Deviations Register

Transcription

Deviations Register

Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Certificate Issue Date
Certificate End Date
Date Application Received Applicant Organisation
Lead SC
Lead SC Approval Date
Deviation Status
GMRT2210
Two
Appendix A
Identification of Rail Vehicles
TNC-98-001
Vehicle Numbering
It is not seen as a safety critical issue to
change a vehicle number.
03/04/1998
Until RGS is revised and
issue is implemented
-
Freightliner Ltd
Traction and Rolling Stock
03/04/1998
Current
GMRT2466
Three
2.1.1
Railway Wheelsets
16-025-DEV
Axle Standards.
Vehicle numbering of C1 57 locomotives for Request to identify re-engineered class 47
Freightliner
as class 57. RSL will be informed of
previous 47xxx number for record purposes
e.g. 57001 (ex 47356 re-engineered).
Timescale - open ended.
The deviation will apply to all Class 345
The implementation of the Technical
units. All vehicle types will have FLEXX
Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs)
Eco bogies.
mandated through a series of European
Union Directives has resulted in a review of
all requirements mandated in Railway
Group Standards.
This combination of standards has recently 11/04/2016
been used for other FLEXX Eco projects
such as ICx in Germany and C30 metro for
Stockholm. Similar standards were applied
to Class 172 and Class 22x units, which
also had FLEXX Eco bogies. However,
standard BS8535 was not published at the
time of authorisation for these units.
BS8535 explicitly addresses inboard
bearing bogies and references EN 13261,
which shows it is intended to be used as
part of the EN suite of wheelset standards.
N/A
18/02/2016
Bombardier Transportation
on behalf of, MTR
Corporation (Crossrail) Ltd
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
GMRT2173
One
3.2.1 and Appendix A
Requirements for the Size of Vehicles and
Position of Equipment.
16-019-DEV
Centre Door Footstep Oversail.
The deviation will apply to the Class 345
fleet over all its operational routes. The
fleet will operate between Reading /
Heathrow and Shenfield / Abbey Wood.
The stepping distances on all of these
routes is being considered as part of the
Crossrail project. There are a number of
stations that are affected by excessive
oversail or stepping distance.
The excessive stepping distance is
20/06/2016
considered acceptable because Selective
Door Operation will prevent any excessive
stepping distances in service. The excessive
oversail is considered acceptable because
adequate clearance between the step-board
and the infrastructure will be demonstrated
as part of the gauging compatibility
process. The step-board is not considered
to present any greater risk to people stood
on platforms than any other parts of the
vehicle. If the step-board were not to be
used as a passenger step, no deviation
would be required. The routes operated by
the Class 345 units will also be operated by
Mk III coaches (which have a larger overall
swept envelope) and IEP vehicles (which
have a longer bogie-spacing and hence
greater overhang on curves).
N/A
18/02/2016
Bombardier Transportation, Rolling Stock
MTR Corporation (Crossrail)
Ltd
11/02/2016
Current
GIRT7016
Five
6.5.2
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
16-030-DEV
A Health and Safety risk assessment has
31/03/2016
been conducted in collaboration with the
stakeholders in order to identify mitigation
measures to address the temporary
deviation. The temporary deviation will take
effect from 01/05/2016 and remain in place
until 12/01/2018.
12/01/2018
14/03/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
N/A
Current
GMRT2100
Five
6.7.6.3
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
16-024-DEV
The cupboard installation will mean that
04/05/2016
even if the fire extinguisher comes out of its
restraints, it will still be constrained by the
cupboard door. This design reduces the
risk to passengers compared to a low-level,
open installation.
N/A
18/02/2016
on behalf of, MTR
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
GMRT2141
Three
2.4.1.1
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
16-018-DEV
N/A
18/02/2016
on behalf of, MTR
N/A
Current
GMRT2044
Four
5.4.2
Braking System Requirements and
Performance for Multiple Units
16-023-DEV
The 21Â° limit has been subject to a
01/04/2016
number of deviations: 14/048/DEV - Class
700 (Thameslink)14/126/DEV - Mk. 3
Galley cars15/047/DEV - Class 465/9 TOSL
car15/067/DEV - Class 321 trailer vehicle.
Through these deviations, it has been
established that a lower cant deficiency limit
is acceptable. As with the vehicles quoted
above, the lowest value for the Class 345
unit occurs on an intermediate vehicle,
which has less sensitivity to roll-over due to
cross winds.
The Class 345 units do not include the
Guidance notes for Clause 2. 2. 2. 1 of the 04/05/2016
function to latch the emergency brake until new draft of GMRT2045, which will replace
the low-speed signal is detected. Therefore, GMRT2044, gives an explanation of the
an emergency brake application can be
source of the requirement. It states that the
cancelled before the unit has come to a
requirement was written to reduce the risk
stop. While it is technically possible to
of mechanical failure of bogie or friction
achieve this function, it was not considered braking equipment due to the higher forces
necessary. Removing this function
from emergency braking for which it was
simplifies the brake control functionality.
not designed. The requirement is now only
applicable to 'ex-BR' units. This is not
applicable to new-build units, where brake
equipment is designed to withstand the
forces associated with emergency braking.
The Locomotives and Passenger (LOC and
PAS) Technical Specification for
Interoperability (TSI) does not specify this
function and envisages that an emergency
brake command could be cancelled (see
clause 4. 2. 4. 4. 1 (4)).
N/A
18/02/2016
on behalf of, MTR
11/03/2016
Current
Current deviations as at 03 October 2016
Nature and Degree
It has been established that the lateral limits
of 50 mm oversail and 275 mm gap
(specified in figure A. 1) correspond with a
centre doorway on a 20 m vehicle - e. g. a
slam-door Mk. 1 EMU. Owing to the
increased bogie-spacing of a 23 m vehicle,
the oversail / gap at the centre of 23 m will
exceed that of a 20 m vehicle. A 23 m
vehicle length was selected for Crossrail to
optimise internal space, door spacing along
the unit and provision of per-vehicle
systems such as bogies and HVAC
modules. The Crossrail Class 345 units are
formed of nine 23 m vehicles. Each vehicle
has three doorways per side to minimise
dwell times. This number of doorways is
key to managing dwell times on the central
part of the Crossrail network. The door
positions are set to achieve even spacing of
doors along the unit. Doors are provided
over the bogies and in the centre of the
vehicle. The centre doorway will not meet
the RGS requirements for oversail and
stepping distance on tighter curve radii: On
curves below 187 m the lateral stepping
distance is exceeded to platforms on the
outside of curves; and on curves below 396
m the step oversails the platform by more
than 50 mm. For information, the centre
Southall Station Platform 3 Canopy support Southall Station Platform 3 canopy - the
As part of the Crossrail surface works, the
columns.
existing canopy columns (4Nos) are the
Down Relief track is slewed, this
only element affected by this work; the
encroaches into the existing noncanopy does provide Mechanical and
compliance area on platform 3, further
Electrical routes, but these are not impacted reducing the distance between the canopy
and are not considered as part of this
supporting columns and the platform edge.
deviation. Southall platform 3 view towards The track slew is to be undertaken in May
country, columns 3 and 4Southall platform 2016; however, the new compliant canopy
3 view towards London, columns 1 and 2
will not be in place until December 2017. A
temporary deviation is sought until the
existing canopy is removed and replaced
with a permanent compliant canopy which,
as per current programme, is December
2017. The planned track slew of the Down
Relief cannot be achieved without narrowing
Platform 3 at the country end with a
maximum reduction of 171 mm. The
reduction in platform width at the other
column positions is shown in the following
table. Table showing existing and proposed
dimensions between the columns and
platform edge The greatest narrowing
distance is recorded at the country end of
Platform 3, between the last canopy support
column 4, and platform edge is 171 mm
(Image 2). The amount of narrowing
decreases gradually towards the London
end, down to 113 mm. The temporary
deviation will provide sufficient time to
Fire Extinguisher Position
units. The units will be delivered as sevencar and nine-car formations, but all units
will ultimately be nine-car formations and
the same design. The fire extinguisher is
stored in a cupboard that is present in both
formations.
Roll-over Cant Deficiency.
The Class 345 unit has been designed to
units. The units will be delivered as 7-car
minimise mass while achieving a high
and 9-car formations, but all units will
passenger capacity. To achieve this, the
ultimately be 9-car formations and the same unit has in-board bearing bogies, and open
design. All vehicle types are considered as saloons with longitudinal seating in most
part of this deviation.
areas. This means that the unit has a
relatively high centre of gravity in under
exceptional payload conditions, and so does
not comply with the 21Â° cant deficiency
requirement.
Emergency Brake Application Deterrent.
units.
Rolling Stock
Page1
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GMRT2461
One
9.1 and 9.3.1
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and On-Track Machines
16-017-DEV
Sanding positions.
Crossrail units will be nine-car fixed
units. The deviation applies equally to both formations (with some units initially
seven-car and nine-car formations.
operating as seven-car units). The
Crossrail technical specification required
sanding at multiple locations. This
requirement aligns with Bombardier€™s
experience with London Underground (LUL)
S-Stock that a single sanding position will
be insufficient to effectively apply sand for a
long unit.
GMRT2473
Two
B7.6
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
16-022-DEV
Loss of Door Interlock Response.
The deviation will apply to all new vehicle
designs.
GMRT2472
Two
3.1.1.5, 3.1.3.1
Requirements for Data Recorders on Trains 16-016-DEV
West Coast Railway Class 37 European
The deviation applies to two Class 37
Train Control System (ETCS) Fitment Data locomotives (37668 and 37669) that are
Recorders.
being fitted with the Hitachi on-board
subsystem to provide ETCS functionality
(baseline 2. 3. 0d).
The application design for the project was
completed in early 2015, and an
Engineering Acceptance Certificate for
37668 was issued in August 2015 to allow
dynamic testing. This was against Issue 1
of GMRT2472. The design for 37669 is
identical, but fitment has been delayed.
This means that the compliance date for
issue 2 of GMRT2472 has now passed. The
proposed On Train Monitoring Recorder
(OTMR) and Juridical Recording Unit (JRU)
are fully compliant with Issue 1, but do not
meet certain specific requirements of Issue
2. Full compliance would require
modifications to the existing design and
installation, which would introduce further
delay and cost with minimal benefit.
GMRT2185
Two
B5.1, B5.3
Train Safety Systems
Isolation Switch Design
The Class 345 will have simple isolation
switches which do not require a key for
operation of the switch itself and do not
have a visible seal or similar. The switches
can be reset by the driver. The benefits of
this solution are that, unlike some previous
designs, the isolation switches do not
require the driver€™s key to move the
switches to 'isolated'. This means that the
driver€™s cab does not require deactivating / re-activating to isolate a system
(which can take several minutes), and so
the process of responding to a fault is
quicker. The isolation switches can be reset by the driver, which removes the risk
that the driver inadvertently isolates the
wrong system and then is unable to resolve
the situation.
16-021-DEV
This deviation will apply to all Class 345
units.
Nature and Degree
The Class 345 door interlock is linked with
the traction system (as required by the
Locomotives and Passenger Technical
Specifications for Interoperability ( LOC and
PAS TSI), Clause 4. 2. 5. 5. 7) and is not
linked with braking control. Therefore,
opening a bodyside door would not cause
an emergency brake application. The
bodyside door design selected for the Class
345 means that a link with the emergency
brake is no longer necessary, as explained
in section 8 - 'Demonstrate that what you
are proposing to do instead is reasonable'.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
There have been a number of recent
11/04/2016
deviations for sanding where units comply
with the objectives of GMRT2461, but do
not comply with the precise requirements of
the standard. In particular, deviation 15061-DEV permits each unit within a multiple
unit consist to sand if that unit detects
wheel slide. The new draft version of
GMRT2461 recognises that current
requirements are too restrictive, and
requirements for sanding position and rate
have been removed in favour of a more
general requirement to not affect track
circuits. The sanding system for Class 345
is being developed to achieve the required
impact on adhesion while minimising the
amount of sand deposited (lower sand
usage reduces maintenance costs as well
as minimising the risks of affecting track
circuits). The current sanding strategy (at
the end of the design phase) is a maximum
sanding rate of 1. 5 kg/min at each sander,
which is equal to the 3 kg/min rate applied
by Electrostar units. The unit will be
capable of sanding at double this rate, but it
is not anticipated that this will be required.
The sanding rate will be managed to ensure
compliance with 7. 5 g/m laying rate in
GMRT2461 Clause 9. 3. 1 is maintained. If
The Class 345 bodyside doors differ from
04/05/2016
those on previous multiple units in that it is
not possible to open the door in any way
while the unit is in motion. (For example,
when the egress device is activated on
Electrostar vehicles, the doors unlock and
then are held closed by the door motors
until sufficient time has passed for the train
to come to a stop. ) On the Class 345,
activating the egress device triggers a
latched switch but further movement of the
egress device is limited by a physical bolt.
The bodyside doors are not unlocked and
do not move. The traction interlock is not
broken. The switch in the egress handle
informs the driver that the handle has been
activated via the Trains Control and
Management System (TCMS). The driver is
told which door is affected on the Human
Machine Interface (HMI) screen. The driver
can use this information and the status of
the door interlock to determine the next safe
place for the unit to stop - in the Central
Operating Section, this will normally be the
next station. When the train has slowed to
less than 1 km/h, the bolt in the egress
handle will release, and the egress handle
can be fully moved. Only at this stage will
the door unlock. This means that the
The proposed protection parameters are
01/04/2016
slightly less extreme than those specified in
Issue 2. However, they still provide a very
high level of protection in the event of an
emergency, and are in line with the existing
installations on a large number of vehicles,
which can be considered to be reference
systems in Common Safety Method (CSM)
terms. The possible impact on data
survivability in the event of an accident is
small, and has no direct safety
consequences. The proposed orange colour
is easily recognisable and identical to a
large number of existing data recorders.
There is no impact on the ability to identify
and locate this item.
N/A
18/02/2016
on behalf of, MTR
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
N/A
18/02/2016
on behalf of, MTR
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
N/A
18/02/2016
West Coast Railway
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
Rule Book Module TW5 contains the
04/05/2016
instructions for isolation of safety systems.
The driver must stop, if not already stopped,
and contact the signaller to receive
instructions. There is no operational
scenario where the driver should isolate
systems while the train is moving. Although
isolating a system while the train is moving
is technically possible, it would require the
driver to leave the driving position, unlock
the isolation switch panel, and isolate the
system while facing away from the direction
of travel. The Class 345 design includes
monitoring of switches by the Train
Diagnostic System, which is clearly visible
to the driver. This is considered to be
sufficient deterrent to the driver mis-using
the isolation switches. The Train Diagnostic
System and the Train Data Recorder both
log use of the isolation switches so it can
clearly be determined if and when a system
has been isolated. The operator (MTR
Crossrail) has been engaged throughout the
design review process with the design of the
cab and the operation of the train by the
driver, and is satisfied with the proposed
design.
N/A
18/02/2016
on behalf of, MTR
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
Page2
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Deviation Status
GMRT2472
Two
All clauses
Class 387 - Compliance to GMRT2472
Issue 2.
The scope of this deviation is for all Class
387 vehicles whose application for
authorisation is based on conformity to
Type UKTYPE/51/2015/0012 (Class 387
proxy Type reference). The deviation is
applicable for all routes over which the
Class 387 vehicles will operate.
05/05/2016
Great Western Railway,
Porterbrook Leasing
N/A
Current
Five
6.2.2 b)
and Trains
16-009-DEV
Maryland Station, Platform 1, 2 and 3,
Restricted Platform Width.
For the 3. 90 m length of the platform 2/3
lift, on both the platform 2 and 3 sides of
the lifts. For a 3. 88 m length of platform 1
eastwards from the corner of the new lift
shaft.
N/A
05/02/2016
Mott MacDonald on behalf
of, Rail for London
Infrastructure
02/03/2016
Current
GMRT2173
One
3.3.1 e)
Requirements for the Size of Vehicles and
Position of Equipment.
16-020-DEV
Leading Axle Overhang.
The deviation will apply to the whole Class
345 fleet over all its operational routes. The
fleet will operate on all routes, except on
routes with obtuse crossings where the
crossing angle lies within the range 82. 5
degrees to a right angle.
It is not possible to comply with the 3226
mm limit - the coupler head will exceed this
limit. This exceedance is due to a number
of requirements affecting the design of the
cab area: the saloon area was arranged to
maximise passenger capacity; the cab back
wall area was defined to include an
increased amount of equipment compared
to earlier units (e. g. European Train
Control System (ETCS)); the cab was
arranged to ensure correct sightlines and
ergonomics, and to give space for the driver
to move through the cab; the cab front was
designed to include the necessary structure
to protect the driver in the collision
scenarios mandated by GMRT2100 / EN
15227. With these elements fixed, it was
found that the front auto-coupler needed to
be extended to provide clearance between
the coupler head and cab structure on tight
curves. This extension caused the
exceedance of the 3226 mm limit.
It is considered that there is no negative
17/06/2016
impact from complying with GMRT2472
Issue 1 instead of GMRT2472 Issue 2. The
revised GMRT2472 Issue 2 requires the
recording of additional data and a greater
level of protection capability for data
survivability. The OTDR only records and
stores data that can be analysed in the
event of an incident; the recording of
additional information does not by itself
improve the safety of the vehicles. This is
reflected in GMRT2472 Issue 2 itself, since
it does not mandate to bring existing rail
vehicles into compliance. The revised
requirements in GMRT2472 Issue 2 do not
have an effect on the ability of the unit to
meet the essential requirement that trains
must be fitted with a recording device. The
Class 387 design is now almost life-expired
because of the June 2017 transition phase
for introducing non- Technical Specification
for Interoperability (TSI) compliant rolling
stock. Therefore, this application is for a
limited number of units only. In order to
comply with the requirements of GMRT2472
Issue 2 would require fitting a proportionally
small number of trains with a different Data
Recorder to that used across a fleet of
several hundred trains. This would
The original scope of the Crossrail project
23/03/2016
would have left seven stations that are to be
served by Crossrail trains without step free
access to the platforms, one of which is
Maryland station. This station was
reconstructed in the 1940s with a new four
track layout, and with a new station building
and new access steps to the four platforms.
That reconstruction resulted in platform
widths of less than 2. 5 m on platforms 1, 2
and 3 at locations adjacent to the stairs that
provide access from the station structure
above. The platforms are located in a
cutting bounded by retaining walls, with the
wall to the rear of platform 1 being a
reinforced concrete structure. The attached
drawing MMD-336583-C-SK-MYL-0005
provides key dimensions for the current
layout. Following feasibility and option
selection studies, a preferred scheme for
the provision of lifts to provide step free
access to all platforms was selected. The
layout of the proposed lifts for platforms 1,
2 and 3 is shown on the attached drawing
MMD-336583-C-SK-MYL-0005 and 0006
The lift to serve platform 4 will be located in
existing platform buildings, and does not
affect the clear width of platform 4. The
proposed lift structure on platform 1 will
The impact of the extension of the auto26/06/2016
coupler beyond the 3226 mm limit has been
assessed by comparison with a squareended vehicle with exactly 3226 mm
overhang (see figure below). This shows
that there is no impact on converging lines
at angles up to 82Â°. There is only a very
minor impact where lines converge at 8390Â°, which happens very rarely, and does
not happen on the current Crossrail
network. Infrastructure should be designed
with a 1600 mm margin in addition to the
vehicle overhang, which includes a 1300
mm allowance for roll-back. The overhang
exceedance is less than the 300 mm
margin. Railway Group Standard
GKRT0028 requires that new infrastructure
is built using an assumed overhang of 4200
mm (as specified in ERA/ERTMS/033281).
N/A
GIRT7016
Compared to GMRT2472 Issue 1, the
requirements of GMRT2472 Issue 2 specify
new and more demanding survivability
requirements for the Crash-Proof Memory,
additional data to be recorded, more
onerous recording performance
requirements (I. e. faster speed to record
data), new reliability figures, and new
requirements related to both maintainability
and data retrieval. These new requirements
cannot be met by the current Class 387 OnTrain Data Recorder (OTDR). Therefore, to
achieve full compliance with GMRT2472
Issue 2, a new OTDR will need to be fitted
to the Class 387 vehicles. Bombardier has
been working with the supplier HaslerRail to
develop a GMRT2472 Issue 2 compliant
solution for the fully TSI-compliant Class
345 Crossrail design. This solution is not
electrically compatible with the Class 387
design because of the introduction of a new
electronic interface with the Trains Control
and Management System (TCMS). In
addition, the OTDR unit has larger physical
dimensions and higher mass because of the
significant difference in the level of
protection of the data required, so that the
new OTDR unit does not physically fit in the
existing space envelope. To implement the
The minimum practical width of a new lift
shaft structure, together with the existing
constraints arising from the platform layout
and adjacent structures (the platform 1
retaining wall) are such that platform widths
of 2. 5 m or greater cannot be achieved
alongside the new lifts. The new lifts are
proposed so as to provide improved access
to the platforms for passengers of reduced
mobility, including the disabled, who would
be unable to use the stairs, or who could
only use the stairs with difficulty. The
internal width of the lift cars is set to
achieve compliance with the requirements
of the Department for Transport (DfT)
"Design Standards for Accessible Railway
Stations".
N/A
18/02/2016
MTR Corporation (Crossrail)
Ltd
11/03/2016
Current
GMRT2131
One
All clauses
Audibility and Visibility of Trains
16-014-DEV
Class 387 - Compliance to GMRT2131
Issue 1.
The scope of this deviation is for all Class
387 vehicles whose application for
authorisation is based on conformity to
Type UKTYPE/51/2015/0012 (Class 387
proxy Type reference). The deviation is
applicable for all routes over which the
Class 387 vehicles will operate.
Visibility The differences between
GMRT2483 Issue 1 and GMRT2131 Issue 1
are significant; GMRT2131 Issue 1
specifies different requirements for the
dimensions of the lights, beam intensity and
beam pattern, introduces new dimming
control functionality and different
measurement criteria etc. Therefore, a
design solution that could meet both
standards is not achievable. Bombardier
has been working with the supplier Translec
to develop a GMRT2131 compliant solution
for the fully TSI-compliant Class 345
Crossrail design; it is expected to reach
design finalisation by March 2016. This
new Translec design solution does not fit
within the Class 387 head/tail/marker light
space envelope and has a different control
unit to achieve the newly specified dimming
functionality. To implement the solution in
the Class 387 vehicles will require a new
bracket mounting arrangement,
modification to the wiring schematics and
redesign of the GRP front end. The Class
387 design has been in production
continuously since May 2014; the
production of the next 'batch' of Class 387
vehicles which require authorisation (as
conforming to Type) will commence in
18/05/2016
impact from complying with GMRT2483
Issue 1 and GMRT2484 Issue 2 instead of
GMRT2131 Issue 1. With respect to
audibility, the requirements in GMRT2484
Issue 2 and GMRT2131 Issue 1 are
equivalent - as stated in the relative impact
assessment - and therefore there is no
difference in complying with GMRT2484
Issue 2 instead of GMRT2131 Issue 1.
With respect to visibility, the additional
Class 387 units (which conform to the
authorised Class 387 Type design) are fully
compliant with GMRT2483 Issue 1. As
stated by impact assessment 15 IA22,
GMRT2483 Issue 1 reflects the existing UK
operating conditions. Therefore, modifying
existing designs to achieve compliance with
GMRT2131 Issue 1 instead of GMRT2483
Issue 1 will not improve the safety of the
railway system. This is reflected in
GMRT2131 Issue 1 itself, since it does not
mandate to bring existing rail vehicles into
compliance. Continued compliance with
GMRT2483 Issue 1 and GMRT2484 Issue 2
will avoid any design incompatibility among
the Class 387 fleet, with significant benefits
to the Operators in terms of operational and
maintenance costs. In addition, the Class
N/A
05/05/2016
on behalf of, Great Western
Railway, Porterbrook
Leasing
N/A
Current
Certificate Number
Lead SC
Page3
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GERT8000-TW7
Six
1.1 and 1.2
Wrong-direction movements
16-069-DEV
Trialling of Phase 1a of the On-Track
Machine (OTM) protection zone procedure.
Trial areas / routes will include: Anglia
Route - Delivery Units: Tottenham,
Romford, Ipswich; Western Route - Delivery
Units: Bristol, Swindon, Plymouth,
Reading; Wessex Route -Delivery Unit:
Eastleigh; Scotland Route -Delivery Units:
Motherwell Glasgow, Perth, Edinburgh;
Wales Route - Delivery Units: Shrewsbury,
Cardiff; London North Eastern (LNE) Route Delivery Units: Hitchin York, Leeds,
Sheffield; London North Western (LNW)
Route (WM and C) - Delivery Units:
Saltley, Sandwell and Dudley.
GIRT7016
Five
6.2.2. b
and Trains
16-013-DEV
Platforms 7 and 8 Vauxhall Station minimum platform width.
GERT8000-HB7
Five
3.1
General duties of a controller of site safety
(COSS)
16-007-DEV
Continuation of the trial on the London
North Eastern (LNE) route with Leeds and
Newcastle Delivery Unit, and for further
trials in London North Western (LNW) and
Wales and Anglia Routes.
GERT8000-OTM
Seven
4.1 and 4.2
Working of on-track machines (OTM)
16-068-DEV
Tranche 2 of Phase 1a trials of the OTM
protection zone procedure on track circuit
block lines.
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
With supplementary protection in place, the 14/07/2016
OTM is protected from coming into contact
with other traffic on that line.
31/07/2017
29/06/2016
Network Rail
Traffic Operation and
Management
N/A
Current
The overall impact of these works is to
16/06/2016
improve safety by reducing overall
passenger congestion, this is supported by
pedestrian flow modelling. South West
Trains have been consulted, have agreed
the proposals, and have appropriate
operational procedures. The proposed
solution is to some extent a 'sticking
plaster'. A March 2016 passenger flow
survey shows that, while the total number of
passengers using the suburban line
services at Vauxhall Station continues to
increase, the maximum number in a given
hour has remained relatively constant and
the peak period has increased in duration.
Crossrail 2 is likely to affect passenger
demand at Vauxhall Station. Additional
interventions to address congestion at
Vauxhall during and beyond CP6 are likely
to be required if passenger congestion
creeps back up to current levels, as
anticipated by 2024.
N/A
15/02/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2016
Current
Trials will be subject to controlled
26/06/2016
conditions, only those briefed will be able to
use the process, knowledge of the process
will also be confirmed before use. The
GSM-R mobile handsets have to be used.
Regular route and project team
communication will occur to confirm how
the trial is progressing and to agree and
carry on or stop the trial at a trial location if
required. Safety validations, output and
feedback (see supporting documentation
attached), and consultation with
stakeholders will take place during the
trials.
31/05/2017
02/02/2016
Network Rail
Management
10/05/2016
Current
Clause 4. 1 stipulates that the work will not With supplementary protection in place, the 14/07/2016
require wrong direction movements (except OTM is protected from coming into contact
as described for the rail grinding train), the with other traffic on that line.
on-track machine (OTM) that will be trialled
as part of the OTM protection zone
procedure (tampers and stoneblowers) need
to make at least 2-3 wrong direction
movements as part of their normal method
of operation. The clause also stipulates that
a machine may so work if signalled as an
Engineering train requiring to stop in
section, but not on a Track Circuit Block
(TCB) line or where intermediate block
signals are provided. Clause 4. 2 stipulates
that the driver must tell the signaller that the
OTM will be working outside of a
possession as part of the trials of the OTM
protection zone procedure there is not
requirement for the driver to do this as the
signaller will be made aware by the
published Weekly Operating Notice (WON)
notice and the Track Quality Supervisor
(TQS). So a temporary deviation is sought
to allow tranche 2 of Phase 1a trials of the
OTM protection zone procedure on track
circuit block lines and to allow the OTM to
make wrong direction movements as
required. The Phase 1a trials will be limited
to single and double track lines in track
31/07/2017
29/06/2016
Network Rail
Management
N/A
Current
Brief details of requirements: This clause
documents the ten occasions when a
signaller may authorise the driver to make
wrong direction movement for which a
signal is not provided. To allow Tranche 2
of trials of Phase 1a of the OTM protection
zone to proceed, there is a requirement to
add the trials of this procedure to the list of
reasons when a wrong direction movement
can be made without the authority of a
signal. Additionally, there is a need to add
the Track Quality Supervisor (TQS) to the
list of people who can authorise the OTM
driver to make a wrong direction movement.
The Phase 1a trials will be limited to single
and double track lines in track circuit block
areas that do not have axle counters, level
crossings or ground frames in non-DC
electrified areas. The deviation is to allow
the continued trialling of Phase 1a of the
OTM protection zone procedure a
temporary deviation against Clause1. 1 to
allow wrong direction movements where no
signal is provided as required. A further
deviation is required against Clause 1. 2 to
add the TQS to the list of people who can
authorise the OTM driver to make a wrong
direction movement. This deviation is an
extension of application 13-098-DEV
Platforms 7 and 8 Vauxhall Station.
Wessex Capacity Programme: Vauxhall
Station: Platforms 7 and 8. Please refer to
the attached general arrangement.
Platforms 7 and 8 serve the suburban lines
on the South West Trains network out of
London Waterloo (ELR: BML1) and most
trains call at Vauxhall. There is severe
passenger congestion (I. e. Fruin level of
service F at platform level) on island
Platform 7 and 8 at peak times. To mitigate
this and allow for future growth in
passenger numbers, pedestrian modelling
studies have demonstrated that relocating
the existing lift approximately 5 m towards
Country and constructing a new stairway at
the Country end of Platforms 7 and 8 will
reduce the existing and predicted future
platform level congestion. However,
relocation of the lift and construction of the
stairway will result in localised platform
widths of less than 2500 mm. There is
insufficient space to comply with the
requirements. Island Platform 7 and 8 is
curved and tapers to a minimum width of
5740 mm in the area where the new
stairway and relocated lift is proposed. It is
not possible to provide a new stairway while
complying with the minimum 2500 mm
platform edge distance to it. Note that the
The application is to request the
The proposal does not look to change the
continuation of the trial on the LNE Route
requirements to plan a Safe System of
with Leeds and Newcastle Delivery Unit,
Work (SSOW) that may include these
and for further trials in LNW and Wales and identified locations but due to the
Anglia Routes.
disproportionate time taken to complete the
Signallers and SWL /COSS / IWA
documentation, which at times can take up
to 10 minutes or more, for a short activity of
between two and three minutes. This
temporary deviation is requiring to not
comply with the requirements for Signaller
and SWL / COSS / IWA to complete form
RT3180 and RT3181 respectively. Also to
withdraw the requirements to place signals
to danger as a form of protection when a
suitable margin has been agreed to cross
the line. This also drives a poor safety
culture where groups can potentially split up
and become IWA to cross the open line due
to the difficulties in obtaining a line
blockage. The current requirement is to
plan the line blockage but, as previously
mentioned, the group may have to wait for a
prolonged time track side or cross the line
as IWA's to regroup again once the line has
been crossed. Observed evidence indicates
that a group may have to wait thirty minutes
to get a line blockage to cross the line.
Trial areas/routes will include: Anglia Route
- Delivery Units: Tottenham, Romford,
Ipswich; Western Route - Delivery Units:
Bristol, Swindon, Plymouth, Reading;
Wessex Route -Delivery Unit: Eastleigh;
Scotland Route - Delivery Units:
Wales Route -Delivery Units: Shrewsbury,
Page4
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
GIRT7016
Five
11.1.3
and Trains
16-012-DEV
Waterloo Station Platforms 1 - 6 Platform
cross fall.
Waterloo Station Platforms 1 - 6
Waterloo Station Platforms 1 - 4 are being There is no worsening of the current
extended and Platforms 5 - 6 are being
situation.
altered in order to facilitate a new track
layout. Whilst platform extensions will have
compliant falls those areas of associated
platform which will require re surfacing will
not have compliant falls Provision of
compliant falls is not practicable due to cost
and programme considerations. The design
proposes to retain the existing platform
construction, where the track alignment
allows this and the platform edge positions
to be adjusted to compliant offsets to the
new track alignment. The crossfalls shall
be improved as far as reasonably
practicable in doing so. Note that Platform 78 is not considered within the scope of this
derogation as the modifications to this
platform only comprise re-positioning of
platform edge copers as opposed to
complete platform reconstruction works.
GERT8000-HB6
Five
3.1
General duties of an individual working
alone (IWA)
16-006-DEV
North Eastern (LNE) Route with Leeds and
and for further trials in LNW and Wales and
Anglia Routes.
identified locations but due to the
Signallers and IWA documentation, which
at times can take up to 10 minutes or more,
for a short activity of between 2 and 3
minutes. This temporary deviation is
requiring to: not comply with the
requirements for Signaller and IWA to
complete form RT3180 and RT3181
respectively; to withdraw the requirements
to place signals to danger as a form of
protection when a suitable margin has been
agreed to cross the line. This also drives a
poor safety culture where groups can
potentially split up and become IWA to
cross the open line due to the difficulties in
obtaining a line blockage. The current
requirement is to plan the line blockage but,
as previously mentioned, the group may
have to wait for a prolonged time track side
or cross the line as IWAs to regroup again
once the line has been crossed. Observed
evidence indicates that a group may have to
wait 30 minutes to get a line blockage to
cross the line.
GMRT2141
Three
2.4.1.1
16-067-DEV
Class 707 (South-West Train Electric
N/A. Not related to a specific location.
Multiple Unit - SWT EMU) â€“ Resistance to
Roll-Over.
GIRT7016
Five
2.1.1 and 2.1.3
and Trains
16-011-DEV
Class 707 (SWT EMU) vehicles are
designed as lightweight vehicles with high
payload, in terms of a whole life, whole
system optimisation. In combination with
the conventional high floor level, and
consequently high centres of gravity, this
design leads generally to non-compliance
with the 21Â° criterion of GMRT2141 The
design has been optimised with respect to
weight reduction in the bogie and carbody
design. Moreover, the interior layout has
been designed to carry more passengers
during rush hours. Notwithstanding,
measures to lower the centres of gravity as
much as possible were introduced during
the vehicle design process: Class 707 has
a lower floor height (1100 mm) in
comparison with existing suburban rolling
stock (1140 mm). This lowers the centre of
gravity of the body by about 40 mm.
Additionally, the body shell design of the
roof is light weight, consisting of rectangular
cells with short intermediate connections
instead of trapezoidal cells with longer
connections. The wall thickness is only 3. 0
mm instead of 3. 5 mm as used for the
sidewalls. Complying with the 21Â°
criterion would require technical measures
which lead to severe disadvantages:
Proposed platform radii for the extensions
This proposed permanent non-compliance Wessex Capacity Programme: Waterloo
of Platforms 1-4, modifications of Platforms relates to the proposed platform radii for the Station Platforms. Waterloo Station
5-8 and modifications to Platforms 20-24.
extensions of Platforms 1-4, the
Platforms are to be extended and modified
modifications of Platforms 5-8 and the
in order to increase capacity. It is not
modifications to Platforms 20-24.
reasonably practicable to comply with the
standard requirements for platforms to be
located on radii in excess of the minimum
requirements. This proposed permanent
non-compliance relates to the proposed
platform radii for the extensions of
Platforms 1-4, the modifications of
Platforms 5-8 and the modifications to
Platforms 20-24. Due to space constraints
at the throat area of Waterloo Station, it is
not possible to provide the track radii
required by GIRT7016 (Interface between
Station, Platforms, Track and Trains Issue
5) along the full length of the extended
platforms. To achieve the platforms lengths
required for ten-car train operation, the
track layout on the approach to Waterloo
Station has to be significantly modified. A
number of pinch points exist on the
approach route to Waterloo Station which
limit the geometry of the track and prohibit
an earlier start of the station approach
throat area, the main pinch point being the
bridge structure to Westminster Bridge
Road Bridge. The track layout is also
Lead SC
Deviation Status
15/04/2016
N/A
15/02/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
02/03/2016
Current
26/06/2016
trials.
31/05/2017
02/02/2016
Network Rail
Traffic operation and
Management
10/05/2016
Current
Several deviations have already been
08/07/2016
granted against the roll-over criterion in
GMRT2141: 10/046/DGN Chiltem Railways
Mk3 TSOW predicted to overturn at 20Â°.
14/048/DEV Class 700 (Thameslink)
predicted not to overturn up to 19. 5Â°.
14/126/DEV Chiltern Railways Mk3 Galley
First Wheelchair predicted to overturn at 20.
3Â°. 15/047/DEV Refurbished Class 465/9
TOSL vehicles comply with a roll-over angle
of 19. 3Â°. 15/067/DEV Refurbished Class
321 trailer vehicle achieve a roll-over angle
of 18. 9Â°. Vehicles comply with a
minimum roll-over angle of 18. 0Â°.
Supplementary there is a certain
understanding that the roll-over angle will
be reduced to 18 degrees in the next
revision of GMRT2141, cp. 15/047/DEV
and 15/067/DEV. The impact of a deviation
from the 21Â° criterion of GMRT2141 was
investigated in detail for 14/048/DEV of
Class 700, Thameslink EMU which has
been already granted. The key statements
are also valid for Class 707, SWT EMU, see
supporting document A6Z00033632574.
The investigation shows that, based on the
design limits and provision instructions from
the RGS, the lower roll-over resistance does
not introduce an additional risk of such
The overall aim of this programme is to
16/06/2016
increase capacity and relieve congestion
not only at Waterloo Station but also at
outlying stations where congestion and
passenger comfort are issues. It should
also be noted that the existing minimum
radii are currently non-compliant with this
clause and the proposed scheme generally
improves on the existing conditions. The
following alternative provisions will be
implemented, as agreed with Network Rail
and South West Trains: Banner repeaters
will be provided on the platforms to ensure
train drivers have sight of relevant signals;
Area to be monitored by station staff and
Close Circuit Television (CCTV) during peak
times to ensure passenger safety (new
CCTV cameras are being installed to
extended sections of Platforms 1-4 and
Platforms 20-24; existing CCTV coverage
to Platform 5-8 are proposed to be
maintained); Station staff to provide
assistance to people of reduced mobility
who may need to board coaches of the train
in areas with an increased stepping
distance.
N/A
28/06/2016
Siemens plc
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
N/A
15/02/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2016
Current
Page5
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8000-TS1
Ten
13.2
General signalling regulations
16-005-DEV
North Eastern (LNE) route with Leeds and
and for further trials in LNW and Wales and
Anglia Routes.
identified locations but due to the
Signallers and SWL / COSS / IWA
documentation, which at times can take up
to ten minutes or more, for a short activity
of between two and three minutes. This
temporary deviation is requiring to not
comply with the requirements for Signaller
and SWL / COSS / IWA to complete form
RT3180 and RT3181 respectively. Also to
withdraw the requirements to place signals
to danger as a form of protection when a
suitable margin has been agreed to cross
the line. This also drives a poor safety
culture where groups can potentially split up
and become IWA to cross the open line due
to the difficulties in obtaining a line
blockage. The current requirement is to plan
the line blockage but, as previously
mentioned, the group may have to wait for a
prolonged time track side or cross the line
as IWA's to regroup again once the line has
been crossed. Observed evidence indicates
that a group may have to wait 30 minutes to
get a line blockage to cross the line.
26/06/2016
trials.
31/05/2017
02/02/2016
Network Rail
Management
10/05/2016
Current
GIRT7016
Five
7.3.1 (c) and 7.4.1
and Trains
16-010-DEV
Waterloo Station, Platforms 3 to 6 Waterloo Station, Platforms 3 to 6 Wessex Capacity Programme is extending
Reduced Platform Widths at Country Ends. Reduced Platform Widths at Country Ends. and altering platforms at Waterloo Station
in order to improve overall capacity into
Waterloo Station. It is not practicable to
provide compliant platform widths,
particularly as some platforms are already
non-compliant to the requirements of the
standard. Platforms 3 - 6 will have noncompliant widths at their country ends.
Platforms 3 and 4 are to be extended to
accommodate ten-car class 458 trains. To
accommodate the required changes in track
layout platforms 5 and 6 will be shortened
and a large portion will be rebuilt. A
number of pinch points exist on the
approach route to Waterloo Station which
limit the geometry of the track - the main
pinch point being the bridge structure to
Westminster Road Bridge. The track layout
is also limited by operational requirements such as achieving 18 trains per hour during
peak operations.
This programme of work increases capacity 15/04/2016
at Waterloo Station and other outlying
stations helping to relieve passenger
congestion and improving passenger
comfort. Whilst the proposed platform
lengthening will introduce non-compliant
widths, the proposal has been assessed to
bring significant benefits to passenger
capacity and congestion relief for the
current and future operation of the station.
We strongly believe this to be a reasonable
approach and the scheme is supported by
our stakeholders.
N/A
15/02/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
02/03/2016
Current
GERT8000-HB7
Five
4.4
(COSS)
16-071-DEV
Tranche 2 of trials of Phase 1a of the OTM
protection zone.
Route - Delivery Units: Tottenham,
Romford, Ipswich; Western Route - Delivery
Reading; Wessex Route - Delivery Unit:
Eastleigh; Scotland Route - Delivery Units:
Wales Route - Delivery Units: Shrewsbury,
31/07/2017
29/06/2016
Network Rail
Management
N/A
Current
GKRT0028
Two
2.3.1.1
Infrastructure Based Train Detection
Interface Requirements
16-059-DEV
Platform 1 at Queen Street Station,
Glasgow, 2194 track circuit.
Platform 1 at Queen Street Station,
Glasgow, 2194 track circuit.
Layout and physical constraints can only
29/07/2016
be overcome by significant change to
station buildings, which is unreasonable at
this time; however, this work is planned for
KO3 phase of the project. This route is not
classed as a new high speed line and there
is no planned use of the platform by stock
type requiring the published normalised
clearance during the deviation period; it is
deemed safe to provide the track clearance
of 4880 mm until KO3 occurs.
31/12/2018
16/06/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
N/A
Current
GKRT0045
Four
5.1.2.4
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
16-003-DEV
Bristol signal B25, situated to the East of
Bedminster Station on the MLN1 at 119M
2Ch.
Bristol signal B25, situated to the East of
Bedminster Station on the MLN1 at 119M
2Ch.
31/12/2017
28/01/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
18/02/2016
Current
This handbook clause details that the
Controller of Site Safety (COSS) may use a
blocked line as part of the safe system of
work, it then lays down guidelines on when
a line may be considered to be blocked.
The COSS must only consider a line to be
blocked if at least one of the following
applies: The COSS has blocked the line or
lines concerned as shown in handbook 8.
The line or lines concerned have been
blocked by a Protection Controller (PC) and
the COSS has agreed a safe system of
work with that PC as shown in handbook 8.
The COSS's site of work is within an
Engineering Supervisor (ES)'s work site and
the COSS has agreed a safe system of
work with that ES, as shown in handbook 9.
The COSS's site of work is within a siding
and the COSS has agreed a safe system of
work with that Person in Charge of Sidings
(PICOS), as shown in handbook 9. The
project continues to require the addition of
the OTM protection zone as reason why a
line should be considered to be blocked to
allow tranche 2 of Phase 1a trials to take
place to evaluate the procedure further. The
Phase 1a trials will be limited to single and
double track lines in track circuit block
Under KO1 we are unable to obtain the
5800 mm clearance distance as the layout
and physical constraints do not permit.
Bristol signal B25 (BL2166 by new WMSR N/A
numbering system) is currently mounted on
a two track cantilever with B27 (BL2168):
both are 4 aspect signals. B25 is applicable
to the Up Relief, for an Up direction move
and B27 is applicable to the Up Main, also
in the Up direction. B27 has Junction
Indicators at positions 4 and 5, but B25 is
now mounted on the upright column of the
structure and is provided with Alphanumeric
Route Indicators in place of the former
Junction Indicators at positions 4, 5 and 6.
The linespeed on the approach to B25 is 40
mph, but there is a 25 mph Permanent
Speed Restriction at the toes of 769B points
which applies to all routes available from
B25. B25 has four recorded Category A
Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) in
recent years (22/12/1993, 04/07/2003,
02/07/2006 and 27/12/2011). Three of the
SPADs have been recorded as being due to
'reading wrong signal' [B27]. The SPAD
investigation recommended the relocation
of the signal onto a straight post in order to
reduce the possibility of any crossreading
with B27. It is not possible to site B25
provided with Junction Indicators on a
straight post due to the limited space
available between the Up Relief and the
07/03/2016
Page6
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0075
Four
2.6.1 and Appendix A Table Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
1
Signage
16-058-DEV
Camberley F341 Braking Deficiency.
Camberley Station ELR AAV, 35m, 35ch.
Platform 2 start signal F341.
A signal position compliant with signal
spacing requirements is not available with
the following constraints. The fragile legacy
signalling infrastructure (wiring degradation)
limits the level of alteration which is
reasonable to achieve. Signal sighting
constraints limit the suitability of signal
position in this area. The signal spacing
requirements from which this deviation
applies is applicable to freight trains only on
a route where there are no scheduled freight
services. The application of differential
speed restrictions in this area would have
unacceptable impact on Freight Operating
Company (FOC) train paths and conflicts
with the Southern 2/3 rule for freight
speeds.
N/A
16/06/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
07/07/2016
Current
GKRT0044
Three
3.2.1c, 3.2.2
Permissive Working
16-002-DEV
Doncaster Station Area Capacity
Enhancements - Provision of Signalling
Controls for Permissive Working.
This deviation is specifically associated to
signals reading into Doncaster Station
platform 1 (D279) from the South. It is
specific to permissive routes from signals
D269, D1465, D1467 and D1471.
N/A
25/01/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
18/02/2016
Current
GIRT7016
Five
6.2.2 b
and Trains
16-057-DEV
Maryland Station, platforms 1 and 4,
Platforms 1 and 4 at Maryland station.
temporary hoardings and restricted platform
width.
Not all the controls specified within
GKRT0044 (3. 2. 1c and 3. 2. 2) are
currently provided for Doncaster area.
Drivers within the area are aware of the
current arrangements, and application of
these controls would create unnecessary
interlocking works and limited safety benefit
for the Doncaster Station area
enhancements scheme. Whilst the controls
stipulated within Sections 3. 2. 1 and 3. 2. 2
are achievable in the detailed wiring design,
provision of these controls would result in
the following: The introduction of conflicting
controls in the Doncaster interlocking, which
could result in an unsafe arrangement. The
signaller at Doncaster will retain the ability
to signal trains from other signals for the
purposes of attaching and detaching,
utilising the existing controls provided by
the Westpac circuitry without the inclusion
of the requirements listed above. The
introduction of a potentially confusing
operational arrangement to the signaller
and driver where the controls would differ
for similar signalled moves. The
introduction of novel and complex freewired circuitry in the Doncaster interlocking
including the requirement for additional new
free wired relays. The introduction of
The original scope of the Crossrail project
would have left seven stations that are to be
served by Crossrail trains without step-free
access to the platforms, one of which is
Maryland station. This station was
reconstructed in the 1940s with a new fourtrack layout, and with a new station building
and new access steps to the four platforms.
That reconstruction resulted in noncompliant platform widths of less than 2. 5
m at locations adjacent to the stairs that
provide access from the station structure
above. The platforms are located in a
cutting bounded by retaining walls, with the
wall to the rear of Platform 1 being a
reinforced concrete structure. To comply
with current RGS requirements would mean
it is impractical to install the hoardings
required to segregate the worksite and
ensure the safety of passengers and staff,
and prevent accidental damage to facilities
during the station improvement construction
works.
The Project proposes to move F341 signal 29/07/2016
at Camberley Station to accommodate a 14
m platform extension and to give a 25 m
stand-back for train driver sighting (scheme
plan attached). The line of route was resignalled c1970 and applied the Southern
Region braking curves applicable at the
time. When current requirements are
considered, along with the improvement in
vehicle braking since that period for the
predominance of trains, the proposed
position improves the available spacing
from the existing arrangement. It is noted
the signal spacing requirements are
conservative in this part of the braking
curve, with consistent figures for speeds
between 80 mph and 40 mph for this
gradient. Further justification stems from
the risk associated with interfering with the
interlocking wiring. The asset owner also
deems compliance to represent too great a
safety risk to the signalling system as a
whole. The arrangements described will last
for a relatively short period and be rectified
when Feltham Re-signalling Project
commissions their work. A risk assessment
attached with this application has been
carried out and has determined the
technical and operational risks of the nonThe implementation of the projects proposal 07/03/2016
will affect the below by: The safety of the
railway system - We are proposing to
implement a proven, tried and tested
method of permissive working that is
consistent with the existing approach within
that specific area. The compatibility of the
railway system now and in the future - The
project approach is to provide a consistent
compatible method of permissive working
for the existing railway system/operation. It
is envisaged that this would simplify future
alterations/upgrades. Costs and service
performance, including reliability and
availability - by delivering the same
functionality as existing is the most costeffective method for the project to deliver
the works. If it became a requirement to
achieve full compliance to the standard, the
increased complexity of the physical works
and the conflicting approach with providing
the additional controls could have a
negative impact on the service provided.
Reference should be made to Risk
Assessment Ref. 139058/SIG/RA/001 that
was carried out to form the projects opinion.
The risk assessment method to be adopted
is qualitative, with expert judgement being
the primary method for assessing the risks
The proposed provisions will reduce the
29/07/2016
area of platform available for passengers to
wait and travel. There will be no impact to
the safety of the railway system,
environmental health and protection. Any
areas of the station where there is less than
600 mm between the station edge warning
line should be marked as 'no waiting' zones
to allow for the safe passing of passengers.
These areas have been highlighted on
Drawing 16556-00-HCT-MRY-HRD-01 C5.
The hoardings have been designed to be
made of a post in hole construction at 4. 5
m maximum intervals with walers spanning
between them at 600 mm centres. The
posts will consist of SHS and the walers will
be steel 'C' sections, designed to suit the
required loading. A layer of 19 mm thick
plywood will complete the structure, which
will be 2. 4 m in height.
31/03/2017
14/06/2016
Hochtief Construction UK
Infrastructure
06/07/2016
Current
GERT8000-TW5
Six
11.2
Preparation and movement of trains.
Defective or isolated vehicles and on-train
equipment
16-001-DEV
Emergency bypass switch (EBS)
requirement for competent person.
The risk of operating a train formed of more 01/03/2016
than one unit with the EBS raised is that, if
the train becomes divided, no brake
application is automatically made on the
front portion and the driver is likely to be
unaware that a division has taken place.
The brakes will automatically apply on the
rear portion. No changes are intended to be
made to the existing arrangements for
detraining passengers, if it is necessary to
operate the EBS on a train in passenger
service. Consequently, the risk of
passengers travelling in the rear portion of a
divided train are unchanged. The revised
arrangements are only intended to be
applied on lines signalled by TCB so, in the
event of a train division, the rear portion will
be protected by the signalling system.
Clause 11. 2 already requires the signaller
to be told that the train is travelling with the
EBS operated. The revised arrangements
should avoid some of the present significant
delays that result when it becomes
necessary to operate the EBS on a driveronly passenger train formed of more than
one unit.
31/12/2018
08/01/2016
Great Western Railway
Management
02/02/2016
Current
RGS Title
All Great Western Routes, provided the
If it is necessary to operate the EBS on a
distance is specified within the Defective On- train in service and it is formed of more
Train Equipment (DOTE) plan.
than one unit, unless it is possible to move
all the passengers into the front unit, it is
necessary to detrain the passengers at the
first suitable station. This then means that
the train would be required to enter service
as Empty Coaching Stock (ECS) from that
station. Clause 11. 2 requires that, if a train
on which the EBS has been operated is to
enter service as ECS to travel to a
maintenance depot, and it is formed of
more than one unit, a guard or competent
person has to travel in the rear unit. If the
train was being worked driver only, it is
unlikely that there will be anyone
immediately available to act as a competent
person. In such situations, it takes about
an hour for a competent person to reach the
train. At most locations, this means that
the line in one direction is blocked for that
entire time as the train is not permitted to
make any movement until a competent
person is provided. This delay is in addition
to that already incurred by the defect that
resulted in the requirement to operate the
EBS. An incident of this type on the Great
Western network on 09/11/2015 caused
c1400 minutes of delay, 21 cancellations
Page7
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
GMRT2400
Five
2.3.1.1
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 16-062-DEV
Running Mode
Brakes on on-track machines in running
mode - Loram Stone Rail Grinder
machines.
Machine Description Machine Serial
NumberC4401-32 Stone Rail Grinder
209197C4402-32 Stone Rail Grinder
209199C4403-64 Stone Rail Grinder
209201
Loram, Maintenance of Way, Inc On-track It is considered that there is no increased
machines authorized to self-propel inside
risk by adopting the proposed alternate
and outside possessions. The Stone Rail
provisions.
Grinder machines will not have a driver's
override for the emergency brake fitted.
This deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under
the Railways (Interoperability) Regulations
2011. No alternative options available. To
comply with this paragraph would require
the development of an override system
capable of achieving the required
functionality without any reduction in safety
or reliability. Apart from the driving cab, the
only other location on an On-track Machine
(OTM) where personnel are authorised to
be present during running is the rear cab.
There is direct communication between the
rear cab and the operable driving cab. In
the exceptionally unlikely event of the need
to apply the emergency brake from the rear
cab, any personnel present in the rear cab
will be trained OTM staff who will be able to
explain to the driver why they have done so
and reset the emergency brake button if
requested by the driver. It is considered
that there is no increased risk by adopting
the proposed alternate provisions.
GIRT7016
Five
6.2.2 b)
and Trains
16-056-DEV
Seven Kings Station, all platforms,
Hoarding positions are detailed within
temporary hoardings and restricted platform Drawing 16555-00-HCT-7KS-HRD-01
width.
Version C6. Hoarding positions affect all
four platforms at Seven Kings Station. For
discrete locations along each hoarding line,
worst case dimensions (minimum) are
shown from the hoarding to the platform
face.
GIRT7016
Five
11.1.3.3
and Trains
16-055-DEV
Bristol Temple Meads - Platform 13.
GERT8000-M1
Three
3.8
Dealing with a train accident or train
evacuation
16-049-DEV
Trialling of Emergency Special Working
(ESW).
Certificate Number
Lead SC
Deviation Status
11/08/2016
N/A
27/06/2016
Network Rail
Rolling Stock
22/07/2016
Current
The station improvement works consist of
the construction of new bridges and lift
shafts to allow step-free access to platforms
for passengers. As such, it is necessary to
install the hoardings to segregate the
worksite and ensure the improvement works
are constructed in a safe manner. The
hoardings are required at points to
encroach within the 2. 5 m of the platform
edge which will allow for a safe working
area and to ensure the ground conditions
are suitable to ensure the structural integrity
of the hoarding. To comply with current
RGS requirements would mean it is
impracticable to install the hoardings
required to ensure the safety of passengers
and staff and prevent accidental damage to
facilities during the station improvement
works. An alternative was to consider the
construction of the station improvement
works during possession working only,
however this is not practical to achieve the
programme construction completion date.
The proposed provisions will reduce the
04/08/2016
area of platform available for passengers to
wait and travel. There will be no impact to
the safety of the railway system,
environmental health and protection. The
hoardings have been designed to be made
of a post in hole construction at 4. 5 m
maximum intervals with walers spanning
between them at 600 mm centres. The
posts will consist of SHS and the walers will
be steel 'C' sections, designed to suit the
required loading. A layer of 19 mm thick
plywood will complete the structure, which
will be 2. 4 m in height.
19/02/2017
14/06/2016
Hochtief Construction UK
Infrastructure
06/07/2016
Current
The proposed falls will need to match
existing track levels. The target nominal 1
in 50 fall (1 in 80 max, 1 in 40 min) away
from the track will not be achievable as the
Platform 13 line is approximately 30 mm
higher than Platform 15 line. A risk
assessment was undertaken with the Great
Western Railway (GWR) and the Network
Rail (NR) station teams to assess the risks
associated with a sub-standard crossfall
and identify the mitigation measures. The
proposed crossfall on Platform 13 was
deemed as acceptable and necessary to
achieve the correct stepping distance.
Please see document 3 for the risk
assessment. In order for the crossfall on
Platform 13 to be made compliant, the track
would need to be lowered to the same level
as Platform 15. It has been determined that
lowering the track would be infeasible as it
runs over a shallow bridge deck which
would be difficult to lower and would have a
significant impact on a very busy junction
running into the station. In addition to
lowering the track, the rest of the platform
would need to be re-built to bring it into
compliance with current standards. See risk
assessment attached. The risks are low.
The severity is minor.
Deviation to apply over the following routes. The temporary deviation will be used to
The whole of the Wessex Route with the
carry out trials in the Wessex, Western and
following exceptions: Earley to Reading
Anglia Routes, on Network Rail
Salisbury to Westbury Wimbledon to East
infrastructure. If the trial proves successful,
Putney Redbridge to Salisbury Tunnel Jct
Network Rail will submit a proposal to
Shalford Jct to Gomshall Havant Jct to
change the standards. Trial will be
Warblington Aldershot South Jct to
restricted to three routes under controlled
Wokingham. The deviation will apply only conditions following a previous trial, various
to South West Trains Train Operating
joint meetings, safety validations, table.
Company on Network Rail Wessex Route
and Cross-Country trains between Reading
and Basingstoke. All other train operators
will work under existing rules and
procedures. The Western Route:
Ladbroke Grove and Wootton Bassett
Junction. Didcot and Heyford. The deviation
will apply to First Great Western, Hex, and
Cross Country Trains on Network Rail
Western Route. All other train operators
procedures. Anglia Route: London
Fenchurch Street -Shoeburyness inclusive
of Tilbury lines. The deviation will apply to
C2C trains on Network Rail Anglia Route.
All other train operators will work under
existing rules and procedures.
See risk assessment attached. The
26/07/2016
crossfall is necessary to achieve the correct
stepping distance.
N/A
13/06/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/07/2016
Current
The temporary deviation is to allow the
08/06/2016
trialling of Emergency Special Working
(ESW) which is a precursor to the
implementation of Temporary Block
Working (TBW) as an initial emergency
response to major signalling failures on
track circuit block lines. Rules were
developed in 2013 and previously presented
to Train Operation and Management
Standards Committee (TOM SC). The
revised procedures are documented as new
section 6 of module S5, revised section M1
clause 3. 8, and M2 clause 2. 1 for the
driver, and a revised track circuit block
regulation 3. 5. 3 for the signaller. The
principles of the new procedure are to avoid
the need for any hand signallers with direct
communication between the controlling
signaller and driver, and to be able to rely
on point detection when available. This is
anticipated to lead to a much speedier
establishment of alternative method of
working until TBW is implemented. During
the time ESW is being worked, trains will be
worked point to point (from an entrance
signal to a location readily identifiable by a
driver, which will usually be a station). The
driver will be required to complete an ESW
ticket detailing the entrance signal, the
30/06/2017
27/05/2016
Network Rail
Management
N/A
Current
Bristol Temple Meads - Platform 13; no
equipment is affected.
Page8
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GKRT0045
Five
5.1.2.8
Signals
16-060-DEV
GIRT7016
Five
7.2.1 (b) and 7.3.1 (c)
and Trains
16-054-DEV
GIRT7016
Five
6.2.2
and Trains
16-048-DEV
GERT8000-TW5
Six
4.44.5 and 22.3
equipment
16-070-DEV
Route indications at Bristol Parkway station The following signals in the Bristol Parkway The existing layout at Stoke Gifford is to be
and environs.
area: BL1481, BL1518, BL1830, BL6586
modified to allow the connection of the new
and BL1522
depot, which will service the Intercity
Express Programme (IEP) electric trains
whose introduction triggers the major
upgrade and immunisation of the Western
Route. Some minor amendments are thus
required to the Stoke Gifford layout at the
relock stage. One of the amendments is to
provide a new Limit Of Shunt (LOS) on the
Down Badminton line, such that a train can
be routed from the new depot into Platform
2 at Bristol Parkway station. Operational
requirements deemed that shunt signal
BL6586 should gain a route indicator
displaying the legend 'X' for that new route.
The equivalent signal today already has
routes to six other destinations but has no
route indicator; provision of the route
indication for the new route thus results in a
requirement for an indication for each of
those existing destinations, one of which is
to the Up Passenger loop. Three main
signals exist which each have a shunt class
route into the Up Passenger loop at Bristol
Parkway - these are B109 (becomes
BL1518), B389 (becomes BL1830) and
B110 (BL1481). Each today is provided
with a fibre optic miniature indicator (MI)
Bristol Temple Meads - The country end of Bristol Temple Meads - The country end of The variation refers to a proposed platform
platforms 13 and 15
platforms 13 and 15.
extension. There is insufficient space to
build the platform extension to the specified
width for a double faced island platform The
country end of platforms 13 and 15. As
described briefly above, to make the space
necessary to fully comply the existing
platform 15, track would need to move
towards the cess by up to 1000 mm, which
would result in significant extra works as
described in the attached scope document
(document 1). It is not practicable to slew
the platform 13 bay track towards the 6 foot
as the existing narrow 6 foots would result
in a knock-on effect to the far platform
(Platform 12). Action has been taken to
identify mitigation measures - see risk
assessment attached. In order to complete
the work to the current standard for an
island platform, a significant amount of
work would be involved as described in the
attached scope document. It is not
reasonably practical to widen the platforms
/ slew the tracks due to the cost of the work
that would be required. To create the space
necessary to widen the platform, it has been
estimated that it could cost around 5. 1
million (refer to document 1 scope and
estimate) to design and alter both the track
West Ealing Station, platform 3.
West Ealing Station.
To temporarily deviate from standard
platform width for the construction of the
new staircase foundation on Platform 3.
The deviation will be required for the
installation of pile caps and the lift pit.
Platform 3 is adjacent to a 90 mph line and
the platform width will require reducing
below the minimum specified amount of 2.
5 m to 2. 2 m over a 12 m length as a result
of hoarding erected on the platform. The
works to be carried out during the
temporary deviation are: construct upper
slab staircase foundation, backfill and
remove temporary deviation. Change of
dates from Tracker 22914 (15/107/DEV).
Once the staircase foundation is
constructed and can be backfilled, fencing
can be moved back to 2. 5 m from the
platform edge. Platform width to be reduced
to 2. 2 m over a 12 m length of platform
during construction of the staircase
foundation. This will affect passengers
making their way from the front of the train
to the stairs that allow exit and access to
street level.
Trialling of Phase 1a of the On-Track
The OTM-PZ project continues to require
Machine (OTM) protection zone procedure. Route - Delivery Units: Tottenham,
the addition of the OTM protection zone as
Romford, Ipswich; Western Route - Delivery reason why a line should be considered to
be blocked to allow Tranche 2 of Phase 1a
Reading; Wessex Route - Delivery Unit:
trials to take place to evaluate the
Eastleigh; Scotland Route - Delivery Units: procedure further. These clauses relate to
train-borne defective / isolated Automatic
Wales Route - Delivery Units: Shrewsbury, Warning System (AWS) and Track Circuit
Cardiff; London North Eastern (LNE) Route - Actuators (TCA) 4. 4, 4. 5, 22. 3. These
Delivery Units: Hitchin York, Leeds,
clauses instruct the driver that the signaller
must be informed immediately of defective /
isolated equipment and that further
movement must not be made until
authorised. The clauses go on to document
what action must be taken before the train
can proceed. The project requests that the
OTM driver does not need to comply with
these clauses as part of the OTM protection
zone trials. The Phase 1a trials will be
limited to single and double track lines in
track circuit block areas that do not have
axle counters, level crossings or ground
frames in non-DC electrified areas. To
allow the continued trialling of Phase 1a of
the OTM protection zone procedure, a time
limited deviation against Clauses 4. 4, 4,5
and 22. 3 is needed. When tampers are in
'work mode' their on-board equipment is
powered by a 24 volt system. To minimise
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Any confusion risk is mitigated by driver
29/07/2016
briefing packs used in training drivers to
become familiar with the revised signalling
and layout, including supplementary Notice
of Signalling and Permanent Way
applications (Yellow Peril) and a Weekly
Operating Notice (WON) Section C notice
when the relock stage is commissioned at
August 2016. The subsequent Bristol
Parkway enhancement scheme, planned for
introduction at December 2017, is described
on scheme plan 131-GW-020 Version 3. 8.
It amends the routes to the Up Passenger
Loop and replaces the facing shunt signal
with a new main signal, BL1516. The final
arrangement will be making the all route
indicators consistent and therefore
achieving compliance. Structured
engineering judgement, the short term
nature of the deviation, and mitigations for
the arising risk, justify the deviation.
30/06/2018
16/06/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
07/07/2016
Current
See risk assessment attached. Only crew
will be using the non-compliant part of the
platform due to the train layout (see
drawings attached). The position of the
single lighting column shown in the area of
the platform extension shall be moved to a
compliant position.
01/08/2016
N/A
13/06/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/07/2016
Current
N/A
27/05/2016
08/01/2017
13/05/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
N/A
Current
31/07/2017
29/06/2016
Network Rail
Management
N/A
Current
Page9
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Title
Scope
GERT8000-HB20
Two
3.1
General duties of a safe work leader (SWL) 16-047-DEV
working outside a possession
North Eastern (LNE) Route with Leeds and
trials in London North Western (LNW), and
and for further trials in LNW, and Wales
and Anglia Routes.
GMRT2149
Three
B10.1
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
the Size of Railway Vehicles
16-074-DEV
South West Train Class 707 Pantograph
Sway.
GERT8000-TS2
Four
3.5.3
Track circuit block regulations
16-052-DEV
Temporary deviation to allow the trialling of Deviation to apply over the following routes.
Emergency Special Working (ESW).
Wokingham. The deviation will apply only
and Cross Country trains between Reading
Junction. Didcot and Heyford. The
deviation will apply to First Great Western,
Hex, and Cross Country Trains on Network
Rail Western Route. All other train
operators will work under existing rules and
of Tilbury lines The deviation will apply to
GERT8000-SS1
Four
3.3
Station duties and train dispatch
16-046-DEV
Train Dispatch by Radio Communication
â€“ Preston to Carlisle via Barrow in
Furness.
GERT8000-S5
Six
6
Passing a signal at danger or an end of
authority (EoA) without a movement
authority (MA)
16-051-DEV
Temporary deviation is to allow the trialling
of Emergency Special Working (ESW)
Certificate Number
Nature and Degree
As the current requirements are for
Signallers and SWL / COSS / IWA to
complete the RT3180 and RT3181 forms,
this creates a disproportionately lengthy
process that in fact is an activity of a very
short duration. It creates missed
opportunities to carry out a simple activity.
This also drives a poor safety culture where
groups can potentially split up and become
IWA to cross the open line due to the
difficulties in obtaining a line blockage. The
current requirement is to plan the line
blockage, but the group may have to wait
for a prolonged time track side or cross the
line as IWAs to regroup again once the line
has been crossed. Observed evidence
indicates that a group may have to wait 30
minutes to get a line blockage to cross the
line.
South West Trains Class 707 does not
The design of the train to comply with the
meet the requirements in sub-clause a) for existing RGS limits in any case, especially
cants higher than 100 mm. It also does not in the unlikely 35 m/s wind case, would lead
meet the requirements in sub-clause b) for inevitably to stiffer anti-roll-bar
the following combinations of cant/vehicle
characteristic and/or primary suspension
speed: 100 mm / 140 km/h, 125 mm / 120 which affects the derailment safety. On
km/h, 150 mm / 100 km/h.
safety aspects, the derailment safety can be
regarded as highest priority.
As a result of varying stopping positions,
platform curvature and the barred
droplights, the display of a green
handsignal to the driver becomes extremely
difficult, if not impossible, at most stations.
The attached 'Cumbrian Coast Locomotivehauled: quick Guide' details the layout and
stopping position at each calling point in
either direction of travel. In particular, the
following locations have curved platforms or
the whole of the train cannot be
accommodated on the platform requiring
selective door operation to be used from a
defined point on the train. Wigton, Flimby,
Whitehaven, Harrington, Nethertown,
Braystones, Silecroft, Dalton Carnforth.
The temporary deviation will be used to
conditions following a previous trial, various
From the May 2015 timetable, Northern Rail
has operated locomotive-hauled trains
between Preston and Carlisle in both
directions in push and pull formation. The
trains concerned have been composed of a
Class 37/4 locomotive and three, Mark 2 airconditioned Tourist Standard Opens (TSO)
with a Driving Brake standard Open (DBSO)
on the end of the set. These vehicles are
equipped with central door-locking and
selective door operation. This formation
exceeds the usable platform length at a
number of stations on the route, and the
guard€™s dispatch position will vary as
between each station. When the DBSO is
the leading vehicle, bell/buzzer
communication is available for use by the
guard at every door control panel but, with
the locomotive leading, no bell/buzzer
communication can be received by the
driver and the 'ready-to-start' signal would
therefore have to be given by handsignal.
Owing to restricted clearances between
Maryport and Carlisle, a Sectional Appendix
instruction requires window bars to be fitted
when any locomotive-hauled stock with
droplights is operated, including for Mark 2
air-conditioned vehicles. The potential
consequences of the conductor attempting
Deviation to apply over the following routes. The temporary deviation will be used to
Wokingham. The deviation will apply only conditions following a previous trial, various
deviation will apply to Great Western
Railway, Hex, and Cross Country Trains on
Network Rail Western Route. All other train
of Tilbury line. The deviation will apply to
Lead SC
Deviation Status
conditions. Only those briefed will be able
to use the process; knowledge of the
process will also be confirmed before use.
The GSM-R mobile handsets have to be
used. Regular route and project team
the trial is progressing, and to agree and
trials.
26/06/2016
31/05/2017
27/04/2016
Network Rail
Management
10/05/2016
Current
The deviation has no impact on the train
18/08/2016
design as the train is designed in its safest
way. The changed approach considers the
new requirements on Panto Sway defined
by the standard GMRT2173, Issue 1. A
compatibility with the environment is
ensured now and in the future. This
approach, based on the RSSB research
project T942 instead of GMRT2173, has
already been accepted on Class 700 of the
Desiro City platform under deviation 15-058DEV. GMRT2173 was not yet in place at
that time, but RSSB research project T942
formed the key input for new approach on
Panto Sway for GMRT2173.
N/A
28/06/2016
Siemens plc
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
08/06/2016
Section 6 of Module S5, revised Section M1
Clause 3. 8, and M2 Clause 2. 1 for the
By using back-to-back handheld radios, this 17/06/2016
enables the driver to advise the conductor
that the train is correctly positioned at a
platform and that it is safe for the
passenger doors to be released. The
conductor only has use of a local door
facility to carry out these checks personally
in the DBSO so, where the train is
positioned without the DBSO adjacent the
platform or on a curved platform, the
conductor is not able to perform this safety
check on their own: The use of the radios
only takes place once the train has come to
a stand at the platform and therefore does
not impact upon the driver while the train is
in motion or distract the driver from their
primary task. The use of this method of
work has been performed since inception
from 14/05/2015 on the Cumbrian coast
without dispatch incident. By using radio
communication between the driver and
conductor to both confirm that it is safe for
passenger doors to be released on arrival at
platform, and also to give and receive the
ready to start signal, this has been a more
cost-effective solution rather than refitting
all of the mark 2 coching stock with a local
door facility and rewiring all class 37
locomotives to enable use of bell buzzer
08/06/2016
Section 6 of Module S5, revised Section M1
driver, which will usually be a station. The
30/06/2017
27/05/2016
Network Rail
Management
N/A
Current
N/A
22/04/2016
Arriva Rail North Ltd,
trading as Northern
Management
10/05/2016
Current
30/06/2017
27/05/2016
Network Rail
Management
N/A
Current
Page10
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0045
Four
5.1.2.4 c)
Signals
16-045-DEV
Colchester station junction signals CO1027,
CO1033 and CO1074 have SARI type
junction indicators without indications for
straight routes into station platforms.
Down signals CO1027, signal CO1033, and
Up Signal CO1074, on the junction
protecting signals for Colchester station.
Engineer's Line Reference is LTN,
Colchester station is at 51 miles 52 chains.
.
Adding indications for the straight routes on
the SARI would introduce aspect controls
that would cause reduction in network
capacity, possibly making operation of
Colchester station impracticable.
It is the belief of the project that the
27/05/2016
severity of this variation is slight in terms of
safety and performance. The straight
routes are into through platforms. Drivers
will receive a briefing to ensure they are
aware of the situation using the Section C
notice procedure. Train drivers are very
familiar with the existing controls on the
signals, which have shown no indication for
the straight routes for many years already.
There are no known safety related incidents
with the current arrangements.
N/A
21/04/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
12/05/2016
Current
GIRT7016
Five
3.1.13.2.13.2.2 and 8.1.1
and Trains
16-083-DEV
Blackfriars Station Platforms 1 and 2.
Although this deviation is driven by dwell
time reduction, the resulting level access
will allow safer, unassisted PRM access
with reduced vertical stepping distances.
The improved ability for PRM access
removes the requirement for platform staff
to deploy platform ramps.
20/09/2016
N/A
31/08/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
N/A
Current
GIRT7016
Five
3.2.1 and 3.2.2
and Trains
16-043-DEV
Borders Rail Project - ELR : SBO, Platform
Coper offsets at 2 no. stations.
Shawfair Up and Eskbank platforms.
Additional list entry: existing additional
control measures will remain in place until
the platforms are corrected via tamping.
The risk to passengers from the increased
offset values is controlled by the stepping
distances being within the maximum
permitted dimensions. Improve offsets
result in reduced and special reduced
kinematic clearances below the normal
requirements of GIRT7073 which are
managed under and NR/L2/TRK/3201.
Transport Scotland have agreed to delete
W9 from the funders' requirement for the
route which would otherwise be foul to
kinematic clearances to met compliant
offsets.
01/08/2016
28/02/2017
18/04/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/07/2016
Current
GIRT7016
Five
7.3.1 (c) and 7.4.1
and Trains
16-037-DEV
Waterloo Station. Platforms 7 and 8 island
platform at country end.
Waterloo Station, Platforms 7 and 8 island
platform at country end.
The Thameslink Programme is proposing to
install a locally raised length of platform at
its 'Core' stations, namely: St Pancras
(Thameslink) Station - Platforms A and B
Farringdon Station - Platforms 3 and 4 City
Thameslink Station - Platforms 1 and 2
Blackfriars Station - Platforms 1 and 2
London Bridge Station - Platforms 4 and 5.
This application is for Blackfriars Station Platforms 1 and 2 only. Blackfriars Station
Platforms 1 and 2 will be raised locally
(over a length of 26 m) to 1075 mm above
plane of rail. This is to provide a boarding
aid (platform hump) to avoid the need to
use manual boarding ramps, the use of
which will prevent dwell times required to
run the specified 24 tph being met. The
installation of the platform humps will create
a nominal vertical stepping distance of 25
mm to the floor height of a Class 700 train
(and similar to other rolling stock) in
accordance with DfT level access guidance
of Â±50mm. Only at each platform hump,
the platform edge offsets will also be varied
from 730 mm to optimise the stepping
distance and accommodate all permitted
types of rolling stock, including W6A.
Clearances will remain positive with
appropriate control measures. To assist
The original approved design considered
the requirements of GCRT5161 (Stepping
distances), GIRT7016 (platform height and
offset) and GCRT5212 (clearances to
structures), the Infrastructure TSI and the
guidance offered by Network Rail's
PAN0062 at the time of AIP design in
December 2012 and detailed design in
January 2014. This provided normal
clearances, compliant stepping distances
and based on PAN 62 guidance non
compliant offsets. Subsequent to guidance
in late 2014 from the Gauging Engineer that
there was scope to reduce the clearances to
the W9 to Reduced and Special Reduced,
particularly at platform, a revised track
design and updated gauging report to
improve the offset with reduced clearances
were produced in November 2014. At the
time of the design update
PAN/AM(T)/GM1/0062 was still live, in spite
of the PAN guidance being relaxed and
subsequently withdrawn in December 2015.
The project had a foreseeable passenger
rolling stock requirement of Class 158 and
170 only (even though the project remit was
to include freight gauges up to and
including W12); these are the only types of
rolling stock that will be permitted to
This proposed permanent deviation relates
to the usable platform widths for the
modified platform layout of the doublefaced, terminating Platform 7-8 at Waterloo
Station. Due to space constraints, the
required 4 m platform width cannot be
provided at the country ends of these
platforms. Note that, currently, a length of
32 m at the country end of Platform 7-8 has
a non-compliant width (reducing to 2. 31 m
at the top of the ramp). This section of
platform will only be narrowed further (down
to 1. 831 m) over the last 6 m (at the
country end) to accommodate the proposed
track layout (see Figure 1 and drawing
WCUP-WCA-330-PL-SK-CE-40411).
Whilst the platform width is reduced at the
country end, the width at the last sets of
doors is marginally increased. Summary of
dimensions existing and proposed The
proposed dimensions in table 1 are the
worst case and will be bettered if possible.
The non-compliant platform widths are
20/06/2016
located at the country ends of the platforms
and will be used by considerably fewer
passengers than towards the station end of
the platforms. In addition, platform width at
the last passenger door is less severe than
the width at the end of the operational
platform length and is actually an
improvement over the existing condition
(see attached). Pedflow analysis has been
carried out which supports this application
and South West Trains have given written
support.
N/A
15/04/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2016
Current
GERT8000-M2
Four
2.1
Train stopped by train failure
16-050-DEV
Trialling of Emergency Special Working
(ESW).
Deviation to apply over the following routes.
Wokingham. The deviation will apply only
deviation will apply to First Great Western,
Hex, and Cross Country Trains on Network
Rail Western Route. All other train
of Tilbury lines. The deviation will apply to
conditions following a previous trial, various
08/06/2016
section 6 of module S5, revised section M1
30/06/2017
27/05/2016
Network Rail
Management
N/A
Current
Page11
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
GIRT7016
Five
4.2.24.2.3 and 11.1.4.1
Interface ,between,Station Platforms, Track 16-042-DEV
and Trains
GKRT0045
Four
5.1.2.4 c)
Signals
16-035-DEV
GKRT0075
Four
3.2.3.3 a)
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
16-029-DEV
GIRT7016
Five
3.2.1 and 3.2.2
and Trains
16-073-DEV
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Platform alterations to achieve gauge
clearance for the Class 345 on Crossrail
North Eastern route (platforms listed in
Section 5).
This deviation applies to the following
platforms: Maryland Platform 2 Maryland
Platform 3 Forest Gate Platform 1 Manor
Park Platform 1 Manor Park Platform 3
Ilford Platform 3Seven Kings Platform
1Seven Kings Platform 2 Seven Kings
Platform 3 Goodmayes Platform 4 Chadwell
Heath Platform 1 Chadwell Heath Platform
2 Chadwell Heath Platform 4 Romford
Platform 5 Gidea Park Platform 1 Harold
Wood Platform 3 Harold Wood Platform 4
Nature and Degree
The existing platforms on the North Eastern
Crossrail route (Anglia route, Liverpool
Street to Shenfield) are legacy platforms,
which have been left significantly 'high' (as
compared to the GB standard platform - see
Appendix G), due to the route permanent
way being lowered to accommodate
electrification during the 1950s. This has
inevitably led to significant increase in the
route's current platform heights outside of
standard. The route is predominantly
serviced by the Class 315 fleet currently
(operated by both Transport for London
(TfL) and Abellio Group), designed with a
high step to interface with the route's high
platforms (see Appendix G). The new
Crossrail Class 345 rolling stock has been
designed with a lower and further protruding
step that exacerbates fouling along certain
platforms on the Anglia Crossrail Route.
The new Crossrail Class 345 train will be
gradually phased into the route and will
replace all the existing Class 315 over a
four year period (to be reconfirmed by TfL).
To obtain Class 345 Stock gauge clearance
for trial running (referenced as Stage KD10
within the project), Network Rail is currently
undertaking design and construction works
to the Anglia Crossrail platforms. Stage
CA211 signal, the Down Main junction
CA211 signal, the Down Main junction
The deviation to the standard applies on the
protecting signal for new station, Cambridge protecting signal for new station, Cambridge Cambridge Science Park Signalling Scheme
Science Park.
Science Park.
Plan (12-SO-104) for CA211 junction
protecting signal only. The signal is located
on the Down Main (Bethnal Green - Kings
Lynn main line - BGK). The signal is
situated mid way between the 57 Â¼
milepost and the 57 Â½ milepost. The
design proposes to use a SARI as the
junction indicator type. It will not have a
route indication for the straight ahead route
(linespeed 75 mph), although the two main
routes both lead to station platforms
(straight ahead route leads to a through
platform). In an attempt to comply with this
standard, a Position Light Junction Indicator
(PLJI) was proposed for CA211. However,
this goes against NR/L2/SIG/19609 section
6. 1 which states: "A PLJI shall be used in
association with main aspects where more
than one route exists except where an SI is
required due to one of the following
conditions: The route is a terminal
platform" It was the opinion of the chairman
of Network Rail Major Schemes Review
Panel (MSRP) that a SARI would be the
most appropriate type of junction indicator
for this particular situation. There are two
possible impacts on complying with clause
Braking distance for PSR on the Down Slow Woking Junction down slow line on the
To provide the PSWI at compliant position
line at Woking Junction.
BML1 Line.
incurs excessive alteration to the
interlocking (SSI), which is at its capacity
limit.
Borders Rail Project - ELR : SBO, Platform
Coper offsets at 5 no. stations.
Shawfair
DownNewtongrangeGorebridgeStow (Up
and Down) Galashiels.
The original approved design considered
the requirements of GCRT5161 (Stepping
distances), GIRT7016 (platform height and
offset) and GCRT5212 (clearances to
structures), the Infrastructure TSI and the
guidance offered by Network Rail's
PAN0062 at the time of AIP design in
December 2012 and detailed design in
January 2014. This provided normal
clearances, compliant stepping distances
and based on PAN 62 guidance non
compliant offsets. Subsequent to guidance
in late 2014 from the Gauging Engineer that
there was scope to reduce the clearances to
the W9 to Reduced and Special Reduced,
particularly at platform, a revised track
design and updated gauging report to
improve the offset with reduced clearances
were produced in November 2014. At the
time of the design update
PAN/AM(T)/GM1/0062 was still live, in spite
of the PAN guidance being relaxed and
subsequently withdrawn in December 2015.
The project had a foreseeable passenger
rolling stock requirement of Class 158 and
170 only (even though the project remit was
to include freight gauges up to and
including W12); these are the only types of
rolling stock that will be permitted to
Lead SC
Deviation Status
The project will continue to implement coper 17/06/2016
moves, for these platforms for the K0. 1
milestone subject to the following:
Monitoring will be undertaken on the
platforms that are altered, whilst they are
still served by 315 vehicles , to understand
the impact on passengers and ensure the
risk is mitigated; . Clarification of the long
term platform position through completion
of reference designs which takes account of
the impact on the whole rail system.
Clarification of the intended timeframe to
deliver the long term infrastructure
amendments for these platforms ,
achievable through future asset upgrades
and renewals, and evidence key stakeholder
commitment to achieve the target platform
positions. The project will return to
Infrastructure Standards Committee in
September 2016 to update the committee
on all of the above points. This deviation is
not setting a precedent for any future work.
N/A
18/04/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2016
Current
Use of JI not allowed due to terminal
27/05/2016
platform. Approach control for SARI if
applied to main route would be unduly
restrictive, would introduce a Signal Passed
at Danger (SPAD) risk and increase level
crossing down time leading to crossing
abuse. The proposed arrangement imports
the least risk. Main Aspect Red (MAR) plus
SARI will be implemented for movements
into the bay. It is proposed that there is no
specific action plan required to support this
variation. Drivers will receive a briefing to
ensure they are aware of the situation using
the usual Section C notice. No safety
implications have been identified with the
proposal. It is considered sufficient that a
driver's route knowledge will allow them to
control their speed appropriately if they are
due a station stop at Cambridge Science
Park station Drivers are familiar with
approaching without an indication, therefore
it should not be reported as a signal failure.
Both platforms are the same length. There
is only one through platform and both
platforms have the same stopping point, so
the likelihood of driver error in misjudging
the stopping point due to incorrect
interpretation of route indication is
negligible.
At the time of commissioning the signalling 14/04/2016
system at Woking (circa 1997), there was a
speed reduction from 90 mph to 60 mph for
routes towards Basingstoke on the BML1
line (due to track curvature across the
junction). Following the Woking Junction
remodelling circa 2008, excessive side wear
has been noticed on 2234 points across the
junction, so a 40 mph TSR was imposed to
prolong the life of the points and keep them
safe and reliable. The TSR has been in
service since 2008. The speed shown on
the PSWI at 1188 m will be changed from
60 to 40 mph, on the basis that the vast
majority of trains conform to Table C
braking and that anything else will not or is
not permitted to exceed 75 mph and would
brake within 1188 m, which is inside the
Appendix X braking distance of 1307 m. It
should also be noted that the Appendix X
braking rates are historic and do not reflect
the reality of current rolling stock. The
proposal is to convert the current TSR to a
40 mph PSR but retain the current PSWI
signage board location which is currently
placed at Table C braking distances and not
for Table A and B. The Existing PSWI for 60
mph is currently at 1188 m from the PSR. A
Compliant PSWI for 40 mph would need to
The proposed deferral of full compliance at 01/08/2016
Stow and Shawfair down until first
maintenance tamp and deferral of improved
offsets at Newton grange, Gorebridge and
Galashiels stations until first maintenance
tamp with a permanent variation to remain
for part of the platform lengths is justified on
the following basis: Current additional
control measures will remain in place until
tamping delivers the improved offsets
Borders Railway Platform Offset Clearance
Risk Evaluation rev 1. 3 has shown that the
costs to provide immediate platform
remediation are grossly disproportionate to
the safety benefit that can be achieved. .
The risk to passengers from the increased
offset values is controlled by the stepping
distances being compliant with the limits
established in the Infrastructure TSI.
Improve offsets result in reduced and
special reduced kinematic clearances below
the normal requirements of GIRT7073
which are managed under and
NR/L2/TRK/3201. Transport Scotland have
agreed to delete W9 from the funders'
requirement for the route which would
otherwise be foul to kinematic clearances to
met compliant offsets. A separate deviation
will be sought for Newton grange,
N/A
08/04/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
12/05/2016
Current
N/A
26/02/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/03/2016
Current
31/10/2020
18/04/2016
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/07/2016
Current
Page12
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2466
Three
2.6.1
Railway Wheelsets
16-034-DEV
S1002 Wheel Profile.
These vehicles are used nationally, and can 2. 6. 1: The wheelsets for the crane KRC
be working on any Network Rail managed
250 (S) UK have been ordered and
routes.
manufactured and fitted under the Kirow
Crane KRC 250 (S), and is an S1002
variant not listed in Appendix A of
GMRT2466 Issue 3. Originally, the profile
was thought to be the variant within
GMRT2466, and a letter of approval was
given by the Principal Vehicle Engineer at
S&SD in the year 2000 but, recently, this
has been found not to be the case, and is a
different variant. Since 2000, there have
been about 10 other Kirow Cranes running
around the network with this profile until
they have their first tyre turn, in which case
they are turned down to P10. However, the
new Kirow KRC 250 (S), and Kirow Cranes
that have new or replacement wheelsets
under them, would have had the noncompliant S1002 profile. The S1002 variant
is one with 32. 5 mm flange thickness
(measured 10 mm from tread datum) and
30 mm flange height. The cost of reprofiling the wheels on this crane and all the
others that may have an S1002 profile is
prohibitive and, by analysis of the P10 and
the non-compliant S1002 profiles, will be
seen to be unnecessary.
Altogether, ten cranes of the types KRC 250 16/08/2016
UK, KRC 810 UK and KRC 1200 UK have
been delivered to UK, starting in 2001. The
running gear of all these cranes, including
the bogies, is completely identical:
designed, manufactured and approved in
accordance with the then valid Group
Standards, fulfilling all the requirements.
The wheelsets with this S1002 have been
running successfully and without incident
under Kirow Cranes in the UK since 2001
(until turned to P10); on average, the
annual mileage is less than 10,000 miles in
trains with a maximum speed of 60 mph
and 13. 5 t axle load.
31/07/2017
23/03/2016
Babcock (Rail)
Rolling Stock
17/06/2016
Current
GKRT0077
One
2.2.1.4
Ground Frames and Shunters' Releases
16-028-DEV
Severn Beach single line working system
including SERC ground frame connection
not including track circuit detection
indications at the control point.
ELR AMB - Severn Beach single line
working system from Hallen Marsh Jn to
Severn Beach Station, including SERC
ground frame connection. Controlled by the
St Andrews Signal Box panel.
In order to comply with the requirement,
costs and risks of the significant alterations
to line side circuits, interlocking and the
panel in St Andrews Signal Box (SB) for the
provision of three track circuits are too high.
The new and revised controls will be
14/04/2016
designed such that track circuit failure
cannot result in an inadvertent release of
interlocking. A robust train exit sequence is
proposed for the new shut in arrangement,
which will include the requirement for the
local operator to manually confirm that the
train has cleared the main line complete
with tail light and the signaller to confirm to
the operator that all signalling has returned
to normal before the operator may leave.
Remote Condition Monitoring (RCM)
facilities will be available to monitor track
circuit performance as required. The
interlocking will prevent section signals from
clearing unless track circuits are clear.
Provision is being made for the
implementation of remote condition
monitoring for the new track circuits.
Medium-voltage Direct Current (MVDC)
track circuits, with track feed relays, to be
utilised for improved reliability of train
detection.
N/A
25/02/2016
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/03/2016
Current
GMRT2472
Two
3.1.1.5 and 3.1.3.1
OTMR Memory Module.
On-Track Machines identified as follows:
TypeDR NumberEVN09-3X
DynamicDR7312099709123120-609-2X
DynamicDR7312199709123121-409-2X
DynamicDR73122997091231214USP5000DR77909997091259090USP6000DR7701099709125909-0Unimat
09-4x4/4S DynamicDR74002997091280021
The supplier of OTMR equipment to Plasser
and Theurer is Arrowvale and they are still
undergoing testing of the memory module
to demonstrate compliance with the
protection requirements. As the problem
has only been revealed late in the project,
alternative suppliers are unable to supply
compliant equipment in any reasonable
timescale. To comply with the full
requirements would involve delaying the
entry in to service of the five self-propelled
machines being supplied as part of High
Output Ballast Cleaning System 5 and an
Unimat 09-4x4/4S Dynamic machine being
supplied to Sweitelsky.
3. 1. 1. 5 As shown in the attached
18/05/2016
documents provided by Arrowvale, the
equipment is fully compliant except in
respect of protection. The levels of
protection have correctly been set to ensure
equipment survivability in the event of a
collision involving high speed trains. Given
the low maximum speed (60 mile/h) and
low annual mileage of these machines, the
risk of being involved in such a collision is
exceptionally low. The level of protection of
the memory module to be fitted on a
temporary basis gives the same level of
protection as that fitted to OTMRs mounted
on railway driving vehicles in service before
compliance with GMRT2472 Issue 2
became mandatory. 3. 1. 3. 1There is
considered to be no risk involved in failing
to comply with the colour requirements.
This is considered an optional requirement
in BS EN 62625-2: 2013.
30/04/2019
01/02/2016
Plasser UK Ltd
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
GIRT7033
Three
1.2.22.22.32.4.1 and 2.4.2
Lineside Signs
Provision of platform stop markers for:
Class 800 'Super Express Train' (SET) and
all its sub-classe; Class 365 'Electrical
Multiple Units' (EMU) and all its subclasses;Class 387 'Electrical Multiple Units'
(EMU) and all its sub-classes.
Class 800 'Super Express Train' (SET) and
all its sub-classes. Class 387 'EMU' and all
its sub-classes. Class 365 'EMU' and all its
sub-classes. All routes where Great
Western Railway operates. New platform
stop markers will be placed over a GWR
trial route (between Paddington and Hayes
only for EMU and Tilehurst to Didcot for
SET) at predetermined positions to facilitate
the stopping strategy for the Class 800, 387
and 365 trains. The purpose of the trial
period will be to check the suitability of the
signs under routine operating conditions.
The specific points to be addressed within
the trial period are as follows: The
effectiveness of new Platform Stop Markers
(PSMs) as a stopping aid. The effectiveness
of in-cab train length reminders cards
(TLRCs) as a stopping aid. PSM and TLRC
visibility for varying background ambient
light conditions. Readability of PSM
geometric symbols as required to support
operational tasks. Readability of the PSM
alphanumeric data as required to support
operational tasks. Readability of PSM
supplementary text based instructions for
selective door operation as required to
support operational tasks. Obtaining
feedback from drivers on the overall
The design specification of the class 365
and 387 units is of fixed formations of four,
eight or twelve cars. The design
specification of the class 800 unit is of fixed
formations of five, nine or ten cars. There
are already a variety of designs of Platform
Stop Markers (PSMs), as well as wide
variations in train length formations in use,
over the routes where the new rolling stock
will be introduced. Existing rolling stock and
new rolling stock cascades when introduced
will be required to operate in parallel for a
significant period of time. Following
withdrawal from service of non-required
rolling stock, the associated redundant
platform signage will be removed. This
means, however, that for a significant
period of time, anomalies may exist for
example, such as two different train types,
both of four car formation but of different
actual lengths, being required to stop at
platform stop markers displaying the same
number. Providing identical PSMs for all
train types at different positions on the
platform is not considered viable, therefore,
due to the potential risk of stop short
incidents. As an example, this could occur
if the longer four-car train stopped at the
PSM for the shorter four-car train.
The alternative provisions will provide for a 12/05/2016
robust procedure for bringing the new
vehicles to a stand at the correct position at
the platform for their train type and
formation. The design of the platform stop
markers is such that the chance of
confusion and misreading is considered to
be reduced both between the variants of the
new PSMs and also with existing signage,
to as low as reasonably practicable.
31/12/2016
22/02/2016
Great Western Railway
Control Command and
Signalling
17/03/2016
Current
16-027-DEV
Nature and Degree
Page13
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2141
Three
2.4.2.1 and 2.4.2.2
16-088-DEV
Class 465/0 and 465/1 Roll-Over Induced
by Overspeeding.
The scope of this deviation application is all
current and future routes on the GB
mainline railway where Class 465/0 and
Class 465/1 vehicles are permitted to
operate, I. e. there is no geographical
limitation other than that imposed by
compatibility / route acceptance. Note that
only the TSDW vehicles do not comply with
the requirement. The other three vehicles in
each four-car unit remain compliant whilst
also achieving the requirements of the PRM
TSI.
SNC-Lavalin Rail and Transit is supporting
Bombardier Transportation in the design
and implementation of a refurbishment of
the Class 465/0 and Class 465/1 vehicles.
By necessity, the PRM modifications
introduce additional crush load and a higher
centre of gravity. Maintaining compliance
with the 21Â° cant deficiency case would
require vehicle ballasting or suspension
changes, which would involve significant
additional work and may have a detrimental
effect on other aspects of the vehicles'
performance, including resistance to
derailment. Such additional changes are
unnecessary when compared to the
performance of other vehicles, and are
considered to be disproportionate to the
small increased risk of roll-over. Refer to
the attached technical report (T37120, LETRTUK-20160831, dated 31/08/2016) for
further details.
N/A
09/09/2016
SNC-Lavalin, on behalf of,
Southeastern
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GMRT2473
Two
B8.4.2
16-026-DEV
Signal Buzzer Functionality and Texture.
This deviation applies to all Class 345 units. The Class 345 signal buzzer is not textured
and does not comply with the functionality
specified in the standard. It is not
considered appropriate to provide a textured
button for the signal buzzer, because the
adjacent 'doors close' pushbutton is also
textured. The other highlighted parts of the
clause are not complied with to enable a
simpler design of circuit. The Locomotives
and Passenger Rolling Stock (LOC and
PAS) Technical Specifications for
Interoperability (TSI) places no
requirements on signal bell functionality.
N/A
18/02/2016
on behalf of, MTR
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
GERT8000-TW3
Two
2.1
Preparation and movement of locomotive
hauled trains
10-192-DGN
Alternative measures for the function of a
Wrexham and Shropshire will operate train
brake van for top and tailed passenger loco- services using the following formations: 1 hauled trains.
Class 67 + 3 Mk3 TSOs + Mk3 GFW +
Class 82 DVT 2 - Class 67 + 3 Mk3 TSOs +
Mk3 GFW + Class 67 It is also possible that
trains shorter than this may be operated
occasionally due to stock availability. Rule
book module TW3 clause 2. 1 limits the
speed of the trains formed by these
formations.
Compliance would result in reduced train
service performance due to the required
lower line speed currently required for class
67 locomotives limiting contingency
operations.
The requirement for resistance to roll-over 21/09/2016
at 21Âº cant deficiency is based on the
known historical performance of Mk3 Day
Coaches (refer to withdrawn GMRC2512,
Clause 9. 3). Subsequent deviation
applications for other fleets (examples listed
below) cite the known historical
performance of other Mk3 catering vehicles
that do not meet the 21Âº requirement. In
addition, there are no known incidents of
overturning for the fleets already covered by
the deviations listed below with overturning
angles as low as 18. 9Âº. It is noted that the
provision of TPWS and other train safety
systems reduce the risk of overspeeding at
critical locations. Furthermore, the TSDW
vehicles are intermediate vehicles in
formation of the units, and are therefore not
subject to the worst cases of wind loading.
It is therefore considered that the risk of rollover is adequately controlled. Existing
deviations on the same subject are listed
below: DeviationsComments16-067DEVClass 707 with an overturning angle of
19. 25Âº16-018-DEVClass 345 with an
overturning angle of 19. 2Âº15-067DEVClass 321 with an overturning angle of
18. 9Âº15-047-DEVClass 465/9 with an
overturning angle of 19. 3Âº14-126The proposed functionality is suitable for
04/05/2016
the operation of Class 345 units. The
majority of the operation will be driver-only
operation, and so the signal bell will not be
required. When the units are operated with
a guard, the only remote place the guard
can close the doors from is the rear cab.
Therefore, both cabs will be occupied and it
is appropriate to sound the buzzer in both
cabs. There is no scenario when the buzzer
would be used with only one cab occupied.
Linking the buzzer functionality with the
bodyside door status is not considered
necessary, since bodyside doors are
already interlocked with traction. If the
buzzer is sounded too early during platform
duties, the driver will not be able to leave
the station. A number of similar deviations
have been raised for Turbostar and
Electrostar units (14/087/DEV, 12/126/DEV,
08/113/DGN, 09/046/DGN) owing to
inconsistency between GMRT2473, the
Rule Book, and the operation of these units
in service. The operator (MTR Crossrail)
has been engaged throughout the design
review process with the design of the cab
and the operation of the train by the driver
and guard, and is satisfied with the
proposed design.
Class 67s locomotives have a brake
26/11/2010
performance of at least the equivalent of a
Mk3 coach compliant with GK/RT0034
Appendix C brake curve, hence a
derogation is possible from the restriction
on the overall speed of the formations
specified in Clause 2. 1 of TW3
GE/RT8000. An existing derogation
(06/093/DGN) has already been approved
that permitted the then GNER Class 67
locomotives to run light at the permissible
line speed on Network Rail LNE, LNW,
Anglia and Scotland. The arguments
contained within the derogation certificate,
including the Engineering Support Group
report, are valid for Wrexham and
Shropshire train services. Paragraph 2. 2
of TW3 also acknowledges the superior
brake performance of class 67 locomotives
when applied to non-Mk3 passenger
vehicles. The impact to Wrexham and
Shropshire railway is minimal as they have
operational experience of this mode of
operation - temporary non-compliance:
08/070/TNC refers.
N/A
13/10/2010
Shropshire and Marylebone Traffic Operation and
Railway Company Ltd
Management
09/11/2010
Current
GERT8082
One
3.9.13.9.23.9.3 3.9.43.9.5
and 3.9.7
GSM-R Cab Mobile, Great Britain Open
10-048-DGN
GSM-R Radio Speech Quality - Class 379
There is no known route whereby it is
believed full compliance to the standard can
be demonstrated. The generic Siemens
GSM-R radio system is itself not compliant
to the speech quality section of the standard
and has also been subject to its own
derogation (09/087/DGN). The existing
derogation points out that, in total, 27
handset types were tested against the
requirements of the standard, and none of
them could meet the requirements of the
standard. The existing derogation states
"Technology limitations prevent the cab
mobile from complying with the
requirements of supporting a TMOS of 3. 8.
It is also unlikely that an improvement in the
TMOS score from 3. 5 to 3. 8 (if this were
possible) would result in a detectable voice
quality improvement". Not all parts of this
existing derogation are being applied to the
Class 379 as the Class 379 uses a different
handset to that used in the generic Siemens
system. This additional derogation is
required for the specific sections relating to
the handset. Therefore, rather than pursue
the test methodology and results outlined in
the standard, we intend to adopt the
approach defined in section 9 of this
deviation application, to undertake to
There is effectively no impact of the
09/06/2010
alternative actions of this deviation on the
affected parties. The use of the single
handset is a benefit to the train operator as
it provides a single audio interface which
has ergonomic advantages to the driver.
The single handset also provides a cab
desk installation that fits within the available
space and meets all ergonomic
requirements. A large number of handsets
have been tested against the test
methodology in GE/RT8082. None of these
handsets have met the requirement of the
standard. Therefore, rather than test using
the methodology in the standard (that has
been determined as impractical), it is
deemed that a comparison approach to the
Class 378 equipment which is already
approved would be practical and sensible.
N/A
14/04/2010
London Eastern Railway Ltd Control Command and
(trading as National Express Signalling
East Anglia),
13/05/2010
Current
The scope of this application covers the
requirements of the standard that relate to
the speech quality assessment test
methodology associated with the
microphone and earpiece of the handset
along with the standard pass criteria for
these tests. It is proposed not to use the
Siemens (generic) handset for the Class
379 design. This is because the Class 379
arrangement uses one common handset for
Public Address, Cab-Cab and GSM-R radio
which is not the one specified by Siemens.
The Class 379 design uses the same
handset, manufactured by Hosiden and
Besson, as is used on Class 378 (covered
by Derogation 09/285/DGN), and a similar
"interface unit" as is used on Class 378, e.
g. has the same handset audio levels but is
not fitted with controls to select Cab Secure
Radio or NRN Radio which are not required
on Class 379. Demonstration of
acceptance will be made by comparisons
with the Class 378 design. This derogation
applies to all Class 379 Units.
Page14
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8081
One
3.3.6
Requirements for GSM-R Voice Radio
System
10-078-DGN
GE/RT8081 - Call Forwarding Unconditional The scope of the derogation relates to the
national application of GSM-R IN Great
Britain, both trainborne and infrastructure.
The derogation is to remove clause 3. 3. 6
and replace with the alternative measures
listed in section 9 of this certificate.
Therefore, with this derogation, the
provision of Call Forwarding on No Reply
(CFNRy) will no longer be mandated on the
Infrastructure Manager and the Railway
Undertaking.
The European Integrated Railway Radio
Enhanced Network (EIRENE) System
Requirements Specification version 15
section 10. 2 mandates that all calls
received by a cab mobile with an Enhanced
Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption
(eMLPP) level of higher than 3 (eMLPP 0 to
3) to-auto answer. Having auto answered
(I. e. effectively replied), CFNRy would not
forward the call to a hand portable (eMLPP
0 to 3). Therefore a driver would not be
aware of the call. This is in conflict with the
UK Application of GSM-R The Operational
Concept Issue 1 (attached). Extract from
EIRENE System Requirements
Specification: 10. 2 Allocation of priorities
10. 2. 1 In order to provide a consistent
international service, it is necessary to
ensure that priorities are allocated
consistently across all railways. The
following allocation of UIC priority levels to
eMLPP priority codes is mandatory: (M)
The impacts of the proposed alternative
06/08/2010
actions are that all calls to the cab mobile
will be forwarded as required in the UK
Application of GSM-R The Operational
Concept Issue 1 (attached), including the
auto answered calls. This would not have
been the case with the current version of
clause 3. 3. 6 of the RGS. Furthermore, by
using CFU, no additional requirements are
placed on the GB application over and
above the TSI requirements in relation to
call forwarding.
N/A
21/05/2010
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
15/07/2010
Current
GERT8030
Two
C4.6
Requirements for the Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS)
10-045-DGN
TPWS antenna location for Harsco EU rail
grinding machines
The new Harsco EU rail grinding machines.
These are: Machine No. Driving vehicle
Driving vehicle Potential middle trailer
vehicle EU1 DR79266 DR79276 Not
required EU2 DR79267 DR79277 DR79287
EU3 DR79268 DR79278 DR79288 EU4
DR79269 DR79279 DR79289 EU5
DR79270 DR79280 DR79290.
These machines are largely based on the
five RGH20C grinders that were introduced
into service in the UK in 2003. The
requirement of GE/RT8030 has changed
from Issue 1 to Issue 2 where the
requirement of issue 1 allowed the TPWS
antenna to be fitted in front of the leading
wheelset whereas issue 2 requires the
antenna to be behind the leading wheelset.
The requirements of GE/RT8030 cannot be
readily complied with, due to the lack of
space available behind the leading wheelset
for mounting the TPWS antenna. The
relocation of the antenna would add notable
cost and time to the project.
