LUXURY ROBBERIES Anticipating attacks in high

Transcription

LUXURY ROBBERIES
Anticipating attacks in high-end jewellery Houses
Xavier MACDONALD
Mémoire de Diplôme d’Université de 3ème cycle
Analyse des Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines
Institut de Criminologie de Paris
Département de Recherche sur les Menaces Contemporaines
Directeur de Recherches
Professeur François HAUT
Université Paris II – Panthéon Assas
Xavier Mac Donald
Année Universitaire 2009/2010
LUXURY ROBBERIES
Anticipating attacks in high-end jewellery Houses
Xavier MACDONALD
Mémoire de Diplôme d’Université de 3ème cycle
Analyse des Menaces criminelles Contemporaines
Institut de Criminologie de Paris
Département de Recherche sur les Menaces Contemporaines
Directeur de Recherches
Professeur François HAUT
Université Paris II – Panthéon Assas
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« L’université n’entend donner aucune approbation ni improbation aux
opinions émises dans les mémoires de 3ème cycle ; ces opinions sont
considérées comme propres à leurs auteurs. »
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
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EXTRAIT DU MEMOIRE
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METHODOLOGY, INTERVIEWS, DATA
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INTRODUCTION
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I. SECURITY AWARENESS
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FORESEEING AND ANTICIPATING ATTACKS
RISK ASSESSMENT
COMMITMENT AND DIRECTION FROM THE DECISION MAKERS
FINDING THE WEAKNESSES AND FIXING THEM
IMPLEMENTING COUNTERMEASURES (DETERRENTS), MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT
PROCEDURES. GOING BY THE BOOK
TRAINING PERSONNEL
SECURITY IS AUDITS
HARDWARE AND ELECTRONIC SECURITY
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II. DEFENDERS VERSUS PREDATORS
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THE DEFENDERS:
MANAGING THE SECURITY DEPARTMENT
SECURITY PERSONNEL
THE PREDATORS
SETTING THE SCENES
WHO ARE THESE CRIMINALS?
THE RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANNING PHASE. COLLECTING INFORMATION.
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III. CASE STUDIES MONACO AND PARIS
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PARIS
MONACO
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CONCLUSION
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A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE
DISSERTATION, INCLUDING POINTERS TO THE FUTURE
- 67 BIBLIOGRAPHY
- 72 NOTES
- 74 APPENDICES
- 75 REDOINE FAÏD, FORMER ARMED ROBBER
- 76 REDOINE FAÏD, FORMER ARMED ROBBER (FRENCH VERSION)
- 123 MAIL SENT BY REDOINE FAÏD ON 11 JUNE 2010 CONCERNING FEAR
- 129 MAIL SENT TO THE AUTHOR CONCERNING THE WEAKNESSES IN THE JEWELLERY TRADE. 25 MAY
2010
- 133 KIND REGARDS AND SEE YOU SOON
- 133 REDOINE FAÏD MAIL ENVOYE PAR REDOINE FAÏD A L’AUTEUR CONCERNANT LES FAIBLESSES
DANS LA JOAILLERIE. 25 MAI 2010
- 133 GARY TREDGETT LLOYD’S UNDERWRITER AT ASCOT
- 136 INTERVIEW DORON LEVY, SECURITY CONSULTANT
- 144 INTERVIEW ROBERT POLET, CEO GUCCI GROUP
- 147 MAIL INTERVIEW WITH POLICE CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT CHRISTOPHE HAGET IN MONACO- 149 THANK YOU LETTER FROM MONACO POLICE
- 162 STATISTICS
- 165 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The author has focussed this paper on anticipation and prevention to avoid or at
least seriously reduce attacks in high-end jewellery and watch Houses. Security is
similar to a game of chess where one has to anticipate the opponent's moves by
thinking like him but always keeping one step ahead. This is done by reading who
the criminals are, knowing how they operate and analysing their latest modes of
operation.
The security manager must then perform a risk assessment of the whole company
which will highlight all the weak points. These weak points will show the
deficiencies in procedures, personnel, hardware and electronic security. The
security manager must then put together his security strategy and then his security
budget that top management will then need to approve. When the risks and
priorities have been identified and his security strategy and budget are approved,
he must then re-engineer the different sites by putting in countermeasures and
carrying out training. Once all this is in place, he must then control if all is
working by performing in and out-of-house audits.
Not only must the security manager closely work with people from within the
company, he must also share information with the other Houses, the police and the
underwriters. They in turn must also share their information.
It is mainly during the reconnaissance phase that it is possible to ward off an
attack. Criminals must understand that the outside perimeter is under surveillance
and that once they go into the store to carry out their own 'criminal audits' they
are tracked by the guard and personnel who follow tight procedures. Criminals do
not necessarily come in through the front doors but will also collect information
from personnel to enter through the rear doors or through the neighbouring walls,
ceilings or with tiger attacks (taking hostages). Personnel must also be taught and
regularly reminded to remain discreet at all times.
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EXTRAIT DU MEMOIRE
Afin d’éviter ou de réduire de façon substantielle les attaques à main armée dans
les Maisons de haute joaillerie et d’horlogerie, l’auteur a ciblé ce mémoire sur
l’anticipation et la prévention. La sécurité est semblable à un jeu d’échecs ou l’on
doit anticiper le jeu de son adversaire en ayant toujours un coup d’avance. Ceci est
possible en sachant qui sont ces criminels et en analysant leurs techniques et leurs
modes opératoires.
Le responsable de la sécurité doit d’abord faire une évaluation de tous ses
magasins, ce qui lui permettra de repérer les points faibles tant dans les
procédures, le matériel et la formation du personnel. Il pourra ainsi définir sa
stratégie en fixant ses priorités et son budget qui devra être approuvé par la
Direction. Une fois les forces et les faiblesses identifiées, la stratégie et le budget
approuvés, il devra mettre en place des contremesures et les formations
nécessaires, puis afin d’en contrôler le bon fonctionnement il devra effectuer des
audits internes et externes.
Le responsable de la sécurité devra travailler en étroite collaboration non
seulement avec tout le personnel de la Maison mais également avec les autres
Maisons, la police ainsi que les assureurs pour communiquer et échanger les
informations.
Les braqueurs n’entrant pas forcément par la porte d’entrée, ils chercheront à
recueillir des informations par différents biais : repérage des lieux, indiscrétions
du personnel, etc., d’où l’importance de la vigilance et du suivi des procédures par
les agents de surveillance, les vendeurs et le personnel car ce sera principalement
pendant la phase de reconnaissance qu’il sera possible de dissuader les braqueurs
d’opérer.
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METHODOLOGY, INTERVIEWS, DATA
The author of this dissertation has no lessons to give to anybody who works in the
security or retail trade, the police or the underwriters but instead would like to
convey his personal observations that he has gathered over the last five years
whilst working as the worldwide security manager in one of the most luxurious
and exclusive jewellery Houses in the world. He would also like to exchange a few
ideas and recommendations so that they can be passed on to others and improved.
The author is nevertheless convinced that a lot of what is written today in this
paper will no longer be valid tomorrow, since “…the present is always, immediately,
out-dated”.1 The basis of the thought process should not only allow the reader to
ask himself the right questions concerning armed robberies but should also help
him to protect any kind of site from an attack and in any other field. Sleight of
hand or any other form of theft or loss would have to be discussed in another
dissertation even though the method of preventing them is very similar.
To arrive at a thorough analysis of these criminals, one would have to carry out an
independent sociological and social demographic survey by interviewing these
robbers in and out of prison and in and out of France or any other country, on a
very large scale. Roger Matthews who is a specialist in criminology carried out a
similar study in the Great Britain in the 1990s, interviewing 340 convicted
prisoners that the author has cited when necessary. When carrying out an
interview with a former robber, Redoine FAID who had carried out 150 armed
robberies before being apprehended at 26 years old, the author kept well in mind
that he would probably play down “…the benefits or attractiveness of armed
robbery and instead explain his involvement predominantly in terms of a need for
money or because of unfortunate circumstances”.2 This could all boil down to him
telling what he wanted the author to hear and try to pass himself off as the victim.
This was kept constantly in mind to avoid falling into this trap and being led
astray. The author also knew that he had to upgrade his security measures to
protect the jewellery House, his family and himself by putting-in new procedures.
Interviewing Redoine was quite exceptional because few robbers of this calibre can
or want to be interviewed. The author found the former criminals he spoke with
both very intelligent and well organised and who would probably have had very
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good careers had they put all their management skills to another use. He found
that although these robbers may not be university graduates they were far from
being ignorant and this must be kept well in mind by all the security managers.
Although the information collected from the interviews has to be treated with
caution, the author will try to analyse how and why the attacks are carried out and
the influences to which they may be subject – procedures, electronic security,
intelligence, money, drugs, adrenaline, the media and so on. What the author
believes is important in this paper is what can then be done to reduce these risks.
High-end jewellery Houses protect the identity of their customers as does a doctor,
a lawyer and certain banks. Clients are rarely cited even between personnel
because of discretion. They are referred to as Mr. X or Ms Y. There is an old
unwritten code of conduct of discretion in these Houses and customers expect this.
Discretion goes all the way from the top of the organizational chart to the guards
and the cleaning personnel. “Mum’s the word” in all the trade off since “walls
have ears” although leaks tend to take place from time to time due to personnel
who do not follow procedures by being discreet.
Very little security information written in this paper can be used by the robbers to
know how the jewellery trade operates. This is deliberate but should not however
prevent the reader from asking himself the right questions in order to foresee and
counter attacks. A sound security survey and analysis by the security manager or a
professional will give ways of defending a site and protecting personnel. The
examples the author has given may seem a little simple but hopefully they will get
straight to the point. The main reason for this is to avoid giving away valuable
security information from inside his and other jewellery Houses to avoid as well as
tempting would-be robbers going into action.
The author has tried to view this problem from an independent position and not
from the point of view of a security manager or a police officer or an underwriter.
He has chosen to view things from the ‘attackers’ perspective, how they think,
what motivates them and what will make them go elsewhere.
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If there were no criminals, your humble author would be out of a job and so would
all the people directly or indirectly related to this trade – the police, the
underwriters, the lawyers, the judges, hardware and software companies, security
guards and consultants. This is a truism but this is not what happens in real life
and it is always the honest citizens that have to pay for these offenders.
As long as the demand is high, criminals will always supply their customers and
will also adapt themselves to the new demands by offering even more innovative
illicit products, high value goods and criminal services.
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INTRODUCTION
In a rapidly changing world, security managers have had to adapt and change not
only at the same pace as the criminals but at a faster one. Security for companies
has today become more and more complex. Finished are the days when a guard, a
few cameras and an alarm system are sufficient to secure a site.
This dissertation accordingly examines the players on both sides: those who try to
protect and those who try to steal. For the “protectors,” what relations are there
between the security managers, the police, security consultants and the
underwriters in order to counter the robbers and thieves? To what extent is this
‘security joint venture’ a close-knit community based on trust, understanding and
communication or does each have its own individual role and separate agenda? If
the aim of high jewellery companies is to limit losses, protect personnel and brand
image should security not be taken at a higher level?
For those who try to rob, is it then possible to anticipate and counter all potential
forms of criminality or is an occasional “hit” an inevitability that one has to
accept? Why, at what moment, based on which criteria do criminals make their
decision to attack this store rather than that store?
This study discusses, step by step, how one could seriously limit armed robberies
that can be extremely grave for the personnel who are involved as well as the
negative media impact and the loss in financial results. The author believes that by
reducing both the vulnerability of a threat (the weaknesses) and the threat of an
attack (the attacker), this will reduce risk.
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THE APPENDICES _______________________________________________
In order to obtain material which is up-to-date and has not been previously
published, a series of interviews has been conducted in France and England. These
were carried out amongst former seasoned armed robbers, high-ranking members
of the French police force, experts in security, an underwriter, a loss adjuster and
those who were kind enough to spend some of their time talking to the author
about their personnel experiences in the high-end jewellery trade and the luxury
world in general. The results of this research have been referred to in the text as is
necessary and the details concerning the respondents; together with the full
transcript of the interviews translated into English will be found in a section
following the bibliography at the end of the dissertation.
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I.
SECURITY AWARENESS
Foreseeing and anticipating attacks
The whole concept of security for personnel and goods in a store, a company, a
town, a region or a country is prevention and anticipation - avoiding being hit. It is
taking the time to think how to counter future events instead of being affected by
them. By foreseeing attacks or predicting them, one is given a valuable means to
counter them or to prevent them altogether. It is far wiser to foresee an attack
rather than responding to it whilst it takes place or after it has occurred. It is
better to stop a terrorist’s van loaded with explosives before it leaves their
clandestine garage than trying to stop it ready to blow en-route or in front of the
objective. Just as in public health, prevention is always cheaper than treatment.
When a jewellery House is robbed, procedures are improved, electronic technology
is upgraded or added and training is carried out in order to avoid the same attack
but also to reassure management and personnel. Why undergo an attack in the
first place instead of taking simple immediate preventive actions to at least reduce
the risks of an attack instead of counting on fate or chance? Security is never one
hundred per cent foolproof because there is always a chance factor involved. Good
luck certainly does exist in everyday life and we all use this word from time to time
especially when playing the national lottery or Euro Millions. However, by
counting on it every day, one puts oneself in a solely defensive posture. This will
inevitably one day or another turn into bad luck. The more the security manager
puts in place pro-active robber/thief oriented protective measures which anticipate
a potential gang’s modus operandi, to include the reconnaissance phase, the less he
will need to count on luck.
If the role then of many security professionals is to protect only against past
attacks or counting on luck, this may work if the robbers always use the same
modus operandi. What does one do if robbers start changing their modes of
operation? Security managers have to be capable of identifying tomorrow’s
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attacks today and finding immediate solutions to counter them. Tightening or
enforcing security measures in jewellery Houses and adapting to the new modes of
operation will make the robbers move on to new areas. Security managers must
keep on their toes by constantly improving preventive measures and continually
changing, adding or improving defensive protections. “It’s 24/7 365 days a year
and you’ve got to keep that one step ahead or at least attempt to be one step
ahead”.1 This cycle is never-ending and thus the security managers must always
look to the front and not to the rear if they want to anticipate any form of attack.
Foreseeing or anticipating attacks means putting oneself in the shoes of the
criminal. One must learn to think like them. In other words, one must constantly
think as an attacker instead of a defender. Security managers must know what
they are up against; who the criminals are, their new modes of operation if they
expect to put in place the correct protective measures. Security managers in highend jewellery Houses have thus to declare war on these criminals by being
proactive and by taking the advantage or the initiative rather than waiting for
these criminals to walk into a site waving their weapons around. The author uses
the word “war” because these criminals adopt military-like tactics. Robbers are
armed predators who wear flak-jackets, carry automatic weapons with war
ammunition and use rocket launchers, grenades and explosives. Security managers
and personnel are unarmed defenders who only have their procedures, equipment
and intelligence to outsmart them.
Thinking like criminals, observing their modes of operation and putting in the
necessary and immediate countermeasures and procedures will allow the security
managers to detect or deter them during their reconnaissance phase. The initial
reconnaissance and planning phase will be analysed rather than explaining at
great lengths the different ethnic criminal communities or categories, which would
need another paper. Robbers of high-end jewellery stores will take all the time that
is necessary to analyse a site and find the best way to succeed. This is the
reconnaissance and planning phase where they will observe every detail and every
weakness in the system and this is where the security manager must anticipate
their moves. Criminals carry out a reconnaissance weeks beforehand of both the
store and its surroundings and it is this phase the author believes is crucial in
warding off an attack and not whilst it takes place. They also have to perform an
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initial reconnaissance of the store to make sure their chances of success are high by
gathering overt and covert information. The author has hence tried to tug the
analytic line back to the reconnaissance phase which robbers carry out instead of
focussing all his efforts on the immediate entrance of a store or during the attack
because he believes this is too late. John Shaw, a loss adjuster, believes that all
jewellery Houses and stores are reconnoitred at least twice a year.
The main question one could then ask oneself concerning robberies is “Why does
an attack take place and how does one minimize the risks?” rather than “When
are we going to be attacked and what do we then do?” By thinking this way, the
author believes that the scales of success will tilt in the security manager’s favour
and the chances of success are significantly increased. If one simply sits and waits
for an attack to take place it most certainly will happen. If on the other hand one
expects the unexpected then one cannot be completely surprised when the
unexpected occurs.
How then does one foresee what is unexpected or unpredictable? Luckily man is
foreseeable which makes him predictable simply because he follows patterns and is
often repetitive. Robberies are not done at random and are rarely one-off events in
blue chip jewellery Houses. They are first and foremost based on calculated risks
and offenders quite understandably do not want to be caught, killed or wounded.
The selection of targets is performed in a rational way and analysed by the
criminals in a methodological and thorough manner to detect all the weaknesses.
They will thus choose the weakest store of the pack before they attack because
success is capital.
The security risk of robbing a jewellery store is not that high and there are not
that many robbers going around attacking Houses. There is a greater risk of
having a car accident or being run over on a zebra crossing than being robbed.
One can also naively imagine that if there are no attacks, the security system is
functioning. This is very slippery ground. All systems need to be regularly audited
both in- and out-of-house as well as training of personnel. To anticipate attacks,
personnel need to be kept alert by regularly informing and reminding them of the
potential dangers and to follow the procedures strictly.
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Why do we become ‘mentally’ void or often short-sighted concerning security?
What stops us from looking ahead into the unknown?
Man’s natural inertia makes him judge and understands only what happened in
the past, sometimes in the present but rarely in the future. It is a truism that
history will be made with the future and that future events will become history and
so on. Events appear clear in the past because with hindsight one can stand back,
understand, and judge better. The past is reassuring, easy to comprehend while the
future is uncertain, blurry, difficult to foresee and therefore to anticipate.
Man also needs to be reassured that he works in a protected and safe environment.
Security gives oneself the impression or the feeling of being safe should aggressive
behaviour or events occur. We may even try to convince ourselves that systems
always work and worst of all fool others into believing they will work. We are
reassured by routine, having cameras that work, a guard that is in place instead of
questioning ourselves about what is going on outside to anticipate an event. A form
of weariness and self-satisfaction deceitfully sets in and convinces us that
everything is working. Similar to a computer screen, our brains go on stand-by.
On go the blinkers and off we all go for a trot around the track. What happens on
the sides - let alone all around - often remains a mystery. Security managers
therefore need to question themselves regularly concerning what is going on
otherwise they can also be caught up by the same kind of blindness that affects the
guards and personnel. They must never be content that all is working or that they
are invincible and must always keep in mind that nothing is impossible and must
always be on the lookout for a new criminal opportunity. Armed robbers are
opportunists and will sway from one field to another and are always watching for
an easy and profitable heist. They will go where the money or the goods are and
follow them around, which can make them unpredictable if one does not anticipate
what is going on. The criminals must always be analysed through an opportunist’s
eye. A security manager must hence foresee the criminal’s next move and then
remove the opportunity otherwise criminals will take the lead.
Since man creates opportunity (the risk environment) in which the criminal
operates, it is up to the security manager to remove these risks by making it more
difficult for the offenders. Robbers will inevitably detect all vulnerabilities
(weaknesses) and can on occasions create them when necessary by bribing,
carrying out tiger attacks (taking people hostage - e.g. kidnapping family
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members), seducing personnel for information or neutralising hardware and
electronic security. The security manager should be capable of detecting a
particular vulnerability that will lead to a particular threat which will in time lead
to a financial or physical loss. One could even push this reasoning a little further
by saying that if the objective of the company is to make money, the security
manager must detect all forms of risk that can reduce profit. Security managers,
owners of retail stores or personnel in general should think ahead by focussing on
their weaknesses and not on their strengths. The criminals certainly will.
If security is then based on impressions or feelings, one can admit that it is
subjective which means that different people, including security managers,
imagine different things at any given time and for different security risks. People
can make bad decisions simply because they are based on subjective or perceived
risks instead of objective ones and that they often react to emotions instead of
taking a step back and being rational. Many non-security-trained professionals do
not have the global security picture and will often create incidents whilst believing
they are doing the correct thing to avoid them. Protecting people is paramount but
often people do not even realise the dangers that exist or that can take place and
can put themselves or the company at risk. The security manager must always take
the time to explain the security situation with clear, objective and easy
explanations so that personnel understand the ins and outs of the problems in
order to adhere.
There is also a part of intuition or a sixth sense that sales people and security
officers have but often do not develop. When interviewing victims or guards after a
robbery took place they often told the author “I thought something was odd” or
“He did look suspicious”. Why then did they not take immediate action, warn
personnel or follow the procedures by not letting them in straight away, pressing
the panic button or calling for the manager? After one of the out-of-house audits
where a ring had been substituted from an experienced salesperson he told the
author, during the de-briefing phase, that he had noticed that the ‘mystery client’
was very nervous. She in fact told the author that she was trembling and was very
nervous because it was not a natural thing for her to do. The important point here
is why then did the salesperson not take immediate action by bringing the sales
tray back to his side and warn the guard or other colleagues of a suspicious event?
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Does another form of blindness stop people from leaving what is known instead of
developing what is unknown? Most probably it is since attacks are rare and that
people are afraid of doing the wrong thing or do not remember what to do,
especially under stress. Only highly trained elite police or military personnel would
be able to react correctly and even then they can make mistakes. The author
believes that people do in fact notice unusual events but do not push their intuition
in order to counter the situation. This is a seriously weak point in the system and is
clearly why training is so important so that they immediately report events and
execute the procedures. People can make mistakes, we all do, but need to be taught
and reminded how not to make or repeat them or at least how to respond to them.
Personnel need to be constantly reminded concerning procedures by following, at
the minimum, yearly security trainings. Themes and topics also have to be taught
e.g., discretion, the role of the guards, anticipation and prevention of attacks and
so on so that they get a better understanding of the global picture. When training
has been completed, personnel must then be regularly controlled with in- and outof-house audits.
Is it however possible to foresee, anticipate or predict an attack without looking
into a crystal ball or reading tea leaves?
“Losses happen and some are more preventable than others”2 if one is prepared to
anticipate events by opening one’s mind by listening, reading and analysing what is
currently going on outside the stores and not only in them. Security managers
must read the local and national papers to find out the new modes of operation,
techniques and trends of what is taking place today and what could certainly
happen tomorrow. By reading these tabloids, Jérôme Pierrat who is a journalist
specialised in criminology believes it is possible to anticipate fifty per cent of all
attacks. He believes that one person or one gang may have a new idea of attacking
a site and that fifteen other gangs or people will just follow the same mode of
operation simply because they will read about it in the papers or see it on
television. Roger Matthews adds that “Offenders are greatly influenced by the
media who can perform a sensitising role that instructs or encourages those
already predisposed to crime and violence to express these tendencies”.3 The media
probably have an effect on criminals and “… often depict the robbers as
dangerous psychopaths or as cold calculating criminals”.4 This is often the case for
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petty criminals who use unnecessary violence but not certain high-end robbers
who carry out attacks with innovative and unexpected modes of operation, as was
the case for the Great Train Robbery in 1963 or the Harry Winston armed
robbery in Paris in 2008, the Graff Old Bond Street heist in 2009, the Leviev
robbery in Cannes in 2013. Even the police and security managers have a certain
respect for this category of criminals. “These upmarket robberies will get prime of
place because of the high market value of the robbery and possibly because this
kind of robbery in highly protected places verges on the technical feat.” In that
perspective, these robberies can easily be portrayed as a kind of “specialised craft
reserved to professionals which has nothing to do with the vulgar smash-and-grab
job”. The use of sledgehammers, window cutting tools, two criminals on a scooter,
ram rod attacks, etc., are all foreseeable if one is prepared to read. By reading this
information in the tabloids it is possible to anticipate which method will probably
be used and how to protect oneself. The security manager must ask himself
whether his stores can resist such attacks and if not, put in place new protective
measures and procedures immediately. The police will no doubt catch them in the
end but this can take months. Once they are caught the remaining criminals will
simply move on to other targets and/or use other modes of operation.
Criminals do not retire or go straight overnight, they simply move on to easier
targets since “…there is no noticeable decrease in the industry on the whole”.5 If
the defender’s system is effective, it is likely that robbers will move on since it will
“…generate a displacement effect to softer targets in the same field”.6 When
jewellery store attacks increase, it is most probably because procedures and
security are tighter in other sectors (see appendices). “If there is a weakness in a
country or a town; a bad co-operation between the police and the retail merchants,
they will exploit this. If an area is really secured and that there is cohesion between
all the actors then thefts and armed robberies become very difficult – but not
impossible”.7
One may try to put numerical values to predict future risks by following trends in
the past. Whatever goes on outside of the stores, whichever robbers are in
circulation, jewellery Houses have to carry on with their business and thus security
risks have to be calculated and probabilities also put into the equation. What is the
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probability of being attacked during this event or that private client presentation?
A zero per cent probability of an attack may never be a realistic objective or
possible to obtain but security managers must try to get as close as possible to this
figure. By doing this they have to calculate the possibility of a risk, analyse the
weak points and put in sufficient countermeasures (deterrents) to stop or delay an
attack.
One could put high value goods under a marquee in the gardens of the Versailles
chateau and put an armed guard in front of it to upgrade security. Would this be
effective to stop criminals cutting their way into the back? Putting an extra guard
inside the marquee - will this deter the criminals? Probably not since they will just
adapt to this situation and attack if they think it is worthwhile and easy for them to
carry out and get away. Security protections must increase according to the values
and the risk environment. Risk is only a probability of what could happen in the
future and only becomes real when an incident occurs.
A quantitative risk analysis can also be useful to analyse trends concerning attacks
or costs so that the security manager can defend his budget. The author tries to
analyse the yearly trends concerning attacks he receives (see appendices) but this
raw material does not allow oneself to analyse the reasons behind these figures.
Why have they increased or decreased, in which sectors, areas, or fields? Who are
these criminals carrying out these attacks? New entrants or seasoned robbers?
Were these offenders former bank robbers before security was improved or are
they first-timers? Thus, from 2007 to 2010, where did this huge 163% increase (see
appendices) in armed robberies in the jewellery trade come from, all of a sudden?
Were these criminals recently released from prison? When criminals are convicted
and sent to prison, criminality quite understandably goes down. These figures do
not tell us much but what one can be sure of is that these robbers do not go away
but simply adapt to new fields and especially to soft targets. All these unpolished
figures may have some interest or at least for opinion polls or governments but
armed robberies and sleight of hand are carried out by people who generally adapt
to soft and hard targets and jewellery Houses are often soft targets (see
appendices). The harder the target, the greater the chance of avoiding an attack.
Reducing the risks increases protection but one has firstly to detect the weaknesses
and then to fix them and put in countermeasures to make it more difficult.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Is a hundred per cent security system possible in jewellery stores since they are
open to the general public and clients walk in and out freely? Nuclear plants and
embassies need to be airtight, jewellery Houses to be welcoming. One could not
imagine making clients in jewellery stores walk through 3D scanners, searching
their belongings, taking off their shoes before entering. For this reason, security
managers must think upstream if they want to foil the robbers and not passively
wait for them at the front door.
When an attack does takes place, it is practically too late to do anything or to stop
them, even if someone presses on one of the panic buttons. Criminals know that
even in a worst-case scenario, they have a few minutes to carry out their job and
get out before the police turn up. “Robbers generally expressed the view that
whether alarms were audible or silent made very little difference since they felt
they would have enough time to carry out the robbery and make an escape”.8 One
can basically say that it is game over, it is checkmate even if thieves and robbers
get away with very little or are finally caught. The chances of recovering the goods
after a crime are rather low since thieves and robbers will always try to get rid of
them as fast as possible to their receivers. If they are sent to prison, criminals know
that they may as well have some assets, capital or goods when they get out
especially if the prison sentence is roughly the same whether or not the goods are
recovered. The end result, however, is that personnel and clients are traumatised,
financial resources are lost and insurance premiums are increased.
Criminals must never be underestimated since they can often think out of the
security manager’s box and have the advantage of surprise. When interviewing
and talking with criminals, the author was surprised how different their way of
seeing things were. They will observe details that most people will oversee or
ignore. Although many high-end robbers are indeed intelligent and act rationally
they must never be analysed in a logical way since robberies are, by definition,
illogical through the eyes of the normal world. If security managers imagine that
criminals think logically, there is a great chance they will be looking in the wrong
direction and will not be able to anticipate their moves. Redoine told the author for
example that “jewellery … is something which makes people dream. Jewels are
items which attract. It is not like a bank robbery - it is a beautiful robbery”.9 A
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Xavier Mac Donald
‘beautiful robbery’ seems more like an oxymoron or even illogical since banks,
cash-in-transit (C.I.T) vans and drugs all generate cash that can be spent
immediately whereas jewels have to go through receivers for a fraction of the retail
value (+/-15%).
The attackers have the advantage of surprise and that in itself is a serious trump
card but the security manager also has a few cards up his sleeve. One could
suppose that the initiative lies with the criminals when in fact it often remains with
the security managers. All the security actors must be prepared to anticipate these
events by sharing information and by closely co-operating. If all the security actors
are federated and share information it will then be possible to prevent or reduce
crime in this high-end segment.
Collecting and sharing information from various sources is an easy and effective
way of obtaining intelligence in order to anticipate attacks. Informing stores of
what is happening on the outside can often give the necessary time to put in place
the appropriate countermeasures. This information can come in different forms
from either in-house or out-of-house sources. In-house information comes mainly
from the shop floor level when guards and personnel identify suspicious clients and
events. The security manager or his representative, who can be the floor manager
or other designated personnel, must pass on this information as quickly as possible
if it is to be effective. It must be passed down to all personnel including the guards
who should sign this off in a folder to make sure they have been read and can be
re-read. There is no bad information and personnel must be encouraged to do this
as quickly and as regularly as possible. Sales people, guards and other in-house
personnel must be trained to do this naturally but again this takes time. The
information cycle has to be continually nurtured if one is to succeed by
anticipation. The different high-end jewellery Houses worldwide represent
thousands of honourable correspondents who can pass on valuable information to
their own stores as well as the other Houses. These ‘correspondents’ are the ones
that can spot robbers and inform about what is happening on the field at the
grassroots level, especially since this is where it all takes place. Unfortunately, this
is seldom done. Out-of-house information can come from several sources including
the police, the security consultants, the media and the underwriters. The security
manager must have regular contacts with all in order to gather and exchange
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Xavier Mac Donald
valuable information. Exchanging information between security managers is vital
and should not be kept secret as would marketing, product development or press
managers who have to remain discreet.
The author receives security warnings from various sources but rarely from the
police concerning armed robbers that attack jewellery stores, malls and Houses in
France which represents roughly one attack a day. Security warnings/bulletins are
forwarded to the security managers in their original form from press releases or
security consultants. No analyses or recommendations are attached e.g., mode of
operation and region of attack, number and type of persons, time of attack, the
type of vehicle used and so on. To allow the security manager to anticipate future
attacks, all this information would need to be treated by extracting only what is
interesting on a pre-formatted chart and graph by answering - who, what, when,
where and how. At a glance, security professionals would be able to see what and
where attacks are currently taking place and what to look out for according to
trends and new modes of operation.
In- and out-of-house security bulletins and warnings as well as mug shots must
quickly be sent out to all the stores in Europe and worldwide to inform them of
possible attacks and thefts that are taking place and what to do to counter them.
There is no point in sending out too much security information or bulletins since
they can have the opposite effect. Too much information kills information. They
have to be well chosen and given in small doses otherwise personnel will end up
ignoring them or even worse being afraid of working in the stores because of the
fear of being attacked.
To what extent is this ‘security joint venture’ (security managers, police, security
consultants, underwriters) a close-knit community based on trust, understanding
and communication or does each have its own individual role and separate
agenda?
There is unfortunately, to a certain extent, competition between security managers
from the different Houses, each one hoping or believing he is doing better than his
opposite number in the other Houses. They seldom co-operate with each other even
though attempts are made to change this in Place Vendôme. The main reason for
this is that since security is subjective, each security manager works differently. It
is less a question of whether the security managers are doing their jobs well but are
they working in the same direction with common goals and understanding of the
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Xavier Mac Donald
criminal world? Only with all agreeing on sharing information and carrying out
the same training and mission procedures will the system work. Regular quarterly
meetings have to be set up between security managers to review latest trends and
to agree on joint action plans but under the impetus of CEOs, CFOs or
underwriters.
To anticipate robberies, police forces must also share their information, since
dealing with attacks afterwards is only regressive instead of being preventive. For
security managers, it is often too late when the police come in, thus they have to
anticipate these attacks well in advance. The police in general, probably due to
their strategy and workload, focus their attention on an incident by collecting
video and forensic evidence and eye-witness descriptions to look for leads that will
take them to criminals. They thus focus on the crime and not the criminal. They
come onto the scene to record that an event has taken place and have little time for
proactive work that is needed to apprehend criminals who cause these problems in
the first place. Christophe Haget, chief superintendent in Monaco, believes that the
“police focus only on solving cases (running after criminals) instead of preventing
them from happening.”10 Arguably proactive policing may have little effect on
crime reduction or levels but it will keep under a certain control the professional
criminals. Since the police mainly come into the picture after a store is robbed, the
security manager will end up dealing with traumatized personnel, negative media
coverage and loss of goods. Tightening or enforcing security measures in jewellery
Houses, as well as adapting to the new modes of operation, will make the robbers
move on to new areas e.g. from jewellery stores to banks, to cash-in-transit vans, to
cash dispensers, to the workshops of jewellery stores, to auction houses and so on.
When robbers change their targets due to improved security features, the police
have to adapt immediately their strategy to these new sectors. This keeps the police
going round in circles and unfortunately often one step behind. It then becomes
difficult for the police to communicate information since they have very little to
pass down. Anticipating events rather than dealing with them afterwards would
oblige the police to change their strategy completely.
Police co-operation also greatly depends on the objectives and priorities given at
government levels. Personnel can be given to terrorism rather than to organized
crime; drug trafficking rather than armed robberies; prostitution rather than to
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Xavier Mac Donald
counterfeiting and so on. Co-operation between states is also often problematical,
due to local legislation, corruption, financing and money laundering. This is,
however, one of the important levels where one could nip in the bud future attacks
from international criminals. Offenders should be monitored when leaving their
countries of origin and the information passed on to the other states and police
institutions e.g. Interpol and Europol, national police forces and all the way down
to the security managers but this is rarely done except in Monaco. With the
opening of the European borders to other states this will most certainly increase
this problem. Countries such as Macedonia, Serbia, Rumania, Albania,
Montenegro, Turkey, etc., will bring with them in the short/medium term their
share of criminals who will also want a piece of the criminal pie. It will become
‘mandatory’ to build very close co-operation with these police forces before these
countries are integrated into the EU otherwise they will quickly lose control.
