveillance of the patient when the latter needed most attention,
he/she may be deemed guilty. The need to intervene in favor of another patient
did not prevent the physician from ensuring, in a different way or through
another person, the continuation of this surveillance (Mons Court of Appeal
1987: 195). In medical emergencies, responsibility reaches its maximum. The
circumstances in which the medical act had to be performed in an emergency
service, under less favorable conditions, is irrelevant for the assessment of guilt,
since it does not have to have repercussions on the quality of medical care in
those working settings afforded by the polyclinic (Luxembourg Court of Appeal
1991: 134). The physician must, as a rule, prefer the most secure and efficient
treatment, as compared to a more risky method (Court of Antwerp 1994: 134). A
medical act is not justified unless the operation is balanced out by the expected
outcome (Court of Antwerp 1993 134). The physician cannot afford to postpone
a decision, and his/her memory is the library that he/she consults spontaneously.
If a computer may aid him/her, he/she may not, at any rate, share responsibility
with the former. Among the easements of current medicine, characterized by the
explosion of scientific information, is iatrogeny. The proliferation of medications
led to threatening number of adverse reactions.
Renouncing the condition of grave error as a premise for liability was
marked by the decision of the State Council of France on April 10, 1992, in the
case of spouses V (CE 1992: 507).
On May 9, 1979, a few days before the predictable birth, Mrs. V was
hospitalized for cesarean section under peridural anesthesia. During the
intervention, a few abrupt drops in blood pressure occurred, as well as a halfhour cardiac arrest. After on-the-spot reanimation, she was taken to the
reanimation service in Rouen, where she remained hospitalized until July 4,
1979, that is, for almost two months. After being released from hospital, she was
left with important neurological and psychological disorders, as a consequence
of the cardiac arrest that occurred during the surgery. Apart from the risk of
arterial hypotension, related to peridural anesthesia, the expertise ordered by the
Administrative Court of Rouen also found that the cesarean section performed
on Mrs. V entailed a well-known risk of hemorrhage, susceptible of causing
hypotension and a drop in heart rate, due to the praevia placenta highlighted by
the ultrasound scan. The administrative court considered a series of errors
characterizing erroneous behavior. Before the intervention, the anesthetist
administered the patient an excessive dose of a hypotensor. Half an hour later, an
abrupt drop in blood pressure occurred, accompanied by cardiac disorder and
nausea. Still, the practitioner administered the anesthetic product with a
hypotensive effect and the second drop in blood pressure was produced. After
the cesarean section and birth, the third such drop occurred. The patient was then
given defrosted plasma, which was inadequately re-heated. Strong pain and
cardiac arrest were the immediate consequences. On these deeds, the
administrative court concluded, according to a constant jurisprudence, that no
grave error was committed and refused to engage the liability of the public
hospital service for the medical act.
The Plenum of the State Council decided, on April 10, 1992 that the
errors committed, which were the cause of the accident incurred by Mrs. V,
constituted a medical error likely to engage the hospital’s liability. Thus, the
State Council of France abandoned the requirement of grave error, which had
been necessary for engaging the liability of the public hospital service. At the
same time, the prior distinction between simple error and grave error was erased.
This distinction was a subtle one. For detriment caused by defective
organization or service malfunctioning, or by faulty management of non-medical
services, simple error was sufficient for engaging hospital liability.
On the contrary, detriment caused by a faulty performance of medical or
surgical care required the evidence of grave error in order to engage hospital
liability.
Acts of medical care, according to a decision by the State Council of
June 26, 1959, are those acts which have a current character: injections,
perfusions, massages and all other acts likely to be performed by auxiliary
medical staff. Therefore, the distinction was operated between organization and
functioning (simple error) and medical or surgical acts (grave error).
Simple error was considered in the case of the hospital failing to carry out one of
its duties:
- insufficient staff or material means;
- delays in managing cares;
- misuse of materials;
- inadequate surveillance;
- failure to inform the patient, including on financial aspects.
For medical acts, administrative courts demanded evidence of grave
error.
This grave error had an abnormal character, assessed by the court in the
concrete circumstances of the case. For example, misdiagnosis was considered a
grave error, as well as misprescription of drugs, inappropriate choice of therapy
or examination, treatment and care, or flawed surgical interventions. In the case
of nosocomial infections, guilt was presumed.
The decision pronounced in the case of spouses V. unified the liability
regime, re-establishing the equality of treatment between victims and between
the clients of private clinics and those of public clinics.
Law 2002-303 of March 4, 2002 unified, in principle, the liability of
error in sanitary matters, so that, subsequent to this law, a simple error is
sufficient to engage the liability of the author, whether healthcare professional,
public hospital or private hospital. However, jurisprudence marked a certain
survival of the idea of grave error, in the sense that, in some cases, grave error is
invariable, and in others it is subject to assessment from the court in the concrete
circumstance of the case.
In the former situation are those activities for which the court does not
verify the concrete circumstances in order to qualify them as grave errors, so
that, in such situations, it has a residual character (penitentiary services,
ambulance services and firefighting).
Police services are held liable for simple error when their bureaucratic
activity is involved.
Abandoning the idea of grave error is a simplification favorable to the
victims.
The physician’s personal liability is engaged by a wide range of errors,
which can nevertheless be classified into technical medical errors and human
medical errors.
Physicians are held liable by the obligation to keep their professional
knowledge up to date throughout their lifetimes. This necessity for continuous
professional training is based both on the relativity of continuously changing
scientific knowledge, and on the physician’s obligation to utilize the most
appropriate means for giving care to the patient. In other words, the physician’s
obligation is a medical competency. The duty of being competent regards both
the establishment of a diagnosis and the choice of treatment
In two decisions pronounced by the French Court of Cassation on May
23, 2000 (Cass. Ire. Civ. 2000: 100), the concept of technical error was
introduced. In the first case, the patient’s claim was rejected, as it was
established that the physicians employed all necessary means, and the
complication whose victim the patient was resulted from a non-imputable
surgical act. In the second case, the physician was made responsible although he
proved that the abnormal trajectory of the patient’s nerve, which he sectioned,
could not have been detected by any means available to science. The Court of
Cassation decided, in this case, that the simple fact of touching an organ or
tissue, under conditions where this touch was not necessary in order to perform
the medical intervention, is a technical error if it is not established that the organ
or tissue had an anomaly that made it inevitable for it to be touched.
By this decision, the French Court of Cassation expressed a very broad
view on medical error, as mere awkwardness may engage the physician’s
liability. The judges deemed that in this particular field of work, where the
success of the medical act is based on the greater or lesser ability of the
physician, depending on the complexity of this intervention, a solid technique
almost entirely limited the random factor. Randomness is the determining
criterion of error. If we accept that the patient is entitled to expect an exemplary
precision from the part of the surgeon, whose primary competence is the
operating technique, it is illusory to believe that the best technique could
eliminate that randomness entirely, the latter being intrinsic the medical activity
itself. Even if the technique is perfect, reality proves that the particularities of a
human body can sometimes justify awkwardness.
This conclusion, of maximum importance for jurisprudence, did not
emerge on a ground with no precedents. In 1997, the same Court of Cassation
established the surgeon’s responsibility for a wound he caused on the patient,
raising concern among physicians on the possibility of liability without guilt,
and a few months later, another decision stated that any awkwardness of the
surgeon engages his/her liability. On October 13, 1999, the same court
proclaimed the principle according to which any awkwardness of the surgeon
engages his/her liability.
Therefore, the two decisions of May 23, 2000 did not establish an
objective liability, but they did establish a presumption of guilt if an organ or a
tissue is touched, although it was supposed to remain extraneous to the
operation.
c)
d)
Over the following period, the random factor reappeared in the
jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation. Thus, in a decision of November 29,
2005, it was established that there is also an inherent risk to the technique being
employed, which cannot be imputed to the practitioner. More recently, on
September 18, 2008, the Court of cassation qualified it as an inherent risk to the
intervention, which does not engage the physician’s liability in the case of a
surgeon who injures a nerve. On the same day, the same court, in another case,
seems to have returned to the idea of presumption of guilt. Consequently, at
present there is no clear position as to the assessment of technical error by the
practitioner.
As regards medical humanism, the term was introduced from morals and
it stands for the intimate moral preoccupation in the exercise of medicine, as
expressed by Hippocrates.
The main ethical obligations whose infringement may engage the
recognition of the practitioner’s guilt refers to medical secrecy, the duty to
inform and the patient’s consent. If the physician does not carry out his/her
obligation of humanism and this omission causes detriment to the patient, the
physician engages his/her personal liability.
A physician detected a disease in a patient and foresaw a long-term
treatment, which involved inserting a vesical catheter. The patient refused the
treatment, and the physician recorded this refusal. As the patient’s state
aggravated, the physician performed an enteroplasty. After the intervention, the
patient complained of certain disorders and asked for compensation in civil
courts, invoking the physician’s personal liability. The court of appeal rejected
his action, on grounds that he refused to submit to the initial treatment and that
this refusal deprived him of the chance of avoiding the mutilating operation. The
Court of Cassation admitted the recourse, as the court of appeal did not verify if
the patient was informed by the physician on the grave risks of opposing the
foreseen treatment, which would have meant that the patient had to make an
option based on the full knowledge of all aspects, as a consequence of being
informed by the physician.
The patient’s consent must be obtained by any physician, for any surgery
or act of medical care. Respect for this consent is essential, and it must be freely
expressed and informed. It goes without saying that this consent cannot be
validly obtained if any pressures are exerted on the patient. This consent is the
result of prior, sufficiently accurate and reliable information, provided by the
physician. Information also contains data regarding the risks of treatment, both
the normally predictable, and the exceptional ones, as results from the decisions
of the French Court of Cassation of October 7, 1998. As the patient is free to
choose between the possible solutions of suggested medical care, so can he/she
refuse not only any of the suggested solutions, but even listening to the
information provided by the physician. However, it would be wrong to believe
that if the physician conforms to the patient’s refusal, he/she no longer has to
insist. The moral duty of the physician is to convince the patient to accept the
suggested medical care.
Conclusions
A better understanding is necessary between the medical world and the
judiciary one, based on reciprocal confidence and knowledge. Physicians must be
better informed on the law, whereas magistrates and lawyers must acquire more
profound knowledge of the issues of medical responsibility.
As long as physicians are unaware of the fact that lawyers and
magistrates wish to know about medicine and to understand their problems, they
do not have the right to reproach anyone that other choose solutions for them and
that these solutions are sometimes unfavorable.
Finally, to paraphrase Malraux, we dare say that the 21st century will be
the century of HUMAN and ENVIRONMENTAL protection or will not be.
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THE INSTITUTION OF BANAT IN THE BANAT OF
LUGOJ AND CARANSEBES IN THE XVIth-XVIIth
CENTURIES
Sorin BULBOACĂ Ph. D.
“Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad
Faculty of Humanities, Politics and Administrative Sciences, Arad
Phone: 0727-455952
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. In this article, we try to investigate and explain the
connection between the Banat og Lugoj-Caransebes and the central institution
in Transylvania, during the XVIth and XVIIth centuries. In the Principality of
Transylvania, the banat of Lugoj and Caransebes was a member of the council
of the prince, as second to the grand captain of Oradea. The most important
prerogatives of the bans of Lugoj and Cransebes are the military ones, as they
also had other important military posistions in the Principality. They had
diplomatic atributions as messengers and negotiators in the relations with the
Ottoman Empire or in the relations with Walachia and Moldavia. They were the
presidents of the nobility’s assenblies from the Banat of Lugoj and Cransebes or
of two districts. The documents mention the „chair of judgement” of the ban,
which had competency regarding property, succession, confiscation or distraint
of estates for political reasons, in case of betrayal. They have also participated
to the religious affairs, encouraging Calvinsm and the translation of some
religious books into Romanian.
Keywords: Banat, prerogatives, military, diplomatic attributions, religious
affairs
The history of banate of Lugoj and Caransebes in the XVIth-XVIIth
centuries represents an integrant part of the medieval history of Transylvania, of
the history of Romanians in general. The second half of the XIXth century
brought the publication of the first documents referring to Banat, by the
Hungarian historian Szilagy Sandor, in some series dedicated to the debates of
general commissions of Transylvania (Monumenta Comitialia Regni
Transsylvania 1875-1898). The Banat historian Pesty Frigyes continued the
publication of medieval documents referring to the history of Banat, especially of
the old Romanian districts, of the county of Severin or of county of Caras. His
documentary series continue to represent fundamental sources as they capitalize
archive pieces dating back in the XIIIth-XVIIIth centuries, on the basis of which
the life of Banat Romanians under all its aspect can be re-constituted (Pesty
1876; Pesty 1878; Pesty 1882-1883).
At the beginning of the XXth century another synthesis dedicated to the
history of Banat appeared, following the evolution of Banat of Severin, owed to
Patriciu Dragalina. Although today it is surpassed considering the information
and the interpretations, the work of Patriciu Dragalina has the merit of having
drawn the main aspects of the history of Banat of Severin and of having
highlighted the continuity that exists between the Banat of Severin (XIIIth-XVIth)
and the banat of Lugoj and Caransebes (XVIth-XVIIth centuries) (Dragalina 19001902). He is among the first who emphasized the military, strategic role played
by the Banat of Severin for the defense of the Kingdom of Hungary and the
principality of Transylvania. The documents edited by Andrei Veres between
1929 and 1939 are of great importance for the history of Ardeal and Banat
(Veress 1929-1939) .
The controversial personality of the last ban of Lugoj and Caransebes,
Acatiu Barcsai, was rigorously analyzed, on the basis of the testimonies of the
epoch, by I. Bănăţeanul (Bănăţeanul 1960: 29-35), who highlighted his role as a
stimulator of cultural-church progress and Ion Totoiu approached the problem of
Turkish domination in Banat and Crisana, achieving the first study about the
history of vilayet of Timisoara (Totoiu 1960: 5-35). In 1965 the historian Stefan
Stefanescu published a reference book that already became classical, about the
institution of banat in Tara Romaneasca, analyzing the prerogatives and the role
of the ban of Craiova, work that can serve as a comparative reference point for
the analysis of the institution and the prerogatives of banat in the banat of Lugoj
and Caransebes (Ştefănescu 1965).
Significant contributions in the medieval history of Banat were made in
the ‘70s-‘80s of the XXth century by the researchers Costin and Cristina Fenesan,
in the conditions of materialization and introduction in the scientific circuit of
numerous sources, some of them new-fangled. Costin Fenesan also approached
the epoch of prince Gabriel Bethlen, studying both his reports with Stefan Vaida,
former ban, one of his adversaries, and the political situation of the banate of
Lugoj and Caransebes between 1614 and 1615 (Feneşan 1977: 411-418; Feneşan
1976: 175-183). Costin Fenesan’s preoccupations for medieval history of Banat
were crowned by the publishing in 1981 of a volume of Documente medievale
banatene, inserting 92 documents belonging to the interval 1440-1653, 84 of
which are new and of exceptional importance for the unraveling of the socialpolitical structures of the banate of Lugoj and Caransebes. (Feneşan 1981).
Tragic events for the principality of Transylvania at the middle of the
XVIIth century, including the disappearance of Lugoj and Caransebes constituted
the object of several studies owed to Cristina Feneşan (Feneşan 1977: 223-238;
Feneşan 1979: 319-340) and Liviu Borcea (Borcea 1980: 361-366; Borcea 1985:
97-118).
The researcher Ligia Boldea studied in detail the political evolution and
the meanders of the social ascension of the noble family de Macicas, in the XIVXVIth centuries (Boldea 1986-1987: 171-177), while Viorel Achim focused on
the analysis of public assemblies in the districts of Banat, mentioning their
composition, their organization, specific competences etc (Achim 1987: 371-378;
Achim 1988: 191-203). Cristina Fenesan explained the premises of the
instauration of Ottoman domination in Banat in the middle of the XVIIth century,
on the basis of some new sources and Costin Fenesan presented the territorial
evolution of the county of Severin at the end of the XVIIth century.
The Revolution in December 1989 eliminated the political and
ideological constraints that negatively influenced the liberty of creation of the
Romanian historians. After 1990, Viorel Achim continued the incursions in the
history of medieval Banat, using an impressive documentation, inclusively
external sources, insisting on the districts of Banat, but also on the confessional
aspects (Catolicismul la romanii banateni in evul mediu) (Achim 1996: 41-55;
Achim 1996: 391-410; Achim 2002: 125-128). These studies, to which other are
added, were reunited in the year 2000 in a volume suggestively named Banatul
in evul mediu (Achim 2000).
An important contribution to the cognition of medieval institution of
Transylvania and Banat was brought by the historian Ioan Aurel Pop from Cluj.
The historian from Cluj discussed and analyzed minutely and rigorously the
structure and organization of Romanian princely and aristocratic assemblies in
Transylvania, dedicating several chapters to the particular situation of medieval
Banat (Pop 1991).
Susana Andea, a researcher from Cluj, referring to political reports
between Transylvania, Tara Romaneasca and Moldova between 1656-1688
reconstitutes in a rigorous manner the internal and international political context
of the collapse of prince Gheorghe Rakoczy II and the annexation of the banate
of Lugoj and Caransebes by the Ottoman Empire. The complex and contradictory
personality of the last ban of Lugoj and Caransebes, the Romanian Acatiu
Barcsai is restored in the context of international reports (Andea 1996).
The researcher of Turkish history and problems Calin Felezeu analyzed
in detail the statute of the principality of Transylvania in the relations with the
Ottoman Empire in the period 1541-1688, highlighting the differences that
appear from one epoch to another and on the basis of the Turkish ahd-namels
(Felezeu 1996). Calin Felezeu also studied the fluctuations of the boarder
between the vilayet of Timisoara and the banate of Lugoj and Caransebes. The
list of the residents of Ardeal at the Poarta is presented in the annex, among
which Romanian aristocrats of Banat are found (Felezeu 1996: 334-347).
The prerogatives and competences of the bans of Lugoj and Caransebes
were analyzed by Dragos Lucian Ţigău in two studies, on the basis of the
approach of an impressive number of sources (Ţigău 1998: 225-241; Ţigău 1999:
237-251). In the Vth volume of the treatise Istoria Romanilor that appeared
under the aegis of the Romanian Academy, Susana Andea refers to the judicial
attributions of the ban of Lugoj and Caransebes (Istoria Românilor 2002: 711).
The banate of Lugoj and Caransebes represents a direct continuation of
the banate of Severin, set up and organized by the Arpadian kings in 1230. The
banate of Severin disappeared in the context of a complex political-military
conjuncture, determined by the success of the Ottoman offensive in Central
Europe in the times of the sultan Soliman the Magnificent (1520-1566). The
conquest of the citadels of Belgrad (1521), Orsova (1522) and Severin (1524) by
the Turkish and the catastrophe from Mohacs (1526) sealed the fate of banate of
Severin, the succession of the bans being interrupted in 1526, being followed by
a long holiday, attested by the documents of the epoch (Romanescu 1944-1946:
10-14; Hurmuzaki 1889-1893: 656-657).
The most important institution of the Eastern Banat in the XVIth-XVIIth
centuries is the institution of banat. The appointment of the bans of Lugoj and
Caransebes represented, in most cases, the result of the decision and will of the
princes of Ardeal but almost always the princes took into consideration the
interests of the Romanian aristocracy of Banat, the rank of banat being owned in
most cases by Romanian nobles of Banat of the families Barcsai, Bekes,
Garlisteanu de Rudaria, Palatici de Ilidia, Vaida de Caransebes, Tompa
(Bulboacă 2006: 96-99).
There are situations when the same person holds the title of ban several
times: Petru Petrovici of Suraklin (between 1548 and 1549; 1554-1557), George
Berendy (1566; 1568-1569), George Palatici de Ilidia (1586-1588;1592-1594;
May-June 1596), Paul Keresztessi de Nagy Magyer (1605-1606;1610-1613).
Most bans kept their positions for a relatively short period (1-3 years), notable
exceptions being represented by the last two bans of Lugoj and Caransebes, Paul
Nagy of Deva (June1617-June 1644) and Acatiu Barcsai (December 1644September 1658), who enjoyed the trust of princes Gabriel Bethlen, Gheorghe
Rakoczy I and II.
The most important prerogatives of the bans of Lugoj and Caransebes, as
the ones of the bans of Severin, were the military ones, Banat representing a
buffer-area between the vilayet of Timisoara and the principality of Transylvania.
Most bans proved military aptitudes before occupying this position (Bulboacă
2010: 82-89).
After being appointed in this position, the ban of Lugoj and Caransebes
would obtain supreme military command upon the region. The ban can cumulate
other important military functions, like Paul Nagy of Deva who held for more
than 16 years (1627-1643) the position of captain of personal pedestrian guard of
princes Gabriel Bethlen and Gheorghe Rakoczy I (Feneşan 1981: 153-154; 159160). Although he had in suborder a series of administrators of citadels and
castellans with military attributions, the ban always initiated approaches for the
fortification of the citadels of Banat (Caransebes, Lugoj, Jdioara, Mehadia), to
obtain high quantities of armament and sufficient munitions and to maintain a
high number of soldiers (Ţigău 1999: 235).
The bans of Lugoj and Caransebes proved real military qualities during
the campaigns in which they participated. Thus, during the Anti-Ottoman war of
1593-1606, the bans Borbely of Sima and Andrei Barcsai became famous
through the victories they obtained in 1595-1596 and 1598 against the Turks. The
military role of the ban of Lugoj-Caransebes is comparable to the one of the great
captain of Oradea, another important citadel from the strategic point of view, for
the defense of Transylvania.
Together with the military prerogatives of the bans of Lugoj and
Caransebes, the political-diplomatic competences are also important (Bulboacă
2006: 101-103). From the occupation of the position, many bans would possess a
remarkable diplomatic experience. The ban Stefan Tompa, who in 1570 was part
of a mission of Ardeal to the Poarta also proved diplomatic qualities. He made
himself remarked as a diplomat and George Palatici of Ilidia, sent as a messenger
to the ruler of Tara Romaneasca (Mihnea Turcitul), to the beilerbei of Rumelia,
at the Poarta and subsequently maintaining a correspondence with the great
unifying ruler Mihai Viteazul (Păiuşan 1983: 31-32; Hurmukazi 1889-1893:
380).