The risk associated with the TPWS
11/06/2010
antenna being located in front of the leading
wheelset is considered to be very low for the
following reasons: The five existing
RGH20C rail grinding vehicles have been
operating without problem since 2003 with
the same TPWS antenna location. Harsco
Multipurpose Stoneblowers and GBRfoperated Class 73 locomotives have been
granted a similar derogation where the
antenna is located in front of the leading
wheelset - see derogations 06/105/DGN
and 05/032/DGN. The grinding vehicles do
not emit significant electromagnetic
emissions since they are not electrically
powered and do not have electric traction
motors (the drive is hydraulic) so the risk of
electromagnetic emissions causing a
spurious TPWS fault is considered low. The
EU1 grinding vehicles will cover low
distances compared to other rail vehicles,
further reducing the risk.
N/A
26/03/2010
Harsco Rail Ltd
Control Command and
Signalling
13/05/2010
Current
GERT8000-OTM
Three
5.1
10-217-DGN
Control of Matisa D75 ballast removal unit
Applies to controlling the movement of the
D75 when being used or moved as
independent OTM vehicle rather than when
formed in and as part of a high output track
relaying system formation. TOPS
registered vehicle: DR76750
This OTM has an operating cab, including
driving controls, in the centre of the vehicle
and has no location (at either end) from
which a competent person can control the
movement. Whilst this OTM can be used
formed inside a high output track relaying
system (HOTRS) train formation, where the
rail movement is provided by and controlled
by other parts of the HOTRS, to facilitate
crew training, machine testing and on some
sites to undertake ballast lowering work
independently of the full HOTRS there is a
need to allow this OTM to move as an
independent OTM.
The proposed use of colour CCTV on an
26/01/2011
OTM is identical to that currently allowed for
OTP. The proposed use of controls in
Module SS2 reflects the fact that control of
an OTM not driven from the leading cab is
identical to that currently allowed for any
other traction unit making a propelling
movement or not being driven from the
leading end.
N/A
28/10/2010
Amey Fleet Services Ltd
Management
07/12/2010
Current
GERT8082
One
4.10.1.1 and 4.14.2.1
GSM-R Mobile, Great Britain Open
Interface Requirements (Rapid Response)
10-182-DGN
Short code telephone number - GSM-R
This impacts upon the entire GSM-R
Network outgoing high priority point-to-point Network and all cab mobiles.
call
There is no impact as the trains fitted with a 28/10/2010
v2. 01 SIM do not roam internationally and
so will not set up a 1299 call on a foreign
network.
N/A
23/09/2010
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/10/2010
Current
GERT8035
One
B12.5.1
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
10-144-DGN
AWS Caution Acknowledgement period for
class 360/1 units
The derogation will apply to all class 360/1
units operated by London Eastern Railway
(LER)
Short code telephone number 1299 was
originally used within the GSM-R network to
support the UK specific high priority point to
point call from cab mobile to signaller, often
referred to as the "Yellow Button" call. The
GSM-R project allocated short code 1299 to
this function. As a result, SIM Card V2. 01
uses this number. Unfortunately, according
to the EIRENE Numbering Plan (included
within the SRS), short code telephone
numbers in the range 1201 to 1299 should
route to most appropriate primary
controller, where the last 2 digits (01 to 99)
may be used to provide supplementary
location information within a cell. The
project actually uses the last 2 digits of
short code 1299 (I. e. 99) to identify that
the call has a higher priority call (eMLPP 2)
instead of providing supplementary location
information. Use of 1299 is not compliant
with how this number should be used for
supplementary location information, thereby
preventing interoperability if used on a nonGB network. Complying with the RGS
would result in the system being noncompliant with EIRENE. All cab mobiles
leaving the factory are fitted with v3. 0 SIM
cards. Trial fleet vehicles will be replaced
as part of the cab radio version 2 rollout as
The Class 360/1 units AWS
acknowledgement time is set to 2 seconds.
This has caused a number of penalty brake
applications due to late cancellation of the
AWS, which in turn has caused loss of
driver confidence in the AWS system and
increased operational risk associated with
trains stopped on the network. LER also
operate 100mph class 321 units which are
set to 2. 7 seconds. Changing the 360/1
AWS acknowledgement time to 2. 7
seconds will standardise the LER Ilford
fleets and eliminate confusion regarding the
drivers having to adjust to the 2 second
acknowledgement time on a class 360/1.
The increase in the AWS acknowledgement 08/09/2010
time will have no negative impact on
operational risks and improve operational
safety.
N/A
21/07/2010
London Eastern Railway,
Control Command and
trading as National Express Signalling
19/08/2010
Current
GERT8000-SP
Three
2.5
Speeds
10-227-DGN
Class 380 inclusion in Rule Book Module
SP Clause 2.5
New rolling stock classified as 380.
It is not perceived that this change will have
any negative impact as it will facilitate the
operation of the new rolling stock in the
same manner as the rolling stock currently
operating on the affected lines of route.
Deviating from the Rule Book Module SP
01/12/2010
will facilitate the utilisation of differential line
speeds on the introduction of the Class 380
to passenger service.
N/A
08/10/2010
First ScotRail
09/11/2010
Current
GMRT2466
Two
2.1.1
Railway Wheelsets
09-044-DGN
Inboard Bearing Standards
The derogation will apply to all Class 172
vehicles fitted with B5000-type bogies
No standard exists for the design of axles
with inboard bearings. Therefore, it is not
possible to comply with the standard.
The proposed Bombardier design guideline 22/04/2009
has been used before for both Class 220
and Class 222 axle design and therefore is
a well proven method with in-service
history. The axles and wheels will be
manufactured to BS EN 13260, 13261 and
13262 and the proposed action will have no
detriment to the quality of the product.
N/A
12/03/2009
Bombardier Transportation,, Rolling Stock
on behalf of:, The Chiltern
Railway Company Ltd,
LOROL, London Midland
03/04/2009
Current
Scope
Management
Page15
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8082
One
ITEM 1 (Registration Failed GSM-R Cab Mobile, Great Britain Open
Message):2.4.2.1, Table 2.1 Interface Requirements
2.4.2.22.6.3.4 4.4.3.1, Table
4.4 4.4.3.24.4.3.3 and
4.6.1.3 ITEM 2 (Ops
Message Display in 1
sec):2.4.2.3 ITEM 3 (Testing
at -16dBm0):3.9.7.4 ITEM 4
(Tone Set):3.7.7 and table
3.10 ITEM 5 (TMOS of
3.8):3.9.3.2 and 3.9.3.3
ITEM 6 (DSD
Acknowledgement
message):4.9 ITEM 7
(Automatic Registration of
Attached Systems):2.6.2.3
ITEM 8 (SIM Card
Profile):4.14.2.1 Note that
items 1, 2, 4 and 6 were
previously tabled at the
February Stand ards
Committee Meeting.
09-087-DGN
GSM-R Cab Mobile Derogations
ITEMS 1-7 To be applied to all cab radios
fitted as part of the Network Rail led crossindustry GSM-R Programme. ITEM 8 To be
applied to SIM card.
ITEM 1 (Registration Failed Message) No
22/05/2009
impact. The UKCR1D1 cab mobile is
compliant to the proposed RGS requirement
modification. ITEM 2 (Ops Message
Display in 1 sec) No impact. The
UKCR1D1 cab mobile is compliant to the
proposed RGS requirement modification.
ITEM 3 (Testing at -16dBm0) No impact.
The UKCR1D1 cab mobile is compliant to
the proposed RGS requirement
modification. ITEM 4 (Tone Set) No impact.
modification. ITEM 5 (TMOS of 3. 8) No
modification. ITEM 6 (DSD
Acknowledgement message) No impact.
modification. ITEM 7 (Automatic
Registration of Attached Systems) No
modification. ITEM 8 (SIM Card Profile) No
impact. The current SIM card profile is
modification.
N/A
01/05/2009
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
14/05/2009
Current
GKRT0063
One
5.3
Approach Locking and Train Operated
Route Release
03-071-DGN
Train Operated Route Release: Additional
Requirements for Running Movements
UK / Siemens SIMIS W Interlocking
The following explains the potential impact
on cab mobile 1D1 development of
complying with the RGS clauses listed in
section 6c of this document. It also why
compliance is considered to be
unreasonable. ITEM 1 (Registration Failed
Message) Background The only scenario
where the sending of a registration failed
message (by the FTS) is triggered is if a
UKCR1B3 cab mobile is CT2 (EIRENE Call
Type 2) registered and is powered down
then up again. A UKCR1B3 mobile would
interrogate the network, would attempt to
register again, and this would trigger the
fixed terminal system (FTS) to send the
registration failed message. If a CT2
registered UKCR1D1 cab mobile is powered
down then up again, the mobile will
interrogate the network but will not then
attempt to re-register. It will thus not trigger
a registration failed message from the FTS.
As the FTS only sends the ATRN once
registration has been successful, there is no
scenario that would lead to stage 2 failing
after successful stage 1. Note that this
refers to the second stage of the 2 stage
registration process. The first stage is an
EIRENE registration, the second stage is
the sending of the ATRN (Alpha numeric
Once approach locking has been released,
train operated route release (TORR) will
commence on the next clear track section in
the route becoming occupied or the last
track section in the route becoming clear.
The route locking on a track section shall
not release until: (a) the track section is
clear and the track section in advance is
occupied or (b) the track section is clear, a
route is set for a movement away from the
track section in the opposite direction from
that to which the route locking applies, and
the track section ahead of the signal for the
route which has been set is occupied.
Section 1 of SIMIS W Interlocking Logic
Risk Assessment, attached to application.
Avoids the design of complicated site
specific data to accomplish TORR. Under
normal operating conditions TORR will be
enabled as early as possible, allowing the
faster setting of subsequent routes.
28/11/2003
N/A
18/03/2003
Network Rail
Train Control and
Communications
17/04/2003
Current
GKRT0091
Two
6.1.1
Driver's Reminder Appliance
04-110-DGN
Functionality of DRA
Risk Assessment attached to application.
01/07/2004
The current button fractures along its collar
and renders the DRA box unusable. New
aluminium buttons have been fitted but only
moved the failure mode to the shaft of the
DRA button.
N/A
06/05/2004
South Eastern Trains
Traction and Rolling Stock
04/06/2004
Current
GCRT5203
Three
8.2
Infrastructure Requirements for Personal
04-055-DGN
Safety in Respect of Clearance and Access
Access for train crew to signal post
telephones and other locations on or near
the line
Fleets affected are 50 x 465/2 and 43 x 466 DRA button required to be push action to
units and 12 508's
set and pull action to reset. South Eastern
Trains (SET) requires derogation from pull
action to reset. SET are proposing to
change the current design of the DRA
button, the current design is of a push pull
type with a mushroom head. SET are
proposing to fit a push to operate and a
push again to de-activate with a flush fit
latching button. The functionality of the
modified DRA box will not be affected. The
functionality of the DRA box will not be
affected; the button will be changed to a
latching type.
The geographical scope of the derogation
Work to install and upgrade SPT walkways
covers the full extent of the main routes of
has been carried out. These works have
the West Coast Main Line
complied with the requirements of
GC/RT5203, with the exception of the
walkway level requirement, which has not
been achieved in 350 cases, (approximately
20% of the total number of SPT walkways
on WCML). The degree of the derogation
varies with the distance from the track level
to the SPT Walkway. At a typical offset of
2. 1m. the walkway will be a maximum of
~250mm below top of sleeper level.
N/A
30/01/2004
Network Rail
Track and Structures
28/01/2004
Current
GORT3201
Two
4.3
Working of Passenger Trains Over NonPassenger Lines
Planned Working
Risk Assessment attached to application.
21/06/2004
A derogation is sought in these cases on
the basis that the safety benefit is
disproportionate to the cost of compliance.
Figure 1 presents a schematic diagram of
the standards requirement and the
proposed derogation allowance. Appendix
A presents a schedule of all WCRM
locations. Appendices B and C are graphs
showing the distribution of walkway levels
and walkway to sleeper gradients among
the walkways already built. The arguments
in favour of the proposed derogation are
detailed below. The construction of
compliant walkways on WCRM routes
would often require major works such as
retaining walls and elevated platforms that
would divert resources from projects that
could provide greater safety benefit.
Compliance would only mitigate against a
very small proportion of, if any, driver
injuries (See Section 8). Construction on
steep banks or in steep cuttings could
instigate slope instability with consequent
risk to the operational railway. The
requirement to retain access to existing
drainage and cable routes would
necessitate significant expenditure. Where
land-take is restricted, a compliant SPT
EWS has many years of experience of
14/12/2004
operating charter trains, both over Goods
lines and onto infrastructure controlled by
other infrastructure controllers. In the
process EWS have developed a
comprehensive list of generic hazards
associated with this type of operation, and
applied appropriate control measures to the
resultant risks. This application concerns a
technical rather than a safety issue. An
independent risk assessment exercise was
not deemed to be relevant. Dialogue with
Network Rail LNE route in September 2004
over ECML pathing arrangements
highlighted the need to regularise the
planning of the operation of this train.
Attachment to application is: Letter to
Network Rail dated 11 October, 2004 and
response EWS contends that it's company
train should not fall within the strict train
classification definition of a passenger train
used in this standard, because the risks to
be controlled are not of the same magnitude
as a loaded timetabled passenger train.
EWS believes that the standard was not
intended to include an Officers Special
train, with no fare paying passengers, in its
scope. The standard should remain
unaltered for other passenger services.
N/A
16/11/2004
English Welsh and Scottish Operations Standards
Railway
14/12/2004
Current
RGS Title
04-252-DGN
The EWS company train operated over
To exempt EWS from the requirement to
Goods lines on the national rail network and provide additional documentation over and
beyond into other freight yards and sidings above that which is submitted within the
normal train planning process in respect of
an Officers Special train. 100% exemption
from the requirements of clause 4. 3.
Page16
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
GMRT1300
Four
B3 Definitions - Service
Brake
Engineering Acceptance of Road-Rail
Vehicles and Associated Equipment
04-243-DGN
Service Brake
Track handing trolleys: JFM Fleet Nos.
Fassetta RLS 6331 to 6346 Geismar Serial
Nos. PLUM 18 / serial 461 to 483 Geismar
Serial Nos. MTW 86 / serial 183, 240, 241,
242, 295, 296, 341, 347, 374, 413, 416 to
419, 421, 424, 430, 431, 438 to 441 First
Engineering Fleet Nos. MLT H47381/484 to
499
The word "progressive" in section B3
Definitions - Service Brake. Use of a
"discrete" - on/off - control of the service
brake rather than a variable (or progressive)
control mechanism. Severity/degree of
derogation is complete.
GERT8000-TW1
Two
15.3
Rule Book Module TW1 - Preparation and
Movement of Trains
04-207-DGN
Proceeding after being stopped
GKRT0064
One
8.1
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and 05-213-NC
Trapping
Provision of overlaps - Flank protection and National.
trapping
GKRT0064
One
6.1.1 (a)
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and 05-114-DGN
Trapping
GERT8030
Two
C4.6
Requirements for a Train Protection and
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and Retractable Restraining Device (RRD) at
Trapping: Trap points.
Heathrow Branchline headshunt (8223
points). Description of the Heathrow
Headshunt: The headshunt was
constructed at the same time as the
Heathrow Branchline tunnels in 1997, as a
spur to the proposed T5 extension. At that
time, it was equipped with all necessary
infrastructure (track, OHLE, signalling etc),
to enable the headshunt to be used to
berth/turn trains. The headshunt has seen
very little use, until the recent introduction of
the `Connect' service. Currently, only 4-car
CL332s or 4-car CL360/2s can be
accommodated within the headshunt
although, towards the end of 2005, it will be
extended slightly to enable accommodation
of 5-car CL360/2s (the 4-car limit for
CL332s will remain). The headshunt is fully
equipped with ATP, as are the CL332s and
CL360/2 trains that will use it. The
headshunt will only be used by ECS trains.
As shown on the attached sketch (Ref
T16986/002), there is a limited distance
beyond the exit signal (SN342) protecting
the conflict at the junction ahead. Technical
description of the RRD: The RRD was
included during the original construction of
the headshunt. The RRD effectively acts as
Position of train sub-system receiver
Class 73 Electro-Diesel Locomotive (73235)
to be fitted with Thales TPWS equipment
Scope revised on 11/08/2005 by request of
GB Railfreight Limited to include: Class 73
electro-diesel locomotive 73136
05-032-DGN
The operating characteristic of the non03/12/2004
compliant "discrete" brake control produces
no additional risk or reduction in safety
compared to the compliant "progressive"
control. Attachments to application are:
Jarvis document - 193 Ops Risk Ass1. doc
Geismar document - PLUM PUM Brakes
Risk Ass Ver 3 First Engineering document Operation Risks Geismar Plum units. doc
Assurance is not considered necessary as
no hazards are introduced by the proposed
change. Risk Assessment is attached to
the application. Initial review of the
proposed brake system had considered that
the service brake could fully comply with the
standard. Subsequent analysis at time of
certification changed this view. This
requirement for derogation emerged from
the VAB/PAB scrutiny of the operating
arrangement. These trolleys are having
service brakes fitted after many years of
use without having a remotely applied failsafe brake. The use to which the trolleys
are put is infrequent very low speed (5 mph)
use. It is not reasonably practicable to fit a
service brake into to give a varying brake
force. It is reasonably practicable to fit a
"discrete" control for the service brake. The
"discrete" control is applied to a brake that
This derogation will apply to all power
Trains formed of power door stock stopped Risk assessment attached to application.
11/01/2005
operated door trains worked by South West at station platforms where the train is not
Initial risk assessment undertaken by a
Trains on Network Rail South East Territory booked to call should be allowed to depart competent risk assessor in the Operations
(formerly Wessex)
without requiring the Ready to start signal
Standards department and independently
from the guard, provided the driver has
assessed by the Head of Safety. Guards
made sure it is safe to restart the train.
may not always be in the cab or guards
Severity/degree of derogation is partial due office, e.g. undertaking revenue protection
to the fact that the application is for Power duties. This causes delay whilst they
Door stock only.
return. It is not reasonable to use a door
station at a passenger door as this will
allow passengers to enter / exit resulting in
increased risk to passengers. Because
some services are still formed of Slam Door
trains a revision to the RGS would not be
appropriate until these trains are all
removed from service.
The present standard allows points to be
restored only to the normal position. In
some circumstances, it was safer to restore
reverse positions.
Operation of the railway between Heathrow
CTA and T4 stations, without protection
from the headshunt by trap points (or
equivalent). Complete non-compliance with
6. 1. 1 (a). Safety risk is train collision,
following run away or SPAD (Cat A or Cat
D) of SN342. Reference has been made to
RSSB document "How Safe is Safe
Enough?" Edition 1a, February 2005 in the
preparation of this Application. Particular
attention is drawn to the guidance given on
"Removing a Safety Measure" (page 20),
which states "An established control
measure may be withdrawn if: Withdrawal
has no material detrimental impact on
overall safety, for example where control of
the risk is provided by another means or the
activity or asset giving rise to the risk is no
longer used. It conflicts with legislation. It is
not reasonably practicable, for example
because the risk has fallen or because new
information demonstrates that an original
decision was flawed. " This Application
seeks to demonstrate that these conditions
are met in this instance.
This is in the spirit of the original standard, 06/02/2006
but recognising the points naming
conventions in the standard is not always
appropriate.
The situation at the subject location is
21/09/2005
unusual due to: The limited train types
using the headshunt (CL332 and CL360/2
only),The fact that ATP is fitted to the
protecting signal (SN342), and all train
types that use the headshunt. The location
in question is a restricted access single
bore tunnel, which does not lend itself to
recovery of derailed trains. This situation is
unlikely to be replicated elsewhere within
the British railway network. In addition, it
should be noted that the headshunt/RRD
will cease to exist in 2007, when the
extension to T5 is completed. Heathrow
Express have compiled this application in
conjunction with a number of bodies,
including: Kerry Schofield, Graham Scott,
John Martin and Shaun Cavanagh of
Interfleet Technology, Lawrie Hall of Lloyds
Register RailIvor Lloyd of Network Rail.
This application has been reviewed, and is
supported and sponsored by Dave Collins,
GW Territory Signalling Engineer, Network
Rail. An independent review of this
derogation application has also been
carried out by Phil Hingley, Principal
Consultant - Lloyds Register Rail. Phil is a
Chartered Engineer, with over 40 years
broad-based experience in railway
In Issue One of this standard the
No significant increase in risk perceived. It 11/08/2005
requirement for positioning the aerial was
is believed that the Standard was changed
different. Clause 7. 4 stated "The position due to a number of spurious operations of
on the vehicle of the receiver detecting the the TPWS caused by interference from
emissions of the TSS track transmitters
certain types of track circuit. We, and the
shall be such that the train on which th
owners, are not aware of any such issues
receiver is mounted does not cause the
with this class of locomotive associated with
signalling system to reset the signal to
the position of the aerial. On designs where
danger before the receiver has passed over this has been an issue, the spurious
the TSS track transmitters. This can be
operation of the TPWS caused a brake
achieved by positioning the TPWS receiver demand, therefore there is little increase in
on the leading vehicle such that it is no
risk. Due to the design of the bogie it is not
further than 2. 3 m behind the leading
practical to position the Thales aerial behind
wheelset and at least 1 m from the extreme the leading axle.
front end of the leading vehicle. " The
original design for the installation of Thales
TPWS on Class 73 locomotives was
compliant with Issue One of this Standard
and has the aerial positioned in front of the
leading axle. The aerial is located at 1. 1m
from the buffer face. There are currently a
number of this class with design certificates
issued for this arrangement, which are in
service on Network Rail. Problems
encountered with SWT's 411 and 412 EMUs
which have a similar aerial arrangement,
have not been reported on SWT's existing
class 73 loco fitted with the same design
TPWS installation.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
N/A
03/11/2004
Jarvis Rail
Plant
25/11/2004
Current
N/A
25/08/2004
South West Trains Limited
Operations Standards
19/10/2004
Current
N/A
08/12/2005
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
19/01/2006
Current
N/A
26/07/2005
Heathrow Express
Control Command and
Signalling
01/09/2005
Current
N/A
16/02/2005
South West Trains Limited,
GB Railfreight
Rolling Stock
04/03/2005
Current
Page17
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0064
One
6.4
Provision of Overlaps- Flank Protection and 05-059-DGN
Trapping
Operation of a track circuit interrupter
S and C "like-for-like" relaying projects.
Initially Bristol East Depot Down Main/Down
Goods Running Loop connection and will
apply to other similar schemes on Western
Territory.
Operation of a track circuit interrupter shall
only place or maintain main running signals
at danger and not shunt/subsidiary signals.
Minor degree of severity: perpetuates
existing circuitry which has been in situ for
over 30 years without incident.
Western Region circuitry up to the early
21/06/2005
1980's only provided for main running
signals to be replaced to or maintained at
danger when an interrupter is operated.
Shunt/subsidiary signals (where the
movement authority is only "as far as the
line is clear") were not controlled by track
circuit operation. It is anticipated that a
total of two jobs to be carried out in 2005-06
will be affected by this non-compliance.
This will result in typical figures for each
financial year being in the region of
Âœ100,000 to achieve compliance.
Reproduce existing circuitry. Upgrading to
latest standard would increase project price
by about Âœ50k at each site for no
significant reduction in risk. The track
circuit interrupter and the interlocking
circuitry are two separate items. It is the
circuitry that is non-compliant to modern
standards, and the circuitry is not being
replaced, only the interrupter. If compliance
is achieved, Signaller may be lulled into a
false sense that similar controls may apply
elsewhere in the area.
N/A
08/04/2005
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
12/05/2005
Current
GMRT2043
One
5.3.1
,Braking System and Performance for
Freight Train,
05-129-DGN
Braking system and performance of freight
trains
Nacco 102t GLW box wagons on long term By reducing the tare brake cylinder pressure
hire to Mendip Rail Ltd (NACO 3900 to
to 1. 1 bar (from 1. 31bar) and when loaded
3954 inclusive).
up to a mass just below the brake
changeover weight at 39t GLW and
operated in single pipe mode, an individual
vehicle will stop in 996m, not 951m.
No action taken at this stage - fleet
22/02/2006
modification will proceed only if the
submission is successful. Reduction in tare
brake cylinder pressure is being undertaken
in an effort to reduce the likelihood of wheel
tread damage associated with the use of
high friction composite brake blocks. See
attached paper NR. 1848. rp001 issue 1.
N/A
24/08/2005
English Welsh and Scottish Rolling Stock
Railways
20/09/2005
Current
GERT8030
Two
C4.6
Requirement for a Train Protection and
06-105-DGN
Requirements for a Train Warning and
Protection System
Multipurpose Stoneblowers DR80301 to
DR80303.
N/A
15/05/2006
Harsco, Balfour Beatty Rail
Plant Ltd
Control Command and
Signalling
08/06/2006
Current
GKRT0064
One
B4.3.2
Trapping
Provision of overlaps - flank protection and
trapping
Edinburgh Waverley scheme. Mid-platform
signals E453 and E455. Signalling Scheme
Plan, Version 'E' refers.
N/A
19/10/2006
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
30/11/2006
Current
GKRT0064
One
6.3.1
Trapping
Provision of Overlaps - Flank Protection
and Trapping
This application is for 1418 trap points.
They are located on the downside of the
layout approximately a quarter of a mile
north of Northampton Station and are
controlled from Rugby PSB. The details of
the points are as follows: Points RY1418A
are new trap points which are being
installed to protect the Down Goods Loop
and main lines against unauthorised
movements from the new Siemens Traincare Depot. These trap points will be
combined with the existing single ended set
of points 1418 (to be renumbered as
1418B) to operate as a crossover. The
proposed signalling arrangements are
detailed in the scheme Plan that is provided
as supporting documentation to this
application.
Refer to the supporting letter
28/06/2006
CD13052/EE/2006/001 from Jon Hemsley
who is Head of Electrical Engineering at
AEA Technology and is independent of the
Stoneblower project and operations. The
letter demonstrates that an independent and
competent assessor has conducted a Risk
Assessment and has concluded that the
proposed derogation is acceptable. It is not
practical to position the aerial behind the
leading axle due to the design of the bogies,
and the mounting of under-frame
equipment. The bogie axle centres are 1.
8m. Issue two of the standard places the
receiver up to 0. 5 m from the trailing axle.
Front: Due to the close proximity of the
trailing axle (axle #2) of the front bogie to
the Main Hopper Auger end speed pickup
and fuel tanks, it is not practical to place the
receiver close to the trailing axle and
maintain sufficient clearance between the
TPWS antenna and surrounding metal.
The Y27 bogies used on Stoneblowers are
constructed with a centre bolster, without
head or tail stocks. The position and
required movement of the brake beam and
spring applied brake release mechanisms
do not allow the mounting of the aerial on
the bogie. Rear: Both axles on the rear
As stated in the Design Log extract,
13/12/2006
compliance with the letter of GK/RT0064
would give rise to a more restrictive
situation under the new layout without any
true safety justification. The alternative of a
warning aspect would not work well
because of the steepness of the
approaching rising gradient.
The Signalling Overrun Risk Assessment
04/08/2006
done for the works, which included TOC
representatives, concluded that additional
alarms "would not significantly reduce any
risks, and could in practice introduce
confusion if they were the only trap point(s)
on the Rugby PSB which were fitted with
the alarm. It is not considered feasible or
necessary for all trap points on the Rugby
PSB panel to be fitted with alarms. The risk
of siding vehicles unintentionally reaching
main line routes is primarily controlled by
the arrangements for points 1417.
Additional controls to points 1418 is unlikely
to reduce this risk further, and may
introduce other unintended hazards and
risks for the signaller. The risk of siding
vehicles unintentionally reaching main line
routes is primarily controlled by the
arrangements for points 1417. Additional
controls to points 1418 is unlikely to reduce
this risk further, and may introduce other
unintended hazards and risks for the
signaller. Full compliance with the
Standard will be achieved when the
signalling in this area is renewed. This is
currently planned for implementation by the
end of 2008.
N/A
25/05/2006
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
20/07/2006
Current
GERT8000-TW3
Two
2.1
Preparation and movement of locomotivehauled trains (including HSTs, push-pulls,
postal, parcels)
hauled trains
Class 67 locomotives operated by GNER on
Network Rail LNE, LNW, Anglia and
Scotland routes.
It is intended that the RGS GE/RT8000 be
amended. Report to justify increased
operating speed has been produced by
external rail consultancy, Engineering
Support Group. Derogation application is
made pending change to rule book
GE/RT8000, module TW3 section 2. 1.
-
28/04/2006
Great North Eastern
Railways
Management
30/05/2006
Current
Certificate Number
06-093-DGN
The receiver on the vehicle detecting the
emissions of the track transmitters shall be
positioned behind the leading wheelset.
The actual position shall be such that the
leading wheelset does not cause the
signalling system to reset the signal to
danger before the receiver has passed over
the TSS track transmitters. This can be
achieved by positioning the TPWS receiver
no further than 2. 3 m behind the leading
wheelset. In Issue One of this standard, the
requirement for positioning the aerial was
different. Clause 7. 4 stated "The position
on the vehicle of the receiver detecting the
emissions of the TSS track transmitters
shall be achieved by positioning the TPWS
receiver on the leading vehicle such that it
is not further than 2. 3m behind the leading
wheelset and at least 1m from the extreme
front end of the leading vehicle. " The
original fleet of (18) Plain Line Stoneblowers
have been fitted with TPWS receivers
compliant with Issue One. The
Stoneblowers have a TPWS receiver
mounted at each end because the machine
is capable of travelling from either end. The
receivers are mounted in front of the leading
wheelsets. The front end receiver is located
2. 57m from the front buffer face, and the
The requirement in clause B4. 3. 2 of
GK/RT0064 for the maximum distance, on
the approach to the signal from which the
reduced permissible speed applies, not to
be less than 400 metres. Under the
Waverley scheme, it is proposed that the
permitted speed commences 325m on the
approach to the signals.
A visual and / or audible indication, over
and above provision of the point key
indication, to remind the signaller to restore
trap points shall not be provided. The
position of the points is indicated to the
signaller through the point key indications.
An additional indication is not being
provided. Project Background: The
Northampton loop is currently a mixture of
SSI and Daventry SSI and Northampton
Station SSI split by relay controlled auto
section and a small geographical relay
interlocking at Watford Lodge. WC project
will re-control the whole loop to Rugby SCC
in 2008 and at the same time upgrade the
existing SSIs to 2MHz and re-control the
relay controlled areas with SSI. Phase 1 of
this project is to provide access to a new
depot at Northampton and extend a goods
loop at Northampton to provide additional
standage for goods trains. These works are
planned to be commissioned on the 21st
May 2006. Part of these works is the
provision of trapping protection for the
Depot. Protection is being enhanced from
the existing arrangements, which protect the
existing siding that will become the depot
arrival line. Additional trapping protection,
in addition to that provided by 1417 points
For Class 67 locomotives operated by
GNER, light locomotive running speed of
75/60mph maximum. It is intended that
maximum light locomotive speed be
increased from 75mph to 100mph.
Essentially operation at all permissible line
speeds up to a maximum of 100mph.
Severity issue: Increase in maximum
speed from 75 to 100mph.
30/06/2006
Page18
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0064
One
B4.8.4 (b)
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and 06-230-NC
Trapping
Provision of overlaps - Flank protection and National.
trapping
GK/RT 0064 Section B 4. 8. 4 stipulates
the conditions under which it is permissible
to waiver the requirement to provide a
separate overlap track circuit in respect of
automatic signals. Clause b) states where
'there is no calling-on or shunt class route
up to the signal'. As part of the scheme to
improve First Great Western train
performance (WARs), there is a proposal to
provide an additional signal between Oxford
Road Jcn and Southcote Jcn on the Down
Berks and Hants line at Reading. It is
proposed the new signal be a three-aspect
automatic signal with no separate overlap
track circuit. There are two existing shunt
signals, R550 in Reading Upper Triangle
Diesel Depot and R552 on the Up Berks
and Hants line, reading up to the proposed
new automatic signal. Currently, these
signals read up to signal R348 at Southcote
Jcn, 950yds beyond the position of the
proposed new signal. As was normal with
ex-WR signalling of the era when these
signals were designed, there are no track
circuit or signal ahead lamp proving
controls provided in the shunt signal
controls.
It is believed that GK/RT0064 section B4. 8. 12/03/2007
4 clause b) exists to enable the signaller to
monitor both a first and second train without
them merging on a combined berth and
overlap track circuit. The controls
described above mitigate this risk.
issue implemented.
15/11/2006
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
15/02/2007
Current
GKRT0064
One
6.1.1 a)
Trapping
Provision of Overlaps- Flank Protection and Alloa Town Station to Longannet.
Trapping (Tracker No 4941)
GK/RT0064 Section 6. 1. 1 states that trap
points shall be provided for the protection of
passenger lines against sidings and other
non-running lines. Trap points are not
currently provided at Longannet as the
Mainline is freight only. Under the SAK
project, passenger trains will run as far as
Alloa Town Station. There are no proposals
to extend the passenger service beyond
Alloa. No trap points or other points which
could provide flank protection for passenger
moves into and out of Alloa station are
proposed. Trap points will not be provided
at Longannet power station West Departure
and West Departure lines.
The provision of trap points on the West
09/12/2008
Arrival and Departure lines would incur
considerable costs while not providing any
significant benefit. It is not reasonably
practicable to achieve compliance. The
lack of provision of trap points will not
increase the risk to passenger trains at
Alloa due to the rising gradient and distance
between the siding and Alloa station.
N/A
19/09/2007
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/07/2008
Current
GKRT0064
One
4.2.1 Table 1
Trapping
Provision of overlaps - flank protection and
trapping
Overlap of signal S208. S208 is located on Standard requires overlap to be 180m
Platform 1 of Meadowhall Interchange
Achievable overlap length is 179m, based
Station on the Up Main protecting
on signal and IBJ position.
Wincobank Junction. ELR is TJC2 and
mileage is 161m3/4.
To achieve 180m would require the signal
12/03/2007
to be moved back by 1m or remodel
Wincobank Junction. The cost of this would
be grossly disproportionate as it is believed
that the achievable overlap of 179m is
within the tolerances of the standard.
N/A
04/01/2007
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
15/02/2007
Current
GMRT2473
One
B7.10, B9.1, B10.1 and
B12
08-059-NC
Revisions to requirements related to Power
Operated External Doors
This non-compliance is sought for all
passenger vehicles fitted with power
operated doors with an auto-close facility,
emergency access and egress devices or
Selective Door Opening Systems.
issue implemented
17/03/2008
Rail Safety and Standards
Board
Rolling Stock
10/04/2008
Current
GKRT0031
Four
B19 and B28
Provision of Lineside Signals
08-222-DGN
The requirement in Clause B7. 10 is the
29/05/2008
responsibility of the Railway Undertaking
and is therefore not within the scope of
Railway Group Standards. This clause is a
single duty holders responsibility and
should be removed from GM/RT2473. A
number of deviations are listed against
GM/RT2473 clause B7. 10. The deviations
relate to the reduction of the door autoclose
facility from 45 seconds to a time
determined by the Railway Undertaking.
Allowing Railway Undertakings to determine
the optimum door auto-close timing for
power operated doors would potentially
reduce the risk to passengers of slip / trip
hazards due to inclement weather
conditions. It would also increase
passenger comfort by reducing the
exposure of the interior of the vehicle to the
outside weather conditions. The deviations
are: 07/042/NC (HSBC Rail) for all
external power operated doors05/174/DGN
(Bombardier) Class 170/3 Hull Trains
Turbostar units08/019/NC (New Southern
Railway - Southern) Class 377 unit. A
GM/RT2473 clauses B9. 1 and B10. 1. The
deviations relate to the ability of the access
and egress device to open a door that has
Amalgamation of the point lie with the
15/04/2009
issue of a movement authority is believed to
greatly enhance the overall integrity of the
instruction given by the signalling to the
driver. A secondary reduction in safety
during degraded mode is overcome with the
adoption of the Flashing red, without
causing a conflict with primary 'aspect' of
the stop board. It should be noted that
electric and manual degraded mode means
of operating the points are provided with a
separate fully functional ground switch
panel and indications.
N/A
07/11/2008
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
27/11/2008
Current
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
To allow Railway Undertakings to
determine the door auto-close timing for
power operated doors and to align the
emergency access and egress requirements
for passenger rolling stock in the United
Kingdom with the published High Speed
and proposed draft of the Conventional Rail
Rolling Stock Technical Specifications for
Interoperability. Doors may be locked out
of use. Also to implement recent research
findings on Selective Door Opening
Systems. B7. 10 Door auto-close facilities:
The RSSB Risk and Safety Intelligence
Department has undertaken an analysis of
data on boarding injuries from January
2002 to September 2007. The analysis
does not provide any definitive evidence to
suggest that the auto-close function has
contributed to a change in risk from
boarding. There is no evidence to suggest
that a reduction of the auto-close timing of
45 seconds (as specified in GM/RT2473
clause B7. 10) will lower accidents when
boarding a train. The safety management
system of the Railway Undertaking would
allow the optimal door auto-close timings to
be determined and the risk of a passenger
becoming trapped in a door. Clause B7. 10
is therefore deleted. B9. 1 and B10. 1
Lineside Signals and Indicators - indicators Steady Blue / Flashing Blue indicators: all Removal of the flashing blue indications
at stop boards. (Tracker 5474)
loop exit points, trailing direction, NSTR and (which are in widespread use) would
RETB, Network Rail infrastructure.
increase the risk of TPWS interventions.
Flashing Red / Steady Blue/ Flashing Blue Provision of independent points indicators
indicators: All loop exit points, trailing
would lead to potentially contradictory
direction, on the following NSTR passing
messages to the driver.
loops, Western Territory as they are
converted to motor operation:
KnightonLlandrindodLlanwrtydLlandoveryLl
andeiloTenbyEggesfordYstrad Rhondda.
Other sites, Network Rail infrastructure, in
the trailing direction where train operated
points are converted to power worked.
[Note that in accordance with B11. 2 power
worked points in the facing direction are
protected by Points indicators showing
Flashing Red / Yellow].
Page19
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GMRT2149
Three
B10.4 and Appendix D
the Size of Railway Vehicles.
08-079-NC
Tripcock position with respect to gauge
This deviation applies to the position of the
Tripcock on the Class 378 multiple units
operated by London Overground Rail
Operations Limited and its infringement of
the gauge line shown in GM/RT2149 issue
3 Appendix D when applying static and
dynamic movement conditions.
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2 b
and Trains
11-176-DGN
New waiting shelter(s), clearance to
platform edge(s)
GKRT0064
One
6.1.1
Trapping
Non Provision of trapping protection for
platforms at Nottingham Station and from
Eastcroft Siding.
GKRT0045
One
5.2.3.1
Signals
Flashing aspect sequences for Miskin
Loops and Ystrad Mynach South Junction
as part of Cardiff Area Resignalling
11-018-DGN
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
The tripcock has been positioned on the
Class 378 bogie to ensure that the tripcock
arm will engage with the infrastructure
based tripcock trainstop when accounting
for possible movement conditions. In doing
this, the tripcock arm extends beyond the
gauge line shown in GM/RT2149 Appendix
D. The attached drawing 3EER4000112177 includes two views showing the
position of the tripcock on the Class 378
bogie. The top view shows the position of
the tripcock under various movement
conditions relative to the Lower Sector
Vehicle Gauge taken from GE/GN8573.
The lower view shows the position of the
tripcock with respect to the tripcock gauge
line given in Appendix D of GM/RT2149.
The lower view on 3EER400011-2177
shows that the tripcock arm extends beyond
the GM/RT2149 Appendix D tripcock gauge
line by 16mm. This occurs when
accounting for 23mm, in total, of vertical
downwards movement of the tripcock arm.
This 23mm comprises 19mm of movement
(which includes tare to crush and dynamic
movement to bump stop allowances), 2mm
set-up tolerance, 1mm of creep and 1mm of
wheel wear. The 1mm creep and wheel
wear allowances are based on the tripcock
This derogation relates to horizontal
The existing shelters at the named stations
clearances between the platform edge(s)
in section 7 are all within 2500mm of the
and proposed new waiting shelter(s) at
platform edge. Each location has its own
stations listed below: Arriva Trains Wales difficulties to allow the TOC to comply with
is proposing to replace the existing waiting the RGS requirement for the following
shelters at a number of locations which
reasons: Generally: The shelter width is
currently are within 2500mm from the
1600mm from the centre line of each post,
platform edge. Site constraints do not allow in calculating the proposed distance to
for the installation of the new proposed
platform edge 1700mm has been used as
shelters to achieve the RGS. Therefore we the overall shelter width from outside of
are seeking derogation from the RGS to
post to outside of post. The shelter width is
install on the existing footprint: Maesteg - 1800mm from the centre line of each post,
Single platform - 1 new shelter proposed.
in calculating the proposed distance to
Line speed 25mphEwenny Road - Single
platform - 1 new shelter proposed. Line
the overall shelter width from outside of
speed 35mph Garth - Single platform- 1
post to outside of post. Maesteg - The
new shelter proposed. Line speed
existing shelter is 2. 22m from the platform
40mphSarn - Single platform - 1 new
edge. The existing shelter is 2. 09m in
shelter proposed. Line speed 50mph
width; the proposed new shelter is 1. 9m in
Fernhill - Single platform - 1 new shelter
width and therefore improves the current
proposed. Line speed 40mph
position by 190mm, however this would still
Penrhiwceiber - Single platform - 1 new
not achieve the 2500mm rule. Ewenny
shelter proposed. Line speed 50mph
Road - The existing shelter is 2. 21m from
Treforest Estate - Island platform - 1 dual
the platform edge. The existing shelter is 1.
shelter proposed. 40mph.
83m in width; the proposed new shelter is
1. 7m in width, and therefore improves the
current position by 130mm, however this
would still not achieve the 2500mm rule.
Garth - The existing shelter is 2. 17m from
Nottingham Station Platforms 1 to 7 (west
The Down Eastcroft Siding could be
end) and the Down Eastcroft siding.
provided with trap points or a derailer
however the falling gradient of 1: 290
towards the buffer stops, the track layout
and the slow speeds in the areas make this
an expensive provision. Provision of
trapping protection at the west end of all the
platforms is not practicable due to the
constrained nature of the layout with a
constricted overbridge. Any solution is
likely to introduce more risk from the
derailment especially since in the event of a
SPAD it could be a passenger train which is
derailed. An alternative is to ban the
stabling of trains for extended periods (e. g.
overnight) however this has been custom
and practice and this location for at least 20
years.
Justification for this deviation is presented 29/09/2008
as follows. Separate consideration has
been given to the vertical and lateral gauge
protrusions. Vertical protrusion Section 7 of
this deviation identified a 16mm protrusion
of the tripcock arm beyond the GM/RT2149
Appendix D tripcock gauge line. The
following justification is presented: This
protrusion is a worst case condition that
accounts for maximum dynamic downwards
movement to bumpstops on the bogie.
Accounting for purely static movements, the
protrusion will reduce from 16mm to 8mm.
The amount by which the tripcock can be
vertically raised is limited by ensuring
engagement of the tripcock with the
infrastructure trainstop when applying
dynamic vertical lift. The position of the
tripcock has been optimised to ensure
trainstop engagement whilst limiting gauge
infringement. The LUL gauge line has been
included on the lower view of 3EER4000112177. This has been labelled as 'F1 Gauge
Taken from LUL Engineering Standard E
8013 A1'. The tripcock arm is fully within
this LUL gauge line even when the worst
case conditions are applied (I. e dynamic to
bumstop, etc). This is achieved with a
margin of 9mm. In the analysis shown on
Maesteg - To comply with RGS the land
20/12/2011
behind the shelter would require the
construction of a supporting wall to enable
the proposed waiting shelter to be located
the required 2500mm from the platform
edge. The construction of a supporting wall
would have a big impact on the DDA ramp
which is located behind the existing shelter
and would also reduce the width of the
ramp and therefore make it unsuitable for
wheelchair users etc. The land adjacent to
the ramp is not in Network Rail's ownership.
Ewenny Road - To comply with RGS the
land behind the shelter would require the
construction of a 1. 38m high wall on an
embankment to enable the proposed
waiting shelter to be located the required
2500mm from the platform edge. The
construction of the 1. 38m high wall will
have serious cost implications to the
funding of the proposed programme. Garth
- To comply with RGS the land behind the
shelter would require the construction of a
supporting wall to enable the proposed
2500mm from the platform edge The
construction of a supporting wall will have
serious cost implications to the funding of
the proposed programme. Sarn - To
The Down Eastcroft Siding is located on a 02/08/2012
gradient of 1 in 290 that falls away from exit
of the siding and for compliance with clause
6. 1. 1 trap points should be fitted to prevent
unauthorised or unintentional movements
fouling running lines. However with the
falling gradient any rolling stock that runs
away will do so towards the buffer stop and
not proceed to a position that results in
fouling running lines. Any unauthorised
movement resulting in a SPAD of TN4022
signal is mitigated against by the fitment of
a TPWS TSS loop at this signal. The
platform lines within Nottingham station are
located on a 1 in 270 gradient. These
platform lines are regularly used for the
stabling of unattended rolling stock. The
rolling stock stabled within Nottingham
station is multiple units of modern design
with parking brakes. Therefore
unintentional run away movements are
extremely unlikely to take place.
Unauthorised movements are controlled by
the provision of TPWS TSS loops on all
platform starter signals which are shown to
be fully effective as detailed in the Signal
Overrun Risk Assessment (SORA) report.
issue implemented
18/04/2008
London Overground Rail
Operations Limited
Rolling Stock
11/07/2008
Current
N/A
26/10/2011
Arriva Trains Wales
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
N/A
22/12/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/01/2012
Current
Signals CF2049 and CF2064 on the Down
and Up main respectively of the SWM1
west of Cardiff Central Station approaching
Miskin Loops. Signal CF2836 on the Up
Rhymney on the approach to Ystrad
Mynach South Junction. Both instances will
come under the control of the new South
Wales Control Centre when the new
signalling in the area under the CASR
project is commissioned.
The use of flashing aspects MAY-FA on
20/04/2011
this section of railway approaching the
divergence would be a benefit as it will give
freight train drivers the earliest possible
indication that they are being signalled into
the loops or onto the branch clear of the
main line. This will allow drivers of trains
signalled through the divergences to
regulate their speed more effectively, thus
reducing any delay to following services.
With the steep uphill ruling gradients on the
Up Rhymney and the Cwmbargoed, it would
be beneficial to keep a train on the move. A
PWSI for the diverging speed will be
positioned at the signal displaying the
flashing yellow aspect, allowing the Drivers
an advance reminder of the speed through
the diverging junction. The provision of
flashing aspects is consistent with their
application on the adjacent Newport
scheme. Drivers will expect to stop in
Miskin Loops and the Cwmbargoed branch
is freight only.
N/A
03/02/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/03/2011
Current
The provision of MAR (approach release
from red) would be unduly restrictive for
freight trains accessing the loops and the
Cwmbargoed branch.
Page20
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
GKRT0064
One
6.1.1
Trapping
Non provision of trapping protection at West West Burton West Junction
Burton Power Station
GKRT0064
One
4.3.2
Trapping
Reduced overlap associated with W460
signal, Epsom station.
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2 b
and Trains
platform edge(s)
GKRT0064
One
6.1.1
Trapping
Non provision of trapping protection in
Immingham East area.
GERT8000-TW3
Two
2.1, 2.2
hauled trains (including HSTs, push-pull,
postal, parcels)
Chiltern Railways Linespeed Derogation for Chiltern seeks to operate the following train
of Class 67 + Mk3 + DVT
formation at the maximum permitted
linespeed for class 1, 2 and 5 services:
Class 67 + 3 to 5 Mk3 vehicles + DVT. It is
also possible that trains shorter than this
may be operated occasionally due to stock
availability. Note: The maximum speed of
the train formation will continue to be
capped at the maximum vehicle speed of
the slowest vehicle.
Certificate Number
11-183-DGN
11-015-DGN
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
There are currently no trap points protecting
the passenger lines at West Burton West
Junction from West Burton Power Station
and provision would impact on the
Thrumpton Area Signalling Renewals by
introducing extra cost considered to be
disproportionate to the risks.
The severity of the proposed derogation is 10/03/2011
that the proposal is fully non-compliant with
the requirements of GK/RT0064 (no
trapping protection provided). Also this
scenario is replicating the existing layout,
which has existed for over 20 years since
the trap points were removed with HMRI
approval. The risk of vehicles running away
has been eliminated by the rising gradient.
Residual risk of trains spading is deemed
as low as reasonably practicable. The
project is in a design phase and no
immediate action has been taken. The
existing arrangement is considered to be
reasonably practicable due to the following
specifics: With a rising gradient of 1: 209
towards the running line on the West
Departure No1 Line and West Reception
Line, there is little or no risk of vehicles
running away towards the main line from
signal TN8321 or WB30 respectively. The
majority of trains stop at the protecting
signal TN8321. Line Speed of only 10mph.
The protecting signal TN8321 is provided
with TPWS (TSS, proved to be effective @
4. 5%g). TN8321 is provided with an AWS
magnet in advance of the signal. The
Cripple Yard West ground frame is only
released and the points reversed when there
Epsom station is located at 14m 18ch on
Signal W460 has an existing reduced
Risk assessment for the reduced overlap
21/06/2011
the ELR RPE. The reduced overlap is
swinging overlap of 125m and 121m. The conducted as per the requirements of
associated with W460 signal.
speed on approach to the signal is 20mph GK/RT0064 and considered to be ALARP.
which commences 367m on approach to
Permissible speed is very low, 20mph and
the signal and therefore there is an existing begins 387m on approach to the signal with
non-compliance. The scheme is proposing the non compliance only 13m short of the
to move the signal resulting in the overlap
400m required by the standard. No
being reduced further to 105m and 101m
additional mitigation measures were
respectively. The new position of the signal proposed by the risk assessment. Not
means that the 20mph speed will
appropriate due to operational impact and
commence 387m on approach to the signal costs involved with achieving compliance.
which reduces the magnitude of the noncompliance. Moving the commencement of
the permissible speed would not be
acceptable due to the operational impact.
Moving the signal further is cost prohibitive
due to the proximity of S and C beyond the
signal.
This derogation relates to horizontal
The existing shelters at the named stations Fairwater - To comply with RGS the land
13/12/2011
clearances between the platform edge(s)
in section 7 are all within 2500mm of the
behind the shelters would require the
and proposed new waiting shelter(s) at
platform edge. Each location has its own
construction of a supporting wall and new
stations listed below: Arriva Trains Wales difficulties to allow the TOC to comply with concrete base to enable the proposed
is proposing to replace the existing waiting the RGS requirement for the following
shelters at a number of locations which
reasons: Generally: The shelter width is 2500mm from the platform edge. The
currently are within 2500mm from the
1600mm from the centre line of each post, construction of supporting walls will have
platform edge. Site constraints do not allow in calculating the proposed distance to
serious cost implications to the funding of
for the installation of the new proposed
the proposed programme. Diversion of
shelters to achieve the RGS. Therefore we the overall shelter width from outside of
existing cabling would also be required.
are seeking derogation from the RGS to
post to outside of post. Fairwater (Platform Danescourt (Platform to Coryton) - To
install on the existing footprint: Fairwater - to Coryton) - The existing shelter is 2. 17m comply with RGS the land behind the
Two platforms - 2 new shelters proposed.
from the platform edge. The existing shelter shelters would require the construction of a
Line speed 55mph. Danescourt - Two
is 1. 56m in width; the proposed new
supporting wall and new concrete base to
platforms - 2 new shelters proposed. Line shelter is 1. 7m in width and therefore
enable the proposed waiting shelter to be
speed 55mph
reduces the current position by 140mm.
located the required 2500mm from the
Fairwater (Platform to Radyr) - The existing platform edge. The construction of
shelter is 2. 21m from the platform edge.
supporting walls will have serious cost
The existing shelter is 1. 53m in width; the implications to the funding of the proposed
proposed new shelter is 1. 7m in width, and programme. Diversion of existing cabling
therefore reduces the current position by
would also be required Danescourt Platform
170mm. Danescourt (Platform to Coryton) - to Radyr) - To comply with RGS the land
The existing shelter is 2. 18m from the
behind the shelters would require the
platform edge. The existing shelter is 1.
demolition and subsequent construction of
54m in width; the proposed new shelter is a supporting wall and new concrete base to
1. 7m in width, and therefore reduces the
enable the proposed waiting shelter to be
current position by 160mm. Danescourt
located the required 2500mm from the
(Platform to Radyr) - The existing shelter is platform edge. The demolition /
2. 23m from the platform edge. The
construction of a supporting wall will have
No provision of trapping protection from
This is an existing non compliance in that The existing arrangement has been
07/12/2011
Eastern Jetty, Freight Terminal Sidings and trap points are not currently provided at the considered to be reasonably practicable due
Ridley's Sidings in Immingham East SB
exit of the Eastern Jetty in order to provide to the following specifics: Line speed of
control area.
trapping protection for the passenger line at only 30mph. The re-signalling scheme
Ulceby North Junction. Given the overall
does not encompass Ulceby North Jcn. It is
rising gradient between the area under
evident that there are no existing trapping
consideration and Ulceby North Junction,
arrangements in place against the freight
the low speeds involved and the constraints only line from the junction to the renewal
of the site in providing trap points on the
area. The current junction protecting signal
Eastern Jetty, it is proposed to perpetuate
UJ19 is provided with TPWS TSS (Proved
the existing arrangements. Additionally, it
to be effective @ 6%g with 10 second free
is proposed to remove the existing trap
wheel time). There are two rising gradients
points on the connections to the Freight
between Humber Road Junction and Ulceby
Terminal Sidings and Ridley's Sidings as
North Junction. (1: 176 and 1: 300 giving
part of the re-signalling project. The
a maximum net height gain of 2. 2m to be
removal of these trap points has been
overcome). The risk of vehicles running
subject to Risk Assessment in the form of
away from the Immingham East Junction
SORA and Reduced Overlap RA which
area has been eliminated by the rising
considered the immediate safety risk arising gradient and distance to Ulceby Junction from a collision with a de-railed train. The approximately 6 miles away.
removal of the trap points has also been
reviewed on a cost benefit basis.