The author also believes that it is necessary to co-operate with the brokers,
underwriters or surveyors simply because they may be aware of new modes of
operation that are on-going as well as ideas on how to improve procedures. Gary
Tredgett believes that “it is a partnership and so therefore it’s imperative that
good business practices are considered”.11 Regular contacts with the brokers
before going to certain countries to collect as much information as possible - what
is the crime rate or statistics, what were the last incidents, who are the local
contacts concerning guard companies, etc.? This is also a way of anticipating
robberies by reducing risks.
If one places the security manager at the centre of this security cobweb, who can
he rely on to help him win these battles or what and who can make him lose them?
What in fact is the security manager’s role and who must he count on to help him
fulfil his mission? One may imagine that the problem of attacks lie solely with the
robbers entering the main doors of the premises when in fact they may well use
other entrances with the help from people inside the company or because of a lack
of support from management either deliberately or by ignorance.
Decision makers are often ignorant concerning security. A President will talk with
shareholders at great lengths concerning strategy, marketing, markets, niches,
results, operational margins and EBITDAs but rarely about strategy and tactics
concerning security. It is not a question of capacity of understanding, it is just that
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Xavier Mac Donald
security is rarely quantifiable, often subjective, not very exciting and can seem
complicated which in fact it is not. Decision makers seldom take the time to
understand what security is all about and often blindly and naively outsource their
security decisions to people whom they imagine will do this job and worst of all
without controlling them. Arguably, as was already mentioned, there are more
deaths and injuries due to car accidents than attacks of jewellery Houses. The risk
is thus a low one. However, it is not because the risk is low that the consequences
for the company and the CEO are low. Let us suppose a client gets injured or
killed during an attack - what would the media impact or brand image loss be for
the company? Terrible! Thus, it is not because the risk of an attack is low that the
media or financial impact would not be high. Many CEOs are not aware that in
many countries such as in France they are often criminally responsible for the
safety of their personnel and their clients, if these are injured or killed.
Furthermore, losses of sensitive information or goods can have a serious financial
impact on their results as well as an increase in their insurance premiums and a
possible halt in their careers.
Security is common sense, a way of life, a state of mind. It must be instinctive and
not a constraint. Security may seem complex but in fact it is not. All that one has to
do is to break it down into several parts and treat each part individually whilst
keeping in mind the global picture. By giving the impression that security is
complex, security managers and other mandarins may even try to hide their errors
or weaknesses by sweeping them under the carpet. These flaws will inevitably
surface after an attack when the loss adjusters start their investigations. Security
always needs a system of checks and balances and hierarchy should be there to do
it.
To foresee attacks, the security manager must be constantly looking in both
directions simply because the robbers will be doing the same. One must not put all
one’s protection in the same area since robbers will always look for an easier
access and find it. Did the Maginot line stop the German invasion of France in
1939? One day or the other, friends will inevitably become foes.
Does adding more guards, more cameras and extra police officers make crime
decrease?
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Xavier Mac Donald
Alain Bauer and Xavier Raufer, two French criminologists, believe that “in the
face of such threats, ordinary security measures (police, justice, security officers,
CCTV, etc.) are very often derisory”.12 If one admits that ordinary security
measures are often derisory then what are the security managers to do to stop the
criminals from attacking?
What does one concretely do in order to reduce these risks? The security manager
should first of all perform a risk assessment of all the sites to locate the weaknesses
and fix them, implement countermeasures to slow the robbers down, draft
procedures so that all have the same mission understanding; train personnel and
guards to observe and report incidents and perform regular in- and out-of-house
audits. All these phases which should be performed in this particular order are
essential if one wants to anticipate and deter rather than merely to suffer them. In
that regards, the smallest flaw undetected by security but noted by the criminal
can often have a serious human and financial outcome.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Risk assessment
“A nod’s as good as a wink to a blind bat!” is said in the Nudge Nudge sketch by
Monty Python. A security manager can sometimes act like a blind bat flying
around without seeing what in fact is important. Bats fly using their radar system
to avoid crashing into obstacles. What if someone holds out a net at the last tenth
of a second? The security managers have to anticipate, foresee and learn to
identify all forms of risks otherwise they will be caught, one day or another, in the
mesh. To avoid flying around like bats and avoiding problems, the first thing a
security manager should do is to perform a risk assessment to identify the
weaknesses in order to reduce or to prevent attacks. It will allow him to determine
which security measures are necessary to put in place, what is cost-effective and
what is not and where the priorities are. There is no ideal copy-and-paste matrix
concerning the security of a site but an individual analysis to recommend and
implement tailor-made decisions.
Risk assessment has to be seen primarily as a management tool where one balances
the potential dangers against the benefits. Risk is thus a combination of
opportunity and danger. Similar to the CEO who has to analyse the risks of an
opportunity (new segments of a market, accessories, etc.,) the security manager has
also to detect and to take into account the current and new security risks in order
to protect the goods whilst allowing sales to continue. What risk is there in the
theft of a bottle of champagne and what risks exist that could lead to an attack of a
store by an experienced robber? Priorities have to be given and one must never
lose this from sight even under the pressure from others. From these major and
minor findings he should then put them by order of priority since all sites cannot
always be re-engineered at the same time.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Commitment and direction from the decision makers
When the security manager finishes his risk assessment concerning the different
risks, weaknesses and how to fix them, he can then put together his security
strategy and tactics which will help him structure his security budget. It will then
be possible for him to know where to spend the security resources, how to improve
procedures, what training is required for personnel and when to perform audits.
At this moment, only, can the security manager send his strategy and budget to his
hierarchy for their approval. They in turn will have to decide what importance
they give to each possible threat and the financial and brand image losses as well as
psychological and sociological incidents they are prepared to give up. The more the
security manager clearly and concisely explains the security situation, the more he
has the chance that his strategy is taken seriously and that he obtains the necessary
funds and support. Without the complete support and approval of the CEO or his
hierarchy, the security manager will find it very difficult to implement any of the
necessary procedures and changes that are necessary to anticipate robberies and
thefts. This is what often happens.
Security quite understandably starts at the top of the organisational chart with the
President or the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) who gives clear and precise
direction and guidance. He has to inspire at all levels and to all his personnel the
desire to implement his guidelines and to check regularly that they are carried out.
Without the CEO’s personal backing, people will not be fully committed and this
will often lead to problems and inevitably to attacks and thefts. If he does not
receive the correct backing from his hierarchy, the security manager will find
himself in a difficult position and in the end will have to beat a retreat. Security is
everybody’s problem but the impulse must, first of all, come from the decision
makers. The author believes that most attacks could be avoided if management
were to understand the risks and personally supported the security manager and
the policy.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Finding the weaknesses and fixing them
All security is linked but are some of these links weaker? “A chain is no stronger
than its weakest link” goes the axiom but we tend to take it for granted and lose
sight of it. In security there is no point in upgrading all the system when only the
weakest point(s) need(s) to be fixed. In finding the weak links, one has not only
saved money but has indeed increased security. Buying an expensive safe will serve
to no avail if personnel can give easy access to robbers. To a certain extent it is
better, in some cases, to have a lower quality safe but to have efficient
countermeasures and procedures to protect it from the robbers and from
personnel.
If personnel are the most important element of a security system they are also the
main reason why security systems fail. The dangers for personnel are routine,
tiredness, and self-satisfaction. Who are the weakest links in a store? Salespeople
and guards. They will either give the desire for robbers or thieves to attack or they
will de-motivate them by their behaviour and implementation of the security
procedures.
There are different weak links in every system and all cannot be treated or fixed at
the same time. Security managers have to prioritise according to their risk
management analyses and determine which stores or which sectors are the
priorities and need fixing.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Implementing Countermeasures (deterrents), making it more difficult
The author believes that analysing and finding the risks and fixing the weaknesses
are still not sufficient to anticipate robberies because it is only a question of time
and motivation, according to Roger Matthews, before a site is attacked. Since
criminals adapt to targets and can overrun the security equipment and procedures
and also that the time factor during the planning phase is of minor importance, it
is hence up to the security manager to keep ahead of them by putting in
countermeasures to make it more difficult and to slow them down.
“There is the famous historical fact of the geese that saved Rome in 300 BC from
the attack of the Celts. The sacred geese were located in the temple of Juno, the
Roman queen of gods on the hill of Capitolium. The Celts planned a night attack
and while the trained dogs guarding the Roman troops did not put out a sound
when the first Celtic warriors infiltrated the Capitolium, the geese made an
infernal cackle that alerted the Romans”. This true event took place 2311 years
ago and shows that no matter how well one may believe one is protected, there is
always a high probability that it will be bypassed by others. The Romans did well
not to rely solely on the dogs and did well to have a second countermeasure with
the geese.
“One should never put all one’s eggs in the same basket” as the French saying
goes otherwise one end’s up with an omelette and that is what generally happens.
By placing himself in the shoes of the criminals, the security manager has to push
his analysis as far as possible in order to put in place several countermeasures at
each level and in different areas. Gary Tredgett, a Lloyd’s underwriter, calls it
“the onion ring theory, having layer upon layer of controls in place” and “using
different methods and deterrents”.13 All good security systems need to have
countermeasures (deterrents) to allow them to continue functioning. If the first
defence fails or is overrun due to electronic failure, errors due to personnel or
attacks made by robbers, another countermeasure should immediately take over
and so on. If one does not, the criminals will slip through the net.
There are the regular countermeasures to limit access to sensitive areas and to
slow robbers down but there are also the urgent ones to put in place because of
new modes of operation. This is why the security manager must always keep well
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Xavier Mac Donald
informed of how the criminals operate or by reading about what attacks are ongoing. These countermeasures will slow the criminals down and allow, at a
minimum, a gain of time so that the police, the security sub-contractor or oneself
can intervene. Time is the first major countermeasure the security manager has
concerning the robbery itself, since robbers have to get out very quickly. The more
time they need the more one has a chance they will go elsewhere. Time is thus the
robber’s worst enemy during the armed robbery. Redoine told the author that
“nothing resists us; it’s all a question of time”.14 One could also answer to Redoine
that criminals will always be caught one day or another and that it is also just a
question of time. The longer it takes to catch them, the cleverer they are but they
all, however, finish one day or another behind bars.
Overlapping spheres of competences and responsibility are also simple and
effective countermeasures. The person opening a store with the key must not have
the alarm code or the safe code. Alarms and safes must be under constraint and
equipped with time locks and time delays at opening. Another countermeasure
would be the opening via a video monitoring service. Checks and balances once
again since these countermeasures will make attacks more complicated for
robbers. Personnel must also learn to break habits, use different routes when going
to work and change their times of arrival. Another system is to make all personnel
enter the store at the same time. The variations and combinations of
countermeasures are infinite and often free but people tend not to use them. The
benefits of countermeasures like this are fourfold: personnel security, protection of
the goods, very cheap and easy to implement. All are reassured including
personnel and the underwriters since this reduces the risk of an attack.
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Procedures. Going by the book
It is however one thing to perform a risk assessment and to put in
countermeasures, it is another to put it into action. The next steps after
determining the risks, finding all the weaknesses in the system and putting in
countermeasures is to draft clear procedures, to train personnel and to control
regularly to check that everything is understood and working as planned. The
author believes that procedures are critical concerning security even though they
may not always please personnel. Security is first of all a bottom-up review by
putting in the correct procedures.
When arriving in the jewellery House the author quickly realized that the guards
in the stores did not know what they were doing or what they had to do in order to
carry out their mission. They thought they knew what they were doing but they
had never been told what to do or why and how to do it. The store manager at the
beginning could not understand, when the store was busy, why the guards could
not help out to clear the sales tables by carrying the coffee cups and champagne
glasses to the back office. The author had to explain to him, in detail, the difficulty
there was for guards to do their jobs correctly and to explain to him what their job
actually entailed. Furthermore, guards would then focus on the cups instead of the
customers. The trade-off here was to hire an extra person for two days to assist the
salespeople and to let the guards do their job which in itself is difficult.
Thus the store manager had his idea concerning security, the store personnel
theirs, the security manager his and the guards theirs. It became quite clear that
all concerned had to agree on the same mission procedures. These were written
from scratch and then presented to all parties concerned to get their feedback but
especially their understanding and approval, because once in place they would
have to be implemented by all and carried out to the letter. These procedures have
to be orally explained to all new guards and personnel before they start working
even though their training only starts here.
There are different kinds of procedures that need to be written in high-end
jewellery Houses. There are the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the
stores locally or worldwide that give the general outlines of security; local guard
procedures, temporary procedures for special events and exhibitions, private
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Xavier Mac Donald
presentations,
consignment
procedures,
procedures
concerning
all
the
departments e.g., the workshop, the depot, special orders, marketing, the press and
so on. For a photo-shoot, for example, it is not the press or the communications
department that should decide if security is necessary or not. The press may also
have reduced budgets, friends in the media to impress or film stars to satisfy.
Consigning goods to a film star is excellent for media coverage especially during
the film festivals but the security manager must find ways of consigning goods to
these people but without their losing them. The security manager has to analyse
the situation and put in place the correct procedures to make this happen. The
press and the other departments need to be told what to do and not the other way
round.
There is security with CCTV, panic buttons and procedures for client presentation
with trays but security does not stop there. Who controls the rear doors? Who is
allowed access control? Who has the keys? Who has the codes to the alarm system
and to the safe? What about transportation of goods to and from the site? What
security do the workshop sub-contractors have? What procedures do back-office
personnel have? Security takes a lot of common sense, vision, anticipation and time
but also because it is needed everywhere. There is not an area where security is
unnecessary but the levels change according to the protection needed. The security
manager must thus write down clear procedures for all the departments in the
company and not just the stores.
The security manager must know what is going on in the stores and also inform all
the back office personnel of the risks of attacks and of being indiscreet. Personnel
must be taught never to talk about opening and closing procedures or any other
security issues with outside people including families. They must be told that the
security system is very difficult to overrun in order to make robbers go elsewhere.
This is good if it is leaked!
People working in the different departments of a company are also a serious risk.
How to keep the press, the marketing and the workshop and stock personnel from
talking about their trades without giving out sensitive information. On one
occasion the author read on Facebook that an employee was going to attend a
VVIP event on the French Riviera in August. Pictures of this event were put on
line. Security managers have to remind personnel regularly of the consequences of
such information. Obviously, working in one of the most exclusive jewellery
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Xavier Mac Donald
Houses is status-enhancing and personnel are proud to talk about this. On a
similar occasion another employee told a hairdresser a few hours before an event
at the Royal Albert Hall in London that they would be hosting an event for special
clients and that twenty unique necklaces would be on show. Personnel do not do
this deliberately but mainly because they were not taught not to do so and
especially what to say. Discretion concerning security must be drilled into them
because this is a basic procedure.
People will follow procedures if they understand them and see the end state. There
is a natural willingness to comply with these rules and regulations as long as they
are feasible and possible to carry out. There is no point in trying to implement
unreasonable procedures since they will often be ignored. A security manager
must work closely with all the departments in the company so that he perfectly
understands how they work and integrate their difficulties and agendas into his
security strategy and procedures. He has to talk regularly with the directors and
managers to make sure his messages get across and that they understand and
agree with him. There is no point in putting in procedures if they are countered,
ignored or interpreted in a different way. As soon as one’s back is turned,
personnel will continue their business as usual. Rules and procedures take time to
understand, to put in place and to be accepted and implemented by all.
Procedures can also be ignored by employees because of the culture of the trade, of
the country or if not enforced by top management. There is also a culture
difference between countries and continents where the local people are not made
aware that they have to follow rules and regulations. The author is regularly told
by jewellery personnel when going to Japan, for example, that there is no crime
there. It is true that the crime rate is low but their analysis does not take into
consideration the foreigners who go there to rob and the changes in local criminals
i.e., the Yakusa. The Pink Panthers succeeded in stealing goods in the Ginza
district of Tokyo in 2007 because the Japanese are seen as very easy targets - which
they are.
People naturally interpret or adapt rules or procedures in a way that suits them.
One must always check that all is understood the way one means or intends them
to be carried out. They have to be written as simply and as clearly as possible so
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Xavier Mac Donald
that they can be understood by all. Security procedures for guards or personnel
may be difficult to read or understand since they may be immigrants who may
have difficulties in reading languages other than in Arabic or Cyrillic or by lack of
formal education. Therefore, all points must also be orally explained to them to
make sure no information is lost. When all the procedures have been taught and
understood, personnel must then sign an attendance sheet which will make them
accountable for their actions. If personnel do not follow procedures and are not
made responsible for their acts, the system when needed will rarely function as
intended. People have to report to the security manager and not the other way
round. It is illusory to think that a security manager can cover different stores and
sites in a region, a country or worldwide 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Due to this,
he has to empower managers and salespeople and make them responsible for their
own and their customer’s security as well as for the company’s property. This
empowerment and security management must be written out clearly in the
personnel’s work contract.
Since directors, managers and staff must be made accountable for their actions
they are in fact the acting security managers in place. This does not mean that the
security manager transfers all his responsibilities to them. It simply means that,
once the rules and procedures are agreed, taught, understood and put in place they
have to be implemented by all personnel. They then, however, need to be regularly
controlled especially when there is turnover or when sales personnel are tired due
to high activity periods e.g. Christmas, St Valentine’s Day, etc. or during the
holiday season when part- time replacements or personnel are taken on.
Procedures are paramount in controlling security and they cost very little to write
down. When information is passed on orally words lose their importance and with
time become idle talk. The important information is even deleted because they
become annoying and cumbersome. As a general rule of thumb, always stick to the
proverb “verba voland, scripta manent”, which translates as "Spoken words fly
away, written words remain."
The author regularly heard when putting in place procedures that these were not
done in the past and that the system was built on trust. It certainly is not because
one puts in place procedures that one does not trust people. They are simply there
to protect them. Traditions and customs are sometimes difficult to change but the
world is changing at such a pace that personnel must adapt. Jewellery Houses can
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find themselves overnight, through mergers and acquisitions, part of large groups
and thus the workload and values may substantially increase and therefore
procedures are changed.
Procedures are essential for having good security. They are cheap to draft but are
time-consuming to write and difficult to get right. Good procedures must also be
improved regularly because of changes in local laws, rules and technology
upgrades and new criminal modes of operation. In the author’s first guard
procedures, for example, it was written that it was forbidden to use phones whilst
on duty except for emergencies. What had not been foreseen was the sending of
text messages from a cell phone until a guard was seen writing one. This was
corrected immediately and it just shows that one must keep up with the times.
Procedures have to be perfectly understood but also scrupulously executed if they
are to be effective. Crisis management is not the time to look into folders to know
what to do but for executing orders so as to deal with dangerous or stressful events
whilst continuing to protect people and goods. In the case of an attack, the guard at
the door will follow procedures by not trying to stop the criminals that have
entered and pulled out weapons so that clients and personnel do not get injured or
killed. Under no circumstances are they to counter them in any way even with a
threatening stare. Guards and store personnel have to be submissive, their lives
and those of their clients can depend on this. The criminals also know this and this
is the reason why the security manager must focus upstream to avoid them
entering altogether. The guard and personnel will however try to see if the
criminals have any distinctive signs such as tattoos, if they have an accent (even if
this can be false), if they leave any fingerprints or DNA, etc. Robbers know that
there are cameras but will ignore them or will wear suitable disguises if they are
determined to enter. Procedures are a never-ending story.
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Training personnel
Since store personnel and managers are empowered with a serious part of security,
that they are generally trustworthy and that clear procedures are put in place,
they must then be regularly reminded of the risks and how to avoid them but also
controlled to check that they are implemented. This is also part of anticipating and
preventing attacks.
Security officers and salespeople all know that there are chances of being attacked
but sometimes prefer to avoid thinking about it as if it would never happen and
could be swept away. They cannot be completely surprised when they take place
since like all retail businesses there will always be this risk and this will always be
part of the equation. This is the reason why regular training is essential to make
them think of all the dangers and know what to do if they take place. Managers,
sales personnel and guards should also be trained with real case studies by
explaining the different phases of how a store was hit and how it can be avoided.
Salespeople and guards need to be trained regularly concerning robberies and
sleight of hand and to respect procedures. Salespeople often only think of sleight of
hand, believing that this is the highest and most immediate risk. The security
manager, during his training, must clearly separate both topics (sleight of hand
and armed robberies) otherwise they will not understand that these are two
completely different events involving different people. Offenders committing
sleight of hand are not violent, are often very well educated, can be international
and are excellent at distracting people. Robbers on the other hand would not
hesitate to use violence if necessary and are in and out in minutes.
Guards are also a serious deterrence against attacks but they are also a major
weak point. To be efficient they have to be trained by the security manager before
they even start working in a store. Their security company, when these guards are
outsourced, must give them their basic training concerning the host country’s rules
and regulations but it is up to the security manager to take full operational control
when they work for him. Over the years, the author has often noticed that there
are rarely good or bad guards but often competent or incompetent security
managers. Guards need to be trained regularly, audited and shown to their
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advantage or they will not be operational. The security manager and store
managers must talk with them when they go into a store to see if procedures are
understood and listen to information they may have.
Security is audits
Training guards and personnel takes time since they are not like computers that
can be upgraded in a few minutes. They need time to understand what to do and
why they have to do it. Changing people’s habits is often time-consuming simply
because people need time to understand the changes and to adapt to new
environments. They need to be audited regularly by the security manager or with
independent auditors who will put them in real-life conditions. Since attacks do not
take place every day, regular reminders and practices are crucial so that personnel
have the right reflexes and react correctly. There is no room for improvising and
one does not get a second chance concerning a robbery. Without any regular
training, the procedures finish up on the top of a shelf in a dusty folder or
personnel simply do not remember what to do. Practice makes perfect as the
saying goes since robberies are rare and these exercises can often help to develop
better procedures but also to protect personnel.
When carrying out audits one must take time to talk with people by filling out an
audit form. The in-house and outsourced auditors have to ask personnel the right
questions in order to find all the weaknesses. This may take a little more time but
at the end of the day one will very often discover the weak links in the system or
with personnel. When carrying out audits, the security manager will often find
some of the weaknesses but personnel can also inform him of flaws in the security
system. Drive-by audits simply do not exist in security. The security manager must,
for example, be regularly present before opening and at closing time to observe at
distance how these are done and by whom. This is also where the robbers will be
observing.
A lack of incidents is seldom an indication that the procedures and training are
correct. Security audits are a humbling experience simply because they allow
oneself to know where one’s weaknesses are and that is only how they must be
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seen. They are a management tool, a thermometer to place in a company to see
whether they are above or below standards. The results found by in-house or
external auditors can be quickly integrated into the company’s procedures which
will in turn beef up security. “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (Flavius Vegetius) -If you
want peace, prepare for war.
Management may fear bad audits and may even be tempted to use the information
to send out sanctions to personnel. It is important that the security manager
explains to the hierarchy that they are only an exercise and that it is a learning
process for all concerned and that they cannot be used to sanction personnel
otherwise this would cause unnecessary concern and fear. The author often
explains to guards and personnel that these audits must be seen as a game and they
must do their best to win.
To make sure that procedures are correctly implemented, that there are no other
weaknesses in the system, the security manager must control what is really going
on. This is mandatory and this also is independent from trust. Audits can either be
carried out in-house or be outsourced to private companies. This all depends on
what information one wants to obtain.
In-house audits
Internal security audits are to a certain level independent and impartial since they
are carried out by professionals who usually know what they are doing but they
can also have their limits. They unfortunately tend to focus on existing procedures
rather than taking a step back to get a better and broader picture. The danger and this is often the case with in-house audits - is that the security manager may
want to give a watered down version of what is really going on, so as not to show
his weaknesses. The security manager may simply want to tell his head of
department what he wants him to hear and not what he should hear because of
operational or budgetary reasons. This can be part of a purely human reasoning
since giving one’s manager negative information is not as pleasant as giving
positive or slightly favourable feedback. To avoid this, the security managers
should also be audited each year by top management and between security
managers from the other Houses. This would no doubt create a form of
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competition but would allow them to find the weaknesses and also learn from each
other. Confidentiality forms would need to be signed beforehand.
Out-of-house audits
Outsourced audits are beneficial to the whole company and will actively
participate in the bottom line results. They are a win-win even though the results
may seem a little harsh for management and especially for the security manager.
Auditors see things with a clear and independent perspective and will also see
things that have been overlooked with the passing of time. The books, accounts and
invoices are checked yearly in accounts payable by independent auditors and so
should the security department’s procedures and equipment.
A professional security manager must at one moment or the other write down
objectively or explain orally all the weaknesses in the system. Management may
not accept or may postpone in-house recommendations but may better accept them
when they are carried out by independent experts. These experts need to be hired
by top management so that personnel know that they are important for the
company but also will limit any form of complacency between the security
manager and the audit company. Outsourced auditors must be completely free to
detect any security problem in the system by going as far as possible in their
search.
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Hardware and Electronic security
Hardware and electronic technology is of limited use if the correct diagnostic is not
carried out, if personnel are not taught to use it and if the correct procedures are
not put in place. Electronic security is mainly designed to secure sites/premises
rather than to protect staff. They detect intruders, protect safes and control access.
Alarm systems seldom fail by themselves and neither do cameras. When they do,
countermeasures must take over until they are replaced or repaired.
The spectrum of electronic security and hardware is enormous. The choice of these
systems is governed by cost-effectiveness but often by the security sub-contractor.
If the security manager does not know perfectly well all the material that is needed
to be put in place, he will inevitably be sold the wrong product and will even invest
in expensive but unnecessary James Bondesque equipment. Salespeople from
security technology and hardware companies have sales objectives and will always
try to talk clients into buying what they want to sell them and not what they really
need. Sub-contractors often, unfortunately, do not listen to what the customers
wants or needs are and sometimes talk to the customers as if they were ignorant
and worst of all frightening them into buying the wrong equipment. High-end
jewellery Houses have different needs from luxury stores which sell clothes, shoes
and handbags. Jewellery Houses sell and handle precious stones, watches and
jewellery which are rather small and would not be picked up by the ordinary wideangled cameras that the retail stores would need. Many sub-contractors are not
aware of this and will install inappropriate equipment.
Security managers do not need to know how to install the equipment but they
certainly do need to know what technology exists, how it works, how much it costs
and the different countermeasures available. Since technology evolves rapidly,
constant re-evaluation is necessary to defeat crime. The security manager must
keep abreast of these changes by attending security fairs and by reading. He must
avoid security companies that sell equipment that cannot be serviced or upgraded
by other companies otherwise he will have very little room left to manoeuvre.
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Electronic technology and hardware advance at such a pace that people do not
understand them anymore but will blindly rely on them, thinking that they are
protected. Since equipment evolves rapidly, constant re-evaluation is necessary to
defeat crime. This power advantage can swing from one side to another; if it is left
unchanged this will even in certain circumstances give the advantage to the
attacker. If swipe cards, for example, can be used to control people entering, they
can also be used by an attacker who can steal one from someone’s handbag or
pocket. Where are the checks and balances here? People have to be trained to
inform security immediately in order to block these cards and to report incidents
when something goes wrong or may seem unusual. It is not difficult for robbers to
understand the weaknesses in a system since all is a question of time and
determination. The installing of security measures might deter amateur
opportunist robbers but not necessarily the professional ones. Roger Matthews
also justly believes that this will “…result in the escalation towards more serious
violence”14 if robberies are made more difficult. If robbers are trapped in a store
they are more likely to use violence against personnel. This has to be seriously
taken into consideration when putting in certain security equipment. The author
believes that there must always be a means of letting criminals go but that
foreseeing these attacks well in advance is more effective. One must never forget
that the primary role of security managers in retail businesses is to protect
personnel and clients.
Hardware
Hardware will also rapidly evolve over the coming years and it is wise to buy good
quality hardware (safes, locks, glass, etc.) simply because the equipment that will
open or break into them will also evolve at the same pace. All vaults and safes can
be broken into by skilled robbers, an employee under threat or recently turned
criminal. What can be seen as a good protection safe or window today will most
certainly be easier and easier to break into or cut through in the future with handheld battery or fuel-powered equipment. Spending the extra cost will in fact save
money in the medium run.
When talking with installers or manufacturers of hardware, the author sees that
they always focus on their product but not on the global security picture.
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Installers, for example, of cabinets and counters focus on how difficult it is for
robbers to get hold of the products. Alarms, toughened glass, security locks and
access controls are installed and even armour plated sheets that pop-up in case of
an incident. They focus so much on the product itself but little on the personnel
who open them or on the global security picture. A cabinet is only one part of the
defensive system. The author spoke with an installer who argued that the robbers
would ask for the keys or swipe card to open the showcases themselves (which they
will not) or that personnel would instinctively set off alarms (which they do not).
When people have a weapon aimed at their heads they naturally comply with
robbers and so they should. Setting off an audible alarm would create panic; a
silent alarm would not stop the robbers since they know they would have sufficient
time to take off.
Security technology and hardware is only there to assist people by securing
premises or detecting events after they have taken place. All equipment must be
checked monthly with the monitoring centre by setting off all the alarms and
controlling the DVR and CCTV footage. A report has to be written in a log book so
that information concerning defective equipment can be passed on and repaired. If
these controls are not carried out regularly, the chances are, when needed, they
will often be unserviceable. Technology is at the service of man and not vice-versa
but the main problem concerning security lays ahead – “People”.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
Although cameras improve slowly but regularly, the author believes that CCTV is
of limited importance if a criminal is decided to attack but it can have a certain
deterrent effect on some of them and especially prevents would-be thieves or
robbers from going into action. Those who are afraid of being detected and caught
on CCTV will probably move on to a softer target although it is not yet proven
that, in the mind of the criminal, being caught on camera means being prosecuted.
Four hundred security cameras in Monte Carlo, which is probably the world’s
safest and richest square kilometre, did not deter the Pink Panthers from attacking
the Ciribelli jewellery store in June 2007 and taking off with one million dollars’
worth of watches16 nor did the police substation thirty meters away deter them.
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This once un-attackable fortress revealed its cracks. The same robberies also took
place in all the major capitals in the world - London, Paris, Basel, Geneva, New
York, Tokyo and Dubai. All were caught on tape but few finished behind bars!
Having cameras and alarms may not stop determined robbers but will contribute
to keeping honest people honest by reducing temptation. By reducing the
opportunity one can logically reduce crime.
It is however difficult to document events that have not taken place thanks to
CCTV. Since one cannot measure events that have not taken place one can then
only focus on the footage seen after an event has occurred. One has probably never
read or will ever read a report sent in by a professional robber stating that a
security system and the procedures were just too efficient and thus made him go
down the road.
Cameras have never been seen arresting criminals or sending out an audible
warning and neither do they detect attacks in progress. The only way of stopping
crime while it is occurring is to have the live pictures monitored by competent
people but this in the jewellery trade would be too costly except during opening or
closing of stores and high-jewellery cabinets. Security managers must control all
footage and pictures that go out-of-house including when using IP addresses.
Hackers can easily enter, view and remotely control pictures especially of access
control and safe areas. One could even find one’s pictures on You Tube!
Video footage is however valuable for the police to identify criminals who have
robbed a jewellery store or have stolen goods by sleight of hand and can be used as
evidence to prosecute them or to link different incidents. Video data is especially
useful if store personnel or security officers have spotted people who exhibit odd
behaviour. Pictures can be sent to other stores or Houses, to the police, the
underwriters and to the security consultants. This is very important since it can be
used for early detection to outstrip the robbers during the planning phase of their
attack. Cameras - like cars - are not long-term investments whereas good safes and
sound procedures are.
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II.
DEFENDERS VERSUS PREDATORS
The defenders:
Managing the Security department
The Security Department in most major jewellery companies is placed under the
control of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or the Human Resources (HR)
manager because nobody wants it, knows what to do with it and rarely knows what
it actually does. This is no doubt one of the main problems covering security and
the outcome of so many problems including armed robberies. Security
management is primarily people management. Accounts payable, financial
controlling, Management Information Services (Systems) MIS, etc., all work
mainly with computers. Their world is often limited to a screen in an office and
sending out figures or information via the internet to an opposite number around
the world who does the same job. Although a part of security can be done through
the web the security manager’s main role is to analyse the risks and from his
findings, write out procedures, train, control and physically audit the different
sites and personnel. Human Resources (HR) focus on work conditions and
contracts; labour laws and regulations but not security issues. They would gladly
lower security levels to please personnel and avoid labour court disputes. Security
managers must always focus on their mission which is protecting people and goods
from inside and outside attacks which means that the social and labour contexts
have to remain secondary to them. People in security sometimes have to make
decisions that are good for the company but are not necessarily good for the
security people themselves, as this can sometimes make them unpopular. The
author believes that a security manager has to be placed above the board level in a
company otherwise there are chances that he will follow what people tell him to do
and not what he should do. Ideally he should be operationally under the direct
control of the CEO or President otherwise he will constantly be under pressure or
emotional pressure to do the wrong thing and can even be made to water down and
filter bad news. Furthermore, he should also have a proxy that allows him to put in
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place immediate security and safety protections regardless of cost considerations, if
the situation calls for it.
All departments must understand the importance of the Security Department and
realise that it is there to help them to carry out their business rather than stopping
them from doing it. Salespeople, marketing, press and commercial staff need to
carry out their sales and presentations and the security managers must help them
find solutions to make it all happen. Jewellery and watches tucked away in safes
are not the objectives of a jewellery House. They have to be out and about and sold
to keep shareholders, owners and sales people content. Every employee in these
departments has his own agenda. The CEO has his and the employees theirs shareholders want more profits, employees want more money. This is the basis of a
possible clash. The same conflict of interest happens at the security manager’s
level. Sales people would like to run out of the stores with their pockets full of
goods; the press give as many products as possible to would-be influential people;
the security manager however would like to limit outdoor presentations and
consignments. There have to be trade-offs so that all parties are content and it is
up to the security managers to negotiate with all concerned especially with the nonsecurity experts so that they understand the global problem and adhere.
Bruce Schneier writes that there are “trade-offs” concerning security, meaning
there are “…costs in terms of money, convenience, comfort, freedom and so on
that inevitably attach themselves to security systems”.1 He simply means that it all
depends on “what we are getting and what we are prepared to give up in order to
get it”. Since high-end jewellery stores represent a high risk, the security measures
must be proportionally adapted to protect people and goods.
If the security manager does not find an acceptable solution for both sides with a
trade-off, the risk is that he will, little by little, lose control of the situation and the
worst can then be expected since people will do their business behind his back.