Through the sixth department of the chancellery of the principality of
Transylvania the epistolary exchange of the ban of Lugoj and Caransebes with
the dignitaries of other states in the vicinity was being achieved, firstly with the
pasha of Timisoara (Istoria Românilor 2003: 699). The ban had to prove his
diplomatic qualities on the occasion of accompanying and accommodating the
foreign messengers by the princely court of Alba-Iulia. The ban often possesses a
network o spies and informers in the Ottoman Empire (especially the vilayet of
Timisoara), through which he secures important information for the prince. Other
times, the ban can be met in the position of delegate of the prince of Transylvania
to the Poarta or to different official ceremonies (Ţigău 1998: 231).
During the 17th century, in Transylvania, the ban was a close assistant of
the prince, and one of his confindent persons, sometimes even a relative (Petru
Bethlen was the first cousin of Prince Gabriel Bethlen), and he was the promoter
of the Prince’s politics in Lugoj and towards the vylaet of Timisoara. During the
diplomatic parleys, the ban[s] gave sometimes information about the situation in
the Ottoman Empire and Eastern Europe, to the princes of Transylvania,
maintaining spy networks (Bulboacă 2006: 106-107).
Master, de facto, of Transylvania, the Austrian general George Basta
substituted himself to the Princes of Transylvania and he discharged and
nominated ban[s] of Lugos and Caransebes. In the place of Andrei Barcsai he
nominated two ban[s], Petru Huszar of Brenhida and Simion Lodi of Ttroger
(Bulboacă 2006: 108). Petru Huszar couldn’t stop the Ottoman attack against
Transylvania, mission that he received from George Basta, and he was killed by
the Turks, and Simion Lodi of Ttroger, a foreigner, instituted in Lugos and
Caransebes a regime of terror (Bulboacă 2006: 109-110). The inhabitans of the
Banat called on Radu Serban to help them dethrone him, but this measure was
unsuceseful.
The ban Paul Kerestesyi, a close assistant of Prince Gabriel Bathory,
distinguished himself as a diplomatist when he intervened at the Porte in order to
obtain for the Prince the throne of Walachia and by financially helping Matei
Basarab to get the throne of Wlalachia (Hurmuzaki 1889-1893: 313-315). The
ban Petru Bethlen was the one who captured the rebel Stefan Vaida, the former
ban, in 1607, who refused to surrender Lipova to the Turks, fact that was
necessary to strengthen Gabriel Bathory’s position at the Porte (Feneşan 1976:
175-183; Feneşan 1977: 411-418).
The most important diplomatic activity was that of the last ban, Acatiu
Barcsai (1644-1658), and it’s illustrated by his relations with Walachia and
Moldavia during the reigns of Matei Basarab, Vasile Lupu, Gheorghe Stefan,
Constantin Serban Basarab. A career diplomatist, the confident person of Prince
Gheorghe Rakoczy II, he was a member of the “locumtenens comitee” that
governed Transylvania when the Prince participated at the unfortunate campaign
in Poland (1657) (Andea 1996: 104-110).
Together with the military and diplomatic prerogatives, the bans of
Lugoj and Caransebes held administrative and judicial attributions. As the
historian Ioan Aurel Pop from Cluj mentioned, the aristocratic assemblies of the
banate of Lugoj and Caransebes are chaired by bans or deputy bans, continuing
the tradition of princely and aristocratic assemblies in the 8 privileged districts of
Banat (Pop 1991: 159). In order to leave the country, the inhabitants of the area
of Banat needed the ban’s approval. The medieval documents of property
mention the judging chair of the ban, who had competences in the domains of
property, succession or even confiscation and sequestration of goods for political
reasons (rebellion towards the prince) but only for the Romanian aristocracy and
population in the banate of Lugoj and Caransebes. (Hurmuzaki 1889-1893: 452453).
The ban had to detect the goods of the rebels, to catalogue them and to
keep them in Caransebes. This was the case of Stefan Vaida, rebel towards the
prince Gabriel Bethlen, whose properties are confiscated in 1614 by the ban
Petru Bethlen, his goods being sequestered (Bulboacă 2006: 111).
The bans took over the juridical attributions of the bans of Severin. The
ban would never judge by himself, but only together with the noblemen
“assessors of the judgment chair”. Most of the causes presented at bans’
judgment chair refer to the domination upon the land, to inheritances, to pawns,
to girls’ inheritances, emergences from severalties, redemptions, unfair
possession of estates, reconciliations, buying-selling, exchanges, disputes among
relatives (Istoria Românilor 2003: 711).
For the ones that are not pleased for the sentence given by the seat o
judgment of the ban there was the possibility of appeal at the princely Table.
Some bans, like Acatiu Barcsai, accomplished the position of president of the
princely Table (Istoria Românilor 2003: 706). The ban Acatiu Barcsai also
participated as a member in the commission of revision of Constitutiile
Aprobate ale Transilvaniei (in 1653), that guarantees the privileges of the two
districts of Banat (Constituţiile Aprobate ale Transilvaniei 1997: 21; 246).
In the XVIth-XVIIth century, the bans of Caransebes-Lugoj conducted
the confessional life of Eastern Banat, actively sustaining the Reform, more
precisely the Calvinism. Thus, the ban Acatiu Barcsai forbade the finalization of
the construction of a Catholic church at Slatina de Timis in 1644 and financially
supported the printing of a Romanian book, of Calvinistic structure (Radosav
2003: 86-87; Relationes missionariorum de Hungaria et Transilvania. 1627 –
1707 1995: 83)
The authority and social prestige that he enjoys are determined, to a great
extent, by the personal fortune that he owns. The documents of those times
illustrate the fact that the bans owned significant rear estate fortunes both in the
cities and along the districts of Lugoj and Caransebes. The landed patrimony of
the bans extended by obtaining new domains granted by princes of Ardeal, meant
to repay the fidelity and the faithful services brought to the central power and to
the country (Ţigău 1998: 229).
The institution of deputy bans, mentioned in documents as early as the
existence of the banat of Severin, is closely tied to the institution of banat of
Lugoj and Caransebes. The attributions of deputy bans were, generally, similar to
the ones of the bans, excepting the military prerogatives (Pop 1991: 159-160).
The deputy bans preside over the nobles’ assemblies of the district of Caransebes
or of the nobles in the whole territory of Banat, they also lead the processes
connected to the ownership of the land or they are involved in diplomatic actions.
Some deputy bans get to accumulate important fortunes, they become influent
personalities of the local elites, maintaining their position for more successive
years. This is also the case of ban Nicolae Macicas (1650-1658) (Feneşan 1976:
196-197; 198-199).
Except for some cases, most bans were Romanians or at least of
Romanian origin, the role o bans being the one of preserving the autonomy and
the privileges of the Romanians in the two districts of Banat that remained
unoccupied by the Turks (Lugoj and Caransebes) until 1658 (Feneşan 1977: 230238; Ciobanu 1997: 48-61).
The disappearance of the banate of Lugoj was produced in the context of
the tragic events in 1658, when the great vizier Mehmed Kuprulu undertook a
punitive expedition against prince Gheorghe Rakoczy the IInd, who had
flagrantly encroached upon his dispositions. Under the threat of the Turkish army
and lacking all support of prince Gheorghe Rakoczy the IInd, on August the 23rd
the authorities of Ardeal accept the “election” of the last ban of Lugoj and
Caransebes, Acatiu Barcsai, as prince of Transylvania (Felezeu 1996: 109). The
Porta imposed the new prince extremely tough conditions, among which the
renunciation to the citadels that were providing the defensive line of the country
in the western part: Lugoj, Ineu, Caransebes, Dezna, that passed under Turkish
domination. The districts o Caransebes and Lugoj were yielded to the Turks by
Acatiu Barcsai only in the context of the Ottoman ultimatum of September 1658
(Gemil 1986: 720).
Conclusions
In the Principality of Transylvania, the banat of Lugoj and Caransebes
was a member of the council of the prince, as second to the grand captain of
Oradea. The most important prerogatives of the bans of Lugoj and Cransebes are
the military ones, as they also had other important military posistions in the
Principality. They had diplomatic atributions as messengers and negotiators in
the relations with the Ottoman Empire or in the relations with Walachia and
Moldavia. They were the presidents of the nobility’s assenblies from the Banat of
Lugoj and Cransebes or of two districts. We consider that the institution of banat
and vice-banat, honored mainly by Romanian noblemen from Banat, confer the
Eastern Banat a special statute in the principality of Transylvania, being a
“Romanian country” also politically, not only demographically. We are
convinced that the extension of the investigation upon the political, religious and
cultural history of eastern Banat of the XVIth-XVIIth centuries would bring more
light upon some controversial or less known aspects, as it was the case of most
bans and vice-bans of Lugoj and Caransebes, that deserve special studies, in
order to be recuperated by the Romanian historiography.
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THE OSCE AND THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Cristian BENŢE, Lecturer Ph. D.
“Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad
Faculty of Humanities, Political and Administrative Sciences
Phone: 0257 - 282324
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the
mechanisms developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) in order to protect the human rights. The OSCE, which
originally began as a series of meetings in Helsinki under the name of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), now includes fiftysix participating states from throughout Europe, as well as the Confederation of
Independent States, Canada, and the United States. The first part of this article
describes the historical evolution and the structure of the OSCE and the second
part focuses on the specific issues related to the protection of human rights.
Key words: CSCE, OSCE, human rights, protection, evolution
I. The evolution of the organization for security and co-operation in
Europe in the international context
A. The first Helsinki meetings
The Helsinki meetings are part of the complex history of the Cold War
and should be interpreted within this context.
The OSCE traces its origins to the détente phase of the early 1970s, when
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created to
serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and
West. Meeting over two years in Helsinki and Geneva, the CSCE reached
agreement on the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed on 1 August 1975. This
document contained a number of key commitments on polito-military, economic
and environmental and human rights issues that became central to the so-called
'Helsinki process'. It also established ten fundamental principles (the 'Decalogue')
governing the behaviour of States towards their citizens, as well as towards each
other (Galbreath 2007: 24-39; Korey 1993; Maresca 1985).
Until 1990, the CSCE functioned mainly as a series of meetings and
conferences that built on and extended the participating States' commitments,
while periodically reviewing their implementation. However, with the end of the
Cold War, the Paris Summit of November 1990 set the CSCE on a new course.
In the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the CSCE was called upon to play its
part in managing the historic change taking place in Europe and responding to
the new challenges of the post-Cold War period, which led to its acquiring
permanent institutions and operational capabilities.
As part of this institutionalization process, the name was changed from
the CSCE to the OSCE by a decision of the Budapest Summit of Heads of State
or Government in December 1994.
On 1 August 1975, with the process of détente gradually thawing the
chill that the Cold War had cast over international relations, the Heads of State or
Government of 35 nations gathered in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).
In the coming decades, the CSCE would evolve from a diplomatic
Conference that helped to break down the barriers of mistrust between East and
West into an international Organization - the OSCE - whose numerous
institutions and field operations proved vital to stability in the post-Cold War
world.
This timeline traces the growth of the OSCE from its origins in Helsinki
into an organization with truly global reach that is actively engaged in conflict
prevention, resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation - as well as a whole host of
other activities related to security, co-operation, human rights and more.
The signing of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975 was a historic
occasion. The 35 Heads of State (including the two superpower leaders, US
President Gerald Ford and USSR Communist Party General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev) committed themselves irrevocably to mutually beneficial dialogue
instead of mutually assured destruction (Galbreath 2007: 27-30).
The Helsinki Final Act was a landmark accord in many ways. One of the
most significant was that it made human rights issues - which had long been a
no-go area in relations between East and West - a subject of legitimate concern to
all. No longer could nations seek to shield human rights violations from
international scrutiny by claiming they were internal affairs.
The agreement also featured three main sets of principles, often known
as 'baskets'. They were issues related to the politico-military aspects of security
(basket I); co-operation in economics, science and technology and the
environment (basket II); and co-operation in humanitarian and other fields
(basket III).
B. OSCE as a catalyst for change
For a decade and a half after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the
CSCE served as a forum for dialogue and a catalyst for change; forming a vital
bridge between the two halves of what was still an ideologically, politically and
economically divided Europe.
None of the original 35 signatories, however, could have predicted the
startling speed with which the communist bloc would finally collapse at the end
of the 1980s. As regime after regime crumbled, it was easy to get carried away
by the seemingly universal atmosphere of optimism. The "end of history" was
confidently predicted.
History, however, refused to lie down and die. In Eastern Europe, many
old tensions and rivalries - ethnic, political and geographical - bubbled to the
surface. Despite all efforts to stop them, a number of bloody conflicts would flare
up in the next few years.
It was clear that the framework for co-operation provided by Helsinki
was no longer adequate. But even as the old Soviet Union prepared to de-invent
itself, the CSCE was already busy reinventing itself to meet the security
challenges of the new Europe.
C. From Conference to Organization
In November 1990, the CSCE Heads of State or Government gathered in
Paris for what was only their second-ever Summit to lay the groundwork for the
transformation of the CSCE from a diplomatic Conference into an Organization
dedicated to the promotion of security and co-operation in Europe (Galbreath
2007: 40-44).
To address the new challenges created by the now-volatile situation in
many regions of Eastern Europe and beyond, the CSCE created numerous field
operations and other bodies. The process was marked by the renaming of the
CSCE to the OSCE at the Fourth Heads of State Summit in Budapest in
December 1994.
By the end of the 1990s, the OSCE had set up a considerable number of
institutions and field operations, ranging in size from just a few staff to well over
1,000 in the case of Kosovo. With their flexible and practical methods of
working, these field operations contributed greatly to increased security and
stability in many parts of Europe.
D. The new security challenges of the 21st century
But the arrival of the new millennium - far from ushering in a new age of
peace and security - demonstrated once again the truth of the old saying that the
price of freedom is eternal vigilance. The horrific events of September 11 in the
USA, and other later terrorist attacks in several OSCE participating States,
pointed to the need for a more comprehensive approach to global security
(Galbreath 2007: 120).
Meanwhile, other voices calling for further OSCE reform were beginning
to make themselves heard. Was the OSCE, which had achieved so much during
the 1990s, really equipped to tackle the challenges of the twenty-first century? It
is a question that will continue to be discussed in depth as the OSCE's 56
participating States consider its future.
II. The role of OSCE in defending human rights
As mentioned above, the Helsinki process has issued a number of
documents that create human rights commitments and has established a number
of unusual procedures to promote the implementation of these commitments.
There are four characteristics of the OSCE human rights regime that particularly
distinguish it from institutions like the United Nations and other regional
organizations that promote human rights: first, the “political” rather than the
“legal” nature of the human rights commitments; second, the role played by
“implementation” and “review” meetings; third, the emphasis placed on
“linkage” between human rights and other issues; and, finally, the participation
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the meetings (Gunn 2002: 225226).
A. The multiple dimensions of human rights commitments of OSCE
Unlike the UN and the regional systems such as the Council of Europe,
the OSCE has not adopted human rights treaties that must be ratified by states
and that are intended to become binding international law. Rather, the
participating states of the OSCE have adopted, by consensus, documents that
articulate the “political” commitments that they make to each other, including
commitments to protect human rights. Because they are adopted by consensus,
these political commitments do not permit states to attach reservations or
exceptions. The OSCE declarations therefore are not law and cannot be enforced
by any court, although they are political commitments to which other OSCE
participating states may legitimately raise questions about other states’
compliance. (Gunn 2002: 225)
The OSCE, again unlike the UN and regional systems, has no human
rights courts or commissions and its participating states have no obligation to
issue reports on the status of their compliance with OSCE commitments.
Although the human rights provisions of the OSCE declarations do not provide
mechanisms for responding to individual complaints, they nevertheless are, in
many ways, more detailed than other human rights instruments, particularly with
respect to rights related to the freedom of religion and belief. Rather than
awaiting interpretive guidance from courts or commissions, the Helsinki
process—when it works according to its design—develops increasingly specific
commitments through its follow-up meetings and during its negotiations on new
documents.
The OSCE has explicitly rejected what might be called the “traditional”
doctrine that human rights is an issue solely of domestic concern and that states
do not have the right to criticize the internal affairs of other states. The Preamble
to the Moscow Document of 1991 asserts that the participating states
“categorically declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human
dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all
participating States and do not belong to the internal affairs of the State
concerned.” Speaking as the Director of the Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights, Ambassador Audrey Glover stated bluntly: “The argument of
non-interference in internal affairs with regard to the human dimension is not
valid; it never has been.” In the words of Arie Bloed, one of the preeminent
commentators on the OSCE, this is “sometimes referred to as the ‘universality
principle.’ It has also been expressly agreed that all such matters are of
‘international concern’ and are therefore no longer regarded as being exclusively
internal affairs.”(Gunn 2002: 226). Despite the official adoption of the position
that human rights issues are an international concern and not solely a domestic
issue, many OSCE participating states continue to object to criticism from the
outside on the grounds that such criticisms constitute an improper interference
with their internal affairs. Professor Louis Henkin correctly responds to the
“noninterference in domestic affairs” argument by stating “[t]hat which is
governed by international law or agreement is ipso facto and by definition not a
matter of domestic jurisdiction.” (Gunn 2002: 226)
B. The “follow-up meetings”
The final section of the Helsinki Final Act provided that there should be
a number of “follow-up meetings” to examine whether the participating states
had implemented the commitments made in 1975, and scheduled the first such
meeting to be held in Belgrade in 1977. The follow-up meetings, which William
Korey later described as “one of the greatest achievements of the Helsinki Final
Act,” began inauspiciously. (Gunn 2002: 227) The meetings in Belgrade (1977–
78) and Madrid (1980–83), as well as the first part of Vienna (1986–89), were
marred by divisive ideological accusations with little attempt to foster a genuine
discussion. The Madrid meeting added modestly to protection of religious
freedom and adopted a mechanism that provided for states to engage in voluntary
bilateral meetings to discuss implementation of the commitments. Nevertheless,
in the words of Thomas Buergenthal, the years before 1989 were principally
characterized by “posturing, hypocrisy, and outright dishonesty.” (Gunn 2002:
227)
Since 1990, when the implementation and review meetings began to
avoid drafting new standards and became principally focused on reviewing
participating state compliance with preexisting OSCE commitments, they have
taken on a somewhat different character. As they now operate, the
implementation meetings typically take place over a two week period and are
divided into a number of thematic sessions. The October 2000 implementation
meeting in Warsaw, for example, was divided into thirteen different sessions and
included such topics as democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom of
expression, tolerance, national minorities, and freedom of thought, conscience,
religion, and belief. NGOs are now active participants at the review and
implementation meetings.
C. The new dimension of human rights problem
In the beginning of the Helsinki process, Western states sought to link
agreement on issues related to security to issues related to human rights. By
connecting human rights and security concerns, the Western states created
incentives for communist governments to adhere internally to human rights
norms.
One of the means by which this linkage was established was to
acknowledge that each state had a legitimate interest in each other state’s
compliance with all of the terms of the Helsinki Final Act.
By linking human rights to peace and friendly relations, the participating
states transformed human rights from a marginal item on the pan-European
political agenda into a subject of central importance to it. Henceforth it was
politically legitimate to link the protection of human rights with arms control and
the liberalization of trade relations. (Buergenthal: 34).
The linkage of human rights to security concerns may indeed have been
the principal reason for the success of the Helsinki process in the cold war years.
Unfortunately, there have been few, if any, attempts to link human rights
compliance with security interests since 1989. Indeed, the post-1991 human
dimension implementation meetings and review conferences essentially have
been segregated from the military, political, and security interests of the OSCE.
D. The increasing role of NGOs
During the past twenty years, NGOs have played an increasingly active
role in most intergovernmental human rights bodies. During the 1993 UN World
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, for example, NGO meetings convened
in the same building at the same time as the official UN meetings, albeit on
different floors and in different rooms. NGOs were able to speak to delegates
informally and were, after some debate, permitted to observe some of the official
meetings. At the UN, however, NGO meetings typically run parallel to official
meetings and NGOs are relegated to observer status at best.
Perhaps nowhere else has the participation of NGOs been as active and
integrated into the intergovernmental process as it has in the OSCE. In the 1999
Review Conference in Vienna, for example, NGOs were permitted to make
interventions on virtually the same terms as governmental delegations.
Governments and NGOs, for all practical purposes, spoke in the order in which
they signed the speakers’ list—meaning that many NGOs spoke prior to
governments. (Governments, unlike NGOs, do have a “right of reply” when they
are criticized either by other governments or by NGOs.) Because statements of
governments and NGOs are not reviewed or censored, the criticisms can become
very pointed. In the October 2000 implementation meeting in Warsaw, for
example, the 200 representatives from 144 NGOs were warmly welcomed by
Austrian Ambassador Dr. Jutta Stefan-Batsl, who spoke on behalf of the
Chairperson-in-Office. In some cases, particularly for states with poor human
rights records, the OSCE implementation and review meetings provide virtually
the only forum for NGOs to speak directly to officials from their own
governments. The principal exception to NGO participation at OSCE meetings is
at the weekly Permanent Council meetings, where NGOs have not yet been
admitted.
Conclusions
The OSCE focus on the human dimension has evolved over time to
become what it is today. Cold War politics made discussion of democracy and
human rights politically divisive. The Final Act provided for an initial focus on
the human dimension, although it focused more on what the Council of Europe
was already doing at its most basic level: cultural exchange. Nevertheless, there
was enough in the Final Act to allow the West to continue to criticize human
rights violations in the Socialist bloc. Within the East itself, Helsinki groups,
named after the Final Act, became important players in the socialist regimes. As
the Soviet leadership changed, first unwilling to repress Poland and eventually
opening political debate in the Soviet Union, the human dimension took on new
importance. Europe was in the middle of its “third wave” with the collapse of the
socialist regimes and the spread of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,
though at varying paces. However, eventually, the human dimension took on a
further importance as the socialist regimes began to collapse. Societal and human
insecurities played important parts in producing conflict in the former Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia.
The OSCE was already evolving to address these issues, with the Meeting on the
Human Dimension, the Charter for a New Europe, and eventually the
Copenhagen and Budapest Documents, the OSCE was able to address many of
the insecurities in the Euro-Atlantic area. Through strengthening democratic
institutions, human rights, and the role of the media in divided states, the OSCE
has attempted to make this area a safer place.
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and New York: Routledge. 2007.