Compliance to Clauses 2. 1 and 2. 2 would
result in reduced train service performance
and network capacity. Complying also
creates a potential for confusion over
maximum speed for traincrew (as
continuous adjustment has to be made
mentally where the permissible speed
exceeds 60 mph).
An existing derogation has been granted to 08/05/2012
WSMR (RSSB 10/192/DGN) for identical
locomotives and stock operating on the
same infrastructure. A temporary noncompliance permitted this operation before
this. WSMR and Engineering Support
Group have undertaken documented brake
tests (see certificate Ref. 10/192/DGN) with
class 67+ MK3 + DVT's for various train
lengths. In addition, the braking capability
of class 67 locomotives has been accepted
in deviation Ref. 06/093/DGN, where Class
67 locomotives can run light at the
Permissible Line speed on Network Rail
LNE, LNW, Anglia and Scotland.
Paragraph 2. 2 of Rule Book Module TW3
also acknowledges the superior brake
performance of class 67 locomotives when
used with Mk3 sleeping vehicles. The
impact to Chiltern will be to simplify the task
of driving these trains.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
N/A
20/01/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/02/2011
Current
N/A
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/05/2011
Current
N/A
26/10/2011
Arriva Trains Wales
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
N/A
25/10/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/11/2011
Current
N/A
25/01/2011
Chiltern Railway Company
Ltd
Management
01/03/2011
Current
Page21
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GERT8035
One
B6.1.1
11-119-DGN
Non provision of AWS at siding exit signals, Immingham East Jcn SB Signalling
Immingham East Jcn SB area
Renewals project - four signals are affected:
MB4123 - Eastern Jetty Siding MB4124 Immingham Depot Sidings MB4127 - Ridley
Siding MB4115 - Freight Terminal Sidings.
GERT8000-TW3
Two
2.1
postal, parcels)
11-169-DGN
Class 67 Running Light Engine and Hauling Restrictions in the following table apply to
Short Trains at Permissible Speeds
locomotive-hauled trains in the formation
shown and all locomotives running light.
Table lists maximum permitted speeds
against permissible line speeds.
GKRT0045
One
5.2.4 and 5.2.1.1
Signals
11-038-DGN
Junction signalling approaching Old kent
Road Junction from Queens Road
Peckham.
GERT8000-TW3
Two
2.1
postal, parcels)
12-025-DGN
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4.1
and Trains
12-016-DGN
Scope
Lead SC
Deviation Status
The Signal Overrun Risk Assessment,
07/02/2012
including HAZOP, has identified that the
consequences of a collision has a very low
risk to life (driver only), and the likelihood of
a collision is low due to the low line-speeds
and low levels of freight only traffic on this
line. The low collision risk minimises the
secondary consequences of derailment and
environmental spillage. The project has
undertaken a signal overrun risk
assessment; the resultant HAZOP
workshop consisting of
FOCs/Designers/Operations staff and
Signal Sighting representation fully
assessed the risks to an ALARP status. It
recommended that providing AWS for the
main colour light signals that read out of the
non-trapped sidings in this instance would
lead to greater risk of distraction and
confusion, and an increase in driver task
demands in sidings movements. Also, it
has been normal practice in the past to not
provide AWS in sidings. This situation is
similar to that described in the approved
deviation 07/118/NC in that (although for
turnback moves in the instance of
07/118/NC and not sidings) there is no
signalled move up to the signals in question
and, as the movement concerned is unThe current RGS was written for the historic This alternative action will reduce rescue
25/11/2011
situation where locomotives had a braking times for failed locomotive hauled trains on
capability worse than the coaches they were Chiltern Railways routes and allow better
hauling. The class 67 is a modern
use of available line capacity since a cl 67
locomotive with braking capability better
running light engine or hauling a short train
than the figure 3 curve of GM/RT2042 (for
can run at the permissible speeds. This
use on lines signalled to GK/RT0024
approach is reasonable since the brake
appendix 3) and therefore this RGS
capability of a cl 67 is sufficient for all
assumption is not appropriate to the cl 67
signalled routes on Network Rail
locomotive. Complying with the current
infrastructure. The class 67 is fitted with
RGS results in: Under utilisation of track
automatic sanders and modern WSP
capacity due to reduced running speeds of systems to minimise the risk of poor rail
cl 67 running light on ECS movements.
adhesion. Chiltern Railways drivers will be
Increased rescue times for rescuing failed
briefed on this derogation pending planned
trains with a cl 67 locomotive.
revision of TW3 to permit this.
N/A
28/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
N/A
18/10/2011
The Chiltern Railways
Company Ltd ("Chiltern
Railways")
Management
08/11/2011
Current
With the current timetable, trains which are
scheduled to stop at Queens Road station
are the trains which are routed onto the Up
Silwood. This means that drivers will be
expected to start from the platform with a
single yellow aspect and approach the
junction signal which will release almost
immediately. This arrangement would lead
to trains proceeding slower than
operationally required and not being able to
achieve the divergence speed of 40mph.
Additionally, the regular approach to the
junction signal held at red could become a
SPAD trap.
A non-stop train not expecting to take the
20/04/2011
divergence will receive a restrictive aspect
sequence enabling the driver to stop at the
junction signal in the event of misrouting. A
stopping train will receive an advance
caution on the platform starter enabling the
driver to accelerate towards the junction
with the confidence that the junction signal
is showing a proceed aspect. At the highest
potential acceleration rate, the train would
not be exceeding 40mph by the junction
signal. In the event of misrouting, the driver
would be able to see the junction signal in
sufficient time to brake to a stand at the
junction signal. The prime risk of over
speed through the junction is managed by
the MAR approach for non-stopping trains
and MAY-YY where the train has been
proven to have reduced speed to stop in the
platform and hence is unable to accelerate
to a dangerous speed. The linespeed for
that section is 60 mph and the speed over
the junction turnout is 40 mph. All trains
going towards divergence are stopping at
Queens Road Peckham. The junction
signal will be visible from the platform of the
station. The signal sighting exercise has
concluded that the available reading
distance for the junction signal will be 339
Class 67 Running Light Engine and Hauling This deviation applies to all light engine and Rule Book TW3 was written for the
This alternative action will allow better use 22/03/2012
Short Trains at Permissible Speeds
short train movements of class 67
situation where locomotives had a braking of line capacity when operating light engine
locomotives by Arriva Trains Wales on
performance worse than the coaches they
or with short formations of coaches. It will
Network Rail infrastructure. Arriva Trains
were hauling. The class 67 is a modern
also reduce rescue times in the event of a
Wales seeks to permit class 67 locomotives locomotive with braking performance that
locomotive hauled train failure on Arriva
running as light engine or hauling three or
exceeds curve A3 of GM/RT2042 (for use
Trains Wales routes. This approach is
less coaches to run up to the permissible
on lines signalled to GK/RT0075 Appendix reasonable since the brake performance of
line speed (it is noted that clause 2. 2 of
C). Therefore, this Rule Book assumption a class 67 is sufficient for all signalled
TW3 already contains an exemption to
is not appropriate to the class 67
routes on Network Rail infrastructure. The
allow class 67 locomotives hauling four or locomotive. Complying with the current
class 67 is fitted with automatic sanders
more coaches to operate up to the
RGS results in : Under utilisation of track and modern WSP system to minimise the
permissible line speed).
capacity due to reduced running speeds of risk of poor rail adhesion. Arriva Trains
class 67 running light engine. Increased
Wales drivers will be briefed on this
rescue times for rescuing failed trains with a derogation pending planned revision of
class 67 locomotive.
TW3 to permit this.
N/A
24/02/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/03/2011
Current
N/A
14/02/2012
Arriva Trains Wales/Trenau Traffic Operation and
Arriva Cymru Limited
Management
06/03/2012
Current
Barnes Station, Platform 3 and 4. - Platform Barnes Station, Platform 3 and 4.
extension and recess
N/A
02/02/2012
Network Rail
07/03/2012
Current
L620 and L622 signals on the Up line
between Queens Road Peckham and Old
Kent Road Junction.
Nature and Degree
The provision of AWS on the approach to
the exit signals would not provide any extra
information to the drivers of trains and
could lead to distraction of drivers
approaching the exit signals during
shunting.
Platform extension works at Barnes Station
required the Down fast and Down slow lines
to be slewed to provide a sufficient width to
the island platform. The works involved
alteration of a 51. 57 m length of Platform 3
(Down Fast), and a 77. 67 m length of
Platform 4. Prior to the works, Platforms 3
and 4 comprised a riser wall and fill infill;
the former had no recess beneath the
coper, whereas the latter had a 300 mm
recess below the coper. Through widening
of Platform 3 (See DRG-0905), a recess of
between 0 to 300 mm was constructed over
a 30 m length. The coper was realigned for
the first 12 m (see section A) and an
oversail block provided with the realigned
coper over the remaining 18 m section (see
section B and C). At Platform 4, the track
was slewed towards the platform, and this
required cutting the platform back (See
DRG-0906). Because of the time limits
imposed by working within the possession,
a 42. 5 m length of the platform was
demolished and rebuilt (compliant) with
precast units, but on a 20 m or so length
the oversail block was cut back (see Section
C) and on a 20 m or so length the copers
were realigned (see Section D). Given the
limitations of the length of the available
Due to the constraints of the site, it was not 11/04/2012
practicable to provide a compliant solution
within the timeframe of the project. A
compliant solution would have required the
abandonment of the agreed possessions
and a resheduling of the works. It would
have taken some time to agree the
resheduling, and it still might not have been
practicable to provide a compliant solution.
Low risk to passengers using the Platforms.
Although a non-compliance has been
introduced to Platform 4, the situation has
been much improved on Platform 3. The
lengthening of the platforms might also
improve safety by reducing passenger
density on the platforms. The numbers of
passengers using the London End of Down
Platform 3 and 4 are low. The risk to
passengers is low.
Infrastructure
Page22
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0063
One
34.14.24.2.1 and A2
Route Release
12-017-DGN
Improved risk management at mechanical
signalboxes supervising a controlled level
crossing where approach locking (or
equivalent) is not currently provided on the
protecting signals or the level crossing
directly through barrier inhibition.
Mechanical signalboxes supervising a
controlled level crossing where approach
locking (or equivalent) is not currently
provided on the protecting signals or the
level crossing directly.
A risk has been identified with 118
mechanical signalboxes with controlled
level crossings (gates or barriers) directly
supervised and protected by signals
controlled from the signalbox. Historically,
the signaller was required to observe the
passage of trains and not replace protecting
signals until the train had passed all
moveable infrastructure. Approach locking
is not provided at these locations. The
application of conventional approach
locking to the protecting signals would
require bespoke design, the addition or
modification of train detection and a change
in the method of working. The cost of
applying conventional approach locking has
been estimated at Âœ47M and, due to the
bespoke design at each site, it would not be
possible to address the safety risk in a
timely manner.
N/A
02/02/2012
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
23/02/2012
Current
GKRT0063
One
5.3
Route Release
12-180-DGN
Cardiff Area TORR Release Conditions.
Cardiff Area Signalling Renewal (CASR)
project area. Routes without required
number of track sections.
There are a number of routes on the project
where the paucity of train detection sections
would require additional detection elements
solely for the purpose of TORR. Provision
of these sections would incur additional
costs for provision and ongoing
maintenance. Also, additional track
sections would increase the likely hood of
any secondary risks that may occur in the
event of failure of the additional equipment.
N/A
19/10/2012
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
08/11/2012
Current
GERT8082
One
3.9.1 3.9.2 3.9.3 3.9.4 3.9.5 GSM-R Cab Mobile, Great Britain Open
and 3.9.7
12-102-DGN
Derogation against GE/RT8082 call quality Use of the existing Whiteley/BTROS TD500
requirements for GSM-R Radio installations handset or the equivalent replacement DAC
using single handset Cab Audio Control
handset in place of a single GSM-R handset
Units.
on the Class 357 Electrostar fleet operated
by c2c. A standard GSM-R installation
utilises a dedicated GSM-R handset for
radio communication function. However,
vehicles currently fitted with a single
handset will have their Cab Audio
Communication Unit (CACU) modified to
allow the existing single handset to work in
conjunction with the GSM-R radio, thus
maintaining the existing arrangement
whereby all cab audio functions are
managed through a single handset. It
should be noted that the scope of this
deviation is similar to that for derogations
09/285/DGN and 10/048/DGN, which also
relate to the use of a single handset and
CACU arrangement which cannot pass the
test criteria as set out in section 6 above.
This deviation applies to the use of the
existing handset (Whiteley/BTROS TD500)
or equivalent replacement (DAC) in place of
a dedicated GSM-R handset on the Class
357 Electrostar fleet, noting that the existing
handset and CACU arrangement will not
pass the test requirements in the clauses
identified in section 6.
This addresses a risk which has arisen
06/03/2012
where a number of mechanical boxes rely
on the signaller following the rules to not
replace signals until a train has passed all
moveable infrastructure within a route.
Following an error by a signaller, it has
been decided that the signaller should be
supported by a solution which prevents the
level crossing being opened once a train
has been signalled towards it. This needs
to be achieved quickly at a number of sites.
The proposed solution is considered to
meet the safety objectives of approach
locking and has been subject to a range of
assessments and HAZIDs. It is estimated
that this will reduce the cost by Âœ233,346
per crossing safety saving the industry a
total of Âœ23M whilst, in Network Rail's
opinion, delivering an equivalent safety
benefit to the application of approach
locking (taking account of the faster
provision).
It is understood that the main purpose of
27/11/2012
the additional sequence was to address
risks associated with potential common
mode failures on track circuits sharing
IRJ's. The CASR project is using Frauscher
FAdC axle counter train detection that
significantly reduces the risk of spurious
operation that might satisfy the TISP and
TORR conditions. See also attached
HAZID which was conducted by the
modular project. This has been reviewed
and remains valid for the CASR application
because the traffic levels were not deemed
a mitigation.
There are no negative impacts of the
31/07/2012
alternative actions. This is because
maintaining the use of a single handset
reduces the level of change effected by the
introduction of the GSM-R radio to the
Class 357 cab design, thereby maintaining
current driver practice of controlling voice
communications through a single handset.
N/A
28/06/2012
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
12/07/2012
Current
GKRT0064
One
4.2.1
Trapping
Signal BH58 Overlap Length.
BH58 Signal, Up Slow Line (LEC4)
protecting Basford Hall Junction.
The application of this derogation is
against an existing deficiency which has
been submitted as a result of a change in
speed. This deviation is for the future
linespeed increase from 75 mph to 100
mph. This deviation is also to be extended
to cater for the future linespeed increase
from 75 mph to 100 mph. Compliance
would require relocation of the Insulated
Rail Joints and associated track circuit
alterations at a cost of approximately
Â£40k, with very little overall safety
improvement. No work is currently planned
in the area as part of linespeed
improvements.
This is an existing deficiency for the current 27/11/2012
permissible linespeed of 75 mph. The safe
overrun distance (SOD) is 260 m, which
negates the overlap being at 177. 4 m as a
train is more likely to be using the junction
that standing ahead of BH58 under the
current service pattern. BH58 signal has
TPWS+ and was deemed ALARP for
existing and higher line speed by DA
committee upon review of this signal at DA
workshop held for the proposed line speed
increase. No further mitigation measures
were deemed necessary. The signal has
good sighting, with available reading
distance in excess of 500 m with a required
reading distance of 357 m at the proposed
higher linespeed.
N/A
19/10/2012
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
08/11/2012
Current
GKRT0064
One
4.2.1
Trapping
Reduced overlap on M499 signal at
Holytown Junction
Full overlap on M499 signal at Holytown
Junction, Scotland.
The planned S and C Renewal at Holytown
Junction will increase the overlap to 177 m
from the current 162 m. Options to achieve
compliance identified are: Movement of
signal to make the overlap compliant would
require full signal sighting and, due to site
conditions, the probable addition of a
banner repeater, Redesign of the junction
however this is not possible within the
physical confines without significant
reductions in speed, Extension of the
overlap through the S and C which would
impact on route capacity, Provision of a
restricted approach (creating a restricted
overlap) which would be unacceptable to
the train operators, Reduce the speed on
approach to M499 which would not be
acceptable to operations.
The signal is adequately sighted on a
28/09/2012
falling gradient of 1: 117. The speed rises
from 60 to 65 mph approximately 400 m
before the signal and after passing the
previous signal. If the line speed remained
at 60 mph, then a reduced overlap of 135 m
would be sufficient. The adjustment of the
TPWS reduces the risk of a SPAD reaching
the point of conflict and there is no history
of SPADs at the signal. An overrun risk
assessment has been undertaken and it has
been agreed that, rather than the enhanced
TPWS described, the relocation of the
existing equipment will produce similar
safety benefits.
N/A
23/05/2012
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
14/06/2012
Current
GIRT7033
Two
Appendix A, Section AD:
Sign AD01m
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
Utilisation of miniature permanent speed
indicator for Urlay Nook Up 60 mph PSR
The scope of the derogation is limited to the
proposed new 60 mph PSI at 7 m 12 chains
(SSF DSN1US712U) on LER DSN1 for
Urlay Nook.
A replacement 60 mph Permissible Speed
Indicator (PSI) Sign AD02m (450 mm x 450
mm) has been proposed for project 115545
(Urlay Nook Re-control to Bowesfield) by
the Signal Sighting Committee at the
position of, and fixed to, the post of
proposed new B963 signal to comply with
GE/RT8037 clause C1. 5 in preference to
the requirement with GI/RT7033 Appendix A
which specifies the use of Sign AD01m (900
mm x 900 mm). GE/RT8037 clause C1. 5
states "Lineside signs, required to be
observed by a driver for the purpose of
controlling the train, shall be positioned so
as not to create unnecessary distraction
from the driver's primary role of observing
signals. So far as is reasonably
practicable, signs shall not be positioned
between the signal and its associated AWS
or within 50 m beyond the signal. If the
sign has AWS equipment associated with it,
the sign shall be positioned such that the
AWS for the sign does not fall between the
signal and its AWS equipment. Where this
is not achievable, the sign shall be
positioned at the signal and consideration
shall be given to the size, lateral position
and reflective properties to ensure that all
the information displayed is proportionate
It is not deemed practicable to provide a
10/04/2012
900 mm x 900 mm AD01m sign at signal
B963, as the additional cost to locate the
PSI in a position that avoids unnecessary
distraction from the driver's prime purpose
of observing signals will be disproportionate
to the benefit gained. The practice of using
Sign AD02m in this circumstance is
widespread across Network Rail
infrastructure with no known reported issues
when used as a PSI for an increase in
permissible line speed, and meets the
requirements within 'Signal Positioning and
Visibility' Clause C1. 5 and associated
guidance within GE/GN8537. The risk of
the 60 mph PSI being misread leading to a
train travelling at incorrect line speed is low
because the readability requirement of
minimum 4 seconds within GI/RT7033
AD01m is exceeded at the approach speed
of 50 mph (89 m at 50 mph). Additionally,
if the sign is not read, it will result in a train
travelling at 50 mph rather than the
permitted 60 mph, although driver route
knowledge should mitigate the likelihood of
this occurring. There are no level crossings
or speed dependant signalling infrastructure
that would be affected by a train travelling
at less than permissible line speed.
N/A
21/02/2012
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
22/03/2012
Current
12-034-DGN
Page23
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GKRT0063
One
Appendix A - A4
Route Release
12-209-DGN
West Hampstead Train Approaching
Eight pairs of signals affected in the West
Approach Locking Release with Conditional Hampstead PSB control area as part of the
Double Red
Midland Mainline Linespeed Improvement
Project. Look back arrangements apply to
the inner signal approach locking release
only. Inner WH61 outer WH59 (Down Fast
approach to Radlett Junction)Inner WH54
outer WH56 (Up Fast approach to Radlett
Junction)Inner WH84 outer WH86 (Up Fast
approach to Harpenden Junction)Inner
WH112 outer WH114 (Up Fast approach to
Leagrave Junction)Inner WH134 outer
WH136 (Up Fast approach to Flitwick
Junction)Inner WH143 outer WH141 (Down
Fast approach to Bedford South Junction
Inner WH156 outer WH158 (Up Fast
approach to Bedford South Junction)Inner
WH162 outer WH164 (Bedford North
Junction).
GMRT2461
One
9.1
and On-Track Machines
12-137-DGN
GERT8075
One
2.2.4.7
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
13-070-DEV
GERT8082
One
3.9.1 3.9.23.9.3 3.9.4 3.9.5
and 3.9.7
13-107-DEV
Scope
Nature and Degree
To provide a compliant solution would
Impact of the provision of a conditional
require extending the train approaching look- double red, means that the distant aspects
back for an additional signal section due the then moving one signal back. See
requirement for provision of Conditional
consultation report for full details. However,
Double Red (CDR) sequence. The CDR is the outer signal has an aspect only level of
required as part of the project for SPAD
control (designed to extend the influence of
mitigation due to the increase line speeds
the TPWS) and that signal does not require
proposed. Provision of this additional
to any additional interlocking provision.
section, in most cases at West Hampsted
When the junction is not available or
PSB area, would involve significant
replaced, the outer signal will be held at red
alterations to existing interlocking and
only until the approaching train has passed
lineside infrastructure due to current
a TPWS (OSS) at a position on the
interlocking boundaries. Such changes
approach to the outer signal. Under these
would be substantial and disproportionate
circumstances, the outer signal will always
to the benefits offered - see attached
clear (therefore effectively acting as a more
consultation report.
robust inner junction signal). Because the
outer signal will always clear on the
approach of the train, the stopping position
of the train is therefore at the same place as
it would be prior to the provision of CDR
controls. If the signal was put back, while a
driver may be 'surprised' by a reversion, no
additional hazard arises because the outer
signal will always clear as the train
approaches, permitting the train to proceed
to the same position at which the driver was
planning to stop anyway. The release of
locking on the inner signal following a signal
reversion will be mitigated by the TPWS
Position of Sand Delivery System on
Plasser 09-4x4/4S Tamping Machines.
For operation in braking mode, sand shall The 09-4x4/4S Tamping Machine is
Plasser 09-4x4/4S.
be delivered to the railhead by the leading
mounted on five bogies, each with two
vehicle only for all train formations
axles, a total of ten axles. By mounting the
(including multiple formations), at a location sand delivery system in advance of the fifth
forward of the third axle and after the
axle for travel in the working direction, there
second axle, in the direction of travel. To
would still be six axles in rear of the delivery
meet the requirements of GM/RT2461, one system. This meets the requirement of the
of the sanding units (on each side of the
third paragraph of clause 9. 1. It is
machine) would need to be mounted on the therefore considered that this system would
satellite unit. When the machine is
still meet with the spirit of the RGS
tamping, the continuous action (a feature of requirements and there is therefore no
this type of tamper) is achieved by the
impact.
satellite unit moving semi-independently of
the main machine. This means that the
sanding units and their hoppers would have
to be mounted on the Satellite Unit and this
has potential implications for the safe riding
of the bogie supporting the satellite unit.
Additionally, special sand delivery systems
would have to be designed to fit on the
satellite bogie and these would have to
withstand the working environment of the
satellite unit in close proximity to the
tamping banks.
AWS Caution acknowledgement period for The deviation applies to all 390 and 221
During the last three full Railway years and We know, from experience, that the
Class 390 and Class 221 Super Voyager
operated by Virgin Trains.
three periods of the current 2013/14 year,
reduced acknowledgment period increases
operated by Virgin Trains on the West
the total number of AWS late to cancel
the likelihood of late to cancel AWS/TPWS
Coast Mainline.
events stands at 135 (see chart). It can be activations. RSSB research has shown that
seen from the year on year data that we are unnecessary AWS/TPWS interventions
getting worse. We believe some of this
reduce driver confidence in these systems
might be due to a higher density of traffic
and increase the likelihood of TPWS reset
and considered normalising on mileage but and continue events. Since the
to do so would only serve to disguise the
implementation of the AWS system, the
problem. The random nature of late to
infrastructure and train have changed in
cancel AWS warnings supports the theory many ways. The inclusion of TPWS and
of unexpected AWS warnings and high
the OSS+ at critical locations has
workload being at the centre of the issue
significantly reduced the risk from a SPAD.
however the low period 6 figures are
Virgin Class 390 and 221 tilting trains have
interesting and no explanation for this has
speed supervision from track mounted
been identified as yet. Both the 390 and
balises through the Tilt Authorisation and
221 are speed supervised allowing the
Speed Supervision (TASS) system. The
trains to run at EPS. Part of the TASS
numerous braking systems cope very well
system is an arrangement to warn of the
with the demands of the high speed Railway
approach to speed restrictions where the
and equally well under emergency braking.
train measures an approach speed higher
The brake performance of the 221 and 390
than desirable. This initiates an in-cab
fleet under emergency braking following
audible warning that requires a driver brake actual late to cancel incidents is reproduced
application to avoid an automatic
below for both classes. The two charts
emergency brake application. Should the
depict actual AWS late to cancel at 125
driver fail to respond to the warning and
mph and the time and distance table
should an automatic brake application
beneath each chart represents both values
apply, then the driver must acknowledge the taken from the moment AWS goes false
intervention in order to gain release of and and the emergency brake applies to
Call quality requirements for GSM-R Radio A standard GSM-R installation utilises a
As with derogations 09/285/DGN,
There are no negative impacts of the
installations using single handset Cab
dedicated GSM-R handset for radio
10/048/DGN and 12/102/DGN, there is no
alternative actions. This is because
Audio Control Units on Southeastern Cl375, communication function. However, vehicles known route whereby compliance to the
maintaining the use of a single handset
376, 465 and 466 fleets.
currently fitted with a single handset will
clauses in Section 6 can be achieved. The reduces the level of change effected by the
have their Cab Audio Communication Unit Southeastern Classes 375 and 376 fleets
introduction of the GSM-R radio to the
(CACU, sometimes known as Drivers
have had a single handset arrangement
Classes 375, 376, 465 and 466 cab designs
Interface Unit - DIU) modified to allow the
since they were introduced into service.
thereby maintaining current driver practice
existing single handset to work in
The existing handset occupies the optimum of controlling voice communications
conjunction with the GSM-R radio, thus
position in terms of driver ergonomics.
through a single handset.
maintaining the existing arrangement
Fitment of a dedicated GSM-R handset
whereby all cab audio functions are
would require the GSM-R handset to be
managed through a single handset. This
placed in another location, away from the
deviation application applies to the use of
optimum location. The Southeastern
the existing handset (Whiteley/BTROS
Classes 465 and 466 underwent a
TD500 or DAC handset) in place of a
modification programme to replace
dedicated GSM-R handset on the Classes
separate radio and PA handsets with a
375 and 376 Electrostar fleets and the
single handset arrangement. This new
Classes 465 and 466 Networker fleets,
arrangement only allows for one handset to
noting that the existing handset and CACU be fitted in the optimum cab location. This
arrangement will not pass the test
means the fitment of a dedicated GSM-R
requirements in the clauses identified in
handset would require drivers to change the
Section 6 of this application (Details of
way the operate the GSM-R radio in
Railway Group Standard). It should be
comparison to current practice.
noted that the scope of this deviation is
similar to that for derogations 09/285/DGN,
10/048/DGN and 12/102/DGN which also
relate to the use of a single handset and
CACU arrangement which cannot pass the
test criteria as set out in section 6 above.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
10/01/2013
N/A
15/11/2012
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/12/2012
Current
08/11/2012
N/A
08/08/2012
Plasser UK Ltd
Rolling Stock
31/08/2012
Current
18/10/2013
N/A
13/05/2013
West Coast Trains Ltd
Control Command and
Signalling
03/10/2013
Current
04/09/2013
N/A
11/07/2013
Southeastern
Control Command and
Signalling
15/08/2013
Current
Page24
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0064
One
4.3.2
Trapping
PN245 signal overlap length, Lancaster.
PN245 signal only. Platform 5 Lancaster
Station.
21/05/2013
has been conducted as per requirements of
section 4. 9 of GK/RT0064 and considered
the overlap risk to be ALARP (see attached
SORA report Appendix F). Permissible
speed is very low (10 mph) and begins 315
m on approach to the signal and hence only
85 m short of the requirement. GK/RT0075
states that braking at 10 mph on a 1 in 100
fall gradient to be 118 m, thus the 400 m
approach distance is significantly more than
that required to actually stop at PN245.
TPWS is provided at the signal and will be
fully effective for train with up to 9%g
effective brakes. Trains with an emergency
brake of less that 9%g are mitigated by the
provision of a sliding buffer that will retard
the train in a controlled manner.
N/A
28/03/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
18/04/2013
Current
GKRT0063
One
5.3
Route Release
13-050-DGN
Reading Station Area - Unconditional Train Reading Station Area Redevelopment
Operated Route Release (TORR) for routes (RSAR) Project, routes equipped with axle
equipped with axle counters.
counters.
New routes are being provided to PN245
signal as part of S and C renewal work at
Lancaster Station. PN245 signal is an
existing signal that has no main route
approaches currently, and so no overlap.
At 400 m on approach to PN245 signal, the
line speed is 40 mph; however, at 315 m
on approach, the line speed reduces to 10
mph and stays at that speed up to the
signal. To comply with the 400 m
requirement would require either no overlap
being provided to the neck, extending of the
neck to permit a 40 mph reduced overlap
(minimum 80 m) or reduction in line speed.
These options were considered (see section
11 - What other options have been
considered?) but would affect performance
of other routes and layout or have a
relatively large cost compared to the safety
benefit.
Provision of additional train detection
sections and/or treadles for the purpose of
TORR would incur additional costs for
provision and on-going maintenance. Also,
additional equipment would increase the
likelihood of any secondary risks that may
occur in the event of failure of the additional
equipment.
N/A
28/03/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
18/04/2013
Current
GERT8030
Four
F2.1.1 F2.1.3 (part) F2.1.4
and F 2.10.7.
Requirements for Train Protection and
13-091-DEV
GE/RT8030 Appendix F Clause F.2.1
TPWS DMI appearance and labelling.
This application is for the MPV vehicles
supplied by Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH which form part of
the Network Rail High Output OLE
Construction System (HOPS) and is to
permit non-compliance with the RGS
standard clauses as identified in 6b above,
for the following vehicles: MPV Type 1
(SOPB): 99 70 9131 010-9 99 70 9131
013-3 99 70 9131 021-6 99 70 9131 022-4
99 70 9131 023-2. MPV Type 2 (HOPB):
99 70 9131 001-8 99 70 9131 005-9 99 70
9131 006-7 99 70 9131 011-7. MPV Type 5
(SORB): 99 70 9131 014-1.
N/A
20/06/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Control Command and
Signalling
11/07/2013
Current
GERT8000-TW1
Eight
Section 2
Preparation and movement of trains General
13-007-DGN
Higher priority Freight trains.
National.
It is understood that the main purpose of
23/05/2013
the additional sequence was to address
risks associated with potential common
mode failures on track circuits sharing
Insulated Rail Joints (IRJs). The RSAR
project is using Thales axle counter train
detection that significantly reduces the risk
of spurious operation that might satisfy the
Train in Section Proving (TISP) and TORR
conditions. No specific risk has been
identified and, as such, no alternative action
proposed so, with less trackside equipment,
there is less maintenance required. As
such, this application offers a 'safer' railway
through less equipment, which would be
required trackside without the provision of
'Unconditional TORR'. The call-on routes
will require the approaching train to be
signalled in to the station at low speed as
the release of the call-on aspect will require
the train to be more or less at a stand to
release the call-on aspect in to the
platforms and will be undertaken by the
berth track section being occupied for a
time. If the driver of the train misjudges the
requirement of slowing down on the
approach to the signal in question (for the
call on route) and passes the signal at
danger, then the train protection equipment
Retention of the earlier version DMI panels 07/08/2013
will remove the need to substantially
change the driver's desk layout,
construction and associated components.
The current layout has also been agreed
with the vehicle owner (Network Rail) and
Operator (Amey) and will negate the
requirement for further consultation on any
potential changes. The differences between
the DMI panel currently fitted and the later
supplied approved panel are; The AWS
isolation light is included in the current
panel; this is not compliant with clauses
F2. 1. 1, F2. 1. 3 and F2. 1. 4 of
GE/RT8030 Issue 4. The labelling of the
panel is smaller than specified by clause F
2. 10. 7 of GE/RT8030 Issue 4. The
inclusion of the AWS isolation light in the
DMI panel has been the subject of a
previous derogation application
12/203/DGN, and the labelling of the DMI
panel of derogation application
12/204/DGN. In both cases, the
derogations were submitted but
subsequently withdrawn by Unipart. The
Train Operator has also been consulted in
the use of this panel and does not foresee
any problems. Vehicle drivers will be fully
briefed, instructed and trained on the
Identification of the current and future
01/03/2013
freight services that convey high
consequence and perishable goods. These
services need to be amended in the working
timetable and any other requirements
changed to allow the services to operate. A
proposal has been submitted via a
"proposal for change document - SDP
1226". Previous conversations on the
subject have taken place with all the main
Freight Operators, including DB Schenker,
Freightliner, Direct Rail Services, GBRf and
Colas. Due to a specific incident in 2012
involving high consequence goods, a new
requirement for the conveyance of this
traffic has led to an urgent requirement to
address the issue. DB Schenker has
requested that a specific train has a
different headcode with immediate effect,
and Direct Rail Services have shown
considerable support for the perishable
goods that they carry. Also, discussions
with the Network Rail Freight Director and
his team have taken place, and they are
looking into any commercial issues that
may arise with the change.
N/A
15/01/2013
Network Rail
Management
05/02/2013
Current
Certificate Number
Derogation 12/162/DGN was authorised in
November 2012 to permit a TPWS
installation in accordance with GE/RT8030
Issue 2 to be installed on these vehicles
instead of a system compliant with Issue 4
of the Standard. This derogation was
sought due to the risk that validated TPWS
equipment compliant with Issue 4 of the
Standard would not be available within the
project delivery timescales current at that
time. This application was subsequently
supported by derogation 13/010/DGN
authorised in March 2013 to permit noncompliance with Clause 2. 6. 8. 2 of
GE/RT8035 Issue 2 which requires the
capability to isolate train borne AWS
equipment independent of the isolation of
TPWS equipment. Inclusion of this
requirement was not possible since the new
generation TPWS equipment was not
available. In seeking these derogations,
Windhoff committed to design the vehicles
to accept equipment supplied to them at
that time for which approval was being
sought by Unipart, and which was believed
to be compliant with GE/RT8030. The
Project also committed to retrofit equipment
compliant with GE/RT8030 issue 4 as and
when approved equipment became
Currently, Freight trains are restricted to
class 4, 6, 7, 8, dependant on the
permissible speed of the train and wagons.
We currently have a number of train
services on the network conveying high
consequence and perishable goods. At
certain times, and also in line with transit
requirements, there needs to be a way of
defining these services as having a higher
priority (but not necessary a higher speed).
By changing the headcodes to become a
class 3, with a suitable route briefing pack,
the trains can be managed differently on the
network, and treat with higher priority where
allowed.
Page25
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8075
One
3.2.1.3
14-038-DEV
TPWS receiver position on Class 68 UK
Light locomotive.
UK Light locomotives manufactured by
Vossloh España S. A. (Class 68) (limited to
a maximum of 41 units due to stage IIIA
engine). This application is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
The requirement to position the TPWS
25/03/2014
receiver behind the leading axle was
introduced to avoid spurious operation of
TPWS caused by interference from TI21
track circuits. A number of derogations
have previously been granted against the
same technical requirement in GE/RT8030
Issue 4, which permit the TPWS antenna to
be located ahead of the leading axle (for
instance derogations 10/045/DGN,
06/105/DGN and 05/032/DGN). On this
basis, it is considered that the risk
associated with the TPWS antenna being
located ahead of the leading axle is
controlled. The new location avoids the
technical and geometrical problems of the
original position (available space and EMC
emissions).
N/A
11/02/2014
Vossloh EspaÃ±a S.A. on
behalf of, Direct Rail
Services Limited
Control Command and
Signalling
06/03/2014
Current
GCRT5212
One
C2.1, Table 2 Categorisation of
clearances for absolute
gauging. G4.1 - Alterations
other than to permit the
passage of larger rail
vehicles.
Clearances
14-174-DEV
Heathrow CTA, platforms 1 and 2 reduction in clearance during trial of
platform gap fillers
The impacts of the proposed gap filler have 27/01/2015
been more fully detailed in the supporting
documents attached. In summary, the gap
filler trial is expected to: Improve
passenger safety on CTA Platforms 1 and
2. Maintain acceptable train / platform
clearances, as demonstrated in the trials
ongoing on Heathrow Terminal 5, whilst not
affecting technical compatibility of the
railway system through the reduction in
normal clearance arrangements. The gap
fillers can be removed if railway
requirements change in the future, or if the
trial proves to be unsuccessful. Have no
effect on service performance. Have no
direct impact on environment. Supporting
documentation attached to this report
discusses the details, including the risk
assessment.
15/01/2017
15/12/2014
Heathrow Express
Operating Company Ltd
Infrastructure
06/01/2015
Current
GCRT5212
One
vehicles.
Clearances
14-143-DEV
Heathrow Airport Terminal 5, Platform 4 reduction of clearance at platform gap
fillers.
Clause C2 Table 2 provides definition of
normal/reduced/special reduced clearances
in the lower sector. Clause G4. 1 states
that alterations to infrastructure should not
cause reduction of clearances from one
category to a more severe (smaller
clearance) category. The current platform
clearances comply with the RGS
requirements. In this scenario, there have
been incidents of passengers, especially
those with a small foot size, stepping
between the platform and the Class 332
stepping plate and getting their foot/leg
trapped. HEx is trialling the gap fillers to
assess their benefits in reducing the number
of such accidents on Heathrow Terminal 5
Platform 4.
passenger safety on the Terminal 5
platform 4. Maintain acceptable train platform clearances, as demonstrated
through Phase 1 trials, whilst affecting
technical compatibility of the railway system
through the reduction in normal clearance
arrangements. The gap fillers can be
removed if railway requirements change in
the future, or if the trial proves to be
unsuccessful. Have no effect on service
performance. Have no direct impact on
environment. Please see the supporting
documentation for details.
12/11/2016
21/10/2014
Heathrow Express
Operating Company Ltd.
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
GERT8000-HB11
Two
4.2
Duties of the person in charge of a
possession (PICOP)
14-035-DEV
LNE Route - 'Flexible Train Arrival Point'.
This deviation against GC/RT5212 Issue 1
is for the installation of rubber platform gap
fillers along the full length of the Heathrow
Express CTA station Platforms 1 and 2 for a
second phase of trialling. The impact of the
installation is to reduce nominal clearance
between vehicles and the infrastructure
from 80 mm-105 mm (I. e. normal
clearance) to 25 mm-50 mm (I. e. reduced
clearance). The gap filler is, however,
flexible and effective clearance remains
greater than this nominal value. The
clearance rules of GC/RT5212 Issue 1,
however, do not recognise the possibility of
such flexible components and deviation is
therefore necessary. The trial will be
conducted for a period of up to 24 months
to allow for sufficient trial time and data
gathering to demonstrate that the gap filler
achieves a safety benefit and the
installation is robust under the operating
conditions and application of the gap fillers
on CTA. Conclusions of the trial and
evidence of the benefits will be presented to
RSSB once they are available within the 24
month period. If, at any time during the trial
period, the findings of the trial indicate that
the fillers have an overall negative impact,
they will be removed. Please find the
This deviation against GC/RT5212 Issue 1
is for the installation of rubber platform gap
fillers at all door positions (for the Class 332
rolling stock that operates the services into
the platform in question) along the length of
Heathrow Terminal 5 (T5), Platform 4, for a
second phase of trialling. Initial trials,
installing the gap fillers at a limited number
of doors positions, was undertaken
following agreement of deviation
13/227/DEV in January 2014. The impact
of the installation is to reduce nominal
clearance between vehicles and the
infrastructure from 70 mm (I. e. normal
clearance) to 25 mm (I. e. reduced
such flexible components and deviation is
conducted for a period of up to 24 months
to allow for sufficient trial time and data
gathering to demonstrate that the gap filler
achieves a safety benefit. Conclusions of
the trial and evidence of the benefits will be
presented to the RSSB once they are
available within the 24 month period. If, at
National.
The Vossloh Class 68 (UK Light) project is
already at an advanced stage, with the first
units already built and the lead unit in the
UK for commissioning. The project was
previously being assessed against
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 as amended by
deviation 12/116/DGN which has already
been granted. To future proof further
locomotive builds and to comply with the
latest list of NNTRs published by the UK
Department for Transport (DfT) in midOctober, Vossloh have decided to
demonstrate compliance against
GE/RT8075 Issue 1 rather than GE/RT8030
Issue 4. As such, a new/updated deviation
against Clause 3. 2. 1. 3 of GE/RT8075
Issue 1 is required, covering the same
technical requirements as derogation
12/116/DGN against GE/RT8030 Issue 4.
The UK Light design is based on the
existing EuroLight locomotive. The
arrangement of the UK Light locomotive
components is such that it is impossible to
fit the Train Protection and Warning System
(TPWS) antenna no further than 2. 3 m
behind the leading wheelset. This is due to:
The lack of available space behind the
leading wheelset. Any installation of the
TPWS receiver 2. 3 m behind the leading
clearance) category. The current platform
requirements. In this scenario there have
been instances of passengers, especially
those with a small foot size, stepping
between the platform and the Class 332 and
Class 360/2 stepping plate and getting their
foot/leg trapped. HEx propose to trial the
gap fillers to assess their benefits in
reducing the number of such accidents on
Heathrow CTA Platforms 1 and 2.
The current RGS requires that, when
possession is taken around a train, it is
done so whilst the engineering train is
standing at a signal which is being held at
danger. This means the High Output (HO)
trains are positioned away from their
planned start-of-work site, and between 10
and 20 minutes of lost production occur at
the start of work whilst the train is
positioned in the correct place to start work.
This can equate to an estimated 50,000
Pounds Sterling in lost production.
The HO train would be stopped at the
02/09/2015
FTAP at the exact location of work (which
would ordinarily be distant from a signal)
and possession would be taken around the
train at that point. It is estimated that this
would allow 10 to 20 minutes of additional
production time on every HO shift. This
could equate to an estimated 50,000
Pounds Sterling increase in production each
shift. As part of the initial study, a risk
assessment has been performed, involving
stakeholders from route operations,
National Delivery Service (NDS),
Freightliner, RSSB and HO Operations. As
possession will not be granted until the HO
train is at the FTAP, then no personnel will
be on or near the line whilst the train is in
motion. There is a risk that the HO train
overshoots the FTAP. Threats relating to
this have been assessed and mitigated,
principally by driver briefing and the use of
countdown markers on the approach to the
FTAP (see FTAP proposal document).
31/12/2017
11/02/2014
Network Rail
Management
28/07/2015
Current
Page26
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GKRT0075
Two
3.3.8.2 a)
Signage
14-045-DEV
Automatic Warning System (AWS) position
for LTN00538 permissible speed warning
indicator located approaching Forest Gate
Station.
AWS position for LTN00538 permissible
speed warning indicator located on the Up
Electric line of the GE route from Liverpool
Street to Shenfield, approaching Forest
Gate station, at 5M 38CH.
GERT8075
One
Appendix A
14-124-DEV
Variation to AWS Indicator Image layout
GERT8000-SP
Four
2.2
Speeds
14-081-DEV
Class 68 Running Light Engine and Hauling This deviation applies to all light engine and
Short Trains at Permissible Speeds.
short train movements of class 68
locomotives by the Chiltern Railway
Company Limited ("Chiltern Railways") on
Network Rail infrastructure. Chiltern
Railways seeks to permit class 68
locomotives running as light engine or
hauling short trains of Mk3 coaches to run
at the permissible line speed.
The current RGS was written for the
historic situation where locomotives had a
braking capability worse than the coaches
they were hauling. The class 68 is a
modern locomotive with braking capability
better than the figure 3 curve of GM/RT2042
(for use on lines signalled to GK/RT0024
appendix 3) and, therefore, this RGS
assumption is not appropriate to the class
68 locomotive. Complying with the current
RGS results in: Under-utilisation of track
capacity due to reduced running speeds of
class 68 running light on Empty Coaching
Stock (ECS) movements or hauling short
trains. Increased rescue times for rescuing
failed trains with a class 68 locomotive.
GMRT2483
One
C1.1C1.2C2.1C2.2C2.3.1C2 Visibility Requirements for Trains
.4C2.5C3.2.1 and C3.3
14-070-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Visibility (Issue 5).
The tram train is required to provide lighting Please refer to Appendix 1 attached for the
that complies with the road vehicle lighting justification for the alternative provisions.
regulations 1989 and ORR RSP2 (Guidance
on tramways).
GERT8000-SP
Four
2.2
14-111-DEV
Class 68 Locomotives Running Light
Engine at Permissible Speeds.
Speeds
Nature and Degree
Requirement for AWS at permissible speed
warning indicators is specified as exactly
180 m in GK/RT0075. Given existing signal
spacing in the area is circa 300 m,
compliance is not possible without moving
signals or putting signal AWS at less than
normal 180 m or move the permissible
speed warning indicator without
compromising one or more of the other
clauses in GK/RT0075: 3. 3. 8. 1. - The
AWS magnet shall: b) be positioned not
less than 4 seconds running time from any
other AWS equipment. c) not be positioned
between any other AWS equipment and its
associated signal, board or indicator. 3. 3.
5. 1 a): The board must be positioned as
close as practicable to the longest
deceleration distance from the PSR. 3. 3.
8. 1: An AWS magnet shall be provided on
the approach to all permissible speed
warning indicators provided to satisfy the
criteria set out in 3. 3. 1. 4. 3. 3. 5. 1 b):
The board must not be positioned between
a signal and its AWS. To position the AWS
at less than 180 m is considered the least
onerous to break. Train Operating
Companies (TOCs), Freight Operating
Companies (FOCs) and Network Rail agree
that positioning the permissible speed
Minimum dimension of AWS Visual
Compliance will require the redesign of the
Indicator. This deviation is for a project
LED arrangement to use an alternative LED
requiring authorisation for placing in service and filter arrangement. Should the
application be rejected we will be faced with
Regulations 2011.
redesigning the unit.
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train EMUs: Unit numbers:
399201 - 399207. Vehicle numbers:
99001 - 99007, 99101 - 99107, 99201 99207.
This deviation applies to all light engine
movements of Class 68 Locomotives by
Direct Rail Services on Network Rail
Infrastructure. Direct Rail Services seeks to
permit Class 68 locomotives running as
light engine to run at permissible line speed.
The current RGS was written for the
historic situation where locomotives had a
braking capability worse than the vehicles
that they were hauling. The Class 68 is a
modern locomotive with braking capability
better than that shown in figure 3 of
GM/RT2042 'Stopping Distance Curve Maximum Speed 125 mile/h Performance
for Traction Units required to operate over
routes signalled in accordance with
Appendix 3 of GK/RT0034'. The locomotive
meets the required stopping distances for
all signalled routes on Network Rail
infrastructure, therefore the RGS
assumption is not appropriate to the class
68 locomotive. Complying with the current
RGS will result in under-utilisation of track
capacity due to reduced running speeds of
Class 68 locomotives running light or
hauling short trains.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Impacts are considered minor. The AWS 01/04/2014
will still be in position in line with
requirements of GE/RT8075: 2. 1. 8. 1.
allows a signal AWS to be positioned a
minimum of 3 seconds from the signal,
and2. 1. 8. 2. h) permits a signal sighting
committee (SSC) to recommend an
alternative position and this achieves a
reduction in risk. Drivers use signal AWS to
assist with stopping at signals so a
standard 180 m distance is import; no
equivalent use is made of AWS at
permissible speed warning indicator.
GN158 in GK/GN0675 implies variation is
permitted, but wording in GK/RT0075
means a deviation is still required. GN158
states: "GE/RT8035: Automatic Warning
System (AWS) permits the distance from
the AWS magnet to the permissible speed
warning indicator to be reduced to a
minimum of 3 seconds running time. This
accounts for the 1 second delay after
passing over the permanent magnet before
the AWS equipment gives a warning
indication and provides the driver with a
minimum of 2 seconds to respond to the
AWS indication, observe the speed sign
and acknowledge the warning. "
N/A
13/02/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/03/2014
Current
No impact on other affected parties. The
22/09/2014
TY341 AWS LED Indicator is a redesign of
the earlier TY228 AWS LED Indicator
developed for the Channel Tunnel fleets in
1991. The indicator uses the same LED
display elements and size as the earlier
design which has proved satisfactory in use
since the Channel Tunnel opened in 1993.
It is also the image used to illustrate
Appendix A of GE/RT8075. Given that the
requested display size has been in use on
Class 92 and Class 373 vehicles, and on
the Class 395 since June 2009, it is
believed that the display diameter of 38 mm
has been shown to be adequate for the
application. It is not believed that the
deviation will have any impact on the
following: The safety of the railway
system; The technical compatibility of the
railway system now and in the future; Costs
and service performance, including
reliability and availability; If relevant, other
essential requirements such as
environmental protection and health.
N/A
04/09/2014
Mors Smitt UK Ltd.
Control Command and
Signalling
18/09/2014
Current
This alternative action will reduce rescue
04/07/2014
times for failed locomotive hauled trains on
Chiltern Railways routes and allow better
use of available line capacity since a class
68 running light engine or hauling a short
train can run at the permissible speeds.
This approach is reasonable since the brake
capability of a class 68 is sufficient for all
automatic sanders and modern Wheel Slide
Protection (WSP) systems to minimise the
risk of poor rail adhesion. Chiltern Railways
drivers will be briefed on this derogation
pending planned revision of rule book
module SP to permit this. It is notable that
Rule Book module SP already recognises
that these restrictions do not need to apply
for locomotives with enhanced braking
(such as class 67s) and this derogation
seeks to apply this principle to a new
locomotive with similar braking capability.
N/A
02/06/2014
The Chiltern Railways
Company Ltd
Management
24/06/2014
Current
14/10/2015
N/A
19/02/2015
Stagecoach Supertram
Rolling Stock
28/08/2015
Current
This alternative action will allow better use 27/08/2014
of available line capacity since a class 68
locomotive running light engine will be able
to run at the permissible speeds. This
approach is reasonable since the braking
capability of a class 68 is sufficient for all
automatic sanders and modern Wheel Slide
Protection (WSP) systems to minimise the
risk of poor rail adhesion. Direct Rail
Services drivers' will be briefed on this
deviation pending planned revision of Rule
Book module SP to permit this. It is notable
that Rule Book module SP already
recognises that these restrictions do not
need to apply for locomotives with
enhanced braking (such as Class 67) and
this deviation seeks to apply this principle to
a new locomotive with similar braking
capability.
N/A
18/08/2014
Direct Rail Services
Management
N/A
Current
Page27
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GERT8000-TW5
Five
6.1
equipment
14-077-DEV
Door defects on passenger vehicles exemption from isolating a vehicle where
the first or last sets of passenger doors are
locked out of use.
Class 700 'Thameslink EMU' and all its sub- The following diagram shows the scaled
classes.
layout of the leading and trailing vehicles,
including the lockable first class partition
door. The class 700 does not have
conventional gangway or vestibule doors
between the vehicles; rather, it is open
plan, thus allowing quick access from one
vehicle to the next. Both sub-classes of the
train are fitted with two pairs of deployable
gangway partitions per unit. Compliance
with the existing rule would result in the
leading or rear three vehicles being locked
out of use by means of the deployable
gangway partitions due to their location
within the unit. This would result in the train
being taken out of service as continuation
would result in excessive dwell times and
confusion amongst passengers attempting
to alight at subsequent station stops which
are adjacent to the locked vehicles. The
diagram below demonstrates deployment of
the gangway partitions and the consequent
impact this would have on the leading or
trailing three vehicles if the current Rule
Book requirements are applied.