Salespeople have sales objectives, commissions and egos and will take unnecessary
risks if they believe a sale can be made. It is important to talk with them and
explain that security is common sense and that crime is often easy to avoid. They
need to understand the risks involved so that they always include the security
factor when they do their business. From time to time, the security manager even
during a trade-off and after clear explanations of security issues will inevitably
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have to say “NO” if personnel, the company, or goods are at risk and this is also
what he is paid for.
Money is the root of all evil for security managers because certain people would
too gladly take it away from him. Do cutting back budgets in an uninformed,
arbitrary fashion inevitably lead to problems? If this is the case, what then can the
security managers do to reduce budget shrinkage?
It is no secret that security expenditure may be under pressure by management
and especially CFOs who would gladly take any opportunity to downsize budgets,
especially when recession can make profits dwindle. One of the first areas for cost
cutting is quite naturally for many decision makers - security. Budgets will often
be reduced to a minimum until better days and thus audits and training will be
limited; hardware and electronic security will not be replaced or upgraded.
Cutting back the cost of guards to the bone is often done by management to reduce
spending since they do not always see the proper use of them but only the
immediate savings. The paradox is that when no attacks or thefts take place, senior
and middle management and even security personnel begin to wonder whether
security expenditure is wasteful or if their job is warranted.
Although financial considerations should always be at the top of the list when
deciding where expenditure is necessary and what is cost effective, the CFO’s
decisions can be purely based on cost considerations. The security manager must
respond to this by showing that in the medium term there can be a return on
investment with lower insurance premiums “...if the business outperforms its
peers”.2 Gary Tredgett also highlighted that “this can also work the other way,
where the level of security is such that a penalty premium is given”.3 By better
managing the security budget one can often save valuable resources that can be reinvested in equipment, training and audits. This, the author believes, is sound
planning and good management.
Robert Polet, the CEO of Gucci Group, gave an interesting and valid argument
saying that “the scarceness the budget the more creative the people are”.4 The
author believes he is right and that in a very competitive world economies of scale
have also to be made in order to stay competitive and in business. Bids have to be
sent out to keep costs under control. Companies must re-organise to adapt to an
evolving market and at the end of the day so must the subcontractors. Economies
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can be made without reducing the quality of security by simply getting more for
less financial resources. When interviewing Mr. Polet it became quite clear to the
author that he has never taken the time to ask for his security strategy although his
priorities are “people, brand image and goods”.5 The problem here, excluding
security of personnel and goods, is that he is probably losing valuable financial
resources that could be re-invested elsewhere.
Security managers must also, in a similar way that CFOs manage finance, analyse
past performance and figures concerning losses and thefts. Putting in an extra
guard in certain shops-within-shops or counters in department stores seven days a
week will increase costs but not necessarily reduce attacks or thefts. If these events
can take place from time to time, is the estimated cost value of these losses
seriously lower than the cost of a guard? If this is the case, training personnel to
prevent thefts and having clear procedures to prevent attacks can often be more
cost effective and efficient than having a guard. Security must be adapted to the
site that needs to be to protected by spending no more or no less than is necessary.
Security managers must learn how to transform this cost centre into a cost saving
centre whilst maintaining high quality security. Once the security manager
receives the confirmation of what has been agreed in his security budget he must
be completely independent concerning the purchasing of equipment and his travel
expenses.
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Security Personnel
People in security must be free from any suspicion since they have been trained to
detect future problems and to make the right decisions when they occur. The
paradox is that the more we trust people, the more the system is vulnerable and
the more they become a risk since they know how the system works and how it can
fail. Security managers can hence clean out their own stores since they are the ones
who give access to all the personnel. For the company’s security and their own
security due to bribes, threats and of weaknesses in human nature they quite
obviously have to refuse themselves full control of security systems, for example
any access to safe openings. “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies” ("Who will watch the
watchmen themselves?)" once wrote the satiric Latin poet Juvenal. Checks and
balances have to be put in place to prevent the security personnel and guards (e.g.
Toni Musulin a CIT van driver who stole 11.6M€ 15.7M$ in 2009) from stealing
but also to protect themselves from tiger attacks or other forms of pressure. This is
a major weakness because one can never know what personnel and guards do after
work; who they see or the situation in which people will find themselves tomorrow.
What happens when families are taken hostage or when fundamentalists put
pressure on families that have stayed in their countries of origin? Guards are also
a danger because one does not know what they do, who they see after work and
who their acquaintances are. Since nowadays, according to statistics, seventy per
cent of people take or have tried some form of drugs even occasionally, who do
they buy these from? Criminals. Criminals will quickly find out where they work
and will exploit the information to create trust and meetings will then be set up to
gather more information. This is what happened in Paris in 2009 to Harry
Winston where all the security information concerning the store that was passed
on to the robbers, which came from the local guard who met the offenders during
soccer training in a local club. Redoine told the author that “… guards must never
be told of all the security measures”6 and must not have access to alarms, CCTV or
access control. This has to be made perfectly clear to all the managers and store
personnel and that they cannot outsource this responsibility.
The author’s general rule of thumb is not to trust people blindly even though
security needs trustworthy people to function. This has to be clearly explained to
security and sales personnel and that limited access and procedures are there for
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their own safety and not because of lack of trust. The security manager, however,
has to establish a trust environment with all the personnel. People have to know
that they can talk with him without being reprimanded or scolded. This takes time
but in the medium-long term it pays more than immediate sanctioning. Without
this trust relationship, information will not work its way up to him and people will
end up ignoring him. Furthermore, he must also protect his sources from their
managers or directors otherwise trust and information will disappear and his
sources will run dry. It is only by working closely all together in a company that
there is any chance of success to fight crime.
The security trade is seldom status-enhancing and often associated with the
positioning of a guard at the entrance of a store. Some store managers believe that
guards can even deter the entering of clients because they do not look attractive!
Who has ever looked at a guard when entering a store except a robber or a thief?
Security is not exciting and nor does it have to be. Security people must always
stay out of the limelight otherwise they will not see what is going on around them.
The guard’s role does not stop at the door but goes beyond the outside perimeter.
They are not doormen who simply bow and scrape the customers in. Guards must
control what is going on outside the store to see if anything is suspicious, if people
are taking photos, are loitering, noting car number plates, etc. Access control is
taking the extra seconds before opening the door and looking for accomplices who
may be waiting on the sides. These people can often be spotted through the
reflexion in the side mirrors or showcases located at the entrance or using the
windows on the opposite side of the road. Guards must also look if one or several
accomplices are in the location. They must be told to press the silent panic button
when they have a doubt and not keep them in their pockets or behind counters
otherwise they will not be able to use them or even worse they will always be afraid
of using them. They must then fix the customers in the eye before opening the door
to see if they look at him or if they have an evasive look or wearing wigs, false
moustaches and other props. Hats, crash helmets and sun glasses must be removed
before entering a store. Customers wearing hats and gloves are a good indication
of somebody trying to conceal their identities. It could simply be a film star or a
head of state trying not to attract attention but it can also be a robber trying to
enter to attack or carrying out a reconnaissance. Security measures must take over
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immediately at the slightest doubt and personnel must be trained to develop their
intuition. Once customers have entered the store, they have to be invited to leave
their bags, umbrellas, crash helmets, etc. at the entrance. A real client will only
think that the service is premium and not notice anything odd or feel aggressed.
Clients worldwide know that there is security and accept it for their own safety. A
criminal however, would react adversely and this would score badly on his audit
form. All these precursory signs have to be picked up by the guard and the
personnel before opening the door and whilst they enter but are these sufficient to
stop robberies? Very often, security professionals only train personnel of what to
do if an armed robbery takes place instead of anticipating an attack by looking for
signs during the reconnaissance phase.
Profiling can also be subjective since it is also based on general appearance and
behaviour. It does, however, allow in a few seconds and through attitude and
speech to have an intuition, whether confirmed or not, that something is unusual.
A normal customer will not notice or take this badly but robbers and thieves on
the other hand and especially during the reconnaissance phase will not take this
too well and will understand that their chances of success are low. Criminals have
to understand that the security measures and procedures will make an attack
difficult. This is where foreseeing attacks and countering them start and this is well
before they actually take place.
Guards and personnel have to be trained to become predators and always on the
look out to anticipate future events. The author often sends his guards out of the
stores to see what is going on in the neighbouring stores and close vicinity. This
allows them to see what the other establishments are doing e.g., guards reading
newspapers, guard and salesperson smoking together outside after the goods are in
the windows; a cleaning lady mopping up the doorstep (with the door open and
goods in the cabinets!) or throwing out the trash at the same time every day whilst
goods are being put in place, etc.
Trustworthy people in security with low salaries are difficult to come across and
seldom stay for long periods. Turnover is a major problem especially in the
security world. When this happens, not only do people walk away with valuable
information, new guards have to be re-trained and this takes time and costs
valuable resources. To avoid this, officers have to be correctly greeted onto a site;
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they have to feel part of the team and especially useful otherwise they will walk
away for a 30€ ($50) a month wage increase. The author has unfortunately seen on
many occasions a security manager putting all the blame on the guard or on the
guard company when it is often his fault. Some managers even go as far as
changing
security
companies
instead
of
questioning
themselves
and
communicating with the President or the supervisors of these companies. By
changing security companies the security problem is seldom solved but is often
worsened due to management change and personnel turnover. There has to be a
win-win situation between both sides and not pointing fingers in one direction or
another. Guards must always be under the operational control of the security
manager when working for him; they become his responsibility.
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THE PREDATORS
Setting the scenes
The author believes it is necessary to succinctly set the scenes of the high-end
criminals so that the reader gets a feeling of who they are and how they operate.
Not understanding where they come from and how they think would make it
difficult to understand and to foresee their moves.
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the opening of new markets and the creation
of new states have no doubt brought with it its share of wealth but also of poverty
and crime. From 50 states at the beginning of the 20 century to over 200 today,
many of these micro-states are weak and have shadowy political policies. This has
no doubt led to the arrival of new organized criminals on the scene from former
Yugoslavia, Estonia, Romania, Nigeria, China, etc., as well as an increase in
terrorism. Security managers therefore must now have a broader picture of the
criminal world - mafias, cartels, drugs, prostitution, counterfeiting, etc., because
crime and criminals are often connected especially when laundering money.
With the demise of communism and the opening of these borders, gangs from the
Balkans (e.g. the Pink Panthers) entered the scene in the mid-nineties. This group
of 150 to 200 international criminals carried-out 110 armed robberies in 26
countries and robbed 350 million dollars’ worth of goods. They quickly understood
the weakness of co-operation between European and international police and were
thus able to move freely around the world using dual or false IDs rendering them
practically invisible. It took roughly ten years for international police forces to
work together and arrest some of them. Police forces were then probably mainly
focussing on drug trafficking, terrorism and the traffic of human beings. “With the
borders coming down, organized crime groups that before operated only on a
national level, were able to operate much more internationally”.7 In the last few
years, however, police co-operation between European and international states has
started to improve.
Different penal laws between European countries have also encouraged armed
robbers to attack countries with lower prison sentences. “You take, for example,
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Sweden and Norway. If you commit the same cash armed robbery in Sweden and
you’ll get two to three years. If you commit the same robbery in Norway you get
ten or fifteen. Therefore, if it’s a simple boat crossing which is going to last an hour
and a half, I know what I would do. It thus becomes very challenging if you have
an open gateway into Europe”.8
New national criminals have also moved into the scene due to post war
immigration and housing estates to reap the benefits of extremely lucrative
markets. The traditional criminals are now being replaced by these newcomers
who are now operating on global markets by opening new routes and markets.
Redoine explained that the North Africans who have “grown up in the shadow of
the traditional criminal fraternity, have become real professionals and have
reached the highest level of organised crime”9. The young North African and
African criminals in France nowadays “are very violent - much more than
traditional criminals. They are heavily armed in case anybody wants to interfere in
their activities”.10 These criminals who have not gone through military service do
not hesitate to use their weapons even if this means wounding innocent bystanders.
He went on explaining that “even if the code of ‘honour amongst thieves is just
folklore, there existed a number of people who knew how to behave”.11 When he
operated, Redoine preferred to remain low key and worked with only four to five
‘trusted’ associates and did not use any weapons against his victims. Robbers
nowadays put together task forces to carry out one attack and then separate. One
or two robbers will meet up with two other robbers and join forces “to hit the
jewellery store, share the loot and Ciao”.12 They do not spend their whole careers
together as the traditional criminals used to.
Redoine also made an interesting point by saying that the French police had “left
aside and ignored” the “suburb and housing estate”13 North Africans for years in
pursuit of more traditional criminals. Since these North Africans had no criminal
records they could “carry on their business in peace”.14 He told the author that
these robbers sell the goods from jewellery robberies to the drug dealers in the
housing estates who then send them to North Africa and especially to Algeria.
These goods are placed in the jewellery stores without being altered or taken
apart. This information will need to be verified but it would allow certain drug
dealers to launder part of their cash. The author also believes that a certain part of
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these goods made of platinum, good and silver are melted down locally and then
sold off as a raw product since the price has more than doubled in the last four
years.
Up to now it was thought that the stolen goods were sent to Antwerp, Tel Aviv,
New York, Hong Kong and Mumbai to be re-cut and re-mounted. Police for
example are still investigating allegations of a $1.094 Billion diamond fraud that
took place in the Antwerp diamond square mile when they raided dozens of
diamond dealers and a transporter in 2005 and 2007.
Redoine also explained that when certain wealthy clients from the Middle-East
come to Europe on drinking and sex sprees, their drivers are often from the North
African community. They are capable of finding any goods and services for these
customers. Drugs and women will be found and stolen jewellery and watches will
be offered at very competitive prices. This information will also need to be checked
but would also allow them to unload the goods.
Until the mid-1990s, banks, post offices and cash-in-transit vans and jewellery
stores were the main targets because of the cash and goods which the robbers
could steal and the relative ease to carry it out. When the banks, for example,
improved their security measures by installing double doors and limiting cash in
the branches, the criminals focused on cash-in transit vans and jewellery houses.
They are now also attacking cash dispensers with explosives but it is more likely
that they will move on to easier and more profitable sources of income such as
drug trafficking, smuggling people, counterfeiting (incl. selling counterfeit
medicine), importing protected animal species and tobacco as well as high-jacking
lorries with valuable goods and robbing chemical laboratories, technological sites
and museums. Robbing gemmologists, auction houses, sub-contractor workshops
and casinos for example would probably be far easier and more profitable than
attacking a high-end jewellery store.
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Who are these criminals?
Robbers are not part of a homogeneous group but will roughly all adhere to the
same rules when attacking a site. Roger Matthews writes that there are in fact
three categories of robbers - “the amateurs, the intermediates and then the
professional and persistent ones.”15 What we can suppose then is that “the main
difference between persistent robbers and the other groups is in the level of
planning, selection of targets, the use of firearms and the deployment of
violence”.16
The security manager will often only take into account or analyse the offenders
who carefully plan their attacks, whom Roger Matthews names the “professional
and persistent criminals”17. Here again, criminals are illogical and by focussing
only on this ‘professional and persistent’ category one may ignore the other
offenders who are equally as dangerous. What about the one-off robbers, the
desperate ones who have recently been released from prison or who are on the
run? The more ‘amateur and intermediate’ category will also want to have a go at
these new targets one day or another so as to move into the first division criminal
league like their elders. When a robber has successfully attacked ten to fifteen
small jewellery stores and banks he will no doubt, due to lessons learned and
experience, try a high-end one.
The author believes that some of these ‘professional and persistent robbers’
sometimes prefer to stay in this segment of criminality (banks, cash-in-transit vans,
jewellery stores, etc.,) rather than the other fields of drugs and arms trafficking,
prostitution and so on in order to remain more discreet and low key. The author
calls this the “specialist” category where their experience in only one or two
segments make them experts in these fields and that their success rate is very high.
Furthermore, professional criminals selling illicit substances have to deal with
several intermediaries all the way down the supply chain from the producers, the
traffickers, the go-fasters, the wholesalers, the retailers and to the corner street
dealers. This puts them in the limelight with police forces as well as with rival
gangs or traffickers. Redoine explained that “the trafficking of narcotics is a
‘twisted’ market full of scams, deceitful actions and full of informers” and where
disputes between “members of this criminal fraternity settle their matters with
guns”18. This, however, does not mean that certain robbers will not attack
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jewellery stores in order to start up their own businesses to buy their first
shipment of drugs. Many robbers, however, do not want to attract media coverage
because this would channel police enquiries towards them and that others could
emulate them. A professional robber wants to stay underground and wants to
remain anonymous.
For many professional and experienced robbers “robbery is more of a job and a
way of life” and “…involves contempt for conventional lifestyles” but is “also
because of necessity and laziness.”19 Carrying out a robbery is quite
straightforward and “simply involves selecting an appropriate target, walking into
the premises, threatening the personnel with a weapon, taking the goods and
walking out”.20 This may seem quite simple but attacking a high-end jewellery
store is far more complex and needs a great deal of planning and expertise.
When robbers wave their weapons at people this is certainly the worst moment to
irritate them in any way since adrenaline is pumping at high speed through their
veins and their testosterone levels are overflowing. “They’re doing as they are told,
you’re in full control. It’s just brilliant. You’re just there. You’re a man. You’re
like God”.21
Many robbers do not necessarily want to use their weapons against their victims
but use them as a deterrent or as a means to escape. This would not be the same if
they were up against the police since both parties would not hesitate if their lives
were at stake or if they would be caught. Admittedly, “the advantage of carrying a
real firearm, it was felt, was that victim resistance would be minimal and no one
would get hurt”.22According to Roger Matthews around half the robbers thought
it was “stupid or irrational” for personnel “to have a go at them”23 since it was not
their money or goods.
Quite understandably robbers carry firearms to instil immediate fear if they want
the sales personnel, guards and clients to co-operate. “When you carry out an
armed robbery, even if you don’t harm anyone or even if you don’t kill anyone,
you spread fear”.24 They want people to know straightaway that they mean
business since time is their greatest enemy. One way the robbers achieve this is by
“engaging in apparently gratuitous or irrational violence on the onset of the
robbery”.25 Redoine went on by saying that “you have to condition them into
thinking your way. You have to use really violent language to make them
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understand that you are not there for a laugh”.26 They can, to a certain extent, be
compared to actors who go on stage every night and must convince the public in
the first few seconds that they are another person.
What the author has also noticed during his interviews with the different former
criminals and through research is that they were all, at different levels, affected by
adrenaline because “it’s just like when you do coke, you get a rush out of it”.27 At
one moment Redoine wanted to stop since he had put enough money aside but was
then “caught up in an infernal spiral”28, getting adrenaline rushes from his
robberies. For him adrenaline had thus become a form of addiction and was
needed again and again since he “had become dependent”.
Not only does adrenaline give them a rush but many robbers also take drugs
and/or consume alcohol to help them do their job because of the high stress level
they experience and the fear of being killed or caught. Those who snort cocaine or
take other substances for attacks are generally daily consumers and become a
danger to their own system and also to their victims. With experience and lessons
learned, those who do not take drugs become stronger in their minds and in their
bodies. Redoine told the author that he vomited the day before entering a site or
attacking a cash-in-transit van but took no drugs or alcohol because it stopped him
from concentrating. Since a large percentage are however under the influence of
drugs or alcohol immediately prior to the robbery or during it, it would thus be
completely irrational to hope that expensive security equipment would deter these
criminals. Worst of all they can become extremely violent if personnel do not cooperate immediately or if they feel they are cornered.
Fear is rarely explained by criminals because it is often taboo. Redoine told the
author that before and during an attack he and his team always experienced fear.
With experience and minute preparation the level of fear did lower a little over
time but he said that during the attack “you are winded; your heart beat is at 200.
Nobody talks, time has literally stopped. Your face is rigid and white. Your blood
has stopped flowing. Your teeth are clenched. You do not think of anything except
your mission. You’re a robot. … Anyhow, you do not hear anything. It’s as if there
was no more sound on earth. Only silence. Your silence; you’re on another
planet”.29 Adrenaline, drugs, fear and weapons are a lethal cocktail and this is
certainly not the time to mess around with the robbers but to avoid robberies
altogether by declaring war to them.
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The reconnaissance and planning phase. Collecting information.
According to Roger Matthews “the selection of suitable targets was in many cases
based upon a kind of criminal folklore that was dependent, in turn, on a
hotchpotch of common-sense notions mixed with popular anecdotes”.30 A
considerable degree of fatalism was also expressed, with targets being selected and
deselected on the basis of “…hunches, intuitions or omens of good and bad luck”.
However, the first thing robbers will do before selecting a target is to check what
kind of goods are in the outside window displays and then inside to see what is in
the display cabinets. They will also read in the media if the store has already been
robbed and how much was stolen. It is absolutely necessary for them to go into the
store at least once to see what it looks like unless they have an inside informer.
Personnel and guards must be very vigilant during this phase to either detect them
or make them go elsewhere. These criminals have to perform a reconnaissance
inside the store to identify the positioning of the cameras, the alarms, type of
security door and type of cabinet glass; who has the keys and badges, how to go to
the back-office, the rear door, names of personnel, etc. Sometimes they will even
buy goods (with cash!) so that sales personnel and guards do not become
suspicious. All this information will be carefully noted and processed.
The more the attack is prepared with accuracy, the more they have a chance of
avoiding unforeseen events and the less they will be nervous before and during the
attack. They will try to find the flaw (weakness) in the system irrelevant of the time
it takes. Who has the code to the door, to the alarm system; who has the keys; what
are the opening or closing procedures; who is in charge and so on.
For the attack they will disguise themselves with wigs, kippas (Jewish skullcaps),
glasses, moustaches, change their accents, dye their hair, wear gloves, use
wheelchairs, dress up as delivery men, policemen, sheiks, anything that will help
them get in through the front door without giving the alert. Escape routes and
secondary itineraries will be reconnoitred and timed with the precision of a Swiss
watch maker. These are done at different times of the day and on different days
including Sundays where few people are around, including the police. After the
heist, escape vehicles will be burnt and clothes will be changed very quickly. Teams
will split up and meet again at a later date.
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Photos, films and audio recordings will be done so that they can work at distance
in a safe environment to put their operation plan together. They will use scrambled
means of communications and earphones on wires so that no one can listen in and
thus remain discreet. Postmen’s, firemen’s, electrician’s emergency or skeleton
keys will be obtained to allow them to escape through neighbouring houses and
roofs.
Robberies are carried out through the front doors but also through the rear doors,
the roofs, the basements, party walls and the sewers as well as with the help from
people inside. If no direct access is found they will go for tiger attacks or seducing
personnel. Families and friends, personnel and guards will be followed home and
observed with several cars and with different people without the victims ever
realizing. Car number plates will be noted and checked by a friend working at the
vehicle registration office as well as the registry office of the town hall to find the
owner’s home address. Information concerning Limited Companies will be
obtained to again find the owner’s home address. The Who’s Who will be read and
so will websites such as LinkedIn and Facebook to find information concerning
families and friends.
The security manager must limit visits to the workshop as well as pictures that can
give valuable information concerning access control, safes, CCTV and alarm
systems. The author regularly sees documentaries concerning sensitive sites on
television where the owners or the press walk camera crews around sensitive areas
without informing them of what is forbidden to film. These inside shots are perfect
for criminals who only need to download the footage and work on them. By not
controlling these pictures these companies will inevitably be attacked and put
personnel at great risk.
Google Earth or pictures in the press or on television will also be downloaded to
analyse the roofs, escape routes and the insides. Redoine told the author, for
example, that he had seriously considered robbing the jeweller Fred on Place
Vendôme since it was the only building with a flat roof and that he had seen this in
a Paris Match magazine. (See appendices) Since there are no ‘how to rob highjewellery store’ manuals available in bookshops everything has to be self-taught
through lessons learnt or with other armed robbers or during their stays in the
‘criminal academies’- the prisons.
They will watch police series and armed
robbery films over and over again- Heist, The Score, Goodfellas, Heat, The Town,
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Point Break, Reservoir Dogs, The Thief, Mesrine, etc., to get ideas and learn the
tricks of the trade. Redoine told the author that fifty per cent of what he had learnt
was done watching these films.
Robbers will need to find patterns because “routine and complacency is a killer
within the industry”31. Schedules of arrivals and departures will be recorded;
nicknames will be given to personnel- the fat guard, the blonde lady, the old man,
etc. Every detail will be soaked in. Untreated, crude information will be collected,
analysed, processed and put together into confirmed intelligence. Little by little,
piece by piece, they will put together their robbery puzzle because on D-Day their
heist has to be over in minutes and that they must succeed. Anticipating these
attacks and avoiding them is constantly to break these patterns during the
reconnaissance phase whilst they detect the weaknesses - changing itineraries;
having different or several people opening the store; regular police patrols
especially during opening and closing times. A person observing at a distance the
perimeter but not going into the store; different times for taking lunch and coffee
breaks, etc., “impromptu and random and unexpected behaviour”.32 This is what
robbers detest the most since they “cannot operate”.
The main role of the security manager, guards and sales personnel is to avoid these
attacks by making the robbers and thieves go elsewhere down the street or do
other criminal activities. If criminals, during this reconnaissance phase understand
that security procedures are tight, that there are no important weaknesses and that
the risk of failure is high they will certainly think twice before hitting a store.
Personnel in stores have to make offenders understand that there is a symbiosis
between the guards and the salespeople. A glance between both parties and a
simple code is enough to show that there is a problem and the criminals will pick
this up. People in stores must look out for each other and this is why team work is
essential. Salespeople and guards must be told about the reconnaissance phase and
how to report suspicious attitudes - clients giving odd answers to questions;
requesting to see lots of high value pieces, etc. They have to understand that tight
security measures and procedures are essential in making would-be attackers go
elsewhere. “If you look the part and are professional, then the assailants may look
elsewhere”.33 Criminals will also choose more vulnerable and compliant victims to
increase their chances of success and these will also be identified during the
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reconnaissance phase. Salespeople and guards not showing vigilance and who do
not show that they are following procedures are what criminals are looking for.
This will be noticed immediately by robbers and no doubt this will be ticked off on
their ‘criminal’ audit sheet.
To reduce attacks against jewellery Houses, the security manager must constantly
explain to all concerned how the criminals operate and what to do to counter them.
This takes time but in the medium run will probably payoff.
The following case studies are good examples of how probable attacks were
avoided. The author has had other examples of reconnaissance but is sure that
there were many others that took place.
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III. CASE STUDIES MONACO AND PARIS
The author had two examples of reconnaissance in 2009 in Paris and Monaco by
criminals. Both were detected and foiled.
Paris
A car pulled up outside one of the stores in Paris in August in which there were
four passengers. Two North-African-looking men were seated in the front and two
African-looking men at the rear. The front passenger got out and seemed to be
phoning. The guard inside saw that this was suspicious since he had the impression
the boutique was being filmed with his phone. The guard immediately pulled out
his cell phone and took pictures of the entire scene. On seeing this, the driver of the
car lowered his head to conceal his ID and they quickly drove off to avoid being
photographed. The guard noted the car number plate as well as other relevant
information. He then had the pictures and information sent up to the security
manager who passed it on to the criminal police squad. All this was done in less
than one hour. The following day the author received a call from the crime squad
informing him that these people were in fact known criminals from the suburbs
and were in fact reconnoitring.
The lesson learned here was the criminals had seen that they had been detected
and moved on. The guard was congratulated, received a thank-you letter and cited
to his colleagues and company CEO.
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Photo taken by the guard of a team of armed robbers performing a reconnaissance
outside a jewellery store
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Monaco
Two Pink Panthers were on the prowl in Monte Carlo in June 2009. The Monaco
police sent a mug shot of these people to all the boutiques. The salesperson called
me in panic telling me he had recognized one of the persons on the photo and that
he was outside the boutique. The Police chief was informed straight away and all
the Monaco police went on red alert and followed these people around for a couple
of days before arresting them.
Lesson learned: Information is vital in deterring an attack and so is the feedback.
Information must go up and down very quickly. The author’s jewellery store and
the other jewellery Houses received a thank you letter from the Monaco Head of
Police for the excellent co-operation between the retailers and the police. (See
appendices)
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CONCLUSION
A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF
THE DISSERTATION, INCLUDING POINTERS TO THE FUTURE
Protecting against crime as was explained in this paper is not a passive concept but
a proactive and preventive one aimed at reducing loss by reducing temptation.
Finished are the days when a guard and a few cameras are sufficient to deter
robbers. The security manager nowadays must foresee and counter tomorrow’s
attacks by considering the problem from every possible angle and also globally.
This is done by analysing the criminals by thinking like them and by reading about
their modes of operation. The security manager must constantly analyse these
trends by asking himself if his stores can resist to such an attack.
Robbers will, on their side, try to exploit all the vulnerabilities they can detect
and/or create them if necessary. If they do not find a flaw or think that the risk is
too high they will simply adapt to new situations, sectors and opportunities.
To reduce these attacks, the security manager must detect these vulnerabilities by
performing a risk assessment of all the sites by taking each segment apart and by
setting priorities. Only then can he put together his security strategy and budget
for which he will need full commitment and direction from top management. This
risk assessment will allow him to correct these weaknesses by putting-in
countermeasures as well as drafting procedures, training personnel and
controlling that all is understood. If decision makers and security managers,
however, do not anticipate these attacks, the chances are they will be robbed since
criminals are very imaginative and know how to bypass difficulties.
This security assessment and security management must be left to professionals
but day-to-day security is everyone’s concern. People have to report to the security
manager and inform him of what is going on. Due to this, he has to empower
directors, managers, sales personnel, back-office staff and guards and make them
responsible for their actions and security.
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Sending the robbers and thieves to the store down the road is a short sighted
approach. It is together with all the protectors that one can, through a better
understanding of each other and by exchanging information fight crime in the
jewellery trade. This information has to travel very fast in all directions, especially
between the in-house stores, the other jewellery Houses, the police, the loss
adjusters, the consultants and the underwriters to merge and form a close-knit
community.
The opening of Europe to new member states e.g., Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria
will most certainly bring with it a steady increase in crime. Police co-operation will
have to work upstream to counter these criminals. Increased co-operation between
the police and the security managers in Europe and worldwide is thus essential if
one is to anticipate robberies. Security managers must be warned about robbers
and thieves on the prowl who in return must also inform the police of suspicious
events.
Many Presidents (CEOs) outsource their security to HRs, CFOs or COOs who
outsource to the security managers who in turn outsource to consultants and
security companies who have rarely worked or understand the jewellery trade.
Outsourcing security training to consultants and sub-contractors and to the police
must be done sparingly. Security managers must hence take full operational
control of personnel and guards if they are to be effective to reduce crime.
Furthermore, CEOs must take an interest in security by regularly inviting their
security managers to review the situation. Without their full backing this will very
often lead to problems.
Presidents, CEOs and CFOs must understand the impact poor security can have
on their results. Underwriters and brokers should explain to senior management
the financial risks they may have and the advantages of re-engineering their
security departments can have on their insurance premiums. Insurance bonus
incentives (profit commissions) could be given to jewellery Houses who outperform
their peers and who re-invest the premium return in security and personnel. Loss
adjusters would give ratings based on independent yearly (every two years)
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surveys. This would be a win-win since it would increase security and thus reduce
crime.
Security, like intelligence, is a never-ending cycle in which three components are
important – human resources, procedures, hardware and electronic technology.
All three are necessary to avoid an attack but people are the weakest link and need
to be constantly trained to follow procedures, remain discreet and be controlled
regularly with in- and out-of-house audits to stay alert. Should one of these pillars
subside it must be fixed immediately otherwise this will seriously increase the risks
of an attack since robbers will pick this up and exploit it.
Criminality in jewellery stores goes down when it becomes more difficult and less
attractive for robbers. Should the jewellery industry as a whole seriously increase
their procedures and their training and upgrade certain security features,
criminals will simply move on to easier and more profitable targets such as
diamond/gold traders and shops, gemmologists, couriers, jewellery subcontractors, museums, auction houses, casinos, cash machines (ATMs) as well as
hostage taking or other highly profitable goods and services.
Soaring gold prices due to weak Western financial markets as well as an increase
in the cost of polished diamonds and manufacturing jewellery will no doubt
encourage robberies and thefts in the whole trade from the producer to the
consumer. Gold, silver and diamonds may become a refuge until better days. These
prices will probably continue to increase in the short-medium term and so will
crime. Stealing these goods are a consequence and not the cause. Soft targets due
to poor security management are the reason.
Criminals from the housing estates in the United Kingdom and in France are also
on the move as is seen concerning the increase of attacks against jewellery stores.
They are currently attacking the small jewellery stores but with lessons learned
and experience they will no doubt move on to high-end ones especially since the
prison sentences are the same. These in-country criminals have taken over the
traditional criminals.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Guards who are on low salaries should be given bonuses or pay incentives when
they report events. This will no doubt help to motivate them to hunt down
suspicious persons and incidents.
Guards must have no access to sensitive areas, hardware and electronic security
since this is a major weakness in the system. There must also be limited access for
all in-house personnel.
The police must assist in background checks for personnel working in sensitive
areas.
Even though the security measures in the jewellery trade may seem different from
those in an embassy or a nuclear plant, the thought process and security analysis
for avoiding them are very similar. The author believes that there is little
difference between protecting high-end jewellery stores in prime locations, a bank,
a casino or a cash-in-transit van even though some people may believe the
contrary. All is based on anticipating events rather than being subject to them.
To improve security in high-end jewellery environments further research would
need to be carried out in several areas:
- Transportation procedures to events, photo shoots and couriers would need to be
analysed as well as consignments to sub-contractors and franchises. These are also
the weak points in the system where armed robberies can easily be carried out.
- Find out if an increase in security measures will make the robbers use more
violence or take hostages or if this will lead to the robbers being displaced to softer
targets.
- Create a pre-formatted chart concerning the modes of operation (Who, what,
when, how). This should be put together, treated and up-dated by the police who
would send the information to all the jewellery trade.
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Xavier Mac Donald
- Send surveyors or in-country professionals (Brinks, G4S, loss adjusters, private
security auditors, etc.) to see if stolen goods are sold in the jewellery stores in
certain countries e.g. Algeria and find out how and by whom they are taken there.
- Analyse the trends and modes of operation concerning thefts and armed
robberies in other European countries and how the local legislation, the police and
the security managers, etc, deal with them. From these findings and lessons
learned it should be possible to think globally, act differently in order to improve
security.