Gunn, J. T., “The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe and the
Rights of Religion or Belief” in Danchin, Peter J. and Cole, Elisabeth A. (eds.)
Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe. New York:
Columbia University Pres, 2002, pp. 222-250.
Korey, W. The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and
American Foreign Policy. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993.
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1973–1975. North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1985.
THE MACHIAVELLIAN CONCEPT OF CIVIC
VIRTUES
Oana MATEI, Lecturer Ph.D.
“Vasile Goldiş” Western University of Arad,
Faculty of Humanities, Political and Administrative Sciences
Phone: 0040-257-282324
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. The Machiavellian moment seems to be more and
more influent in the context of the 20th and 21st century. Machiavelli’s legacy,
once associated with an immoral way of thinking, is, nowadays, more and more
interpreted and appreciated. This paper tries to argue that Machiavelli created
a new concept of virtues, civic virtues, and this concept is not completely
opposed to the traditional Greek concept of virtue, in fact, virtù and arete are
two concepts with common origins.
Key words: virtù, the second reason ethics, prudence, savio, phronesis,
civic virtues
Introduction
Machiavelli’s legacy has been incorrectly interpreted and associated with
the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe. Following this key of
interpretation, Machiavelli appears to be the victim of a time when the fire of
religious intolerance consumed all the works of thought and reclaimed certainties
based on faith. (Lefort 1986). One of the first interpreters of Machiavelli’s works
in this key of interpretation is Innocent Gentillet who associates Machiavelli’s
legacy to massacre on Saint Bartholomew’s Day (Discours d’etat sur le moyens
de bien gouverner et maintenir en bonne paix un Royaume ou autre
principauté…Contre Nicolas Machiavel, florentin (1576) by Innocent Gentillet.
Gentillet’s book had a lot of reprints by the end of the Seventeenth century,
creating the pejorative terms of Machiavellianism and Machiavellian). Today,
one cannot read Machiavelli without having in mind these nefarious
interpretations.
Other interpreters considered Machiavelli to be in complete contradiction
with the Greeks’ classical way of thinking. Machiavelli claimed that actions are
considered to be right or wrong according to their consequences and not
according to the personal character or intentions of the person involved in that
specific action. The aim of this paper is to argue that Machiavelli’s ethics is not
completely opposed to classical Greek ethics, in fact, virtù and arete are two
concepts with common origins.
The second reason ethics
Machiavelli had and developed a specific type of ethics, the second
reason ethics (Gabriel Liiceanu classifies ethics in the first reason ethics or
Achilles’ ethics, due to which is preferably to lose one battle than to win it
through an unfair mean and the second reason ethics or Odysseus ethics, a type
of ethics instrumented by its own efficacy, not paying attention to the action
rightfulness in itself. Liiceanu 2006: 17-25) and more than that, he transformed
this second reason ethics in political ethics. Plato did the same thing when he
allowed and insisted on the philosopher kings to lie, he established the second
reason ethics as political ethics (Then if anyone at all is to have the privilege of
lying, the rulers of the State should be the person; and they, in their dealings
either with their enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the
public good. Plato 2004: 389b). The aim for both philosophers is a common one:
the city’s safety, the state’s safety and the citizens’ welfare (the common good).
The common good is not a utilitarian concept, but the moral and political
condition of human life. According to Machiavelli, men are not good or bad, but
longing for security and personal achievement that can be gained only by the
union of them all. This idea is common with Aristotle’s idea of common good.
The development of an educational pattern for the rulers (the philosopher kings
and the prince) such as to provide the common good represents the method
designed by both thinkers.
But, as with Plato, the ethical side of the educational process aims to
achieve the higher goal of educating the citizens. The difference between the two
authors comes as a consequence of the fact that Plato suggested an educational
pattern inspired from the Eternal World of Forms, whereas Machiavelli’s method
was based on empirical observation of the facts, as they were, without any kind
of distortions, sterile speculations, only by reclaiming the wisdom of the past.
Machiavelli’s method is a scientific method applied in the field of politics,
dictated by the premises on which he developed his work on: the precise and
systematic description of the public facts, the effort of correlating these facts and
establishing laws of action and, by these, to predict future facts, to a certain
extent of probability.
At the end of the 15th century and at the beginning of the 16th century, the
conventional image of a prince was designed as follows: a man who never
abandons the task of searching the common good for the community/the state he
rules and who posses all the necessary virtues in order to accomplish this task.
He is a RECTOR and a MODERATOR. If the state is corrupt, the prince’s task is
even harder; he will have to reform the constitution and the laws such as to reestablish peace and security. A prince should posses the following qualities: the
art of oratory (charisma, the capacity of mobilizing citizens), power of conviction
and prudence. And when the state should be reformed, the prince, as an architect,
should be able to empower new political institutions (Skinner 2000: 67). There is
no grater achievement than this and due to an achievement like this, the prince
will gain glory.
In Discourses, Machiavelli tried reawaken his contemporaries’ passion
for the ancient virtues and to redefine politics as the art of ruling a good state.
This was Machiavelli’s intention when he designed prince’s portrait. If you wish
to attain glory, you have to dedicate your life to the soul purpose of ruling a good
state. His greatest desire was to design a state where the civic spirit would be at
its utmost. The possibility of creating a good state depended only on the citizens’
and the prince’s capacity to use all the necessary means to achieve that goal.
Machiavelli explains that a good society may be enforced by the virtù of
the leader but it necessitates the sharing of civic virtues by the people
(Machiavelli 1983). Institutions are necessary as educators of civic virtues and to
sustain the pursuit of the ideal of the good society when those virtues are no
longer alive within the spirit of the leader and within the people. The aim of
Machiavelli’s politics is not theoretical knowledge, but action, a practical
knowledge, a probabilistic knowledge, an accurate deliberation regarding what is
good and useful.
The Prince is at the same time a recruiting document for a new prince as
well as a handbook which can be used in the process of governing. The structure
of power is paradoxical: its exigencies are contradictory, divided between logical
necessity and historical imperative. According to circumstances, the prince has to
act fairly but still has to have the capacity to dissimulate; he has to be generous
and still cruel, good and bad, honest and cunning, generous and greedy, friendly
and distant, loved and feared. His advisors have to tell him the truth but he is not
bound to do the same. The ethics of power has an adequate content, it has to be
mobile and functional.
Virtù, arete and the concept of the good state
Politics is an activity which allows the leader to accomplish a superior
form of good, the common good (Bock, Skinner and Viroli 1999: 146). In the
Aristotelian way of thinking, politics is a practical science which has a defining,
practical and ultimate purpose that subordinates all the other practical sciences,
all of them having different defining purposes but all of them being included in
the supreme purpose of politics. From Machiavelli’s point of view, politics isn’t
just about decreeing laws; a final goal of politics is to educate the citizens, to
shape their civic conducts.
If a prince wants to maintain his position, he has to learn how not to be
good. But a prince’s purpose to be bad is that to maintain his state or to reform a
corrupt state. The goal of achieving the common good comes from the highest
authority, God. Machiavelli does not plead for tyranny because he has the
following motivation: one single ruler is more susceptible to be corrupted by
power and wealth than the people who have less from each one; a single ruler is
less susceptible to promote his own interests than those of the entire state. The
corruption of the state is the result of the rulers’ and peoples’ corruption. In
Machiavelli’s words, corruption does not have the modern meaning, but is the
disappearance of civic virtues. Machiavelli thinks there is a distinct connection
between great majority of virtuous citizens and the proper functioning of a state.
If people are devoted to the common good, then the state will be a strong one. If
people are corrupted and many of them lose their sense of civic values, then the
state will be facing disorder and disturbances (Also virtue and corruption spread
from top to the bottom. Ledeen 2004: 144). The future of the republic depends on
the vitality of the political life and the sharing of civic virtues among citizens.
For Machiavelli, there are three important elements in the development of a
society: virtù of the leader, civic virtues shared by the citizens and the capacity to
face corruption (Pocock 1975).
Machiavelli’s advice continues to be of actuality. He always aims for the
essence, wishing leaders to play for the highest stake: promoting and protecting
the common good. He believes that if the advice he gives is systematically
followed, the possibility of crises is reduced and drastic measures won’t be
necessary. Machiavelli’s rules are based on an accurate knowledge of the human
nature. Machiavelli’s world is populated by people who are more inclined to do
bad than good things (If men were entirely good, this percept would not hold, but
because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to
observe it with them. Machiavelli 2001: 93). The efficient use of power is the
only way to control your enemies and to convince your friends to collaborate
with you. The ways of success are not identical and not always in accordance
with traditional ethics. The one who governs can attract peoples’ hatred both
trough good deeds as through bad ones. And than, a wise prince ought to adopt
such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance
have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful
(Machiavelli 2001: 61). The goal of every man who is in charge with the state’s
rule is maintaining the power, the security of the state by gaining people’s
approval. This is the moral rule to which all other conduct reasons submit.
Machiavelli says that the art of governing demands prudence in decisions, actions
and alliances. A clever prince does not look only for present disorders but also
for future ones and, using all his skills, he tries to successfully prevent them.
Savio or sagio seems to be the equivalent for the Greek phronesis (practical
reason) the condition without which the virtue of prudence cannot be
acquired\attained. And the statesman who has savio/phronesis will be able to
develop and to cultivate the ethical, practical virtue of prudence (an algorithm
inspired by the Aristotelian ethics). The concept of virtù seems to be inspired by
the Greek concept of phronesis. A ruler is suitable for his job when he is capable
of varying his conduct from good to evil and back again as fortune and
circumstances dictate (Pocock 1975).
The Machiavellian concept of prudence can be described as the power of
reason to predict the effect, always choosing the lesser of two evils as the right
solution. Aristotle suggested a morally correct way of living having a virtuous
conduct as a prima facie argument whereas Machiavelli used the virtue of
prudence for higher goals. If, for Aristotle, the concept of arete designated a
desired way of living, a virtuous life being a purpose in its essence, Machiavelli
considers virtue as a means of achieving other goals. Machiavelli removes
himself from the Aristotelian ethics, pleading for the use of ethical virtues as a
means of attaining the purpose of common good. The spirit of common good is
victorious everywhere, it cancels any barrier imposed by the antiquity’s ethics.
The common good is the reason which will also motivate the use of cruelty by
the prince (Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable,
and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion.
And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer,
it may be possible to make them believe by force. Machiavelli 2001: 41;
Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to
mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more
merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from
which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole people,
whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual only.
Machiavelli 2001:88-89).
As in Plato’s Republic, the Machiavellian prince can tell lies, and is even
recommended to do so, when state reasons claim it (Nor will there ever be
wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this
endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and
engagements have been made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of
princes; and he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.
But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a
great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subjects to
present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who
will allow himself to be deceived. Machiavelli 2001:93-94). A prince should not
be corrupt but he has to know every means he has at his disposal in order to
achieve the state’s common welfare. The prince should not be without virtues, on
a contrary, they are necessary; but when the welfare of the state imposes another
type of conduct, it is imperious for him to use all the necessary means in order to
accomplish the higher task at hand (the only moral criteria for judging a prince’s
actions, for that matter) (…and in the actions of all men, and especially of
princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by result. For that
reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the
means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody.
Machiavelli 2001: 96).
The virtuous prince will embed the same character upon his subjects,
even if the latter were not gifted with these qualities (But the basic contention is
that the virtú of an outstanding leader will always take the form, in part, of a
capacity to imprint the same vital quality on his followers, even though they may
not be naturally endowed with it. Skinner 2000: 67). Leaders should personify
the virtues they expect from others (or, at least, be perceived as virtuous)
(Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a fine
example. Machiavelli 2001: 115). The inadequacy between Christian virtues and
the Machiavellian ones is motivated by the same state reasons. Some virtues,
such as kindness, telling the truth won’t always be compatible with the task the
prince has to accomplish, that of promoting the common good. Even if this task
has an inner Christian value, it cannot be attained only by using means which the
Christian ethics considers to be virtuous, although Machiavelli insists on the
virtuous conduct of the prince (So he has no hesitation in concluding that any
attempt to employ a Christian scale of values in judging political affairs must be
altogether given up. Skinner 2000: 183).
Machiavelli sends an unequivocal, clear message: if the prince wants the
state to be strong, its citizens should be involved in public life and, moreover, the
prince must take into account the citizens’ opinions (But who reaches sovereignty
by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are
not prepared to obey him. ... Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the
favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing
they only ask not to be oppressed by him. Machiavelli 2001: 58-60). Machiavelli
considers that a good state is the one in which citizens are actively involved from
a political point or view and understand that the only way of having an authentic
state is that to put the common good above all personal interests. In other words,
the functioning of a good and strong state involves the practice of civic virtues
(ethical, practical virtues) both by officials and simple citizens. The corrupt state
is the state in which citizens put their own interest in front of the common one
and such a state cannot last (Bock, Skinner and Viroli 1999: 156). The real
political man cannot rule in a despotic or unjust manner. If they want to live in a
fair and strong state, the ruler and the citizens have to practice the same virtues.
The idea according to which Machiavelli imposed a certain type of ethics
which has nothing to do with the concept of virtue is somewhat inconsistent
(Skinner 2000: 41). According to Machiavelli’s opinion, if the prince wants to
achieve the virtues of honour and glory he has to be as virtuous as possible
(Skinner 2000: 41). Machiavelli’s ethics is directly linked to the concept of
reason (opinion which has its origins in Aristotelian and the stoical way of
thinking). The prince has to find the most suitable means to accomplish his goals
and this thing does not exclude moral rectitude. Aristotle speaks about the ethical
virtues of courage and moderation whereas Machiavelli imposes the civic virtue
of prudence. Machiavelli’s innovation is having virtù freed in action from
Christian ethics. If the Christian ethics speaks about the virtues of charity and
humility, Machiavelli imposes the civic virtues of honour and glory. He is the
one who created this concept of civic virtue. The civic virtues involve practical
reason (sagio or savio seeming a lot like phronesis), the condition without which
they cannot be achieved, but they do not represent a way of living as a final end,
being a means to accomplish the second reason ethics, the only type of ethics
which can produce common good.
Machiavelli’s approach is not immoral, but imposes the second reason
ethics which, sometimes, is contradictory with the traditional (Aristotelian ethics)
and Christian ethics. …for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions
of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil. Hence it
is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and
to make use of it not according to necessity (Machiavelli 2001: 84). Machiavelli
disputes a certain and convincing image of ethics. According to this image, one
can understand what it is to lead a just and virtuous life and which are the moral
obligations imposed by a moral code. Such an understanding offers final
guidance, regarding the validity of someone’s moral actions. Moral reasoning
should prevail beyond any other opposing considerations. This traditional image
is questioned and disputed by Machiavelli because he believes that moral
reasoning depends on the effects which a certain type of action produces.
Machiavelli did not question the virtues’ thesis unity, but he invented a
new concept of virtue, the civic virtue, a concept which gained a completely
different meaning and connotations. Following the Platonic way of thinking,
Machiavelli develops the unity of the virtues’ thesis, initiating a new concept.
Civic virtues are conditioned by reason (according to Aristotelian philosophy,
phronesis – practical reason- is the main condition for achieving ethical virtues)
and they fit together as a whole (as in Aristotelian philosophy); a courageous
person is also a prudent one, otherwise he would be a rash person, prudence
implies moderation, otherwise it would be cowardice (Bock, Skinner and Viroli
199: 164). Although Machiavelli does not dispute the unity of the virtues, he
submits civic virtues to the second reason ethics. The concept of civic virtue
gains a completely different meaning. Its aim is to lead to positive consequences
for the community. The second reason ethics is based more on consequences than
it is on the agent. If Aristotle had led a way of life based on the practice of
virtues, a way of life which produces, foremost, positive effects on a personal
level, the practice of civic virtues produces positive effects at the community’s
level. That is why the Machiavellian concept of civic virtue encloses some
qualities rejected by the Aristotelian ethics and by the Christian ethics. The
concept of civic virtue also encloses the quality of being bad and telling lies
because it does not designate an ethics of the agent, but a consequences ethics (a
consequentialist ethics).
Even if Plato did not speak in terms of civic virtue, while he was telling
the Founding Myth - the Myth of Metals - and while he was advising the
philosopher king to administer lies as a medicine man would to his patients, he
did not aim towards a personal ethics, this suggestion being opposed to the theory
of virtues developed in The Republic, but rather towards a consequences ethics.
Plato spoke about lies used as medicine precisely because people are sick. This
sickness refers to the human nature which is bad and evil, without access to the
Eternal World of Truth and which must be treated by any means necessary in
order to guide it towards the Truth (I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a
considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their
subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicine
might be of advantage. Plato 2004: 459d; 389b). The assumption of the political
role invariably implies the second reason ethics precisely because of the human
condition. Human nature is the one that generates the usage of the second reason
ethics in politics, because politics implies an aspect of educating the citizens, and
this process is a moral one due the consequences it generates. It is not the
political algorithm which appeals to the second reason ethics, but rather the
necessity of correcting human nature through an educational process which will
produce moral consequences.
Conclusions
Machiavelli’s dilemma was to answer the question regarding how was it
possible for man, with his imperfect nature, to be determined to cultivate civic
virtues? How can people be prevented from adopting corrupted conducts? How
can, the great goal of educating citizens in such a way that their main focus
would be on achieving the common good and maintaining it, be realized? People,
mostly unable to have virtuous conducts can hope to find a ruler who could
impose and cultivate virtuous behaviours through his actions, regardless if this
implies from his part a conduct which goes in conflict with the first reason ethics.
This is the answer found by Machiavelli, the same found by Plato centuries
before. However, according to Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli’s innovation lies in
the creation of vivere politico (Skinner 2000; Skinner 2002). The Aristotelian
philosophy celebrates virtù as a supreme end of a man, an end that can be
achieved through civic activity (vivere civile). The Machiavellian vivere politico
is not an end but a means to defend and maintain the stability of the state.
Bibliography
1.
Bock, G., Skinner, Q., Viroli, M. Machiavelli and Republicanism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
2. Ledeen, M. A. Machiavelli on Modern Leadership. (Romanian version) trad. de
Nastasia, M. şi Nastasia, I., Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2004, p. 144.
3. Lefort, C. Le travail de l’œuvre, Machiavel. Paris : Gallimard, 1986.
4. Liiceanu, G. Despre minciună (On Lie). Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2006.
5. Machiavelli, N. Discourses. I-XII trans. by Crick, B., Walker, L.J., London:
Penguin Classics, 1983.
6. Machiavelli, N. The Prince. trans. by Marriott, W.K., Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Electronic Classic Series Publication,
2001.
7. Plato. Republic. trans. by Jowett, B., New York: Barnes&Noble, 2004.
8. Pocock, J.G.A. The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and
the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
9. Skinner,Q. Machiavelli. A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000.
10. Skinner, Q. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. vol.I The
Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
11. Skinner, Q. Vision of Politics. vol.II Renaissance Virtues. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
PERSONAL GOALS: A NEW APPROACH IN
STUDYING RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION
Lect. univ. dr. Anca MUSTEA
Western University „Vasile Goldiş” of Arad
Phone: 0257/250609
E-mail: [email protected]
Teodor Călin BABA
Western University „Vasile Goldiş” of Arad
Asist. univ. dr. Oana NEGRU
„Babeş-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca
ABSTRACT. In order to understand what makes people engage in
religious beliefs and behaviors, it is necessary to study their religious
motivation. As there are many controversies concerning the intrinsic-extrinsic
religious orientation, alternative ways of studying religious motivation need to
be developed. The present research investigates the possibility of studying
religious motivation through an appraisal of personal religious goals. Using a
mixed methodology, a taxonomy of religious goals is constructed, which
includes: personal development goals, relinquishment / fasting goals, goals
regarding one’s relation to God, and goals oriented towards others. A positive
correlation between the number of personal religious goals and intrinsic
religious orientation is highlighted by the results of the present research. Also,
our research points out a significant correlation between intrinsic and extrinsic
religious orientations. This finding suggests that the two dimensions are not
mutually exclusive, as initially assumed by Allport (1950, 1966).
Key words: religious motivation, personal goals, religious goals, daily religious
experience, meaning
Introduction
In everyday life, as well as in long-term development, humans need to
find coherence and meaning in everything they do. Lack of meaning in life can
lead to certain disorders coined as existential neurosis (noogene neurosis) by
Viktor Frankl (2008). As stated by Emmons (2005), although humans share
almost 98% of their DNA with their closest phylogenetic cousins, they are the
only “meaning seeking” species on Earth.
From the perspective of neuropsychology, researchers try to explain how
evolution led to changes in the brain structures that make spiritual and religious
experiences possible (Newberg & Newberg, 2005). Studies from the psychology
of religion try to investigate more profoundly the way religion can be considered
a meaning system, which contributes to the improvement of human life. Most of
the studies are conducted in the health domain, pointing out a higher quality of
life in the case of religious people as compared to non-religious ones (Emmons,
Cheung, & Tehrani 1998; Emmons 2005; Paloutzian & Park 2005). It seems that
religious motivation should be taken into account in explaining why people get
involved in religious behaviors, even though sometimes there are costs involved
(Karabenick & Maehr 2005).
In this study we attempt to find adequate means to assess religious
motivation. Therefore we analyze two ways of evaluating religious motivation,
according to specific theoretical approaches. We relate these measures to daily
religious experience, which has been proven to positively correlate with quality
of life (Underwood & Teresi 2002).
Religious motivation and the spiritual experience
The study of religious motivation is quite dispersed and reduced. Thus, a
search on Psych Info realized by Neyrinck, Lens, and Vansteenkiste (2005) using
the key words “motivation”, “religion” and “motivation and religion” returns
15,552 entries for the first term, 4997 for the second term, and only 120
references for both terms taken together.
One important line of research in studying religious motivation was
defined by Allport’s theory and research concerning religious orientation
(Gorsuch şi Venable 1983; Kirkpatrick & Hood 1990, 1991; Masters 1991;
Neyrinck et al. 2005). According to Allport’s theory (1950, 1966), people can
have an intrinsic or an extrinsic religious orientation. An intrinsic oriented person
considers religion as the most important aspect of his life, giving him meaning
and influencing all other aspects of his life. For such a person, religious beliefs
and values are internalized without reserve (Neyrinck et al. 2005). For an
extrinsic oriented person religion is something rather peripheral, and constitutes a
means to other ends (Neyrinck et al. 2005). In other words, an intrinsic oriented
person lives through religion, while an extrinsic oriented person rather uses
religion.