GERT8026
One
10.3.6
,Safety Requirements for Cab Signalling
Systems,
14-125-DEV
Automatic control of train speed
Llanbadarn ABCL located between Dovey
approaching and proceeding over
Jcn and Aberystwyth on the SBA2.
Llanbadarn Automatic Barrier level
Crossing Locally monitored by train crew
(ABCL) using European Train Control
System (ETCS) Level 1 controls on Level 2
ETCS fitted lines when the conditions for
the Driver's Crossing Indicator (DCI) to
display a white indication are not met.
Fully interlocking the crossing with the
ETCS would require the crossing to be
converted to a Manned Crossing with
Barriers (MCB) type which would
significantly increase costs, time to
implement and extending crossing closure
times for users. Deviation 09/169/DGN was
granted to permit Automatic Open Crossing
- locally monitored by train crew (AOCL)
and ABCL crossings not be interlocked to
the Movement Authority (MA). Part
compliance with current RGS is possible by
applying a 0 km/h Temporary Speed
Restriction (TSR). However, if a zero speed
were applied locally to the crossing in place
of the proposed 10 km/h, it would prevent a
train from proceeding over the crossing as
directed in GE/RT8000/TW8 ERTMS Rule
Book Level Crossings on ERTMS Lines drivers' instructions Clause 4. 4, without the
driver first overriding the on board systems
cancelling the MA. Therefore, the train
would have to proceed in degraded "Staff
Responsible" mode to the next awakening
area before returning to a supervised mode,
which is considered to increase risk.
GMRT2161
One
6.2.6
Requirements for Driving Cabs of Railway
Vehicles
14-090-DEV
Class 387 Windscreen Wipers Obscuring
Sightline.
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 Electric
Multiple Units (EMUs) and up to thirty-five
four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an option on
the current contract). This deviation is for a
project requiring authorisation for placing in
service under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
To comply with the standard would require
a change to the wiper arm, to incorporate a
'dog-leg' design. This would necessitate
that Class 387 units have a different spare
part from other existing Electrostars.
GMRT2466
Three
4.4.1
Railway Wheelsets
15-113-DEV
Trial of Economic Tyre Turning (ETT) on
Class 390 Wheelsets with P12 Profiles
Up to five-off Class 390/0 and 390/1
trainsets in the number range 01 to 57.
The impact of complying with the current
RGS requirement is that it limits the useful
life of wheel pans. This is because, at each
turn the full wheel profile, including a 'full
thickness' flange must be recreated. As the
wheel pan approaches its scrapping
diameter, it is not always possible to
recreate the full flange thickness of the
wheel profile without reducing the wheel
below its last turning diameter. Therefore,
at this point, whilst the wheel pans still have
usable life remaining, it is necessary for
them to be removed and scrapped. This
imposes avoidable costs on the industry: In
replacing wheels which have some useable
life remaining (unavailability of vehicles,
unplanned wheelset replacement when
wheel pick up damage near the end of their
life etc. ). A study by the University of
Huddersfield Institute of Railway Research
(IRR report 110/81 issue 1) has suggested
that saving of between Â£880K and Â£5.
1M may be realisable across the GB
passenger fleet if RGS permitted Economic
Tyre Turning (ETT) at the end of a wheels
life; In early replacement of wheelsets at
heavy overhaul when they have significant
remaining life. ETT could be one of a range
of measures that allow maintainers to
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
The driver's primary means of egress from 16/07/2014
the cab would normally be via the cab
doors. However, there may be occasions
when they would be required to egress the
train via the passenger doors in the saloon.
In an emergency, they would be required to
unlock the partition door to reach the
standard accommodation area; however,
this is not considered to be any different to
accessing the second coach of a train that
has been locked out of use as per the
existing Rule Book requirements.
N/A
16/05/2014
First Capital Connect
Management
24/06/2014
Current
The fitment of additional automatic
29/04/2015
protection has been recommended in a
report produced by the Rail Accident
Investigation Branch (RAIB) and supported
by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) at
Llanbadarn ABCL. Proposal will
automatically control the speed of an
approaching train to 10 km/h at a predetermined position on the approach to the
crossing. The pre-determined position for
the 10 km/h commencement shall be
calculated such that any train shall be able
to stop from 10 km/h before entering the
crossing. The 10 km/h restriction shall be
enforced on the train continuously from the
commencement of the 10 km/h until the
front of the train passes clear of the
crossing deck. If the vehicle overspeeds, a
Class 158 unit will be subject to a service
brake application that is released once the
vehicle speed has decreased to 10 km/h.
Class 97 locomotives will be subject to an
emergency brake application, which has the
effect of bringing the vehicle to a stand.
The brakes may be released by the driver
once the vehicle is stationary. The 10 km/h
has been selected as the lowest speed it is
practicable to reliably drive all types of
traction in use on the route. The 10 km/h
When the proposed wipers are in the
09/07/2014
parked position (I. e. when not in use) part
of the support arms for the wiper blade
obscures part of the primary vision area,
low down and to the right of the driver's
vision. This obscured part of the driver's
sight lines (taken from the driver's seat
position) measures 94 mm upwards and 48.
5 mm to the left of the bottom right corner
of the primary vision area. The attached
drawing No. 3EER400014-6151 indicates
the obscured portion of the windscreen from
the exterior perspective of the cab, although
the dimensions are as observed from the
driver's seat position. The area obscured is
required by case (a) of the sightlines
required for seated drivers, I. e. : A view of
the track (at rail height) at 5 m beyond the
vehicle buffers (or vehicle end) for vehicles
subject to frequent coupling and uncoupling
activities. The wiper arm will slightly
obscure the right-hand rail (from the driver's
perspective). A small movement of the
driver's head to the left will allow the
obscured area to be viewed. Case (b) - line
side signals - and case (d) - a view of the
track in the distance - are not obscured.
There are no known negative impacts from
the current design. The infringement is
Findings from the RSSB T641 Research
07/01/2016
Project and recent work by the University of
Huddersfield show that the use of a ETT
thin flange wheel profile: Does not
compromise safety against derailment
(T641 report); Has no significant
detrimental effect on vehicle dynamic
performance (T641 report); Has no
significant impact on rail damage and wear
(T641 report and IRR report 110/81); An
economic benefit exists (IRR report 110/81).
On the basis of the above findings, it is
considered that the trial will have no impact
on the safety of the railway system or
compatibility of the trial trainsets with the
West Coast Main Line infrastructure.
Undertaking of the trial will require an
additional cost, related to monitoring the inservice performance of the ETT P12 wheel
profiles and the undertaking of a Ride
Quality assessment. However, provided
that the trial is successful, then it will further
support the introduction of ETT wheel
profiles, which will produce the industry
benefits identified in Section 10.
N/A
08/09/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
19/03/2015
Current
N/A
25/06/2014
Southern
N/A
Current
01/01/2017
05/11/2015
(trading as Virgin Trains)
04/12/2015
Current
Rolling Stock
Page28
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
GERT8000-TS11
Two
1.5
Failure of, or work on, signalling equipment - 15-125-DEV
signallers' regulations
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) The temporary deviation will be used to
Protection Zone Trials.
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas
with single and double track lines in track
circuit block areas that do not have axle
counters, level crossings or ground frames.
GIRT7016
Five
8.1
and Trains
15-099-DEV
Leicester station.- Headroom on Platforms.
GIRT7016
Five
6.2.2 b)
and Trains
15-068-DEV
platform edge(s).
GERT8075
Two
2.2.4.11, 3.2.3.7, 3.2.4.4,
4.2.5.1, 4.2.5.2, 4.2.5.3,
4.2.5.4, 4.2.5.5, 4.2.5.6,
4.2.5.7, 4.2.5.8
15-114-DEV
Transition between European Train Control
System (ETCS) mode SN (class B system
Automatic Warning System / Train
Protection and Warning System
(AWS/TPWS)) and other ETCS modes .
GERT8000-TW1
Ten
46
Preparation and movement of trains
15-118-DEV
High Output Ballast Cleaner (HOBC)
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
This clause relates to signalling equipment
being disconnected and, when a form
RT3187 should be used, the project
requests that the RT3187 form is not used
during the TRS Protection Zone for the
disconnection of any equipment wholly
within the Protection Zone which is outside
of a Line Blockage or T3 Possession. If the
disconnection continues past the TRS
Protection Zone, then TS11 would need to
be complied with.
Normally, an RT3187 form is completed
12/02/2016
when any signalling equipment is
disconnected outside of a Line Blockage or
T3 Possession, or if it affects the normal
passage of trains or needs the signaller's
cooperation, or will affect the normal
operation of the equipment. Whilst the TRS
Protection Zone is in place, some
equipment may be disconnected on the line
affected and will be reconnected prior to the
TRS Protection Zone being given up. The
deviation will support the trial of the TRS
Protection Zone procedure. Network Rail
would like to trial a new form of Protection
Zone of the line that allows the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a
line not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe and
Efficient Access - a proposal (presentation).
The Safe and Efficient Access Safety Case
The SEA risk assessment The SEA detailed
procedure The HO protection form The SEA
trial record sheet The various SEA briefing
documents.
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
The height of the platform canopies is too
low to permit the required 2500 mm
clearance to underside. Smaller displays
would affect the readability of the
information. Low severity - the displays are
'like for like' replacements of existing
displays in their current locations utilising
the existing brackets. The existing displays
have been in place for 15 years with no
incidents.
This deviation from RGS relates to
The existing waiting shelter at the named
horizontal clearance between the platform
station is within 2500 mm of the platform
edge(s) and proposed new waiting shelter at edge(s). The existing shelter is 1. 82 m
the station listed below: Trefforest Estate, (upside) from the platform edge and 2. 08
TRE CAM 09m 53ch. Office of Rail and
m (downside) from the platform edge. The
Road (ORR) Passenger Figures 227,933.
existing shelter is 1. 62 m in width,
Arriva Trains Wales / Network Rail is
measured from the outside of each post and
proposing to replace the existing waiting
excluding any overhang from the roof. The
shelter. Site constraints do not allow for the proposed new shelter is 1. 60 m in width,
installation of the new proposed shelters to measured from the outside of each post and
achieve the RGS.
excluding any overhang from the roof; the
overhang of the roof is 0. 20 m to both
sides measured 2. 50 m above platform
level. The overhang of the proposed roof is
not allowed for in the calculation of the
setback from the platform edge as it
achieves RGS No. GI/RT7016 Clause 8. 1.
1 b) issue five, Platform Headroom.
The height of the platform canopies is too
low to achieve the 2500 mm minimum
height.
09/12/2015
N/A
13/10/2015
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
The new style shelter is a product in the
11/12/2015
latest range of high quality vandal resistant
waiting shelters. The shelters offer no
visible fixings, seating, high efficiency
internal LED lighting system, concealed
drainage and modular glazing. The existing
shelter, which has reduced horizontal
offsets from the edge of platform(s) at 1. 82
m on the Up and 2. 08 m on the down has
been in place for a number of years and no
operational issues with regards to their
proximity to the platform edge has come to
light. The existing shelter has no internal
lighting or Close Circuit Television (CCTV)
provision and a mix of solid window or
missing panels. Cross-sections illustrating
the existing and proposed arrangement for
distances from the edge of the platform are
shown below.
N/A
07/08/2015
Arriva Trains Wales
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
Thameslink Class 700 units.
Brake demand less than 59 seconds - the
21/01/2016
behaviour of the train meets the stated
intent of the 59 second requirement. It is
therefore considered that there is no safety
impact of this non-compliance. Putting the
train into shunt (SH) mode via the DMI and
then deactivating shunt mode - This
scenario will not be possible when the Class
700 enters service in the UK. Siemens
have inhibited the selection of shunt mode
on the ETCS DMI when ETCS operates in
Level NTC. Consequently, the driver will
not be able to select level SH under any
circumstances. Setting the national value
of the maximum speed attainable in SH
mode to zero from Thameslink provides
additional protection to prevent a train
moving in this state. It is considered that
there is no safety implication from this.
Putting the train into another Level, I. e.
Level 2 and then back into Level NTC Drivers have not been told during their
training of this phenomenon. The risk of a
driver identifying this by chance as a means
of circumnavigating the 59 second timeout
following a TPWS brake demand is very
low. If a driver had an intricate
understanding of the system and used this
as a method of bypassing the timeout, it
The temporary deviation is required to allow 09/02/2016
the SWL / ES to take the block on behalf of
the OTM driver as part of the trials of the
HOBC Protection Zone procedure. Once
these trials have been successfully
completed, the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames. With final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. The
application will support the operation of
operation can be found in the Safe Efficient
Access detailed procedure. The procedure
has been designed around one person
being in charge of setting up all Safe
Systems of Work (SSoW) for all staff
working within the HOBC Protection Zone.
The present clause allows only the driver to
get the block of an adjacent line. The
alteration of the clause would remove the
requirement for the driver to take a line
blockage of the adjacent line and increase
the likelihood of the block being granted in
an efficient manner - co-ordinated with
other work. The project aim is to improve
track worker safety by removing the need
N/A
09/11/2015
Govia Thameslink Railway
Limited
Control Command and
Signalling
26/11/2015
Current
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
Leicester station: Platform 1, Qty 3 x CIS
displays; LEI-NTI-001,002 and 003
(2405mm to underside); Platform 2, Qty 3 x
CIS displays; LEI-NTI-004,005 and 006
(2335mm to underside); Platform 3, Qty 3 x
CIS displays; LEI-NTI-007,008 and 009
(2310mm to underside).
Testing of the class 700 fleet has revealed a
number of scenarios in which it is possible
to: have a TPWS or AWS triggered brake
application which lasts for less than 59
seconds reset a TPWS or AWS triggered
brake application by means other than
those specified in the standard. These
circumstances arise due to the interface
requirements between the ETCS and Class
B systems specified in the Command
Control and Signalling Technical
Specifications for Interoperability (CCS
TSI). The train implements baseline 3. 3. 0.
When the train transitions from ETCS mode
SN to another ETCS mode, the TSI requires
that the Class B system is reset. Three
scenarios have been identified where this is
possible. Putting the train into shunt mode
(SH) in level NTC; Selecting another ETCS
level, then reselecting level NTC;
Deactivating the cab and reactivating the
cab using the master switch. To comply
with the RGS requirement, the CCS TSI
(2012/88/EU and 2012/696/EU), Annex A,
Table A2, line 4 would need to be modified,
see Union of Signalling Industry (UNISIG)
Subset-026, chapter 4. 6. 2. The hazard
analyses for ETCS modes performed by
UNISIG and European Railway Agency
Clause 46 specifies that the driver of a train
can ask the signaller to stop trains on any
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will be adjacent line which would otherwise put the
restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
driver's personal safety in danger. The
single and double track lines in track circuit occasions that are listed for doing this
block areas that do not have axle counters, include when an On-Track Machine (OTM)
level crossings or ground frames.
driver requires to check working equipment
is correctly positioned before or after an
OTM carries out work. The 'Safe and
Efficient Access' project believes that the
person setting up the safe systems of work
at the site should be the Safe Works Leader
/ Engineering Supervisor. The trials will be
controlled and managed to a strict and risk
assessed methodology by the HOBC
Services project. Each location will have
their own trial team that will run the day-today trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. The project believes that only
having one person setting up safe systems
of work for the HOBC Protection Zone
procedure will remove the possibility of
confusion and incident by restricting the
communications to the signaller and the On
Train Manager only.
Page29
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
GERT8000-HB12
Five
3 and 10
Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) or 15-131-DEV
safe work leader (SWL) in a possession
Nature and Degree
The project requires the addition of the TRS
Protection Zone as trials to take reason why
a line should be considered to be blocked to
allow place to evaluate the procedure.
These trials will be controlled and managed
to a strict and risk assessed methodology
by the TRS Services project. Each location
will have their own trial team that will run
the day to day trialling whilst reporting into
the main project team. . With
supplementary protection in place the OnTrack Machine (OTM) is fully protected from
coming into contact with other traffic on that
line.
To allow trials of the TRS Protection Zone
12/02/2016
procedure to go ahead a deviation is
required against clauses 3 and 10 to allow a
ES/SWL to be identified within TRS
Protection Zone and for them to be used to
setup a safe system of work. Once the
trials have been successfully completed, the
project will be looking to increase the scope
of the trials to include multiple line
complexities and level crossings and
ground frames. With final trials being
looked at for axle counter areas and
including DC electrified areas. The deviation
will support the trial of the TRS Protection
Zone procedure. Network Rail would like to
trial a new form of Protection Zone of the
line that allows the operation of multiple ontrack machines working on a line not under
possession, the method of operation can be
found in the Safe and Efficient Access - a
proposal (presentation) . The Safe and
Efficient Access Safety Case The SEA risk
assessment The SEA detailed procedure
The HO protection form The SEA trial
record sheet The various SEA briefing
documents.
GMRT2100
Five
Part 2 - All clauses; Part 3 - Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
3.3.2 and 3.3.3.1; Part 4 All clauses; Part 5 - 5.3.1.4,
5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4;
Clause 5.4.2 Part 6 - 6.1.2,
6.2.4, 6.9.1.2, 6.5 and 6.6;
Part 7 - All clauses, plus
Clauses 5.2.3 and 9.2 for
aerodynamics.
15-038-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Structural
Performance (Issue 3).
three-car tram-train Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs) for operation between Meadowhall
South (on the Sheffield tramway),
Rotherham Central and a new turn-back
platform at Parkgate. Unit numbers:
99001 - 99007; 99101 - 99107; 99201 99207.
GERT8000-S5
Six
1.1
authority (MA)
15-124-DEV
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection
Zone Trials.
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will be
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
GIRT7033
Three
2.2.1.1
Lineside Signs
15-098-DEV
Proposed new sign dimensions control the
risks for the line MRDs, applicable to the
Thameslink core area.
GCRT5021
Four
2.8.2.1
Track System Requirements
15-136-DEV
Windsor branch siding track gradient.
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Lead SC
Deviation Status
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
The tram-trains are being built to an existing The tram-train is similar to designs of tram- 16/10/2015
design that is based on compliance with
trains vehicles in Germany. More details
European standards, in particular EN 12663- are provided in Appendix A.
1, EN 15227, EN 13749, EN 15152 and EN
14752.
N/A
27/04/2015
Rolling Stock
22/05/2015
Current
Requirement 1. 1 relates to the occasions
when signals can be passed at danger or an
end of authority (EOA) to be passed without
a movement authority (MA). A temporary
deviation is required to add an High Output
Ballast Cleaner (HOBC) Protection Zone to
the list in sub clause 9 to allow a On-Track
Machine (OTM) to pass a signal at danger
towards a HOBC Protection Zone. These
trials will be controlled and managed to a
strict and risk assessed methodology by the
HOBC Services project. Each location will
have there own trial team that will run the
day to day trialling whilst reporting into the
main project team. With supplementary
protection in place the OTM is fully
protected from coming into contact with
other traffic on that line.
The application is sought to carry out initial 09/02/2016
trials that will be limited to single and
double track lines in track circuit block
crossings or ground frames in non-DC
electrified areas. Once these trials have
been successfully completed the project will
be looking to increase the scope of the trials
to include multiple line complexities and
level crossings and ground frames. With
final trials being looked at for axle counter
areas and including DC electrified areas.
Whilst the HOBC Protection Zone is in
place and there is a requirement to have a
ZKL Track Circuit Operating Device (TCOD)
in place when the HOBC Protection Zone is
granted and therefore the signal protecting
will be held at danger, this request is to
allow additional OTMs into the HOBC
Protection Zone and authority for the
Signaller to grant the movement in
accordance with the conditions in S5. The
application will support the trial of the
HOBC Protection Zone procedure. Network
Rail would like to trial a new form of
Protection Zone of the line that allows the
operation of multiple on-track machines
working on a line not under possession, the
method of operation can be found in the
The proposed variation will be applicable to It is impracticable to use the signs with the The proposed new sign dimensions control 14/04/2016
the Thameslink core (tunnel) area only with dimensions prescribed in the Railway Group the risks for the line Minimum Reading
limited clearances. The non-standard
Standard within the core Thameslink route Distances (MRDs) required. BS EN 16494:
dimensions of the signs proposed: AB02, due to limited clearances in the tunnel. It is 2015 permits variation in size for the
AB03, AB07, AC11. Specific detail on the not practicable to achieve compliance as it European Train Control System (ETCS)
geographic scope is contained in the
would require extensive civil engineering
Block Marker (AB08) and other European
document "Supporting Information"
works to provide the necessary additional
Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)
attached to the application. This deviation
clearance within the core (tunnel) area.
signs. This standard states: "In the case
applies only to the Thameslink 'core'
of low line speeds and/or structure gauge
(tunnel) area with limited clearances and
constraints, it is permissible to use signs
when supported by a signal sighting
within the scope of this standard with height
committee assessment. .
and width less than 500 mm, provided that
the dimensions are proportionally the same
as in Table 3. Where these signs are used,
readability shall be optimized. " Off-site
trials have been conducted and from these
it has been concluded that the smaller signs
are fit for purpose. The risk arising from
their smaller size is negligible. Two reports
for the off-site trials are attached with the
application. Signal Sighting assessment
has taken place, and the visibility of these
signs will be briefed and included in driver
training packs (as part of route learning).
The results of the assessment in the form a
report. Sample sign sighting forms and the
report are attached with the application.
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
N/A
08/10/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
29/10/2015
Current
The Slough Side of Bath Road Overbridge As part of the route funded relock/recontrol,
at 18m 1705yds (CH1040550). ELR - WIN Crossrail West Outer are amending the
Mileage - 18m 1460yds to 18m 1705yds
existing track layout on the Windsor Branch
near Slough station. A key component of
these works is removing the existing
connection between the East Loop and the
Windsor Branch (328a/b pts) and
converting the East Loop into a cripple
siding which will terminate on the Slough
Side of Bath Road Overbridge at 18m
1705yds (CH1040550). The existing East
Loop falls at an average of 1 in 158 towards
Windsor (away from the main line) over the
215 m in front of the proposed buffer
position. Following the proposed track
renewal works the Cripple siding will fall at
an average of 1 in 161. 527 from the newly
installed 8313 pts to the new buffer. The
specification for the proposed works
requires the Windsor Branch to be lowered
under Bath Road Overbridge sufficiently
that the resultant clearances provide for
future electrification. This fixed point at
18m 1740yds along with the existing
Switches and Crossings (SandC) at 18m
1340yds severely restrict the ability to make
any meaningful difference to the vertical
alignment of the East Loop meaning
compliance cannot be achieved. Standard
N/A
09/12/2015
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/01/2016
Current
The risk assessment supporting this
15/02/2016
application has identified the following
controls and mitigation: The facility will
only be used for turnback moves, when the
trains will be occupied by drivers, or for
temporary stabling of failed units so will be
used infrequently. The installed buffer stop
has been risk assessed in line with
GCRT5033 and has been specified
according to the rolling stock that will be
located in the siding and will have
countdown markers and a red 'stop' light.
Stabled, crippled trains will be located close
to the buffer stop so momentum towards
the buffer stop will be reduced. The fall
within the siding is away from the
connection with the branch through line and
is therefore away from operational traffic.
Alignment of the siding is parallel to the
branch line I. e. not towards the running
lines Bridge structure sits beyond extended
wing walls which retain a heavily vegetated
embankment; any train run through would
impact this feature and not the bridge
structure itself - as indicated in the buffer
stop risk assessment.
Page30
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GIRT7016
Five
11.1.4
and Trains
15-105-DEV
Charing Cross Station - Platforms 1-6
(uncovered sections only).
Charing Cross Station - Platforms 1-6
(uncovered sections only) ELR: XTD.
Mileage from 0m 4ch to the country ramp
ends. Charing Cross station has six
existing platforms, which are split
approximately at 0m 4ch) between a
covered and uncovered sections.
GMRT2044
Four
5.4.2
15-079-DEV
Deterrent feature of the emergency brake.
GERT8000-TS1
Ten
13.2.1
15-117-DEV
GERT8000-TW7
Six
1.1, 1.2
15-129-DEV
GERT8000-HB7
Five
4.4
(COSS)
15-130-DEV
Nature and Degree
Charing Cross station has six existing
platforms, which are split (approximately at
0m 4ch) between a covered and uncovered
area. The platform in the uncovered area is
supported by a steel trestle structure which
rests on a trapezoidal steel trough deck. It
is understood that the current bridge deck
and platforms were installed in the early
1970s. The deck and trestle legs are
exhibiting severe corrosion in places. An
interim solution comprising a temporary
lightweight proprietary `Titan' metalwork
structure between the existing platform and
steel bridge deck, to provide additional
support to the platforms has been installed
since December 2013 and maintained
since. The original temporary deviation
(reference number 13/235/DEV) to allow
this installation to proceed was approved in
December 2013 with the current temporary
deviation (reference number 14/074/DEV)
expiring in January 2016. The deviation
was originally approved with the proviso
that a firm programme to reinstate
compliant platforms would be achieved;
however, RAM Sponsor personnel changes,
access restrictions and project
development, design and delivery costs
have prohibited works to progress. The
Hitachi Class 800/801/ 802 vehicles, to be Trains may be delayed and drivers may be
used on Great Western and East Coast
less willing to commence an emergency
services. This deviation is for a project
brake application until they are sure that
requiring authorisation for placing in service such an application is required. Currently,
no deterrent is fitted to the High Speed
Regulations 2011.
Train (HST) 125 fleets.
This clause allows a Safe Work Leader
(SWL) / Controller of Site Safety (COSS) /
Network Rail infrastructure.
Protection Controller (PC) to block the line
for staff to work on a line blocked to all
movements expect those recognised to
work within the Line Blockage. A temporary
deviation is sought to enable the SWL /
Controller of Site Safety (ES) to formally
protect both the Controller of Site Safety
(HOBC) train and staff on a line. This
would allow just the ES / SWL to set up
safe systems of work in the most efficient
manner at the site, therefore removing
possible confusion.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
01/12/2018
21/10/2015
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
16/10/2015
N/A
08/09/2015
Hitachi Rail Europe Ltd
Rolling Stock
01/10/2015
Current
09/02/2016
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
A local risk assessment has been jointly
09/12/2015
undertaken by Infrastructure Project and
Managed Stations to evaluate the possible
risks associated with deviation from Clause
11. 1. 4 and to consider possible additional
controls to mitigate those risks. The output
from further risk assessment will follow
following stakeholder HAZID / HAZOP
meeting scheduled 23/10/2015. The risks
are considered Tolerable. This will be
subject to records of events arising since
the original deviation was imposed and the
findings of the proposed HAZID / HAZOP
scheduled by the SE MFF delivery project
with Asset team, station management and
Train Operating Company (TOC)
stakeholder representatives initially for
23/10/2015. The station is a terminal
station with the linespeed adjacent to these
platforms being 10-15 mph controlled by
Train Protection Warning System (TPWS).
No foreseen impact on this point. TSI
requirement has been defined in order to
meet the essential requirement 2. 4. 1
(Rolling Stock/Safety) and 2. 4. 3 (Technical
compatibility) of the Interoperability
Directive (2008/57/EC).
The temporary deviation is required to allow
Zone Trials.
an SWL or ES to request a line to be
blocked to create a protection zone for a
high output ballast cleaner (HOBC) to work,
with the HOBC standing at an agreed
location, and for a tamper to enter the
blocked line subsequently without using any
other formal blockages as laid down in 13.
2 of TS1. The arrangements to be applied,
including documentation would be as set
out in the documentation issued for the
trials of the arrangements. The Protection
Zone would during the trial become a
recognised way of blocking the line in
conjunction with all other temporary
deviations associated with this application.
Once these trials have been successfully
has been designed around the SWL or ES
This clause documents the ten occasions
So the temporary deviation is to allow trials
when a signaller may authorise the driver to of the TRS Protection Zone procedure by
make wrong direction movement for which allowing the On-Track Machine (OTM)
a signal is not provided. A temporary
authorised to make wrong direction
deviation is required to allow wrong
movements for which no signal is provided
direction movements to be authorised as
as required, as well as asking for the Oncounters, level crossings or ground frames. part of this proposed method of work as
Train Manager to be added to the list of
none of the ten existing circumstances
people who can authorise the OTM driver to
apply. The trials will be controlled and
make a wrong direction movement. Once
managed to a strict and risk assessed
the trials have been successfully completed,
methodology by the TRS Services project. the project will be looking to increase the
Each location will have their own trial team scope of the trials to include multiple line
that will run the day to day trialling whilst
reporting into the main project team. With ground frames, with final trials being looked
supplementary protection in place, the OTM at for axle counter areas and including DC
is fully protected from coming into contact
electrified areas. The application will
support the operation of Multiple on-track
machines working on a line not under
found in the application and will support the
trial of the TRS Protection Zone procedure.
Network Rail would like to trial a new form
of Protection Zone of the line that allows the
Safe and Efficient Access - a proposal
(presentation). The Safe and Efficient
Access Safety Case The SEA risk
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS)
Once the trials have been successfully
and including DC electrified areas The
application will support the continuing trial
of the TRS Protection Zone procedure.
documents.
Page31
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0045
Four
5.2.3.1
Signals
15-111-DEV
Location: Abbotswood Junction - signal BA
3658.
Junction signal BA 3658, ELR: BAG2,
Abbotswood Junction. Mileage: 69 miles.
The only practicable and compliant solution
is to provide an approach release from red
control on BA3658 (the replacement for
G59), but this is considered operationally
restrictive and a worsening of the current
arrangement that train drivers are
accustomed to. It may also create a Signal
Passed at Danger (SPAD) risk due to driver
anticipation.
N/A
29/10/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/11/2015
Current
GERT8000-OTM
Seven
4.1, 4.2
15-123-DEV
Zone Trials.
12/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
GKRT0045
Four
5.2.3.1
Signals
15-097-DEV
Swindon Area Signalling Renewal: Swindon The proposed variation will be applicable to
Station Flashing Aspect Sequences (Down the Swindon Area Signalling Renewal
Direction).
(SASR): Swindon Station Flashing Aspect
Sequences (Down Direction). At the
eastern approach to Swindon Station,
flashing yellow aspect sequences from the
Down Main SW1155 signal to Platform 1
SW1209 signal. Scheme Plan No. 11-GW009/02 Version A. 6 "Swindon Station Area"
refers.
Clause 4. 1 stipulates that the work will not
require wrong direction movements (except
as described for the rail grinding train), the
on-track machine (High Output Ballast
Cleaner (HOBC) and On-Track Machine
(OTM)) that will be trialled as part of the
HOBC Protection Zone procedure
(Tampers) need to make at least 2-3 wrong
direction movements as part of their normal
method of operation. The clause also
stipulates that a machine may so work if
signalled as an Engineering train requiring
to stop in section, but not on a Track Circuit
Block (TCB) lines or where intermediate
block signals are provided. Clause 4. 2
stipulates that the driver must tell the
signaller that the OTM will be working
outside of a possession as part of the trials
of the HOBC Protection Zone procedure
there is not requirement for the driver to do
this as the signaller will be made aware by
the published Weekly Operating Notice
(WON) and the On-Train Manager. The
trials will be controlled and managed to a
strict and risk assessed methodology by the
HOBC Services project. Each location will
have their own trial team that will run the
day to day trialling whilst reporting into the
main project team. With supplementary
Junction method 2 Flashing Yellow Aspect
Sequence requires that, for a permissible
speed approaching the diverging junction in
the range 80 mph - 125 mph, the
permissible speed at the point of divergence
should be 40 mph or greater. Compliance
to the RGS requirement would restrict the
approach to Platform 1 to MAR at SW1175
signal, with performance impact on the
planned timetable services and the
approach would be inconsistent with the
existing arrangements to Platform 3 from
SW1155; this would result in a less
drivable layout from train operator's
perspective. The permissible speed at the
point of divergence (30 mph) is 10 mph
below the limit required by the standard.
The WMSR Signalling Compliance
Approach "Principle of Re-lock and Recontrol" applies (CCMS Reference
10455124). Additionally, the signals
concerned enjoy good sighting of their
cautionary aspects and the permissible
speed profile decreases on approach to the
station. The Advance Warning Indicator
(AWI) for the divergence previously sighted
at braking distance is to be repositioned at
the first caution signal.
As part of the Bromsgrove Corridor
13/01/2016
Resignalling project, there is a requirement
to renew the signalling between Barnt
Green and Ashchurch. Abbotswood
junction is currently a 30 mph turnout on a
90 mph section of line. The existing threeaspect junction signal G59 has a single
flashing yellow in rear and operations have
requested that this is retained as part of the
resignalling to ensure that delays are not
introduced by a more restrictive approach
control. The non-compliance is not
considered to be particularly severe and has
precedents on the network where existing
non-compliant arrangements have been
perpetuated at Operations and Train
Operating Companies (TOCs) request. The
signalling arrangement provides adequate
clear and unambiguous routing information
for the driver at the earliest opportunity so
that he can control the speed of the train
safely. The Train Protection and Warning
System (TPWS) fitment for BA3658 is fully
effective to 6%g. Flashing yellow aspect
sequence reduced the likelihood of a SPAD
due to non-provision of approach release
from red the signal will normally be off when
the diverging route is set rather than at red.
There is only 10 mph difference between
12/02/2016
(presentation): The Safe and Efficient
Access Safety Case. The SEA risk
assessment. The SEA detailed procedure.
The HO protection form. The SEA trial
record sheet. The various SEA briefing
documents.
At Swindon Station, a flashing yellow
18/12/2015
aspect sequence from the Down Main into
Platform 3 has existed for many years; it
has the property that the permissible speed
approaching the diverging junction is 40/85
mph and the permissible speed at the point
of divergence is 30 mph. The alternative
provision to additionally provide MAY-FA for
approach to Platform 1 allows greater
efficiency in the use of Swindon Station.
Although the MAY-FA facility to Platform 3
was provided at a time when most Down
Trains serving Swindon used Platform 3 (or
less commonly Platform 1) it is understood
that the Train Operating Companies (TOCs)
would like to see the present feature
retained, notably for train services from
London to Cheltenham. All the Swindon
area signals relocked by the SASR project
are predicted to be replaced with an ERTMS
L2 system in the future.
N/A
09/10/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
29/10/2015
Current
GIRT7016
Five
8.1.1
and Trains
15-135-DEV
City Thameslink Station, Platforms 1 and
Platform 2Reduced headroom to CIS
screens.
The proposed headroom clearances of 2300 27/01/2016
mm would not cause any safety issues
related to train movements, alighting
between train and platform or public safety
at this station. A signal sighting review has
confirmed that the placement of the six
number banks of TFT displays on Platforms
1 and 2 has no impact to the current
operational railway.
N/A
24/11/2015
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/01/2016
Current
City Thameslink, Platforms 1 and Platform
2 Design Type: Infotec TR Series TFT
displays TR32P. lRefer to attached
schedule which shows the proposed CIS
Display offsets.
At City Thameslink Station, the Thameslink
Programme shall be installing six number
banks of Customer Information System
(CIS) displays on both platforms (platforms
1 and 2), each bank consisting of four
number 32" Thin Film Transistor (TFT)
displays. The N423 CIS enhancements
project has a requirement to show
enhanced train service information
appropriate for a 24 trains per hour (tph)
timetable; to meet this requirement the
project need to replace the existing Infotec
P2014 displays as these can only display
details of the next four trains at each
platform which is appropriate for the current
lower frequency train service but not for 24
tph. The project is proposing to install 32"
TFT displays which will be able to show
details of the next eight trains at each
platform to meet the requirements to show
enhanced train service information for a 24
tph train service. The CIS displays will also
show a train pictogram to show where to
wait and train facilities so that, for example,
PRMs can board the train in the correct
location reducing dwell time. A signal
sighting review has confirmed that the
placement of the six number banks of TFT
displays on Platforms 1 and 2 has no
Page32
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GERT8073
Three
3.1.2.3
Requirements for the Application of
Standard Vehicle Gauges
15-104-DEV
Clarification of the expression 'is included in The scope of the deviation is to clarify how Historically, the Carkind descriptors used in
the Rolling Stock Library' in clause 3.1.2.3 Clause 3. 1. 2. 3 can be applied, particularly the Rolling Stock Library to describe
of GERT8073 Issue 3
in light of changes in the wagon TSI.
different vehicle types do not necessarily
reliably describe particular vehicle designs.
One wagon Carkind descriptor can, for
instance, include vehicles with different
bogie types or different physical attributes.
Similarly, wagons that may have very
similar characteristics from a gauging point
of view may have been allocated different
Carkinds. Furthermore, due to Technical
Specification for Interoperability (TSI) and
other changing standards requirements,
new wagons are likely to differ in detail and
Carkind from their similar predecessors
when, from a gauging perspective, their
physical characteristics may be essentially
identical or substantively similar to vehicles
that have been in successful operational
service for many years. In this situation,
the expression ìs included in The Rolling
Stock Library in R2' is considered to be
inadequately precise to avoid the possibility
of misinterpretation of its intent with a likely
consequential requirement for unintended
overly onerous design and acceptance
processes and unnecessary contract risk.
GERT8000-TS11
Two
1.5
Failure of, or work on, signalling equipment - 15-116-DEV
signallers' regulations
GERT8000-TW5
Six
4.4, 4.5, 22.2, 22.3
equipment
GMRT2400
Five
2.4.1.1
GKRT0192
Two
2.9.3.1 b)
Lead SC
Deviation Status
N/A
21/10/2015
Private Wagon Federation
Rolling Stock
04/12/2015
Current
Normally, an RT3187 form is completed
12/02/2016
when any signalling equipment is
disconnected outside of a Line Blockage or
T3 Possession or if affects the normal
passage of trains or needs the signallers
cooperation or will affect the normal
operation of the equipment. Whilst the
HOBC Protection Zone is in place, some
equipment may be disconnected on the line
affected and will be reconnected prior to the
HOBC Protection Zone being given up. The
working on a line not under possession.
The method of operation can be found in
the Safe and Efficient Access - a proposal
documents.
A temporary deviation is required to allow
12/02/2016
Automatic Warning System (AWS) to be
isolated on an OTM when the OTM is in
working mode on a line not under a T3
possession. These clauses relate to train
crossings and ground frames, with final
borne defective/isolated Automatic Warning trials being looked at for axle counter areas
counters, level crossings or ground frames. System and Track Circuit Actuators. These and including DC electrified areas. going
clauses instruct the driver that the signaller trials on London North Eastern (LNE) and
must be informed immediately of
Anglia which will continue but will include all
defective/isolated equipment and that
routes within Network Rail. The application
further movement must not be made until
will support the trial of the TRS Protection
authorised. The clauses go on to document Zone procedure. Network Rail would like to
what action must be taken before the train trial a new form of Protection Zone of the
can proceed. The project requests that the line that allows the operation of multiple onOn-Track Machine (OTM) driver does not
track machines working on a line not under
need to comply with these clauses as part
of the High Output TRS Protection Zone
trials. The trials will be controlled and
proposal (presentation). The Safe and
Efficient Access Safety Case The SEA risk
methodology by the TRS Services project. assessment The SEA detailed procedure
Each location will have their own trial team The HO protection form The SEA trial
reporting into the main project team. With documents.
supplementary protection in place, the OTM
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
Running Mode
Addition of drain at the base of the fuel
tank.
Plasser and Theurer have a large number of 07/01/2016
machines already certificated for operation
on Network Rail Infrastructure (compliant
with earlier issues of GMRT2400) and fitted
with drains at the base of the fuel tank.
There have been no problems with this
arrangement.
N/A
26/10/2015
Plasser UK Ltd
Rolling Stock
04/12/2015
Current
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
Hardstaffs User Work Crossings (UWC),
non-provision of level crossing position
indicators on East Midlands Control Centre
(EMCC) Mansfield Workstation.
Safety of the rail user and information
02/11/2015
provided to the user by the signaller when
they communicate by the phone is
increased due to the positive identity of the
level crossing on the workstation telephone
concentrator, provision of a laminated
diagram of the crossing positioned next to
the workstation position, a Special Box
Instruction detailing the procedure and
signals leading up to the level crossing, plus
local training and briefing. There will be a
residual risk that signallers will incorrectly
identify the positions of the trains despite
the information provided off of the
workstation screens, but this risk is
considered tolerable.
27/10/2016
18/09/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
01/10/2015
Current
15-128-DEV
15-084-DEV
Zone Trials.
Scope
Network Rail infrastructure. Trials will be
This deviation is for the following vehicle:
TOPS Number: DR74002 EVN: 99 70
9128 002-1.
Nature and Degree
It is considered that clarification of the
07/01/2016
intent of Clause 3. 1. 2. 3: will have no
deleterious effect on the safety of the
railway system, environmental protection or
health. It effectively carries forward the
requirement of Clause 2. 1. 2. 2 of the
superseded RGS GERT8073 Issue 2.
Many thousands of wagons have been
accepted for operation under this process
with no known detrimental safety
consequences. will not affect the
compatibility of the railway system now or
in the future. will avoid the risk of increased
unnecessary costs arising from unintended
overly onerous design and acceptance
processes and the introduction of a new and
unnecessary contract risk.
This clause relates to signalling equipment
being disconnected and when a form
RT3187 should be used. The project
requests that the RT3187 form is not used
during the High Output Ballast Cleaner
(HOBC) Protection Zone for the
disconnection of any equipment wholly
within the HOBC Protection Zone which is
outside of a Line Blockage or T3
Possession. If the disconnection continues
past the HOBC Protection Zone, then TS11
would need to be complied with.
The second sentence of the above clause
mandates 'All openings in the fuel tank shall
be above the maximum fuel level'. Without
a drain plug fitted to the fuel tank, there
would not be the facility to routinely remove
any condensation build-up. Due to the
weather conditions in the United Kingdom
and the working routines in which On-Track
Machines are operated throughout the
winter months, fuel tanks are highly
susceptible to condensation contamination.
The machine's fuel tank will quite often be
manually re-filled from a barrel, which
carries a high risk of water contamination.
There is a necessity to drain the water from
the tank to reduce the risk of damage to the
fuel system.
The deviation applies to Hardstaffs User
The Operations Risk Advisor and the Route
Worked Crossing (ELR RAC 133m 9ch)
Level Crossing Manager are providing an
and the control point Mansfield Workstation, enhancement at Hardstaffs User Worked
EMCC. It is not intended to provide an
Crossing through the provision of
identifying mark for the level crossing on the telephones. The project scope did not
control point Visual Display Unit (VDU)
include the requirement to update the
screen when telephones are commissioned signallers VDU control system and it is
there for use by the Authorised User.
proposed that the required update is
undertaken as part of a future project. The
cost of updating the Westcad screens to
show Hardstaffs UWC is 50,000 Pounds
Sterling, considerably more than the project
could afford and to undertake the change.
In becoming compliant, the level crossing
telephones would not be commissioned,
which continues the residual risk that users
of the crossing miscommunicate their
location to the signaller, and the signaller
therefore may authorise a crossing in an
unsafe situation leading to potential
collision between a train and a road vehicle.
Page33
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8000-HB12
Five
3, 10
Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) or 15-122-DEV
safe work leader (SWL) in a possession
Zone Trials.
The project requires the addition of the
HOBC Protection Zone as reason why a line
should be considered to be blocked to allow
trials to take place to evaluate the
procedure. The trials will be controlled and
methodology by the HOBC Services project.
Each location will have their own trial team
reporting into the main project team. With
To allow trials of the HOBC Protection Zone 09/02/2016
procedure to go ahead a non compliance is
required against clauses 3 and 10 to allow a
ES / SWL to be identified within HOBC
Protection Zone and for them to be used to
setup a safe system of work. Once these
trials have been successfully completed, the
project will be looking to increase the scope
of the trials to include multiple line
ground frames, with final trials being looked
at for axle counter areas and including DC
electrified areas. The application will
support the trial of the HOBC Protection
Zone procedure. Network Rail would like to
trial a new form of Protection Zone of the
line that allows the operation of multiple ontrack machines working on a line not under
proposal (presentation): The Safe and
Efficient Access Safety Case. The SEA risk
documents.
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
GIRT7016
Five
6.2.2 (a)
and Trains
The Island platform is between the down
27/01/2016
relief line and the up main line. The up
main platform is 125 mph through the
station and is only used during perturbation
or planned engineering works. There have
been 13 fatal incidents in the last 5 years, a
majority involving the person stepping onto
the line from a mainline platform. The flow
of pedestrians in peak hours prevents the
usual style of mid-platform fence being
used as it needs to be retractable to allow
passengers to flow around the building
when passengers numbers are high. The
fence will be retracted and gate opened on
any occasion when the main line platform is
in use and the platform is monitored by a
security guard as well as the station staff.
31/08/2018
24/11/2015
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/01/2016
Current
GMRT2130
Four
Part 2 - All clauses. Part 4 - Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
All clauses. Part 5 - 5.1.1
d). Part - 6.3.3.Part 7 7.1.6, 7.1.8 and 7.1.9.
15-039-DEV
See appendix A Issue 2.
18/12/2015
N/A
27/04/2015
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GIRT7016
Five
6.2.2
and Trains
15-103-DEV
Ealing Broadway Station - Island Platform 2 Ealing Broadway Station - Island Platform 2 This deviation will allow a retractable barrier
and 3 mid-platform fencing.
and 3.
to be fitted on the island platform between
the up main line and the down relief line at
Ealing Broadway. A current station building
is situated in middle of the island platform
which prevents the fence being placed 3000
mm from the line. The fence will be noncompliant for a short length adjacent to the
waiting room, with a minimum clearance of
2800 mm. The line Speeds are: Up Main
Platform 2 - 125 mph Down Relief Platform
3 - 90 mph. A retractable fence will be
between the bottom of the staircase and the
current waiting room in the middle of the
platform but this retracts into a nonoperational area and the 'do not pass this
point' sign will be moved to ensure this. Not
installing the fence is severely negating the
potential benefit of the current fencing
already installed at the London end of
Ealing Broadway as it still allows free
access to the main lines at the point at
which members of the public access the
platform. Given the location of Ealing
Broadway within the rail network and the
volume of services in the area which are
affected by fatalities at the station, the
consequences of not fencing the whole
length of the island platform will see the
Sheffield Tram-Train Fire Safety and
See appendix A Issue 2.
Evacuation Performance.
three-car tram-train EMUs: Unit numbers:
399201 - 399207; Vehicle numbers:
99001 - 99007,99101 - 99107, 99201 99207.
Finsbury Park Station - Platform 5/6 Finsbury Park Station is located on the
The platform at the proposed site of the new
particularly Platform 6 side.
East Coast Mainline at ECM1 @ 02mi
passenger lift, is supported off made ground
0902yd. The station - orientated north to
retained by brick viaduct structures running
south - is located in a triangle formed by the along the east and west boundaries of the
local highways: Stroud Green to the north, station. The made ground is circa 8-9 m in
running northwest-southeast; Station Place depth (from platform level), where the strata
to east, running north to south; and Seven is then formed from London clay. Within
Sisters to the south, running southwestthe fill, immediately below the site of the
northeast. The station is accessed from
passenger lift, are buried LUL crossstreet level and is constructed on a series of passageways constructed from either
brick viaducts, with the Network Rail
brickwork or cast segmental lining.
platforms located approximately 6 m above Immediately to the east of the proposed lift
street level. The crown of the LUL running is a north-south running passageway known
tunnels are approximately 2 m below street as the Connect Equipment Room (CER),
level are buried within the London clay
therefore constraining the proposed lift
strata, with the crowns the lower band of the location from being designed further
made ground. Finsbury Park consists of
centrally within the platform.
8no platforms, formed by 4no island
platforms (from east to west - Platforms
1/2, 3/4, 5/6, 7/8), with a redundant
platform, known as the Milkdock, to the
west of the site. This derogation relates
only to Platform 5/6 - particularly Platform 6
side.
N/A
20/10/2015
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
GIRT7033
Three
2.1.1
15-115-DEV
Based on the conservative approach as
09/12/2015
discussed above, the project has identified
the following mitigations and risk-reduction
mechanisms and therefore feels that the
derogation is a sound and sensible
approach: The linespeed of the Down Slow
1 is 35/55 mph, and trains passing on this
line all stop for Platform 7. Direct through
trains are very seldom. Therefore,
passengers should not congregate towards
the edge of Platform 6. Platform 6 side is
not used by the train operator, Govia
Thameslink Railway (GTR), and therefore
after consultation with the operator, the
reduction of the platform edge clearance is
agreeable. The derogation to reduce the
platform edge clearance to proposed 2183
mm, minimum 2100 mm would only be for
a total length of proposed 3900 mm,
maximum 4000 mm. . The total passenger
usage of the combined island Platform 5/6
is very low. Platform 5 side is used, but a
maximum of 3no trains arrive and depart
from this platform every hour, therefore
actual usage and footfall of the platform is
very low. The effective minimum platform
edge clearance from the proposed lift shaft
to Platform 5 side shall be 6890 mm,
therefore an oversized clearance on the
It is estimated that this process would allow 14/04/2016
10-20 minutes additional production time on
every High Output shift. This could equate
to an estimated 50,000 Pounds Sterling
increase in production in every shift. The
following risks have been identified: As the
possession would not be granted until the
train is at the FTAP, other train may
approach the signage. The risk is if the train
this have been assessed and mitigated.
(see FTAP Proposal documentation). From
the bow-tie risk assessment, FTAP will not
be applied 'near' a level crossing that has
not been closed or brought under local
control. 'Near' means: from at least 200 m
before the striking in point on the approach
to a level crossing. to at least 200 m plus
the length of train beyond the striking out
point after a level crossing.
31/12/2017
10/11/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/11/2015
Current
Certificate Number
15-134-DEV.
Flexible Train Arrival Point (FTAP) Trial
Extension.
National - All routes.
Current Group Standard requirements
mean that all trains about to enter a
possession have to be authorised to pass a
signal at danger. Further authorisation and
control is required to bring trains to a stand
within the possession to the exact work site.
This process requires unproductive time
(typically 20 minutes or more) during the
possession, which is at odds with the
requirement for Network Rail to become
more efficient at delivering work generally.
The current requirements therefore mean
the High Output trains are not being used to
best advantage.
Page34
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GERT8000-TW5
Six
6.1
Preparation and movement of trains Defective or isolated vehicles and on train
equipment
15-089-DEV
Class 185 six-car over-length station
operations.
Class 185 six-car over-length operations at:
Liverpool South Parkway Station;
Warrington Central Station; Widnes
Station; Any other station on routes where
the use of the facility is occasional and/or
limited to stations with low numbers of
passengers boarding and alighting [I. e.
meeting the requirements of B12. 1 of
08/059/NC].
GERT8000-TW1
Ten
46
Preparation and movement of trains
15-127-DEV
GMRT2473
Two
B12.1 and B12.2.2.
15-090-DEV
Class 185 six-car over-length station
operations.
Liverpool South Parkway and Widnes
Stations.
GKRT0045
Four
4.1.4.3 and Figure 2
Signals
15-139-DEV
Aldershot Junction North to Aldershot
station. Aspect sequence transition.
Aldershot Junction North to Aldershot
station. WK425 on the Down Acton Line.
Nature and Degree
Compliance in the medium to long term will
be as detailed in Section 9 above - Method
of elimination. None of those options can
be achieved in the short term. Complying in
the short term could therefore involve either:
Reducing the train length from six cars to
three. Demand is such that the service
would be so heavily loaded that passengers
would be left behind at stations. This would
increase the risk of staff, contractor and
passenger assaults and the likelihood of
incidents at the platform/train interface.
Vulnerable passengers would be particularly
at risk. It would also prevent the train crew
from being able to readily walk through the
train, increasing the potential consequences
if, for example, a passenger was taken ill on
the train or a train evacuation was required.
Retaining the train length as six cars but
removing all over-length calls. Almost all of
these stops are a passenger service
requirement of the franchise. Running two
separate three-car trains instead of one sixcar train. Even if additional train crew
resources could be provided, it is highly
unlikely that an additional path would be
available. The TransPennine Express
franchise operates on already congested
routes through busy hubs including Leeds,
This clause documents that the driver of a
train can ask the signaller to stop trains on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will be any adjacent line which would otherwise put
the driver's personal safety in danger. The
single and double track lines in track circuit occasions that are listed for doing this
block areas that do not have axle counters, include when an On-Track Machine (OTM)
driver requires to check working equipment
is correctly positioned before or after an
OTM carries out work. The 'Safe and
Efficient Access' project believes that the
person setting up the safe systems of work
at the site should be the Safe Works Leader
(SWL) / Engineering Supervisor (ES).