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Xavier Mac Donald
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bauer, A. & Raufer, X (2009). La Face Noire de la Mondialisation: CNRS Editions
Bauer, A. & Raufer, X (2002). La guerre ne fait que Commencer : Folio
Bellaïche, A. (2007). Ma vie sans postiche: First Editions
Champeyrade, C. (2007). Sociétés du Crime. Un tour du monde des mafias et
cartels: CNRS Editions
Faïd, R. & Pierrat, J (2010) Braqueur. Des cités au grand banditisme: La
Manufacture de Livres
Gayraud, J.F. (2008). Le monde des mafias. Géopolitique du crime organise: Odile
Jacobs
Glenny, M. (2009). McMafia. Seriously organised crime: Vintage
Kennet, B & Suc, M (2008) Antonio Ferrara: Le Cherche Midi
Levy, D. (2010). Braquages. Actualité, evolution, ripostes: CNRS Editions
Mason, B. (2004). Nine lives. Confessions of a master jewel thief. Bantan Press
Matthews, R. (2002). Armed robber: Willan Publishing
Picca, G. (2009) La criminologie: Que sais-je. 8ème édition.
Pierrat, J. (2008) Mafias, gangs et cartels. La criminalité internationale en France :
Denoël Impacts
Ploquin, F. (2005) Parrains et caïds : Fayard
Raufer, X. (2009) Les nouveaux dangers planétaires. Chaos mondial, décèlement
précoce : CNRS Editions.
Schneier, B. (2003) Beyond Fear: Copercicus Books
Tsouras, P.G. (1992) Warrior’s words. Dictionary of military quotations: Cassell
Extra References:
The official definition of robbery in England and Wales is “A person is guilty of
robbery if he or she steals and immediately before or at any time so doing and in
order to do so, uses force or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being then
and there subjected to force. In summary, robbery is stealing aggravated by
violence”. (Home Office 1991:1).
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Xavier Mac Donald
The term ‘armed robbery’ needs to be explained since it implies the use by
criminals of a lethal weapon but also a concealed or fake one, knives, clubs, etc.
According to Roger Matthews p17 “Robbery is stealing aggravated by violence”.
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Xavier Mac Donald
NOTES
Methodology, Interviews, data
1- “L’actuel est toujours, d’emblée, périmé”. P272 Alain Bauer & Xavier
Raufer. ‘La guerre ne fait que commencer’.
2- « Armed Robbery ». P 7 Roger Matthews
Chapter1
1- Interview Gary Tredgett. p135
2- Interview Gary Tredgett. p135
3- « Armed Robbery ». p 30 Roger Matthews
7- Interview Christophe Haget p 147
9- Interview Redoine Faïd. p 83
10- Interview Christophe Haget p 148
11- Interview Gary Tredgett. P 132
12- Alain Bauer, Xavier Raufer p254. ‘La guerre ne fait que
commencer’.
13- Interview Gary Tredgett p 132
14- Interview Redoine Faïd p 90
15- « Armed Robbery » p 57 Roger Matthews
16- Msnbc.com June 2007 Ciribelli store
Chapter2
1- « Beyond Fear » p 17 Bruce Schneier
4- Interview CEO Gucci Group p143
5- Interview CEO Gucci Group p 142
7- Le Monde des Mafias. Jean-François Gayraud
12- Interview Redoine Faïd
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Xavier Mac Donald
Additional reading:
-
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/lifestyle/esmagazine/article-23955932-smash-ncarry-the-gangs-terrorising-londons-luxury-labels.do
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Xavier Mac Donald
-
Ce gang Serbe qui écume les joailleries. Le Figaro Tuesday 2 December p2
-
The Pink Panthers A tale of diamonds, thieves and the Balkans By David
Samuels. “The New Yorker” April 2010
-
www.dailymotion.com/.../xg7uy7_qui-sont-les-nouveaux-braqueurs_ne...26
mn - 21 déc. 2010
APPENDICES
Redoine Faïd, former armed robber
XMD: “Would you please introduce yourself?
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Xavier Mac Donald
Redoine Faïd: “My name is Redoine. I am 37 years old.
I am not here to apologise for having committed armed robbery. I do not regret
what I have done but if I had to live my life anew, I would not do the same again.
I have been convicted three times for robbing an armoured car, a jewellery shop
and a bank and an escape from Switzerland.
I was aged 27 when I first went to prison. I was given 15 years by the Bobigny
Court in 2002, for holding up an armoured car. Nobody else was identified and I
was confounded by my DNA as I had received a bullet wound.
I got 15 years for the attack on the armoured car.
I got 12 years for an attack on a jewellery shop.
I got 4 years for an escape from Switzerland and 6 years for criminal conspiracy.
Altogether this means that I received an overall total of 40 years of prison
sentences.
I did not succeed escaping from prison.
I was a model prisoner, so that I could get a remission of part of my sentence.
I studied journalism. I passed the baccalaureate (the high school diploma) in
Economic and Social Sciences at the level of Second Grade, whilst I was in solitary
confinement in the Santé Prison.
I also took courses in English, Spanish and History.
Things worked out well. Instead of 40 years, they reduced it to 19 years. Then,
because of my good behaviour, I was given a conditional discharge after 10 years
and 3 months.”
XMD: “How did you start in this career of delinquency?”
Redoine Faïd: “I started to be a delinquent when I was 6. I started by necessity and also
by weakness. I saw my father go to the factory and that frightened me. I didn’t
want to go to work. I started by stealing bottles on which there was a monetary
deposit. Then, bars of chocolate and packets of cakes, which I sold. The misfortune
was that I was never caught.
So it was easy for me to enter into delinquency. I didn’t see myself selling drugs
and I didn’t smoke or drink but I was attracted towards stealing things. I liked the
idea of being a “Gentleman thief”. If you steal money or jewellery, nobody is hurt
and you just leave the scene.
A likely happening, though, is that, when you are 17 or 18 years old, you break
into the apartment of a collector of guns. However, you don’t sell them on to
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Xavier Mac Donald
someone else but instead you keep them for yourself because you do not yet belong
to the world of organized crime.
So, one day I decided to move upwards to hold-ups. I was too good at burglary so
the next logical move upwards was to armed robbery.
One day, you are carrying out a reconnaissance on a bank. You see the employees
arriving in the morning and opening the door of the bank. You notice that in the
morning it is always the same lady employee who has the entry code and who goes
into the bank. You wonder whether it is possible to follow in immediately behind
her and hold up the bank. However, you want to know what happens once the
employee is in the bank. She goes to a little cupboard but what is she doing? Is she
switching off the alarm?
The employee takes a video cassette and puts it in a videotape recorder and
switches it on.
So, you go into the bank and you ask how you can open an account.
You carry on finding out information about how to succeed in your bank robbery.
You now know how the bank operates. You know that there is a camera just in
front of you. You know that there are only two employees. You know that there is
an alarm somewhere. You leave. You talk to your friend. You check all the details.
You come back a week later and you see that everything is the same. They have the
same habits – the same patterns of behaviour.
Then one fine day you say to yourself: “I shall do the hold-up but above all I
mustn’t wound anyone”. You learn by heart what you are going to say, taking
inspiration from the great robbers of the cinema – how they speak.
You say to yourself: “The employee always arrives at 8.55 in the morning. I shall
go there. I shall wear a cap which helps to conceal my face” (You don’t have a
balaclava to cover up your face.) You borrow a pair of tights from your sister.
You follow the employee whilst your associate looks at the things which are
happening outside the bank – the neighbours, the vehicles. You arrive at the bank
just behind the employee, you push her inside and you shut the door behind you.
However, things don’t happen as you were expecting. She cries out. You calm her
by saying that you will not harm her. All you want is to get to the safe and you will
be gone in five minutes.
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Xavier Mac Donald
She types in the security code. She makes a mistake as she is frightened. She does it
again and it works. You tell her not to insert the video cassette but just to open the
safe. She says “Yes, Sir.”
She wants everything to go well. She tells you that she has to switch off the bank
alarm but that there is also an alarm on the safe. You didn’t know that but you
remember it for a future occasion.
The safe is open. Your colleague arrives with a bag. Whilst he is taking the money,
you tie up the employee. Everything has happened in two and a half minutes. You
go back home.
It is 1991. You are 18 years old. You have 200,000 francs (30,000€)! That is 100,000
francs (15.000€) each!
I accompany my associate back to where he lives. Then I go back home. I take off
the track suit which I have been wearing for the robbery. I put on my trousers, my
polo shirt, my jacket and my shoes and I ask my sister to come with me to the
Lycée (college). The afternoon before, I had told the class monitor that I shall be
late. The teacher has not noticed that I was absent from 8 to 9 in the morning. I
have an alibi!
I go home at 5pm and we divide up the pile of money. We tell each other that this
is the end of house-breaking. From now on, it is banks! Banks! Only banks!
We now have to do the same thing again, so we go out early in the morning to
another bank and it is the same scenario. I always say that if you have carried out
one – or two – or three – or four bank robberies and you have not been killed, you
are a professional!
XMD: To quote André Bellaïche (a major bank robber in the 80s), “After the first bank
you have already learned something, after the second bank - if you are not dead you are beginning to become a master of the subject and after the third bank, you
are now a professional”.
Redoine Faïd: Yes! It is exactly that! I always say that after four or five robberies you are
learning very quickly. Nobody has ever told me how to carry out a bank robbery. I
am completely self-taught.
In the first bank which I held up, I watched what the procedures were for three
weeks or a month. As you get accustomed to doing this, you tell yourself that time
doesn’t matter. You can spend as much preparatory time as you wish.
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Xavier Mac Donald
The only thing which works against your bank robberies is when the security
system does not have a regular pattern – which never stops changing. In this case,
you cannot operate.
Nowadays, if you have the resources, if you are strong and strong-willed and if you
have a good team, you can wait until the situation is just right and then everything
will work out OK for the robbery.
I will tell you a story about a potential robbery which I will always remember. I
was watching when the woman employee arriving to open the bank and – I don’t
know why – I didn’t move! I stayed there! Then I went to a baker’s shop and
bought myself a bread roll. Then, what did I see arrive? It was a Brinks’ armoured
van. I said to my friend who was next to me “Why should we rob this bank which
has only one sack of money, when we could rob the 30 sacks in the Brinks’ van?”
It was the Holy Grail of robbery! Five years afterwards, I robbed an armoured
van and I took all the sacks of money in it. How did this come about? It was
because I had never been caught!
Unfortunately, I have had a talent for robbery. If I had been caught when I was
young and received three months in prison, then that would have been that! There
would have been no more robbery!
When you rob a bank when you are eighteen or nineteen and you have made
100,000 francs in three minutes – which is worth 15.000 Euros nowadays but was
equivalent to 30,000 to 40,000 Euros at the time – try telling a young man that he
has to work for a month to earn 1200€ or 1300 Euros. It is not possible!
When someone steals at the age of ten, it is for food. When he is thirteen or
fourteen or fifteen, he steals to buy clothes or to take out his girlfriend. However,
at twenty it is not the same at all. His needs are very much greater. He wants an
apartment, a car, smart clothes and an expensive watch. It is a totally different
way of life.
You go upwards and further upwards in the levels of delinquency. There are no
limits! I concur with André Bellaïche here, when he said “If you are not dead”, in
his days, the police had no hesitation of using their guns. They shot at everything.
There were 140 deaths a year. If you messed things up, you were dead!
In my day, if you messed things up you went to prison – especially for banks and
jewellery shops – as the police are more on the lookout, more professional and
more capable of taking in for questioning.
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Xavier Mac Donald
XMD: What is the difference between you and A. Bellaïche?
Redoine Faïd: A. Bellaïche was very clever. I think that he was one of the greatest robbers
in the history of French banditry but that was thirty years ago. These were the 80s.
This was a man; the best years of his whole career were from 1975 to 1990. He
especially robbed banks at the beginning of the 1980s. He started by robbing the
counters in banks and then, with his band of associates, he moved onwards to
attacking safes.
A team of robbers divided into two distinct groups. There were those who dealt
with the hostages and the customers who came into the bank, whilst the others
went down to the room with the safes, carrying hammers and chisels. You have to
know that the security in those days was not at a very high level. There were no
seismic sensors. Today, if you are downstairs in the room with the safes and you
begin to make hammering noises, the alarm goes off. There are also hidden
microphones which react to the slightest noise.
The robbers were not only after currency. They were also looking for gold bars,
precious stones, watches and necklaces and they needed a receiver of stolen goods.
This was in the 1980s.
XMD: So now we arrive at high-end jewellery. Which stores have you robbed?
Redoine Faïd: I shall speak about the jewellery store for which I was sentenced. The
Platroz jewellery store in the northern suburbs of Paris, in Chantilly.
Why didn’t I rob jewellery stores more early in my career? There is one reason. It
is because jewellery is merchandise and not currency. It is necessary to find a
“fence” – a receiver of stolen goods. Unless we could find one it would not have
been worthwhile.
When I was 22 or 23 years old, I was a battle-hardened professional in carrying
out armed robberies. I had taken hostages with organised groups of criminals and
I had already robbed at least ten banks.
We were a hard core of three or four people who knew each other well and had
worked together for 15 years. We revolved around the Jewish community where
we met receivers of stolen goods and their acquaintances. We were successful in
establishing contact with an up-market receiver who would buy our jewellery.
Therefore, after thus making sure that we had a reliable contact, we decided to
embark upon the robbery of jewellery stores.
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Xavier Mac Donald
We acted the grand and said we would take 10% of the value of the jewellery, in
cash. If we gave him jewellery to a value of 3 million Euros – which is what we
would expect to get from the jewellery store – he would give us 300,000 Euros in
cash. If we should ever get more than 50 or 60 million francs (7.6-9.1M€), they
would take the jewellery, give us a good advance and distribute the lots over a
period of time.
We knew straightaway that we could have confidence in this person. We felt that
we could give him a large amount of merchandise and that he would handle it. We
asked him, though, what he would do with the jewellery since the anti-crime
squad police which deals with this type of robbery and has built up a network of
information on robbers of jewellery stores and on receivers. It is a very dangerous
time to rob jewellery stores or to deal in stolen jewellery
The receiver is someone who must be very discreet, someone who doesn’t speak to
anyone and who sends the jewellery abroad. There is always the possibility that the
media will take an interest in the stolen goods and publish the details. When that
happens it is very, very difficult to sell-on the jewellery.
The best receiver is someone who is capable of waiting for a year or two until the
heat is off and everything has calmed down. It is like this that the stolen goods are
never found.
XMD: How do you get your information for robberies?
Redoine Faïd: Intelligence comes from various sources. Someone could infiltrate a
company. It could be from a source within the company. It could be from someone
who works in security. It could be a girl who is flirting with someone who finds out
that he works in a jewellery shop…
You first start with an empty data base and a receiver who buys the goods. So
what do you do?
You target the jewellery shop but how do you know if there is a lot of jewellery in
one and not in the other?
Firstly, there are the windows which show what is happening inside. There is
always a reconnaissance inside of the store. You know that you are being observed
and filmed and that the photos could well be sent to the security service or to the
police, to see whether you are already on file. Thus, you don’t want to attract any
attention.
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Xavier Mac Donald
How do you do it? Well, it is best if a couple enter the store. Otherwise, send in
woman or if you do go in always be very well dressed and have your nails
manicured and have a chauffeur.
There is always a setting which you should seek to create and, especially, you
should buy something.
Never leave without buying something or you are dead!
It is a fact that if you buy something, the staff of the jewellery store will be less
vigilant.
They look upon you as someone who is “clean” and they lower their guard because
you have bought something.
Someone who doesn’t buy anything – even though of good appearance and well
presented – is taking a risk which is not worth taking.
The best thing to do is to choose a jewellery store which has already been hit.
Why? Because you can go to the archives and read the newspapers, to find out
what losses the store had and whether the store is still doing well.
This is what we did in the case of the Platroz jewellery store. We knew that it had
already been robbed during the daytime and that the thieves had taken the
equivalent of 15-20 million francs (2.2M-3M€) just from the display in the
windows. We knew that the owner of the store has two jewellery stores and so we
said “we shall rob both stores, take all that there is in the windows and empty the
safes. That should give us 40 -50 million francs (6M-7.6M€)!”
I talked to my receiver and it was decided to carry out the robberies.
We took our time, between carrying out our normal robberies of banks and of
ATMs (money-distributing machines in the walls outside banks) but on two days a
week we occupied ourselves with observing the jewellery stores.
XMD: How long did this surveillance take?
Redoine Faïd: That lasted for two months and all this time we were monitoring all the
events at the jewellery store.
The jewellery store is located in the centre Chantilly, a small town North of Paris
on a very busy main road so we had to be very careful in our surveillance of the
store and the surroundings. We did not want to be seen or to attract attention. So,
the strict minimum of observation!
Once everything had been completed and the receiver was ready and the money
was available, we said “We shall do the robbery in February or March.” You don’t
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Xavier Mac Donald
rob in December because, in the month of December there is Christmas and it is
very risky. Some people have carried out robberies at Christmas because they
assume that the stores will not be expecting robberies at that time of year. The
general rule, though, is never to do robberies at the time of public holidays.
It is simpler. It is better to carry out robberies in February or March – or perhaps
October or November. These are times when there are no great public events.
XMD: The statistics of robberies of jewellery stores show an increase at times of public
holidays.
Redoine Faïd: Some robbers are audacious as they know that there are lots of goods.
In the month of December the police are expecting problems. Security is reinforced
and the police know that at this period the louts have a need of money and that
they will commit robberies. We preferred not to operate during this period.
For example, concerning the Harry Winston case, the jewellery store was robbed
in December but in that case it was an inside job and that changes everything, as
you are sure that you will get away with it. If you look several months before,
Harry Winston was robbed during a period in which there was not much activity.
They came at 3 or 4 in the morning – this was also an inside job – and the robbers
did very well.
XMD: Could you come back to the robbery in Chantilly?
Redoine Faïd: To come back to our surveillance of the store. It is necessary to carry out
the observation without being noticed – without attracting attention. (Be welldressed, with manicured hands and an immaculate hair style …)
The surveillance of the store should be a strict minimum. Do not spend much time
looking into the windows. You know that there is a security guard in front with a
dog and another person (owner) with a Magnum .357 pistol inside.
You watch and you see that the guard is always there. Then you see a person who
is young and blonde and who works in the store. Who is this? And from time to
time there is a young woman who works with him.
You come home. You exchange information. You pick up a Dictaphone and make
a note of everything.
The next day, at the same time, you go there again. At 4 in the afternoon things are
quieter. The mothers are picking up their children from school. There are less
people in the jewellery store.
The following week you decide to go into the store to buy something.
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Xavier Mac Donald
I went at 6.30pm in the evening because the person in the store had worked since
first thing in the morning, she was tired, wanted to shut the store and was less
vigilant.
Using the excuse that I wanted to buy a present for my girlfriend, I asked to see a
watch which I had seen in the window. I then asked to see a second watch and
asked the salesperson’s colleague to put the watches on to show me how they
looked. I hesitated. I talked about the watches. I made it clear that I was going to
buy something. That is very important. Eventually I chose one of the watches and
asked for it to be gift-wrapped.
During the time that I was in the store I was able to see the closed-circuit security
system, whether there was a bullet-proof door which separated the sales area from
the safes, the location of the safes, the cameras and the activities of the other
employee. Everybody had confidence in me because I was buying.
I paid in cash, of course, as I did not want to leave any traces. The sales staff was
happy. I left the store.
They would never see me again in their store. I had got all of the important
information that I needed. Originally, I wondered about going into the store with a
camera but the store was small and I needed to know the employees’
responsibilities.
Then my friends and I decided to come back early one morning to see what the
opening procedures were for the store.
We established ourselves in a café next door to the jewellery store and watched.
A male employee arrived every morning at 8.45am or 8.50am. He opened the
security curtain made of iron, then he opened the door and then he shut the door
behind himself.
He looked in every direction and appeared to be tense and stressed. He made signs
of recognition to other shopkeepers.
At 9.30am the security guard arrived and stationed himself outside the shop. He
tapped on the window and made a sign to the person inside.
At 9.45am the female employee arrived. Her colleague opened the door for her;
therefore she had no key of her own.
We continued the surveillance discreetly on board an unmarked van, with the
exception of Wednesday which was market day and where there were too many
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Xavier Mac Donald
people around. We were equipped with a Dictaphone and a walkie-talkie, operated
with an earphone.
There was the same scenario on the following days.
We saw that the male employee always arrived on foot and that he parked his car
in a garage behind the jewellery store. We noted the make and model of his car,
the colour and the registration number.
We had monitored the opening procedures and now we moved to what happened
when the store was shut in the evening.
We decided to follow the employee in his car. We obtained three basic cars which
would not be noticed – a Renault Clio, a Peugeot 306 and a Peugeot 405, each with
one person in the car, so as not to attract attention.
The employee then drove away in the direction of Paris.
I followed him for 100 metres and then I turned right and let the second car follow
him for another 100 metres. Then the third followed the employee for 300 meters
and then broke off!
The employee was suspicious, so we had to stay carefully with this system, when
one of us follows him, then a second person, then a third so that he did not become
suspicious.
We came back the next day to the place where the following of the car had stopped
the previous evening, to watch him and then we came back the following day and
also the days which followed. We had to be very patient.
We saw that the employee always arrived home at the same time– 7.15p.m –
7.20p.m. He parked in an underground car park. It is there that we have to attack
him, when he goes home, because it is a cul-de-sac. We have to enter behind him as
he has a bleeper. He is obliged to come out and it is there that we shall attack him.
Now, we have to go and see the second jewellery store. It is 5 kilometres away. The
same employee is there from 11am to 3pm. His wife looks after the store and
sometimes his father!
We form ourselves into two teams to check on all the details and to be sure that
everything will take place as we wish.
There must be no improvisation!
So we have to go to his home in the evening. We have decided that it must not be a
frontal attack as we don’t want any shooting – there are people around – and we
have 4 or 5 minutes to carry out the attack.
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Xavier Mac Donald
We go there calmly, as gentlemen and take hostages. He must have children and
we shall take the whole family in a van to a place 50 kilometres away. We shall
take the keys and tell him that unless he obeys, his whole family will be in danger.
We shall put pressure on him.
We carried out a reconnaissance where we left the stolen cars and enter the store.
We must wear wigs, spectacles, moustaches and gloves, so as not to be recognised.
We must take a briefcase with us.
So this is the scenario. We continue to follow him, even on Sunday when he is
completely relaxed, to find out all his habits. Thanks to the registration number of
his car, we find out his name and that he is the son of the owner of the two
jewellery stores!
It is very important, psychologically, to let him know that we know everything
about him – his father, his mother, his wife, his children’s school, his tennis playing
– to put him in a position of weakness.
We decide to carry out the attack on a Tuesday, at the end of the day. Then we go
to the jewellery store on Wednesday morning, which is market day. There will be a
lot of people around, so we are less likely to be noticed.
We waited for him near his home; in an ordinary car which would not be noticed
and we followed him into the garage. We parked the unmarked van in a peaceful
place, 5 km away and four of us decided to hold up the owner.
He arrives, drives down to the garage and parks his car. We are wearing
balaclavas, boiler suits and bullet-proof vests and are carrying automatic pistols.
We catch him and put handcuffs on him. He is frightened. We get in the car and
put him in the back. We take his bleeper and his keys and he sees that we are not
going upstairs to his home. He knows why we are there and he is calm.
No speaking to him. No useless gestures. He knows that he is dealing with
professionals. We drive off to another unmarked van, tie him up and put him
inside. We ask him the purpose of the various keys. We tell him that no harm will
come to his wife; that everything will be OK if he follows instructions and that
everything will be over by the following morning.
XMD: Why did you rob jewellery stores?
Redoine Faïd: Jewellery! That is something which makes people dream. Jewels are items
which attract. It is not like a bank robbery – it is a beautiful robbery.
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Unfortunately, you can fall in love with the jewellery when you have it in your
hands – but you must not keep it!
One day I met someone who had raided the Alexandre Reza workshop in 1995-96.
I knew the brains behind the raid – “Mimi”, who also calls himself Benaïssa; I
asked him how he had carried out the job. He told me that he already had good
information and he had taken hostages but that, especially, they had found a
weakness in the system. They had gone up to the 4th floor and found a storage
room where they could hide themselves and observe everything that was
happening. That was the reason that they could attack and take everything.
Unfortunately – or fortunately – they were caught, which was due to the act of
handling stolen goods. However, they belonged to the milieu of great robbers, they
snorted a lot of cocaine and they went to the discotheque bars…
The anti-crime Squad was able to arrest him because they found stolen goods at
his home but this did not worry the other members of the gang.
I know also Djamel Boukchiche who was caught in 1996. He wanted to capture
members of the Boucheron family in the 16th District of Paris in order to break
into the Boucheron jewellery shop. He found the address of the family in “Who’s
Who” but the anti-crime Crime Squad caught him before the robbery could take
place.
You will notice that the people who attacked those large jewellery shops in Place
Vendôme in the 1990s came from the Maghreb (i.e. North African) environment.
Also, the very large holdups of armoured vehicles transporting cash in the ‘90s
were carried out by people of North African origin who lived in the Paris area.
At one moment, I was very interested in the jewellery shop “FRED”; primarily
because the entrance is not situated in the front of the shop but at the side, where
you can see everything which is happening inside. Also, there was a big error. They
appeared in an article in Paris Match, which included an aerial view of the Place
Vendôme. We could see all the different shops and companies, with their addresses
and we could see the roof of every building.
If you look at the roof of Boucheron you will see that it is tiled. This does not
interest us because tiles are dangerous and you can slip and fall.
One of the few roofs which are flat is “FRED’s and which have doors to enter into
the building and you can also access the other side of the street. What is worth
doing was to go to the corner where the jeweller ‘Fred’ is located, to go up the
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staircases – we have firemen’s keys and police passes – thus we have everything
needed to open the doors. We cannot access the jewellery workshops but we can
get into a service entrance. It is quite possible, even though there are cameras and
alarms but we didn’t carry out this raid. Why not? The answer is that an
armoured van (CIT) is far more interesting to us.
XMD: Could you please talk to me about the robbery at the jewellery shop?
Redoine Faïd: The robbery of the jewellery shop started very well. Everything was based
on the taking of hostages. Certainly, it involved obtaining certain supplies (boiler
suits, hoods, gloves, walkie-talkies, wigs, costumes, guns, etc.) cars, a backup plan
with a hideout, a “scenario” (or rather a ‘cinema’ but the most important thing of
all is that nobody should pay any attention to you in the time whilst you take the
family hostage. Why? Because it is essential that nobody sees you, that nobody
hears anything at all – that there is nothing abnormal. Once you have got hold of
the family, you have succeeded in 99% of the operation.
The person you are targeting will not play the hero and will do everything you ask.
Already, he will give you information during the ‘long night’ of being taken
hostage that he will tell you all the details that you could not possibly know.
Because you know that it is he who holds the codes or the keys, you can go into the
shop and wait for the rest of the staff. However, what you don’t know is that his
personal telephone will ring three times at 7am and that he has to reply from his
home with the same three rings to the person who called him and again when he
gets to the jewellery shop. There are lots of signals, not least in how to open the
shop, or how to park the car, or other things.
However, the “target” will tell you everything because the lives of his family are
much more important than anything else. But if there has been a problem in
getting into the family home, you’ve completely screwed up the operation. This will
have happened because the person yelled out to attract the attention of a passer-by
or in order to activate an alarm.
For the son of the owner, the kidnapping took place in an underground car park.
We were unstoppable! The only thing that can go wrong in an underground car
park would be the presence of another person in another car (a neighbour) or a
camera linked to an electronic monitoring device that will contact the police in the
case of a tenant being attacked in the parking area or the threat of carjacking, etc.
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Of course, this was not the case and the person was intercepted in the car park
without major difficulties. Placed into the car, we took him two or three kilometres
from his home where he was watched over by an accomplice who kept an eye on
the neighbours. This would have been too risky. This would have been too visible
and too risky. We had to wait until 11.30 p.m. to midnight.
At that time the car park is deserted and therefore quieter. In the meantime, we
will recover any keys: his flat, the tone of his garage and, of course, the “Sesame”
of Ali Baba cavern (keys to both jewellery stores and the safes). Everything is ok.
The bag containing my three piece light-coloured suit with a tie, a wig and a
moustache, the makeup, the Ray-Ban ‘Wayfarer’ sunglasses, gloves, a leather
holster and a 9mm gun.
Everything is ready for the great “cinema”. The rest is to go to the home of his wife
because she will be worried if her husband does not return home. Off to their
house. It is child’s play. We have the keys! We do not knock on the door – we open
the locks. She hears the key in the lock
“Is that you?”
I replied: “Yes.”
She unbolts the door. I put my hand directly over her mouth to stop her from
screaming. She was very, very, very afraid. I did not push her into the living room
and I did not need to “condition” her. She also understood who we were and why
we were there. I asked her not to compromise the operation. If I have the house
keys, then it is obvious that I have her husband. I was holding him and his wife
also. No handcuffs and no gagging. These achieve nothing. I see in a moment that I
am dealing with someone very intelligent. She can even watch TV and eat at the
same time. I leave an accomplice in the apartment and decide to join the other
accomplice who remained with the hostage. A mistake! During my absence, my
accomplice, who is less experienced than I am in the hostage situation, began to
play with his gun. A shot rang out and slammed into the wall of the apartment. He
had already switched off the TV (I wonder why ...) and the noise may have alerted
the neighbours. He panicked. He ties up the woman and headed out of the
apartment. At the same time I reappeared before the apartment and to my great
anxiety, I found him in front of the building.
“What’s happening?
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He explains that, idiotically, he had manipulated his gun and a shot had been fired
accidentally. He had turned off the TV, etc.
“Why did you leave the apartment?”
He did not have time to answer because the police arrived on site. The woman had
managed to untie herself and had alerted the police. I knew she was intelligent!
OK. It’s over! We break of the mission, I take control. I tell the accomplice to do as
I do. We hide in a bush. He himself wants to escape by running away across the
city. I told him: “No way”. We take the car and we will get the friend of ours who
stayed with the hostage 3km away. He disagrees. We argue. I leave with the car.
Two police cars block the road. I feigned throwing up my arms and suddenly. I put
the car into second gear and shot off at top speed.
I had got away! That didn’t stop the police from firing their guns at me. I crouched
down behind the steering wheel. Like in the movies. A tyre burst. I left the car and
I took to my feet. I am in excellent physical condition and I lost my pursuers
without any difficulty. I met up with my buddy – at great risk. I recovered him and
returned home. That’s how I missed Ali Baba’s cave. Finally, we released the
hostage jeweller, who was shocked but happy to find his wife was safe (very brave
and intelligent ...!).
The accomplice who screwed everything was picked up later by the police for
another job and did a deal naming me to minimise his sentence. He’ll do two years
in prison whilst I’ll do twelve years for the same offence. I do not think I was
treated unfairly because I knew why I was in prison.
XMD: Could you speak to me about fear?
Redoine Faïd: Robbery – that is something which causes fear at the beginning.
There are various types of robberies!
-
The amateur robber who is slapdash and who might fire in any direction.
That is not my category.
-
There is the armed attack of a pseudo professional who wears a balaclava,
who doesn’t leave fingerprints, who has a gun and has the nerve to carry out the
robbery, who succeeds by luck and who then leaves.
-
Finally, there is the robbery where everything is thought out in advance and
if the instructions are followed, everything will go well (collecting information,
timing, etc.)
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That procedure gives reassurance and takes away fear but there is always a
residual fear.
When you attack a jewellery shop, you are motivated by the fact that you will
succeed. It is a really fine robbery! A big deal! You are wearing a suit, a wig, a
moustache, spectacles …. That is classy, isn’t it?
Of 150 robberies (banks, jewellery shops, armoured cars) in my life, everything
went well on 135 occasions. I had a dozen failures where I could take away the
money and I had to get away. I was shot at on two occasions – once by the national
gendarmerie and once by the urban police during an attack on an armoured car.
The reason why I have been successful is that I prepared every robbery very
carefully on every occasion and every time the situation went wrong, it was due to
a member of the team not following instructions. This “target”. We could not
arrive hooded and armed at her home at 7pm which is the time when all the
neighbours come home.
It is very important that everybody concentrates on what he is supposed to do. One
person has to control the clients who come into the shop and another to hold in
check those who come in. The other two will smash the windows, take the jewellery
and then make a getaway.
XMD: For how long before a robbery do you feel fear?
Redoine Faïd: A week before – and then you feel more fear three or four days before the
robbery.
On the day before, you might go to the lavatory, or, in my case, I vomited.
Other people experience a lack of appetite and the look on their face changes and
their face acquires certain rigidity.
On the day before, I would take off my watch and my gold chain so that they could
be given to my wife if I were killed.
When you leave for the robbery you have been conditioned. You know exactly
what steps to take and you know that you might be killed but you are determined
to carry on.
Fear is a taboo subject and I often say to my pals that it is normal to be frightened
– it is human condition. The person who has no fear – he is ill and we are going to
die because of him or he is going to kill somebody, so he has no place in our team.
Fear should not paralyse you. You should remain concentrated on the problem.
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Once you have entered the jewellery shop – when the action begins – fear
disappears and you become like a robot. In quiet period before the robbery you
have thought of everything which has to be done and when things heat up, you
know exactly what you have to do. You have to be sure, though, that there is not a
coward in the team, as fear can spread to other people.
A lot of people take cocaine to give themselves courage but that harms your
concentration.
XMD: Do you understand the fear which people feel when you are carrying out a
robbery?
Redoine Faïd: When you carry out an armed robbery – even if you don’t harm anyone or
even if you don’t kill anyone –you spread fear. It is very bad for the person whom
you are facing but don’t know that and you only realise, a long time later when you
are in court, that although you have not wounded him, nor hit him, nor insulted
him, he is still traumatised 10 years later.
It is then that you realise what you are doing and that the simple fact of robbing
someone with a gun can have a considerable moral effect on that person.
XMD: Otherwise, how do the robbers go about their work?
Redoine Faïd: When we get into the shop, it is absolutely necessary that every member of
staff in the shop obeys the orders which are given.
“Everybody on the floor. Don’t try to be heroes. The first one who raises his head
will be shot”.
You have to condition them into thinking your way. You have to use really violent
language to make them understand that you are not there for a laugh. People
scream.
It can be likened to a war scene. People do not understand that. The robbers have
machine guns and bulletproof vests. Anyway, this is a commando raid. It's war!
Faced with well-dressed people in tailored suits, there is a feeling of power that is
extraordinary.
If a person is stubborn be can be managed and it does not cause any panic for the
robbers.