Based on this theory, Allport and Ross (1967) developed a religious
orientation assessment instrument, which was later adapted by Gorsuch and
Venable (1983) in order to be adequately used for children and teenagers as well.
According to the authors, the newly resulted questionnaire, the age universal I-E
scale, can be used starting with fifth grade (Gorsuch & Venable 1983).
Following this line of research, several studies investigated the
relationship between religious orientation and different aspects of personality
such as anxiety, prejudice, fear of death, well-being, pro-social behavior, locus of
control, self control, sociability, responsibility, tolerance, etc. (Gorsuch &
Venable 1983; Kirkpatrick & Hood 1990, 1991; Masters 1991). The relationship
between the extrinsic and the intrinsic orientations was also extensively
investigated. Many controversies still exist in this field of research. One problem
could consist in the fact that the two scales do not represent orthogonal factors.
Therefore, they are not mutually exclusive, and it is possible that the two scales
correlate positively. This would indicate that people who believe and live their
religion, might also use it (Kirkpatrick & Hood 1990, 1991; Masters 1991).
The most problematic aspect refers to the fact that although studies
emphasize the differences between empiric results and the theoretical
conceptualization, a change of Allport’s theory never took place (Kirkpatrick &
Hood 1990, 1991; Masters 1991). Nevertheless, the religious orientation scale is
one of the most widely used instruments in the psychology of religion.
Another direction of studying religious motivation, rapidly developing in
recent years, consists in the assessment of personal goals (Emmons et al. 1998;
Emmons 2005). This line of research focused primarily on understanding how
personal goals relate to long term levels of happiness and life satisfaction. They
also aimed to investigate how such empiric results could be used in order to
increase the subjective well-being of people and which goals contribute the most
to individual well-being (Emmons 2005). People spend a great part of their daily
life reflecting upon, deciding between, and following the realization of their
important and significant goals structuring their lives. Klinger (1998) sustains
that our preoccupations and emotions are linked to the nature and the status of
our goals (Emmons 2005). Attaining our goals is a key element in experiencing
well-being.
Research based on the investigation of a heterogeneous population has
outlined a taxonomy of life meaning, including the following categories
(Emmons 2005): (a) achievement / work; (b) relationship / intimacy, (c) religion /
spirituality, and (d) self-transcendence / generativity. The achievement / work
category refers to one’s commitment towards personal work, beliefs related to
personal worth, and the pleasure of challenge. Relationships and intimacy
includes “relating well to others, trusting others, being altruistic and helpful”
(Emmons 2005: 735). The religion / spirituality category refers to goals about
“having a personal relationship with God, believing in an afterlife, and
contributing to a faith community” (Emmons, 2005: 735). Self-transcendence /
generativity includes goals and beliefs related to self-transcendence of personal
interest in order to contribute to the well-being of the society, leaving a personal
legacy. It appears that goals related to spirituality, intimacy, and generativity are
significantly related to well-being (Emmons 2005).
Several research studies are dedicated to the study of the relationship
between spiritual / religious experiences and physical and mental health, as well
as quality of life (Paloutzian & Park 2005). Underwood and her collaborators
(Underwood & Teresi 2002; Underwood 2006) focus on spiritual and religious
experiences which represent an important part of people’s daily life. A
multidimensional assessment instrument was developed in order to evaluate
several aspects related to the religious aspects of people’s lives, including social
religious support, meaning offered by religion, private and public religious
practices, commitment and religious values (Underwood 2006). The daily
spiritual experience scale tries to capture the common, day by day, spiritual and
religious experience, rather than to focus on particular beliefs and behaviors
(Underwood & Teresi 2002). The authors assume that some daily spiritual
experiences “can contribute positively to health and that can be defined broadly
to include spiritual, psychological and social well-being as well as physical
health” (Underwood & Teresi 2002: 24).
Research in health psychology as well as in the psychology of religion
emphasize a positive relationship between spiritual / religious experiences and
goals and an improved quality of life, well-being, physical and mental health.
Methods
Objectives and hypothesis. Considering the controversies concerning the
assessment of religious motivation through the I-E approach proposed by Allport
(1950, 1966) and his followers (Gorsuch şi Venable 1983; Kirkpatrick & Hood
1990, 1991; Masters 1991; Neyrinck et al. 2005), we aim to find alternative ways
of evaluating this concept. Based on Emmons’ work on personal goals (Emmons
et al. 1998; Emmons 2005), we try to identify a taxonomy of religious goals.
Another aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between the religious
motivation and daily spiritual experiences as captured by the instrument proposed
by Underwood and colleagues (Underwood & Teresi 2002; Underwood 2006).
Our main hypothesis regards the possibility of establishing a taxonomy
of religious personal goals. Another hypothesis tested in this study refers to the
assumption that there is a correlation between intrinsic and extrinsic religious
orientations, contrary to the initial model of Allport (1950, 1966). We also aim at
highlighting the existence of a correlation between religious motivation and daily
religious experiences.
Participants. The participants were 98 students aged between 18 and 52
years (M = 23.16; SD = 7.58); 44 were students in psychology, while 54 were
students in theology. The gender distribution of the participants included 44
males, 54 females and one person who did not declare his/her gender. The
majority of participants (82.7%) were Orthodox Christians, 14.3% were affiliated
to other religions, and 3.1% of participants did not declare their religious
affiliation.
Instruments. In order to assess the religious orientation we used the Age
Universal Religious Orientation Scale adapted by Gorsuch and Venable (1983).
The scale contains 20 items assessing intrinsic religious orientation (9 items) and
extrinsic religious orientation (11 items). For the sample included in this study an
.76 internal consistency alpha was obtained for the intrinsic religious orientation
subscale, while for the extrinsic religious orientation subscale alpha was .62.
The Daily Spiritual Experience Scale developed by Underwood and her
collaborators was used to assess experiences related to spiritual and religious
aspects of daily life (Underwood & Teresi, 2002). The 16 items of the scale refer
to constructs such as worship, awe, gratefulness, compassion, connectedness with
the trascendent, self-transcendence and the desire to get closer to God. A good
consistency of the scale was obtained in the case of our sample (α = .87).
A procedure to evaluate personal goals was adapted from Emmons’
methodology on the assessment of personal strivings (Emmons et al. 1998;
Emmons 2005). This procedure has three stages. First, the participants receive a
short description of personal goals. Then they are asked to list eight most
representative personal goals they will try to attain in the next six months. In the
end they are asked to list three goals related to the religious domain.
Procedure. All participants filled in the instruments at the end of class,
on a voluntary basis. Each participant received a brochure containing the
assessment procedure of personal and religious goals. After completing this
procedure, the participants were asked to complete the religious orientation scale
and the daily spiritual experiences scale.
Results
Religious personal goals. For the analysis of religious personal goals we
combined quantitative and qualitative procedures. First, we quantified the
number of religious goals mentioned by participants in the first list, where they
noted personal goals. For this purpose we considered religious goals those
making a direct reference to the religious domain. The maximum of religious
goals included in the personal goals list was 5; only one person listed this number
of religious goals. The results show that 45.9% of participants did not mention
any religious goals, 37.8% listed one religious goal among their personal goals,
and 9.2% noted two such goals.
In order to establish a taxonomy of religious goals we analyzed and we
coded the second list of goals, where participants were asked to list three
religious goals. We used an “ad-hoc” taxonomy established by the researchers.
After including each goal in the resulted categories, a theologian was consulted
in order to check their accuracy and the correct number of goals for each
category. Six categories of religious goals were identified:
(1) personal development goals: “to go to church more often”, “to be a
better person”, “to read more religious books”, “to grow spiritually”;
(2) relinquishment/ fasting goals: “not to make the same mistakes
anymore”, “to reduce my sins”, “to be more humble”, “not to make stupid things
any more”;
(3) professional goals: “to succeed at my exams”, “to become a religion
teacher”;
(4) goals regarding one’s relation to God: “to be close to God”, “to have
a closer relationship with the divine”, “not to forget and not to doubt God”;
(5) goals oriented towards others: “to help those around me”, “to love
and accept my fellows as they are”, “to be a light for those around me”;
(6) other goals: “to get to the holy places”, “to attain some conferences”,
“to understand the truth”.
After coding the goals and determining the number of goals for each
category, a second researcher, with knowledge in theology, checked the coding
establishing a similar classification. Table 1 contains the frequencies and
percentages for each category of religious goals presented above.
Table 1.
The frequency (f) and the percentage (%) of religious goals for each category
1
2
3
4
5
6
No
f
%
f
%
f
%
f
%
f
%
f
%
0
7
7.1 71 72.4 89 90.8 81 82.7 49 50.0 81 82.7
1
29 29.6 24 24.5 6
6.1 14 14.3 35 35.7 12 12.2
2
45 45.9 3
3.1
3
3.1
3
3.1 13 13.3 4
4.1
3
17 17.3 0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1,0
1
1.0
Total
98 100.0 98 100.0 98 100.0 98 100.0 98 100.0 98 100.0
We note that a large number of goals can be observed for the category of
personal development goals, and for the fifth category, goals oriented towards
others. Only students in theology listed professional goals. It can be observed
that 24 participants have one goal related to relinquishment, mostly referring to
fast.
These religious goals categories are based on the answers offered by the
participants in this study. They are not exhaustive, and may be completed by
extensive studies on more heterogeneous populations.
Religious motivation and daily religious experience. In analyzing
relationship between religious motivation and daily religious experience,
focused on two aspects. Firstly, we focused on the relationship between
religious orientations and the religious goals. Secondly, we analyzed
the
we
the
the
correlation between the two measurements of religious motivation and the score
for daily religious experience.
A noteworthy result consists in a positive correlation between the scores
of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation (r = .21, p = .03). Nevertheless,
only the intrinsic religious orientation scale significantly correlated with the
scores obtained for daily religious experience (r = .69, p = .00).
A positive correlation was found between the number of religious goals
from the list of personal goals (N1 in the Table 2) and the intrinsic religious
orientation (rho = .20, p = .04). A negative significant correlation was obtained
for the same number of religious goals and the extrinsic religious orientation (rho
= .21, p = .03).
Table 2.
The correlation coefficients for the number of religious
experience, intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation
N1
1
2
3
Daily religious
rho
.18
-.02
-.17
.05
experience
p
.06
.81
.08
.62
Intrinsic religious rho
.20
-.08
-.14
.04
orientation
p
.04
.39
.16
.64
Intrinsic religious rho
-.21
-.16
-.19
-.04
orientation
p
.03
.10
.06
.63
goals and daily religious
4
.09
5
.12
6
.02
.33
.14
.24
.17
.84
.00
.15
.18
.08
.00
.98
.15
.07
.99
.13
No significant correlation was found between specific religious goals and
religious orientation or daily spiritual experiences. The score on the daily
spiritual experience scale did not significantly correlate with intrinsic or extrinsic
religious orientation.
Discussions and conclusions
Our results emphasize the current status of research in the field of
religious motivation (Gorsuch & Venable 1983; Kirkpatrick & Hood 1990, 1991;
Masters 1991). Namely, the use of the intrinsic-extrinsic orientation scale
developed by Allport and Ross, (1967) or any of its adapted forms, is a
controversial issue. The positive significant correlation between extrinsic and
intrinsic religious orientations observed in our study would suggest a nonorthogonal relationship between these dimensions, contrary to Allport’s
assumptions (Allport 1950, 1966; Gorsuch & Venable 1983; Kirkpatrick & Hood
1990, 1991; Masters 1991). An alternative way of assessing religious motivation
needs to be developed or existing theories must be reconsidered.
In this respect, we propose a pioneering procedure adapted from
Emmons (Emmons et al. 1998; Emmons 2005) for the evaluation of religious
personal goals. The results show that a taxonomy of religious personal goals is
possible. More extensive studies in heterogeneous populations need to be
conducted in order to further develop our taxonomy. It is also worth mentioning
that the participants in our study were in majority Orthodox Christians. Testing
the current taxonomy on other religious denominations is also necessary.
The results of our study emphasize the fact that daily religious
experience is directly proportional only with the intrinsic religious orientation,
but not with the extrinsic one. Therefore, only people living their religion seem to
focus on and capture their daily religious experiences.
The topic of religious and spiritual motivation is a rather complex one
and there is no wonder it could become such a controversial issue. Nevertheless,
more adequate and ecological assessment procedures could be developed as
presented in this paper. Our methodology, based on the assessment of personal
religious goals and the proposed taxonomy, need to be further developed and
investigated. But the positive health related outcomes of religious and spiritual
involvement of people, emphasized by so many research studies, suggest that any
effort in understanding religious motivation is worth doing.
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9. Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Hood, R. W. “Rub-a-dub-dub: who’s in the tub? Reply to
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THE TRADITIONAL SACRED IN THE CHRISTIAN
POETRY OF VASILE MILITARU
Lect. univ. dr. Corina VAŞCA
Western University „Vasile Goldiş” of Arad
Phone: 0257/250609
Phone: 0257 - 338533
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. The meaning of the word “sacred”, when associated
with traditions, refers to a comprehensive process, manifested by the
Christianization of the Romanian people, the human presence within the world
and its relationship with the Divinity. The sacred is a category of interpretation
and evaluation that “only exists in the religious area” and escapes reason,
according to German theologian and philosopher Rudolf Otto. In his words, the
sacred has a live component in all religions, which makes up its very specific
characteristic. Without this content, Rudolf Otto maintained, “all would be far
from religion”. He called it “numinous”, which implies the idea of “good,
divine”. The human being is linked to the divinity through faith, but only in the
presence of love. The human feelings configured through faith by numinousness
are those of thrilling, respectfully sacred, mystical attraction, vital energy and
love. “Christianity creates the world again, linking the human being to the
divine work.” The principle is the incarnation of the Son of God, Jesus Christ
[…]. He brought into this world, devastated by sin, a new way to accomplish
this work, the theandric way, the divine-human way.” (Crainic, The Paradise
Nostalgia, Iaşi, Moldova Publishing House, 1996, p. 6). Vasile Militaru
acknowledges this type of relationship, and his religious poetry is centered on
meditation and the relationship with the divinity. From a stylistic point of view,
in his poetry one can observe the process of human development towards a
superior moral being, with the coordination of religion. Critically, beyond the
written verse there we find strong experience of the Orthodox faith, a modest
artistic and esthetic level. The Christian poet describes the religion state, but not
how it is experienced. There are stylistic elements, but in all cases, with few
exceptions, they are sacrificed at the expense of versification, moral and
education precepts.
Key words: sacred, divine, poetry, faith, numinous, Cosmic Christianity
The numinous – integral part of the sacred
In the Christian lyrics, poetry and mystical revelation are forms of
living ones faith. Faith, an attribute of the Christian man, is an intuitive form of
understanding the human condition, streamed from tradition and the emotional
bond with the world created by God. Vasile Avram calls this form o faith
“cosmic Christianity” (Abraham 1999: 12) specifying that this doesn’t change at
all the truth revealed by the Gospels.
One of the essential determinations of faith is the certainty of the
existence of a reality even inaccessible to conceptual understanding, just as
beauty in esthetics or time – no matter its forms of existence or sacred in religion.
They all are just interpretatively rated concepts which describe forms of reality.
The meaning of the concept sacred which we associate to tradition, tries to
synthesize a broad process displayed during the Christianization of the Romanian
people. The two stages of the Christianization process analyzed as manifests
emphasize the particularity in which the sacred was assimilated and endowed
with the proprieties which gradually became part of our peoples’ faith.
The first stage is related to the conveyance of the new religion on the
Roman North-Danube territory, through the Christianized roman soldiers as well
as through the apostleship of Andrew which fixed the idea that the Romanian
peoples were born Christians. Arguments show that in the IV century the
apostleship of the bishop Nicetas de Remesiana (335 – 414) had the concrete
historical mission to preach the Gospels to the natives of Dacia (Kembach, 1994:
267). The second stage is “reabsorbţia lui din Liturghia slavonă, intruziunea
adstratului bizantin de expresie slavă” (Kernbach, 1994: 267) and the scholarly
impact of either heretical Bogomil sources or heroic narratives “vestit
Alixăndrie” – as the hagiographic Byzantine writings. Lucian Blaga has written
similarly: “The villager won’t thing about God as abstract, dogmatic or
philosophic as the Byzantine culture defines Him, but mythological that is
prehistorically. The Romanian village assimilated many of the motifs which built
the great Byzantine culture’s heritage that was absolutely historical; but this
historical culture has been assimilated to the pre-historical style of the villages”
(Blaga 1977: 61). Specification: Lucian Blaga uses the term pre-historical related
to the type of minor village, not the villages from the end of the XIX century
(from the poet’s childhood, at the same time different from the village where
Vasile Militaru grew up) what is more the Romanian interwar village studied
rigorously by the researching “teams” of Dimitrie Gusti.
God the Father, Jesus Christ, Mother Mary are for the Christian
villagers legendary countenances, fairytale characters: the incantations involve
the Trinity, the saints are comprised in the mythical-magical practices. In his
selection of fairytales, Lazăr Şăineanu presents “the overlap of the Christian
factor on the pagan primitive layer. Mother Mary replaced the primitive fairy.
The archangel substituted death. The good fairies were replaced by Christian
saints (Saint Sunday, Saint Wednesday, Saint Friday) and the evil ones with the
devil. God Himself descends, accompanied by Saint Peter, to explore people’s
thoughts, rewarding the good and punishing the evil” (Şăineanu 1978: 27).
As a category of interpretation and evaluation, the sacred “doesn’t exist
like that only in the religious field” (Otto 2002: 11). Strictly analyzed, the sacred
shows a component which is alive in all religions and precisely establishes the
characteristics of the religion. According to Otto’s terms: without this content
“none would be the least of a religion”. The German theologian and philosopher
calls it numinous the sacred undertaking the idea of “good” and absolute
goodness which simplifies the content of the concept and also of the feelings this
designates.
The numinous’ element would be “the feeling of being a creature” or
of being dependent, that of mysterium tremendum, the element of absolute power
(majestas), the element of energy. There are fixed elements which make
something special out o the numinous compared to the regular human experience.
Awe, sacred respect, fear, fascinations as mystic attraction, vital energy, power,
against which the human is dust and ashes (Abraham spoke to God about the fate
of those from Sodom, the Book of Genesis 18, 27 “Let me take it upon myself to
speak to the Lord, I who am but dust and ashes.”). Even though these feelings
which we should call characteristics are embedded into the human conscience,
there lacks one decisive for faith – love. God’s love “descending into people
makes these absorb the projection of God’s image in their selves” (Stăniloae
1993: 162).
In the popular Christianity God’s image reflects in the human self
differently: beginning with an anthropomorphic image to His presence in
everything that is seen and unseen. However, the divine energy once impregnated
in one’s soul heads for God bearing the subject’s own intentionality and
affection.
In Nae Ionescu’s interpretation of the phrase: “love the Lord your God
and your neighbor as you love yourself” we find an important shedding of the
meaning and understanding of Christian love. The first part of the phrase “Love
the Lord your God with all your heart and mind” means that nothing of what you
feel or think should be aimed at another direction than God: “…the target of your
entire activities, your every moment’s strain should strive after God, after a
guidance center of all your spiritual powers” (Ionescu 1995: 125). The second
part of the phrase, according to the Romanian philosopher, means that you should
relent something of yourself to give to someone else. Goodness is self-surrender,
not self-love.
The existence of the numinous and of its characteristic feelings
including love is likewise highlighted by Gustav Carl Jung who also finds the
creational function of the religious spirit in spontaneous images precisely because
this is religious by nature (Jung 1973: 15), an idea completed by Mircea Eliade
showing that the sacred “is an element in the structure of the conscience and not
a phase in this conscience’s history” (Eliade 1994: IX) and emphasizing it
through an interrogative argument: “how could the human spirit function without
being convinced that something irreducibly real exists in the world?” (Eliade
1994: IX). Here is a sketch of the presence of the divine in the world and in
humans:
GOD,
JESUS CHRIST,
THE HOLLY GHOST
..................................................................................................................................
..............
REALITY
DEPENDENCE
MYSTERIUM - SACRAMENT
LOVE
THE NUMINOUS
1. AWE: FEAR
LOVE
TREMENDUM
2. ABSOLUTE POWER:
MAJESTAS
3. ENERGY
FAITH
THE
HUMAN
..........................................................................................................................................
FEELINGS
- sacred respect
- fascination/ mystic attraction
- vital energy
- love
We notice that Christianity recreates the World associating the human
being with the divine work. This principle is the incarnation o the Son of God,
Jesus Christ, says a great Christian thinker Dionisie Areopagitul. He brought in
the world devastated by sin a new working approach: the theandric way, the
divine-human way” (Crainic 1996: 6).
Our model is able to present reality in its irreducible aspect with the
presence of the divine which leads to the representation of the human
communion with God, communion expressed in all forms of human activity.
From all these activities we stop at the artistic creation, more accurately at poetry
and mysticism, an activity which shows the rising of the human to the state of
salvation.
The theandric way inflicts the idea of its realization through two types
of Revelations according to the orthodox doctrine: the natural Revelation and the
supernatural Revelation whereby God manifests as human. Humans unite with
the deities through image and affinity, two Christian anthropological concepts.
Developing further the ideas of Nechifor Crainic, we highlight the fact that
humans bear God’s image given in their spiritual structure (see the example
above), but due to his freedom he might not be similar to God. The fulfillment of
God’s image in a human is the genius, fulfilling the affinity with God is the saint.
The genius is the natural prophet of “an order o superior perfection of our world
symbolized in his psalms” (Crainic 1996: 6) and the saint which externalizes the
Christian character allows us through its moral perfection to “contemplate a sign
of eternal perfection”. Of course, their common basis, the image, leads to their
convergence of the genius’ creation who becomes a prophet and of the saint who
is the model of deification. Wishing to systematize, we skim through the aspects
from popular Christianity to the theoretic in order to reveal the manner in which
the assimilation process took place forming the religious experience, the sense of
iconic plasticity, the sensitive perception of God’s world as a world of the
humans with God where imagination, words, sounds and colors may be animated
by the natural Revelation.