These trials will be controlled and managed
to a strict and risk assessed methodology
by the TRS Services project. Each location
will have their own trial team that will run
the day to day trialling whilst reporting into
the main project team. The project believes
that only having one person setting up safe
systems of work for the TRS Protection
Zone procedure will remove the possibility
of confusion and incident by restricting the
communications to the signaller and the On
Train Manager only.
GMRT2473 is also subject to a noncompliance pending standards change:
08/059/NC "Revisions to requirements
related to power-operated external doors"
authorised on 29/05/2008. This noncompliance already permits the use of a
manual Selective Door Opening (SDO)
system "on routes where the use of the
facility is occasional and/or limited to
stations with low numbers of passengers
boarding and alighting. " 08/059/NC
therefore covers most of the Transpennine
Express over-length operations, but
arguably not all. Six-car Class 185s stop
over-length at Liverpool South Parkway and
Widnes during the peak periods at times
when the passenger demand necessitates a
six-car train; this cannot then reasonably
be considered low numbers of passengers
and, depending on interpretation, is not
occasional either. Complying in the short
term could therefore involve either:
Reducing the train length from six cars to
three. Demand is such that the service
would be so heavily loaded that passengers
would be left behind at stations. This would
increase the risk of staff, contractor and
passenger assaults and the likelihood of
incidents at the platform/train interface. It
The Farnham area project has recontrolled
the existing infrastructure from Farnham,
Ash Vale and Aldershot SB to Woking Area
Signal Control (ASC). Signal WK421 is the
first signal in the four aspect sequence
followed by WK425. WK425 should have
been fitted with TPWS but has been
excluded, believed due to the signal being
an auto-signal, plated passable. The
linespeed approaching WK421 is 25 mph
on the Ash branch going over the junction at
15 mph. WK425 is clearly visible from at
least 600 metres, is on plain line and the
point of conflict is beyond two signal
sections ahead. The scheme plan shows
that all signals will be plated non passable
as part of the project re-control work. There
is no increase to line speed, change in
traffic pattern or aspect sequence that
increases the risk profile of the signal,
hence no action taken and no mitigation
measures are proposed on the scheme plan
or Signal Overrun Risk Assessment
(SORA). Perpetuating the existing
arrangement. There is minimal risk of rear
end collision because signal WK425 is a
plain line signal.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
The proposed alternative provisions will
permit the continued operation of six-car
trains over-length at several stations across
the current First TransPennine Express
(FTPE) network, using a manual SDO
system. The manual SDO system involves
the conductor manually locking passenger
doors out of use at the rear of the train,
along with suitable customer information.
GM/RT2473 is subject to a non-compliance
pending standards change: 08/059/NC
"Revisions to requirements related to poweroperated external doors" authorised on
29/05/2008. This non-compliance already
permits the use of a manual SDO system
"on routes where the use of the facility is
occasional and/or limited to stations with
low numbers of passengers boarding and
alighting. "As the Class 185 Method of
Work involves the conductor manually
locking individual doors out of use at the
rear of the train (as opposed to, for
example, manually operating a system from
a cab), the view of the Traffic Operation and
Management Standards Committee (TOM
SC) previously is that a deviation to TW5 is
also needed. Class 185 units comply with
the requirements of GM/RT2473 relating to
the external Emergency Access Device
The temporary deviation is required to allow
the SWL/ ES to take the block on behalf of
the OTM driver as part of the trials of the
Track Renewals System (TRS) Protection
Zone procedure. Once the trials have been
successfully completed, the project will be
looking to increase the scope of the trials to
include multiple line complexities and level
has been designed around one person
being in charge of setting up all safe
systems of work (SSoW) for all staff
working within the TRS Protection Zone.
The present clause allows only the driver to
get the block of an adjacent line. The
alteration of the clause would remove the
requirement for the driver to take a line
blockage of the adjacent line and increase
the likelihood of the block being granted in
an efficient manner - co-ordinated with
other work. The project aim is to improve
track worker safety by removing the need
The current manual SDO Method of Work
has worked successfully since April 2014.
Customer information is provided, although
it is noted that most customers on the peak
hour trains in question are regular
customers. The risk is further reduced on
morning peak trains as most passengers at
both stations are boarding rather than
alighting. An analysis of the method of
work at these stations shows that trains
have called over length at Liverpool South
Parkway in excess of 1800 occasions per
year, and at Widnes approximately 260
occasions per year. This is a total of well
over 2000 occasions per year at these two
stations. In the sixteen month period
between 01/04/2014 and 01/08/2015, only
one irregularity has been reported, which
resulted in the doors being released but did
not result in any injury, and that incident
was on an unplanned strengthening move
arranged by control on the day as opposed
to a planned operation. This data supports
the view that, considering the low likelihood
of an incident and the most likely severity,
the overall risk is low in line with our internal
Risk Assessment standard. A review of the
over length working Method of Work and
Risk Assessment was undertaken involving
Existing arrangement for TPWS fitment was
not fitted on national TPWS scheme. The
work undertaken by the project is making no
change to the risk profile of the signal
WK425, hence recommend a derogation is
provided to perpetuate this arrangement.
Existing infrastructure has been in service
since August 2013 with no recorded
incidence associated with the deviation.
20/11/2015
19/05/2018
28/09/2015
First/Keolis Transpennine
Ltd (trading as First
Transpennine Express)
Management
20/10/2015
Current
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
07/01/2016
19/05/2018
28/09/2015
First/Keolis Transpennine
Ltd (trading as First
Transpennine Express)
Rolling Stock
04/12/2015
Current
26/05/2016
N/A
18/12/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
12/05/2016
Current
Page35
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GCRT5212
One
G2, G4.1
Clearances
15-108-DEV
Lower Sector Structure Gauge - Raised
Check Rails for Tram-Train.
2m61ch (Tinsley Chord turn out) to
5m59ch (Parkgate turn out), approximately
3 miles. This includes 9 point ends:
Tinsley North Junction 2m61chNew turnout
305 pts Tinsley East: 2m79ch2 x existing
turnouts 302 and 301B pts Rotherham:
4m40chExisting crossover 4301
A+BExisting turnout 4300 ptsParkgate
turnout: 5m59chNew crossover 4002
A+BNew turnout 4000 pts. Not
interoperable.
It is not possibly to comply with the gauge
requirements and achieve a technically
compatible solution. Tram-Train vehicles
which have wheels compatible with highway
based tram-type track, have a narrower
flange, and are not compatible with
standard railway check rails. An alternative
design of check rail has been developed to
interact with the Tram Train wheels at a
higher point. This is needed to maintain
their checking function whilst maintaining
the flangeway clearance for conventional
rolling stock wheels. To achieve a check
rail design which will perform its function, it
must exceed the standard lower sector
structure gauge. See RGS deviation and
associated documents attached for risk
justification argument.
See RGS deviation and associated
18/12/2015
documents attached for risk assessment.
The clearance is affected and changes from
standard clearance to special reduced
clearance. The SandC tamper would be
capable of operating over the raised check
rail, including in tamping mode.
N/A
26/10/2015
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
GCRT5212
One
vehicles.
Clearances
15-071-DEV
Amendment to deviation 14/174/DEV
against GC/RT5212 Issue 1 for trialling of
platform gap fillers on Heathrow Central
Terminal Area (CTA) Platforms 1 and 2,
Terminal 4 (T4) Platforms 1 and 2 and
Terminal 5 (T5) Platforms 3 and 4.
clearance) category. The current platforms
requirements. In every platform (including
T5 Platform 4 before June 2014), there
have been instances of passengers,
especially those with a small foot size,
stepping between the platform and the
Class 332 and Class 360/2 step plate and
getting their foot/leg trapped.
passenger safety on T4 Platforms 1 and 2
and T5 Platforms 3 (in addition to T5
Platform 4 and CTA Platforms 1 and 2 as
already covered in other deviations).
Maintain acceptable train / platform
clearances, as demonstrated in the trials
ongoing on Heathrow T5 Platform 4, whilst
not affecting technical compatibility of the
railway system through the reduction in
normal clearance arrangements. The gap
fillers can be removed if railway
requirements change in the future, or if the
trial proves to be unsuccessful. Have no
effect on service performance. Have no
direct impact on environment. Supporting
documentation attached to this report
discusses the details including the risk
assessment.
31/01/2017
14/08/2015
Heathrow Airport Limited on Infrastructure
behalf of, Heathrow Express
Limited
09/09/2015
Current
GMRT2149
Three
B10.1
the Size of Railway Vehicle
15-058-DEV
Class 700 (Thameslink EMU) Pantograph
Sway.
Deviation 14/174/DEV was granted to allow
the trialling of platform gap fillers on CTA
Platforms 1 and 2 until the 15/01/2017. The
amendment that is being sought under the
current submission is to Deviation
14/174/DEV. It seeks to bring all HEx
platform gap filler trials, the ones ongoing
on T5 Platform 4 and those proposed at
CTA, as well as the newly proposed trials
for T4 Platforms 1 and 2 and T3 Platform 5,
under 14/174/DEV with a synchronised
finish date of all trials in January 2017.
"Supporting Document 1" attached to this
deviation amendment gives further details.
The impact of the gap filler installation is to
reduce nominal clearance between vehicles
and the infrastructure from normal
clearance to 25 mm-50 mm (I. e. reduced
such flexible components, and deviation is
conducted up till 31/01/2017 to allow for
sufficient trial time and data gathering to
demonstrate that the gap filler achieves a
safety benefit and the installation is robust
Class 700 'Thameslink EMU' and all its
subclasses. This deviation is for a project
Regulations 2011.
Class 700 fully complies with sub-clause a).
Class 700 fully complies with sub-clause b)
for a wind speed up to 26 m/s and cant
deficiency of 150 mm or wind speeds up to
35 m/s and cant deficiency of 65 mm.
Class 700 does not fulfil the area of 26 m/s
to 35 m/s at cant deficiency of 150 mm and
maximum speed.
The deviation has no impact on the train
18/09/2015
design as the train is designed in its safest
way. The changed approach considers the
basics of the new draft standard as laid out
in T942. The report T942 is the basis for
GM/RT2173 on panto sway; we've worked
to the same principles and the same goal
but being a bit more conservative. We've
also assessed the 35 m/s curves from the
report which are not incorporated in
GM/RT2173. Regarding Figure E. 2 of the
new draft standard, we have an additional
safety margin as we meet the pantograph
sway requirement +190 mm at cant
deficiency 150 mm and 160 kph not only for
maximum wind speed of 22 m/s but also for
26 m/s. Discussions have been held with
the Notified Body (NoBo), and they confirm
that the methodology in T942 (which they
also considered to be valid) has been
correctly applied by Siemens.
N/A
09/07/2015
Limited
Rolling Stock
28/08/2015
Current
GERT8000-HB7
Five
4.4
(COSS)
15-121-DEV
Zone Trials.
single and double track lines circuit block
crossings or ground frames.
Once these trials have been successfully
09/02/2016
application will support the continuing trial
of the HOBC Protection Zone procedure.
(presentation): The Safe and Efficient
Access Safety Case. The SEA risk
documents.
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
GERT8075
Two
4.2.2.1 b)
15-095-DEV
Non-compliance with Clause 4.2.2.1 b) of
GERT8075.
This deviation applies to the AWS Audible
Indicator Unit, part no. 062/016116, when
fitted to Thameslink Class 700 units and
sub-classes.
Rule Book Handbook 7 - Clause 4. 4: This
clause lists the occasions when a COSS
may use a blocked line to set up a safe
system of work. A temporary deviation is
required to introduce the HOBC Protection
Zone procedure into the list as none of the
existing circumstances apply. This clause
details that the COSS may use a blocked
line as part of the safe system of work but
then lays down guidelines on when a line
may be considered to be blocked. The
COSS must only consider a line to be
blocked if at least one of the following
applies: The COSS has blocked the line or
lines concerned as shown in Handbook 8.
The line or lines concerned have been
blocked by a PC and the COSS has agreed
a safe system of work with that PC as
shown in Handbook 8. The COSS's site of
work is within an Engineering Supervisor
(ES)'s or Safe Work Leader (SWL)'s work
site and the COSS has agreed a safe
system of work with that ES, as shown in
Handbook 9. The COSS's site of work is
within a siding and the COSS has agreed a
safe system of work with that Person in
Charge of Sidings (PICOS), as shown in
Handbook 9. The project requires the
addition of the High Output Ballast Cleaner
As part of the approval process to
demonstrate compliance with GERT8075,
sound tests were performed on a
Thameslink Class 700 unit. The test
included on-train measurements of the
ambient noise and the warning- and clear
tones. The measured ambient noise
according to TSI Noise was 74. 7 dB(A). at
100 mph. During testing with the Automatic
Warning System (AWS) Audible Indicator
Unit, part no. 062/015822, it was found that
it was not possible to meet the requirement
for the AWS caution horn and the AWS
clear bell to be 10dB(A) above ambient.
Safety relevant acoustical information from 18/12/2015
AWS can be clearly heard by the driver and
also considers the health and safety
aspects of drivers hearing abilities. This
applies to the AWS caution horn being 6
dB(A) above ambient noise level and only to
appear occasionally, and the AWS 'clear'
bell also being 6 dB(A) above ambient noise
level and to appear very often. The sounds
on the train were also evaluated under real
conditions in the cab by the operator and
trade union representatives. Both parties
described the signals as clearly
distinguishable. The subjective impression
was that the signals were already very loud.
N/A
07/10/2015
Control Command and
Signalling
N/A
Current
Page36
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8000-S5
Six
1.1
authority (MA)
15-133-DEV
Protection Zone Trials
1) Rule Book Module S5 - Section 1. 1 This
clause lists the occasions when a Signal
can be passed at danger or an end of
authority (EOA) to be passed without a
movement authority (MA). A temporary
deviation is required to add an TRS
Protection Zone to the list in sub clause 9 to
allow an On-Track Machine (OTM) to pass
a signal at danger towards a High Output
TRS Protection Zone. The trials will be
controlled and managed to a strict and risk
assessed methodology by the TRS Services
project. Each location will have their own
trial team that will run the day to day
trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. With supplementary
protection in place, the OTM is fully
protected from coming into contact with
other traffic on that line.
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
GKRT0045
Four
5.5.1 d)
Signals
15-046-DEV
Bromsgrove Signals: BA3603 (FYY),
BA3609 (FY+FYY), BA3611 (MAY+FY),
BA3617 (MAY), BA7631, BA7619, BA9621
and BA7623.
ELR: BAG2; Location:
BromsgroveMilage: 52Â½ to 56Â½ miles;
Signals: BA3603 (FYY), BA3609
(FY+FYY), BA3611 (MAY+FY), BA3617
(MAY), BA7631, BA7619, BA9621 and
BA7623.
Compliance to RGS would prohibit the use
of a flashing aspect approach for services
into the Down Bromsgrove loop, or the
flashing aspect sequences for diverging
routes to platforms 1, 2 or 3. Both of these
options have significant performance
impact. Due to the severe gradient of the
Lickey incline, it is felt that the application of
Main Aspect Red (MAR) controls increases
driver expectancy of signal to clear in this
gradient area.
N/A
22/05/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
01/10/2015
Current
GMRT2044
Four
5.4.1
15-076-DEV
Class 700 Enhanced Emergency Brake
Rate.
subclasses. This deviation is for a project
Regulations 2011.
12/02/2016
and including DC electrified areas. Whilst
the TRS Protection Zone is in place and
there is a requirement to have a ZKL Track
Circuit Operating Device (TCOD) in place
when the TRS Protection Zone is granted
and therefore the signal protecting will be
held at danger, this request is to allow
additional OTM's to be allowed into the TRS
Protection Zone and authority for the
Signaller to grant the movement in
accordance with the conditions in S5. The
application will support the trial of the TRS
The SEA risk assessment The SEA detailed
The main risk with this proposal is that a
02/11/2015
train driver gets confused as to which
flashing yellow aspect sequence applies to
which junction. The worst case scenario is
that a driver thinks he is set for the loop
when he is in fact set for a route into one of
the platforms. The risk is that the driver
misjudges his speed and takes the closer
junction too fast. Another risk is that the
driver loses his bearings in fog or at night
time and get confused as to which junction
the flashing yellows are set for. Mitigations
for the risk are: The provision of
Preliminary Routing Indicators (PRIs) for
the first flashing sequence only. The PRIs
provide early route information as to which
platform the driver will be signalled into.
The PRIs will indicate forward arrows for a
route set onto the Loop Permanent Speed
Warning Indicators (PSWIs) are provided
for each turnout. The Automatic Warning
System (AWS) will be suppressed for
routes which do not apply for that sign. The
turnout speed onto the loop is 50 mph and
the turnout speed into the station is 40 mph only a 10 mph difference. A train taking the
40 mph turnout at 50 mph will not derail.
PSWI with AWS are provided to enforce the
turnout speeds. There are geographic
There are no impacts on the risks that are 16/10/2015
addressed by Clause 5. 4. 1. The risks are
identified as: Wheel slide by provision of
too much brake force leading to exceeding
the adhesion limits. Wheel slide then would
be resulting in longer stopping distances
and damage to wheel and also damage to
rail which is less likely. Risk is controlled
by complying with TSI Loc and Pas
2011/291/EU and the adhesion limits
defined within this standard and meeting
braking curve B3 of GM/RT2044 Issue 4
Figure 3. Risk is further mitigated by the
provision of a highly reliable Wheel slide
protection system. Providing to less
additional brake force, not enabling the
driver to react on misjudgement or in case
of emergency appropriately. Risk is
controlled by providing at least 15%
enhancement on the brake performance.
N/A
07/09/2015
Rolling Stock
01/10/2015
Current
GIRT7033
Two
Section AK, sub-section 1,
sign AK104z
15-018-DEV
Provision of specific platform stop markers
for Class 700 trains.
The alternative provisions will provide for a 29/04/2015
robust procedure of bringing class 700 units
to a stand at the correct position at the
platform for their formation. The design
and orientation of the platform stop markers
are such that the chance of confusion and
misreading are reduced to as low as
reasonably practicable.
07/10/2016
12/02/2015
Control Command and
Signalling
19/03/2015
Current
Scope
Class 700 is equipped with an emergency
braking system of high integrity. The
importance of the emergency brake system
is to being failsafe and stopping the train
safely within the shortest possible distance.
To achieve this aim, the Class 700
emergency braking system uses the
adhesion coefficient in the best possible
way as set out within Technical
Specification for Interoperability
Locomotives and Passenger Rolling Stock
(TSI Loc and Pas) 2011/291/EU. TSI Loc
and Pas therefore defines adhesion
coefficient limits, which are considered best
practice. That Class 700 has a high
integrity emergency brake system is also
confirmed by the measured stopping
distance curves (Figures 8. 7-28 - EB at
tare load, 8. 7-38 - EB at full load and 8. 748 - EB at crush load of Extract of Test
report EN2 A6Z00037908793 000 -)
complying to curve B3 of Figure 3 in GM/RT
2044 Issue 4. Regards Appendix A of this
standard curve B3 is considered as the
maximum desirable retardation in order to
reduce the possibility of wheelslide.
Regards full service braking the aim is
considered to best possibly meet curve A3
of Figure 3 of the standard in order to meet
Class 700 'Thameslink Unit' and all its sub- The design specification of the class 700
classes. All routes where Govia
unit is of fixed formations of eight and
Thameslink Railway operates.
twelve cars with a central driving position.
There is no provision of a side-window in
the cab to facilitate the use of existing
platform stop markers and this, in
conjunction with the length of the unit,
would lead to an unacceptable degree of
inaccuracy in the positioning of the train at
a platform when using the existing marks
(please refer to Stopping Strategy
document). Section 13 of this document
(`What other options have been
considered?') provides further evidence of
the potential impacts of complying with
GI/RT7033.
Page37
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GERT8000-TS1
Ten
13.2.1
15-126-DEV
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS)
GKRT0075
Three
3.2.3.3, 3.2.3.4
Signage
15-070-DEV
Shenfield, Down Main line deceleration
distance to diverging points.
GERT8000-TW5
Six
4.4, 4.5, 22.2, 22.3
equipment
15-119-DEV
Zone Trials.
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3
15-082-DEV
Non-compliance of Signals DM3, DM11
position relative to Downham Market Level
Crossing.
Scope
Position of Advance Warning Indicator
(AWI) in relation to 2255A points, Down
Main, ELR LTN at 19 miles 11 chains.
DM3 and DM11 protecting Downham
Market Station Level Crossing. ELR BGK
86 miles 4 ch.
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Rule Book Module TS1 - Clause 13. 2. 1:
This clause allows a SWL/COSS /PC to
block the line for staff to work on a line
blocked to all movements expect those
recognised to work within the Line
Blockage, A temporary deviation is sought
to enable the SWL / Engineering Supervisor
(ES) to formally protect both the TRS train
and staff on a line. This would allow just
the ES/SWL to set up safe systems of work
in the most efficient manner at the site,
therefore removing possible confusion.
This temporary deviation is required to
11/02/2016
allow the SWL / ES to block line with a
Protection Zone without using any other
formal blockages as laid down in 13. 2 of
TS1. The deviation is required to allow an
SWL or ES to request a line to be blocked
to create a protection zone for an TRS to
work, with the TRS standing at an agreed
location, and for a tamper to enter the
blocked line subsequently. The
arrangements to be applied, including
documentation would be as set out in the
documentation issued for the trials of the
arrangements. The Protection Zone would,
during the trial, become a recognised way
of blocking the line in conjunction with all
other deviations associated with this
application. Once the trials have been
successfully completed, the project will be
looking to increase the scope of the trials to
include multiple line complexities and level
deviation will support the operation of
Existing signal spacing is deficient to
07/10/2015
GK/RT/0075 and is mitigated by application
of controls, essentially a YY-YY-Y-R aspect
sequence. The proposed flashing aspect
sequence of FYY-FY-(Y+Pos 1) and
provision of AWI positioned at the FYY
signal does not provide deceleration
distance in accordance with Table X of
GK/RT/0075. The driver will be alerted on
the approach to the AWI as the train passes
over the shared Automatic Warning System
(AWS) magnet which is located 180 m on
the approach. As the AWI has an
Achievable Reading Distance of 161 m
(please refer to the AWI Sighting Form),
this distance more than compensates for
the deficiency of 86 m in the required
distance between the AWI and the diverging
route speed indicator as the driver would,
most likely, commence braking once the
AWI becomes visible instead of when it is
reached.
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
N/A
13/08/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
03/09/2015
Current
A temporary deviation is required to allow
Automatic Warning System (AWS) to be
isolated on an On-Track Machine (OTM)
when the OTM is in working mode on a line
not under a T3 possession. These clauses
relate to train borne defective / isolated
Automatic Warning System and Track
Circuit Actuators. These clauses instruct
the Driver that the Signaller must be
informed immediately of defective/isolated
equipment and that further movement must
not be made until authorised. The clauses
go on to document what action must be
taken before the train can proceed. The
project requests that the On-Track Machine
(OTM) driver does not need to comply with
these clauses as part of the High Output
Ballast Cleaner (HOBC) Protection Zone
trials The trials will be controlled and
methodology by the HOBC Services project.
Each location will have there own trial team
12/02/2016
completed the project will be looking to
documents.
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
Signal DM3: Signal DM3 cannot be moved
due to the limited length of the Up Platform
with the crossover at the far end which
cannot be moved. A timer delaying the
aspect on signal DM3 already exists. The
estimated Â£550k cost of relocating the
Signal is disproportionate to the limited
safety benefits realised. Signal DM11: The
estimated Â£550k cost of relocating the
Signal is disproportionate to the limited
safety benefits realised.
Signal DM3: The SPAD risk at DM3 was 02/11/2015
assessed to be relatively high, the main
causes being: o The short safe overrun
distance (14. 5m). o The short standback
distance (less than 10m for passenger
trains). o Trains normally approaching the
crossing before the sequence has initiated
and the crossing receiving high use by the
public. Therefore, in the event of a SPAD, it
is likely that the road and footway over the
crossing would be occupied. The high risk
was despite the existing SPAD controls,
which include: o Signal DM3 is approach
controlled from the previous signal DM2
(when DM3 is at danger). o The previous
signal (DM2) is protected with both TSS and
Overspeed Sensor System (OSS). o Signal
DM3 is protected by TPWS TSS. Providing
SPAD prediction was found to be the most
cost-effective solution of those examined
and therefore most effective at mitigating
the risk. The cost of the option is
approximately Â£100k. Signal DM11: The
SPAD risk at DM11 was assessed to be
low, the reasons for this are: o The signal
is only normally approached once per day
during normal operation and very rarely
during degraded operations, where the
signal could be approached with a shunt
N/A
10/09/2015
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
01/10/2015
Current
Provision of the AWI at the distance
prescribed by Appendix X of GK/RT0075 or
positioning the AWI at the next available
position 180 m on approach to the flashing
double yellow signal was discounted by the
Signal Sighting Committee because it would
dissociate the warning indicator from the
flashing aspect indicated to the driver.
Appendix X of GK/RT0075 uses the worst
case braking (Appendix A) which is not
reflective of the majority of trains that will be
using this route and 86 m at 75 mph is
equivalent to only approximately 2. 5
seconds of running time, which would have
only a small impact on the overall
deceleration profile. The deficiency
represents only approximately 6% of the
calculated AWI positioning distance.
Page38
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
GERT8000-TW7
Six
1.1, 1.2
15-120-DEV
Zone Trials.
This clause documents the ten occasions
when a Signaller may authorise the driver to
make wrong direction movement for which
a signal is not provided. A temporary
deviation is required to allow wrong
direction movements to be authorised as
part of this proposed method of work as
none of the ten existing circumstances
apply. The trials will be controlled and
methodology by the High Output Ballast
Cleaner (HOBC) Services project. Each
location will have their own trial team that
will run the day to day trialling whilst
supplementary protection in place the OnTrack Machine (OTM) is fully protected from
coming into contact with other traffic on that
line.
GMRT2149
Three
B6.2
15-094-DEV
GERT8000-OTM
Seven
4.1, 4.2
15-132-DEV
GMRT2149
Three
B10.3
14-110-DEV
A temporary deviation is to allow trials of
the HOBC Protection Zone procedure by
allowing the OTM authorised to make wrong
direction movements for which no signal is
provided as required, as well as allowing for
the On-Train Manager to be added to the
list of people who can authorise the OTM
driver to make a wrong direction movement.
Multiple on-track machines working on a
operation can be found in the application
and will support the trial of the HOBC
Efficient Access - a proposal (presentation):
The Safe and Efficient Access Safety Case.
The SEA risk assessment. The SEA
Sheffield Tram-Train Lower Sector Gauge
General background information on the
The proposed alternative provisions have
Clearance.
Tram Train Project is given in Appendix A. the potential to result in insufficient
(EMUs) for operation between Sheffield
The tram-train vehicles are of a low-floor
clearances between the tram-vehicles and
Meadowhall South and a new turn-back
design aimed at achieving level access at
the infrastructure on the proposed operating
platform at Parkgate via Rotherham
tram stops on the tramway, and at
route. In order to establish that sufficient
Central. Unit numbers: 399201 - 399207. dedicated low platforms on the mainline
clearance exists over the route to be
Vehicle numbers: 99001 - 99007; 99101 - railway. The low floor height and
operated by tram-train, an absolute gauging
99107; 99201 - 99207.
associated compact design of the vehicle
methodology has been adopted and
bogies results in areas of limited clearance Network Rail has commissioned Balfour
in the lower sector. Complying with the
Beatty to undertake a Clear Route
RGS requirements would require a
assessment of the tram-train vehicles and
substantial re-design of the existing vehicle the proposed route. The Clear Route
bogie, and may not be technically feasible. assessment was made using a Vampire
The resulting limited clearances are the
model created by the University of
subject of this deviation application.
Huddersfield dynamics team, reference:
Vampire Model 20140604-TT-NR-EL6. tare
Vampire Model 20140604-TT-NR-EL6Deflated. The relevant co-ordinates from
the Vampire model have been input into the
Clear Route model and run over the
proposed route. No infrastructure
infringements have been identified for the
limited route over which the tram-train
vehicles will operate. It should be noted
that the proposed tram-train operation has
no diversionary routes, and the request for
deviation is limited to the route defined in
Signalling Scheme 12_ne_0047 Version 9.
1. Clearance tests and dynamic testing will
Clause 4. 1 stipulates that the work will not Once the trials have been successfully
require wrong direction movements (except completed, the project will be looking to
as described for the rail grinding train), the increase the scope of the trials to include
on-track machine (High Output TRS and On- multiple line complexities and level
Track Machine (OTM)) that will be trialled
as part of the TRS Protection Zone
counters, level crossings or ground frames. procedure (Tampers) need to make at least and including DC electrified areas. The
2-3 wrong direction movements as part of
application will support the trial of the TRS
their normal method of operation. The
clause also stipulates that a machine may would like to trial a new form of Protection
so work if signalled as an Engineering train Zone of the line that allows the operation of
requiring to stop in section, but not on a
Track Circuit Block (TCB) lines or where
intermediate block signals are provided.
Clause 4. 2 stipulates that the driver must
tell the signaller that the OTM will be
working outside of a possession as part of The SEA risk assessment The SEA detailed
the trials of the TRS Protection Zone
procedure there is not requirement for the
driver to do this as the signaller will be
documents.
made aware by the published Weekly
Operating Notice (WON) notice and the On
Train Manager. So a temporary deviation is
sought to allow trials of the TRS Protection
Zone procedure on track circuit block lines
and to allow the OTM to make wrong
direction movements as required. The trials
will be controlled and managed to a strict
and risk assessed methodology by the TRS
Class 375/6 Automatic Power Control
Class 375/6 rolling stock.
If the replacement APC receiver were to be The attached reference document
(APC) Receiver Gauging.
set up within the gauge specified in
(3EER400018-6880) compares the Class
GM/RT2149, it will be outside the
375 fleet with other Electrostar fleets which
specifications that the manufacturer will
have had the same deviation accepted, as
guarantee operation, and therefore subject well as other typical British Rail vehicles
to failing to operate correctly.
(Classes 313 and 365). This comparison
demonstrates that the gauging risk for the
new APC receiver is no greater than those
fleets for which derogations have been
made or the existing British Rail fleets. It is
considered that the risk of the APC not
operating when required, due to being
outside the manufacturer design limits is
greater than the gauging risk considered
above. It is therefore considered
appropriate to progress with this deviation.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
15/02/2016
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
14/12/2015
N/A
06/10/2015
Rolling Stock
30/10/2015
Current
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
16/11/2015
Network Rail
Management
15/12/2015
Current
19/08/2014
N/A
13/08/2014
London and South Eastern
Railway
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
Page39
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8075
One
2.1.9.3
14-156-DEV
Non-provision of commencement and
termination of Automatic Warning System
(AWS) gap signage at London Bridge Low
Level Station.
The extent of deviation apples to all lines
out of London Bridge Low Level Station
terminating platforms to those down
direction signals on the first gantry (XTD 2
miles 9 chains) viz TL4005, TL4119 and
TL4207.
Proposal was initially raised in March 2013
against the GE/RT8035, which has since
been superseded by GE/RT8075, where the
requirement is still pertinent. Compliance
with RGS would therefore require either: a)
Fitting of AWS to signals TL4005, TL4119
and TL4207Because it is difficult to achieve,
it is proposed not to provide AWS at these
signals, and a risk assessment has shown
that this is acceptable. orb) Provision of
AWS gap signage This is considered an
unnecessary visual distraction for drivers
departing (down direction) London Bridge
Low Level Station. For trains approaching
London Bridge Low Level Station in the up
direction, no signage is proposed to be
provided to indicate the commencement of
an AWS gap at structure 3501 (TL4118,
TL4000 and TL4204): the next stop
indication the driver will observe is the
relevant buffer stop or the tail lights of a
train already in the platform and was
considered during the risk assessment that
`commencement of AWS gap' signs on the
approach into the station will not serve any
useful purpose. These conclusions are
supported by the Risk Assessment (N421JAC-RET-SG-010071, version 1. 0).
Trains departing the terminal platforms of 12/01/2015
London Bridge Low Level station will be
travelling at low speed (20 mph). The
relevant signals are all fitted with Train
Protection and Warning System (TPWS)
Train Stop System (TSS) loops which have
been shown to be effective for all trains
(passenger at 12%g and 9%g braking,
freight at 7. 5%g and 6%g braking) passing
the signal at red by stopping them short of
the safe overrun distance. This is a
perpetuation of what is already an existing
arrangement and is envisaged will be for
the lifetime of this installation, I. e. circa 30
years +. Risk Assessment (N421-JAC-RETSG-010071, version 1. 0) was conducted
and accepted that there is no impact by the
non-provision of AWS or AWS gap signage.
N/A
19/11/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
11/12/2014
Current
GMRT2466
Three
Clauses relating to the use Railway Wheelsets
of monobloc wheels: 2.3.1,
2.9.1. Clauses relating to
wheel profile: 2.5.2, 2.5.3,
2.6.1, 4.4.1.
14-049-DEV Revised 15-06- Sheffield Tram Train Wheelsets (Mainline
2015
Testing).
tram trains for test operation on mainline
infrastructure between Meadowhall South
and Parkgate. Operation is subject to the
completion of infrastructure changes that
are essential for compatibility, such as the
raising of check rails by at least 45 mm.
The Tram Train units will use wheelsets that
do not meet RGS requirements in two
areas: Monobloc wheels will not be used;
The wheel profile is not currently permitted,
and will not meet the requirements for
flange tip/back blend and flange toe radii.
This application does not relate to a project
requiring authorisation under the Railways
(Interoperability) Regulations 2011. Tram
train vehicles are included on the Approved
List of Exclusions published by the
Department for Transport.
Changing the wheelset to a monobloc
design would compromise the project
objective of using a `standard' tram train
vehicle, and add significant cost for no
practical benefit. The use of a wheel profile
permitted by GM/RT2466 Issue 3 Appendix
A would result in a fundamental
incompatibility with the Sheffield tramway,
as flange-tip running is necessary to
negotiate switches and crossings on the
tramway.
The use of resilient wheels fitted with tyres 15/06/2015
is consistent with Stagecoach Supertram's
existing fleet and normal practice for tram
vehicles, and is not considered to have a
significant impact on any other party. The
use of the revised wheel profile requires
existing mainline check rails to be raised by
at least 45 mm to ensure compatibility.
Network Rail is managing this change to the
infrastructure alongside other changes
required for tram train operation, and will
consider the effect on other rolling stock as
part of their engineering change process.
IRR Report 81/95 Issue 2, Tram-Train
Wheel Profile Design, dated 27/09/2013,
documents the design process followed in
developing the proposed wheel profile.
Safety against derailment and compatibility
are considered in this report as part of
determining the optimum tram train wheel
profile.
31/12/2016
20/02/2014
Rolling Stock
13/03/2014
Current
GKRT0192
Two
2.11.1.1
14-147-DEV
Woodbridge area - non-provision of
Automatic Level Crossing Advance Warning
Signs (LCAWIs) Automatic Warning
System (AWS).
Route: Anglia. Equipment: Ferry Lane,
ESK, 79m04ch; Haywards, ESK, 79m07ch.
Lime Kiln, ESK, 79m29ch. Sun Wharf,
ESK, 79m31ch.
Complying with the requirements will
require four additional AWS. If Solid State
Interlocking (SSI) data interlocking changes
are needed for suppression of the magnets
(as this is on a single line), this will increase
both costs and timescales for delivering the
Automatic Open Crossing, locally
monitored, with barrier (AOCL+B) upgrade.
The additional costs and programme impact
would mean that the level crossing safety
benefit of adding the barriers would not be
realised as quickly as desired, the costs for
meeting the requirement are estimated to
be Âœ25 000. Provision of AWS could
cause significant distraction to drivers when
approaching level crossings and would
increase driver's workload.
N/A
23/10/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
13/11/2014
Current
GMRT2461
One
6.4
and on- track Machines
14-083-DEV
Class 142, 143, 144, 150, 153, 155 and 156 All Class 142, 143, 144, 150, 153, 155 and
units Sanding in Brake Steps 1 & 2.
156 units.
N/A
23/06/2014
Arriva Trains Wales,
Northern Rail Ltd, Abellio
Greater Anglia, First Great
Western, London and
Birmingham Railway
Limited (trading as London
Midland), East Midlands
Trains Ltd, First Scotrail
Limited
Rolling Stock
25/07/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2
and Trains
14-023-DEV
Paddock Wood Station, Platform 1 reduced platform width at replaced
columns.
N/A
03/02/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
Paddock Wood Station Platform 1. ELR
XTD/PWS1.
The existing arrangement has no AWS
05/12/2014
currently fitted to the LCAWIs between
Haywards and Lime Kiln Crossings. The
proposal perpetuates this arrangement as
the risk reduction/safety benefit achieved at
the level crossing itself is the priority. The
non-provision of the AWS will mean that
train drivers will not receive the warning of
approach to the third or fourth level
crossing, the warning is provided to draw
the driver's attention to the LCAWI and
subsequent Special Speed Restriction
Board (SSRB) and Driver's Crossing
Indicator (DCI). Upon approach to the first
crossing, the driver would have received the
required AWS warning and as these
crossings are so close to one another; they
will see the signage for the next crossing
when clearing the previous one, therefore
will not benefit from another warning. The
residual risk will remain the same as it is
now, and it is believed that providing
additional AWS warnings in-between the
crossings will act as an additional
distraction to the driver, who will be
concentrating on each crossing in turn and
therefore would not benefit from having to
react to an additional AWS.
The multiple unit fleets within the scope of This alternative provision has been proven 30/07/2014
this application have either step 2 or step 1 to have the following advantages: It
sanding enabled, making them nonsupports driver instruction to brake light and
compliant with Clause 6. 4 of RGS
early in areas of poor adhesion; The ability
GM/RT2461; either permanent or
to lay sand earlier in the braking curve
temporary deviations are in place to permit permits drivers to react earlier to low
this. When first fitted, the sanders were
adhesion, applying sand whilst the wheels
initially configured to discharge
are still rotating; Drivers regularly switch
automatically in emergency brake or
between classes of train, standardisation
manually in step 3 when the driver
satisfies their desire for consistency. There
depresses the sanding button. Since then, have been no Wrong Side Track Circuit
a number of temporary deviations have
Failure (WSTCF) attributed to the trials, nor
been sought and approved to allow trials of have network Rail Route Asset Managers manually sanding in braking step 2 and,
Signalling reported any other detriments
more recently, braking step 1, with some
attributable to the change. A survey of
permanent deviations now approved.
Drivers reported widespread positive
Current status: 10/082/DGN - step 2 feedback of the trial. It is the intention of
Class 150/2 (ATW) - permanent;
this application to consolidate the trials
11/137/DGN - step 3 and emergency undertaken to both reduce the number of
Classes 14X & 153 (all operators) future applications and standardise the nonpermanent; 11/054/DGN - step 2 - Class
Wheel Slide Protection (WSP) fleets by
156 (AGA) - permanent; 13/066/DGN - step means of a permanent deviation which will,
2 - class 150 (FGW) - permanent;
in turn, allow for improved sander
13/074/DEV - step 1 trial - Classes 14X &
operation. Neither the step 2 nor the step 1
153 (FGW, NT, ATW, AGA) - expires
trials have resulted in an increase in wrong
31/07/2014; 13/075/DEV - step 1 trial side track circuit failures. The potential for
Classes 150, 155 & 156 (FGW, NT, ATW, an increase in the risk of this failure mode is
AGA) - expires 31/07/2015; 13/171/DEV - therefore considered to be very low.
step 2 trial - Class 153 (LM, AGA, EMT) Weighted against the reduced risk of
It is proposed that two new columns are
The canopy modification support design for 08/04/2014
installed to support the existing canopy
Platform 1 does not comply with the
upon removal of the existing footbridge,
requirements of Railway Group Standard
which currently provides support. The
GI/RT7016 Clause 6. 2. 2. The clearance
columns are to match the existing double
from the proposed outer canopy support
column arrangement. The column nearest column is 1. 733 m, less than 2. 5 m
the platform will be 1. 733 m from the
required. The design has been developed
platform edge.
to match the existing arrangement of the
canopy support structure, which do not
comply with this standard. Compliance with
the standard would require a column
positioned 2. 5 m from the platform edge
which would not align with the existing
canopy support columns and by doing so
would impede sighting along the platform.
Page40
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0075
Two
3.3.1.4
Signage
14-105-DEV
Non-provision of Permissible speed warning Non-provision of PSWI boards in the
indicators (PSWI) boards in the vicinity of
vicinity of Bricklayers Arms Junction.
Bricklayers Arms Junction.
All approaches to the 40mph speed
24/09/2014
restriction are via a high speed turnout at
Bricklayers Arms Junction, which is
immediately followed by a section of line at
50 mph requiring the driver to slow down
from 60 mph. The 50 mph section is
400m+ long on approach to the 40 mph
restriction. This will allow sufficient
time/sighting for the driver to reduce speed
accordingly. Taking into account all
potential warning board positions detailed in
section 10, it is considered that the benefits
of providing a warning of the reduction in
speed is outweighed by the risk of
overloading drivers with information and
liable to cause confusion. (Note this is
described in GK/RT0075 Section 3. 2. 2).
N/A
31/07/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/08/2014
Current
GKRT0045
Three
2.4.5.2 Table 16
Signals
14-044-DEV
OFF indicator legend at Maidstone West
Station Platform 2.
The directional identifier proposed has
01/04/2014
been selected so as to use a distinctive and
recognisable abbreviation of the next
principal station name in the direction of
travel, which all operating staff in the area
would be aware of as part of the route/local
knowledge necessary for the safe and
effective execution of their duties. Proposed
directional legend of the OFF indicator will
provide a clear identification of the direction
of the movement which has been
authorised. Proposed legends present a
lower risk than a standard legend, as they
will not cause confusion as to the direction
of an authorised train movement. The
proposed legend shall be clearly shown in
the signalling notice and other briefing
material prepared for operational staff for
the Railway Undertakings associated with
the commissioning of the new signalling
system, including for Southeastern's train
crew and platform staff. In the longer term,
following the commissioning of the new
signalling, an appreciation of the meaning
of the non-standard legend by operational
staff shall be maintained through the
route/local knowledge applicable to their
role.
N/A
13/02/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/03/2014
Current
GMRT2130
Four
All clauses.
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
14-002-DEV
Deviation against the requirements of
GM/RT2130 Issue 4.
The new Class 70 locomotives
manufactured by General Electric (GE) in
2013 and 2014 onwards.
GE has developed and is in the process of None.
manufacturing 10 new Class 70
locomotives for Colas Rail. Three of these
locomotives (70801, 70803, 70805) are
currently in the UK and undergoing final
commissioning. The September 2013 RGS
catalogue has been applied as the basis of
the current Notified National Technical
Rules (NNTRs) (as per the current
Department for Transport (DfT) published
NNTR list). However, as the December
2013 RGS catalogue includes an update to
GM/RT2130 (to Issue 4), there is a potential
for this to be listed as an NNTR before the
completed application for authorisation is
made to the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR)
under RIR2011. In addition, a derogation
has already been granted to GM/RT2130
Issue 3 (13/041/DGN). Therefore the
project wishes to obtain a derogation to
GM/RT 2130 issue 4, and instead continue
to use issue 3, on the basis of advanced
stage of development.
13/01/2014
N/A
08/01/2014
GE Transportation
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GMRT2473
Two
B9.1, B10.1, B10.2 and
B11.1
14-089-DEV
Class 387 - Locking Doors Out of Use.
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 EMUs
and up to thirty-five four-car Class 387/x
EMUs (an option on the current contract).
2011.
All previous Electrostar builds have the
following functionality when a door is locked
out of service (which complies with
GO/OTS300, the standard in force at the
time the original design was created):
Door interlock is bypassed and so the door
status is no longer monitored. Door
emergency egress devices have no effect
on a door which has been locked out of
service. Door emergency access devices
have no effect on a door which has been
locked out of service. Changing the design
to fully comply with Clauses B9. 1, B10. 1,
B10. 2 and B11. 1 of GM/RT2473 would:
Require the door system to be redesigned.
Increase the security and vandalism risks
associated with unauthorised access to the
train. Conflict with the requirements in the
High Speed Rolling Stock Technical
Specification of Interoperability (HS RST
TSI) (referred to from the SRT TSI). Part of
Clause 4. 2. 2. 4. 2. 1 of the TSI states ". . .
Each door shall be provided with an
individual opening device, accessible to
passengers, to allow that door to be opened
for emergency reasons, at speeds below 10
km/h. This device shall have no effect on 'a
door locked out of service'. . . "Be
inconsistent with the remainder of
The Electrostar functionality was previously 09/07/2014
permitted for "all passenger vehicles fitted
with power operated doors with. . .
emergency access and egress devices"
under non-compliance 08/059/NC.
However, this non-compliance applies to
GM/RT2473 Issue 1. GM/RT2473 has
subsequently been up-issued to Issue 2 and
so the non-compliance cannot be applied to
the Class 387 units. 08/059/NC states: "A
GM/RT2473 Clauses B9. 1 and B10. 1. The
deviations relate to the ability of the access
and egress device to open a door that has
been manually locked out of use by the train
crew. The deviations are: 04/265/DGN
relating to Clauses B9 and B10 which
applies to the unlocking of passenger doors
via the emergency egress and access
devices. 05/031/DGN relating to Clauses
B9. 1, B10 and B11. 2 which applies to the
position of the passenger egress device, the
direction to operate the emergency access
device and the unlocking of passenger
doors via the emergency egress and access
devices. 07/205/DGN relating to Clauses
B9. 1 and B10. 1 which applies to the
unlocking of passenger doors, via the
emergency egress and access devices that
N/A
25/06/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
Scope
Nature and Degree
Permissible speed warning indicators
(PSWI) would need to be provided in the Up
direction for the following speed reductions:
60 mph from the Up Sussex Fast to 40 mph
PSR on the Sussex Reversible at LBC 2816
m; 60 mph from the Up Sussex Slow to 40
mph PSR on the Sussex Reversible at LBC;
60 mph - 40 mph speed reduction would
require a PSWI at minimum of 630 m (at
approximately LBC 3446 m) from the speed
restriction. This would place it within the
switches and crossings (S & C) at
Bricklayers Arms Junction so the PSWI
board would have to be moved back clear
of crossover 8005/8006. There are 35/40
diverging Permanent Speed Restriction
(PSR) boards at this position for routes
towards the Bermondsey Reversible and the
Up Bermondsey Spur. The PSWI board for
the 'straight ahead' route from the Down
Sussex Slow to the Sussex Reversible Line
could be placed alongside the existing
Diverging PSR board. The PSWI board for
the 'straight ahead' route from the Down
Sussex Fast to the Sussex Reversible Line
cannot be similarly positioned because
there is no space. However, it could be
placed on the right hand side opposite the
Diverging PSR board. This issue was
OFF indicator at Maidstone West Platform As a consequence of bi-directional
2 for Signal EK4753. ELR PWS1, 42 miles signalling being installed at Maidstone West
36 chains.
Platform 2, an OFF indicator with a legend
needs to provide an indication of the
direction in which it applies. Maidstone
West station, although a through station, is
located at a transition point in line
designations and Engineers' Line
References (ELRs) such that all trains
leaving the station are effectively "Up"
trains, regardless of their direction of travel
(the line designations change at the
platform starting signal to which the OFF
indicator refers). Only directional
information permitted is the text "UP" or
"DN". Compliant OFF indicator means that
the "UP" or "DN" text would cause confusion
to the platform staff giving with consequent
risk of unauthorised movements taking
place. Confusion to the dispatch staff
increases likelihood of start away Signal
Passed at Danger (SPAD), thus increasing
SPAD risk on EK4753 and EK4750.
Page41
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2484
Two
All clauses
Audibility Requirements for Trains
14-014-DEV
Warning horns Vossloh EspaÃ±a S.A Class 68 UK Light locomotive.
41 x Class 68 UK Light locomotives
manufactured by Vossloh España S. A.
17/01/2014
Services Limited
Rolling Stock
14/02/2014
Current
Four
6.3.1
and Trains
14-072-DEV
East Ham driver's access walkway
This application is to request permission to
footbridge - reduced buffer stop overun risk install the new footbridge at the location,
zone.
being the most practicable and feasible, to
provide a safe crossing for the drivers at the
end of the walkway. The East Ham driver's
access walkway scheme is being proposed
to provide a route for train drivers from the
train station at East Ham to the C2C depot
(and vice-versa). As part of providing a
safe crossing for train drivers over the 60
mph Down Main FSS1 line, a footbridge is
being proposed over the line. Due to the
footprint constraint to implement the
crossing over the down main line, the
deviation will involve the footbridge being
constructed within the overrun risk zone as
defined by Clause 6. 3. 1 of GI/RT/7016.
The bottom of the stairs for the new
footbridge will be 2. 47 m from the face of
the buffer stop. This deviation is for a
Regulations 2011.
The main safety related risks associated
25/02/2014
with the use of non-GM/RT2484 compliant
warning horn sound pressure levels are:
Inadequate warning to persons on or about
the track when trains are approaching.
Noise Pollution. Damage to staff hearing.
The risks from item 2 will be limited due to
the limited number of locomotives in the
fleet (41 maximum). Item 3 will be
controlled by company specific instructions
for operating staff regarding the use of the
warning horn in depots and yard if
necessary. Item 1 is controlled by the fact
that the sound pressure levels mandated in
the Loc&Pas TSI are higher than those
mandated in GM/RT2484 and thus provide
a better level of warning. The effectiveness
of Loc&Pas TSI (EN15153-2: 2007)
compliant warning horns is proven by their
use in mainland Europe. The Common
Safety Methods (CSM) Directive allows the
application of codes of practice as a risk
acceptance criterion. On this basis, by
complying with requirements of TSI
Loc&Pas clause 4. 2. 7. 2. 2 (EN15153-2:
2007), it is considered that the risks
associated with the warning horn sound
pressure level are controlled. In addition,
the Loc&Pas TSI (2011/291/EU) states that
To achieve this within the footprint
29/10/2014
available, the major component of the new
structure (I. e. the substructure of the
footbridge) will be located within the zone
extending 20 m behind the face of the buffer
stop, although the footbridge superstructure
is adjacent to the buffer stop. In addition,
the access to the footbridge is located
within 5 m of the left hand side of the
projected centre line of the track
approaching the buffer stop, but does not
lay parallel to the tracks or buffer stop.
N/A
GIRT7016
The Technical Specification for
Interoperability (TSI) relating to the rolling
stock subsystem - `Locomotives and
passenger rolling stock' of the transEuropean conventional rail system establishes the warning horn sound
pressure levels in its clause 4. 2. 7. 2. 2:
"The C weighted sound pressure level
produced by each horn sounded separately
(or in a group if designed to sound
simultaneously as a chord) shall be
between 115 dB and 123 dB, as defined in
EN 15153-2: 2007, Clause 4. 3. 2. " The
TSI includes a permanent Specific case UK
for Great Britain in its clause 7. 3. 2. 12,
that allows access of TSI compliant rolling
stock: "('P') Rolling stock for national use
only, may be compliant with the horn sound
pressure levels as stipulated in the national
technical rules notified for this purpose in
the UK. Trains intended for international
use shall be compliant with the horn sound
pressure levels as stipulated in this TSI. "
This specific case does not prevent the
access of TSI compliant rolling stock to the
national network. " Vossloh aims to get the
UK Light locomotives assessed against the
currently published Locomotive and
Passenger TSI to simplify future mainland
Compliance cannot be achieved due to site
specific constraints. The risk level of
overrun is extremely low since the sand trap
is designed to prevent trains from entering
the Down Mainline. The Solid State
Signalling Interlocking (SSSI) signalling
system is designed to prevent wrong routed
movements towards the trap point. The
severity of non-compliance will be minor.
The primary function of the current sand
drag and buffer stop is to prevent runaway
train units from the depot from entering the
Fenchurch Street to Southend (FSS) down
main line. With the gradient for this site 1
in 200 away from the buffer stops, it implies
a non-braked unit would travel away from
the sand drag and buffer stop rather than
towards it. There have been no reported
emergency uses in the last 40 years, so the
likelihood of this happening would be rated
as extremely low. In addition, the line
speed is listed as 15 mph; however, from
the depot yard the starting point is 5 mph
with facing spring points, and trap points set
in the wrong position would require a major
signalling failure allowing for the trains to
move in the wrong direction.
N/A
30/04/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
21/05/2014
Current
GERT8014
Two
2.1.1
Hot Axle Bearing Detection
14-065-DEV
Sheffield Tram Train Bearing Condition
Detection.
three-car Tram Train EMUs: Unit numbers:
99001 - 99007 99101 - 99107 99201 99207.