XMD: Concerning Place Vendôme, how does a robber choose one jewellery store rather
than another?
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Redoine Faïd: Boucheron is too big - too much space to control. A place where there is a
lot of staff deters the robbers. Obviously because there are too many people to
control.
You would need many robbers to occupy the shop successfully. Also, there are big
windows and the robbery can be seen by people outside the shop.
It is easier in a small jewellery shop where there are only one or two members of
staff. Also, the brand name on the item of jewellery. Robbers prefer jewellery
which does not have the name of the company on it.
XMD: Why would a robber choose Chopard rather than Boucheron?
Redoine Faïd: Chopard is smaller than Boucheron but especially it is not near the
Ministry of Justice on Place Vendôme. An inspection of the site for Boucheron is
difficult as well. You cannot use a “submarine” (a small undercover van equipped
for surveillance) so it has to be a pedestrian on the other side of the Place
Vendôme, equipped with binoculars. Someone who could take a room at the Ritz
Hotel, as hostages may be taken. Today, in 2010, the robber would be carrying a
camera inside a handbag, together with glasses. The robber may send a woman to
get information. This could be a young person or an old person. Beware of
everyone!
You have several things to do to get into a jewellery store in Place Vendôme.
Once I was performing a reconnaissance of the jewellery shop Fred. We arrived
one by one because, as you know, when two or three or four people arrive together,
it looks suspicious. There should be one who enters the shop, one who follows
behind and a chauffeur.
The car, you don’t even steal it. You have a very nice hired car with a chauffeur.
When the chauffeur arrives with the car, the first thing is to put him into the boot.
You park the car in front of the jewellery shop. The raider is disguised as a Saudi.
He has a beautiful car driven by a chauffeur. You put a cap on the chauffeur’s
head so that nobody can see his hair and then you add a pair of sunglasses. He
accompanies you, carrying your bag – because you are old and then, Bob’s your
uncle! “Everybody on the floor!”
This is just an example of how you get into the shop. Why? Because you know that
the personnel in the shop are looking at you – are keeping an eye on you. It is like
when you go into a discotheque – you must not attract attention to yourself. So,
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when you arrive, you know exactly where to go, where the displays are - what to
do. You do what is necessary and you leave quickly.
XMD: How does the reconnaissance phase work? What are you looking for?
Redoine Faïd: The number of staff is very important and the positions of the cameras.
You will not worry about the cameras as you will neutralise them but the police
will want to look at the cameras to identify the robbers.
If I come and rob you, I shall adopt a Marseille accent or a Corsican one and also I
shall pretend that I have a lisp, to confuse and to manipulate the thinking of the
employee.
All that you say and do will be reported to the police, so say and do only what is
really necessary.
Obviously, you will change the first names which you use when you talk to each
other, during the raid. Also, the cars which you use for the robbery must carry no
traces such as registration plates or fingerprints.
For jewellery stores, you always carry a plastic truncheon – that is the rule – to
knock out someone who stubbornly opposes you – and also carry a tear gas bomb.
XMD: What could we do to stop these things happening?
Redoine Faïd: I tell you that if someone starts to observe the people and the daily
procedures at your shop, for 2 or 3 months, the only thing that will stop them is
impromptu and random behaviour on your part. My personal experience has
taught me that everything is possible, every jewellery store, anywhere as long as
you take the time, with the means today and that you perfectly know your job.
XMD: What is random and unexpected behaviour in the jewellery industry?
Redoine Faïd: Firstly, you had better keep an eye on the staff, especially the guards; if
they haven’t been with you for long because you know nothing about the circle in
which a guard moves. When he leaves the jewellery shop, you don’t know where he
goes, whom he meets – you don’t even know whom he eats with. Those people can
deliver really important information to a group of criminals who rob your shop.
How can people know that a person works at Boucheron? Sometimes he smokes
cannabis – everyone smokes cannabis nowadays. He can confide in a dealer and
then the dealer tells someone else who really shouldn’t have the information. That
is how information gets around. It is so easy.
The guy can be snorting cocaine. Sometimes he frequents prostitutes, who
themselves go to see their pimps. This means that employees should have limited
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information. There are things that some employees do not have to know. Because if
someone is trying to get information from you and has not worked everything out
in advance, if he has not calculated everything! He’s dead!
The security levels must be compartmentalized at the level of trust you give to each
employee. It is super- super-important and it also allows you to identify the source
of information divulged but above all personnel must learn to be silent. The
problem is when people speak out too much. They talk about their working lives,
these idiots. They must keep their mouths shut. When you give sensitive
information to people you must tell them “Shut your gobs! It’s a secret, it’s top
secret”. If a guy is going to give information to his colleague or his wife, then the
whole security system is dead!
XMD: Coming back to the guards, what can be done to make them better - more
operational?
Redoine Faïd: Simulation! Many simulated robberies! Without simulation or training,
you're dead. Whatever you have previously learnt on paper, you will improvise
when faced with a real situation. You need everybody’s reflexes to be automatic.
You have to be brave and conditioned to respond. It must be working sessions – a
lot of work. Why not audits?
XMD: What is the best time of day to rob a jewellery store?
Redoine Faïd: For me the ideal time to rob a jewellery store is midday. People go to have
their lunches and the staff changes. People in the street are also going to eat so they
don’t look in the windows of the shop. It is better to have as few customers inside
as possible. The robbery at Chopard on Place Vendôme was at noon. The cops
picked up the robber abroad, at his receiver of stolen goods. He chose the wrong
receiver.
XMD: What advice would you give to a robber?
Redoine Faïd: My friend, the Number One point is “do not trust anyone except those who
work with you”. Arm yourself. Be vigilant, be quick. The more time you waste in
the shop, the more police officers will arrive and you’ll be trapped in the shop.
XMD: What are the faults of the Pink Panthers?
Redoine Faïd: They often get arrested because, most of the time, they don’t cover up their
faces. The most important way to counter the Pink Panthers is the entrance to the
shop – we must work on protecting the entrance. If they come in, you’re dead.
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So we must work on vigilance, on profiling. Also we must think about the location
of the shop - if it is well-situated or if it is in a cul-de-sac.
XMD: Is there a time or a reason to cancel the mission?
Redoine Faïd: Even if you have calculated everything, there is the unexpected passage of
a passing police patrol at the same time and same place (and thus at the wrong
place at the wrong time for you!). This chance occurrence which interferes in a
robbery does not cancel but does defer the robbery. You come back another time
and it's done. However, if you come back and you cannot see the same people in
the shop or the same security procedures, you leave again. Pay attention to the
operating plan because otherwise it destroys the dynamics of a team of thieves,
which is a group of professionals. However, inside a gang of robbers there are
likely to be slackers. People can balk at the tasks they have been given - they must
constantly move the cars, store the "gear", sacrifice family life etc.
There is symmetry of characters and behaviours that you also find in the middle of
the specialised services of the police. The best are those who manage all these tasks.
When you know all these risks and these major problems and get to your goal,
then you are a ‘PRO’. This is the result that counts and nothing but the result. If
you do not succeed, you are just not good enough for the job. But a robbery is
sometimes not successful because accomplices do not adhere to the agreed
procedures or because they are frightened by a situation which appears to be
dangerous.
You say a guy has to take his scooter, or to wear good trainers because you will
have to escape through the roof of the Vendôme building. However, you don’t
know if he will do as you say. Especially if the goal is to break a window in a flag
ship on place Vendôme in broad daylight! When you walk into a jewellery store to
rob, you do not care about personnel and cameras and the security door.
You must not be noticed. The ideal situation is when it rains! The rain causes
people in their cars to look in front of them and not at the windows of the shop.
Also, the passers-by are anxious to cover themselves up because of the rain. The
security personnel have difficulty in seeing the new people preparing to come into
the shop.
Also you sometimes abandon the attack because an accomplice is not there on DDay- because he is afraid.
XMD: Are there special orders regarding attacks?
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Redoine Faïd: The orders are rare. Most of the time, the one who controls will also decide
on the location of the robbery. Also sometimes he informs on fellow-thieves. The
informer is often a guy who works in the sector or else a dealer/partner who is
jealous for various reasons. But it can also be a receiver of stolen goods. He mixes
with thieves but also with the fine folks who helped to "peddle" the goods. The
receiver has ears; he listens and knows sniff-out deals. But it is rare to find this
winning combination. An unidentifiable receiver with good tips in the jewellery
trade; a trio of professional and discreet robbers who are well-off and who are able
to be patient…
The case of the largest diamond robbery in the world on the Thames in London in
2001 is the perfect illustration. A Jewish receiver who was in contact with the
Russians. An order was passed. A team of particularly dangerous criminals was
assembled. A mechanical digger was used to smash the gate. The thieves use rapid
and effective methods. A fast motor boat was standing by to escape by river.
Unfortunately, Scotland Yard had anticipated the raid from the beginning and all
of the people were arrested in flagrante delicto! (Whilst committing the crime).
XMD: Did you have a checklist in preparation for attacks?
Redoine Faïd: When you go on surveillance, no one must know - except you and someone
close to you - that you have chosen this particular shop to raid, that you are
collecting information – that you are preparing for a “hit”. Absolutely no one!
There is no trust. I am not saying that there is a black sheep in your team but
someone can make a mistake by going to the target shop without taking the strict
measures necessary to detect a possible police presence. This is a very important
point. If you are going to reconnoitre a place, it is vital to be sure that there is no
possibility of a police presence. Then you move on to the important information
that you have to collect to enable a successful robbery. Firstly, you ascertain the
number of people working inside the shop and the different level of responsibility
which each member of the staff has. For example, a middle-aged woman who
enters the shop through the staff entrance and whom you will almost never see on
the ground floor of the shop. You assume that she has seniority and therefore she
is trusted and she should be a person in whom you are interested - someone who
has her office upstairs, or is in the workshop. She is therefore a person in whom
you should be interested - someone to whom they give responsibility.
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Another woman is not just a simple sales person who has been asked to host a
client. This sales person should interest you because she has the keys for the
windows.
When they leave the shop, they are rarely wary. Once they leave at night, you
follow them. On foot or by car. You see where they live. You have got their names
and addresses. You know every model of car or scooters owned by the staff. You
know who comes by subway, who is dropped outside the shop by her husband, who
comes by car… Better still, the day that you carry out the robbery; you call people
by their first name. This will certainly confuse the police and make them believe
that information is coming from within. You draw a red herring across the trail.
It's a breeze. Ditto for the security guys. You store their faces in your brain. You
find the person in charge. Always. By dint of seeing them in the morning and
during the day, you end up giving them names: “The old", "The blonde", "The
sturdy", "The boss", "The fat", etc.
Then there is the question of the shop. The timing schedule is crucial: Pre-opening.
Opening. Frequency of breaks. Lunch. Closure. The name of the monitoring
company and the alarm used. The location of alarms and cameras, inside and
outside of the shop but also the cameras in the streets around the entire area so
that you do not have later problems with investigation by the police. Then the
outer windows (toughness, gaps between the window and products, thickness,
jewellery on display…), the internal windows (locks, jewellery on display,
thickness …). The external door and the interior door (locks, thickness, armour
plating …).
Finally, it is important to gauge the environment in which you will operate. The
entire area. Know where the nearest police are located. The place where you can
park your getaway car, then the car you change to after the getaway. Which route
will you take to arrive at the scene, avoiding the cameras and the people? You have
to do this work well. Acknowledge of the layout of the area and expert timing of
the raid are essential for a good commando operation. Knowing the sites well gives
you more confidence in your actions. Not only you know how to get into the shop –
and what jobs the various people do therein – but you also know where to find
what interests you. Also the places around the shop keep no secrets from you
In short, the accumulation of information leads to an overall vision of the jewellery
shop and its setting. It is this database of information that will define the
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procedure for "hitting" the shop – the day of the week, the time of day and the
weather conditions. Remember, though, that without a receiver of stolen goods
there would be no robberies!
XMD: Because of recidivism, is one obliged to start robbing once one is out of prison?
Statistically 70-80% of former-prisoners commit offences again.
Redoine Faïd: With regard to recidivism, after (5-6 years in prison, I thought I
understood everything, so if I had been let out of prison at that time it would not
have done me a service. After 7-8 years, I was still learning things. I was more
positive at the time. I’d had time to think about my life. I learned about myself,
about the events that led me to prison, my family… After 9 years, I was stagnating
in prison but justice prevailed because a year later I was set free.
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Redoine FAID
Redoine est un ancien braqueur reconverti
XMD : Pouvez-vous vous présenter ?
Redoine Faïd : Je m’appelle Rédoïne, j’ai 37 ans.
Je ne suis pas là pour faire l’apologie du banditisme, je ne regrette pas ce que j’ai
fait, mais si c’était à refaire, je ne le referais pas.
J’ai été condamné dans 3 affaires concernant : un fourgon blindé, une bijouterie,
une banque et une évasion en Suisse.
J’avais 27 ans pour ma première peine de prison, j’ai pris 15 ans pour l’attaque
d’un fourgon blindé par la cour d’assises de Bobigny en 2002. Personne d’autre
n’a été identifié, j’ai été confondu par mon ADN parce que j’avais pris une balle.
J’ai pris 12 ans pour l’attaque d’une bijouterie.
J’ai pris 4 ans pour une évasion en Suisse et 6 ans pour association de malfaiteurs.
J’ai eu un cumul de 40 ans de prison.
Je n’ai pas réussi à m’évader. J’ai été un détenu modèle pour avoir une remise de
peine.
J’ai fait des études de journalisme, j’ai passé un bac E.S que j’ai obtenu avec
mention A.B pendant que j’étais à l’isolement à la Santé.
J’ai aussi pris des cours d’anglais, d’espagnol, d’histoire…
Tout c’est bien passé, au lieu de 40 ans, ils m’en ont donné 19. Après, pour bonne
conduite ils m’ont sorti en conditionnelle au bout de 10 ans 3 mois.
XMD : Comment êtes-vous entré dans la délinquance ?
Redoine Faïd : Je suis dans la délinquance depuis l’âge de 6 ans, j’y suis entré par
nécessité et par faiblesse aussi. J’ai vu mon père aller à l’usine, ça m’a fait peur, je
n’avais pas envie d’aller travailler. J’ai commencé par voler des bouteilles
consignées, des plaquettes de chocolat, des paquets de gâteaux que j’allais revendre
et pour mon « plus grand malheur », je ne me suis jamais fait attraper.
Donc par facilité, je suis entré dans le monde de la délinquance et comme je ne me
voyais pas vendre de la drogue je ne fumais pas, ne buvais pas, j’ai été attiré par le
vol. J’aimais bien l’idée du « gentleman voleur » : prendre l’argent, les bijoux, on
ne blesse personne et on s’en va.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Forcément, un jour à l’âge de 17-18 ans, tu rentres dans un appartement, tu
trouves un collectionneur qui a des armes tu ne les revends pas tu les gardes parceque tu n’appartiens pas au milieu du grand banditisme.
Puis un jour j’ai décidé de monter au braquage, j’étais trop bon dans le
cambriolage, j’allai passer à la suite logique : l’attaque à mains armées.
Un jour, tu observes une banque, tu regardes les employés arriver le matin, ouvrir,
tu te rends compte que le matin c’est toujours la même personne qui fait le code et
qui entre et tu te dis qu’il y a peut-être possibilité de rentrer derrière elle pour la
braquer oui mais après qu’est ce qui se passe derrière ? Elle va dans un petit
placard tu ne sais pas ce qu’elle fait, peut-être elle débranche une alarme, elle
prend une cassette vidéo, elle la met dans un magnétoscope et puis elle met en
marche ?
Donc, tu regardes puis tu rentres dans la banque, tu demandes comment faire pour
ouvrir un compte en banque, tu commences ton repérage.
Tu as déjà de bonnes habitudes, tu rentres à l’intérieur, tu vois qu’il y a une
caméra en face, qu’ils sont juste deux employé, tu te dis qu’il doit y avoir une
alarme quelque part, tu repars, tu en parles avec ton copain, tu vérifies.
Tu reviens la semaine d’après et tu te rends compte que c’est toujours pareil, ils
ont les mêmes habitudes.
Puis un beau jour tu te dis : je vais y aller mais il ne faut surtout pas que je blesse
alors t’apprends ton texte par cœur, tu t’inspires des grands bandits du cinéma,
comment ils parlent…
Tu te dis la personne elle arrive toujours à 8h55, alors je vais y aller, je vais
prendre une casquette, t’as pas de cagoule, tu prends un collant à ta sœur.
Tu suis l’employée pendant que ton comparse surveille l’extérieur, les voisins, les
véhicules, tu arrives juste derrière elle, tu la pousses à l’intérieur, tu refermes.
Mais ça ne se passe pas comme prévu, elle crie, tu la calmes en lui disant que tu
ne lui feras pas de mal, que tu n’en veux qu’au coffre et que tout sera fini en 5
minutes.
Elle fait le code, elle se trompe elle a peur, le refait ça marche. Tu rentres dans la
banque tu lui dis de ne pas mettre de cassette vidéo, d’ouvrir le coffre, elle te dit
oui monsieur, elle veut que ça se passe bien, elle te dit qu’elle a retiré l’alarme de la
banque mais qu’il y a aussi l’alarme du coffre à retirer et ça tu ne le savais pas
mais tu le sauras pour la prochaine fois.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Le coffre est ouvert, ton collègue arrive avec un sac, il prépare, moi j’attache
l’employée, on s’en va ça a duré 2 mn 30 et c’est fini, tu rentres chez toi.
C’est en 1991, tu as 18 ans et tu te retrouves avec la somme de 200 000 francs, ça
fait 100 000 francs chacun !
Je dépose mon copain chez lui, je rentre chez moi, j’enlève mon survêtement, je
mets un pantalon, un polo, un blouson une paire de chaussures et je dis à ma sœur
de m’accompagner au lycée. La veille, j’avais prévenu la responsable de classe que
j’arriverais en retard, la prof ne s’est pas rendu compte que j’étais absent de 8h à
9h, je reste au lycée jusqu’à 17h, j’ai un alibi !
Je rentre chez moi à 17h et on partage le magot et là on se dit c’est fini les
cambriolages, les banques, les banques uniquement les banques !
On se dit maintenant, va falloir y aller une deuxième fois, on y va le matin même
scénario et je dis toujours : si au bout de 1, 2, 3, 4 braquages de banque tu t’es pas
fait tuer, t’es un professionnel.
XMD : Je cite André Bellaïche : « Après la première banque tu as déjà appris quelque
chose, à la deuxième si t’es pas mort, tu commences à mieux maîtriser le sujet, à la
troisième : t’es un pro »
Redoine Faïd : C’est exactement ça, moi je dis qu’au bout de 4, 5 braquages t’apprends
très vite, tu es amateur, tu n’as jamais braqué, personne ne m’a jamais dit tu fais
comme ça, je suis un autodidacte.
La première banque que j’ai braqué, je l’ai observée pendant 3 semaines 1 mois et
quand tu prends bien l’habitude, tu te dis finalement avec le temps n’importe quel
système de sécurité, tu le casses, si tu prends ton temps c’est obligatoire, le temps
joue pour toi.
La seule chose qui va t’empêcher de faire ton coup, c’est quand le système de
sécurité en face de toi est trop aléatoire, qu’il n’arrête pas de changer, c’est ce qui
fait que tu ne pourras pas opérer.
Maintenant, si tu as les moyens, si tu es fort, si tu as une équipe solide, tu peux
tomber sur une équipe qui va se poster et qui va attendre le moment où ça se passe
comme elle veut que ça se passe.
Pour l’anecdote, sur ce braquage je me souviendrai toujours de cette scène qui a
marqué ma vie. Je suis au repérage, je vois la dame arriver se garer et je ne sais
pas pourquoi, je reste là, je vais dans la boulangerie d’en face m’acheter un petit
pain et qu’est ce que je vois arriver : un fourgon de la Brinks et là je dis à mon ami
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Xavier Mac Donald
qui est à côté de moi : pourquoi faire cette banque où il y a 1 sac alors que là il y a
30 sacs !
C’est un rêve, c’est le Graal ! Et 5, 6 ans après je me retrouverai à faire un fourgon
de transports de fond et à prendre tous les sacs qu’il y dedans. Pourquoi ? Encore
une fois parce que je ne me suis jamais attraper !
Malheureusement, j’ai eu un talent pour ça, si je m’étais fait attraper quand j’étais
jeune, quitte à prendre 3 mois de prison, basta, ça aurait été fini !
Quand tu braques une banque à 18-19 ans, quand tu prends 100 000 francs (ça fait
15 000 euros mais à l’époque c’est l’équivalant de 30 000, 40 000 euros) en 3
minutes, va expliquer à un gamin qu’il faut aller travailler pour toucher 1200-1300
euros, c’est plus possible !
Quelqu’un qui vole à 10 ans, il vole pour manger, à 13-14 ans ou 15 ans il vole pour
s’habiller, pour inviter sa copine ; à 20 ans c’est plus pareil, il a de gros besoins : il
veut un appartement, une voiture, s’habiller en costume, avoir de belles montres,
c’est un autre train de vie
Tu montes, tu montes, tu gravis les échelons de la délinquance, il n’y a pas de
limites !
Là où je rejoins A. Bellaïche, quand il dit « si t’es pas mort » c’est qu’à son époque,
les flics ne faisaient pas de détail, ils tiraient à tout va, il y avait 140 morts par an,
si tu loupes, là t’es mort !
A mon époque non, si tu loupes tu vas en prison, en tout cas pour les banques et
les bijouteries parce que les flics aujourd’hui sont plus aguerris plus professionnels
et capables de t’interpeler.
XMD : Quelle différence y-a-t’il entre vous et A. Bellaïche ?
Redoine Faïd : André Bellaïche c’est un malin, je considère que c’est l’un des plus grands
braqueurs de l’histoire du grand banditisme français, mais il y a 30 ans. C’était les
années 80.
C’est un homme qui a « fait carrière » de 1975 à 1990. Il a surtout braqué des
banques au début des années 80. Il a commencé par des braquages au guichet puis,
avec sa bande de copains, il a décidé de s’attaquer aux coffres.
Ils se sont séparés en 2 équipes distinctes, une équipe qui s’occupe des otages et des
clients qui rentrent dans la boutique pendant qu’une autre descend dans la salle
des coffres pour les ouvrir avec marteaux et burins.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Il faut savoir qu’à l’époque, la sécurité n’était pas au point, il n’y avait pas de
capteurs sismiques. Aujourd’hui, si vous descendez et que vous commencez à
taper, l’alarme se déclenche, il y a aussi des micros cachés qui enregistrent les
moindres bruits.
A l’époque, ils ne partaient pas pour trouver des espèces dans les coffres. Ils
trouvaient des lingots d’or, des pierres précieuses, des montres, des colliers et il
fallait un receleur.
C’était les années 80.
XMD : Là nous arrivons dans la joaillerie-haute joaillerie, lesquelles avez-vous faites?
Redoine Faïd : Alors je vais surtout parler de celle pour laquelle j’ai été condamné : la
bijouterie Platroz.
La plus belle bijouterie de l’Oise. Elle est située à Chantilly.
Pourquoi je ne suis pas allé plus tôt vers les bijouteries ? Il y a une raison : c’est
parce que c’est de la marchandise, pas des espèces il faut un « fourgue » (un
receleur) sinon ça n’est pas intéressant.
Quand je m’y suis mis à l’âge de 22-23 ans, j’étais déjà un professionnel très bien
aguerri à l’attaque à mains armées, j’avais fait des prises d’otages en bande
organisées, j’avais déjà attaqué plus d’une dizaine de banques…
Nous étions un noyau dur de 3-4 personnes qui nous connaissions et travaillions
ensemble depuis 15 ans et comme nous gravitions beaucoup dans la communauté
juive, à force de les fréquenter, nous avons rencontré des receleurs et des
personnes qui gravitaient autour de ces gens et de là on a essayé d’établir un
contact pour trouver quelqu’un de sérieux pour racheter les bijoux.
Après avoir vérifié que la source était fiable, on a décidé de se lancer dans le
braquage de bijouterie.
On a été grand seigneur tout de suite, on a dit nous on veut 10% tu nous ramènes
ça on te fait 90% de réduction. Je lui dis par exemple si je te ramène 3 millions
d’euros (c’est ce qu’on allait faire sur cette bijouterie) de marchandise est-ce que
toi tu es capable de nous ramener 300 000 euros tout de suite cash il a dit pas de
problèmes, maintenant il me dit si tu dépasses 50-60 millions de francs, je te
prends ta marchandise, je te donne une bonne avance tu me fais confiance, et moi
je distribue mes lots je sais comment je fais…
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Xavier Mac Donald
On comprend tout de suite qu’il va y avoir un lien de confiance avec la personne,
tu vas prendre une petite partie et tu vas donner beaucoup de marchandises et que
la personne en face de toi, elle a intérêt à tenir la route.
Nous, avant même de braquer l’affaire, c’est ça qui nous intéresse. L’affaire en
elle-même on se prend pas la tête, on va la faire, on va déjouer les systèmes de
sécurité, ce n’est pas un problème.
Mais qu’est-ce que tu fais avec la marchandise ? Parce qu’on sait que la Brigade
de Répression du Banditisme a tissé une toile dans la région parisienne et ailleurs
et on sait qu’ils remontent les équipes de braqueurs de bijouterie par les receleurs
donc on sait que c’est très, très dangereux.
Donc, j’insiste, un receleur c’est quelqu’un de très discret, qui ne parle pas, qui
envoie la marchandise à l’étranger…
Parce qu’on sait aussi que ça risque d’être médiatisé et que la marchandise volée
médiatisée c’est hyper difficile à revendre.
Le meilleur fourgue, c’est celui capable d’attendre que les choses se calment, 1 an 2
ans parfois.
C’est comme ça que l’on ne retrouve jamais la marchandise.
XMD : Comment vous récupérez vos informations ?
Redoine Faïd : Là, on va parler de renseignement, c’est encore autre chose, là on rentre
dans l’infiltration, dans la source intérieure : un mec qui travaille dans la sécurité,
une fille dont on apprend qu’elle flirte avec quelqu’un, qu’elle travaille dans une
bijouterie…
Pour l’instant, on part juste sur une base de données où il n’y a rien, il y a juste un
fourgue qui te rachètes de la marchandise et toi tu vas lui ramener alors toi qu’estce que tu fais ?
Tu cibles la bijouterie, comment tu sais qu’il y a de l’argent dans celle-là et pas
dans celle-là ?
D’abord ce sont les vitrines, ce qui se passe à l’intérieur, il y a toujours un
repérage intérieur qui est effectué, tu sais que tu es filmé, observé, qu’il y a des
photos qui sont susceptibles d’être prises et envoyées dans un service de sécurité ou
de police pour voir si tu es fiché, donc il ne faut vraiment pas attirer l’attention.
Comment faire ? Alors, c’est rentrer en couple, envoyé une femme à ta place ou
alors être très bien habillé, les ongles bien coupés avec un chauffeur, il y a toute
une mise en scène mais surtout c’est d’acheter quelque chose.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Ne jamais rentrer sans rien acheter sinon tu es mort.
C’est le fait d’acheter quelque chose qui va accentuer le manque de vigilance des
personnes de la bijouterie.
Ils te prennent pour quelqu’un de « clean » et ils baissent la garde parce que tu as
acheté.
Quelqu’un qui vient sans rien acheter, même si il présente bien, c’est un risque et
ce risque il ne faut pas le prendre.
Le mieux, c’est de choisir une bijouterie qui a déjà été tapée, pourquoi ? Parce que
tu vas dans les archives, tu lis les journaux et tu apprends beaucoup sur le
préjudice subit et tu sais si la bijouterie baisse ou pas.
C’est ce qu’on a fait pour la bijouterie Platroz. On savait qu’elle s’était déjà faite
braquée en plein jour et que les mecs avaient pris l’équivalent de 15-20 millions de
francs et ils avaient juste pris les vitrines ! On savait aussi que le propriétaire avait
2 bijouteries, alors on s’est dit : « on va faire les 2, prendre tout ce qu’il y a dans
les vitrines et vider tous les coffres et on va monter à 40-50 millions de francs ! »
J’ai vu ça avec mon fourgue et on a décidé de taper l’affaire.
On a pris le temps, entre nos petites affaires de braquage à droite à gauche, de
banque, de D.A.B … et 2 jours par semaine, on s’est occupé de la bijouterie, on
s’est mis à l’observer …
XMD : Combien de temps dure le repérage?
Redoine Faïd : Ça a duré, au bas mot 2 mois où l’on a fait que de la surveillance.
La bijouterie est située au centre-ville de Chantilly, sur une artère très fréquentée
donc il fallait un bon repérage.
Une fois que tout a été au point, le recel, le fait
qu’il y avait de l’argent à
prendre… On s’est dit on y va, on va se la faire en février ou en mars !
On ne tape pas au mois de décembre, parce que le mois de décembre, c’est Noël,
c’est très risqué ! Il y en a qui décide de faire ça au culot, de se dire tiens on va y
aller parce que jamais les bijoutiers ne vont s’attendre à ce que l’on vienne les
braquer.
Alors la règle, c’est surtout de ne pas y aller pendant les fêtes !
C’est plus simple d’y aller en février, mars ou au mois d’octobre, novembre à des
périodes creuses où il n’y a pas de grands évènements
XMD : Les statistiques de braquage de bijouterie sont pourtant à la hausse pendant les
fêtes !
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Xavier Mac Donald
Redoine Faïd : Certains préfèrent jouer au culot parce qu’ils savent qu’il y a la « came ».
Au mois de décembre, les policiers sont sur les dents, la sécurité est renforcée, ils
savent qu’à cette époque les voyous ont besoin d’argent et qu’ils vont y aller ; nous,
on préférait éviter ces périodes-là.
Pour exemple : en ce qui concerne l’affaire Harry Winston, la bijouterie a été
braquée au mois de décembre mais là, il y avait une source intérieure, donc ça
change la donne, tu y vas, tu es sûr de ton coup. Si tu regardes quelques mois
avant, Harry Winston s’est fait braqué en période creuse, ils sont venus à 3-4, un
matin, c’était en interne aussi et ils ont fait une belle affaire !
XMD : Pouvez-vous revenir sur le braquage de Chantilly ?
Redoine Faïd : Donc on se remet au repérage, il faut repérer sans se faire remarquer, ne
pas attirer l’attention (bien s’habiller, ongles bien coupés, coupe de cheveux
soignée, …).
Repérer le strict minimum, c’est passer en ne regardant surtout pas la vitrine
parce qu’il faut savoir que cette bijouterie, elle a un gardien de surveillance devant
avec un chien et on savait que le gars avait un 357 magnum à l’intérieur.
On observe, on voit que le gars est tout le temps-là, on voit les gens et puis on voit
une personne : jeune, blond qui bosse dedans… C’est qui ? Et de temps en temps il
y a une fille qui bosse avec lui.
On rentre, on met les infos en commun, on prend un dictaphone et on note tout !
Le lendemain, à la même heure, on refait la même chose, on y va vers 16h pour
être tranquille, les mamans récupèrent leurs enfants à l’école il y a moins de
monde dans la boutique.
La semaine suivante, on décide de rentrer pour acheter quelque chose.
J’y suis allé vers 18h30 parce que la personne travaille depuis le matin, elle est
fatiguée, pressée de fermer sa boutique, elle est moins vigilante.
Prétextant un cadeau à faire à ma petite amie, je demande à voir une montre que
j’ai vue en vitrine, je demande à en voir une deuxième, si sa collègue peut l’essayer
pour me montrer le résultat…tu en rajoutes, tu fais semblant d’hésiter, tu
négocies, tu montres que tu es vraiment dans la vente, c’est très important. Enfin,
je me décide et je demande un paquet cadeau.
Pendant ce temps, j’ai pu voir le SAS, si il y avait une porte pare-balles qui
séparait la boutique de la salle des coffres, le coffre, les caméras, l’activité de
l’autre employée.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Tout le monde est en confiance.
Je paie en espèces, bien sûr, pour ne pas laisser de traces, l’employé est content et
je m’en vais.
Plus jamais ils ne me reverront dans leur boutique, j’ai capté toutes les infos
essentielles.
Alors, on a hésité à rentrer avec une caméra, mais comme la boutique était petite,
on y a renoncé, mais j’ai pu me rendre compte que cet employé avait des
responsabilités.
Nous décidons, avec mes amis, de revenir un matin pour voir les procédures
d’ouverture de la bijouterie.
Nous nous postons dans un café juste à côté et on observe :
L’employé arrive tous les matins vers 8h45, 8h50, il ouvre le rideau de fer, il ouvre
la porte, il rentre et referme juste derrière lui.
Il regarde de tous les côtés, on sent qu’il est stressé, tendu, il fait des signes aux
autres commerçants.
A 9h30, le gardien de surveillance arrive et se poste directement devant, tape sur la
vitre et fait un petit signe à l’intérieur.
A 9h45, l’employée arrive. Son collègue vient lui ouvrir, donc elle n’a pas de clé.
Nous poursuivons une surveillance discrète à bord d’un « sous-marin », (sauf le
mercredi jour de marché, il y trop de monde) muni d’un dictaphone, d’un talkiewalkie, d’une oreillette…
Même scénario les jours suivants.
Nous remarquons que l’homme arrive toujours à pied, mais qu’il se gare dans un
garage derrière la bijouterie. Nous repérons sa voiture, marque, couleur et plaque
d’immatriculation.
On a fait l’ouverture, maintenant on va faire la fermeture.
On décide de le suivre, on ramène 3 véhicules discrets (Clio, 405, 306…) avec une
seule personne à bord pour ne pas attirer l’attention l’homme part en direction de
Paris.
Je le suis à 100 mètres, je prends à droite et je laisse le deuxième qui le suit sur
100m et part à droite puis le troisième qui le suit sur 300m, et on arrête là !
L’homme est méfiant, alors nous opérons une «filature en dentelle »
On revient le lendemain, on se poste là où l’on s’est arrêté la veille et on
recommence le lendemain et les jours suivants, patiemment.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Nous constatons qu’il arrive chez lui tous les soirs à la même heure : 19h15, 19h20.
Il se gare dans un parking sous-terrain. C’est là qu’il faut l’arrêter, quand il rentre
chez lui parce que c’est un cul-de-sac ; il faut rentrer derrière lui parce que lui il a
le bip, il est obligé de sortir et là on le braque.
Maintenant, il faut aller voir la deuxième bijouterie. Elle est située à Creil, à 5 km
de Chantilly et l’on s’aperçoit que de 11h du matin à 15h, il est là-bas et que c’est
sa femme qui tient la boutique, parfois son père !