From divine revelation to human revelation
From this general frame, from the perspective of which we understand
the religious art and literature, we place ourselves at a lower level of
understanding of the lyrical creation of Vasile Militaru, which we consider as
being the expression of talent. “The talent surpasses our epoch. The talent is a
technical virtuosity, which gives a beautiful shape or agreeable to an ordinary
content. “ (Crainic 1996:225) We will find in the lyrical forms, where the sacred
will be symbolized, this particular ordinary content, but which, starting from the
traditionally Christianity, will draw also the orthodox theology’s pattern
systematized in holy books. To an extent, we can say that the author followed the
path from the human world having God’s face, a world of villages and traditions
to the divine world transmitted by the Holy Spirit in the content of Holy
Scripture.
Literary, though, taking into account also the esthetic success, the road
will be a difficult one. The poet has in view the depiction of the religious mood
and not its experience, he illustrates metaphysical moments, stressing the ethics
and their teaching. A mere poem of the faith that is offered, which lacks, though,
the mystery’s thrill and the unutterable of the divine order. For the Christian poet,
the heart represents the organ where it is focused the power of faith, it is here that
lays the enthusiasm of great actions, which configurates the fulfillment’s path
and the purpose of the poet:
„Te cânt inimă, că, vie, printr-o sfântă vrere-adâncă
Ai pornit să baţi în pieptu-mi, până-a nu mă naşte încă,
Şi de-atunci tu baţi într-una, făr-o clipă de repaus
Puls al Cosmosului însuşi, închegat în ce-a fost haos”.
The unique metaphor “pulse of the outer space itself” indicates the
energy, element of the sacred; the further symbolic expressions indicate vitality,
passion, will, love, being the personification of God himself, but also the tension
of touching and unification with the divinity. The poem of my heart from the
volume The poems of immortality (1995, Craiova) is a large unfolding of the
sacred’s vitality aspects conceived by the human being. We situate ourselves in a
high position that the poet has reached through the image promoted by the
theology ( and of course, by the poem that has influenced him, particularly the
eminescian one) , through which the divine creation meant the transition from
chaos to outer space, the outer space being perceived as an order. We mention
that in ancient Greek, for Pythagoreans, the outer space was considered as a
“living creature” (zoon) , with breathing system but it was also a principle of
Boundary (peras).
The leit motiv “ Te cant inima” is the lyrical form through which the
human being’s decisions are connected, as a living person, in the reality crossed
by the divinity’s spirit, moral values and the faith rises upon the Absolute Creator
“ The one from which you withdraw”. The heart, “a startling human being”, the
fertile soil of love, the sun, the life, the music and the weeping, bears in it the
power of the Holy Cross, and the secret of the celestial worlds, it praises the
Creator of the nine Canopies of Heaven and it rises the Human Being to the sky “
indumnezeindu-I firea”.
The message of the poem is obvious, if we take into consideration the
Latin etymon of the word heart: anima. The signification “vital principle, life,
soul” is able to reveal the idea of the assembly, of the Outer space organized in
its own rules by the Creator. The power of faith and the redemption paths are
found also in the concept of the “heart” as an equivalent for the soul. The poet
builds its vision through the indication of the vital organ and its functions passing
to the old meanings disguised in the Latin form of the word, used in religious
texts and in the liturgical ones.
The personification, as a semantic figure, is created in the poem through
metaphors taken from the most diverse areas of existence: the heart is YOU, alter
ego, a person and a flower: “.. te-mbeţi adânc în faţa unui răsărit de soare/ Cantre florile grădinii, ce de asemeni te îmbată/ Înflorind mereu ca ele, te simţi
floare înmiresmată”. It is , as well, a fireplace with vapaie “mangaioasa” ( epitet
adjectival derivat din verb) it is gold, not mud, it is Maiastra- a remarkably
semantically dense metaphor, and finally, Golden Shrine, suggestiong the
popular image of God, an Old Man that sits on a golden throne and who
supervises the ongoing life of the world and human beings.
The heart is in poem also the perceptive organ of the Revelation, it is
shown the world created in the fabulous of faith, but also the Revelation’s means
of conduction. The heart, personified, it becomes another thing and we
distinguish “the human being’s experience in the second person” through the fact
that unlike everything that exists in the world, it appears as a subject that limits
us. Now we can add that the human being, in the most vivid existence, as YOU,
is being sent by us, as a subject that leaves and raises us too to the subject level
(Stăniloae 1993: 23). Through the poetic makeshift of division, Vasile Militaru
places two subjects in a communication situation, when he writes:
„Te cânt, inimă, că tu eşti vietatea ce tresaltă
În adâncul veşniciei cu fiorii cei mai nalţi
Ce pe OM îl suie-n ceruri, îndumnezeindu-i firea
Că-n pământul tău răsare floarea-florilor: iubirea!”.
The poet applies in the lyrics the ideas of faith, love and the presence and
the conduction of the Revelation. The faith of the other one ( “the heart”, You), is
the faith in the human being, because it is in the heart of eternity, faith in God.
Love is the harmony with God and the way to the deifying of the human beong.
The idea of the sacrifice of the Jesus Christ is in people’s understanding as the
means through which the Son of God saved the world. The poet keeps only the
pain. In the case of Crucifixion, we talk about an absolvable suffering, “a penalty
carried voluntary without any sign of reproach against God, as an absolute tribute
brought to Him”( Staniloae 1993: 271). The suffering is pure sacrifice, the only
one that God wants.
In the poem “On the Cross”, the poet imagines similar sufferance and
invokes the name of the One that dies on the cross. Through the dialogue, as a
literary means, the scene is dramatized: „Au ce sunt durerile tale, nevrednic
vierme – îmi spui,/ Ce-nseamnă-ndurarea ta toată, pe lângă-ndurările Lui?”. The
poet’s pains are appeased, living among the loved ones, but he asks himself: „Dar
Celui pe Cruce-n piroane – în pieptu-I stingându-şi suspinul/ Au cine-a venit să-l
aline, măcar mângâindu-I tot chinul?. The unappeased suffering is given
precisely to emphasize the assuming of guilt, of the humanity’s sins. Through it,
the intensity of love, responsibility and purity reaches the last limit, a condition
that can bring the redemption. The cross on which the poet crucifies is the one of
pain linked to the impossibility of expression: the image of the young apple,
personified “ numai zambet” is a gift, the poet though, doubts it; it can be one of
temptation, of testing, “ cum dar lui Adam s-a dat Evei?” Is is the creation an
illusion? „Că-n florile mărului toate, drag, chipul iubirii s-arată”.
Vasile Militaru didn’t express himself in a “poetical art” in the poem; he
rather illustrated in the lyrics the role of the poet: the promotion of the identity
values, the moral ones, the traditions and the faith. It is just accidentally, like it is
the poem above that he speaks about the poem as an expression of sufferings,
that through the word they succeed to reach the salvation. With gentleness
“zambeste din orice petala”, the face of the flame induces him the feeling “ de nu
stiu cum”, that nescio quid of the esthetics of the romanticism’s beginnings. For
the analyzed poet, though, “ nu stiu ce”/ “ nu stiu cum” receives concretization:
“Can dinger e, cand o femeie!”. The poem becomes clear, the ambiguity is a
strange notion for the poet, the esthetic effects of the chiaroscuro are unknown as
well for him. He goes only after the clear expression of love in two aspects of a
soul “alb fluture” , which knows the fly’s tension “ spre Tine la ceruri” si
freamatul coborarii la “ea”. The terrestrial love, born from suffering cannot fulfill
but melted with the divine love: “Poetul si-a marului floare se-nalta vapaie spre
Tine”.
Another argument of the religious background of human being is given
by the presence of the symbols in the religious practices. Their existence
indicates also the religious way of thinking. It’s a symbolic way of thinking, in
which takes place a signification of the symbol in relation with the Christian
vision. “In terms of ideas, a symbol is still a connection element, charged with
meditation and analogy. It unifies the contradictory elements and reduces
oppositions. Nothing can be understood, nor communicated without its
participation” (Benois 1995:6)- tells us Luc Benoist.
The poem, using the word as a symbol, is at its turn, meditation and
analogy. Using the religious symbols, the poet expresses its state of spirit, in
which the perception of the divine is transmitted through the word, the message
meaning the charge of the symbol. In the popular Christianity, the range of
symbols is extremely vast and it keeps a part of their original significance. The
cross, the faith’s central symbol represents the extent on the horizontal axis of
the” human being’s extension in all directions of his individuality. Vertically, it
unifies the hierarchical stages of the superior phases towards which he can aim.”
(Benois 1995:62).
In Troita from the Stropi de roua volume, Vasile Militaru brings the
Cross’ symbol in its basic form. The crucifix placed in the field, near the road,
achieves “fair and saint” face for the land toiling. The peasant, searches for years
a cure for his wife, has the revelation of faith, kneels and praises. Important, is
though, the saint frame where the communion act with God takes place. :
„Picior de om în preajmă nu-i;/ Sunt doar scaieţi în cărărui/ Şi, roşu, soarele
apune...” Ceasul de graţie în care ţăranul şi-a urcat spre Dumnezeu durerea, cu
ochii spre cer l-a covârşit şi-a rămas „cu ochii uzi, cu fruntea-n jos,/ Ca şi când iar fi zis Hristos/ Să aştepte leac pentru nevastă...”.
The last verse cited upsets the balance of the composition saturated by
the holly as a whole. The icon and the prayer are part of the symbolism of man’s
intimacy with God. The practical aspect, in this case the efficiency of human
undertaking invoked in the prayer, has introduced the common, the mundane in
the rustic setting. Esthetically it is a loss, as the poet concerned with exposition
and narrative unity, produces an unbalance by putting together inspired imagery
with prosaic elements. Poetry is first and foremost artistic imagery, as the ending
demonstrates:
„Şi-n timp ce sufletul lui cheamă,
Plângând o rază de lumină
Sub a apusului maramă
Troiţa pare de aramă
Iar Sfinţii-ncununaţi se-nchină!”.
In these poems about feelings, the poet manages to elevate lyricism to
the level of the metaphysical and convey emotions related to the believer’s
exceptional state in relationship to the symbolized divinity. In another poem from
the same tome, Icoana veche (Old icon) Vasile Militaru uses words as means of
painting a portrait of the peasant at work surrounded by the same air of the
metaphysical. The pain of the one who digs the land which is not his is
concentrated in a tear.
The shovel, like half of a sun shining in thousand rays, the old incurable
longings give a face its dramatic substance, which seems to be looking for God’s
help. The hues of the sunset expressed in a concentrated form by „Jariştea din
soare” (“the scorch from the sun”), projected onto the stony face, bloodies the
running tear. The agony of humanity’s sins on Christ’s face crucified on the cross
of deliverance, the poet’s agony crucified in words, man’s agony in prayer and
the one separated from his land are impregnated with faith as a form of uplifting
and deliverance. The expressive power of the poems steaming from traditional
Christian vision is stronger, the poet’s means are lyrical. Image, suggestion,
color, atmosphere are communicated in forms that follow the rhythm of natural
speech.
Within the orthodox dogmatic the icon is an object of worship and to the
same extent an object of study. Saint John of Damascus, the first dogmatic
theorist to talk about the cult of the icons, defines the icon as follows: “… a
resemblance, a model, an engraving of someone which shows the person
presented in the icon. This does not wholly resemble the original since the icon
and the original are two different things…” (Damascus 1937: 19). Let us keep in
mind the attributes of the icon: resemblance, an anthropological concept that
implies the presence of divinity and gives the depiction its Christian character;
the model is the reflection of and the clear proof that the Son of God, in the case
of the icon of Jesus Christ, has truly crafted His own human body; the engraving
is the reception and assimilation of the exhibited face into the consciousness, thus
amplifying the religious feeling. We also add here the beautiful as the aesthetic
category validating the theological attributes of the icon in terms of feeling. We
wish to mention one of the most beautiful icons of Orthodoxy with the Holly
Trinity as its topic, titled the Trinity of the Pious icon painter Andrei Rubliov
(Breda 2001: 7-21). For poetry the icon can achieve not so much aesthetical
significance (the thesis of Ut picture poesis was augmented in the history of
aesthetics) as one of content and the meaning presupposed from the perspective
of the poet’s individual perception.
Prayer is another form of lyrical expression, borrowed from Christian
ritual and found in the works of the most important poets. The content of prayers
has laic characteristics for the most part. Of importance are the structural
elements and the kind of relationship (the beneficial feeling of being protected, of
support), but the requirements are worthy of the poet’s attitude and his demands.
If Octavian Goga asks: „Dă-mi tot amarul, toată ura/ Atâtor doruri fără leacuri,/
Dă-mi visele în care urlă şi gem/ Robiile de veacuri”, the neomodernist Mircea
Dinescu asks for the values specific to man in a partial form with ironic distance:
„Dă-mi Doamne, totul numai pe din două/ Spânzurători din funie de mac/ Iubite
credincioase doar când plouă/ Şi libertatea ghemuită-n sac”. These are two
examples which indicate an accepted form, but also the distance between
traditional and contemporary poetry, having overcome the modern experience.
In a Prayer (Ruga) Vasile Militaru uses the image of Christian purity, of
spiritual purity necessary for communication and communion with God through
prayer: „Mi-e sufletul ca un cireş în floare” (My soul is like a blossoming cheery
tree) – says the poet. This is in accordance with the structure of the Christian
prayer: 1) Calling upon God; 2) the request regarding temptation; 3) the request
regarding salvation and 4) purification for the Final Judgement:
(1) „O, Doamne, azi când nimeni nu mai poate
(2) Să biruie a ispitelor sudum,
Când înspre iad duc drumurile toate,
Iar înspre Rai mai duce-un singur drum
(3) Trimite-mi Îngeri, astfel să mă poarte,
Să nu mă întineze nici un greş,
Ca, sufletu-mi să ţi-l aduc la moarte,
Îmbătător ca floarea de cireş”.
(Rugă – volume Stropi de rouă)
We notice new elements in this poem : at the lexical level he uses words
such as temptation in the religious sense of attraction or minimal resistance to the
seductions of the laic world but also the regional term “sudum” in the sense of
effect, crowd. The necessities of rhythm and rime are met (sudum/drum);
communication is however obscured. The opposition Heaven/Hell, purposefully
substantiated using capital letters, is also borrowed from tradition, as well as the
Angels, who have the role of accompanying man in his endeavors, the more so
considering this is the road to salvation.
Prayer is a constant of the believer’s behavior, and evening prayer has
the role of accentuating human consciousness’ communion with God. The
meanings of protection, of home and trust are necessary to: „Să pornesc la
muncă sfântă, cum pornesc albinele/ Să pot umple ca şi ele fagurii cu binele” Evening Prayer. Another prayer for the Final Judgment evokes the countless
numbers of those who will come: „Şi stăpâni, şi slugi, şi tineri, şi bătrâni, şi
fragezi prunci,/ Şi bogaţii, şi săracii, şi smeriţii, şi trufaşii”. But the image of their
division is devoid of the tension between the souls who are on the threshold of
redemption and those who are not: „Drepţii vor fi daţi la dreapta, păcătoşii-n
partea stângă”. Its simplicity bares the mark of orality, without the supposed
dramatic tension.
Man’s relationship with the divine mystery
In popular Christian-orthodox tradition the elements of the Gospels were
assimilated through liturgical practice, through the parables, allegories, the
histories of the martyrs and through popular books. The Gospels themselves are
related in a literary form, close to that of legends, stories, consequently having a
powerful persuasive impact. The poetic substance and sometimes even the forms
were structured in a certain manner, with a precise moral message. The gap
between soteriology and theology is one that rational metaphysics is supposed to
fill by grounding the divine mystery in rationality. Dogmatic thought in its
conceptual richness and in its hermeneutical engagement can not become poetical
substance. You cannot semantically burden a concept which is clearly defined by
itself and instrumentalized to function within a specifically articulated logical
system.
The path Vasile Militaru walks is one of great trials, a path on which the
aura of poetry threatens to disintegrate. The poet attempts a lyrical exegesis of
one of the statements from the Lord’s Prayer, “Our Father”, the first Christian
prayer left behind as a model by Jesus Christ in his Sermon on the Mount. Its
content is structured into four parts (Ciobanu 1994: 246):
(1) Calling upon God the Father: Our Father who art in Heaven
(2) Three requests regarding the Kingdom of Heaven:
Hallowed be thy name;
Thy kingdom come
Thy will be done
On earth as it is in heaven.
(3) Three soteriological requests, the ones regarding man: Give us this day our
daily bread;
And forgive us our trespasses
As we forgive those who trespass against us;
And lead us not into temptation,
But deliver us from evil.
(4) Praise to God: For thine is the kingdom,
And the power,
And the glory,
Forever.
Vasile Militaru remembers the second request directed at the Kingdom of
Heaven and sets it as title: Thy kingdom - come. (In the poet’s orthography some
deviations from rules are present. In quoting the lines we respect these for
deontological reasons. The question arises if the punctuation marks are omitted
for a stylistic purpose?) In some poems/lines this aspect is obvious but in others it
is not. Here, the rule can change the meaning of the sentence (and of the whole
prayer!). Vie (come) can be understood as a substantive and then the meaning is
of a „Împărăţie vie” (“Living Kingdome”) or in the spirit of the prayer as an
imperative verb: să vie / să vină! (Come/let it come!)).
It is a massive poem, graphically structured, with long, Alexandrine
lines, specific to the poet with ten line stanzas (three) followed by two six line
stanzas, than a succession of eight, ten, six, two, four line stanzas, finishing with
three eight – ten – eight line stanzas.
From this formal structure we can infer that the poet’s aim is to exhaust
the idea over the length of the stanza. Thus the graphic form is the result of the
thought pattern and not of deliberate aesthetic effects related to rhythm and form.
We can assert that this graphic model is in accordance with the content. Vasile
Militaru has the conviction that the clarity of the words from the Lord’s Prayer
(this is how he refers to it although the classification is theological!) hides a deep
meaning:
„La suprafaţă-s ape limpezi ca de izvor, dar au în ele
Atât adânc precum e-adâncul cel pururi plin de sori şi stele”.
Not any mind, says the poet, can interpret the meaning of godly words,
and through alliteration – a figure of sound often used by the poet - „Atât adânc
precum e-adâncul...” gives the image of the sky full of suns and stars. Fortunate
is he who can retrieve the gems of wisdom from this depth: the comparison
„Acela e ca un scafandru ce din adâncul fund de mare,/ Îi scoate lumii, ca şi sieşi, comoară de mărgăritare!” expresses the condition of the poetic self. Intuition
leads him to the depths were the gems lye. The mind and words in their
expressive forms bring to the surface the gems meant for the world but also for
oneself – as remedies for the moral condition – and the lights which show the
way to redemption.
The logic of the verse seems twisted: the depth is that of the skies filed
with suns and stars, the nine mentioned in another poem or of the diver,
immensely deep (adanc de mare)? We can also identify the poet as a gaze, which
reminds us of the first sentence from Plotin’s Enneads: We can also find the
beautiful as a diver absorbed in the depths of his feelings (Plotin 2000: 11).
Vasile Militaru opens up vast perspectives and from a discursive point of view
introduces the exemplifying parable, full of meanings, which are eventually
indicated under a practical aspect. The human condition is marked by sins,
among which is living the moment without the awareness of eternity:
„Şi totuşi, tu te dărui clipei, la Cel Etern fără-a căta
Pe când, din ale lui cuvinte, zici: «Vie Împărăţia Ta!»
Unde să vină, când în tine, în loc de-a lui Împărăţie,
S-a-ntins pustiul fără soare, cu noaptea ca de veşnicie”.
Deep understanding of the request regarding the Kingdom is necessarily
linked with the preparatory practice for salvation:
„Alungă-l pe Satan din tine, cu toate-a lui viclene şoapte,
Să fie-n tine numai soare, ca-n veci să nu mai fie noapte”.
To get to the meaning of this sentence, the poet creates an antithesis
between preparations to receive an earthly emperor and earthly happiness and the
preparations to receive the heavenly emperor, He who reigns eternal over
everything else and for which the sinner is not prepared.
The two parts are different in regards to tone because stylistically the
rhetorical interrogation is the only means by which the poetic discourse develops.
In the first part gradation is achieved through cumulation: the house becomes a
garden, the most valuable garments, the table full of fine dishes, everything
should be of the best quality. „La fel de-nşelătoare toate şi toate pier ca fumu-n
vânt!”. The tone changes, it becomes solemn, full of incriminations, of
invectives: foolish mouth, a path full of shards and sharp broken glass gravel.
In this poem we find the poet’s attempt to settle his role in relationship to
spreading the faith: the one who discovers the precious gems, he who writes from
a theological perspective feels this time that it his calling to enlighten the sinner,
to show him the path to redemption. Thus, Vasile Militaru, having reached the
holly texts, turns towards the believer as a preacher. His rhetoric is however
limited to the stylistic repertoire characteristic of him: rhetorical interrogation
used to incriminate, antithesis, dialog, invocation, invective, metaphor: cei ce
caerul îşi torc sub Cer, a metaphor for people’s lives. Divinity and its attributes
are marked by capital letters: Izvorul Vieţii, Prea-Înaltul, El Eternul, Dumnezeul
Slavei, inversions and the image is diluted through explanations: „Şi-ntru
eternitate fi-va-n fiecare, deci, şi-n tine! ”. One observation is necessary
regarding the excess usage of the hyphen as a consequence of aphaeresis which
in the spoken popular language is frequent. In this case it is not a mark of orality
but rather a requirement of the necessities of versification (metrical foot and
rhythm). The aesthetic effect seems diluted by the verse’s monotony and
graphically by the recurrence of the sign.
“All Christianity consists of communication and receiving the divine
«word»: in Jesus Christ himself, all we have is the divine «word», in the sense of
speaking to the people” (Stăniloae, 1993: 120), writes Dumitru Stăniloae. Faith is
supported by trusting the dialogue with God and the prayer is appreciated as a
heavenly gift and as a man’s deed, it is the mystery of union with God. Whereas
Vasile Militaru is trying to replace that mystery with another, in the ideal way,
that is thorugh poetry, but words are deprived of the very thing that they should
suggest – the mystery of the divinity, the secret of faith. On the same lines, the
author of the Divine Building has in mind to unveil the meanings of Communion
through an ample poem, entitled The Holy Housel, for the world oafs [who] do
not understand it.”