BS EN 15437-1: 2009 is not applicable
See Appendix (GE/RT8014, Sheffield Tram- 20/10/2014
because the tram-train vehicles are fitted
Train Bearing Condition Detection, Issue 2).
with inboard axle bearings. Clause 2. 1. 1
of GE/RT8014 therefore requires an
onboard axle bearing monitoring system to
be fitted. The tram-train vehicles are being
built to an existing design which, in
common with other tram vehicles, does not
have any bearing monitoring equipment
fitted. Fitting a bearing monitoring system
would require re-design of the vehicle and
development and validation of onboard
systems to incorporate the associated
alarm functions.
N/A
17/04/2014
Rolling Stock
03/10/2014
Current
GMRT2161
One
7.2.1 (j)
Vehicles
14-016-DEV Revised 02-07- Use of transportable GSM-R equipment on GWR steam Rail Motor Class: Steam Rail
2014
steam locomotives registered to operate on Motor Original number: 93 TOPS number:
Network Rail.
99093 Max speed (mph) Forward/reverse:
25/25 King Edward II Class: King class
Original number: 6023 TOPS number:
98823 Max speed (mph) Forward/reverse:
75/45 Pendennis Castle Class: Castle
class Original number: 4079 TOPS
number: 98779 Max speed (mph)
Forward/reverse: 75/45 Lady of Legend
Class: Based on Saint class Original
number: 2999 TOPS number: 98499 Max
speed (mph) Forward/reverse: 75/45
County of Glamorgan Class: Based on
1000 class Original number: 1014 TOPS
number: 98614 Max speed (mph)
Forward/reverse: 75/45.
N/A
22/01/2014
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GIRT7016
Five
2.1
and Trains
14-082-DEV
Impacts on company: Improved flexibility 02/07/2014
and reduced costs. Improved security as
equipment can be securely locked away
when not in use. Impacts on affected
parties: Impacts already covered in
deviation 12/032/DGN. Impact on the crew:
Footplate crew have improved visibility of
the equipment over the normal fixed
installation. Impact on the safety of the
railway system: No increased risk over
that accepted in deviation 12/032/GDN.
Technical compatibility: Fully compatible
with the GSM-R system. Cost and service
performance: Reduced cost of installation.
Improved availability as equipment can be
easily swapped. Procedures will be
produced covering the installation,
operation, maintenance and repair of the
equipment, as is the case for fixed
installations. Attachments: Appendix B User instruction for transportable GSM-R;
Appendix C - Technical specification of the
equipment. It should be noted that steam
locomotives that operate on the national rail
network are: Registered, certified and
maintained to operate safely; Limited to a
maximum of 15,000 miles per annum;
Have, as a minimum, a second person in
the cab (fireman) that are trained and
Existing unused bay platform at Pontypridd 03/09/2014
Station is to be brought back into
operational use as a Turnback platform.
The platform forms one side of the island
platform (and is currently fenced off). The
horizontal track radius through the usable
length of the bay platform is 280 m which is
less than 1000 m and therefore does not
comply with GI/RT7016, Clause 2. 1. A
joint risk assessment workshop "106610TRT Curvature Joint Risk Assessmentsigned. pdf" was undertaken and evidence
of this has been included in the derogation
application pack.
N/A
18/06/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/07/2014
Current
Due to its limited application solely to
British steam locomotives operating on
Network rail controlled infrastructure, the
deviation does not require authorisation
Regulations 2011. The deviation would
apply to steam locomotives registered to
operate on Network Rail and will permit the
use of a restrained transportable Global
System for Mobile communications for
Railways (GSM-R) as an alternative to a
permanently installed system. The
deviation is to be implemented by the
Railway Undertaking where a limited
number of operations and geographical
scope might impose disproportionate effort
in order to gain the benefits of fitting a
permanently fixed system. As stated in
derogation 12/032/DGN, it is not practicable
to fit the GSM-R equipment within reach of
the driver's position on a steam locomotive
due to the restricted space that is available
and the temperatures that potentially occur
in the area immediately beside the driver,
which are beyond the known reliability
range of the GSM-R equipment. The
derogation allows the equipment to be sited
behind the driver due to the fact that there is
more than one person on the footplate and,
Unused Bay Platform at Pontypridd Station - The variation applies to the currently
Minor - Although the radius of the platform
Horizontal curvature.
unused Bay Platform at Pontypridd Station, is much less than the minimum required,
Wales.
the design will provide compliant stepping
distances and safe train dispatch
arrangements. This is shown in attached
evidence "AFC-Proposed Bay Combined.
pdf".
Page42
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
GERT8000-T3
Three
2.2 and 9.7
Possession of a running line for engineering 14-037-DEV
work
GMRT2000
Three
See details of RGS clauses Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
in Annex 1.
14-130-DEV
GERT8075
One
2.1.9.3
14-157-DEV
GKRT0045
Three
2.4.5.2 Table 16
Signals
14-043-DEV
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
LNE Route - 'Flexible Train Arrival Point'
National.
This can equate to an estimated Âœ50,000
in lost production.
02/09/2015
could equate to an estimated Âœ50,000
increase in production each shift. As part of
the initial study, a risk assessment has
been performed, involving stakeholders
from route operations, National Delivery
Service (NDS), Freightliner, RSSB and HO
Operations. As possession will not be
granted until the HO train is at the FTAP,
then no personnel will be on or near the line
whilst the train is in motion. There is a risk
that the HO train overshoots the FTAP.
Threats relating to this have been assessed
and mitigated, principally by driver briefing
and the use of countdown markers on the
approach to the FTAP (see FTAP proposal
document).
31/12/2017
11/02/2014
Network Rail
Management
28/07/2015
Current
Generic deviation against NNTRs for UK
Dual Locomotives.
This deviation is for a new fleet of dual
electric/diesel powered locomotives, known
as UK Dual (Class 88), supplied by Vossloh
España S. A. for operation by Direct Rail
Services Ltd. This deviation is sought for
the present order of 10 locomotives (8800188010) and all subsequent builds of Class
88 as allowed by the type authorisation
rules (subject to major standards changes).
The UK Dual locomotive is based on the
existing EUROLIGHT and UK Light design.
2011.
Use of the alternative actions are
considered to deliver an equivalent level of
control and safety as demonstrated in
BB14807700005 (--) and will also not
require any further ongoing actions or
operational constraints.
02/12/2014
N/A
29/09/2014
Vossloh EspaÃ±a S.A on
Services Limited
Rolling Stock
31/10/2014
Current
Trains departing the terminal platforms of 12/01/2015
Cannon Street Station will be travelling at
low speed (15 mph). The relevant signals
are all fitted with Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS) Train Stop
System (TSS) loops which have been
shown to be effective for all trains
(passenger at 12%g and 9%g braking,
freight at 7. 5%g and 6%g braking) passing
the signal at red by stopping them short of
the safe overrun distance. This is a
perpetuation of what is already an existing
arrangement and is envisaged will be for
the lifetime of this installation, I. e. circa 30
years +. Risk assessment (N421-JAC-RETSG-010072, version 3. 0) was conducted
and accepted that there is no impact by the
non-provision of AWS or AWS gap signage.
N/A
19/11/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
11/12/2014
Current
Proposed alternative identifiers have been 01/04/2014
selected to use distinctive characters that
minimise the risk of confusion between
legend. They are also both recognisable
abbreviations to local station names that all
operating staff in the area are aware of as
part of their current route/local knowledge
necessary for the safe and effective
execution of their duties. Proposed
directional legend of the OFF indicator will
provide a clear identification of the direction
of the movement which has been
authorised. Proposed legends present a
lower risk than standard legends as they will
not cause confusion as to the direction of
an authorised train movement. Legends
will be shown in the signalling notice and
other briefing material prepared for
operational staff associated with the
commissioning of the new signalling
equipment. All will be briefed to the Train
operating Company (TOC) and Freight
Operating Company (FOC) drivers and
platform dispatch staff. In the longer term,
following commissioning of the new
signalling equipment, an appreciation of the
meaning of the non-standard legend by
operational staff shall be maintained
through the route/local knowledge
N/A
13/02/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/03/2014
Current
The UK Dual locomotive will be compliant
with the Technical Specifications for
Interoperability (TSI) requirements,
including the Locomotive and Passenger
TSI. In addition, it will be compliant with all
applicable Notified National Technical Rules
(NNTRs) to cover open points and specific
cases, and ensure compatibility with the GB
mainline system. It will also operate over
off Trans-European Network (TEN) routes
and therefore the complete suite of RGSs is
applicable. Within these RGSs, there are a
significant number of requirements that are
not directly related to TSI open points,
specific cases or compatibility. These
requirements have equivalent or
comparable requirements within the suite of
TSIs, therefore compliance with these RGS
requirements duplicates the TSI
assessment. Consequently, additional
effort and cost will be expended both in
respect of production of the evidence of
compliance and in its subsequent
assessment by the Designated Body. It is
also possible that, due to the differences in
the detail of the requirements, conflicts
might exist that either prevent full
compliance with both the TSI and RGS
clauses or necessitate a more complex
Non-provision of commencement and
The extent of deviation apples to all lines
Proposal was initially raised in March 2013
termination of Automatic Warning System
out of Cannon Street Station terminating
against the GE/RT8035, which has since
(AWS) gap signage at Cannon Street
platforms to those down direction signals on been superseded by GE/RT8075, where the
Station.
the first gantry (CBM 0 miles 20 chains) viz requirement is still pertinent. Compliance
TL2519, TL2707, TL2411, TL2717 and
with RGS would therefore require either: a)
TL2715.
Fitting of AWS to signals TL2519, TL2707,
TL2411, TL2717 and TL2715 Because it is
difficult to achieve, it is proposed not to
provide AWS at these signals, and a risk
assessment has shown that this is
acceptable. or b) Provision of AWS gap
signage. This is considered an
unnecessary visual distraction for drivers
departing (down direction) Cannon Street
Station. For trains approaching Cannon
Street Station on lines A to E in the up
direction, no signage is proposed to be
provided to indicate the commencement of
an AWS gap at structure 423 (TL2296,
TL2412, TL2510, TL2718 and TL2816), as
the next stop indication the driver will
observe is the relevant buffer stop or the tail
lights of a train already in the platform and
was considered during the risk assessment
that `commencement of AWS gap' signs on
the approach into the station will not serve
any useful purpose. These conclusions are
supported by the risk assessment (N421JAC-RET-SG-010072, version 3. 0).
OFF indicator legends at Clapham Junction OFF indicators at Clapham Junction
As a consequence of platform extension
Station Platform 17.
Station Platform 17 for Signals VC600 and works, OFF indicators are needed on
VC607 signals. Route Kent/Sussex, ELR
Platform 17 at Clapham Station. Due to a
TTB1, 2 miles 57 chains.
curve through the platform, which continues
once the platform is extended; the signal
VC600 mounted on the left hand side
cannot be seen from the platform by the
dispatch staff. Signal VC607 cannot be
seen due to the passenger over-bridge
restricting dispatch staff visibility of the
signal. Existing Platform 17 Up and Down
directions are the opposite to the rest of the
platforms at the Clapham Junction (Up to
Wandsworth, Down to Kensington). Trains
depart from Platform 17 via the Up West
London, either towards the Down West
London line or the Down Brighton Slow line.
This means all trains depart in a down
direction. Only directional information
permitted is the suffix (or prefix) "UP" or
"DN". A compliant OFF indicator means
that the "UP" or "DN" text would cause
confusion to the platform staff with
consequent risk of unauthorised
movements taking place. Confusion to the
dispatch staff increases likelihood of start
away Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD),
thus increasing SPAD risk on VC600 and
VC607.
Page43
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8075
One
4.2.2.1 b)
14-127-DEV
Class 170 and 334 Light Emitting Diode
(LED) Automatic Warning System (AWS)
Indicator Sounder Levels.
This deviation applies to the LED AWS
indicator unit, part no. 062/015808 when
fitted to ScotRail Class 170 and 334 trains.
15/09/2014
First ScotRail
Control Command and
Signalling
16/10/2014
Current
Three
5.1.2.7 a)
Signals
14-159-DEV
Signals TL4000 and TL4118 alternative
route indications.
Signals TL4000 and TL4118 approaching
London Bridge Low Level Station.
Using a compliant indicator would require a 10/11/2014
louder sounder. However, drivers have
indicated that this louder sound is of
discomfort and acts as a potential
distraction whilst driving. Using the 90 dBA
indicator is felt to be a safer solution (see
associated risk assessment FSRM786).
Previous conversations with RSSB have
stated that there is a view that 6 dBA is the
appropriate minimum value as this is
specified for controls and indications in the
cab in the Rolling Stock Locomotive and
Passengers Technical Specifications for
Interoperability (RST LOC_PAS TSI),
Clause 4. 2. 9. 3. 4 (see email "RE: LED
AWS indicators" dated 10/10/2013 22: 04).
A further benefit of the new LED style (as
opposed to the traditional mechanical style)
indicator is increased reliability. This
benefit has been witnessed across the 156
fleet which have been fitted with the
indicator as a fleet change and have seen
an increase in indicator reliability. The
increased reliability means that this
component is no longer replaced as
frequently with associated price savings.
Using a uniform style of indicator across the
fleet also simplifies stock management,
reducing the opportunity for error.
Using a generic deceleration figure of 0.
12/01/2015
74m/s2, this gives a calculated speed at the
signals of 34 mph. However, the signal
sighting committee have assessed the
speed on the approach and believe the
likely maximum approach speed to be circa
30 mph. The Signal Sighting Committee
(SSC) has endorsed the signal sighting
form as such. At either of these approach
speeds, the derailment risk is very low but
drivers would not be aware which route is
set. As such, drivers would need to assume
the more restrictive alternative route is set
and drive to the 25 mph limit. Approach
release controls are proposed as will these
provides significant difference in approach
to the signals for the alternative routes,
allowing drivers to control speed over the
crossovers, but also drive to the 20 mph
limit for the proffered route. Using
NR/L2/SIG/11201-Mod B7 approach release
will be based on release speed of 25 mph;
this equates to a release point of 75 m on
approach to the signals.
N/A
GKRT0045
Have a sound level at least 10 dBA above
the expected ambient noise level, subject to
a minimum of 65 dBA and a maximum of
95 dBA, at a distance of 1 m from the front
of the equipment, measured as installed in
the driving cab. As part of the approval
process to demonstrate compliance with
GE/RT8035 (since superseded), sound
tests were performed on all First ScotRail
(FSR) fleets which were proposed to be
fitted with the new indicators. See Atkins
reports Let0045022(1 and 2a) for further
details. The test included on train
measurements of the ambient noise and the
warning and clear tones. During testing, it
was found that the clear 'ping' tone sounder
volume was measured to be slightly lower
than the warning 'horn' tone sounder. As a
result of this, the class 170 and 334 tests do
not meet the requirement for 10dBA above
ambient. It is suggested, in the report, that
this is likely due to the initial transient
nature of the 'ping' signal and meter
readings every 0. 125 seconds not providing
enough resolution to capture the peak
sound level. The supplier Unipart confirmed
that the volume levels for both clear and
warning are set to the same level. The cost
of using meter equipment with a higher
TL4000 and TL4118 signals are in a 50
mph permissible speed area with a
permissible speed change to 20 mph is
approximately 100 m beyond the signals.
Alternative routes are available to the
platforms 11, 12 and 13 via the 25 mph
crossovers (7222 or 7224). Signals are
fitted with Standard Alphanumeric Route
Indicators displaying only the platform
numbers. Compliance would require an
additional indication for each alternative
route. This would potentially be difficult to
provide, and increase the complexity and
number of elements on signals that are
already complex, I. e. additional Standard
Alphanumeric Route Indicator on each
signal.
N/A
19/11/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
11/12/2014
Current
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3
14-007-DEV
PT249 and PT449 signals in the proximity
of Llanelli East level crossing.
PT249 and PT449 signals in the proximity
of Llanelli East level crossing situated on
the GW900 Pilining to Fishguard Harbour
ELR SWM2 Western Route. Llanelli East is
located at 225 miles 14 chain.
N/A
15/01/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/02/2014
Current
GERT8075
One
All clauses.
14-057-DEV
Deviation against the TPWS and AWS
requirements of GE/RT8075 Issue One.
The 10 new Class 70 locomotives (70801 to
70810 inclusive) manufactured by General
Electric (GE) in 2013 and 2014 onwards for
Colas Rail. This deviation is for a project
Regulations 2011.
N/A
28/03/2014
GE Transportation
Control Command and
Signalling
01/05/2014
Current
GMRT2461
One
7.1, 9.1, 10
14-120-DEV
Sheffield Tram Train Sanding, Issue 2.
(EMUs). Unit numbers: 399201 - 399207.
Vehicle numbers: 99001 - 99007; 99101 99107; 99201 - 99207.
If a train approaching PT249 does not
27/02/2014
trigger the SPAD Prediction equipment to
commence a warning sequence on Llanelli
East level crossing, the user will not see
any indication from the road traffic lights or
audible warning until the train has come to
a stand in the station, and the forward route
is set; the level crossing then goes through
the full sequence of amber and flashing red
lights before the barriers come down. If the
SPAD Prediction equipment calculates that
a SPAD is likely, then the red flashing road
lights are initiated to give at least five
seconds of warning to road users to get
clear, but the barriers are not lowered. The
risk of this happening is judged to be very
low, I. e. the train will not SPAD or the
forward route is set and the crossing is
already closed to the road. This SPAD
prediction initiation supplements the
initiation caused when the train passes the
red signal. The design of SPAD prediction
timers are based on deceleration of a train,
and gives an improved warning time of the
actual SPAD of the train, which will trigger
the red flashing road traffic lights at less
than five seconds. Signal PT449 controls
reversing moves, and cannot be
approached by trains in normal operation.
The deviation 13/044/DGN against
Mk3 TPWS equipment from Thales, which 19/05/2014
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 to allow the installation GE Transportation plan to install to the
and usage of the Thales MK3 TPWS
newly built locomotives, is compliant with
equipment (which complies with
GE/RT8030 Issue 2 but not GE/RT8075
GE/RT8030 Issue 2) was granted to the
Issue 1. Derogation was granted in midproject. With the publication of GE/RT8075 2013 for this, prior to the publication of
Issue 1 to supersede GE/RT8030 Issue 4,
GE/RT8075.
the project is seeking to extend the
deviation to apply to GE/RT8075 Issue 1.
The need for this deviation follows the
update by the Department for Transport
(DfT) of the Notified National Technical Rule
(NNTR) list, whilst the locos development /
manufacture is at a very advance stage (the
first three locomotives are currently in the
UK). As presented in the previous deviation
application, production Thales Mk4 TPWS
equipment that is validated as being
compliant with GE/RT8075 Issue 1 was
only recently made available for
procurement on the market by Thales. The
production of the locomotives had been
started by then and had reached final
stages, with one locomotive already
completed. The integration of the MK4
TPWS equipment would have caused a
delay of 4 to 6 months and large integration
costs of design and installation. In addition,
this delay would have had major
The tram-trains are not permitted to
Sanding is ahead of the leading wheelset
02/09/2015
continue in service with isolated sanders.
and risk to train detection is discussed in
The tram-train is fitted with a distributed
Appendix A. The mainline route is fitted
sanding system, when operating on the
with axle counters that are immune to
mainline: only the leading sander will be
sanders.
used. The sand used will be the same as
for the Sheffield Supertram.
31/12/2016
04/09/2014
Rolling Stock
24/07/2015
Current
It is not practicable to move PT249 or
PT449 due to the close proximity of both
Llanelli East and West level crossings
adjacent to both ends of the platform, and
prior works have taken place to enable First
Great Western trains to stand in the
platform where train stop boards have been
provided. Any further adjustment of these
signals would not allow the service to use
this station. It is not practicable to close
either of the level crossings to create
additional standage at the platforms.
Page44
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2130
Three
2.3.3
14-118-DEV
Contradiction of Running Time
Requirements - Class 387.
2011.
To comply with Clause 2. 3. 3, it would be
necessary to provide significant protection
of systems and/or redundancy to enable the
units to operate for 15 minutes after the
outbreak of a fire. Control cabling in any
area judged to be vulnerable would need to
be protected by some form of shielding.
Some systems may need redundancy with
cabling routed in separate locations. To
achieve this, there would be significant
design changes and additional equipment.
This would add significant cost to the
project. In addition, maintenance of the
vehicles would be changed and in some
cases hindered by the extra protection.
impact from complying with the relevant
clause of the SRT TSI instead of
GM/RT2130. The requirement of the SRT
TSI is considered to be an appropriate
requirement for the Class 387 units.
02/09/2014
N/A
29/08/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GMRT2149
Three
B10.2
14-085-DEV
Class 387 Shoegear Gauge.
Regulations 2011.
It is possible to comply with the
requirements by raising the shoegear
height, but this would cause extremely poor
contact between the conductor rail and the
shoegear. If the Class 387 shoegear is set
to comply with GM/RT2149, then the
following risks arise: The shoes will lose
contact with the third rail and thus prevent
the Class 387 from being powered if static
and present unreliable operation if running
dynamically. When running dynamically
the shoes would periodically lose contact
with the third rail which will cause
significant arching and the electrical
interference generated as a result of this
would give rise to signalling compatibility
issues.
The nominal shoegear height setting on the 09/07/2014
Class 387 is 57 mm ARL in the static tare
laden condition. When the two cases of
GM/RT2149 are applied, this leads to a
worst case exceedance of the swept
envelope of 13. 2 mm. All Electrostar units
fitted with shoegear are subject to
deviations to permit shoegear height setting
which infringes the swept envelope defined
in GM/RT2149 Appendix B (see
08/145/DGN and 10/218/DGN). The oldest
DC Electrostar fleet (Class 375) has been
running on Network Rail infrastructure for
over 10 years. There have been no
significant issues as a result of the gauge
infringement.
N/A
25/06/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GMRT2400
Five
All clauses
Running Mode
Advance stage deviation for installation of
GSM-R to Plasser & Theurer 09-16 CSM
Tampers.
Applies to the installation of GSM-R system
to DR 73105. This deviation is for a project
Regulations 2011.
The machine will operate with the same
level of compliance as all other on-track
machines in the UK that have already been
fitted with GSM-R.
02/05/2014
N/A
28/02/2014
dg8 Design and Engineering Rolling Stock
Ltd
11/04/2014
Current
GMRT2130
Four
All clauses.
14-051-DEV
GSM-R to Plasser & Theurer 09-16 CSM
Tampers.
Due to GM/RT2400 Issue 5 being notified
as a National Technical Rule (NTR) by the
competent authority in the UK, this standard
has become applicable to the project
following the completion of GSM-R system
development, but prior to it being fitted to
DR 73105 (expected to be fitted in
March/April 2014). The design of the GSMR system is compliant with Issue 4 of
GM/RT2400 and the other relevant RGS
that have been excluded by Issue 5 of
GM/RT2400. Issue 5 of GM/RT2400 is a
fundamental revision of the standard to
align it with the prevailing Euronorm EN 14
033 and demonstrating compliance with
Issue 5 would require a complete new
assessment. Therefore, checking
compliance with the new standard at this
advanced stage of the GSM-R project would
require significant new assessment which
would incur additional unjustified cost and
delays to the project.
Applies to the installation of GSM-R system Due to GM/RT2130 Issue 4 being notified
to DR 73105. This deviation is for a project as a National Technical Rule (NTR) by the
requiring authorisation for placing in service competent authority in the UK, this standard
Regulations 2011.
following the completion of Global System
for Mobile communications for Railways
(GSM-R) system development, but prior to
it being fitted to DR 73105 (expected to be
fitted in March/April 2014). The design of
the GSM-R system is compliant with Issue
3 of GM/RT2130. Issue 4 of GM/RT2130 is
a fundamental revision of the standard to
align it with EN 45545, and demonstrating
compliance with Issue 4 would require a
complete new assessment. Therefore,
checking compliance with the new standard
at this advanced stage of the GSM-R
project would require significant new
assessment which would incur additional
cost and delays to the project. In addition,
fixed system parameters cannot be
modified, resulting in the risk that the GSMR system may not comply with the new
Euronorm.
level of compliance as all other on-track
machines in the UK that have already been
fitted with GSM-R.
02/05/2014
N/A
28/02/2014
dg8 Design and Engineering Rolling Stock
Ltd
11/04/2014
Current
GMRT2161
One
6.2.1, 6.2.5
Requirements of Driving Cabs for Railway
Vehicles
14-122-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Windscreen Optical
Properties.
See Appendix.
See Appendix.
12/11/2014
N/A
04/09/2014
Rolling Stock
03/10/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Five
Appendix 1, Clause 1.2
and Trains
14-142-DEV
Lea Bridge Station - Platform offset.
This deviation relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train EMUs. Unit numbers:
99001 - 99007; 99101 - 99107; 99201 99207.
Lea Bridge Station. Engineers' Line
Reference (ELR): SDC. Mileage: 6m
25ch.
Compliance with the standard would mean
non-compliance with another.
Minor impact in regards to safety, no affect 11/12/2014
to performance: The increased offset
reduced the platform overhang which is the
subject of another deviation application Ref.
14/108/DEV (Tracker No. 17890).
N/A
21/10/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
GMRT2141
Three
2.4.1.1 b)
14-126-DEV
Chiltern Railways Mk3 Galley First
Wheelchair (GFW) Auxiliary Power Unit
Modification Resistance to Overturning.
Chiltern Railways Mk3 GFW; extension of
derogation 10/046/DGN.
Chiltern Railways intends to modify its
None
locomotive-hauled Mk3 Galley First
Wheelchair (GFW) vehicles by removing
the motor alternator sets and associated
control equipment and installing one
modern, solid-state Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU). With the proposed new underframe
layout of the GFW vehicle in crush laden
conditions, using the DeltaRail VAMPIRE
modelling software, the vehicle is predicted
to overturn at 20. 3Ã¸ (non-compliant by 0.
7Ã¸). The singular cause of this deviation,
in comparison to the existing GFW vehicle,
is due to the mass reduction and higher
centre of gravity of the vehicle with the net
reduction in vehicle mass. The DeltaRail
VAMPIRE software has been previously
validated for accuracy against Mk3 vehicle
sway test results produced by the British
Railways Board (BRB). On the GFW
vehicle, a universal accessible toilet and
two wheelchair positions are provided at
one end and a galley with vestibule-facing
serving counter at the other end, which,
when calculated in accordance with BRB
document TPE24 `Calculation of Passenger
Carrying Capacity in Multiple Unit Trains',
equates in crush laden conditions to 134
standing passengers. The mass and centre
N/A
12/09/2014
Chiltern Railways
Rolling Stock
03/10/2014
Current
20/10/2014
Page45
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2130
Four
All clauses.
14-109-DEV
Global System for Mobile communications
for Railways (GSM-R) to Class 37
Locomotives.
to 4x Class 37 locomotives;
37116/175/219/421. This deviation is for a
Regulations 2011.
Class 37 locomotives 37116/175/219/421
(expected to be fitted in Summer/Autumn
2014). The design of the GSM-R system is
compliant with Issue 3 of GM/RT2130.
Issue 4 of GM/RT2130 is a fundamental
revision of the standard to align it with EN
assessment. Therefore, complying with the
new standard at this advanced stage of the
GSM-R project would require significant rework that would incur additional cost and
delays to the project. In addition, fixed
system parameters cannot be modified,
resulting in the risk that the GSM-R system
may not comply with the new Euronorm.
level of compliance as all other Class 37
locomotives in the UK that have already
been fitted with GSM-R.
04/08/2014
N/A
04/08/2014
Colas Rail Ltd
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GMRT2149
Three
B10.3
14-084-DEV
Class 387 Automatic Power Control (APC)
Gauge.
Regulations 2011.
If the APC receiver is fitted in a location
which complies with Clause B10. 3 of
GM/RT2149 Issue 3, the manufacturer will
not underwrite the performance of the
device. There is no alternative supplier for
the APC receiver. If the receiver is not
positioned in accordance with the
manufacturer's requirements, the receiver
may not function correctly.
N/A
25/06/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GIRT7016
Five
6.2.1 and 6.2.2 (a) and (b)
and Trains
14-145-DEV
London Bridge station, platforms 1, 2/3, 4/5, London Bridge station, Platforms 1, 2/3,
6/7 and 8/9 eastern (Country) end - reduced 4/5, 6/7 and 8/9 eastern (Country) end,
platform widths a canopy columns.
canopy columns.
N/A
22/10/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
GKRT0045
Three
5.1.2.4
Signals
14-047-DEV
No Route Indication for Straight Route on
EK4157 signal at Rainham, Kent.
This APC receiver has been designed to be 09/07/2014
dimensionally set-up in accordance with the
manufacturer's requirements. When the inservice conditions of the bogie (and
subsequently APC receiver) are analysed
for gauging purposes and compared to the
APC gauge as defined in Appendix C of
GM/RT2149, both a lateral infringement of
17. 25 mm and a vertical infringement of 24
mm to the gauge line is experienced.
Lateral Infringement: GE/GN8573
Guidance on Gauging, Part 4, defines a
lower sector vehicle gauge that can be used
by vehicle manufacturers to ensure
compliance with the relevant Railway Group
Standards. After considering all appropriate
static displacement and dynamic
movements (including tolerances and
vehicle maintenance), if the vehicle and
components on it are within the limits
defined in Part 4 of GE/GN8573,
compliance has been demonstrated. When
the lateral movements of the Class 387
APC receiver are superimposed against the
Lower Sector Vehicle Gauge as shown in
Drawing Ref. 100173029, it can be seen
that there is no lateral infringement, and
hence the lateral infringement of 17. 25 mm
against GM/RT2149, Clause B10. 3 is
Six columns at the country end of
11/12/2014
Platforms 1, 2/3, 4/5, 6/7, 8/9 are less than
2500 mm from the platform edge. This is
because the width of the land owned by
Network Rail, the number of platforms
required to run the train service specified
and agreed with the Department for
Transport (DfT), and the spacing of the rail
tracks at this point drives the platform
widths. Edge distances are as follows:
Platform 1: 1980 mm; Platform 2/3:
2178 mm from Platform 2; 2283 mm from
Platform 3; Platform 4/5: 2179/1957 mm
from Platform 4; 2376/2139 mm from
Platform 5; Platform 6/7: 2492 mm from
Platform 6; Platform 8/9: 2493 mm from
Platform 8; 2462 mm from Platform 9.
Please see diagram attached. The width of
the platforms is driven by the track
alignments, and these are governed by the
width of the viaduct. It is not possible,
using the powers available to Network Rail,
to widen the viaduct. The design chosen is
a balance between widths of platforms
across the whole station, and a degree of
non-compliance is inevitable. The six
terminating platforms (10-15) are slightly
wider, as trains terminating discharge all
their passengers at once. Not all
EK4157 signal has been assessed during 01/04/2014
the signal sighting process as being visible
from 800 m away with an essentially
straight approach and the line speed on the
approach is 80 mph. The divergent routes
into platforms 1 and 0 are to be approachcontrolled from red due to the step down in
speed required to traverse the divergent
routes through the crossovers into the
platforms (these shall be restricted to 25
mph). Impact is considered to be minor as
both diverging routes from the signal are
approach-released from red. Therefore, if
the signal is sighted displaying a proceed
aspect from a significant distance, the
driver will be aware that this corresponds to
the straight-ahead route for which a route
indication is not provided. The proposed
route indication arrangement shall be
clearly shown in the signalling notice and
other briefing material prepared for
operational staff associated with the
commissioning of the new signalling system
including for Southeastern's train crew. In
the longer term, following the
commissioning of the new signalling, an
appreciation of the route indication
arrangements at this signal by drivers shall
be maintained through the route knowledge
N/A
16/02/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/03/2014
Current
EK4157 signal on Down Chatham Line
approaching Rainham Station.
One column on Platform 1 is slightly less
than 2000 mm from the platform edge. It is
very close to the end of the platform and
east of the emergency escape stair, and so
it is in an area of very low pedestrian flow.
One other column is less than 2000 mm
from the edge of platforms 4/5, but this is
close to the end of the operational platform
length. All columns that are less than 2500
mm from the platform edge are at the
country ends of the platforms where, in
normal operation of the station, passenger
flows are low. No flow analysis is offered
with this submission. If there is a need to
evacuate Platforms 2/3, 4/5, 6/7 and 8/9
using the country end escape stairs,
pedestrian flows past the non-compliant
columns could be high, but the pinch point
on the escape routes is always the stairs
themselves, and past these columns the
flow capability is more than twice the
capacity of the escape stairs. Evacuation of
Platform 1 would not result in a high
pedestrian flow past the non-compliant
column because the stair is on the London
side of the column. The proposed new
track and platform alignment is not
significantly different from the layout that
exists today, meaning that station personnel
Rainham Station area is to be resignalled
and the track layout remodelled with the
provision an additional bay platform. Trains
approaching on the Down Chatham line
may be routed three ways from the junction
signal (EK4157) via main class routes into
Rainham Station: Route A(M) - Down
Chatham line (straight ahead) into Platform
2 and subsequently onwards towards the
coast. Route B(M) - Across to Up Chatham
line and into Platform 1 to terminate at a
fixed red light. Route C(M) - Across to Bay
Platform 0 to terminate. Application of a
route indication for the straight ahead route
without approach control would not be
compatible with the readability performance
of the standard alpha-numeric route
indicator due to the line speed for the
straight-ahead route. Approach control of
the signal for the straight-ahead route which
is likely to result in a Signal Passed at
Danger (SPAD) trap as drivers as would
routinely clearing as the train approaches.
This is consequently not considered to be a
satisfactory arrangement by the signal
sighting committee. Therefore, it is
considered that the arrangement of
providing a standard route indicator with an
indication only for the divergent routes
Page46
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0045
Three
2.5.3.4 b) and d)
Signals
14-133-DEV
Richmond Station Platforms 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Richmond Station Buffer Stops - Platforms
4, 5, 6 and 7.
Railway Group Standard GK/RT0045
conflicts with London Underground (LU)
Category 1 Standard S1195. RGS
GK/RT0045 - Clause 2. 5. 3. 4 b) and d)
requires stop lights to be vertically aligned
above the centre line of the track and be
positioned at the buffer stop, in the same
vertical plan as the buffer stop. LU
Category 1 Standard S1195, Clause 3. 4. 2.
7. 3 - Fixed red lights shall be provided for
each track, 2 side-by-side, approximately 3
metres beyond the normal stopping point
and, if there is greater than 10 metres
between the 2 fixed red lights and the end of
the track, a third shall be placed at the
extreme end of the track, at sidings and
terminal platforms. If site geography does
not allow 3 metres between the normal
stopping mark and the two red lights, then
that distance may be decreased, but it shall
not be less than 1. 5 metres. Project felt
that the current requirements in GK/RT0045
were overly prescriptive; it should be left
with the Signal Sighting Committee to
decide the position.
The arrangements are complaint to LUL
12/11/2014
standard and meet the operators (LU and
LOROL) requirements. The proposed Fixed
Red Lights (FRL) arrangements have been
supported by the Signal Sighting Chairman
and Committee members and mitigates
against multiple stop light positions and
considers failure of NR or LU lights. A retroreflective buffer beam surface will be
provided. No risk introduced, the solution
proposed by the Signal Sighting Chairman
and committee members and supported by
the endorsed SSFs.
N/A
08/10/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
16/10/2014
Current
GKRT0192
Two
2.10.2.1
14-062-DEV
Telephones requirements for Automatic
Open Crossing, locally monitored, with
barrier (AOCL+B) crossing type.
All Automatic Open Crossings Locally
Monitored (AOCL) that are being provided
with addition of half barriers. Network Rail
have designated this crossing type as
AOCL+B.
Installation of telephones at all sites being
converted to AOCL+B crossings will require
additional design and installation exercise,
which would delay provision of the barriers
at currently open crossings, type AOCL.
The impact of adding phones would require
signaller ergonomic aspects to be
considered. Addition of telephones at level
crossings with barriers can affect the
signaller's workload, particularly due to
nuisance usage of telephones. This can
distract signallers from safe operation of
railway and other crossings. Workload
would need to be assessed to ensure that it
will not adversely affect the performance of
the signaller. In some cases, an increase of
the number of telephones within a control
area may lead to the assessment requiring
more resources to adequately manage the
control area. This additional work would
make provision of barriers, which provide
the intended safety improvement, less cost
effective and may lead to fewer crossings
being enhanced.
As a fundamental part of AOCL+B is the
28/05/2014
existing AOCL, the crossing remains locally
monitored by the train driver. Telephones
associated with locally monitored crossing
types including AOCL+B are not required to
be utilised for making emergency calls, and
they are of a type that is not self-proving.
Their primarily use is to report equipment
failure, and request permission to cross in
vehicles that need additional crossing time
(typically slow freight vehicles, wide loads,
and low loaders at risk of grounding).
Addition of telephones at locally monitored
crossings does very little to improve overall
risk management when compared to the
addition of the barrier. Since the primary
safety operation of the crossing includes
monitoring of the crossing area by train
driver and trains operated at speed such
they can stop short of the crossing if it does
not operate correctly, non-provision of
phones is not considered to have an impact
of crossing safety.
N/A
11/04/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
01/05/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2. and 6.3.1
and Trains
14-024-DEV
Paddock Wood Station, Platform 2 Reduced platform width and column in
overrun risk zone.
Paddock Wood Station Platform 2. ELR
XTD/PWS1.
N/A
03/02/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
GIRT7033
Two
B6.1, Appendix A Signs
AF02m, AF03, AF04m.
14-078-DEV
Reduced Sized Temporary Speed
Restriction Boards for Thameslink.
The scope of using these Temporary
Speed Restriction (TSR) boards covers the
geographical area of London Bridge on the
Thameslink Programme. The extents of
which are: All lines on ELR XTD from
Charing Cross to Hither Green; All lines on
ELR LBW from London Bridge to Brockley;
All lines on ELR LBC from London Bridge to
Bricklayers Arms Junction; All lines on ELR
CBM from Canon Street to London Bridge;
All lines on ELR CSW from Canon street to
Metropolitan Junction; All lines on ELR HHH
and BMJ from Blackfriars to Metropolitan
Junction. The equipment involved is a
temporary speed restriction sign of identical
construction to those already in use with a
reduced surface area. Note that the same
design of sign is used for emergency speed
restrictions, and this usage is in scope of
this deviation.
A major rebuild of the station canopy would The canopy cannot be supported without
11/04/2014
be required.
the positioning of a column within a buffer
overrun zone and at a sub-standard
clearance from the platform edge.
Due to the complex layout and works
Readability of the smaller sized sign has
16/07/2014
around London Bridge, temporary speed
been designed to be at least as effective at
restrictions for multiple lines often require a 60 mph as the standard sized sign at 125
large number of signs to be placed in the
mph which complies with current standards.
same location, which becomes foul of
As this size of font is already suitable for
gauge once three or more standard sized
speeds up to 125 mph, the reduced size
signs are placed on top of each other if the boards proposed here have better
currently authorised signs are continued to readability than those already approved for
be used. In order to avoid them being
use. The proposed smaller signs reduces
struck by trains, it may be necessary to
the risk of a TSR boards being struck by a
greatly extend temporary speed restrictions, train and reduces the cost of operational
which is undesirable.
delays by minimising the length of TSR
sites. Reduced size signs are proposed for
a scope area where the maximum line
speed does not exceed 60 mph. Trials have
been undertaken to prove that, at line speed
60 mph, the reduced size board is at least
as visible as the standard sign at 125 mph,
which is currently approved. A reduced
sized sign was tested against the
requirement for a sign to be readable for
four seconds at 60 mph, a distance of 107.
26 m. This will provide a surface area
approximately 60% of the size of a normal
sign.
22/10/2018
05/06/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/06/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Five
7.3
and Trains
14-136-DEV
Strood Station, Platforms 2 and 3 - reduced This deviation relates to Platforms 2 and 3
platform width.
at Strood station in Kent.
As part of the East Kent Resignalling
Phase 2 (EKR2) Project, the platforms at
Strood station are to be lengthened at the
London end to accommodate twelve-car
trains in place of the current ten-car
maximum. This is required to facilitate
service lengthening of Southeastern metro
services to twelve-car operation on this
route as the networker train fleet used does
not have selective door operation capability.
The platforms can only be extended at the
London end because of the existence of a
major junction layout at the country end of
the platforms, and hence the extensions are
being undertaken at the London end which
is on a curve constrained by the position of
the entrance to Strood tunnel. This
deviation relates only to the Up island
platform (Platforms 2 and 3). As the
permanent speed restriction applicable to all
lines through Strood station is 15 mph, this
should have a minimum width of 4000 m for
compliance. However, in this instance, it is
proposed that the island platform will taper
to a minimum width of 2905 mm. The total
length of platform less than 4000 mm wide
will be 25 m (of a total platform length of
circa 270 m). To maximise the space
available for the platform extension,
N/A
13/10/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
Network Rail have worked with the relevant 11/12/2014
train operating company, Southeastern, to
assess the risks arising from the final twelvecar platform arrangements. The resulting
risk assessment document is attached and
is supportive of this deviation. Control
measures proposed over and above those
needed to achieve compliance with Railway
Group and Network Rail company
standards have been identified as follows
and will be implemented: Signage to
encourage passengers to wait in the
appropriate section of the platform; Signage
to prohibit passengers from waiting in the
narrowest area beyond the 8/10/12-car
DOO monitor bank where trains will not
routinely stop. It will be ensured that
signage and platform finishes (lining and
tactiles) remain present, legible and
effective for the life of the asset through
appropriate maintenance regimes. Note
that (unlike the temporary arrangement
covered under Tracker No. 18100 14/115/DEV), there is no requirement to
restrict where passengers, who need to use
the access ramp to board or alight the train,
can be accommodated as the platform
width - although reduced - is sufficient to
allow the ramp to be used safely on the 16
Page47
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2400
Five
2.3.1.1
Running Mode
Provision of emergency brake override.
This deviation applies to eight sets of three
permanently coupled vehicles known as
MMS (mobile maintenance systems) TOPS
Vehicle numbers (for the traction vehicles)
DR97501 to DR97508. This deviation is for
a project requiring authorisation for placing
in service under the Railways
(Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
The brakes on on-track machines, in
running mode and when working outside of
a possession if designed for working at
speeds greater than 30 km/h, shall comply
with BS EN 14033-1: 2011 Clause 9. The
performance parameters shall be as set out
in GM/RT2042 or GM/RT2043 as
applicable. Clause 9 of BS EN14033-1
states among many requirements that "An
override device for the emergency brake for
use by the driver shall be provided where
there is the possibility of the emergency
brake being applied remotely from the
driving cab. " It is not reasonable to comply
with this requirement because it would
involve re-engineering of an existing proven
system of control used in other machines of
this type. Moreover, it will not provide any
safety risk and is not a feature that will be
required in the future.
It is not thought that this non-provision of a 02/02/2015
driver override device will have any safety
effect at all. In the event of an emergency,
the machine consist could be brought to a
halt by the actions of the crew in the mess
room without any action on the part of the
driver. The vehicle could not be set in
motion without resetting of that emergency
control. The driver would at all times be
aware of what had happened and would be
in radio contact with the mess room. This
is not thought to be an unsafe situation and
differs greatly from a situation where
passengers are involved and who might
start to exit a train in an inappropriate place.
N/A
18/12/2014
Plasser UK Ltd
Rolling Stock
16/01/2015
Current
GCRT5033
Two
2.3.1
Terminal Tracks - Requirements for Buffer
Stops, Arresting Devices and End Impact
Walls
14-112-DEV
Waterloo International, Platforms 20-23 track curvature at buffer stop
Waterloo International, Platforms 20-23.
P20 radius 220m at proposed location; P21
radius 223m at proposed location; P22
radius 227m at proposed location; P23
radius 241m at proposed location. Please
refer to the attached document 'Waterloo
International Terminal - Buffer Stop
Derogation - Issue 3'.
N/A
18/08/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
GKRT0045
Three
5.2.2.1 a)
Signals
14-008-DEV
TJ30/37 Signal - use of unrestricted aspect
sequence for junction signalling controls
TJ30/37B(M) Route, Gainsborough Trent
Junction.
To comply with the RGS would require one
of the following options to be implemented:
Junction Method 3 - Approach Control from
red: the impact of this would be an
increased Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD)
risk by creation of consecutive approach
release sequences. Junction Method 2 Flashing yellow aspect sequence: the
impact of this would be an increased
complexity in the design and alteration to
existing equipment due to be removed in
approximately two years. Lower
permissible speed on approach for
passenger trains (to achieve junction
method 1: Unrestricted aspect sequence) the impact of this would be to impose a
capacity constraint for all passenger trains
that was not considered acceptable when
viewed against over speed risks at the
junction. None of the methods above were
considered appropriate as the final solution
(see also attached supporting statement).
The Waterloo International Station
12/12/2014
platforms were originally designed to
operate using the areas under the platforms
(arrivals and departures with passport
controls) for the low frequency Eurostar
services. Changing to a high intensity
service requires additional space behind the
buffer stops to allow passenger
congregation and access to and from the
platforms to occur safely, where opposing
passenger flows will occur. The station
structure and platforms have a small
existing straight section (approximately 35
m) at the buffer stop end, and then curve at
radii between 220-241 m. The proposed
location for the buffer stop is approximately
57 m from its current position, which is
compatible with track remodelling options
from GRIP 2 and existing structural bracing
of the elevated track slabs. The
modifications being proposed to the existing
structure are so significant, Section 2. 3
General Requirements for New
Construction have been applied. A risk
assessment using GC/RC5633 has been
undertaken to satisfy Section 2. 4 Requirements for Existing Locations. The
need for a straight approach to the buffer
stops, to satisfy Clause 2. 3. 1. 1, is to
Line-speed on the Up Main from
27/02/2014
Thrumpton to the junction signal TJ30/37 is
currently 30/40 mph. The turn out speed for
the junction is 25 mph. The permissible
speed differential of 15 mph is 5 mph over
that which the standard permits, and the
risk of overspeeding are considered low as
sighting of the junction indicator is in region
of 500 m, and gives sufficient time for the
driver to identify signal and control train
speed to that of the turnout. Route
knowledge learning and briefing are being
carried out for project works and new
signalling arrangements are part of this
work. Other changes are being undertaken
but, as turn out speed is not changing,
existing route knowledge will also mitigate
any overspeed risk at the junction. This
deviation will allow removal of the TSR
applied to make differential in speed
10mph, covered under Deviation No.
13/228/DEV (tracker No. 15381) which
expires on 28/02/2014. Further details on
the analysis of proposed arrangements are
contained in the supporting information.
N/A
16/01/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/02/2014
Current
GMRT2000
Three
6.6.3 and Appendix H
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
14-066-DEV
Derogation for a Steam Locomotive.
Operation of the following preserved steam
locomotive from Sheringham East Network
Rail / North Norfolk Railway (NNR)
boundary to Cromer bufferstops Platform 2,
with diversionary route to Cromer Platform
1 for contingency purposes. Note that:
There is no run round facility at Cromer;
Movements from the NNR must be routed
to Platform 2 at Cromer and the route set
throughout; There is limited scope for
parallel movements - only at Cromer;
Sheringham East Network Rail (NR)
boundary is protected by rail stop devices
vice Train Protection and Warning System
(TPWS); Working of single lines by
Pilotman is currently implemented for all
Cromer to NNR movements London and
North Eastern Railway (LNER). B12 class
steam locomotive No. 8572 TOPS No.
98472 Painted No. 8572 Class / Power
Classification 4 Wheel Arrangement 4-6-0
Maximum Speed 25 mph. For further
details, see Appendix 8.
It would not be practical to revise the RGS
to include steam locomotives, due to their
wide diversity of design from modern
traction units and the general scarcity of
technical information now available to prove
their compliance or otherwise. In a number
of recent re-issues of RGS, specific
exemptions for steam locomotives, shown
in the previous issues, have been
withdrawn, increasing the number of noncompliances for which derogation has now
to be sought.
As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
05/06/2014
document. The preserved steam
locomotive is of a type that ran safely over
the British railway infrastructure since its
introduction in 1928, and continued until its
withdrawal from revenue service. The
design was an updated version of an earlier
design from 1913 (the B12/1). The
improved locomotive design had a history
of reliable service. The locomotive is
intended for Heritage Operation only. In
order to achieve compliance with RGS, the
cost would be prohibitive and such
engineering change would also destroy the
locomotive's fundamental nature and
authenticity as a `heritage' vehicle. Making
the locomotive compliant would, in many
instances, be impractical because of the
bulk and location of the locomotive boiler.
In addition, complying with some elements
of RGS would be of limited benefit, due to
the specific characteristics of the route to be
operated on.
N/A
22/04/2014
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Rolling Stock
15/05/2014
Current
Certificate Number
Page48
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8075
One
4.1.3.34.2.1.7 and 4.2.3.
14-139-DEV
TPWS application on steam locomotive
34016.
Operation of the following preserved Steam
Locomotive on all lines as agreed by
Network Rail Acceptance Panel (NRAP)
and, subsequently, by the Transport
Undertaking. S. R. West Country steam
locomotive `Bodmin'. TOPS No. 98716
Painted No. 34016 Class / Power
Classification 7P Wheel Arrangement 4-6-2
Maximum Speed 75 mph.
Enhancements to the TPWS DMI and
speech warning announcements. Noncompatibility for spares with other steam
locomotives currently operating on Network
Rail controlled infrastructure under
deviations from RGS and non-comparative
driver interface for steam locomotives.
The preserved steam locomotive is of a
04/12/2014
type that ran safely over the British railway
infrastructure since its introduction and
continued until its withdrawal from revenue
service. The locomotive had a history of
reliable service. The locomotive is intended
for Heritage Operation only. In order to
achieve compliance with all RGSs, the cost
would be prohibitive and such engineering
change would also destroy the locomotive's
fundamental nature and authenticity as a
"heritage" vehicle. Making the locomotive
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the bulk and location
of the locomotive boiler. Footplate crew are
subject to specific training in the handling of
a steam locomotive. Steam locomotive
operation requires at least two persons to
present in the cab at all times and regularly
includes a third person whose role is to
independently monitor the performance.
Use of locomotive restricted to <15 k Miles
p. a. as a 'heritage' vehicle which limits
exposure to risk.
N/A
15/10/2014
West Coast Railway
Company Limited
Control Command and
Signalling
13/11/2014
Current
GERT8075
One
2.1.7.4 Table 7, Section H.
14-146-DEV
Woodbridge area - non-provision of
Automatic Level Crossing Advance Warning
Signs (LCAWIs) Automatic Warning
System (AWS).
Route: Anglia. Equipment: Ferry Lane;
ESK: 79m04ch; Haywards, ESK:
79m07ch; Lime Kiln, ESK: 79m29ch;
Sun Wharf, ESK: 79m31ch.
Complying with the requirements will
require four additional AWS. If Solid State
Interlocking (SSI) data interlocking changes
are needed for suppression of the magnets
(as this is on a single line), this will increase
both costs and timescales for delivering the
Automatic Open Crossing, locally
monitored, with barrier (AOCL+B) upgrade.
The additional costs and programme impact
would mean that the level crossing safety
benefit of adding the barriers would not be
realised as quickly as desired, the costs for
meeting the requirement are estimated to
be Âœ25 000. Provision of AWS could
cause significant distraction to drivers when
approaching level crossings and would
increase driver's workload.
N/A
23/10/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
13/11/2014
Current
GCRT5112
Two
7.1.3
Rail Traffic Loading Requirements for the
Design of Railway Structures
14-001-DEV
Bridge 110 in Tanners Hill area - Design for Localised derogation for deck and new
collision loading.
trestles for Bridge 110 in the Tanners Hill
area.
N/A
09/01/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
GMRT2130
Four
All clauses.
14-059-DEV
Deviation against GM/RT2130 Issue 4 for
GSM-R Equipment Installation.
The existing arrangement has no AWS
05/12/2014
currently fitted to the LCAWIs between
Haywards and Lime Kiln Crossings. The
proposal perpetuates this arrangement as
the risk reduction/safety benefit achieved at
the level crossing itself is the priority. The
non-provision of the AWS will mean that
train drivers will not receive the warning of
approach to the third or fourth level
crossing, the warning is provided to draw
the driver's attention to the LCAWI and
subsequent Special Speed Restriction
Board (SSRB) and Driver's Crossing
Indicator (DCI). Upon approach to the first
crossing, the driver would have received the
required AWS warning and, as these
crossings are so close to one another, they
will see the signage for the next crossing
when clearing the previous one, therefore
will not benefit from another warning. The
residual risk will remain the same as it is
now, and it is believed that providing
additional AWS warnings in-between the
crossings will act as an additional
distraction to the driver, who will be
concentrating on each crossing in turn and
therefore would not benefit from having to
react to an additional AWS.
An existing footbridge (Bridge 110)
10/04/2014
currently spans three tracks of the fourtrack XTD (Charing Cross to Dover)
mainline and a reversible single LVT
(Lewisham Vale and Tanners Hill Line)
track at Tanners Hill, with two existing steel
support trestles adjacent to the railway
without any derailment protection. In order
to double the LVT line, one existing steel
support trestle needs to be removed as it
clashes with the proposed new alignment.