Nous nous séparons en 2 équipes pour vérifier toutes les infos et être sûr que tout
se passera exactement comme nous le voulons.
Il n’y a pas d’improvisation !
Donc il faut qu’on aille chez eux le soir, mais on a décidé de ne pas l’attaquer de
front, parce qu’on s’est dit : un coup de feu peut partir, il y a du monde, on va
devoir taper en 4-5 mn.
On va y aller tranquillement, en gentlemen, on va les prendre en otages, il doit
sûrement y avoir des enfants, on va évacuer toute sa famille en camionnette à 50
km des lieux, on va prendre ses clés et lui dire que s’il n’obéit pas c’est toute sa
famille qui y passe !
On va lui mettre la pression !
Donc on repère où on va laisser les voitures volées, après, comment on va entrer à
l’intérieur, il faudra avoir de belles perruques, des lunettes, des moustaches, des
gants pour ne pas être reconnus, une mallette…
Voilà le scénario. On a continué à le suivre, même le dimanche quand il est
complètement détendu, pour connaître toutes ses habitudes. Grâce à sa plaque
d’immatriculation, on apprend son nom : Platroz et qu’il est le fils du propriétaire
de la bijouterie !
Il est très important psychologiquement, le moment venu, de lui montrer que l’on
sait tout sur lui : son père, sa mère, l’école de ses enfants, sa femme, le tennis pour
le mettre en position de faiblesse.
On décide de taper l’affaire un mardi en fin de journée comme ça on va y aller le
mercredi matin, jour de marché, donc beaucoup de monde et il est plus facile de
passer inaperçu.
On l’attend donc le mardi soir chez lui, dans une voiture classique, pas voyante et
on le suit dans le parking. On gare le sous-marin à 5 km au calme, avec 2
personnes et moi et une autre personne on décide d’aller braquer M. Platroz.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Il arrive, il descend, il se gare, il sort ; on est encagoulés, en combinaison, gilet
pare-balles, pistolet automatique, on l’attrape et on lui met une paire de menottes,
il a peur. On l’embarque et on le fait monter derrière ; on lui prend son bip, ses
clés et il voit que l’on ne monte pas chez lui. Il sait pourquoi on est là, il est calme.
Ne pas parler avec lui, pas de gestes inutiles, il sait qu’il a affaire à des pros. On y
va, on roule, on l’amène à l’autre sous-marin, on le ligote. On lui demande quelles
sont les différentes clés, on lui dit que l’on ne fera aucun mal à son épouse, que
tout ce passera bien si il suit les instructions et que le lendemain matin tout sera
terminé.
XMD : Pourquoi attaquer les bijouteries?
Redoine Faïd : La bijouterie, c’est quelque chose qui fait rêver. Les bijoux sont des choses
qui attirent, ce n’est pas comme un braquage de banque, c’est un beau braquage.
Limite tu tombes amoureux de ta marchandise quand tu l’as entre les mains, mais
tu ne peux pas la garder !
Un jour, je suis tombé sur quelqu’un qui avait braqué les ateliers RESA en 199596. Je connais le cerveau présumé « Mimi » mais qui s’appelle BENAISSA et je lui
ai demandé comment il avait fait. Il m’a répondu qu’ils avaient déjà de bons
renseignements, ils ont fait une prise d’otages mais que surtout, ils avaient capté
une faille : ils étaient montés au 4ème étage où il y avait un cagibi où ils ont pu
planquer et observer ; c’est comme ça qu’ils ont pu attaquer et tout prendre.
Malheureusement ou heureusement, ils se sont fait attraper à cause du recel, de
plus ils appartenaient au milieu du grand banditisme, ils sniffaient beaucoup de
coke, ils allaient dans les discothèques…
La B.R.B a pu remonter jusqu’à lui parce qu’ils ont trouvé de la marchandise chez
lui, mais les autres n’ont pas été inquiétés.
J’ai connu aussi Djamel Boukriche qui s’est fait attraper en 1996 et qui voulait
séquestrer la famille BOUCHERON dans le 16ème arrondissement pour braquer
BOUCHERON. Il avait eu l’adresse dans le Who’s Who. Mais il n’a pas pu parce
que la B.R.B l’a attrapé avant.
Un moment je me suis beaucoup intéressé à la boutique FRED, d’abord parce
qu’elle n’est pas en façade, on rentre sur le côté par la droite, on voit ce qui se
passe à l’intérieur et deuxièmement un jour ils ont fait une grande erreur : ils ont
fait Paris Match avec une prise de vue de la Place Vendôme vue de haut.
On voyait toutes les enseignes avec les numéros et on pouvait voir tous les toits.
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Si tu regardes le toit de Boucheron, par exemple, il est en tuiles, pas intéressant
parce que c’est dangereux, on peut glisser.
L’un des seuls toits qui est plat, c’est celui de FRED, avec des portes pour rentrer
dans l’immeuble et tu retombes de l’autre côté de la rue… Ce qui était intéressant,
c’était de rentrer dans le coin où il y a FRED, de monter les escaliers…on a les clés
des pompiers, les passes des policiers…on a tout nous…On ne peut pas rentrer
dans les ateliers mais on peut accéder à une porte de service, c’est faisable ; en
pensant bien qu’il peut y avoir des alarmes, des caméras…mais ça ne s’est pas
fait ! Pourquoi ? Simplement parce que le transport de fonds, c’est plus
intéressant.
XMD : Peux-tu me reparler de la suite de la casse de la bijouterie Platroz à Chantilly
Redoine Faïd : Le braquage de la bijouterie Platroz a très bien commencé. Tout était basé
sur la prise d’otage. Certes, il faut une logistique (combinaisons et cagoules-gants,
talkie-walkie, postiches et costumes, armes, etc..), des véhicules, un plan de repli
avec une planque, un « scénario » (ou plutôt un « cinéma » !) mais le plus
important est de ne pas te faire remarquer lorsque tu interviens pour pendre la
famille en otage. Pourquoi ? Parce qu’il faut absolument que personne ne te voit,
personne n’entende quoique ce soit, qu’il n’y est rien d’anormal. Si tu « enquilles »
bien la famille, t’as réussi 99 % de l’affaire. Sa famille prise en otage, la « cible »
ne jouera pas au héros et fera tout ce que tu demandes. Déjà, elle te briefera
durant la « longue nuit » qu’elle va passer avec toi sur tous les détails que toi, tu ne
peux pas connaître. Car tu sais que c’est elle qui détient les « codes » ou les clés, tu
peux rentrer et attendre le reste du personnel mais tu n’es pas au courant que son
téléphone personnel sonne trois fois à 7heures et qu’elle doit rendre la même à son
interlocuteur depuis son domicile et une fois arrivé sur place. Il y a tout un tas de
signaux, ne serait-ce que dans la manière d’ouvrir la boutique ou la façon de garer
son véhicule ou autre. Mais la « cible » te dira tout car la vie de sa famille est
beaucoup plus importante que le reste. Mais si tu t’es mal introduit au domicile de
la famille, alors tu as complètement foiré l’opération. Parce que la personne a crié
(s’est défendue) a alarmé un passant ou actionné une alarme.
Pour la bijouterie Platroz, «l’enquillade» s’est passée dans le parking souterrain.
Imparable. La seule chose qui puisse empêcher cela sous un parking souterrain
serait la présence d’une autre personne dans une autre voiture (un voisin), voir
une caméra reliée à un dispositif de télésurveillance qui préviendrait les services de
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police de facto au cas ou un locataire se ferait agressé sous le parking (menace de
car-jacking ou autre). Bien entendu, cela n’était pas le cas et on a pu l’intercepter
sous le parking sans grandes difficultés. Placé dans la voiture, on l’a amené à deux
trois kilomètres de son domicile ou l’attendait un complice qui a gardé la « cible ».
On ne pouvait monter encagoulés et armés à son domicile à 19 heures, à un
moment où tous les locataires rentrent chez eux. Trop visible et trop risqué. Il
fallait attendre 23 heures 30-minuit. C’est désert, et donc plus calme. Dans
l’attente, on récupère toutes les clés : celle de son appartement, le bip de son
garage et, bien sûr, le « sésame » de la caverne d’Ali Baba (clés de la bijouterie de
Creil et de Chantilly et celles des coffres). Tout est ok. La housse contenant mon
costume trois pièces de couleur clair, cravate, la perruque et moustache, le fond de
teint, la paire de lunettes « Wayfarer » Ray-Ban, gants en cuir, holster et 9mm…
Tout est prêt pour le « grand » cinéma. La suite, c’est de se rendre au domicile de
sa femme car elle va s’inquiéter si son mari ne rentre pas. Direction le domicile. Un
jeu d’enfant : On a les clés ! On ne frappe pas à la porte, on ouvre les serrures. Elle
entend les clés du verrou : « C’est toi ? » Je lui réponds : « Oui ». Elle m’ouvre. Je
lui mets direct une main sur la bouche car elle risque de crier. Elle a très, très, très
peur. Je ne la pousse pas dans le salon et je n’ai pas besoin de la « conditionner ».
Elle aussi, comprend « qui » on est et « pourquoi » on est ici. Je lui demande de ne
pas compromettre l’opération. Si j’ai les clés, c’est que « j’ai » son mari. « On « la
tient » elle aussi avec le piège que « l’autre » est pris en otage. Pas de menottes ni
de « billonnage ». Cela ne sert à rien. Je vois en un instant que j’ai affaire à
quelqu’un de très intelligent. Elle peut même regarder la télé et consommer. Je
laisse un complice sur place et je pars rejoindre le complice resté avec la « cible ».
Erreur monumentale. Durant mon absence, mon complice qui est beaucoup moins
aguerri que moi à la prise d’otages se met à manipuler son arme. Un coup de feu
part et claque dans l’enceinte de l’appartement. Il avait éteint la télé (on se
demande pourquoi…) et le bruit a peut-être alerté les voisins. Il panique. Il ligote
la femme et quitte les lieux. Au même moment je refais apparition devant la
résidence et à ma grande inquiétude je le retrouve au pied de l’immeuble : «
Qu’est ce qui se passe ?! » il m’explique que connement il a manipulé son arme et
un coup de feu est parti, qu’il a éteint la télé, etc.… « Pourquoi t’es sorti de
l’appartement ? » Il n’a pas le temps de me répondre car les gendarmes sont sur
place. La femme a réussi à se défaire de ses liens et a prévenu les gendarmes. Je
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savais qu’elle était intelligente ! OK, c’est mort. On décroche. Je prends la suite
des opérations. Je demande au complice de faire comme moi. On se planque dans
un buisson. Lui, il veut s’enfuir en courant à travers la ville. Je lui dis : « Pas
question. On prend la voiture et on va récupérer le copain resté avec la « cible » à 3
kilomètres ». Il n’est pas d’accord. On se fâche. Bref, je pars dans la voiture. Deux
voitures de gendarmes veulent me barrer la route. Je feinte en levant les bras et
d’un coup, j’embraye la deuxième et je redémarre sur les chapeaux de roue. Je les
ais bien eus ! Cela ne les empêche pas de me tirer dessus. Je m’abaisse sous le
volant. Comme dans les films. Un pneu crève. J’abandonne la voiture et je prends
mes jambes à mon cou. Je suis en excellente condition physique et je perds mes
poursuivants sans aucune difficulté. Je rejoins mon « copain » au prix de gros
risques. Je le récupère et on rentre. Voilà comment j’ai « raté » la caverne d’Ali
Baba. Au final, on laisse un bijoutier traumatisé mais heureux de retrouver sa
femme (très courageuse… et intelligente !). Le complice qui a tout fait foirer se
fera prendre bien plus tard pour une autre histoire et me balancera de surcroît
pour atténuer sa peine. Il ne fera que deux ans de prison alors que j’en prendrai
douze pour le même délit. Je ne trouve pas que j’ai été traité injustement car je
sais pourquoi j’étais en prison.
XMD : Peux-tu me parler de la peur ?
Redoine Faïd : Le braquage, c’est quelque chose qui fait peur au départ.
Il y a plusieurs sortes de braquages, d’abord :
- le braqueur amateur qui vient à la va-vite, qui peut tirer dans tous les sens, ce
n’est pas ma catégorie.
-puis il y a l’attaque à mains armées du pseudo-professionnel qui va avoir une
cagoule, qui ne va laisser d’empreintes, qui va avoir un flingue mais qui va y aller
au culot, qui a de la chance et qui part…
-ensuite, il y a le braquage où tout est prévu ; si les consignes sont respectées, tout
se passera bien (renseignement, timing, …)
Ca apporte plus d’assurance, ça enlève de la peur, mais elle est toujours là.
Quand tu montes sur une bijouterie, t’es animé par le fait de réussir ton coup, un
beau coup, tu sais que tu fais une belle affaire, t’es en costard, t’as une perruque,
des moustaches, des lunettes…c’est la classe quoi !!!
Sur 150 braquages dans ma vie (banques, bijouteries, fourgons blindés…) ça s’est
bien passé au moins 135 fois, j’ai eu une dizaine d’échecs où je n’ai pas pu prendre
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l’argent et je me suis sauvé, et on m’a tiré dessus 2 fois, une fois les gendarmes et
une fois les policiers lors de l’attaque d’un fourgon blindé.
J’ai eu beaucoup de réussite parce qu’à chaque fois, j’ai bien préparé mon affaire,
et chaque fois que ça s’est mal passé, c’est que quelqu’un dans l’équipe n’a pas
respecté les consignes.
Il est très important que chacun s’occupe de ce qu’il a à faire : quelqu’un qui doit
rester au comité d’accueil pour les clients qui arrivent…quelqu’un qui va tenir en
respect les employés et les clients et 2 qui vont fracasser les vitres prendre le
matériel et puis se sauver.
XMD : On a peur combien de temps à l’avance ?
Redoine Faïd : Une semaine, 3-4 jours avant, tu as un plus peur. La veille et le jour de
l’affaire, là tu vas aux toilettes, moi j’allais vomir.
D’autres, ont un manque d’appétit, le regard qui change, il y a une rigidité sur le
visage.
Un jour avant, je retirais ma montre et ma chaîne en or pour que quelqu’un les
donne à ma femme si je mourrais.
Quand tu pars, tu es conditionné, tu sais exactement où tu mets les pieds, tu sais
que tu peux mourir mais tu restes déterminé.
C’est un sujet tabou la peur et je disais souvent à mes potes qu’il est normal
d’avoir peur, c’est humain. Le mec qui n’a pas peur, c’est un malade, on va mourir
à cause de lui ou il va tuer quelqu’un donc il n’a pas sa place ici.
Mais la peur ne doit pas paralyser, on doit rester concentré.
Une fois que l’on est entré dans la bijouterie, que l’action commence, la peur
disparaît, t’es un robot. A froid, tu as pensé à tout ce que tu allais faire donc
forcément à chaud, tu sais exactement ce que tu fais. Mais il faut faire attention
aussi à ce qu’il n’y ait pas un grand peureux dans l’équipe car la peur se diffuse.
Beaucoup prennent de la cocaïne pour se donner du courage, mais ça nuit à la
concentration.
XMD : Es-tu conscient de la peur qu’éprouvent les gens quand vous les braquiez ?
Redoine Faïd : Quand tu braques avec une arme, même si tu ne blesses pas, même si tu ne
tues pas, tu diffuses une peur ; moralement c’est dur pour la personne en face de
toi. Mais ça tu ne le sais pas, tu te rendras compte bien plus tard, quand tu
passeras en cours d’assises et que tu auras les victimes en face de toi, que tu n’as ni
blessées, ni tapées, ni insultées mais qui restent traumatisées 10 ans après.
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C’est vraiment là que tu te rends compte que ce que tu fais, le simple fait de
braquer quelqu’un avec une arme peut avoir un préjudice moral assez
exceptionnel.
XMD : Sinon, ils font comment les braqueurs ?
Redoine Faïd : Quand on pénètre dans la boutique il faut que tout le monde obéisse.
« Tout le monde à terre, ne faîtes pas les héros, le premier qui lève la tête je le
bute. » Il faut les mettre en condition. Il faut être vraiment méchant verbalement
pour qu’ils comprennent que tu n’es pas là pour rigoler. Attention je vais tirer. Ca
gueule.
Ca peut s’apparenter à une scène de guerre. Les gens n’ont pas compris ça. Parce
que les braqueurs ont des pistolets mitrailleurs, des gilets pare balles. C’est un
commando quand même, c’est la guerre. Face à des gens habillées en costume et en
tailleurs il y a une force de puissance qui est extraordinaire.
Une personne qui est récalcitrante ça se gère mais ça ne fait pas paniquer pour
autant les braqueurs.
XMD : Concernant la Place Vendôme, comment un braqueur va-t-il choisir une
bijouterie plutôt qu’une autre ?
Redoine Faïd : Boucheron, c’est trop grand, trop d’espace à maîtriser il faut être
nombreux pour occuper le terrain, trop de grandes vitrines aussi, donc plus de
gens qui te voient de l’extérieur.
Ce sera plus facile dans une petite bijouterie où il y a 1 ou 2 personnels, un endroit
où il y a beaucoup de personnels fera reculer un braqueur, trop de gens à
maîtriser.
La marque aussi, ceux qui braquent les bijouteries préfèrent avoir des bijoux qui
ne sont pas marqués.
XMD : Pourquoi un braqueur choisira plutôt Chopard que Boucheron ?
Redoine Faïd : Chopard est plus petit que Boucheron mais surtout ce n’est pas vers le
ministère de la Justice, elle n’est pas sur la place Vendôme.
Le repérage des lieux, pour Boucheron, est difficile aussi, tu ne pourras pas utiliser
de sous-marin, donc ce sera un piéton de l’autre côté de la place, vers chez
Chopard avec des jumelles ; quelqu’un qui prend une chambre au Ritz ; il pourra
y avoir une prise d’otages. Aujourd’hui, en 2010, le mec rentrera certainement
repérer avec une caméra dans une sacoche, des lunettes. Le braqueur peut envoyer
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une femme en repérage. Ca peut être un vieux, une vielle, il faut se méfier de tout
le monde.
Tu as plusieurs choses à faire pour rentrer dans une bijouterie Place Vendôme.
J’étais à un moment sur la boutique Fred. On serait arrivé à deux voir un parce
que, tu le sais très bien, quand tu arrives à deux, trois ou quatre ça fait bizarre. Il
faut qu’il y ait un qui rentre ou un deuxième qui suit derrière et un chauffeur.
Tiens la bagnole, tu ne la vole même pas. T’as la belle voiture de location avec
chauffeur. Il vient, le mec il finit dans le coffre et tu as la voiture le matin même.
Tu la places devant la boutique. Le mec est déguisé en saoudien, celui qui a une
belle voiture avec chauffeur (tu lui mets une casquette comme ça on ne voit pas ses
cheveux et une paire de lunettes), il t’accompagne avec ton sac parce que toi t’es
vieux, tu rentres et alors hop « tout le monde à terre ! » C’est juste un exemple
d’entrée. Pourquoi ? Parce que tu sais que la personne en face te surveille, il
t’observe. C’est comme pour rentrer dans une discothèque, il ne faut surtout pas
attirer l’attention. Toi, quand tu arrives, tu connais déjà les lieux, les vitrines où
aller. Tu vas à l’essentiel et tu te casses vite fait.
XMD : Comment se déroule la phase de reconnaissance ? Qu’est-ce que tu cherches ?
Redoine Faïd : Le nombre de personnel est très important, les dispositifs des caméras, tu
t’en fous parce que tu vas les neutraliser, ça ne sert à rien elles peuvent servir à la
police pour l’identification.
Si je viens te braquer, toi, je vais prendre un accent (marseillais, corse, un cheveu
sur la langue…) pour embrouiller et manipuler les employés.
Tout ce que tu fais va être répété à la police, donc n’en fait pas trop.
Évidemment, tu changes les prénoms, les voitures que tu vas utiliser pour le
braquage ne doivent pas laisser de traces (plaques d’immatriculation, empreintes,
…)
Pour la bijouterie, t’as toujours une matraque en plastique, c’est la règle (pour
assommer quelqu’un de récalcitrant…) une bombe lacrymogène.
XMD : Qu’est ce qu’on peut faire pour arrêter ce genre de choses ?
Redoine Faïd : Je te dis que si un mec se « met » sur toi sérieusement, qu’il t’observe
pendant 2-3 mois il n’y a que le truc aléatoire qui l’arrêtera.
Mon expérience personnelle m’a appris que tout est faisable n’importe quelle
bijouterie, n’importe où à partir du moment où tu prends le temps, avec les
moyens d’aujourd’hui, et que tu connais bien ton travail.
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XMD : Qu’est ce qui peut être considéré comme aléatoire dans une bijouterie ?
Redoine Faïd : Déjà, le personnel, le garde tu as intérêt à bien le surveiller, surtout s’il
n’est pas là depuis longtemps, parce que tu ne connais pas ses relations. Quand il
quitte la boutique, tu ne sais pas où il va, ses fréquentations, tu ne sais pas avec qui
il mange. Ces gens-là peuvent apporter des infos assez cruciales à un groupe de
malfaiteurs qui peut te taper. Comment on sait qu’un mec travaille chez
Boucheron ? Parfois, il fume du shit, tout le monde fume du shit maintenant. Il
peut se confier à un dealer et le dealer il va en parler à quelqu’un qu’il ne faut
pas ; c’est comme ça qu’on remonte les sources ; c’est tout con. Le mec il sniffe de
la coke. Parfois aussi, il fréquente les prostituées qui elles-mêmes fréquentent les
caïds….Ils ne doivent pas tout savoir. Il y a des choses que les employés ne doivent
pas savoir. Parce que quelqu’un qui cherche des infos, s’il n’a pas tout calculé, il
est mort.
Les niveaux de sécurité doivent être cloisonnés au niveau de l’échelle de confiance
que tu donnes à chacun des employés. Ça c’est hyper, hyper important et ça te
permet aussi d’identifier la source mais ils doivent surtout apprendre à se taire. Le
problème c’est une fois dehors les gens parlent de trop. Ils racontent leurs vies ces
cons. Il faut qu’ils ferment leur gueule. Celui à qui tu donnes des responsabilités tu
lui dis « fermes ta gueule ». C’est secret, c’est top secret. Le mec va se confier avec
sa collègue ou sa femme et c’est tout le système qui est mort.
XMD : Revenons aux gardes, que faut-il faire d’autre pour qu’ils soient plus
opérationnels ?
Redoine Faïd : La simulation, beaucoup de simulation. Sans simulation ou entraînement
t’es mort. C’est bien le papier mais tu vas improviser. Il faut que les réflexes soient
automatiques. Tu dois être courageux et conditionné pour réagir. Il faut faire des
séances de travail, beaucoup bosser. A la limite un audit.
XMD : Quelle est la meilleure période de la journée pour attaquer une bijouterie ?
Redoine Faïd : Pour moi l’idéal pour taper une bijouterie c’est à midi. Les gens vont
manger, ils changent de service. Les gens dans la rue vont manger aussi ils ne
regardent pas dans les vitrines. Il est mieux d’avoir le moins de clients à l’intérieur
que possible. L’attaque chez Chopard place Vendôme c’était à midi. Les flics l’ont
topé chez le receleur à l’étranger. Il a mal choisi son receleur.
XMD : Quels conseils donnerais-tu à un braqueur?
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Redoine Faïd : Mon pote, numéro un ne fait confiance à personne hormis ceux qui
bossent avec toi. Armes toi. Soit vigilant, soit rapide. Plus tu perds du temps plus
tu auras des policiers qui seront sur place et tu seras enfermé comme dans un
piège.
XMD : Quelles sont les failles des Pink Panthers ?
Redoine Faïd : Ils se font souvent arrêter parce que la plupart du temps, ils travaillent à
visage découvert.
Le plus important pour contrer les Pink Panther c’est l’entrée, il faut travailler sur
l’entrée, eux, si ils entrent, t’es mort.
Donc il faut travailler sur la vigilance, sur le profiling, l’emplacement de la
boutique si elle est bien placée ou si elle se trouve dans un cul-de-sac.
XMD : Il y a-t-il un moment ou une raison pouvant faire annuler la mission ?
Redoine Faïd : Si tu as tout calculé, il n’y a que le passage inopiné d’une patrouille de
police qui passe au même moment et au même endroit (et donc : au mauvais
endroit et au mauvais moment pour toi !). Le hasard qui s’immisce dans un
braquage ne le fait pas « annuler » mais le fait « reporter ». Tu reviens une autre
fois et c’est réglé. Par contre, si tu viens et tu ne trouves pas la même personne ou
le même procédé de sécurité, tu repars aussi. Faut faire attention au « report »
d’opération car cela casse la « dynamique » d’une équipe de voleurs (aussi
professionnelle soit- elle). Car le milieu des braqueurs est un monde de fainéants.
Les gens rechignent à la tâche (faut sans cesse déplacer les voitures, ranger le «
matos », sacrifice de la vie de famille… Il y a comme une symétrie de caractères et
de comportements que tu trouves au sein du milieu des services spécialisés de la
PJ). Les meilleurs sont ceux qui arrivent justement à gérer tous ces paramètres.
Quand tu connais tous ces risques et ces problèmes majeurs, et que tu arrives à ta
finalité, c’est que tu es un « TOP ». C’est le résultat qui compte et rien que le
résultat. Si tu n’y arrives pas, c’est que tu n’es pas fait pour ça. Mais ce n’est pas
évident aussi car parfois les complices n’adhèrent pas au mode opératoire ou ils
sont pris par « l’apparence » dangereuse du coup. Tu dis a un mec de prendre son
scooter ou bien de se prémunir de bonnes baskets car on va devoir s’échapper par
le toit d’immeuble de la place Vendôme, c’est pas sûr qu’il adhère… Surtout si
l’objectif est de briser à la masse une vitrine d’une grande enseigne de la place en
plein jour ! Quand tu entres dans une bijouterie pour la braquer, tu t’en fous du
personnel et des caméras, tout comme le sas. Faut pas te faire remarquer. L’idéal :
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t’arrives quand il pleut ! La pluie fait que les gens dans leurs voitures regardent
devant eux, les passants sont pressés de se couvrir, le personnel de sécurité
discerne mal les nouveaux entrants. Parfois tu te désistes aussi parce qu’un
complice n’est pas là le jour J parce qu’il a peur…
XMD : Il y a-t-il des commandes spéciales concernant les attaques ?
Redoine Faïd : Les commandes sont rares. La plupart du temps, celui qui « commande »
va aussi proposer « l’affaire » ou la « donner ». C’est souvent un gars qui bosse
dans le secteur ou un négociant-associé jaloux pour diverses causes. Mais cela peut
aussi être un fourgue. Celui-ci côtoie des voleurs certes, mais aussi tout le beau
monde qui va l’aider à « fourguer » la marchandise. Le fourgue a des oreilles, il
écoute et sait renifler les bonnes affaires. Mais il est rare de se trouver face à cette
« combinaison gagnante » : Un fourgue « inremontable » avec des tuyaux en or au
sein du milieu de la joaillerie, un trio de braqueurs professionnel et discret, des
gens aisés et capables d’être patients…
Le casse du plus grand diamant du monde sur la Tamise à LONDRES en 2001 en
est la parfaite illustration. Un fourgue juif ayant un contact avec des russes.
Commande est prise. Une équipe de malfaiteurs particulièrement redoutable. Un
casse monté à la perfection avec une pelleteuse pour défoncer la grille d’entrée, des
« voleurs rapides » aux méthodes efficaces, un bateau à moteur rapide pour
s’échapper par le fleuve… Hélas, Scotland Yard était sur le coup dès le départ et a
coffré tout ce beau monde en flagrant délit !
XMD : Avais-tu une check-list en préparation des attaques ?
Redoine Faïd : Quand tu pars en repérage, personne ne sait, hormis toi et un proche, que
tu as choisi cet objectif, que tu le surveilles, ou que tu sois sur un « coup ».
Absolument personne. Il n’y a aucune confiance. Pas qu’il y ait une brebis galeuse
dans ton équipe mais quelqu’un peut faire une maladresse ou se rendre sur le lieu
du coup sans passer par les mesures strictement nécessaires à une contre-filature
susceptible de détecter une éventuelle « présence policière ». C’est un point très
important. Car il est vital de se rendre en reconnaissance sans qu’il y ait le
moindre doute concernant la police.
Ensuite, tu cibles tout ce qui va être primordial pour « taper » l’affaire :
D’abord le nombre de personnes travaillant à l’intérieur de la boutique et
connaître les différents échelons de responsabilité de chacun. Par exemple une
dame d’un certain âge qui pénètre par l’entrée du personnel et que tu ne vois
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pratiquement jamais au rez-de-chaussée de la boutique, tu vas supposer qu’elle a
de l’ancienneté et que donc on lui fait confiance et que si tu ne la vois pas en vitrine
c’est qu’elle est au bureau d’en haut, voire qu’elle bosse à l’atelier. C’est donc une
personne intéressante pour toi, quelqu’un à qui on confie des responsabilités. C’est
pas une simple vendeuse à qui on demande d’accueillir un client. Mais la « simple
» vendeuse est tout aussi intéressante pour toi car elle possède les clés des
vitrines… Elles sortent de la boutique, elles ne se méfient jamais. Dès qu’elles
sortent le soir, tu les suis. A pied ou en voiture. Tu les loges. T’as leurs prénoms et
adresses. T’as tous les modèles des véhicules ou scooter du personnel. Tu sais qui
vient en métro, qui se fait déposer par son mari, qui vient en voiture… Mieux, le
jour ou tu tapes, t’appelles les gens par leur prénom, à coup sûr, cela va
embrouiller la police et faire croire à une information venue de l’intérieur. Tu
brouilles ainsi les pistes. C’est un jeu d’enfant. Idem pour les gars de la sécu. Tu
emmagasines les visages dans ton cerveau. Tu ressors toujours le « responsable ».
Toujours. A force de les voir le matin et pendant la journée, tu finis par leur
donner même des noms : la « vieille », la « blonde », le « costaud », le « boss », le «
gros », etc.
Ensuite vient la boutique. Primordial, c’est le chronométrage des horaires : Préouverture. Ouverture. Fréquence des pauses. Déjeuner. Fermeture. Le nom de la
société de télésurveillance et de l’alarme. Emplacement des sirènes et des caméras,
intérieur et extérieur, de la boutique mais aussi les caméras des rues avoisinant
tout le périmètre afin de ne pas avoir de problèmes par la suite avec « l’enquête »
de la PJ. Puis les vitrines extérieures (solidité, espace d’air, épaisseur, marchandise
exposée…), vitrines intérieures (serrures, marchandises exposée, épaisseur…),
porte d’entrée et de service ainsi que porte intérieure (sas, serrures, épaisseur,
blindage…).
Enfin, il est important de jauger l’environnement dans lequel tu vas opérer. Tout
le périmètre. Savoir où sont les « policiers » les plus proches. L’endroit où tu vas
garer ton véhicule de fuite, ton véhicule relais. Quelle route vas-tu emprunter pour
arriver sur les lieux en évitant les caméras et les « gens » ? Tu y travailles. La
configuration extérieure et le chronométrage du mode opératoire sont des éléments
essentiels à une bonne opération « commando ». Connaître les lieux t’amènes à
plus d’assurance dans ton action. Non seulement tu sais comment entrer, qui est
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qui, tu sais où trouver ce qui t’intéresse, les lieux extérieurs n’ont aucun secret
pour toi.
En bref, l’accumulation des infos amène à une vision globale de toute la boutique.
C’est cette base de données qui va définir le mode opératoire pour « frapper » la
boutique, le jour, l’heure, le temps. Mais sans « fourgue », pas de « casse ».
XMD : « Il n’y a pas d’issue que la récidive » est-on obligé de recommencer une fois sorti
de prison ?
Statistiquement 70-80% récidivent.
Redoine Faïd : En ce qui concerne la récidive, au bout de 5-6 ans de prison, je pensais que
j’avais tout compris, si j’étais sorti à ce moment-là, on ne m’aurait pas rendu
service.
Au bout de 7-8 ans, j’ai encore appris des choses, j’ai positivé sur ce temps perdu,
j’ai eu le temps de faire un cheminement intérieur. J’ai appris sur moi-même, sur
les évènements qui m’ont amené en prison, la famille…au bout de 9 ans, j’ai
stagné, mais la justice a bien fait les choses parce qu’un an après, je sortais.
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Redoine Faïd, Former Armed Robber
Courtesy translation of a mail sent by Redoine to the author on 4 February 2010
following a question that was asked to him: “which are the criminal markets in the
coming years”?
“My dear friend,
It is generally believed by all the specialists in criminal matters that the future of
criminal activity will be the trafficking of cocaine on a large scale. This area of
narcotics is currently is very largely controlled by North America, which contains the
heaviest users of cocaine but the overcrowding of the route to the United States has
meant that a new opportunity has arisen to make a lot of money from narcotics, with
new hubs in Spain and Holland. However, everybody is aware of this. There is,
though, a similar trend in France, where it is recognised that the consumption of
narcotics seems to be increasing.
Over the 1980s the trafficking of narcotics, particularly of cannabis, gradually
increased in France. The traditional criminal fraternity began, little by little, to move
out of bank hold-ups and prostitution in favour of the “Dope” sector (as they called it
at that time) which was much more lucrative and also less risky.
After the great waves of arrests of armed robbers (which was the most popular type of
crime in the 1980s) the majority of criminals moved into the “Dope” market.
Even if the code of “Honour amongst thieves” is just folklore, there existed a number
of people who knew how to behave. The narcotics market gradually corrupts the
audacious - yet courageous - nature of the criminal class. This is because the
trafficking of narcotics is a “twisted” market, full of scams, deceitful actions and full
of informers. It is not a closed community. It is more a relationship between dealers
than a relationship between members of an organised crime syndicate, such as is seen
in “The Goodfellas”. There are still disputes between gun-carrying members of the criminal
fraternity and some drugs dealers also settle matters with the gun.
The Judiciary Police (PJ) has a good understanding of the activities of French gangsters in the field
of narcotics. However, their wish to pursue traditional criminals has blinded them to the new
phenomena of “housing estates” and of “the suburbs”. Young people are distrusted by the normal
criminal community. Young French people who originate in North Africa and Africa inspire neither
confidence nor respect. Because of racism, the French criminals have not shared their perch with
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the new generation and also looked down upon people from North Africa. They were left aside and
ignored.
So, to give an example of how young criminals might operate, let us suppose that a person from
Paris meets up with a young person from Lyons and another from Marseilles. Firstly, they find a
contact who can sell them cannabis. Then they decide that they need money, capital outlay, mobile
telephones and stolen cars – they know how to steal cars – rent a lock-up garage and sell dope.