The moment when Jesus sets up the Mystery of Communion by
transubstantiation, the bread into His Body and the wine into His Blood, as
symbols of supreme offering for the redemption of mankind, is at the Last
Supper, in Marie’s House, together with His twelve Disciples. The Gospel of
Matthew (26, 26-28) thus describes the moment:
“26. As they ate, Jesus took the bread and blessed it and broke it and
gave it to his disciples, and he said: consume it, this is my body.
27. And he took the cup and made the covenant and gave it to them and
said, "Drink in fulfillment of it, all of you.
28. This is my blood of the New Covenant, that will be spilled on behalf
of many for the forgiveness of sins.
These verses are put into lyrics, with the intention of suggesting the
sacredness loaded atmosphere around Jesus:
„În vremea ceea, Astrul lumii stinsese farul lui feeric,
Şi coborâse peste fire nemărginire de-ntuneric...
Iisus, cu Ucenicii-n juru-I, învăluiţi de-a nopţii haină
Intrau, tăcuţi, unde sta gata să-nceapă «Cina cea de taină»”.
“În vremea aceea”, a typical formulation of the Orthodox religious ritual
and especially of the patristic writings, which is of obvious oral manner, starts
the narration of that unique moment when the bread and the wine are
transubstantiated by the Holy Ghost. By repeating the invocation “O”, a hopeless
state, and also the presence of the divine world, is transmitted.
„O, Cină plină de durere, o, Cină plină de lumină” says the poet, also
explaining his state:
„Din care, lumii-n veac unire cu Dumnezeu avea să vină”.
Two different states indicate the invocation: in our opinion, that is a
rather dramaturgic procedure, the poem being sprinkled with dialogues –
monologues, to be more precise – because, on the one hand, Jesus will
communicate the symbolic of the bread and wine, and on the other hand, the
Christian poet receives the divine command to cleanse himself before the
Mystery of Communion.
The poem is written according to the Gospel of Matthew and it
encompasses short episodes from Jesus’ life, which, being transformed into
lyrics, they dilute the message of the poem. Besides, the redundancy of the
poems in general diminishes the aesthetic effect, turning them into educational
poems. We follow the content units of the poem and, by comparison, the plan of
the Gospel of Matthew (Mihoc, Mihoc, Mihoc 2001:119-121). In each of the five
parts of the Gospel we find a narrative section and a lecture. (the Gospel preach
Sermon on the Mount; the apostolical lecture – the mission of the Holy Disciples,
Lecture – seven parables, the ecclesiastic Lecture – the community conduct, the
eschatological Lecture).
The model of poem goes like this:
1. The circumstance of the Last Supper
The narrative section:
2. The Disciples and the story of His betrayal by Judas
3. The transubstantiation of the bread and wine
Lecture:
„«Spre a păcatelor iertare», cu înţelesul că dă viaţă
Întregei lumi, în veşnicie, nu numai celor Lui de faţă”.
What follows is the development of some general meanings linked to the
Christian dogma, such as the Holy Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the Crucifixion, the
episode about the Holy Disciple Thomas and his remorse, narrations from other
Gospels also being illustrated in the poem. (Marcus, John).
In general, the poet uses the language by following denotative meanings.
The herd = mankind; black, mud, dirt = sin; fire = divine light, purification;
emptiness = lack of faith, just as they appear in the other poems.
The invention manifests itself at the metaphorical level concerning the
naming of the divinity: the Pious of Eternity, Eternal Priest, at the lexical level by
turning into adjectives: pity>Pious (inner feature of Jesus, turned into a noun by
articulation and written with a capital letter, in fact, a double change of the
grammatical category), Eucharistic> “your Eucharistic fire”. A vegetal
comparison for the efficiency of Communion: „O, Sfântă Cuminecătură, sfinţenia
lucrând în om,/ Cum, nevăzut prin bunătate lucrează şi altoiu-n pom,/ Când,
dintr-un pui de pom sălbatic, el se preface-n pom de soi/ Dând rod de mare preţ
în ramuri, cum n-ar fi dat fără altoi...” is diluted by the repetition of the
comparison, explaining the identities: the poet = wild tree; the graft = the Holy
Communion. It seems to be a particular understanding of the notion of poetry
that, regularly, tries to find multiple connotations for an idea or a feeling.
In the case of these poems, we are in the presence of some lyrical
homilies, where the dogmatic contents are being interpreted and revealed to us.
In this poem, there is a moment when the poet creates the dramatic tension that
will determine him to repeat the experience of crucifixion in order to redeem
himself. Here we are shown the difference between the religious poem and the
Christian educational prosody:
Şi inima-mi, Tu las-o, Doamne, să simt cum lancea-n ea se-mplântă,
Cum curge sângele-mi şiroae, pe lemn, de-a lungul şi de-a latul,
Nu spre-a fi Dumnezeu ca Tine, ci ca să-mi spăl cu El păcatul!...”.
(Sfânta Euharistie)
If dying on the Cross is the symbol of redemption for Jesus, a symb
ol of achieving his divine being for the Christian, like in Miorita, the
death-wedding is, at its origin, an ancient religious element. “It is about a new
religious creation, typical for the South-Eastern Europe, which we called “cosmic
Christianity” because, on the one hand, it projects the mystery of Christ upon the
entire nature and, on the other hand, it neglects all historical elements of
Christianity, though insisting on the liturgical dimension of the man’s existence
in the world”. (Eliade 1980:246)
With the poem “White witch, a letter chosen for my bride!” of the
volume “The Poems of Immortality”, Vasile Militaru illustrates this vision of
folkloric Christianity which, by the rich rituals of posthumous wedding
ceremonials, is the poet’s source of inspiration. But the Christian mystics and
theologians also interpreted Christ’s agony and Death as a wedding. Mircea
Eliade (see above) quotes St. Augustin: Christ, like a newly wed... comes in the
honeymoon bed of the Cross and climbing in it, he completes the wedding”, and
Nae Ionescu, interpreting strictly spiritually the Song of Songs, develops the idea
that the act of mystical union of the man’s soul with God is a wedding because
the cornerstone of the Mystery of Wedding is represented by the act of love, just
like in the case of the intercommunion with God, Jesus being the bridegroom.
So preoccupied in other poems with identifying faith and its virtues in
life’s rhythms or explaining its secrets in lyrics and its theological wisdom, now,
by personifying death, the poet tries to encompass its grand secret. With a
philosophical intuition that was never emphasised elsewhere he induces the idea
of a limit: „Şi mă-ntreb într-una, cu păreri de bine:/ Cam ce-ar face, Moarte,
omul fără tine?...”. Death is the limit of life, “the tragical situation is only
compatible with conscious beings, beings confronted with the limit” (Liiceanu
1975: 37) – writes Gabriel Liiceanu and he comes back on the limit as a task of
philosophical reflection – about the limit, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing
House, 1993. The poet catches death as a limit in the form that is known by the
man, as moral censure, as a barrier of excesses, as a dimensioning of destinies, as
an egalitarian factor. The poet’s interrogations are headed towards the
fundamental data of this great and mysterious miracle: Ce le spui tu oare, Moarte,
tuturora,/ De-ţi ascultă-ntocmai, totu-n tot, cuvântul?”... „În ce limbă le grăieşti
cuvântul”, „Ce beteală-aduce mâna ta, din soare/ Tinerei copile...”, „Pruncilor din
leagăn, fragezi ca răsura/ Ce poveşti cu zâne şi cu zmei le-ai spune?...”, to the
warriors that have fallen with their eyes towards the sky, to the mothers who
abandon their children. The answer is that of a conscience filled with faith in
redemption:
„Eu te văd: Înaltă, tânără Crăiasă,
Creatorul dându-ţi nesfârşite graţii
Tinerii, bătrânii, Regii şi-Împăraţii
Şi câţi vor cuvântul pe pământ să-ţi crează
Pe când mor în lume, dincolo-nviază”.
The cosmic wedding ceremonial has for fulfilment the eternal happiness.
Here is the reason for which the existence, as it is understood and lived by the
Romanians, has to do with the order of eternity and blurs the conscience of the
tragic. In the Criterion generation and in definitive cultural creations, in general,
we meet numerous examples of this attitude. We consider that in the Orthodox
religion, too, assimilated as a fundamental spiritual component, this motive of
wedding-death persists, the intercommunion with man-God also being the state
of complete happiness.
The poems that emphasise the celebration of existence in its
metaphysical dimension, whose loop is faith, are all, in Vasile Militaru’s
creation, filled with religious meanings. Christ’s bride, the ancient Church, is
hailed through the words of the poet because it is the inly one that gives a
meaning to the existence:
„M-a dezlegat pe veci de lanţul păcatelor în care frânt
Goneam în ocne de-ntuneric şi n-aveam către Cer cuvânt:
Din ciutura-I cu «Apă Vie» sorbind, m-am curăţit de tină,
Şi-am îmbrăcat veşminte nouă, ţesute-n raze de lumină...”.
The Church becomes a community of those who confess their faith in
God through the Descent of the Holy Ghost. Following the Holy Scriptures, the
poet emphasises once more the fusion of the folkloric ceremonial with the
Christian belief about Whit Sunday, when the Holy Ghost descended over the
Disciples and, as whips of fire, he gives then the gift of speaking in unknown
languages in order to disseminate the word of God throughout the world. At this
point, we also come across a comparison implicit with the poet, whose words are
meant to bear the “Living Water” of faith.
The divine revelation is found in the Gospels, the natural revelation in
poetry. Vasile Militaru does not build himself a poetic, but he expresses the
thought that poetry, “white shore of a white flower”, with infinite powers, filled
with jewels, “bright empire”, is the one through which the emperor-poets go in
the “Sky to God”. Images assimilated to Eminescu (“emperor-poet”), poets’
destinies (born in cottages, have light on their foreheads), evocations of universal
values – Homer, Vergiliu, Dante – are comprised in two functions that they are
meant to fulfil: Fiindcă poleieşti cu aur zdrenţele cui ţi se-nchină/ Şi-n Palat
preschimbi coliba-i cea de sărăcie plină” şi „Pentru că-i alungi din Suflet, frânt
fiind adeseori/ Întunerecul şi-n locu-i, harul tău aprinde Sori”. „Strai de purpură
şi aur peste ţărâna cea grea” said Mihai Eminescu through poetry, his echo
resounding through the years in a faithful conscience, that inspires him to a poem
fit to eliminate sin and pour in the light of faith.
Summoned to voice the purity of faith, Vasile Militaru evocates in a
ceremonial tone “Christ’s Brides”, “the maidens that give all their lives” to God
through prayer. The poem “on their forehead a beam shines” is the anthem that
hails this spiritual union, whose model is the wedding:
„Mărire vouă-n veci Mirese ce nu v-aţi întinat nicicând,
Ci pe Iisus mereu purtându-L ca Mire-n inimă şi-n gând
I-l închinaţi şi trup şi Suflet Lui, pentru oameni rugătoare”.
The language of the poetry embedded in the soul by the Holy
Ghost spreads the light of faith, bringing the intercommunion the conscience of
the one who, not only feels like the bearer of faith, but also by poetry,
„Aproapelui meu, viaţa toată, Să-i fiu un frate-adevărat, Să pot veni-n a Ta
lumină, Sublimule crucificat!”.
As conclusions
The path from cosmic Christianity to the theoretic one is covered in
Vasile Militaru’s Christian poetry in such a way that his faith is a intuitive form
of understanding the human condition. His poetry has a constant: identity, as a
concept that rightfully defines “what is permanent and fundamental in the life of
a people”.
The analyzed works have all the attributes above mentioned. We notice,
beyond them, a strong feeling of faith, but a modest artistic and aesthetic level. In
his lyrics, the Christian poet seeks the description of the religious state and not its
experience. The chills of mystery and indefinable are missing. The style and
prosody elements are present, but in all cases, these are either sacrificed in the
detriment of prosody, or in the shadow of morale and educational perceptions.
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L’IMPORTANCE DU SYMBOLE ET DU
SYMBOLISME DANS LE DEVELOPPEMENT
PSYCHIQUE
Gabriel BALACI, Lecturer Ph. D.
Western University „Vasile Goldiş” of Arad
Telefon: 0257 - 250609
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. The Symbol in Psychoanalyze is defined as an
indirect representation of an object, person, idea, supernatural being, etc. This
indirect representation is nothing but a synthesis of all the others means of
expression as comparisony, allegory, metaphor etc. For a psychic content to be
symbolized, namely expressed in a symbolic form, is mandatory for it to be
repressed in the unconscious. The Symbolism is a representations system based
on symbols and aims the expression and the transmission of beliefs and
traditions from one generation to another. The Symbol acquires its full value to
the word. The language is the most complex and comprehensive symbolic
system. The access to the language, therefore the implied use of the default
symbol stand for the acquiring of the symbolization ability of the subject, and
assures in this way his access to the culture. By analyzing different physical
manifestations, but also of artistic creations, such as folklore, myths, legends,
we see the universality of symbols. Such symbols have the same meaning in
dreams, in the creations of folklore and the legends from different historical
periods and peoples geographically very distant from each other. According to
some authors, like Ferenczi, symbolism has its roots in the tendency of child to
figure as satisfying his needs and desires, using his own body. By the symbolic
identification the child succeeds to appropriate the environment relating his
body or parts of it. The use of the symbol, the acquisition capacity of
symbolization and the access to symbolic ensure a normal process of mental
development for child. The Symbols system,the symbolic,ensures the insertion of
person in a historical trail linking him to his ancestors and assures a paternal
role in relation to his followers. Among the symbols the most active impact on
our psychic lives we mention the Shadow, The Symbol of Twice, which lies at the
basis of numerous legends and myths of the hero. This symbol is discussed at
length, beside organics symbolism in this article.
Key words: symbol, symbolism, symbol of twice, symbolical relations, psychic
development
Cet article fait partie de ma thèse qui porte sur la capacité de
symbolisation dans le travail du deuil. Le terme « symbole » est apparu en 1380.
Il dérive du grec sumbolon qui dérive du verbe sumbalein (symballein) (de synavec, et -ballein, jeter] signifiant « mettre ensemble », « joindre », « comparer »,
«échanger», « se rencontrer », « expliquer ». Selon l’encyclopédie Universalis, le
terme « symbole » recouvre trois ensembles de significations différentes. « Le
sens courant attribue à la notion de symbole un sens proche de celui d’analogie
emblématique. La colombe est le symbole de la paix, le lion est le symbole du
courage, la croix latine est le symbole du christianisme, le sceptre et la couronne
sont les symboles de la royauté, ou du pouvoir. On peut dire de manière générale
que ce sens se confond avec celui d’une concrétisation (objet, animal, figure...),
d’une réalité abstraite (vertu, état, pouvoir, croyance...) » (Encyclopædia
Universalis France 2003)
D’un point de vue étymologique le sens du mot grec s´umolon, dérivé du
verbe sum´ally, « je joins », définit deux morceaux d'un objet brisé, partagé en
deux morceaux. Leur réunion, par un assemblage parfait, permet de se rejoindre
et de se reconnaître deux individus différents, qui ont la possession de chacune
des deux parties. « Lorsqu’on est condamné à vivre dans la clandestinité, ou en
d’autres occasions similaires, le partage en deux d’un billet de banque permet la
reconnaissance et la sécurité de parole à deux personnes ne se connaissant pas :
les deux parties du billet ou, plutôt, le dispositif lié qu’elles permettent, sont au
sens propre un symbole. Il en est de même, à un niveau plus abstrait, de la
pratique du « mot de passe », ainsi que, d’une manière encore plus élaborée, de
toute formule dont la possession et la locution permettent à des membres d’une
même communauté de se reconnaître comme tels : le Symbole des Apôtres (le
Credo), par exemple, a eu ce rôle dans le christianisme. » (Encyclopædia
Universalis France 2003)
La troisième signification du mot grec « s´umolon » est celle du symbole
logico-mathématique, à la quelle se rattache le symbole chimique et physique et
par lequel on entend tout signe graphique.
Pour conclure, nous pouvons dire que le symbole montre, réunit et
enjoint.
« Le symbole, d’abord, montre. Il rend sensible ce qui ne l’est pas :
valeurs abstraites, pouvoirs, vices, vertus, communautés. Il ne s’agit pas
de la simple analogie, régie par la conjonction « comme ». « Laid
comme un crapaud » ne signifie pas que le crapaud est le symbole de la
laideur, privilège qu’il partagerait... avec les sept péchés capitaux ! On
dit d’ailleurs aussi « laid comme un pou ». En d’autres termes, le
symbole est exclusif. Le courage ne saurait ętre symbolisé que par le
lion, lequel, d’ailleurs, n’accepte que difficilement de symboliser autre
chose (l’orgueil est plutôt symbolisé par le paon). » (Encyclopædia
Universalis France 2003)
Dans la sphère de la religion, les actes symboliques propres à la vie
chrétienne, qui ont un sens proche du sens du mot « sumbolon » grec, sont
appelés sacramenta dès le IIIe siècle. Chez les Romains, sacramentum signifie le
gage de fidélité pour l’Empereur. Tertullien qui a introduit, le premier, ce terme
dans le vocabulaire chrétien explique que si le sacramentum est le signe d’un
engagement irrévocable au service du Christ, cet engagement n’est qu’une
réponse aux sacramenta de Dieu lui-même qui s’est engagé le premier envers
nous et qui nous a donné des gages de salut en Jésus Christ.
Le symbole est un élément des échanges et des représentations humaines,
qui a apparemment une fonction de représentation mais qui est, plus
fondamentalement, constitutif de la réalité humaine elle-même.
Pour Saussure, les symboles, sont des représentations plus souvent
iconiques, ayant des similitudes avec la chose représentée. Le symbole est
originellement une représentation porteuse de sens. C'est un système signifiant
relevant de la connotation de l'analogie. Des opérations de distinction et de
relation/unification produisent du sens pour un individu ou un groupe social. Le
symbole apparaît ainsi comme la réalité visible qui invite à découvrir des réalités
invisibles. Cette unité ne se fait pas par un mode fusionnel mais par ajustement
(sumbolh). Le symbole devient une représentation de l’absent et de
l’imperceptible. Le symbole est polysémique et ambivalent : son interprétation
découle de la culture de chacun, tout en s'inscrivant dans une réalité universelle.
Dans la psychanalyse le terme de symbole est utilisé par plusieurs auteurs
avec des significations différentes. Chez Freud, le terme symbole est utilisé avec
le sens d’icônes dans « L’interprétation des rêves » (1900). Pour Freud, le rêve
exprime parfois le désir refoulé par un symbole. Dans sa théorie les symboles
auront le plus souvent une signification sexuelle. Lacan aborde la question du
symbole en partant en effet du don, celui qui établit l’échange entre les groupes
humains, celui qui en ce sens est d’abord signifiant d’un pacte. Or, si les objets
du don peuvent avoir cette valeur, c’est d’abord parce qu’ils sont dépouillés de
leur fonction utilitaire : « Vases faits pour être vides, boucliers trop lourds pour
être portés, gerbes se desséchant, piques qu’on enfonce au sol, sont sans usage
par destination, sinon superflus par leur abondance ». (Encyclopædia Universalis
France 2003)
Le symbole se constitue comme « évidement » du réel. C’est toutefois
dans le mot que le symbole prend sa valeur achevée. Si celui-ci détache l’homme
du rapport immédiat à la chose, il est en même temps ce qui la fait subsister
comme telle au-delà de cette transformation ou de sa disparition empirique. Le
mot donne à l’homme son seul mode d’accès à cette réalité, mais aussi à l’autre,
que ce soit l’autre de l’amour ou celui de la rivalité. Et si la lettre peut venir dans
l’inconscient inscrire le désir, si le signifiant peut l’exprimer c’est que le symbole
régit le monde humain.
Lacan parvient à la conclusion que l’ensemble des conduites humaines
s’insère à l’intérieur d’un ordre structurant qui se distingue à la fois de l’ordre
réel sans être pour autant un ordre imaginaire : l’ordre symbolique au sens de
Lévi-Strauss, ou plus simplement le symbolique, dont c’est ici la seconde
acception.
« La relation entre les deux utilisations du terme s’entrevoit à
partir de ce que dit Lacan à propos de la nomination de parenté : dans la
mesure où le Nom-du-père représente une instance qui ne réduit la figure
du père ni à sa réalité individuelle pour le sujet (père réel), ni à ses
formations substitutives (au premier rang desquelles la figure de
l’analyste lors du transfert : père imaginaire), mais représente la
reconnaissance de la loi fondamentale qui sert de clé de voûte à tout le
système symbolique, l’impossibilité pour le sujet de la reconnaître en
tant que telle introduit à une compréhension des névroses et des
psychoses». (Encyclopædia Universalis France 2003)
Le terme de symbolisme désigne un système de représentation fondé sur
des symboles et destine à exprimer des croyances et à transmettre des traditions
et des rites.
A la fin du troisième chapitre, « A propos du symbolisme », de son livre
« Psychanalyse clinique » H. Segal montre que « le symbolisme s’origine dans
l’identification projective, avant tout dans la relation au sein, puis au corps entier
la mère. Quand en résultent trop de dégât (ou de ratés) ou une identification
excessive toute-puissante de type adhésive, les symboles sont excessivement
concrets, vide de sens ou bizarres. Si la projection ne se fait pas trop dans l’envie,
ou si elle n’est pas trop narcissique, et si la réponse maternelle n’est pas trop
mutilante, l’enfant introjecte un sein et une mère capables d’assurer une fonction
symbolique, au sens bionien, c’est-à-dire de convertir les éléments alpha en
éléments bêta. Lorsque tout ceci se passe, la formation de symbole dans
l’expérience dépressive peut être mise en place ». (Segal 2004 : 65)
Le symbolisme de l’âme (Le symbole du Double)
Le symbole pour Rank et Sachs est un moyen d’expression du refoulé.
Le symbole est vu par ces auteurs comme une représentation indirecte qui
implique une unification idéale de tous les moyens d’expression tels que la
comparaison, l’allégorie, l’allusion, la métaphore, qui experiment quelque chose
de caché. « …il (le symbole) est l’expression substitutive et l’équivalent intuitif
de quelque chose de caché, avec quoi il possède en commun des caractères
patents, ou à quoi il est lié associativement par des connexions internes. Son
essence réside dans la dualité ou la multiplicité de sa signification, qui résulte
d’une sorte de condensation revenant à « mettre ensemble » (sumballein) des
éléments caractéristiques qui étaient d’abord isolés ». (Rank, Sachs 1980 : 21)
Jones, Rank et Sachs ont décrit la formation de symboles comme un
phénomène régressif vers la pensée figurative à laquelle l’homme civilisé a
difficilement accès. A la base de la symbolisation se trouve la fonction de
l’identification. Cette identification représente un moyen d’adaptation à la réalité
qui a perdu son efficacité.
« A ce point de vue psychologique correspond une fonction dont
l’histoire des cultures peut démontrer le caractère originaire : la fonction
de l’identification qui est à la base de la symbolisation et qui est un
moyen d’adaptation au réel devenu superflu, descendu à un niveau du
psychisme où il n’a plus que la signification d’un symbole dès lors que
l’adaptation elle-même a réussi ». (Rank, Sachs 1980 : 29)
Ainsi le symbolisme se constitue de tous les moyens primitifs
d’adaptation à la réalité devenus hors d’usage. Le symbole, d’un point de vue
psychanalytique, et tel qu’il nous est révélé par le langage du rêve, dans la
conception de ces deux auteurs, a les caractéristiques suivantes :
il se substitue à l’inconscient,
il possède une signification constante,
il est indépendant des conditions individuelles,
son fondement est évolutif et historique,
il est en relation avec la langue
il présente des connexions linguistiques et des parallèles phylogéniques
dans les mythes, les religions etc.
Le matériel symbolique montre l’influence exercée par l’inhibition de la
vie sexuelle d’un peuple sur le reste de son éthique et il permet la compréhension
des effets exercés par le refoulement sexuel sur la vie psychique de l’individu.
La symbolique que l’on retrouve dans les usages et les coutumes des
peuples les plus différents, représente le reste d’une vieille identité entre le
symbole et le figuré, dans la vie psychique primitive. Les symboles rencontrés
dans les usages et les coutumes populaires, représentent des résidus d’un passé
révolu. Dans le symbolisme, le passé individuel et le passé de l’humanité, sont
équivalents.
En passant par plusieurs religions primitives, mais aussi par diverses
œuvres littéraires, comme celles de Hoffmann, Jean-Paul, Wilde, Heine,
Maupassant, Dostoïevski, Otto Rank, montre dans son livre Don Juan et Le
double, l'équivalence entre l’ombre et l'âme, mais aussi, entre l’ombre et le
double. L’auteur assimile tout naturellement l’ombre au double et passe d'un
terme à l'autre lorsqu'il disserte sur la représentation de l'âme: l'ombre, le reflet,
le miroir sont des symboles de l’âme.
Que ce soit dans le cadre des superstitions ou des croyances religieuses
"primitives", l’ombre ou double a une double signification, elle représente la
mort, mais aussi, la vie. Cette double signification de l’ombre comme symbole,
repose sur une croyance primitive de la dualité de l’âme. Les âmes des morts sont
des ombres et elles ne peuvent pas projeter d’ombre. Le mort ne peut pas avoir
une ombre, bien qu’il en soit une lui-même. Pour les vivants, l’absence de
l’ombre signifie, dans le folklore, sa mort imminente et la visualisation du
Double est un présage de mort. Dans la croyance populaire, la vue de son Double
ne signifie rien de bon.
D’après Rank, la croyance en l’âme est issue de la division du moi
en une partie mortelle et une partie immortelle. Au début le Double-Moi
avait comme fonction de nier la mort et de garantir l’immortalité du Moi.
L’ombre va continuer à vivre après la disparition du Moi corporel et
devient le symbole de la force procréatrice et de la fécondité de l’homme,
auquel s’ajoute celui du rajeunissement et de la résurrection dans les
descendants. L’ombre qui survit après la mort, devient ainsi, un Double
renaissant avec chaque nouveau-né. Initialement, le Double est un Moi
identique. Plus tard il représentera un Moi antérieur contenant les traits de
l’individu qu’il veut préserver dans le futur et ensuite le Double devient un
Moi opposé qui représente la partie mortelle, détachée de la personnalité
actuelle qui la répudie.
Le motif du Double, présenté par Rank, n’est pas étranger au
narcissisme. Dans la légende de Narcisse nous trouvons explicité cette question.
Narcisse, à qui Tirésias a prévu une longue vie, à condition qu’il ne se voit pas
lui-même, trouve la mort après qu’il ait regardé son reflet, son Double, dans l’eau
et soit devenu tellement amoureux de lui-même.
La disposition amoureuse pour le Moi propre peut être dépassée si
l’individu se sépare d’une partie de son Moi, contre laquelle il se défend.
L’amour pour son Double symbolise l’incapacité de l’individu à l’amour.
Le motif du Double est concrétisé dans l’œuvre de Rank par le motif des
jumeaux. Ce motif du jumeau est lié, non pas à la naissance gémellaire, mais à la
croyance en une âme double, l’une mortelle et l’autre immortelle. Les jumeaux
sont le prototype du héros. Des pouvoirs supranaturels, particulièrement sur la
vie et sur la mort, sont attribués aux jumeaux, à cause du fait qu’en venant au
monde, l’homme amène son double immortel. Il apparaissait comme immortel à
cause de son double corporel et avait par là pouvoir de vie et de mort sur les
autres. Les jumeaux se rendent indépendants de la procréation sexuelle en
s'autoreproduisant par le désir immortel de l'âme.
Le jumeau peut figurer la possible expansion narcissique du sujet,
garante du même coup de son immortalité, mais en même temps, elle peut
devenir persécutrice.
Le symbole du Double, de l’ombre, connaît une autre transformation : il
s’agit de l’Ange gardien et la conscience persécutrice, personnifié par le Diable.
L’idée du Diable est une production religieuse de l’angoisse de mort. Cette
croyance en l’âme, a pour effet la division du moi en deux parties, dont la plus
chargée est projetée dans le monde extérieur.
Rank note que dans les civilisations primitives la naissance des jumeaux
entraînait l’immolation des enfants et de la mère ou le bannissement des enfants
après qu’ils soient déclarés comme tabous. Le destin des jumeaux a été pour la
plupart d’entre eux, le même : un était assassiné et l’autre fondait une ville.
Les jumeaux se rendent indépendants de la procréation sexuelle en se
reproduisant par le désir immortel de l’âme. Ils se sont créés eux-mêmes par la
voie spirituelle. Les jumeaux sont la représentation d’un hermaphroditisme
capable d’autoreproduction et d’une bisexualité embryonnaire couplée au
narcissisme primaire.
Le symbolisme organique
L’origine du symbolisme se trouve, selon Ferenczi, dans la tendance de
l’enfant à figurer comme accomplis ses désirs infantiles au moyen de son propre
corps. L’enfant établit des équivalences entre diverses parties de son corps et les
objets du monde extérieur par l’identification symbolique. Par l’identification
symbolique l’enfant retrouve les objets externes désirés sur son propre corps,
mais aussi, il retrouve dans les objets externes, conçus dans un mode animiste les
organes de son corps, hautement valorisés.
Le développement de l’enfant suppose son évolution du principe du
plaisir au principe de réalité. Ce passage permet à l’enfant de développer son sens
de réalité. L’essentiel du développement du Moi suppose le remplacement de la
mégalomanie infantile par la reconnaissance du pouvoir des forces provenant du
monde externe, des forces de la nature.
Dans la vie intra-utérine, même si la vie psychique est inconsciente,
l’être humain a l’impression d’être vraiment tout-puissant. Ferenczi définit la
toute-puissance ainsi : « L’impression d’avoir tout ce qu’on veut et de n’avoir
plus rien à désirer. » Dans la vie intra-utérine, le fœtus a tout ce qui lui est
nécessaire pour la satisfaction de ses pulsions. Cette étape de la vie de chaque
individu, représente la période de la toute-puissance inconditionnelle.
Après la naissance, les traces des processus psychiques intra-utérins
influencent la configuration du matériel psychique du nouveau-né. Au moment
de la naissance, le nouveau-né ressent une brutale perturbation, tant au niveau
biologique qu’au niveau psychique. Son comportement dénonce ses désirs de
retrouver la situation dans laquelle il se trouvait dans le corps de sa mère. La
première conséquence de cette perturbation est le réinvestissement hallucinatoire
de l’état antérieur de satisfaction. Son désir de se retrouver dans la situation
d’avant la naissance qu’il cherche à satisfaire sur le mode hallucinatoire, est
accomplie par les personnes qui s’occupent de lui et qui sont très attentifs et très
prompts avec ses besoins et ses désirs. Cette satisfaction hallucinatoire lui
permette de maintenir la toute-puissance inconditionnelle.
Au fur et à mesure du développement, ses désirs et ses besoins
deviennent dans plus en plus complexes. Pour le satisfaire ne lui suffira plus la
représentation hallucinatoire de leur accomplissement. Ces représentations
doivent être accompagnées par des signaux, ce qui implique un travail moteur.
Dans ce deuxième stade du développement du sens de la réalité, l’enfant
commence à utiliser des actions motrices, simples et chaotiques, pour satisfaire
ses désirs. Les sons émisses par l’enfant sont considérées par celui-ci, comme de
signaux magiques qui réalisent la perception de la satisfaction de ses désirs, bien
sûr grâce aux personnes qui s’occupent de lui.
Les désirs qui prennent des formes de plus en plus spécifiques, obligent
l’enfant à différencier ses signaux correspondants, mais aussi les actions qui
visent la satisfaction pulsionnelle. Par le langage gestuel il devienne capable à
exprimer des besoins et désirs très spécifiques qui seront satisfaits. Cette
satisfaction lui permet de se croire tout-puissant. La période à laquelle je me
réfère ici, est définie par Ferenczi comme la période de la toute-puissance avec
des gestes magiques.
Par la complexification des désirs, des besoins et par leur quantité qui
augmente avec l’âge, les conditions auxquelles l’individu doit se soumettre pour
les satisfaire, se multiplient. Ses gestes, jadis efficaces ne lui suffiront plus. Il va
être obligé de distinguer son Moi du monde extérieur qui s’oppose à la
satisfaction de ses besoins et ses désirs. Sa toute-puissance est menacée dans sa
confrontation avec le monde extérieur qu’il commence à découvrir. Pour
Ferenczi les stades de toute-puissance représentent les phases d’introjection et le
stade de réalité représente la phase de projection du développement du Moi.
Malgré l’objectivation du monde extérieur, l’individu dans cette étape du
développement du sens de réalité, ne fait pas complètement la distinction entre le
Moi et le non-Moi. La partie du monde dont il ne dispose pas, le non-Moi, est
néanmoins investie par l’enfant de qualités qu’il a découvertes en lui-même,
c’est-à-dire des qualités du Moi. Dans cette période animiste l’enfant tente de
retrouver dans les objets du monde extérieur, en raison de ressemblance, des
parties de son corps ou le fonctionnement de divers organes.
Les relations qui s’établissent ainsi sont nommées par Ferenczi relations
symboliques. Le monde est perçu par l’enfant comme étant composé des
reproductions de sa corporéité. Par cette figuration symbolique qui représente
une évolution et un perfectionnement du langage gestuel, l’enfant exprime ses
désirs liés à son corps, mais aussi ses désirs qui visent la modification du monde
extérieur.
Au fur et à mesure, l’enfant remplace son langage gestuel par des sons
verbaux, par des imitations des bruits produits par les objets externes. Le
symbolisme gestuel est remplacé par le symbolisme verbal. « En même temps le
symbolisme verbal rend possible la pensée consciente dans la mesure où
s’associant aux processus de pensée en eux-mêmes inconscients, il leur confère
des qualités perceptibles ». (Ferenczi 1970 : 60)
La pensée consciente permet à l’enfant de s’adapter à la réalité en
retardant la décharge motrice réflexe. Malgré les progrès enregistrés jusqu’à cette
étape de son développement psychique, l’enfant garde encore son sentiment de
toute-puissance. La satisfaction de ses désirs conçus sous forme de pensée reste
toujours liée à son entourage qui est capable de deviner ses pensées. L’enfant
considère qu’il détient des pouvoirs magiques et se trouve dans la période des
pensées et des mots magiques.
Quand l’enfant arrive à se détacher complètement de ses parents sur le
plan psychique, il est capable de passer du principe de plaisir au principe de
réalité. Il renonce à son sentiment de toute-puissance et reconnaît l’importance
des circonstances dans la satisfaction de ses désirs.
Nous pouvons constater en suivant le processus du développement de l’enfant,
qu’il est très préoccupé, tout au long de ce processus, par la satisfaction
pulsionnelle. Quand ses besoins et ses désirs se complexifient, l’enfant est obligé
de s’adapter et de prendre conscience de la réalité. Au début de son
développement l’enfant est intéressé exclusivement par son corps qui représente
la seule source de satisfaction pulsionnelle. Lors de son développement, l’intérêt
de l’enfant sera attiré par des objets et des processus du monde extérieur qui lui
rappellent ses expériences les plus plaisantes. L’enfant établit ce type d’analogie
entre diverses parties de son corps et les objets externes, mais aussi entre divers
organes ou parties de son corps, comme par exemple entre le pénis et les dents,
l’anus et la bouche etc. Ferenczi identifie dans les rêves de ses patients et dans les
névroses, comme d’ailleurs Freud et Rank, le lien symbolique qui s’établit entre
l’extraction d’une dent et l’onanisme. « Le rêve substitue symboliquement
l’avulsion à la castration (c’est-à-dire le châtiment à l’onanisme) ». (Ferenczi
1968 : 252) La castration et l’extraction d’une dent sont les premières situations
où l’enfant se sent menacé.
Dans son étude sur la génitalité, Thalassa étude sur la théorie de la
génitalité, Ferenczi montre que dans la phase orale cannibalique, l’enfant en
utilisant ses dents, veut dévorer sa mère qui est obligée ainsi de le sevrer. Dans
cette phase, les dents deviennent des instruments « à l’aide desquels l’enfant
cherche à pénétrer dans le corps de la mère ». (Ferenczi 1974 : 267) Souvent,
dans les rêves et dans la névrose, on retrouve l’identité symbolique entre l’enfant
et le pénis. Dans sa conception, l’auteur considère la dent comme un pénis
archaïque. Par conséquent, ce n’est pas la dent le symbole du pénis, mais c’est le
pénis qui est le symbole de l’instrument de pénétration qui est la dent. Selon
Ferenczi les rapports symboliques qui s’établissent entre deux parties du corps ou
entre le corps et l’environnement, sont précédés par une équation entre deux
objets qui peuvent se remplacer réciproquement.
Pour que ces analogies deviennent des symboles, il est nécessaire que
« …l’éducation culturelle entraine le refoulement d’un de termes de l’analogie
(le plus important) que l’autre terme (le plus insignifiant à l’origine) gagne un
supplément d’importance affective et devienne un symbole du terme refoulé ».
(Ferenczi 1970 : 107)
Selon la conception de Ferenczi, les facteurs affectifs ont une importance
décisive dans la formation du symbole authentique. Les facteurs affectifs nous
permettent de distinguer les symboles des autres produits psychiques, telle que la
métaphore, la comparaison etc.
« Nous ne pouvons considérer comme symbole, dans le sens psychanalytique du
terme, que les choses (représentations) qui parviennent à la conscience avec un
investissement affectif que la logique n’explique ni ne justifie, et dont l’analyse
permet d’établir qu’elles doivent cette surcharge affective à une identification
inconsciente avec une autre chose (représentation) à laquelle appartient en fait ce
supplément affectif ». (Ferenczi 1970 : 106) Pour qu’une comparaison devienne
un symbole il est nécessaire qu’un de ses termes soit refoulé dans l’inconscient.
Dans son article « Interprétation et traitement psychanalytiques de
l’impuissance sexuelle » Ferenczi présente l’impuissance sexuelle comme une
manifestation symbolique des souvenirs d’enfance des événements vécues et
ensuite refoulés dans l’inconscient et du désir de répéter ces expériences. Entre la
conscience d’adulte civilisé et ces désirs s’installe un conflit psychique qui se
manifeste symboliquement au niveau psychosomatique par ce symptôme
névrotique, qui est l’impuissance sexuelle.
« L’impuissance psycho-sexuelle est un symptôme partiel d’une
psychonévrose en accord avec la thèse de Freud, à savoir, qu’il s’agit toujours de
la manifestation symbolique du souvenir d’événements sexuels vécus dans la
première enfance puis refoulés dans l’inconscient, du désir inconscient visant
leur répétition et du conflit psychique qui en résulte ». (Ferenczi 1968 : 48)
On retrouve dans l’interprétation du mythe d’Œdipe d’autres exemples
de manifestation du symbolisme organique, dans l’article « La figuration
symbolique des principes de plaisir et de réalité dans le mythe d’Œdipe ».
(Ferenczi 1968 : 215) Le nom du héros, Œdipe qui signifie le pied enflé,
symbolise l’organe génital masculin.
« Ce nom étrange et absurde en apparence, prend son sens lorsque nous
apprenons que dans les rêves et les mots d’esprit, comme dans le fétichisme du
pied ou la phobie névrotique de ce membre, le pied symbolise l’organe sexuel
masculin.
L’enflure du membre, signalé dans le nom du héros, s’explique
suffisamment par son érectilité ». (Ferenczi 1968 : 220)
D’un point de vue psychanalytique, les yeux sont une représentation
symbolique des organes génitaux. Ainsi le geste d’Œdipe de se crever les yeux,
après la découverte de l’inceste qu’il a commis, représente un autre phénomène
symbolique somatique qui symbolise l’autocastration. Par son geste Œdipe
devienne incapable de regarder le soleil, qui représente un symbole du père,
comme le montre Ferenczi dans l’article « Effets psychiques des bains de soleil »
. (Ferenczi 1970 : 135)
Dans le même article, en partant de la description faite par Schopenhauer
d’Œdipe et de Jocaste, dans une lettre à Goethe du 11 novembre 1815, Ferenczi
considère les deux personnages comme étant des représentations symboliques de
deux principes de fonctionnement psychique. Œdipe, dans sa quête à la recherche
de son destin, représente le principe de la réalité, et Jocaste qui supplie Œdipe
d’arrêter sa recherche, représente le principe de plaisir.
La relation symbolique entre les organes du corps et les objets externes,
est mise en évidence dans la présentation d’un rêve fait par un des patients de
Ferenczi, qui est décrit dans son article Une variante du symbole « chaussure »
pour représenter le vagin. Dans ce rêve, le vagin est représenté symboliquement
par une chaussure. Un autre objet externe, qui dans le rêve symbolise souvent un
organe sexuel est le pont. La signification du pont dans les rêves des névrosés est
une signification sexuelle. Le pont représente symboliquement l’organe sexuel
masculin et en particulier « le membre puissant du père ». (Ferenczi 1974 : 113)
Le pont, en tant que symbole, a une double signification : lien entre les
deux parents et lien entre la vie et la non-vie. La non-vie peut signifier la mort,
mais aussi, ce qui n’est pas encore né. Le passage entre la non-vie, ou « pas
encore né », et la vie est symbolisée dans les rêves par le pont.
« Dans la mesure où c’est au membre masculin que l’on doit d’être né de
cette eau, le pont constitue un voie de passage important entre l’ « autre-côté »
(ce qui n’est pas encore né, le sein maternel) et « Ce côté » (la vie).». (Ferenczi
1974 : 177)
Tous ces exemples de symbolisation soutiennent et renforcent la
conception du Ferenczi sur la base physiologique du symbolisme.
« Enfin, on se souviendra de ceci : en dernière analyse, presque tout
symbole, peut-être tout symbole en général, a également une base physiologique,
c'est-à-dire exprime d’une façon ou d’une autre le corps tout entier, un organe du
corps, ou une fonction de celui-ci». (Ferenczi 1974 : 115)
La base physiologique du symbolisme de la vie psychique apparaît,
aussi, dans le symptôme hystérique. Ferenczi soutient que « …l’hystérie de
conversion génitalise les parties du corps où se manifestent les symptômes».
(Ferenczi 1974 : 53) La sexualisation de la partie supérieure du corps se réalise
par ce que Freud a appelé le déplacement du bas vers le haut. Le déplacement
d’excitation physiologique de certaines zones érogènes sur d’autres organes qui
ressemblent aux organes génitaux, peut être le noyau du symbolisme génital.
(Ferenczi 1982 : 165) On peut retrouver ce symbolisme dans les rêves dont
lesquels les organes génitaux sont représentés par d’autres organes ou fonctions
du corps.
Le symbolisme du rêve ne peut pas être réduit au remplacement des
activités sexuelles considérées par le rêveur comme honteuses, par d’autres
activités, mais on retrouve dans les rêves diverses expressions symboliques de
certaines personnes significatives pour l’auteur du rêve. Ses parents sont souvent
représentés symboliquement par un roi et une reine. Liées au corps, la droite et la
gauche représentent l’expression symbolique de ce qui est permis ou interdit.
« Dans la vie psychique le développement du symbolisme est en général
parallèle au processus de refoulement pulsionnel imposé par le développement
culturel». (Ferenczi 1982 : 164)
En s’appuyant sur la phylogénétique, Ferenczi met en évidence le fait
que par les formes d’expression symbolique, tant du côté du corps que du côté du
psychisme, sont exprimées des parties de l’histoire de la vie de l’individu qui
contiennent en elles-mêmes des épisodes de l’évolution phylogénétique,
complètement oubliées et inaccessibles autrement. En partant de l’image du
poisson dans l’eau, comme symbole de l’acte sexuel mais aussi de la situation
intra-utérine, dans Thalassa, étude sur la théorie de la génitalité, l’auteur fait
l’hypothèse que par le symbolisme s’exprime une connaissance phylogénétique
sur le fait que l’homme descend des vertébrés aquatiques. Dans les rêves et dans
les névroses, il existe une analogie symbolique entre le corps de la mère, plus
exactement entre l’intérieur du corps de la mère et l’océan, mais aussi entre celuici et la terre-nourricière.
Dans la conception ferenczienne, en suivant les phases de l’évolution
phylogénétique, le symbolisme marin de la mère est plus archaïque et plus
primitif que le symbolisme de la terre-nourricière. Les deux types de
symbolismes ont leur origine dans les deux phases phylogénétiques de
l’évolution de l’espèce humaine de la période aquatique à la période terrestre.