So then they go about their scheme and Bingo! It works. A really self-taught operation. They are not
on any criminal register, thus the police do not keep an eye on them. They can carry on their
business in peace.
One more thing. These young criminals share their knowledge with other young people and thus the
trafficking of drugs spreads through the community.
Additionally, we see the arrival of the famous “Go Fast” and “Slow Fast” cars which are loaded
with cannabis in Spain and which then come up the roads from the South of France at very high
speed.
These young people organise efficiently all the required elements in the narcotics market, which
include buying the drugs, their transhipment and storage, the selling of drugs to customers and nowadays - the laundering of the money. The effect of this is that young people who have grown up
in the shadow of the traditional criminal fraternity have become real professionals and have reached
the highest levels of organised crime.
Today, traditional criminals are disappearing. The Judicial Police are beginning to understand the
role of young people in organised crime.
In addition, the Minister of the Interior has just created a specialised unit to collect
the maximum of information on the activities of these young organized delinquents.
This is because the authorities are very worried about the situation. Why is this? The
answer is to be found in the following situation.
Momo and his friend Mamadou are sitting outside a sandwich bar, eating a kebab
sandwich and drinking from a can of Coca-Cola Zero. Then they go back into the
sandwich bar, pick up their satellite telephone and call - not Morocco - but Caracas
in Venezuela.
Then, talking to their South-American contacts in English or in
Spanish, they order hundreds of kilos of cocaine, for which they will pay millions of
Euros in cash. The money will be supplied by a bureau de change, which is run by a
Jew whom they have bribed with their money. These dealers have very, very large
amounts of money.
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Xavier Mac Donald
The people under discussion are very violent – much more than traditional criminals.
They are heavily armed, in case anybody wants to interfere in their activities. It is no
longer the .357 Magnum of Belmondo or the .45 automatic, which is the typical
weapon of hit men of the older generation. The young criminal will get his scooter,
find a partner, obtain a Kalashnikov and then fire into the crowd. Something similar
to this happened recently at Gare du Nord in Paris, where the passengers in a car
were fired upon.
In September 2009, a young drug-dealer did not hesitate to hire a hit man, arm him
with a rifle with a telescopic sight and then get him to kill one of the inmates of
Grenoble prison. The contract was accordingly carried out.
With the enormous amounts of money generated by trafficking cocaine, there is a risk
that violence will increase to a higher level. One sees this in Mexico, which is the
most important place in the world for the narcotics trade, where not a day passes
without the killing of a politician, a magistrate or a police officer, as a result of a
Mafia-style contract. In brief, young people are beginning to acquire enormous
resources.”
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Redoine Faïd ancien braqueur à main armée
Mail envoyé à l’auteur par Redoine le 4 février 2010, concernant une question qui
lui a été posée “Quels sont les marchés porteurs dans les années à venir ? »
« Cher ami,
Il est une évidence pour tous les spécialistes, le marché criminel en Europe de
l'avenir sera le trafic de cocaïne à grande échelle. Ce secteur du stupéfiants étant plus
ou moins réservé à l'Amérique du nord (le plus gros consommateur de cocaïne) mais
la saturation de la "route" vers les États-Unis a ouvert un nouvel eldorado (avec
comme nouvelle plaque tournante l'Espagne et la Hollande). Mais de cela, tout le
monde est au courant.
Pourtant, un phénomène lié à ce marché des "stups"(qui là aussi, n'échappera à
personne) semble surgir en France.
Dans les années 80, le trafic des stups lié au cannabis apparaît peu à peu en France.
Les gars du "milieu traditionnel" commencent peu à peu à délaisser le braquage de
banque et la prostitution pour ce secteur du "chite" (comme ils disaient à cette
époque) beaucoup plus lucratif mais aussi, beaucoup moins risqué. Après la grosse
vague d'arrestations des équipes de braqueurs (qui était à cette période la forme de
criminalité la plus répandue) dans les années 80, la plupart se sont reconverties dans
le "chite". La "mentale" en a pris un coup. Même si le code d'honneur reste un
folklore, y'avait tout de même un paquet de gars qui savait se tenir. Le marché des
stups va peu à peu "corrompre" la vaillance et le courage du "milieu". Tout
simplement parce que le marché des stups, c'est un milieu tordu: y'a pleins
d'embrouilles, des magouilles, des balances à la pelle ; c'est pas un monde
"cloisonné", c'est plus une relation de "commerçants" que de "GOODFELLAS"...
Sauf que tu as des "flingues" entre les gars et que les différents "commerciaux" se
règlent par le feu.
Les services spécialisés de la PJ ont été bien entendus très au fait de l'activité de la
truanderie française au niveau des stups. Mais leur obnubilation à suivre les voyous
du milieu traditionnel les ont aveuglés sur le phénomène des "cités", de la banlieue...
Les jeunes sont mal vus par le milieu « traditionnel ». Les black-beurs n'inspire ni la
confiance, ni le respect. Le racisme aidant les voyous français n'ont pas tendu la
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perche à la nouvelle génération. Ils les ont méprisés en cachette. Alors -pour faire
une métaphore- un jour, tu as un jeune de Paris, avec un autre de Lyon, et encore un
autre de Marseille qui décident de s'affranchir des aînés en partant en Espagne et au
Maroc. Au bluff, ils arrivent à dénicher un "contact" qui leur vendrait le cannabis.
Ils réfléchissent: faut de l'argent - une mise de départ -, des téléphones portables, des
voitures volées-ils savent voler les voitures-, louer des box, et vendre la "came"... Ils
se lancent et BINGO! Ça marche. De vrais autodidactes. Ils ne sont pas fichés et donc
pas surveillés. Ils vont pouvoir monter leur business dans le calme. Le truc en plus:
les "jeunes" partagent leur "science" avec leurs pairs de banlieue. Ce qui fait que
tous les jeunes se sont lancés dans le business.
C'est l'apparition des fameux GOFAST et SLOWFAST (des voitures chargés de
cannabis en Espagne et qui remontent en bombe les routes du Sud). Inconsciemment,
ils maitrisent les éléments essentiels au bon fonctionnement du marché des
stupéfiants: L'achat, le transport, le transbordement, le stockage, la distribution et aujourd'hui- le blanchiment. En clair, les jeunes -dans l'ombre du "milieu
traditionnel"- sont devenus de véritables professionnels et ont pénétrés les plus hautes
sphères du grand banditisme.
Aujourd'hui, le milieu "traditionnel" a disparu. La PJ commence à découvrir
l'ampleur que les jeunes de "cités" ont pris dans la "délinquance" organisée.
D'ailleurs, le ministère de l'intérieur vient de créer une unité spécialisée pour
collecter le maximum d'infos sur les jeunes de banlieue parce qu'aujourd'hui, ils
s'inquiètent beaucoup. Pourquoi? Pour la simple raison que le Momo et son copain
Mamadou, devant toi, ils mangent un sandwich kebab avec une canette de Coca-zéro.
Mais lorsqu'ils rentrent dans la gargote (sandwicherie), ils dégainent un téléphone
"satellitaire", appelle un contact -non plus au Maroc - mais à Caracas au Venezuela,
parle en anglais ou en espagnol avec leur interlocuteurs sud-américains, commande
des centaines de kilos de cocaïne, paye cash la marchandises en millions d'euros via
un bureau de change d'un juif de la place de Paris qu'ils ont soudoyés avec leur fric...
Et là, c'est d’autres moyens: c'est beaucoup, beaucoup d'argent. Ce sont des gens très
violents. Les gars de banlieue ont surclassés l'ancienne génération. A leur manière.
Ils se sont armés lourdement au cas où on voudrait les emmerder. Le jeune de la cité,
ce n’est pas le 357 magnum de Belmondo ou le 45 automatique qui est la signature
des "nettoyeurs" du milieu traditionnel. Le jeune de banlieue, il prend son scooter,
prend un partenaire vite-fait, prend une Kalachnikov et va tirer dans le tas... Comme
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Xavier Mac Donald
cela s'est passé dernièrement à la gare du nord. Un gars d'une cité de banlieue n'a
pas hésité à payer un mec, l'armer d'un fusil à lunettes, pour lui demander de tuer un
gars de cités qui était emprisonné à la prison de Grenoble. Contrat exécuté l'année
dernière. Avec les énormes moyens que le trafic de cocaïne va générer, la violence
risque de monter d'un cran. On le voit au Mexique, les nouveaux boss du narco
mondial, ou pas un jour ne se passe sans qu'un député, un magistrat ou un policier
ne soient assassinés par un "contrat" mafieux. Bref, les jeunes commencent à
posséder de très gros moyens. »
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Xavier Mac Donald
Mail sent by Redoine Faïd on 11 June 2010 concerning fear
« Dear Xavier,
There is a subject that is taboo in organised crime- fear. As you told me so well, if you
are afraid, then why do it? It’s a real dilemma. It took some time for me to answer
you because I had to seriously think about it…
Our common « mate » tried to talk about this in his book but without going into
depth. However, he does bring out a certain truth. I do not remember at which page
when he explained that whenever he went to reconnoitre a future target the found all
the excuses not to do it. But the following week he went back because he needed the
money.
More objectively, I think he was afraid. Even frightened to do an armed robbery.
Afraid of being caught, afraid of dying. Armed robbery is not like selling illicit
products, controlling fruit machines or prostitution. When you prepare an armed
robbery you are really afraid because you know you can die. People will always tell
you that when you “enter the scene” the stage fright goes away but when you have
done an armed robbery you feel completely empty. Somewhere down the line, the fact
that you have tasted this fear and this sensation of doubt, is this not similar to a ‘fix’?
To such a point that your body (mind?) asks for it again and again. Some will tell you
that it’s a game. It’s not a game. Push back the limits to see if you can push back or
master fear. Overcome fear? I don’t think so. Fear in terms of metaphysics is a kind
of « sensation ». The armed robber like the police officer seeks it. But this nobody will
admit it. There are some that can’t do it. They need to be led (bad influence) or
“snort”. To sum it up, they are not cut out for this work. But who is “made” for this?
Lunatics? What’s certain is this criminal category, at this level, is rare.
When you prepare a « high-end » heist similar to where you work, you can be sure
that the level of fear is at its highest: you are winded; your heart beat is at 200.
Nobody talks, time has literally stopped. Your face is rigid and white. Your blood has
stopped flowing. Your teeth are clenched. You do not think of anything except your
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mission. You’re a robot. … Everything is calculated to the second. You’re very
concentrated and the consequence is that your senses are on full alert. Everything
can be read in the eyes of each other. Anyhow, you do not hear anything. It’s as if
there was no more sound on earth. Only silence. Or rather, your own silence; you’re
on another “planet”. Inside you are swimming in sweat. Then, when the robbery is
over everything calms down. You come back down to “earth”. In brief, it’s the world
of armed robbers. The harder it is the higher you climb in temperature.
So why do all this if it is so ponderous? Nothing is surprising to turn back when you
live this sad life. It’s normal that you do not feel like doing it. Me, the prison, the
wasted time, the victims; my family that helped me to move on. Some are not able to
get rid of this “electric shock”. The lure of gain and inordinate ambitions of criminals
could be the reason for continuing. However, you come across certain cases or people
who don’t have the choice. Not because they are in need but simply because they are
on the run and that they need money or papers.
This is my inner feelings concerning “fear”. I am very clumsy when I talk about this.
You’ll notice that I didn’t talk about the cliché of robbers attacking for fun or
because of the beauty of the heist. The ones that tell you this are either completely
mad or surely that they are lying.
See you soon
Redoine »
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Xavier Mac Donald
Mail envoyé par Redoine Faïd le 11 juin 2010 concernant la peur
« Cher Xavier,
Si il y a un sujet tabou dans le milieu du grand banditisme, c’est bien la peur. Comme
tu me l’as si bien dit. Alors si tu as peur, pourquoi faire cela ? C’est un sacré
dilemme. J’ai mis du temps à te répondre car faut vraiment rechercher en
profondeur…
Notre « pote » en commun a essayé de parler de cela dans son livre sans vraiment
aborder le fond. Pourtant, il nous lâche quand même une certaine vérité. Je ne sais
plus à quelle page, il nous explique que lorsqu’il allait repérer le lieu de son futur
objectif, il trouvait toute les raisons pour ne pas y aller. Mais la semaine suivante, il y
revenait tout de même. Parce qu’il avait besoin d’argent.
Plus objectivement, je dirais qu’il avait peur. Même très peur de « retourner » au
braquage. Peur de se faire attraper, peur de mourir. Le braquage, c’est pas comme
vendre des produits stupéfiants, les machines à sous ou le proxénétisme. Lorsque tu
montes un hold-up, tu as très peur car tu sais que tu peux y laisser ta peau. Alors on
te dira toujours que lorsque « tu entres en scène » le trac s’en va, mais tu en ressors
complètement vidé. Quelque part, est ce que le fait d’avoir gouter à cette peur et à ce
sentiment de doute absolue- cela n’a-t-il pas agi comme un « shoot » sur ton
organisme ? Si bien que ton corps (ton esprit ?) te redemandera toujours ce défi. Y’en
a qui te dise que c’est un jeu. Ce n’est pas un jeu. Repousser les limites et voir si tu
peux repousser ou maitriser ta peur. Vaincre sa Peur ? Je ne pense pas. La peur en
terme métaphysique est une sorte de « sensation ». Le braqueur –comme le flic- la
recherche. Mais de cela, personne ne te l’avoueras. Il y en a qui n’y arrive pas. Ils ont
besoin soi d’être « entrainés » (mauvaise influence) ou « sniffé ». En clair, ils ne sont
pas faits pour cela. Mais qui est « fait » pour cela ? Des fous ? Ce qu’il y a de certain,
c’est que ce genre de mecs, de ce niveau, c’est rare.
Lorsque tu montes sur une affaire de « haut-niveau » comme sur le lieu de ton
travail, tu peux être sûr que le degré de peur sera à son top niveau : Tu as le souffle
coupé, le pouls à 200, Plus personne ne parle ou s’exprime. Le temps est littéralement
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Xavier Mac Donald
arrêté. Ton visage est rigide et blanc. Il n’y a plus de sang qui circule. La mâchoire
est serrée. Tu ne penses plus à rien d’autre que ce que tu dois faire. Tu es un « robot
». Tout est calculé au millimètre. Tu es tendu comme un arc et la conséquence
immédiate est que tous tes sens sont en alerte maximales. Tout se lit dans le regard de
chacun. De toute manière, tu n’entends plus rien. C’est comme si il n’y avait plus de
sons sur terre. Que le silence. Ou plutôt, que ton « silence ». T’es dans une autre
planète. Intérieurement, tu nages de sueur. Ensuite –une fois l’affaire terminée- tout
redescends. Tu reviens sur « terre ». Bref, C’est l’univers des voleurs. Au fur et à
mesure de ce que tu voles, tu « subis » cette « épreuve ». Plus c’est relevé, plus tu
montes en température.
Alors pourquoi faire tout cela si c’est tellement pesant ? Rien n’est étonnant de faire
demi-tour quand tu vis cette triste vie. Il est normal que tu n’aies pas envie de le faire.
Moi, la prison, le temps perdu, les victimes, la famille m’a fait passer à autre chose.
D’autre n’arrive pas à se défaire de cette « décharge » électrique. L’appât du gain et
les ambitions démesurées de certains gangsters peuvent être aussi la raison de cette
continuation. Cependant, tu retrouves aussi certains cas ou ces personnes n’ont pas
le choix. Non pas qu’il soit dans la nécessité, mais tout simplement parce qu’ils sont
en cavale et ils ont besoin d’argent et papiers.
Voilà pour cette recherche intérieure sur « la peur ». Je suis très maladroit lorsque je
parle de cela. Tu remarqueras que je ne t’ai pas parlé de ce cliché qui veut que des
gars montent sur un coup par « jeu » ou par beauté du casse. Celui qui te raconte
cela, c’est soi un barjot complet et surement quelqu’un qui ment.
Porte toi bien et profites de la coupe du monde. L’Angleterre a une très belle équipe :
de superbes individualités, mais surtout un excellent entraineur –Fabio Capello-.
Toute l’Angleterre est derrière son équipe. Personnellement, je supporterais le Brésil.
Rendez-vous en finale.
A très bientôt
Redoine »
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Xavier Mac Donald
Mail sent to the author concerning the weaknesses in the jewellery trade. 25
May 2010
« Hello Xavier,
Just a few words to conclude with our previous meeting. We worked very well last
time; I didn’t see the time go by.
…/…
I’d like to tell you that you must not be surprised if to detect weaknesses in your
‘security system’. Whether it’s the protection of a site or as sensitive site such as in
place Vendôme, with a lot of nerve, being well dressed and ‘in a hurry’, one is able
to enter sensitive zones. I experienced this. Sometimes you imagine that you have
thought about everything and then you read concerning Harry Winston, Avenue
Montaigne or in Graff in London that the entrance of the armed robbers was done
with such ease that it seems disconcerting. Why? Simply because the security of
the stores is placed are under the responsibility of men and women. It’s a weak
bastion because of the security guards:
A moment of inattention
Routine sets in
The certitude that nobody will dare ‘attack’ a site supposed to be ultraprotected.
Xavier, these are at least three reasons that may explain a ‘human’ dysfunction
concerning armed robberies especially if they are carried out by fast and efficient
professionals.”
Kind regards and see you soon
Redoine Faïd »
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Mail envoyé par Redoine Faïd à l’auteur concernant les faiblesses dans la
joaillerie. 25 Mai 2010
« Bonjour Xavier,
Je reviens vers toi afin de conclure notre dernier entretien. On a bien bossé la
dernière fois même si je n’ai pas vu le temps passé.
Je pense que l’on a fait le tour du sujet bien que l’on pourrait y travailler des jours
et des jours encore. Tu m’as dit que tu n’aimerais pas vivre aux Etats-Unis sauf
pour y travailler. Je te dirais donc de rester dans notre « vieille Europe » car la
France a besoin de ta culture de sécurité « anglo-saxonne ». Là-bas, la sécurité est
prise très au sérieux et ce, depuis très longtemps. Ce qui n’est pas toujours le cas
en France.
Je voudrais te dire aussi que tu ne dois pas être surpris parfois si tu trouves des
failles dans ton « système ». Que ce soit dans la protection d’un site, même aussi
sensible qu’il peut l’être sur la place Vendôme. Avec du culot, en étant très bien
habillé et « pressé », on arrive à pénétrer dans des zones sensibles. J’en ai fait
l’expérience. Parfois tu peux penser à tout et tu apprends que chez HARRY
WINSTON
-avenue Montaigne- ou GRAFF à LONDRES, l’intrusion («
l’enquillade ») des gangsters s’est déroulée avec une facilité absolument
déconcertante. Pourquoi ? Tout simplement parce que la sécurité des boutiques
sont sous la responsabilité d’hommes et de femmes. C’est un rempart faillible à
partir du moment où l’on cause ou provoque un manque de discernement aux
agents de sécurité :
-
Un instant d’inattention
-
La routine qui s’installe
-
La certitude que personne n’osera tenter une « attaque » dans un lieu censé
être ultra-protégé.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Xavier, voilà au moins trois raisons qui peuvent expliquer un disfonctionnement «
humain » lié à un braquage (de surcroît si celui-ci est exécuté par des
professionnels rapides et efficaces).
Cordialement et à très bientôt
Redoine Faïd »
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Xavier Mac Donald
Gary Tredgett Lloyd’s Underwriter at Ascot
My name is Gary Tredgett and I’m a Lloyd’s underwriter. At Ascot I’m
responsible for managing the Specie, Fine Art and Jewellery account, offering
various insurance products and solutions for a variety of businesses throughout the
world. The account consists of the following; Jewellery related business, from
mining the raw materials (gems) all the way through to the retail sector.
Cash in transit – offering financial institutions insurance products for cash
logistics
Fine Art – where we entertain private collectors to multi-million dollar exhibitions.
In addition, I also underwrite other interests such as precious metals, bullion etc.
We are one of the world’s market leaders in the Specie, Fine Art and Jewellery
business.
XMD: Could you tell a little concerning your security strategy concerning high jewellery
stores and cash-in-transit (CIT).
Gary Tredgett: Absolutely. We can break it down into quite some detail here. As I’ve
mentioned, with Lloyd’s itself, several of the blue chip companies (by blue chip
companies, I’m simply referring to well established jewellers and Cash logistical
companies) purchase their insurance products through Lloyd’s of London.
Therefore, the likes of Boucheron, Harry Winston, Graff, Brinks are associated
with Lloyd’s in one shape or form. There are a lot of considerations that are
required before the leading underwriters can make the judgement call into writing
the business and in turn take a share of the risk. Security therefore is paramount
when it comes to evaluating the risk. And it is a key component to consider given
the nature of the interest being insured, i.e. in my case Jewellery and cash.
Obviously, two desirable items for criminals to feed their activities and lifestyle.
My task is to gain a level of comfort with the client and the insurance risk on a
professional level. There would be interaction with the broker and the client,
establishing what their risk management processes are. A detailed submission of
the security information would be provided (which is treated as highly
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confidential) and with the aid of a third party surveyor, a complete review would
be conducted.
That’s how pretty much it works. It is quite a detailed approach and in order to
get to a level of comfort, this process is necessary and indeed compulsory. Once all
of this is in order, then the underwriter, or myself, can set the terms, conditions
and parameters of the policy that will hopefully tailor fit for that account or
Company.
XMD: So how do you calculate risk for one of your clients? You carry out a survey but
how do you actually calculate a risk?
Gary Tredgett: This is a challenge. You can only calculate the risk once you have
established what insurance coverage is being requested. And so after analysing all
the data (proposal forms, security survey reports, loss record, CV’s, business plan,
etc) which has been provided to you by the client and the broker, only then you can
genuinely evaluate the associated risk. This changes from client to client.
You then need to evaluate the risk factors and then determine the premium you
wish to charge. Each risk is different, albeit they are selling the same product in
some cases. This is what makes the market place so diverse by offering various
types of insurance cover and offering risk transfer solutions where possible.
It’s a challenge; and it’s a difficult class to write. I can’t personally control crime,
but I can align myself with the clients who take their insurance needs seriously.
XMD: Thus the risk is not done quantitatively with figures but through background
checks by talking with people and a proposal form. You would obviously look into
past performance?
Gary Tredgett: You’re right. Statistical analysis is important but its only part of the
process.
If you have an account or business which comes into London for
insurance purposes and into Lloyd’s, then there is a high probability that there
will be some historical data in bedded into the system already. Often background
checks are conducted with the business owners and concerns are also raised and
checked if the business is conducting business in a given sanctioned country etc.
Basically what I’m saying is that there are numerous checks and procedures
carried out behind the scenes.
With each risk, there is always a story and it’s important to listening and respond
to the clients’ needs, but I stress that this is a partnership and so therefore it’s
imperative that good business practices are considered. Information and
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Xavier Mac Donald
background research is key. You are building a picture partly with information
produced by the broker, but I also take my job very seriously and I think I go one
step further because I’m quite passionate about the industry but it’s also
paramount for me to meet the client; to sit down with them and look at them in the
eyes and to see what’s going on.
As an example, in Italy, I cancelled an insurance policy with an Insured, where the
proposal form and information said one thing, but upon my physical visit to the
operation is was quickly apparent that all was not well!! And so I came off the risk
immediately.
I’ve got to stress, that every business / risk is different. The controlling factors are
very different. The core requirements are the same but the processes will be on
different levels with different needs and desires.
XMD: How then do you know security is well done? You see something odd; you don’t
feel comfortable with a person? How do know if the security work inside is
correctly done?
Gary Tredgett: That’s a very good question and I’d like to say hand on my heart that I’m
comfortable with it but I’m not. The example I would give you is that, you as a
company, could have a procedural manual, a risk manual from which that all of
your employees have signed that they have read and understood the content. They
have done their due diligence, but are they conducting themselves 100% to this
level, to this standard 365 days of the year? Probably not and that’s where, for me,
complacency is a killer within the industry. It’s that odd day where the guard or
indeed the courier isn’t really focused and then situations occur which are
detrimental to the business.
XMD: What kind of control or checks and balances do you have in there; surveyors?
Gary Tredgett: Yes, absolutely. It’s encouraged that the said entity that is being insured
opens its doors, its books to an independent surveyor. A 360 degree view if you
like! I think if everything is positive on both sides and transparent, then this is a
good indication.
The surveyor, which I employ, walks through the business both from a physical
and a procedural standpoint. His job is to identify and asses the business quality. If
it is apparent that there are weaknesses within the system, then these will be
identified and a solution or recommendation to improve this aspect of the business
would be discussed and carried out.
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Xavier Mac Donald
As an Underwriter, I’m forever testing the system, effectively making sure that
they are as robust as they could be as a business.
Then you’ve got the continuing business model itself. Every account is different.
The broker should be in contact frequently with the client and continually
providing insurance needs as the business grows and where different risks
therefore appear.
XMD: Do your auditors or surveyors know what’s going on inside?
Gary Tredgett: It depends on who you’re using to do that job. There are levels of quality
out there. I’m a strong believer that if you pay for the best you get the best and the
team I use have military, police, underwriting and broking experience within the
industry. They are fairly measured in their approach. The underwriter will give
the surveyor an initial brief of what’s expected and what job I’m asking them to go
in and do. I’m looking for the surveyor to test the system and find weaknesses in
the various processes that are in place. As an example, we do covert operations
sometimes to test what has been put in place. To observe, monitor and report back.
We will extract that information and deal with that as we see fit.
XMD: So your checks and balances are your brokers and your independent surveyors.
Gary Tredgett: Yes they are to a degree. Plus also the quality and extent of information
that the Assured has provided. This level or quality of information can be
extremely varied and sometimes even inaccurate.
The proposal form which is filled out by the Assured is a vital part of the
underwriting process as it gives the underwriter a snap shot of the business in
terms of details of security, exposure information etc. It’s therefore so important
that this information is true and accurate.
So I guess it’s the quality control that I’m looking for. I can give you a statistic. I
lead quite a high percentage of the business within Lloyd’s (approx. 70%) and I
also decline a huge percentage of business in a given week or a given month. Why
is that? That’s because the information or the insurance offering isn’t very good
and it of a poor quality. For example, an Assured may have had several losses of
the same type which could be an indicator that the problem is not being solved at
all, just being ignored perhaps? Clients need to continually to invest and re-invest
in security and training, because crime doesn’t stand still. It’s 24-7 365 days of the
year and you’ve got to keep that one step ahead or at least attempt to be one step
ahead. It may just be the perception? If you look the part and are professional,
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Xavier Mac Donald
then the assailants may look elsewhere. A victory for the good guys that day! You
have to react to the environment you operate in and it changes quite frequently.
XMD: One step ahead is good but where for you is tomorrow’s step ahead? Are there
sectors that you have identified and dangerous?
Gary Tredgett: Interesting. I did state that you’re never going to wipe crime out. We have
the benefit within Lloyd’s in accessing global statistics and in deed trends in losses.
Our information network also assists us in looking at potential future concerns.
The market is fairly cyclical within the market and the criminal fraternity move
around from class to class basically trying to find the weakest animal at that time.
It could be the cash-in-transit industry for the first six months then the jewellery
sector. When one industry attempts to manoeuvre itself into a healthier/stronger
position post a poor run of losses they look elsewhere. For example if a target, say
an armoured vehicle, carrying cash becomes much more harder to penetrate after
improving the level of protections then it’s not uncommon for the assailants to
choose another business or victim.
One such area could be the Jewellery retail sector.
XMD: Why do you think they move on?
Gary Tredgett: Because it’s easier to do so. The criminal cells are often well organised
and will happily share information with each other. And I guess it boils down to
least amount of effort for the same reward. The weakness in the system at any one
given time could be a jewellery premises, a courier, an ATM. It’s constantly
changing.
This is where I’ve got to say you’ve now got the risk control aspect. If you have five
jewellers for example all wishing to obtain the same limits and pay the same
premium for the insurance product. You can guarantee that all 5 will have
different levels of risk management and security in place. They are going to
conduct their businesses very differently. Losses happen and some are more
preventable than others. As an example an extra alarm system in place can be the
difference between having a loss or not.
XMD: The criminals are moving around or what are the new fields they will move in to?
Gary Tredgett: You have the physical threats that are always there but you’ve got an ever
growing issue for example over a period of time the banks have outsourced their
cash management processing. This means that you have got entrepreneurial
entities setting up with the right licensing and the right security parameters can
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Xavier Mac Donald
process and deliver cash for the major banks. They have electronic systems in
operation. I think there is a big concern in the industry for that penetration even
within the Lloyd’s market. Now, there is a cyber-market available and has been
established only in the last five years. This market has appeared for a reason. And
I feel that this is a real threat to the various associated businesses.
The different degrees of penal systems in place which make criminals move as
well. In Europe for example, it’s very easy for a criminal gang or unit to go across
to a country and commit a crime and then return to their home town within a few
hours. The local authorities are looking for the criminals within their own country,
not somewhere else. So the ebb and flow of crime seems to be much easier and
more widespread. We have found that, as an example, Sweden and Norway. If you
commit the same cash armed robbery in Sweden then the assailants will get two to
three years. If you commit the same robbery in Norway you get ten to fifteen.
Therefore, it’s a simple decision for the criminal to make! I have the benefit of
writing a worldwide portfolio and I’ve been to some fairly unpleasant places.
What’s interesting is, you take a country like Brazil for example, on the CIT side
and the jewellery side, the physical presence of their security is enormous. It’s
quite sad and quite disturbing but the level of attack is going to be severe, with
automatic weapons, grenades etc. And for any pick-up drop-off’s they are
expecting trouble and have their guns at the ready. Europe is very keen to develop
systems, I’m not saying it’s the wrong thing to do but you’ve got to be mindful of
the fact where you are operating in the industry because each level of risk is very
different. My theory to protect a risk, be it a diamond, be it a currency note, or a
bar of gold, or a diamond necklace is that the security should be fairly similar but
you must attempt to ring fence that product from a security standpoint as many
times as you can using different methods and deterrents. This is known as the
onion ring theory, having layer upon layer of controls in place.
I’m convinced that employees within the industry have a major part in providing
assailants with the necessary information to commit crime. If we take some of the
biggest CIT fleet operations in the world, let’s take G4S, Brinks or Loomis, they
have thousands of people working for these entities. 99.9% of the staff are honest,
law abiding citizens. But it only takes a handful of employees to be in that mind set
of “I’m going to steal from the system” and being a large corporation this is
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Xavier Mac Donald
extremely difficult to find the leakage despite having very good controls and
procedures in place.
The challenge is to remove as much human intervention as possible to help reduce
this risk in the form of security and processes.
XMD: Do you have any intelligence to know who your good or bad clients are?
Gary Tredgett: Yes I do. I don’t want to go into too much detail who they are but
certainly I’ve got some sources within the industry that I operate and coordinate
with. They will provide me with the necessary information and data which I can
act upon where needed.
XMD: Who’s your biggest enemy or worse?
Gary Tredgett: My biggest enemy? That’s a great question. I think the industry in itself
let’s itself down.
The moral aspect for me is one of major concern. And through the business the
level of professionalism varies dramatically. And sadly the systems aren’t in place
to control this in its entirety. And it’s this area that tarnishes the industry for
others.
In today’s market it’s all about money and profit.
In the CIT industry, more financial help should be given by the financial
institutions themselves in an attempt to improve security measures and standards.
The price of the services that are provided by the CIT carriers to the banks etc are
just under-priced. In essence, what I’m saying is that they don’t really allow them
to deliver the quality of service that they should be. In the US for example it’s
more expensive to transport the trash than it is the cash.
XMD: We spoke about audits earlier so would you be interested in sending into a site and
or several auditors to re-engineer a site in order to then cover them?
Gary Tredgett: That has happened. I’ll give you another example if I may, which was a
huge potential loss situation in the German cash-in-transit market. The entity was
called Heros at the time. Basically the scenario involved the key members of that
business, the owners, extracting cash from the company. Roughly 400 million
Euros was stolen over a period of time. At the time of the news breaking, that
entity had about 70% of the German market. It’s staggering to think that one
company alone controlled such a large percentage of the cash flow within
Germany. Therefore the country would be in turmoil if this business was to
collapse - The Bundesbank could not allow this to happen. I was asked to look at
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Xavier Mac Donald
this company post the loss and I therefore set out to have a full review of the
business by means of appointing various individuals and teams from different
fields to enable me to get a feel for the risk, I sent in teams from Kroll, Clyde and
Co. and Lowers Associates, so the three independent teams conducted a full
forensic review, business review, security review etc. The audits lasted over 6
weeks and only after this time were we satisfied of the risk going forward.
XMD: Are you prepared to lower premiums if you think security is well done?
Gary Tredgett: If the overall picture dictates that the said business or entity clearly out
performs its peers, then yes, that would indeed be a possibility and a consideration.
This can also work the other way, where the level of security is such that a penalty
premium is given! The quality control for me is very important and arguably the
price is one of the last components that should be considered. Having a robust risk
management process in place and the assured acting as if un-insured is critical.
Concessions are given depending upon the quality of the entity.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Interview Doron Levy, Security Consultant
XMD: Please explain who you are and what your job entails
Doron Levy: My name is Doron Levy and I have funded the company OFEK Consulting
& risk management. The main scales of the company are:
1. Protection of high risk property and people
2. Technical expertise on airport security detection technologies
3. Analysis and detection of contemporary criminal threats
4. Risk analysis and global security plans
5. Crisis and regulatory monitoring
In practice, the company has many activities on the jeweller’s field specific
exposure
1.
Creation and delivery of training courses – awareness about specific security
issues for prestigious French jewellery retailers, gemmologists, high-risk museums
and specialised insurances companies.
2.
Performance of risk assessment audits for sensitive sites (factories, registered
offices, ancillary installations, boutiques.) Implementation of “Blind tests” focused
on the security issues of the commercial networks throughout Europe & France
luxury jewellery retailers.
3.
Spokesman of the Jewellery and Clock-making Security Monitoring Unit to
the Inter-professional Committee for the Jewellery and Clock-making Trade
The Jewellers’’ drill system concept was first established in 2001 with the “Club
Sécurité Gold” of CESG/ICTS Europe. Reactivated in 2008 with the “RESEAU
OFEK” (Ofek), the major purpose of the network is to provide a dedicated crime
survey by experienced and certified experts in risk evaluation and targeted
investigations. Serving over 350 Clients & partners in Aviation security dedicated
department, and high risk commercial activities (jewellers, diamonds - gems
dealers, and luxurious hotels).