Concernant la relation symbolique entre la mère et l’océan, on retrouve
la même situation comme dans la relation symbolique entre le pénis et la dent. Ça
veut dire, selon un symbolisme inversé, la mère représente symboliquement
l’océan et n’est pas l’inverse. À la base du symbolisme marin de la mère se
trouve le désir de régression thalassale motivé par la tendance de l’individu à
« établir l’existence aquatique dans l’utérus maternel humide et riche en
nourriture». (Ferenczi 1974 : 291)
L’identification symbolique entre la mère et la terre-nourricière suit le
symbolisme marin et il est exprimé par plusieurs symboles, tels que le
symbolisme de la charrue, le symbolisme de branches qu’on casse, le
symbolisme des fruits qu’on arrache, etc.
En s’appuyant sur la théorie de Ferenczi concernant la formation des
symboles, nous pouvons constater la relation étroite entre le développement
psychobiologique d’un individu, qui englobe en lui-même les phases de
l’évolution phylogénétique de l’espèce humaine et les différentes formes du
symbolisme lors du développement de l’individu. Sous l’aspect
psychopathologique, l’interprétation des symboles, en se basant sur cette théorie,
nous aide à comprendre plus profondément, à quel niveau régressent les malades
et dans quelle étape de son évolution, son développement a été perturbé.
Conclusion
Les processus de symbolisation jouent un rôle central dans la capacité
d'élaborer la séparation et la perte d'objet, et Hanna Segal a montré en particulier
comment le symbole sert à surmonter une perte acceptée, tandis que l'équation
symbolique est utilisée pour dénier la séparation entre le sujet et l'objet. Selon
elle, le processus de symbolisation requiert une relation à trois termes - le moi,
l'objet et le symbole - et la formation du symbole se développe progressivement
au cours du passage de la position paranoïde-schizoïde à la position dépressive.
Au cours du développement normal, dans la position paranoïde-schizoïde qui
fonctionne au début de la vie, le concept d'absence existe à peine, les symboles
précoces sont formés par identification projective, et il en résulte la formation
d'équations symboliques. H. Segal a introduit le terme d'équation symbolique
pour désigner les symboles précoces qui sont de nature très différente des
symboles qui se forment ultérieurement.
En effet, les symboles précoces ne sont pas ressentis comme des
symboles ou des substituts, mais comme l'objet originel lui-même. Au cours du
développement psychique, des perturbations dans la différenciation entre le moi
et l'objet peuvent conduire à des perturbations dans la différenciation entre le
symbole et l'objet symbolisé.
Dans la position dépressive, il existe un plus grand degré de
différenciation et de séparation entre le moi et l'objet, et après les expériences
répétées de perte, de retrouvaille et de recréation, un bon objet s'installe de
manière sûre dans le moi. Le symbole est alors utilisé pour surmonter une perte
qui a été acceptée parce que le moi est devenu capable de renoncer à l'objet, d'en
faire le deuil, et il est ressenti comme une création du moi, d'après H. Segal. Ce
stade n'est cependant pas irréversible, car dans les moments de régression le
symbolisme peut revenir à une forme concrète, même chez des individus non
psychotiques.
H. Segal souligne également que la possibilité de former des symboles
régît la capacité de communiquer, aussi bien dans la communication avec
l'extérieur que dans la communication interne, puisque toute communication est
faite au moyen de symboles. Dans les troubles de la différenciation entre le sujet
et l'objet, les symboles sont ressentis de manière concrète et sont inutilisables à
des fins de communication. Ce qui constitue l'une des difficultés de l'analyse des
patients psychotiques.
Par contre la capacité de symboliser acquise dans la position dépressive
est utilisée pour traiter les conflits précoces non résolus en les symbolisant, de
sorte que les angoisses qui étaient restées clivées dans le moi liées à des relations
d'objet précoces - peuvent être progressivement traitées par le moi au moyen de
la symbolisation. A la fin du troisième chapitre, « A propos du symbolisme », de
son livre « Psychanalyse clinique » H. Segal montre que « le symbolisme
s’origine dans l’identification projective, avant tout dans la relation au sein, puis
au corps entier la mère. Quand en résultent trop de dégât (ou de ratés) ou une
identification excessive toute-puissante de type adhésive, les symboles sont
excessivement concrets, vide de sens ou bizarres. Si la projection ne se fait pas
trop dans l’envie, ou si elle n’est pas trop narcissique, et si la réponse maternelle
n’est pas trop mutilante, l’enfant introjecte un sein et une mère capables d’assurer
une fonction symbolique, au sens bionien, c’est-à-dire de convertir les éléments
alpha en éléments bêta. Lorsque tout ceci se passe, la formation de symbole dans
l’expérience dépressive peut être mise en place». (Segal 2004 : 65)
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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND COMPETITION IN
WORLD AGRICULTURE
Raluca Duma
Ecological University “Traian” Deva, Romania
Phone: 0040 / 254211816
Email: [email protected]
ABSTRACT. Agricultural policies have had a guiding role in
agriculture development and implicitly in their marketing. Usually they belong
to each state and government and are issued in accordance with their specific
climate, social-economic and cultural background which includes food and
gastronomic traditions. Agricultural policies have in view home and foreign
market demand, as well as the socio-demographic, political and military context
at a certain point in the socio-economic development.
Keywords: agricultural policies, centres of agricultural power, present
situation of world agriculture.
During the latest decades, the increased demand for agricultural products
generated by demographic growth and higher exigency with regard to food, has
led to global “agriculture command centres”. Some of them have become
structures of economic, socio-political and even military power (a powerful army
has to be properly fed and equipped). There are three centres of this kind in the
world, all of them in the Northern Hemisphere: the North-American (USA and
Canada), European (European Union) and Asian one (China and India).
As food is going to be a major socio-economic world problem, the
competition among these centres will also bear special connotations (scientific
espionage, economic and financial sabotage, commercial and political conflicts)
and famine will extend in poor countries leading to a humanitarian and migration
drama.
The North-American Centre (USA and Canada) works according to
liberal principles of the capitalist economic system based on private property
over the land and means of production, on initiative, competition and maximum
profit targets.
North American agriculture is very efficient, has vast fertile lands such
as faeozioms, various climate areas allowing diversity of crops and excellent
equipment (the agricultural combine was invented in the USA) and relies on
remarkable marketing spirit (see The Agriculture Stock Market for Meat and
Cereals in Chicago).
USA produces 45% of corn and 55% of soy production, has the following
percents in world sales: 50 corn, 78% soy, 26% wheat, 25% cotton, 15% citric
fruit and rice. Agriculture represents in the USA over 10.4% from the export and
in Canada over 12% (Canada exports 50% from the wheat production, mostly
Manitoba wheat). Agricultural products import is remarkably low – 4% in USA
and 6.5% in Canada (Warde 2005).
The use of fertilizers and pesticides and the growing of genetically
modified plants have contributed to the increased production, together with the
use of better and better tools and equipment (Ford, John Deere, McCornick).
The agricultural belts in the USA represent monocultures: the corn-belt –
1500km in Ohio, Illinois, Iowa and Indiana, together with the soy-belt
(cornsoybelt) or with barley; the cotton-belt is associated with the tobacco-belt;
the wheat-belt in the Mississippi Plane (grown in dry-forming system) is
associated with the dairy-belt (cattle raising) in the north-east. California and
Florida specialized in fruit and vegetables, strongly irrigated. Both the USA and
Canada largely use genetically modified plants (corn, soy, rice, rape, barley,
cotton) (Fouet, Baudrchon 2002).
Cattle raising became industrialized in the feed lots where cattle were fed
soy, corn, and alfalfa and were given hormonal stimuli, which fast enhanced
meat production. Scientific research, mainly genetics, had an important role in
the 4-4.5% increase in productivity. In the North-American agriculture, on a
surface twice the surface of Europe, only 2.6% of the active population (3.6
mil.people) work in agriculture. In Canada 3.4% (60 thousand people) work in
agriculture; the average size of a North American farm is 190ha (Warde 2005).
American agriculture covers the needs of internal market up to the level
of consumerism (see the 70% of obese people in USA) and has remarkable
possibilities to export.
Internally, the transport is made by trucks and for the export are used
cereals cargos and containers leaving from the ports New Orleans, Baltimore,
Seattle, Montreal towards Hamburg, Yokohama, Alexandria, Sankt Petersburg
etc.
The states in the European Union avoid North-American products
obtained through genetically modified plants and meat obtained with growth
hormones, therefore USA imposed higher taxes for the products imported from
EU. USA also has the control in most Latin-American countries, as well as in
some African and Asian ones.
The European Centre (European Union) has an efficient agriculture,
with some exceptions, such as Romania. The EU has sufficient supplies for the
internal markets and can also export meat, dairy, cereals, wine, vegetables, fruit,
citric fruit, olive oil etc. Due to the variety of the climate, the products are very
diversified, from Mediterranean citric fruit to potato which is typical to temperate
oceanic climate. EU states have top technology, excellent tools and equipment
and highly specialized scientific research. Production has doubled during the last
50 years due to thorough selection of plants and animals and to the expanding of
irrigations in the Mediterranean areas (Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and Greece)
(Duma 2009).
The most various products are in France which also has the best pedoclimatic conditions. It is followed by Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark
and Holland.
The EU countries are also specialized on different products; France has
the cereals and vineyards, Spain, Portugal and Greece have the citrus fruit and
the vineyards, Ireland, UK, Germany and Holland have the potatoes and wheat,
Germany, Holland and Denmark have cattle and poultry.
There were 8 million agricultural workers in the EU before Romania and
Bulgaria became members. The farms have at least 50 ha, or 40 cows. The small
farms have been mostly incorporated by lager ones as a result of subsidizing
policies. Large agricultural plots, over 50ha, are in UK – 85.5%, Luxembourg 80.4%, France-76.7%, Denmark – 69.6%, Spain – 68.2%, Germany – 66% and
Portugal -60.1%. In Italy, Austria and Holland the percentage is 34-37% and in
Greece only 10.6% (Popescu 2005). In Italy there are mostly 5 ha farms. Only
4.6% of the Italian farms are larger than 20 ha and they cover 54.8% from the
farming land. Most small farms are run by their owners and their families
represent the working force, this compensating the small size of the farm (Socol
2006). Italy also has the largest ecologically treated surface of farm land in EU –
1.23 mil ha) representing 7.94% from all its farming land; only Austria surpasses
it with 11.3% (Săgeată 2005). Crop rotation, poly-cultures and the moderate
dimensions of the farms allowed European farmers a certain flexibility with
regard to the market demand and reduced the loss due to pests and climate
changes.
EU, through its agricultural policies, has kept its position as centre of
world civilization, also due to its agricultural Mediterranean, Germanic and
Atlantic traditions which ensure its cultural superiority. EU members have a
common agricultural policy –PAC (La Politique Agricole Commune) which,
according to Rome Treaty in 1957 (that founded the EEC), aims at increasing the
efficiency of agriculture in order to offer a decent life standard to the farmers,
stable prices and safe food at reasonable prices. PAC grants a commune unique
market for agricultural products and fast modernization of farming. It relies on
free circulation of agricultural products inside EU, tax free, on the unity of the
market, encouraging of national products consume and financial solidity. The
intervention expenses are financed from FEOGA (European Fund of Orientation
and Guarantee in Agriculture) to which all member countries participate. EU
agricultural policy relies on the demand and offer law which leads to balance
between price and quality and the state intervention allows stable currencies and
absorption of surplus products (Duma 2009).
From late sixties until 1998 agricultural production of EU increased
annually with 1.8%, the efficiency/ha with 2% and the productivity with 4.7%
(Report of the Agricultural Comission Bruxelles, 1998). The evolution of average
production of wheat, barely and corn in EU between 1961-2001 is represented in
Fig.1 and the perspective for the cereals market until 2011 is represented in Fig.2.
wheat
barley
corn
million tons
Fig.1 Evolution of average production of wheat, barley and corn in the
EU, during 1961-2001, according to Alexandri and Sima 2005
Production
Consume
Import
Export
Fig.2 Perspective on cereals market in the EU, according to Alexandri
and Sima 2005
EU bans growing genetically modified plants and the use of growth
hormones in animal breeding. The only countries where such plants (namely
corn) have been used are Romania, Bulgaria and Spain. Spain has already started
eliminating these plants.
EU also has stock markets for very valuable agricultural products;
London for coffee, tea and cocoa and Zurich for cocoa.
Agricultural products are transported on motorways or railways and the
export is made by sea, from Marseille, Rotterdam, Hamburg etc. In areas close to
the EU, such as Russian Federation or Near East, motorways are used.
Perishable goods and hothouse products are transported inside and outside EU in
special planes.
In spite of its pedo-climatic potential, Romania has underdeveloped
agriculture. The farms larger than 100ha represent 46.80% from the farming land.
The smaller ones (below 1ha-5ha) represent 45.80% and they are divided in lots
smaller than 1ha; this is an obstacle for the use of advanced techniques and
efficient equipment and consequently they are inadequately farmed or even
abandoned (Popescu 2005). Ireland, UK, France and Holland had an average
production of 7200-8300kg/ha, while Romania had 2500-2600kg/ha. Austria,
Italy, Greece and Spain had an average corn production of 9000kg/ha and
Romania had 2500-2600kg/ha. Many industrial plants, vegetables, protected
vegetables are grown on smaller areas, leaving place for wheat and corn.
Technology costs in cereals production increased along with the rest of the
prices, while the sums offered to the farmers remained practically the same. Low
profit led to bankruptcy, some oriented towards bioenergetical plants such as
rape. Fruit tree growing regressed too. Many orchards have been abandoned,
others are poorly kept, too old and no plantations were made, except for the small
orchards around farmhouses. These are the reasons why Romania imports fruit
(apples, pears, apricots etc.). There is a similar situation in viticulture and
Romania imports grapes. In this field there have also been attempts at
establishing the compatibility between Romanian and EU wines. Animal
breeding has also diminished drastically because most large farms were closed
and small farms breed animals mostly for their own needs. For this reason,
Romania came to import carcass meat and exports small quantities of processed
meat. And here we have the whole picture of the disaster in Romanian
agriculture: with a pedo-climatic potential ranking it among the first 3-4
countries in EU, Romania imports agricultural products and food, as well as
manufactured products (textiles, ready-made clothes, footwear etc.) which use
agricultural products as raw materials. This happened because no coherent
agricultural policy supports the reorganizing of agriculture, farmers’ subsidizing,
efficient irrigation systems, proper equipment. Part of the intervention funds can
be obtained by accessing structural funds (including FEOGA) on account of
development programmes. It is worth mentioning that, due to its position on the
45o parallel, the incidence angle between sunlight and land is optimum for
biochemical and biosynthesis processes of plants, which confers exceptional
aroma and taste to fruit and vegetables (Duma 2009).
The Russian Federation and the CSI European countries have an extensive
agriculture due to their large farming spaces. They cover most of their needs, but
also import products from USA and EU. The Russian Federation is one of the
most important wheat producers in the world (fourth place after China, India and
USA); it ranks among the first with rye, potatoes (second place in the world after
China), sunflower and corn. Ukraine ranks fourth in the world in potatoes
growing and has remarkable productions of wheat, corn and sun flower.
In the Turkish speaking countries belonging to the CSI, from Central
Asia, there is merely a ‘sustenance’ agriculture, because of the unfavorable
conditions (arid zones) and mostly because of poorly developed technology.
The Asian Centre (China and India) has recently been founded as a
consequence of the population boom.
China has fertile soils in its large plains, impressive workforce which is
also efficient and cheap. Lately there have been record productions in China, due
to modernizing through technology and equipment import and at the same time
due to a certain ideological ‘relaxation’ which encouraged the private initiative of
Chinese farmers. Irrigations, fertilizers, pesticides, genetically modified plants
and know-how- all these contributed to increased production (Gentelle 2004).
China leads in wheat, rice, potatoes, fruit (apples, pears), tea, silk, pork and
mutton production and ranks among the first in corn, soy, wool, poultry and
sugar production. They transport the goods mainly by ship on the large rivers and
canals and the export is made from the ports Shanghai and Huanzghou
(Domenech 2001).
India has also become an important partner in regional and international
agriculture. They obtained better efficiency by expanding the farming areas
which replaced the former woods, by irrigating large surfaces (95 mil.ha in
2006), by using superior technologies, including growing genetically modified
plants, the use of fertilizers and pesticides. India is the world leader in millet,
barley, jute, bananas and sugar and ranks second in the production of rice, wheat,
tobacco and milk; it also ranks among the first producers of corn, soy, cotton,
potatoes, agrumens etc. Animal breeding, although important, has a smaller
importance, it limits to dairy (second in the world) and wool processing, because
of rigid religious traditions which may hinder the economic development
(Assyang 2001).
Demographic growth has been significantly slowed down in China, but it
continues to increase in India where it outweighs the progress in agriculture;
besides, the water for irrigations becomes scarce in Punjab, where most of the
wheat grows.
Japan has a completely distinct agriculture in comparison to the rest of
the Asian countries. Only 12% of the land is used for farming, but it is extremely
efficient due to the small farmers and strong support from the government (72%
from the costs are subsidized). Rice is the predominant plant and it grows both on
the sea shore plains and on terraces. 38 transgenic plants are grown, but they are
exported. There are 3.5 million farms in Japan where only 5% of the population
works. In spite of the high technology, extremely modern equipment and
advanced scientific research, Japanese agriculture produces only 60-65% from
the agricultural products needed and the rest is imported from USA, Australia and
China. The missing animal protein in the food industry is completed with fish
provided by farms or sea fishing (Regine, Serra 2005).
The countries from South-Eastern Asia mostly grow expensive and rare
products, mainly on plantations which are financed and managed by foreign
companies. It is the case with natural rubber (first in the world- Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia), coffee(Indonesia third in the world), cocoa, tea,
bananas, peanuts, palm tree oil; for the home market they produce rice
(Indonesia, third in the world) (Duma 2009).
In the Asian Islamic world, Turkey has made great progress in agriculture
and has a powerful regional economy founded on Ottoman tradition combined
with Kemal Ataturk’s reforms. In fact, Turkey is the most European of the
Islamic countries. The agriculture specialized in production and export of cotton,
tobacco, vegetables (tomatoes), fruit (apples, pears, apricots), citrus fruit (oranges
and lemons), grapes, wool for mohair etc. There are 28 mil. ha of farming land in
Turkey, 21% are irrigated; there are 4 million farms and 99% of them cover less
than 50 ha. Fertilizers and pesticides are largely used, as well as modern tools
and equipment, imported mostly from USA. Agriculture represents 15% from the
gross national product and the export of agricultural products (5.5 billion dollars
worth) represents 10.5% from all exports from Turkey (Massicard 2005). The
agricultural products, the history and tradition of this country, as well as the
modern infrastructure and spectacular landscapes (long beaches, thermal waters
etc.) enabled Turkey to strongly develop tourism. The Turkish agricultural model
is perfectly adapted to the land, climate, history and traditions of the Turkish
people. The fact that Turkey produces enough consumer goods for its population
and that it is also able to export constitutes a great accomplishment, consistent
with its ambitions of ex- world power (Bozarlslan 2004).
The countries close to Turkey, including the Arab ones, have only
‘sustenance’ agriculture because of the severe pedo-climatic conditions (aridity).
One of them, Afghanistan, specialized in dangerous cultures such as poppy,
producing 90% from the opium in the world.
In the Southern Hemisphere there are no real agriculture centres, apart
from Australia, one of the most important producers of wheat and cotton in the
world and second in sheep breeding (after China). Due to its large surface of
farming land, extensive growing of wheat is practiced. Intensive farming and
irrigations are present only on the plains Murray and Darling. New Zealand
specializes in cattle and sheep breeding, as well as meat and dairy products
(Duma 2009).
Both Australia and New Zealand produce enough for the internal market
and also export wheat, mutton, beef, dairy etc.
Agriculture is very scarce in Africa, except for South Africa, where
modern tools and equipment are used. Here they grow wheat, corn, sunflower
and raise animals (sheep and cattle). The rest of the African countries grow millet
and rice (Nigeria, Sudan), but mostly palms for oil, peanuts, coffee, cocoa, tea,
dates, pineapple, bananas etc). Most African countries have sustenance
agriculture and the expensive products, such as bananas, rubber, cocoa and coffee
are managed by North-American companies like United Fruits and Firestone
(Duma 2009).
Agriculture in Latin America is characterized by contrasts – large
productions for the North-American companies (United Brands, Costel and
Coove and Delmonte) and small productions on the natives’ farms.
In Brazil, farming developed as a consequence of massive deforestations,
which led to serious national and global problems, such as global warming. Here
agriculture evolved according to an exogenous consume model (NorthAmerican) which generated an extrovert development, subordinated to important
financing companies. The culture for home consume, such as manioc, is limited,
while the large productions supported by scientific research – soy, rice, cotton
tobacco, coffee, cocoa, agrumens and sugar cane- are largely exported. In the
“cerrados”, wheat is intensively cultivated; its large productions are supported by
North-American capital as well. Genetically modified plants – soy, rice and corn
– have also appeared in Brazil lately. The peasants who lost their farming land
are a cheap and numerous (20 mil. workers) work force, while the small farmers
fight to survive, trying to access the trade circuits. Although the second soy
exporter in the world and one of the most important rice producers, Brazil’s
inhabitants, especially those living in the North-East – such as the Pernambuco
area- are menaced by starvation (Droulers 2001). Brazil is the second in cattle
raising in the world (after India); they mostly raise the zebu breed, but
production, even in the fazendas, is low.
In Latin America, Argentina and Mexico also have important agricultural
productions, but again, with dominant North-American capital. Argentina
produces genetically modified corn and soy, sunflower, fruit (apples, pears),
agrumens and grapes and they raise cattle using growth hormones added to their
food. In Mexico corn millet and rice, agrumens and bananas are the dominant
products. Most of them, especially the valuable ones (meat, bananas, agrumens,
fruit grapes etc) are exported. In fact the countries in Latin America, mainly
Brazil and Argentina and lately Mexico, are only a ‘prolongation’ of the NorthAmerican agricultural power (Duma 2009).
Conclusions
The demand for food will steadily grow in the future, while the farming
land becomes more limited and the global warming will affect irrigations in
agriculture. Consequently, the competition for agricultural products and
implicitly for food resources determined by demographic growth and consumers’
higher expectations will generate more economic conflicts, mostly in the
commercial field and also mass migration of hungry people. As a result,
productions will grow mostly on account of the genetically modified plants and
growth hormones in animal raising, food will be less and less healthy and people
will be sicker and sicker.
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