XMD: Are out-of-house audits necessary in jewellery Houses and if so why?
Doron Levy: The specific security audits for the professional jeweller’s retails are a very
particular service. After training the internal employees (manager, security, and
sale people) based on and the pertinence of the security measures. The Ofek
security services are developed according to the Jewellers’ block Major perils,
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Xavier Mac Donald
BURGLARY: theft by forced entry into the premises; ROBBERY (HOLD-UP) :
theft by using violence, but also pure threat of bodily injury or death; TIGER
KIDNAPPING : theft at premises while family of owner kept hostage at private
house; SMASH & GRAB or VEHICLE RAM-RAID : theft of goods after
breakage of window display(s).
The focus of the security audits for the jeweller’s retails is pointed on :
1.
Personal attitude and individual attention;
2.
Develop capabilities to distinguish customers from crooks;
3.
Keep security protections sharp and updated
XMD: When, how and what needs to be audited?
Doron Levy: The jeweller’s security audit concept includes all the relevant processes of
the exploitation: preparation and back office, transportation and supplying chain,
the human resources, the nominal and emergency procedures and the sale itself. It
is also important to give a feedback of the general atmosphere and the welcoming
process in front of the specific security issues.
XMD: What are the lessons learned for the jewellery profession concerning audits?
Doron Levy: Criminals do their homework and monitor the target. They need at least
some direct contact. Good security is essential, but it should not be taken for
granted.
Too much routine provokes mistakes (e.g. indiscretion, valuable
information left on the desk or in the wastepaper basket). Generally, it is logically
accepted to define the security audits as part of the sale and operational
requirement s. The spirit and the personal touch of each company can easily be
protected and reinforced. Ideally, we recommend two audits per station-boutique
for establishing a coherent statistical analysis. The main weak points identified are
in tree levels:
1.
The human resources no adapted or no managed;
2.
The security organization not updated or not existing;
3.
The sale- payment processes (products storage and presentation, safe
procedures…)
The ritual of the sale and the quality of the client’s satisfaction is a mandatory
factor in this business. The jewellers are exposed and faced the risk in a
“philosophic way”: if you want to sale the jewel you must make it magic, and
present it in a very personal manner….that is the main weak point!
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Xavier Mac Donald
XMD: Is there a return on investment to outsource audits?
Doron Levy: In practice, one thing is sure, if you don’t take in account all the parameters
of the business, you should leave “open areas” in the system. It is so easy to identify
the weaknesses …..The robbers, sometimes very specialized, know how to optimize
the lake of procedures or a non-application of these procedures. On a long time
period, the risk for the company image and reputation can be very concrete….
Socially, the security audits provide a dedicated time for internal feedbacks, it is a
good possibility to identify very early the main factors of the teambuilding and a
close share of impressions with the company management. The more important is
to implicate all the staff and to be transparent with the findings. In this spirit, the
corrective actions and the security procedures are much more accepted and
applied. Logically, the risks are under the acceptable level and the security
awareness of the company higher ... the robbers can also feel and identify this!
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Xavier Mac Donald
Interview Robert Polet, CEO Gucci Group
XMD: Where is the positioning of the Gucci Group security manager in the
organizational chart?
Robert Polet: We have security managers brand by brand and not on a Group level.
There is also a PPR security manager who is in a functional line with the heads of
security of each brand.
XMD: Who does the security manager report to?
Robert Polet: There is no security manager reporting to me since it is done brand by
brand. We don’t co-ordinate on a Gucci Group level.
XMD: Who manages the security strategy?
There again it’s done brand by brand and in co-operation with the head of security
of PPR.
Robert Polet: What are your security strategy and tactics for Gucci Group?
First of all, the protection of our people; secondly preventing damage to the brands
and thirdly prevention of stolen goods. In that order, people, brands, goods.
XMD: Do you meet your Gucci security managers from time to time? How often?
Robert Polet: Yes. Maybe once every year or every two years although I do not remember
meeting with you although you’ve been in Boucheron for the last four years.
I’ve been more involved with the Gucci brand actually. We used to have a
combined function of security. The head of security Gucci brand would double up
as the head of security of Gucci Group. For the last year and a half we’ve changed
that and do not have it at the Group level anymore. Now it’s only at the Gucci level
and PPR level.
XMD: Does your security budget increase or decrease?
Robert Polet: I think it’s stable.
XMD: Is your security quantifiable?
Robert Polet: It depends on which part of security you take. If you take fraud or leakages
in stores, they are measured and we have statistics and we look at them. There are
also counterfeited goods. We also look at those statistics to see how many seizures
there were at border levels and so on and so forth.
XMD: Are you able to measures the cost effectiveness of your resources?
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Xavier Mac Donald
Robert Polet: It’s difficult because if you want to measure cost effectiveness you need to
judge what they are effective against; what is your benchmark; what do you
compare it to and which I find very very difficult. The only thing you could do is to
benchmark against other organizations. As a percentage of turnover this is what I
spent on security. How much do you spend? You could also look at the amount of
people you employ versus the number of stores you have. It’s more in
benchmarking that you can get the right figures whether your budget is optimized
or not. People always want more but I think the scarceness the budget the more
creative the people are.
XMD: Are there Gucci procedures in the stores or for the guards?
Robert Polet: Procedures are there again only done brand by brand. Every brand does it
in its own way because every brand is typical, has its own organization and own
way of operating.
XMD: Do you know where your losses are? Transport, warehouses, back-office, clients?
Robert Polet: Yes we do know it. First it’s the stores, then the warehouses and then
transport.
XMD: Do you have a media crisis plan at your level?
Robert Polet: Yes we do. We have crisis plans in place for all sorts of different types of
things that can happen.
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Mail interview with Police chief Superintendent Christophe Haget in
Monaco 03/12/2010
XMD: Could you please present yourself?
Christophe Haget: French Chief Superintendent attached to the Monaco police force and
head of the Judiciary police.
XMD: Monte Carlo has had a few armed robberies in recent years. Where did these
criminals come from and why?
Christophe Haget: Armed robberies since 2007
Jasre jeweller 30 May 2007, committed by a French delinquent Lionel Rinaudo
and arrested in France for 19 armed robberies
Ciribelli jeweller 21 June 2007, committed by the Pink Panthers (Ivanovic/Kostic
arrested in Paris in 2009
2008
On 5 May three persons from an Estonian gang (arrested in Europe) for robbing
the jewellers Zegg and Cerlatti,
Tamel Vetemae arrested in Italy
Rauno Kuklase arrested in Italy
Sarik Sander arrested in the UK
15 October 2008, arrests in Monaco of Borko Alincic and Dusko Poznan both were
wanted by Interpol, international warrant of arrest and members of the Pink
Panthers that carried out 115 jewellery attacks in Europe.
2009
Two temping agencies on 13 March: loot 56,000€
-
Védior Bis 10.30am two persons of which one was armed, escaped by
Scooter TMax
-
MGTT 07.20am two persons of which one was armed, escaped by foot
Local delinquents, case not solved to this day.
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Xavier Mac Donald
12 June Vladimir Kuzneczov was arrested for attempted robbery against Zegg and
Cerlatti
18 June, attempted theft with violence against the jewellers Chopard and
Boucheron, Vinko Osmakcic, Robert Ljubas and Igor Marinic were arrested for
criminal conspiracy.
2010
Nothing to report
These criminals came from:
-
France
-
Former Yugoslavia (Pink Panthers) Montenegro, Serbia and Croatia
-
Estonia (gang of Estonians)
XMD: What have you done to reduce these attacks? What is your strategy?
Christophe Haget: At my arrival in Monaco, I was tasked to co-ordinate all the
prevention and in three fields:
-
secure cash in transit
-
secure jewellery and similar stores
-
secure banks
For three years, we re-thought all the technical security (alarms, double doors,
cameras, etc.) of these sites and especially all the information concerning the
professionals. The situation was the following: everybody thought they were
‘invincible’ in Monaco, which was true concerning the figures that were very lowless than 2000 incidents a year including bad checks, credit card frauds but not the
security measures concerning the professionals
Our experience in France concerning criminality, allowed us to analyse these
events differently. Monaco remains a very safe area, 520 police officers for 35,000
residents! Every day roughly 40,000 people commute to Monaco. There are hightech cameras, a command post equipped with the latest technology but criminals
will always attack places that are weakly protected and where there is the highest
gain (certain jewellery events exceed 150M Euros).
The last three years have allowed us to objectively compare “feelings” from facts.
XMD: Is there a co-operation between the Monaco police and the professionals?
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Xavier Mac Donald
Christophe Haget: Yes. We nevertheless concerning security had to:
1- Make the professionals understand that Monaco was not protected against
structured and well organised teams e.g. the Pink Panthers (1 armed
robbery and 5 arrests in 3 years). The Estonians (1 armed robbery) or
burglaries against Zeeg and Cerlatti.
2- Encourage all the professionals to upgrade their security systems, train
their personnel but especially co-operate with us.
3- Develop contacts with experts who perfectly know their sectors (C.I.T,
jewellery and watch Houses …).
XMD: Is there a co-operation between the police in Monaco and the other police forces?
Christophe Haget: Yes. We decided to change our habits by ‘communicating’ more and
better: alerts, security conferences, mug shots sent by Interpol, internet site
(dpjcommunication). We do not hesitate to share our information even if they are
operational e.g., the arrival of Osmakcic (Pink Panther) was sent to all the stores
on the same day to all the stores in Monaco. We followed this team for 5 days
before arresting them (surveillance, tailing) on 18 June 2009.
This police ‘communication’ is enhanced by information from all the European
police forces (even worldwide) as well as experts in security specialised in certain
fields e.g. for jewellery stores Ofek, Catline.
In parallel, we developed and strengthened our international ‘network’ in order to
be informed of what was currently on-going elsewhere. Armed robberies in
Switzerland or in Norway represent a great interest for us. To this day, we have a
network of European specialists which allows us to work informally (obviously,
personal contacts are the most effective between two police forces).
We (Monaco) are also at the origin of a working party (to date 27 countries)
concerning the Pink Panthers (more than 280 members are referenced) with
Interpol in 2007. Since then, many meetings have taken place and important
successes were made (identification, arrests, extraditions …).
We are currently working with several countries to put together an Interpol file
concerning stolen goods and which will be available for police forces as well as
professionals; hopefully in 2011 if everything goes as planned.
XMD: Does the police in Monaco do prevention or repression?
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Xavier Mac Donald
Christophe Haget: The vision of the police in Monaco is different from other European
countries. We privilege PREVENTION rather than repression which means, for
example, that we would never let a gang of criminals commit a robbery in order to
condemn them to fifteen years prison instead of two. This avoids putting people at
great risk (murders, violence, etc.) but it also allows the professionals to fully trust
us. The last example was the arrest of Osmakcic with two accomplices and who
were arrested before they entered the Chopard store. They were arrested for
criminal conspiracy (unfortunately they did not have any weapons on them even
though their athletic build made them just as dangerous) but were remanded in
custody for six months.
They were freed in October 2009 but Osmakcic stole a 860,000€ sapphire with two
accomplices in Maastricht on 21 March 2010.
Following this example, Osmakcic, like many other criminals, is very pragmatic. If
there is a weakness in a country, a town; a bad co-operation between the police
and the professionals they will exploit this. If an area is really secur
ed and that there is cohesion between all the actors (police and professionals) then
thefts, armed robberies become very difficult (NOT IMPOSSIBLE, more
difficult!!)
All these security measures must dissuade:
-
the youngest ones, the mad ones that get up in the morning with a
weapon and commit a robbery like going to the betting office …
-
the professional robbers or thieves who will analyse everything, perform
a surveillance beforehand and attack only after analysing all the
elements- ratio: advantages/disadvantages…
Both levels of delinquency have nothing to do with each other. If it’s quite easy to
protect against the first category, the second needs a deeper knowledge of
criminality (mode of operation, etc) in order to find the technical, operational and
human consequences
XMD: What kind of criminals or attacks do you expect in the years to come?
Christophe Haget: The study of delinquency in 2010 is very alarming. The important
increase of armed robberies +36% (jewellery/watch trade), tiger kidnappings and
general violent attacks leads us to believe a more and more violent society with
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Xavier Mac Donald
professional and amateur robbers on the increase. The opening of Europe to 27
countries represents a real and constant threat. We will probably have gangs that
are more and more transnational and European co-operation will become
mandatory.
One will not only have to protect the sites (stores, depots, …) but also people
(journeys, houses and families) and that only the better protected will avoid these
attacks. Excluding technical solutions and training of personnel, a real
communication must be established between the professionals and the police as
well as a real willingness to do prevention by the police forces and not simply to
arrest people for statistics.
XMD: Is this strategy different from that in France and if yes why?
Christophe Haget: Things are perfectly clear in Monaco. Prevention is at the top of our
police policy. This means, for example, that we will never let a robbery take place
in order to catch them red-handed if the security and safety of personnel is at risk.
Only real facts have their importance. The police focus only on solving cases
(running after criminals) instead of preventing them from happening.
The strategy that’s in place rests on simple actions:
-
Our police personnel know all the current threats (from the basic officer
to the superintendent as well as in-house training and information.
-
We share and compare our information with many other European
police forces.
-
There is no competition or rivalry between our services.
Our retail merchants are informed of possible threats; up to date photo albums are
sent out; information meetings are set-up; everyday our police (in uniform or plain
clothes) contact all the merchants.
I know that this strategy is specific to a small territory hardly bigger than a district
in a large town in France but I know that in France we are still on an old system.
One only needs to observe what is happening in highly secured countries in the
world (Singapore, Qatar and Dubai) to understand the weaknesses of the French
system:
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Xavier Mac Donald
1- The dividing up of the different police forces and of the gendarmerie
inescapably leads to a split of operational information, to a competition
between services and the forming of co-ordinating structures…
2- The solving of delinquency (crimes, offenses …) should be, in my opinion,
under the same authority. The Paris police headquarters was good because
otherwise many police services continued to hide important information in
order to solve more cases than their neighbour. The organisation of only
one
‘Judiciary
Direction’
at
the
county/department
level
(police/gendarmerie) would allow collecting information from all the police
and gendarmerie, to organise by priority and to treat them in real time.
3- The cult of secrets maintained by all the police services and encouraged by
magistrates is often counter-productive. I still do not understand why the
police and the gendarmes from a same area are not informed concerning
people who are wanted, the current threats, the teams that are following a
training course, etc (especially nowadays with Facebook, Wikileaks,…)
4- To conclude, I would like to cite an article in the Lyon press dated
12/12/2010 “Robberies: worrying strategy of catching red-handed” A.
Géraud. Because of the high number of robberies in the area a press
conference was set-up where the locals could talk of their anxiety of letting
gangs commit robberies (several people had been wounded by live fire). The
state prosecutor replied that “they were dangerous individuals. One cannot
simply wait to arrest them for simple car thefts”.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Interview par mail de Christophe Haget Chef de la Division de Police
Judiciaire de la Principauté de Monaco 03/12/2010
XMD : Pourrais-tu te présenter ?
Christophe Haget : Haget Christophe 14/12/1966, Commissaire Principal de Police
Français détaché auprès de la Sûreté Publique de Monaco actuellement Chef de la
Division de Police judiciaire
Postes occupés en France :
Chef Sûreté à Dunkerque,
Adjoint au chef de la brigade des stupéfiants de Marseille (BSP),
Chef de la division criminelle à Orléans,
Adjoint au chef de la Division Criminelle de Lyon,
Chef de la Brigade de Recherches et d’Intervention (BRI) de Nice.
XMD : La Principauté de Monaco a subi des attaques à main armée ces dernières années.
D’où sont-ils venus et pourquoi ?
Christophe Haget:
Braquages depuis 2007 :
Bijouterie Jasre 30 mai 2007 Renaudo Lionel délinquant français arrêté en France
(pour 19 Vama : Vol à Main Armée)
Bijouterie 21 Juin 2007 Ciribelli Pink Panthers (Ivanovic/ Kostic Zoran arrêtés à
Paris en 2009)
2008 :
Le 5 mai, trois individus appartenant au gang des Estoniens attaquent la
Bijouterie Zegg et Cerlati
- Vetemae Tamel arrêté en Italie
- Kuklase Rauno arrêté en Italie
- Sander Sarik arrêté au Royaume Uni
15 octobre 2008, arrestation à Monaco de Ilincic Borko et Poznan Dusko,
recherchés par INTERPOL mandats d’arrêt internationaux, (gang Pink Panthers,
plus de 250 membres, 115 attaques de bijouteries en Europe)
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Xavier Mac Donald
2009 :
Deux agences d’intérim le 13 mars 2009 butin 56 000 euros:
Védior Bis 10h30 deux individus dont un armé fuite en Scooter Tmax
MGTT 7h20 deux individus dont un armé fuite à pied
Délinquance locale, individus non identifiés à ce jour.
Le 12/06/2009 arrestation Kuzneczov Vladimir tentative de vol avec effraction
Zegg et Cerlati
Le 18/06/2009 Tentative de vol avec violence en réunion : Bijouterie Chopard.
Arrestations: Osmakcic Vinko, Ljubas Robert et Marinic Igor association de
malfaiteurs objectifs Chopard et Boucheron
2010 :
RAS
-La provenance des délinquants :
-France
-Ex Yougoslavie (Pink Panthers). Monténégro, Serbie, Croatie
-Estonie (gang des Estoniens)
XMD : Qu’as-tu fais pour réduire ces attaques ? Quelle est ta stratégie ?
Christophe Haget : Mesures prises par la Sûreté publique :
J’ai été chargé dès mon arrivée, de prendre en main toute la prévention sur la
Principauté, trois secteurs essentiels :
-sécurité des transports de fonds
-sécurité des bijouteries et commerces assimilés
-sécurité des banques
Durant 3 ans, nous avons repensé toute la sécurité technique (alarmes, SAS,
caméras, ...) des établissements et surtout l’information de tous les professionnels.
Le constat était le suivant : chacun se pensait « invulnérable » sur Monaco, ce qui
était vérifié par des chiffres de la délinquance très bas (moins de 2000 faits
constatés par an où l’on doit retirer les chèques sans provision, les escroqueries à
la carte bleue) mais pas dans les mesures prises par l’ensemble des professionnels.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Notre expérience française du banditisme, nous faisait analyser les faits autrement.
Certes Monaco était une place très sécurisée : 520 fonctionnaires de police pour
environ 35 000 résidents ! (chaque jour environ 40 000 personnes viennent
travailler à Monaco) ; des caméras très performantes, un poste de télésurveillance
moderne équipé des dernières innovations techniques, etc.) mais les malfaiteurs
vont toujours attaquer les endroits les plus faibles ou les plus rentables (certaines
expositions de bijoux dépassent largement 150 millions d’euros).
Ces trois années nous ont servi à faire coller « cet excellent sentiment » de sécurité
aux faits.
XMD : Il y a-t-il une coopération entre la police Monégasque et les professionnels ?
Christophe Haget : Oui. Il fallait donc malgré notre sécurité :
1/ faire comprendre aux professionnels que Monaco n’était pas à l’abri des équipes
structurées et très organisées du style Pink Panthers (1 Vama, 5 arrestations en 3
ans)
Les estoniens (1Vama) ou des « monte en l’air » de génie (tentative d’effraction des
bijouteries Zeeg et Cerlati)
2/ inciter tous les professionnels à moderniser leur systèmes de sécurité, former
leur personnel et surtout collaborer avec nous.
3/ développer des contacts avec des experts ayant une parfaite connaissance de leur
secteur d’activité (transports de fonds, banques, bijouterie, horlogerie)
XMD : Il y a-t-il une coopération entre la police Monégasque et les autres polices dans le
monde?
Christophe
Haget :
Nous avons choisi
de
changer les comportements,
nous
« communiquons » plus et mieux, (alertes, conférences sécurité, album des
criminels signalés par INTERPOL, création d’un lien internet avec chaque
professionnel
(dpjcommunication).
Nous
n’hésitons
pas
à
partager nos
informations même si elles sont opérationnelles (par exemple : la venue
d’Osmakcic (Pink Panther) avait été signalée dès le premier jour à l’ensemble des
commerçants de la principauté. Nous avions travaillé sur cette équipe pendant 5
jours (surveillances/filatures) avant de les arrêter le 18/06/2009).
Cette communication policière est enrichie par toutes les polices d’Europe (voire
du monde), ainsi qu’avec les experts en sécurité spécialisés dans certains domaines
(ex société OFEK, CATLINE pour les bijouteries).
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Xavier Mac Donald
Parallèlement nous avons développé et intensifié notre « réseau » international,
afin d’être exactement dans « l’actualité » du moment. Des braquages en Suisse ou
en Norvège présentent un intérêt évident pour nous. Nous avons à ce jour un
véritable réseau de spécialistes européens sur toutes ces questions informelles (bien
évidemment. le contact personnel étant le seul vraiment efficace entre deux
services de police).
Nous (Monaco) sommes à l’origine de la création du groupe de travail (27 pays à ce
jour) sur les Pink Panthers (plus de 280 membres référencés) à INTERPOL en
2007, depuis de nombreuses réunions ont eu lieu et des succès très importants ont
été réalisés (identifications, interpellations, extraditions, …)
Nous travaillons (avec plusieurs pays) actuellement à la réalisation d’un fichier
INTERPOL des objets volés lors des attaques de bijouteries, horlogerie, etc.
disponible pour les services de police et les professionnels (sortie 2011 si tout va
bien)
XMD : La police Monégasque fait-elle de la prévention ou de la répression ?
Christophe Haget : La vision Monégasque de la délinquance est différente des autres pays
Européens, eu égard à nos spécificités. Nous privilégions la PRÉVENTION à la
répression, ce qui veut dire, par exemple, que l’on ne laissera jamais une équipe de
malfaiteurs monter au braquage dans le but de les faire condamner à 15 ans au
lieu de 2. Cette volonté nous évite de faire courir des risques énormes aux
personnes (meurtre, violences, …) et nous permet d’établir une confiance absolue
entre tous les professionnels de la place et nos policiers. Le dernier exemple étant
l’arrestation d’Osmakcic en compagnie de deux complices que l’on a interpellés
avant qu’ils ne décident d’entrer dans la bijouterie Chopard. Ils ont été poursuivis
pour association de malfaiteurs (malheureusement ils n’avaient pas d’armes, mais
eu égard à leur corpulence athlétique ils n’en ont pas besoin..) sont restés 6 mois en
détention provisoire.
Relâchés en Octobre 2009, Osmakcic volait un Saphir de 860 000 euros avec deux
complices à Maastricht le 21/03/2010.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Poursuivant sur cet exemple, Osmakcic est très pragmatique comme beaucoup
d’autres malfaiteurs. S’il y a une faiblesse dans un pays, une ville, un mauvais
fonctionnement entre la police et les professionnels, ils vont l’exploiter.
Une place très sécurisée, avec une cohésion certaine entre tous les acteurs
(police/professionnels) permet de mettre le malfaiteur en « insécurité » ainsi les
vols et braquages deviennent très difficiles (pas IMPOSSIBLE !! mais plus
difficiles)
Toutes les mesures prises en sécurité doivent dissuader :
-
les plus jeunes, les plus fous qui se lèvent le matin avec une arme et vont au
braquage comme on va au PMU…
-
les professionnels du braquage ou du vol, qui vont tout analyser, faire des
surveillances préalables et passer à l’action après avoir « pesé » tous les
éléments… ratio avantages/inconvénient.
Les deux niveaux de délinquance n’ont rien à voir entre eux. S’il est plutôt facile
de se protéger du premier, le second nécessite toujours de renforcer sa
connaissance du banditisme (mode opératoire, etc.) d’en déduire les conséquences
techniques, opérationnelles et humaines.
XMD : Quels types de criminels ou attaques prévois-tu dans les années à venir ?
Christophe
Haget :
L’étude
de
la
délinquance
2010,
est
très
préoccupante.
L’augmentation significative des Vama +36% (secteur HBJO), séquestrations à
domicile et actes violents en général, nous laisse envisager une société de plus en
plus violente, avec des malfaiteurs professionnels ou pas en augmentation.
L’ouverture de l’Europe à 27 pays représente une menace réelle et constante. Nous
aurons certainement des équipes de plus en plus transnationales, la coopération
internationale va devenir une exigence.
Il faudra non seulement protéger les structures (magasins, entrepôts, ...) mais aussi
les personnels (trajets, maisons, famille), seuls les mieux protégés seront épargnés.
En dehors des solutions techniques et de formation de personnel, une réelle
communication doit s’établir entre les professionnels et les services de police ainsi
qu’une volonté véritable de faire de la « prévention » de la part des services de
police et non « des affaires ».
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Xavier Mac Donald
XMD : Cette stratégie est-elle différente de celle de la France et si oui pourquoi ?
Christophe Haget : Les choses sont parfaitement claires à Monaco, la PRÉVENTION
reste notre seule et unique politique de service. Ce qui veut dire par exemple qu’on
ne laissera jamais « monter » une équipe au « flag » si la sécurité et l’intégrité
physique des personnes est en cause.
Seuls les faits constatés ont de l’importance ici, le taux d’élucidation, c’est ce qui
reste quand on a échoué en prévention...
La stratégie mise en œuvre repose sur des actions simples :
- Nos policiers connaissent tous les menaces actuelles (de l’agent.. au commissaire
de police, formation et information internes importantes).
-Nous échangeons et confrontons nos informations avec de nombreuses polices
européennes.
-Il n’y a aucune compétition ni rivalité entre les services.
-Tous nos commerçants sont informés des menaces éventuelles, des albums
actualisés sont fournis, des réunions d’information sont réalisées, tous les jours nos
policiers (civils et en tenue) prennent attache avec l’ensemble des commerces.
-Nos professionnels ont confiance en nous, ils savent que tout sera fait « pour
éviter » l’infraction et non pour faire un flag.
Je sais bien que cette stratégie, est spécifique à un petit territoire à peine plus
grand « qu’un quartier » d’une grande ville Française, mais je sais aussi
d’expérience que nous sommes (en France) encore sur de vieux schémas. Il suffit
de regarder ce qui ce passe dans les endroits les plus sécurisés de la planète
(Singapour, le Qatar, Dubaï) pour se faire une idée des faiblesses du système
français :
1- la multiplication des services de polices et de gendarmeries conduit
inéluctablement à un éclatement des informations opérationnelles, à une
compétition entre services et finalement à la création de structures de
coordination…
2- le traitement de la délinquance (crime, délit ...) devrait être à mon sens sous une
seule et même autorité (l’exemple de la Préfecture Police était bon), car de
nombreux services continuent aujourd’hui de se cacher des informations
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Xavier Mac Donald
essentielles dans le seul but de faire plus d’affaires que le voisin. L’organisation
d’une
seule
« direction
départementale
judiciaire »
(gendarmerie/police)
permettrait de collecter toutes des informations recueillies par l’ensemble des
forces de l’ordre, de les hiérarchiser et de les traiter en temps réel.
3- Le culte du secret poursuivi par l’ensemble des services de répression et
encouragé par les magistrats, est souvent contre-productif. Je ne comprends
toujours pas pourquoi les policiers ou gendarmes d’une même localité ne seraient
pas informés de l’ensemble des personnes recherchées, des menaces actuelles, des
équipes en formation, etc. (à l’heure de Facebook, Wikileaks, …).
4- En guise de conclusion, je fais référence à un article de la presse Lyonnaise du
12/10/2010 « Braquages : inquiétante stratégie du flag» A. Géraud. Eu égard aux
nombreux braquages sur l’agglomération Lyonnaise une conférence de presse était
organisée, au cours de laquelle les habitants et les commerçants faisaient part de
leurs inquiétudes de laisser les équipes monter au braquage (plusieurs personnes
blessées par armes à feu). Le Procureur de la République répondait «ce sont des
individus dangereux. On ne peut pas se permettre de les interpeller pour de
simples vols de voitures ».
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Xavier Mac Donald
Thank you letter from Monaco police
Mesdames, Messieurs,
Bijoutiers, Horlogers, Orfèvres, Joailliers, directeurs, employés, vendeurs,
vendeuses, membres de la profession,
Au cours de ces deux dernières semaines, l’étroit partenariat que nous avons mis
en place il y a plusieurs mois déjà, a été mis en évidence à deux reprises, une
première fois par l’interpellation en flagrant délit d’un audacieux cambrioleur qui
tentait de pénétrer dans un commerce de luxe par les toits, puis de nouveau
aujourd’hui, par l’interpellation de malfaiteurs internationaux liés au gang dit des
« Pink Panthers » qui s’apprêtaient manifestement à commettre un vol dans l’une
des bijouteries du secteur du Casino.
En effet, depuis le début de semaine, ces malfaiteurs ont été observés et leur
déplacements suivis par plusieurs équipes spécialisées de la Direction de la Sûreté
Publique.
A cet égard, vous avez été plusieurs fois sollicités pour faciliter ce travail essentiel,
dans l’enquête de police, et ce malgré les contingences commerciales qui sont les
vôtres et que je suis loin de négliger.
Ces deux « succès » ne sont pas que le seul fait de l’efficacité des personnels de la
Direction que je dirige, mais bien le fruit d’une collaboration forte et maintenant
ancrée sur des bases solides de confiance réciproque et de professionnalisme.
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Xavier Mac Donald
Ainsi, je tenais à vous remercier vivement pour ce fructueux partenariat, qui j’en
suis certain continuera à assurer en Principauté, une sécurité des biens et des
personnes dans une profession sensible qui attise bien des convoitises de la part de
malfaiteurs de toute nature.
Je vous demande aussi, en mon nom, et au nom du personnel de la Direction de la
Sûreté Publique, de bien vouloir être mon interprète auprès de vos personnels, et
de leur faire parvenir mes sincères remerciements.
Je n’en doute pas, nous continuerons à pérenniser cette collaboration, tant elle a su
montrer son efficacité, au travers de ces deux importantes affaires, mais aussi au
quotidien dans l’échange constant d’informations.
Merci à tous
Le Directeur de la Sûreté Publique
André Muhlberger
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Xavier Mac Donald
Photo Place Vendôme from Paris Match. Redoine Faïd was influenced by this
picture since it allowed him to have an aerial view of the roofs. See N°5 of the
jeweller Fred
- 164 -
Xavier Mac Donald
STATISTICS
2010
january
february
march
april
may
june
july
august
septembre
octobre
novembre
decembre
TOTAL
Armed robberies
Robberies with violence
Burglaries
Tiger kidnappings
Courriers - sales reps
29
5
11
3
0
17
5
25
5
1
23
3
20
3
7
17
4
15
2
1
27
4
13
2
1
25
7
11
3
4
21
3
18
1
1
15
1
12
0
0
23
4
25
0
2
28
6
23
2
3
39
10
27
2
3
33
13
20
2
0
297
65
220
25
23
TOTAL
48
53
56
39
47
50
44
28
47
62
81
68
630
2009
january
february
march
april
may
june
july
august
septembre
octobre
novembre
decembre
TOTAL
Armed robberies
Burglaries
Tiger kidnappings
14
5
1
2
2
22
4
20
5
1
25
6
10
1
5
21
6
9
0
2
16
5
16
0
1
14
6
18
1
2
18
1
12
1
2
16
1
11
1
0
12
3
11
0
0
18
5
23
1
1
32
4
8
2
3
33
6
11
6
1
241
52
150
20
20
TOTAL
24
52
47
38
38
41
34
29
26
48
49
57
483
january
february
march
april
may
june
july
august
septembre
octobre
novembre
decembre
TOTAL
16
2
5
1
1
13
1
12
0
5
18
4
10
0
6
21
0
3
0
2
11
7
10
0
0
12
1
14
1
0
11
2
9
1
0
4
1
11
1
0
12
1
9
0
0
9
8
9
0
1
13
4
7
3
2
18
6
10
2
3
158
37
109
9
20
25
31
38
26
28
28
23
17
22
27
29
39
333
2008
Armed robberies
Burglaries
Tiger kidnappings
TOTAL
2007
january
february
march
april
may
june
july
august
septembre
octobre
novembre
decembre
TOTAL
Armed robberies
Burglaries
Tiger kidnappings
12
2
4
1
4
9
1
7
2
3
14
3
5
1
2
8
3
7
1
4
8
2
10
0
1
10
1
11
0
4
10
5
7
0
1
8
2
7
1
1
8
3
9
0
2
7
1
6
0
3
10
5
6
0
0
9
2
6
0
4
113
30
85
6
29
TOTAL
23
22
25
23
21
26
23
19
22
17
21
21
263
2006
january
february
march
april
may
june
july
august
septembre
octobre
novembre
decembre
TOTAL
Armed robberies
Burglaries
Tiger kidnappings
8
3
13
2
1
20
1
7
2
2
18
6
10
1
14
2
4
12
3
1
14
1
6
3
3
9
8
2
8
10
0
3
4
0
1
5
1
7
1
2
1
1
1
1
18
1
5
1
1
134
23
74
6
11
TOTAL
27
32
35
20
17
23
15
19
14
6
14
26
248
241
158
162
141
112
134
119
113
88
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
Armed robberies jewellery trade - Evolution 2001-2009
- 165 -
Xavier Mac Donald
760
594
Mass
Distribution
543
475
463
420
423
Banks
439
317
329
346
264
326
112
201
195
241
119
141
386
295
254
250
134
241
186
208
192
88
158
111
2002
2003
2004
2005
Post offices
2006
126
2007
2008
Jewellery
trade
2009
Armed robberies
Evolution 2001-2009
All categories/trades
8048
7659
6324
5578
5066
5500
4927
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
4466
2007
2008
6324
7659
6171
5578
5066 4927
4466
total numbers
5500
2569
21771664 16091599 1680 1624
2179
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
- 2008
166 - 2009
principales cibles des VMA
6171
high-street trade
2009
Xavier Mac Donald
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Eléna Bravo: Personal assistant
Redoine Faïd: Former armed robber
Christophe Haget: Deputy Head of Monaco police
François Haut: Professor Criminology
Doron Levy: Security Consultant Ofek
Martin MacDonald
Hélène Merville : Personal assistant
Jérôme Pierrat Journalist and specialized in crime
Robert Polet: CEO Gucci Group
Jean-Claude Sergeant : Professor Sorbonne Paris
John Shaw: A.W. Associates Loss adjuster/surveyor
Gary Tredgett: Lloyd’s underwriter Ascot
Tamara Van Der Pyl: Personal assistant
Stuart Wylie: A.W. Associates Loss adjuster/surveyor
- 167 -

LUXURY ROBBERIES Anticipating attacks in high

Transcription

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