Options considered included: Replacement
of footbridge with a completely new and
compliant structure, with supports outside
the hazard zone. However, this solution
has been deemed excessively expensive
and disruptive to the travelling public (the
footbridge provides access to St John's
station) and has thus been rejected outright.
Installation of two new supports within the
hazard zone, but with the provision of
derailment plinths to ensure that these
supports would not be affected by the
predicted loads acting in the event of a train
derailing and striking the structure. These
plinths would thus ensure compliance with
Clause 7. 1. 3 of standard GC/RT5112.
This solution has been developed, and a
cost of this solution derived, which is used
It is proposed that due to the advanced
11/04/2014
state of the project, this is sufficient to
progress to submission and approval. As
the GSM-R installation is fully compliant
with GM/RT2130 Issue 3, there is no safety
implication of this proposed deviation.
N/A
08/04/2014
Southeastern
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GKRT0045
Three
4.1.3.4 a)
Signals
14-080-DEV
Non-fitment of Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS) to signals that
display the single yellow aspect as part of
the non-standard four-aspect sequence on
Great Eastern Main Line (GEML).
Proposed alternative approach means that 07/08/2014
some signals assessed as "low risk" signals
that display the single yellow aspect as part
of the non-standard four-aspect sequence
would not be fitted with TPWS. The intent
of TPWS fitment is to mitigate any increase
risk of an overrun (SPAD) that arises at a
signal as its preliminary caution would also
be the preliminary caution for the signal
ahead of it. The driver could, therefore,
misinterpret the true meaning of the
preliminary caution (double yellow) aspect
and, as a result, approach the previous
signal, which would be at single yellow, at a
higher than intended speed with the
potential of a SPAD at the signal in
question. A Signal Overrun Risk
Assessment (SORA) using the Signal
Assessment Tool (SAT) has been carried
out on all signals on the Electric Lines that
will be used by Crossrail services. This
assessment has been used to determine the
SPAD "risk score" of all signals. The
normal "risk score" for carrying out
assessment for further mitigations on new
or altered signals (that may lead to the
fitment of additional TPWS protection), is
150 or greater. It is, however, proposed to
reduce this threshold to "risk score" of 75
N/A
05/06/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/06/2014
Current
Permission is being sought to place new
supports to a structure within the hazard
zone (4. 5 m from the cess rail and
anywhere between the tracks) which have
not been designed to withstand accidental
impact. No action plan has been adopted
to achieve the compliance. Alternative
design approaches have been developed
and a risk assessment has been undertaken
to evaluate the risk. The risk assessment
showed that it is not reasonably practical to
seek compliance (please see Part 4 of the
Tracker Application Form for compliance
cost). As a result, the derogation is being
sought. The new steel support trestles are
designed to allow for a passive collapse of
just the trestle when a train collides with
them. The superstructure will be
strengthened, such that it will not fail in the
ultimate limit state, in the event that a train
derailment has caused the removal of one
of the new supporting trestles. Therefore, it
is believed that the proposed solution fulfils
the "spirit" or intention of Clause 7. 1. 3. namely that, in the case of a derailment, an
overhead structure is not brought down onto
the train, causing additional injuries to
either train passengers or people using the
bridge. However, derogation is sought as
Applicable for Southeastern operated Class The GSM-R Project is at an advanced stage
465, 466, 375, 376 and 395 rolling stock.
and demonstrating compliance with the
updated standard would delay the project
implementation.
Modified signals on the Up and Down
Electric Lines of the GEML between
Pudding Mill Lane (Stratford area) and
Gidea Park. Signals without TPWS: L331,
L935, L365, L377, L381, L383, L412, L414.
Details of all the signals affected by
Crossrail are given in Table A.
Fitment of TPWS at all signals affected by
Crossrail that display a single yellow aspect
as part of the non-standard four-aspect
sequence is considered not reasonable. A
number of signals affected have a low
Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) risk
(Signal Assessment Tool (SAT) score less
than 75) and, considering this low risk, do
not justify fitment of TPWS. Complying
with the requirements of RGS will increase
assets that are required to be implemented
and maintained that have no justifiable
benefit or purpose. Crossrail works alters a
number of signals on a section of the GEML
route that makes extensive use of nonstandard four-aspect sequences (see Table
A attached). Full compliance to current
standard for all signals in this area would
require TPWS fitment on most signals on
Up and Down Electric Lines, of the GEML.
Page49
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
14-006-DEV
Signal TEB1372 in close proximity to
Polegate Level Crossing.
Polegate level crossing.
In order to comply with the RGS
requirement, the signal would have to be
positioned at least 25m from the crossing.
Standage for trains in the normal direction
is sufficient for trains to occupy the whole
platform. This in turn would mean that
trains reversing at Polegate would have to
pull forward in normal direction of travel to a
point that allows the other end of the train to
be positioned to view signal TEB1372. The
signal and its base would have to be reinstalled in the compliant position.
27/02/2014
N/A
16/01/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/02/2014
Current
GMRT2461
One
6.4
14-097-DEV
Class 142, 143, 144, 150, 153, 155 and 156 The scope of the deviation shall include all
manual sander systems; sand application
Class 142, 143, 144, 150, 153, 155 and 156
prior to commencement of braking.
Diesel Mechanical Multiple Unit (DMMU)
pacer and sprinter units operated by
Northern Rail, First Great Western and
Arriva Trains Wales over all routes operated
over by the named companies with the
detailed traction types.
14/08/2014
31/12/2017
10/07/2014
Northern Rail Ltd
Rolling Stock
25/07/2014
Current
GMRT2000
Three
6.6.3 and Appendix H.2
14-134-DEV
Use of NYMR Teak Bodied Carriages on
Network Rail Infrastructure
Deviation is requested for seven Ex LNE
Railway teak bodied carriages currently
used by the North Yorkshire Moors Railway
(NYMR) on its internal services viz: Â·
Brake Third Open: 43567; Â· Buffet
Unclassified: 641; Â· Restaurant: 43654;
Â· Tourist Third Open: 23956, 56856; Â·
Saloon: 3087; Â· Brake Third Corridor:
3669.
27/11/2014
31/03/2023
13/10/2014
North Yorkshire Moors
Railway Enterprises plc
Rolling Stock
31/10/2014
Current
GERT8075
One
4.1.3.1Appendix F, claused
F3.6 and F3.7
14-093-DEV
Class 387 Train Protection and Warning
System (TPWS) Labelling.
Four-car Class 387/1 Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs) and four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an
option on the current contract). This
deviation is for a project requiring
2011.
The principle risk that is mitigated by the
level crossing controls is that arising from
SPAD. The signal is not approachable by
trains as there is no wrong direction
signalling. The signal has good sighting
due to the position of the train at its
allocated stopping position and architecture
of the station. TPWS TSS is fitted,
principally to mitigate the SPAD risk
associated with the conflict on the crossover, but has a secondary mitigation role to
arrest a SPAD and therefore minimise the
potential risk of collision on the level
crossing.
It should be acknowledged that the main
impacts of the deviation regarding the use
of sanders has been covered in the
deviation for brake step one sanding. The
main issues raised are the train coming to a
stand "beached" on sand. The application
of additional sand prior to the initial
application of the brake will have no effect
on what occurs at the end of the braking
when the train comes to a stand. It is
hoped that one impact will be the increased
ability of the train, especially the 14x units
to be able to sustain a step one brake
application more readily if the application
commences on a pre-treated rail. 14X units
are susceptible to sliding when the brake is
initially applied and have a low tolerance to
rail head conditions. The application of
sand post the brake application may not
allow the sand to propagate along the train
prior to the slide commencing and, once the
leading axle is sliding, this tends to act like
a plough pushing the applied sand from the
rail head and preventing the trailing axles
from gaining any benefit. Northern have
also noted that, during 2013, there was a
marked increase in 14x wheel set wear.
Whilst the reasons for this are as yet
unclear, there are possible links to the
There is unlikely to be any significant
impact with the use of these vehicles on
NYMR services; they have very similar
traffic characteristics to the existing fleet of
NYMR Mark 1 carriages, with which they
are completely interchangeable, although
the intention would be to run them as a
uniform formation. The benefits to the
NYMR of running these vehicles to Whitby
in particular are: it increases the pool of
available vehicles; it provides a particularly
attractive historical train of vehicles of a
type which will have worked to Whitby
during their LNER and BR service lives.
The use of these vehicles would have no
effect on the safety of the railway system as
they would be used on the same basis as
the NYMR Mark 1 fleet. The use of these
vehicles will have no effect on the technical
compatibility of the railway system now and
in the future as they use conventional drop
head buck eye couplers, conventional
buffers and automatic vacuum brakes. The
use of these vehicles does not affect costs
or service performance. The NYMR
experience of using these vehicles between
Pickering and Grosmont shows them to be
as reliable in service as our mark one fleet.
The affected parties would be Northern Rail
All current existing Electrostar units feature
TPWS Driver Machine Interface (DMI)
labels with a character height of 3 mm and
a similar arrangement to that proposed for
the Class 387. The worst case angle
subtended at the eye is 11. 3 minutes of
arc, which is comparable to and better than
other labels on the driver's desk that comply
with good practice. There is no evidence
that the existing controls are difficult to
read, and so it is not considered that there
is a negative impact from this noncompliance.
21/08/2014
N/A
25/06/2014
on behalf of, Southern
Railway
Control Command and
Signalling
24/07/2014
Current
This is already dealt with in Deviation
14/083/DEV for the fitment and use of brake
step one sanding (will cover all 14X and
15X units so fitted with the manual sanding
device). This is an extension of this and
looks to allow sand to be applied prior to
brake step one taking place to ensure the
train wheels are on a sand treated rail prior
to braking commencing. Note: this does
not cover units fitted with auto-devices that
links into the Wheel Slide Protection (WSP)
systems (I. e. 158, 321, 322, 333 etc. ).
Previously, deviations were raised against
the requirements of GM/RT2461 regarding
the manual application of sand on 14X and
153 units which do not comply to the
standard requirements due to their
wheel/axle formation. The deviation was in
way of asking for permission to have
sanding devices fitted to these units despite
the wording of the procedure. Initial fitment
saw a step three system placed on the units
which was immediately recognised as being
not fit for purpose, and a deviation was
raised to have this changed to step two
application. The step two sanding was an
improvement; however, it was recognised
that, to achieve better results, a deviation
should be requested for step one sanding to
In the case of GM/RT2000, deviation is
sought from the policy statement laid out in
clause H2 (a) which states: "No additional
wooden bodied rail vehicles designed or
modified to carry persons shall be
certificated for registration to operate on
Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure. " The
NYMR, in association with Network Rail,
has been awarded funding from the Coastal
Communities initiative for works at Whitby
Station to enable the NYMR to improve train
services from Whitby to Pickering. The
improvement to services will be enhanced
and sustained by the use of attractive
historic vehicles as an alternative to the
Mark 1 sets which would have to be used
instead. Deviations from the other quoted
RGS requirements are matters of technical
content, for which deviations are sought on
the basis that the vehicles generally
complied with the standards extant at the
time of their service use on the London and
North Eastern Railway (LNER) and British
Rail (BR), but which standards have now
been revised in line with current available
technology. Generally, compliance with this
group of standards would be unreasonably
expensive and would detract from the
experience of offering a passenger service
Fully complying with Clauses F3. 6 and F3.
7 of GE/RT8075 would make the TPWS
labels inconsistent with the labelling in the
remainder of the cab. The control
pushbuttons are different sizes. Complying
with GE/RT8075 Clause F3. 6, vertically
aligning the rows for each label, causes the
space between the control and the label to
be different and larger than necessary. This
is not consistent with good practice whereby
space between the label and control is
consistent. Text would be considerably
larger than the existing labels and would
appear more prominent than on other
controls and indicators. This could be
interpreted as the TPWS interface being
more important than other displays in the
cab. Although it is a primary instrument, it
should not be prioritised over other primary
instrumentation. There is insufficient space
to make all other labelling consistent with
the specified text size. This good practice
of consistency is identified within the "Ten
principles for good interface design", shown
on page 36 of the RSSB's "Understanding
Human Factors - A Guide for Railway
Industry" 2008, and is contained within the
guidance notes of the RSSB's "Alarms and
Alerts Guidance and Evaluation Tool".
Page50
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8000-TW5
Four
4.2
Preparation and movement of trains Defective or isolated vehicles and on-train
equipment
14-060-DEV
AWS required to be sealed to enter service
deviation.
Class 142, 144 and 150/1 Diesel
Mechanical Multiple Unit (DMMU) which
employ a traditional isolating handle with
seal for the Automatic Warning System
(AWS). The deviation is with regards to the
AWS seal being broken and does not in any
way seek to deviate against the rules for
AWS isolation. It is assumed that the AWS
will still be operative but for operational
reasons the AWS seal has had to be broken
to affect a temporary isolation following the
train coming to a stand on the AWS track
equipment.
09/04/2014
Northern Rail Limited
Management
20/05/2014
Current
One
2.1.12.1
14-158-DEV
Far North Radio Electronic Token Block
(RETB) Automatic Warning System (AWS)
cancelling indicators at Halkirk Level
Crossing (LC).
Halkirk LC is located on the WCK line at
145M 59ch.
N/A
19/11/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
11/12/2014
Current
GMRT2000
Three
6.6.3 and Appendix H
14-017-DEV
Derogation for a Steam Locomotive.
Operation of the following preserved steam
locomotive on all lines, as agreed by the
Network Rail Acceptance Body (NRAB) and
subsequently by the Licensed Operator. SR
Merchant Navy class steam locomotive No.
35018 `British India Line'. TOPS No.
98818 Painted No. 35018 Class / Power
of recent re-issues of RGSs, specific
exemptions for steam locomotives shown in
the previous issues have been withdrawn,
increasing the number of non-compliances
for which derogation has now to be sought.
The main impact potentially would be a
06/08/2014
train entering service with AWS isolated due
to the driver either forgetting or choosing to
not re-instate the system. Once the AWS is
re-instated, there is no impact on safety or
any other concerned party. The rule book
now permits a unit to run Empty Coaching
Stock (ECS) with AWS isolated to a depot.
What the rule book does not do is stipulate
what sort of distance this journey may be
so, potentially, a unit could run a great
distance to get to a depot for repair with the
AWS isolated in line with GE/RT8000/TW5,
Clause 4. 4. What Northern are proposing
is a safer system which allows for the fact
that the AWS has been made operative
prior to the journey commencing. Drivers
will receive a full briefing on the deviation
and the method of working and details will
be recorded on the Northern contingency
plan (DOTE). Northern controllers will also
be briefed on the specific requirements.
The frequency of these events is low, which
reduces the amount of times a unit will be
required to run with the AWS unsealed.
The measures to ensure that the AWS
systems are not being misused are: other
drivers who safety check and operate the
units in should be reporting any seals that
On the RETB line North of Inverness,
12/01/2015
Network Rail has developed an upgrade of
Halkirk LC to ABCL. When passing over a
permanent magnet, the driver of the train
has to cancel the warning. Where the
magnet does not apply to the direction the
train travels in, the driver will use route
knowledge to establish that it does not
apply. This project is similar to previous
upgrades at Marrel, Blackwood and
Acheilidh LCs carried out by Railtrack in
2002. These previous schemes were
approved by Her Majesty's Railway
Inspectorate (HMRI) and that approval was
given on the basis of the principle
established during the formal Department of
Transport (DoT) inspection of the original
RETB installation between Dingwall and
Kyle in November 1984. During that
inspection, and duly recorded in the
minutes, it was directed that AWS
cancelling indicators were of no value and
were not required on RETB infrastructure.
This principle, having been established as
part of the very first RETB DoT inspection
was then applied by British Rail to all the
subsequent RETB deployments in Scotland.
This submission, therefore, seeks a
deviation against the current RGS
As indicated in Appendix 7. The preserved 06/03/2014
steam locomotive is of a type that ran safely
over the British railway infrastructure since
its introduction in May 1945 and continued
until its withdrawal from revenue service.
The locomotive had a history of reliable
service. The locomotive is intended for
Heritage Operation only. In order to
achieve compliance with RGS, the cost
of the locomotive boiler.
N/A
GERT8075
Any unit has the potential for coming to a
stand with the on board AWS equipment
directly above the track AWS equipment
which results in the AWS having to be
isolated to be able to move the vehicle off
the magnet. This more often occurs with
the rear vehicle when arriving in stations
such as Leeds where AWS is used in the
platforms for bi-directional working; a driver
changes ends and discovers that the vehicle
is stood over the magnet. With most
modern units, this results in the AWS being
isolated and a fitter or engineer being
required to reinstate the AWS. However,
with 142, 144 and 150/1 units, a traditional
AWS isolating handle with seal is used.
This means that the driver can isolate the
AWS, move the unit and then reinstate the
AWS, but cannot reseal the AWS handle.
We are then left with a unit which has a fully
functioning AWS system but which is not
permitted to enter passenger service due to
the seal being missing and, if we do not
have a fitter to hand, we have to then cancel
the service or severely delay it. However,
this is not a frequent occurrence. Note that
we are not looking to change any rules or
obtain any deviations to any rules
appertaining to the AWS remaining isolated
It is not appropriate to attempt to achieve
compliance due to the high number of level
crossings involved that currently do not
have AWS cancelling boards, and the
substantial costs associated with
installation and future maintenance of AWS
cancelling indicators throughout the Far
North RETB line. Installation of AWS
cancelling boards just at this crossing would
create an inconsistency, and therefore the
only two options are to maintain the current
status quo, with no fitments, or to embark
on complete line of route fitment. To
achieve full compliance, AWS cancelling
indicators would need to be retrospectively
installed at all distant boards and level
crossing Advance Warning Boards (AWBs)
at a substantial cost, both in terms of
installation and subsequent ongoing
inspection / maintenance. It is therefore not
considered reasonably practicable to bring
the entire Far North RETB line into
compliance with this requirement as the
costs far outweigh any safety benefit.
N/A
22/01/2014
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Rolling Stock
14/02/2014
Current
GMRT2461
One
6.2, 9.1, 9.3.1
14-155-DEV
Class 377 Sanding on Trailing Units.
All Class 377 Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs).
The deviation requests enhanced
performance, which is non-compliant with
the standard as written, but consistent with
the objectives of the standard.
Sand will only be dispensed during a brake 02/01/2015
application (step 2, full service or
emergency) by units on which the leading
vehicle detects wheel slide. As such,
trailing units will only dispense sand if they
detect wheel slide and have sufficient sand
available. The likelihood of sanding on
trailing units occurring is lower, as the
leading unit will condition the railhead and
so the trailing units are likely to experience
wheel slide or slip to a lesser extent. This
functionality has been developed to
increase the safety of the railway in
conditions of extremely poor rail head
adhesion or where the sanding system on
the leading unit does not function correctly
(due to a fault or having run out of sand),
having a positive impact on overall system
performance. Whenever sand is applied on
a trailing unit, there will always be at least
twelve axles after the initial sand deposition
point. The amount of sand deposited and
the number axles following the deposition
point will be the same as if the units were
separate trains following each other.
Therefore, it is considered that there is no
negative impact in terms of contamination
of the railhead, noting that sand will only be
deployed on the trailing unit if the railhead
N/A
17/11/2014
Southern Railway Limited
Rolling Stock
05/12/2014
Current
Page51
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2130
Four
All clauses.
14-166-DEV
for Railways (GSM-R) to a Class 47
Locomotive.
to 1 x Class 47 locomotive 47830. This
2011.
Class 47 locomotive 47830 (expected to be
fitted in early 2015). The design of the
GSM-R system is compliant with Issue 3 of
align it with EN 45545, and demonstrating
compliance with Issue 4 would require a
complete new assessment. Therefore,
complying with the new standard at this
advanced stage of the GSM-R project would
require significant re-work that would incur
additional cost and delays to the project. In
addition, fixed system parameters cannot
be modified, resulting in the risk that the
GSM-R system may not comply with the
new Euronorm.
The locomotive will operate with the same
level of compliance as all other Class 47
locomotives in the UK that have already
been fitted with GSM-R.
05/12/2014
N/A
20/11/2014
Freightliner Ltd
Rolling Stock
16/01/2015
Current
GERT8075
One
2.1.12.1
14-148-DEV
Far North Radio Electronic Token Block
(RETB) Automatic Warning System (AWS)
Cancelling Indicators at Duirinish Level
Crossing (LC).
Duirinish LC is located on the KYL Line at
56M 58ch.
It is not appropriate to attempt to achieve
compliance due to the high number of level
crossings involved that currently do not
have AWS cancelling boards, and the
substantial costs associated with
installation and future maintenance of AWS
cancelling indicators throughout the Far
North RETB Line. Installation of AWS
Cancelling Boards just at this crossing
would create an inconsistency and,
therefore, the only two options are to
maintain the current status quo with no
fitments, or to embark on complete Line of
Route fitment. To achieve full compliance,
AWS cancelling indicators would need to be
retrospectively installed at all Distant
Boards and Level Crossing Advance
Warning Boards (AWBs) at a substantial
cost, both in terms of installation and
subsequent ongoing inspection /
maintenance. It is therefore not considered
reasonably practicable to bring the entire
Far North RETB Line into compliance with
this requirement as the costs far outweigh
any safety benefit.
N/A
23/10/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
13/11/2014
Current
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
14-041-DEV
Signal T869 in close proximity to
Billingshurst Level Crossing.
Signal T869 at Billingshurst Station is
positioned 15m from the Level Crossing,
but is only utilised as a Turn Back Signal
and thus non-approached. The signal has
been positioned in parallel to the main
running signal T867 which has been
configured so that movement authorities
towards the stop signal are only displayed
when the level crossing is closed to road
traffic.
In order to comply with the RGS
requirement, the signal would have to be
positioned at least 25 m from the crossing.
Standage for trains in the normal direction
is sufficient for trains to occupy the whole
platform. This in turn would mean that
trains reversing at Billingshurst would have
to pull forward in normal direction of travel
to a point that allows the other end of the
train to be positioned to view signal T869.
The signal and its base would have to be reinstalled in the compliant position.
N/A
13/02/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/03/2014
Current
GMRT2473
Two
B7.10
14-088-DEV
Class 387 Door Auto-Close Timing.
Regulations 2011.
All previous Electrostar builds (as well as
some other non-Bombardier products such
as the Hitachi Class 395) have used a door
auto-close time of around 15 seconds,
rather than the 45 second minimum
specified in GM/RT2473. The energy
consumption of the Heating, Ventilating and
Air Conditioning (HVAC) system would be
increased and passenger comfort reduced if
the auto-close time was increased from
around 15 to 45 seconds.
On the RETB Line North of Inverness,
05/12/2014
Network Rail has developed an upgrade of
Duirinish LC to ABCL. When passing over
a permanent magnet, the driver of the train
has to cancel the warning. Where the
magnet does not apply to the direction the
train travels in, the driver will use route
knowledge to establish that it does not
apply. This project is similar to previous
upgrades at Marrel, Blackwood and
Acheilidh LCs carried out by Railtrack in
2002. These previous schemes were
approved by Her Majesty's Railway
Inspectorate (HMRI) and that approval was
given on the basis of the principle
established during the formal Department of
Transport (DoT) Inspection of the original
RETB installation between Dingwall and
Kyle in November 1984. During that
Inspection, and duly recorded in the
minutes, the DoT directed that AWS
Cancelling Indicators were of no value and
were not required on RETB Infrastructure.
This principle, having been established as
part of the very first RETB DoT Inspection,
was then applied by British Rail to all the
subsequent RETB deployments in Scotland.
This submission therefore seeks a deviation
against the current RGS requirement to
The principal risk that is mitigated by the
25/03/2014
level crossing controls is that arising from
Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD). The
signal is not normally approachable by
trains as there is no wrong direction
signalling. The signal has good sighting
due to the position of the train at its
allocated stopping position and architecture
of the station, and also for trains
approaching under perturbed working
without being signalled. TPWS TSS is
fitted, principally to mitigate the SPAD risk
associated with the conflict on the crossover, but has a secondary mitigation role to
arrest a SPAD and therefore minimise the
potential risk of collision on the level
crossing.
A fifteen-second door auto-close time was 09/07/2014
previously permitted for "all passenger
vehicles fitted with power operated doors
with an autoclose facility" by noncompliance 08/059/NC. However, this noncompliance applies to GM/RT2473 Issue 1.
GM/RT2473 has subsequently been upissued to Issue 2 (a small-scale change not
affecting the auto-close timing requirement)
and so the non-compliance cannot be
applied to the Class 387 units. 08/059/NC
states: "The requirement in Clause B7. 10
is the responsibility of the Railway
Undertaking and is therefore not within the
scope of Railway Group Standards. This
clause is a single duty holders responsibility
and should be removed from GM/RT2473.
A number of deviations are listed against
GM/RT2473 Clause B7. 10. The deviations
relate to the reduction of the door autoclose
facility from 45 seconds to a time
determined by the Railway Undertaking.
Allowing Railway Undertakings to determine
the optimum door auto-close timing for
power operated doors would potentially
reduce the risk to passengers of slip / trip
hazards due to inclement weather
conditions. It would also increase
passenger comfort by reducing the
N/A
25/06/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
Page52
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2
and Trains
14-029-DEV
New Southgate Station Platforms 3 and 4 reduced platform width at mid platform
fencing.
New Southgate Station Platforms 3 and 4.
New fencing would be introduced to
prevent suicide. The fenceline would follow
an existing non-compliance and cannot
comply for pedestrian flow and fire safety
reasons. The existing outer edge of the
stairs has 2720 mm clearance, a noncompliance; therefore, the fenceline cannot
be placed further from the platform edge
and is not making the situation worse.
GERT8075
One
4.1.3.34.2.1.7 and 4.2.3.
14-138-DEV
TPWS application on steam locomotive
76084.
GMRT2130
Three
2.5.5
14-117-DEV
GMRT2130
Three
4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.6
GMRT2000
Three
The clauses against which Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
non-compliances are sought
can be found in Appendix 2
page 1 of the accompanying
supporting document.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
The introduction of 247 metres of 1. 4 m
09/04/2014
high grey galvanised mid-platform fencing
at the location is intended to restrict the
access by passengers to the fast line edge
of the track so as to discourage suicide,
access where it is necessary (e. g. in an
emergency stopping service) is maintained
through the introduction of 3 m wide gates
which will not be locked and clearly
identified by signage. The deviation for
New Southgate is for 5 m of the proposed
fenceline, at the bottom of the stairs to
Platforms 3 and 4, which has a platform
clearance of 2720 mm to the Down Fast
Side. The minimum clearance in
accordance with GI/RT7016 is 3000 mm.
The introduction of this fencing is intended
to save life at a station where four people
have intentionally taken their lives in the last
five years. There is an existing noncompliance which we intend to extend - this
is very similar to approved derogations for
Southall (Certificate No 12/198/DGN),
Hayes and Harlington (Certificate No
12/231/DGN) and Goring and Streatley
(Certificate No 13/089/DEV). Pedestrian
flow and fire safety analysis have been
performed at the station and on these
designs. They have been approved as not
Operation of the following preserved Steam Enhancements to the TPWS DMI and
The preserved steam locomotive is of a
04/12/2014
speech warning announcements. Nontype that ran safely over the British railway
Network Rail Acceptance Panel (NRAP) and compatibility for spares with other steam
infrastructure since its introduction and
subsequently, by the Transport
locomotives currently operating on Network continued until its withdrawal from revenue
Undertaking. British Railways Standard
Rail controlled infrastructure under
service. The locomotive had a history of
Class 4 TOPS No. 98484 Painted No.
deviations from RGS and non-comparative reliable service. The locomotive is intended
76084 Class / Power Classification 4MT
driver interface for steam locomotives.
for Heritage Operation only. In order to
Wheel Arrangement 2-6-0 Maximum Speed
achieve compliance with all RGS, the cost
60 mph.
of the locomotive boiler. Footplate crew are
subject to specific training in the handling of
a steam locomotive. Steam locomotive
operation requires at least two persons to
present in the cab at all times and regularly
includes a third person whose role is to
independently monitor the performance.
Use of locomotive restricted to <15 k Miles
p. a. as a 'heritage' vehicle which limits
exposure to risk.
N/A
11/02/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
N/A
15/10/2014
West Coast Railway
Company Limited
Control Command and
Signalling
13/11/2014
Current
Class 387 Cab-Saloon Door not Self
Closing.
EMUs (an option on the current contract.
2011.
14-116-DEV
Class 387 Emergency Lighting
Performance.
Regulations 2011.
14-132-DEV
Steam Locomotive Bodmin TOPS number
98716.
At the outer ends of a train the cab/saloon
door forms part of the fire barrier between
the cab and the passenger saloon, and it is
locked shut to prevent passenger access to
the cab. This door is not self-closing. To
comply with the clause, a closing device
would have to be added to the door. It is
considered that, if such a device was fitted,
train crew could rely on the device and may
not check that the door is securely closed.
There is a risk that the closing device would
shut the door, but not fully, which presents
a risk to the train security. It should be
noted that, when the cab is in the middle of
a multiple formation, the cab/saloon door is
locked in the converted position, preventing
passenger access to the cab controls, and a
compliant gangway door operates as part of
the fire barrier.
02/09/2014
impact of this deviation since train crew are
already used to closing the cab-saloon
door. Therefore, a fire barrier is always
maintained.
N/A
29/08/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
Â· Light above doorway: There is limited
space above each doorway due to the UK
loading gauge and the space requirements
of the door header gear. To fit emergency
lighting directly above each bodyside door,
the lighting unit would have to be fitted
between the door gear and the header gear
trim panel, moving the trim panel lower.
This would reduce the door throughway
height, which is already lower than that
required by GM/RT2473 Clause B5. 1. 2; a
separate deviation application applies to
this clause. The lower doorway would
increase the risk of passengers striking their
head, and would impede evacuation.
Controls and signage in field of illumination:
The door controls and signage are located
on stand backs to the side of the doorways,
and back from the door itself. It is not
possible to have a single light pointing at
the door threshold and at the controls.
Therefore, multiple lights would be required.
This would contradict the objective of not
attracting passengers to the vestibule (as
described in guidance note GM/RC2531
Clause RC024). Provide lighting for
charging photo-luminescent signage: As
above, this would require a bright light
directed at the signage, which would
Operation of the following preserved Steam Steam Locomotive construction and
operating systems are incompatible with the
Network Rail Acceptance Panel (NRAP)
areas of RGS specified in the supporting
and, subsequently, by the Transport
document.
Undertaking. S. R. West Country steam
locomotive `Bodmin': TOPS No. . 98716
It is considered that there are no negative 02/09/2014
impacts from the Class 387 emergency
lighting design. Position of lights and
illumination of controls: GM/RT2130
(together with guidance note GM/RC2531)
gives two reasons for requiring emergency
lights above the door and not in the centre
of the vestibule. o Firstly, it should avoid
encouraging passengers towards the
vestibule. This is not applicable to vehicles
such as Class 387 where the vestibules are
at 1/3 and 2/3 positions in the vehicle, and
there is no full partition between the
passenger seats. Any lighting in the
vestibule, at the centre or at the doorway,
will be visible to passengers. The proposed
location of lighting will create even lighting
along the vehicle, without attracting
passengers to any area. o Secondly,
lighting from the centre would mean that
passengers created shadows over any
equipment they tried to use since the light
would be behind the passengers. The
position of the lighting on Class 387
minimises this issue within the space
constraints of the doorway. The problems
with shadows are minimised due to the
position of the normal and emergency door
controls (and passenger emergency alarm)
03/12/2014
introduction and continued until its
locomotive had a history of reliable service.
The locomotive is intended for Heritage
Operation only. In order to achieve
compliance with RGS, the cost would be
prohibitive and such engineering change
would also destroy the locomotive's
N/A
29/08/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
N/A
07/10/2014
West Coast Railway
Company Limited
Rolling Stock
31/10/2014
Current
Page53
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.2.2
14-079-DEV
Chaffers TMOB - Stop boards Close to
Crossing.
Chaffers level crossing is located on the
Gannow Jcn to Colne (GJC) single line at
25 miles and 62 chains. Linespeed: 50
mph. The crossing is classed as a Train
Crew Operated Barrier (TMOB).
Moving the stop board to a compliant
position of 50 m from the crossing will have
an adverse effect on the sighting of the
crossing, and increase the barrier down
times. It would adversely affect the sighting
of the St George's Cross sign in the up
direction, and the stop board in the down
direction. The attached risk assessment
has fully assessed the change to the risk
profile that would be introduced by
configuring the crossing with signs in a
position that complies with the requirement.
With respect to the stop board positions,
16/07/2014
changing the operation of the crossing is
not expected to have significant impact on
the safety profile of the crossing. Trains
have been stopping at these stop boards for
many years without recorded incident. As
there is no pull cord to draw up to, trains
may stop further from the stop boards,
which may slightly reduce the risk of
passing these accidentally. The wording on
the stop boards will be altered to remove
reference to the pull cord, which will be no
longer part of the operation of the crossing,
and the railway undertakings will be briefed
on the change in operation. Removal of the
pull cord is designed to mitigate for
vandalism to it; members of the public
have been smearing the cord with
excrement, which is a health hazard. The
proposed method of operation removes the
need for the driver to contact anything in
normal operation, as the crossing is
initiated by treadle. Controls monitor the
train from strike-in, and these do not allow
the driver's white light indication to flash
until the train has come to a stand.
N/A
05/06/2014
LNW North
Control Command and
Signalling
26/06/2014
Current
GKRT0192
Two
2.10.2.1
14-094-DEV
Telephone requirements for Automatic
Barrier Level Crossing Locally Monitored by
train crew (ABCL) converted from
Automatic Open Crossing Locally Monitored
(AOCL).
National application for conversions of
Automatic Open Crossing Locally Monitored
(AOCL) to Automatic Barrier Crossing
Locally Monitored (ABCL).
Many AOCL crossings do not have public
telephones. The impact of adding phones
at the time of conversion to ABCL would
require signaller ergonomic aspects to be
considered. Addition of telephones at level
crossings with barriers can affect the
signaller's workload, particularly due to
nuisance usage of telephones. This can
distract signallers from safe operation of
railway and other crossings. Workload
would need to be assessed to ensure that it
will not adversely affect the performance of
the signaller. In some cases, an increase of
the number of telephones within a control
area may lead to the assessment requiring
more resources to adequately manage the
control area.
A fundamental part of conversion to ABCL 21/08/2014
is that the crossing remains locally
monitored by the train driver. The
telephones associated with locally
monitored crossing types are not required to
be utilised for making emergency calls, and
they are of a type that is not self-proving.
Their use is primarily to report equipment
failure, and to request permission to cross
in vehicles that are likely to need additional
crossing time (typically slow freight
vehicles, wide loads, and low loaders at risk
of grounding). The addition of telephones
at locally monitored crossings does very
little to improve risk management, since the
primary safety operation of the crossing
includes monitoring of the crossing area by
train drivers and trains operated at speed
such they can stop short of the crossing if it
does not operate correctly.
N/A
24/06/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
N/A
Current
GMRT2000
Three
The clauses against which Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
non-compliances are sought
can be found in Appendix 2
page 1 of the accompanying
supporting document.
14-131-DEV
Steam Locomotive TOPS number 98484.
Network Rail Acceptance Panel (NRAP) and
subsequently, by the Transport
Undertaking. British Railways Standard
Class 4 TOPS No. 98484 Painted No.
76084 Class / Power Classification: 4MT
Wheel Arrangement: 2-6-0 Maximum
Speed: 50 mph.
Steam Locomotive construction and
operating systems are incompatible with the
areas of RGS specified in the supporting
document.
03/12/2014
introduction and continued until its
locomotive had a history of reliable service.
N/A
07/10/2014
West Coast Railway
Company Limited
Rolling Stock
31/10/2014
Current
GMRT2491
Two
3.1.1
Design Requirements for a Driver's
Reminder Appliance (DRA)
14-064-DEV
Sheffield Tram Train DRA Fitment.
99001 - 99007, 99101 - 99107,99201 99207.
See Appendix.
12/11/2014
N/A
17/04/2014
Rolling Stock
03/10/2014
Current
GKRT0075
Two
3.3.1.4 b)
Signage
14-104-DEV
Non-provision of Permissible Speed
Warning Indicators (PSWI) boards in the
vicinity of Spa Road.
Non-provision of PSWI boards in the
vicinity of Spa Road.
All approaches to the 30 and 40 mph speed 24/09/2014
restrictions are via 50 mph crossovers or
are on a line with a maximum linespeed of
50 mph for a distance of 500 m+ on
approach, which should allow sufficient
time/sighting for the driver to reduce speed
accordingly. Taking into account all
potential warning board positions detailed in
Section 10, it is considered that the benefits
of providing PSWI for the reduction in
speed is outweighed by the risk of
overloading drivers with information and
liable to cause confusion. (Note this risk is
described in GK/RT0075 Section 3. 2. 2).
N/A
31/07/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/08/2014
Current
GERT8075
One
3.2.1.3
14-123-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS) receiver position. three-car tram-train EMUs for operation
only on routes fitted with axle counters.
Unit numbers: 399201 - 399207. Vehicle
numbers: 99001 - 99007 99101 9910799201 - 99207.
The tram-train vehicles are being built to an
existing design which, in common with other
tram vehicles, does not have a Driver's
Reminder Appliance (DRA) system fitted.
Integration of the DRA system would
require a series of design changes,
including further modification to the driving
cab environment.
Permissible Speed Warning Indicators
(PSWI) would need to be provided in the
Down direction for the following speed
reductions: 60 mph from the Down Sussex
Slow to 40 mph PSR on the Sussex
Reversible at LBC 2624 m; 60 mph from
the Sussex Reversible to 40 mph PSR on
the Sussex Reversible at LBC 2624 m; 60
mph from the South London Reversible to
40 mph PSR on the South London
Reversible at LBC 2624 m; 60 mph from the
South London Reversible to 30 mph PSR
on the South London Reversible at LBC
2624 m; 60 mph - 40 mph speed reduction
would require a PSWI at minimum of 706 m
(at approximately 4865 m) from the speed
restriction; 60 mph - 30 mph speed
reduction would require a PSWI at
minimum of 805 m (at approximately 4766
m) from the speed restriction. The first
logical position for the PSWIs would be
combined with the 30/50 mph turnout board
at 3m00ch on the Down Sussex Slow,
combined with the 30/50 mph turnout at
2m78ch on the Sussex Reversible and
approximately 2m78ch on the South
London Reversible. However, in order to
physically fit the boards in the 6ft, they
would require to be positioned in a stack
Full compliance with the GE/RT8075 Issue
1, Clause 3. 2. 1. 3 would necessitate a
significant redesign of the vehicle, and
would add considerable time and cost to the
project even if it were found to be
technically feasible.
There is no impact of the alternative TPWS 12/10/2015
receiver position on the hazard controlled by
the standard (that of interference with TI21
track circuits).
N/A
04/09/2014
Control Command and
Signalling
03/09/2015
Current
Page54
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0045
Three
5.1.3.4
Signals
14-160-DEV
SN105 and SN125 non-provision of
approach release from red for reduced
junction indication visibility.
Signals SN105 and SN125 are on Line 1
(Down Direction) leaving Paddington
Station, MLN 1Â¬MP to 2MP.
Complying with the standard would require
the signals to have either some form of
approach control for the diverging routes, or
significant infrastructure alterations to
achieve sighting of the junction indicator.
Each approach control method would
increase the level of complexity of the
signalling controls, have negative impact on
capacity, increase Signal Passed at Danger
(SPAD) risk for the area or increase
potential for confusion with other signals in
the area. Achieving sighting of the junction
indicators is not practical to achieve due to
curved approach, amount of OverHead Line
Equipment (OHLE) masts on approach and
boundary constraints. Further detailed
consideration on each option considered is
in Section 7 of supporting document NRSDG-NC-123242. 11-000002.
No approach release controls are proposed 12/01/2015
as approach speed to the signals will be 60
mph, with diverging routes 50 mph. As
such, derailment presents a low safety risk
should a train not read the route
information. Diverging routes are to depot
approach lines (goods lines) and as it is
desirable for passenger train drivers to be
able to avoid taking these routes should
they be misrouted. PRI provision assists in
reducing the likely hood of misrouted train
entering the depot approach lines. PRIs will
provide positive information to train drivers
about all the routes from the signals' similar
to flashing and splitting distant signals, that
would permit non-provision of approach
control. See GK/GN0645 GN 550 and
GN551. PRIs provide more information
than a splitting banner that traditionally
would be used to provide increased reading
distance of a junction signal. Although no
aspect information is provided by the PRI,
the junction signals aspects are readable for
sufficient distance, and it was consider this
information does not require repeating.
N/A
20/11/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
11/12/2014
Current
GMRT2473
Two
B8.4.2
14-087-DEV
Class 387 Ready-to-start Pushbutton
Texture and Functionality.
2011.
The alternative actions are not considered
09/07/2014
to have any adverse effect on safety. The
proposed design increases the level of
safety, as guards are already familiar with
the design, and all passenger doors have to
be closed prior to the guard giving the
`ready to start' signal. When the guard is in
the rear cab and the cab door is open,
traction cannot be taken until the cab door
is shut as the door interlock circuit will not
be made.
N/A
25/06/2014
Southern
N/A
Current
GKRT0094
One
5.11.3.1 and 5.14.2
Train Voice Radio Systems
14-129-DEV
for Railways (GSM-R) Calling Line Identity
and Contacting Emergency Services.
The derogation applies to the UK National
GSM-R network.
All the Southern Electrostar fleets are
designed as follows: The 'ready to start'
pushbutton is not textured (and neither is
the surround), because the control is
located close to the textured 'door close'
pushbutton at most locations. The 'ready to
start' pushbutton on the saloon guard's
control panels is only active when all the
passenger doors are locked closed. The
'ready to start' pushbutton in a cab will
operate irrespective of the status of the
passenger doors. Changing the design to
comply with the RGS requirements would
introduce inconsistency across Govia
Thameslink Railway's Class 377 fleet, and
would prevent the `ready to start'
pushbutton in the non-active cab from
functioning. Complying with this RGS
requirement would also make the design
inconsistent with the Rule Book,
GE/RT8000/SS1, Station Duties and Train
Dispatch, Issue 3.
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card
issue: There is no field on the SIM card
(the fields and contents of which are defined
by international standards) that can provide
this functionality. Public Emergency Call
issue: Any GSM-R subscriber making a
999 or 112 call is connected by a point to
point call to the Rail Emergency Operator
(Level 3) who is able to direct the call to the
appropriate person (public emergency
services, Network Rail Signaller, Network
Rail Route Control).
N/A
12/11/2014
N/A
25/09/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
16/10/2014
Current
GMRT2100
Five
Part 2 Part 3 (except 3.3.3) Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
Part 4 Part 5 (except 5.4 &
5.5) Part 7 Part 8 (except
8.1.6, 8.1.7, 8.1.8, 8.3.1.2,
8.3.1.3 and 8.3.2.3)
Clauses 9.1.1.1 to 9.1.1.3
and 9.2.1, 9.2.3 and 9.2.4.
14-020-DEV
Advanced stage deviation to GM/RT2100
Issue 5 for Class 68 UK Light locomotive
based on the already granted deviation
12/115/DGN that includes GM/RT2100
Issue 4.
Class 68 UK Light locomotives
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from continued use of the current
standard.
31/01/2014
N/A
28/01/2014
Services Limited
Infrastructure
N/A
Current
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4.1
14-031-DEV
Winchmore Hill Platform 2 - reduced width
of recess.
Winchmore Hill Platform 2, Hertfordshire,
UK
2011. The Class 68 UK Light project is
already in an advanced stage, with the firsts
units already built and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in late January.
The project is being assessed against
GM/RT2100 Issue 4 as amended by
deviation 12/115/DGN which has already
been granted. As GM/RT2100 has been upissued to Issue 5 since derogation
12/115/DGN was granted, Vossloh need to
apply for this deviation to meet the Office of
Rail Regulation (ORR) requirement for
authorisation to place in to service against
the latest NNTR list. The UK Department
for Transport (DfT) published an updated
list of NNTRs in mid-October 2013, which
replaces GM/RT2100 Issue 4 with
GM/RT2100 Issue 5. Reassessment work
would be necessary to demonstrate
compliance with GM/RT2100 Issue 5 at this
late stage in the project. This previous
deviation 12/115/DGN remains in place and
is not withdrawn as a result of this further
deviation. There are no changes to the
standards requirements that are the subject
of this application between Issues 4 and 5
Winchmore Hill Platform 2 (140 m in length
/ reduced recess will be over a 10 m
section): If measured from the coping
stone face, the recess will be reduced to a
minimum of 258 mm, 42 mm less than the
minimum standard requirement. There are
no physical track works currently planned at
Winchmore Hill. Thus, technically, the
recess is not reduced by adjustment of the
coping stone. When measuring the
dimension from the running edge of the
nearest rail, the X dimension of 730 mm
dimension increases due to the setback of
the coping stone. A full stepping analysis
has been carried out against existing track /
existing platform and against final platform/
theoretical track. As a result of the coper
lifts at the London end of the platform, the
stepping will be improved and, thus, create
a fully compliant platform for stepping
dimensions.
Winchmore Hill - Platform 2, Down
07/04/2014
Hertford: Throughout the length of the 140
m platform, there is an existing compliant
(Z1) recess value in excess of the 300 mm
requirement. The existing dimensions are
minimum 304 mm and maximum 331 mm.
Due to the required adjustments of the
copers by means of setting back or
trimming the coper face, there is a small 10
m section between Ch260m and Ch270m,
whereby the recess value is reduced by 47
mm. The adjusted dimensions are
minimum 258 mm and maximum 288 mm.
(Please refer to general arrangement
drawing). There is a theoretical smoothing
track alignment submitted in support of the
Civil Engineering design to provide
assurance that the new profile of the
platform face will be compliant to the future
track realignment scheme. Below is a
snapshot taken from Track Design
Handbook NR/L2/TRK/2049 Issue 12, for
illustration purposes, showing the minimum
dimension of the recess value (*a=300
mm). (See attached document for
application with diagram on).
N/A
11/02/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
and Trains
Page55
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2
and Trains
14-030-DEV
Oakleigh Park Station Platform 1 and 2 reduced platform width at mid-platform
fencing.
Oakleigh Park Station Platform 1 and 2.
Station Capacity Planner, Fire Safety
Engineer, Route Asset Manager Buildings
and Route Safety Improvement Manager
have all approved the proposed fencing
design and support this deviation. Support
is also present from the Customer Service
Safety Business Partner for First Capital
Connect (FCC) who runs the station.
Extensive design review has taken place
from the Station Capacity Planner, Fire
Safety Engineer, Route Asset Manager
Buildings and Route Safety Improvement
Manager who all support the design and
this derogation application. The station
facility owner FCC also supports this
derogation via the Customer Service Safety
Business Partner. Finally, it is very similar
to previously granted derogations for
suicide mitigation fencing at Southall
(Certificate No 12/198/DGN), Hayes and
Harlington (Certificate No 12/231/DGN) and
Goring and Streatley (Certificate No
13/089/DEV). For reasons of fire safety and
pedestrian flow, this is the best option for
the fenceline to take.
N/A
11/02/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Five
6.3.1
and Trains
14-149-DEV
London Bridge station, low level terminating London Bridge station, low level terminating A fully compliant design is not considered
platforms 10-15 - position of canopy
platforms 10-15, London end, are included appropriate for the envisaged scenario at
columns in overrun risk zone.
in this application.
the London end of these platforms. One
column on each of Platforms 10-15 is within
the overrun risk zone. The canopies are
designed to remain standing due to the
redundancy of design to prevent
disproportionate collapse in the event of a
train overrun which removes the column in
the risk zone associated with any one
platform. The canopy column alignment
has been set back as far as possible from
the platform edge consistent with providing
a compliant edge distance and maintaining
a straight alignment with those columns
across the bridge decks. A straight
alignment of canopy columns eases
pedestrian flows along the platforms and
simplifies structural framing of the
canopies. The width between pairs of
columns on each island platform is
governed by the width of escalator and stair
access to platforms. Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS) and a compliant
buffer design mitigates any significant risk.
N/A
24/10/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Five
2.1.12.1.2 and 2.1.4 a) and
b)
and Trains
14-144-DEV
London Bridge Station, Platform 9,
Platforms 8 and 7, Platforms 6 and 5,
Platforms 4 and 3, and Platforms 2 and 1 Horizontal track alignment through station
platforms.
This issue applies throughout London
Bridge Station (both High and Low Level).
The lengths of sub-1,000 m radius platform
faces are as follows by platform: Platform
9: 196 m; Platforms 8 and 7: 168 m;
Platforms 6 and 5: approximately 65 m
and 85 m; Platforms 4 and 3:
approximately 206 m and 181 m; Platforms
2 and 1: approximately 209 m and 250 m.
Oakleigh Park Station - approximately 8 m 02/05/2014
of the proposed fenceline, at the bottom of
the stairs to platform 1/2, has a platform
clearance of 2600 mm to the Up Fast Side.
The minimum clearance in accordance with
GI/RT7016 is 3000 mm. The proposed
fenceline directly replaces an existing fence
at the base of the stairs therefore is not
making the arrangement worse. The final 4
m of the proposed fenceline to the south
end of Platform 2 is also non-compliant.
This section of fence is proposed at 2500
mm clearance from the Up Fast platform
edge (GI/RT7016 requires 3000 mm). This
would be the installation of new fencing
which, where the derogation is needed,
would not be installed until this derogation
were approved. This new fencing is to save
lives Oakleigh Park which has seen three
instances of suicide from the platform edge
over the last five years. The Peterborough
to London Kings Cross stretch of the East
Coast Main Line has had 30 mid-platform
suicides and many others from people
walking off platform ends (which has been
mitigated through platform end gating here).
It is the worst area for suicide on our route
and plans are in place to improve defences
at every station in this area.
One column on each of Platforms 10-15 is 11/12/2014
within the over-run risk zone. The noncompliance was identified in the form 001
(N420-COT-FO1-CV-000004 Section A1. 3)
which was signed by Network Rail on
26/02/2013. Some of the columns
supporting the shard interface canopy are
within the overrun risk zone at the end of
the terminating tracks. The canopy is
designed to remain standing in the event of
a train overrunning; the column in a single
overrun zone can be considered as
removed and the canopy will remain
standing, but simultaneous overrun events
are not contemplated as it is very unlikely
that two events will occur at the same time.
Note that the buffer stop locations have
been amended since the Form 001 was
written and the attached sketch has been
amended to show the revised arrangement.
The face of the column on Platforms 10 and
11 is more than 2500 mm from the platform
edge, and therefore it complies with Section
6. 2. 2 of GI/RT7016. The other columns
are not adjacent to platform faces. The
canopy columns have been set as far back
as possible from the platform edge
consistent with maintaining a straight
alignment across the bridge decks. A
The physical constraints of the London
11/12/2014
Bridge Station area and the requirement to
install new High Level platforms, new Low
Level platforms and a new station building
to accommodate twelve-car length trains
drives some platform lines to be designed
on radii that are tighter than the standard
requires. This is a historically constrained
site where the existing layout radius is
below the current standard requirement.
There is no possibility of achieving the 1000
m radius specified due to existing railway
curvature with viaduct and structure
constraints; however, attempts have been
made to maximise the radius as part of the
Guide to Railway Investment Project (GRIP)
4 design, while incorporating the mandatory
requirement for emergency evacuation of
the platforms. Platform widths have been
designed to maximise pedestrian access
and egress for current and anticipated
passenger forecasts. Clear route analysis
has been carried out and platform stepping
distances have been confirmed as within
the Group Standard limits. A permanent
deviation has been certificated for the Low
level Platforms 10 and 15 (number
13/175/DEV - Tracker No. 15192).
N/A
22/10/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
GKRT0045
Three
2.5.3.4 b)
Signals
14-095-DEV
London Bridge station low level terminal
platforms buffer stop lights.
London Bridge station low level platforms.
Line speed on approach to the Buffer Stops 21/08/2014
is 20 mph. The existing London Bridge
Station terminating Platform 8 - 16 inclusive
operate with left hand mounted buffer stops
lights. This reflects application of old
standard CP-PM-040, Section 4. 2. 2. This
permitted this option if curvature of
approach track and rolling stock limits / loss
of viewing of the buffer stops on the
approach to the buffer stops. It has been
proposed in recent updates planned to RGS
to allow buffer stop lights to be positioned to
improve visibility and not fixed to the centre
line. Second stage of the remodelling the
eastern approach to London Bridge Low
Level station (designated LL04) took place
in March 2014, when new Platforms 14 and
15 were brought in to use. The third stage
(LL07 August 2014) and fourth stage (LL09
January 2015) bring remaining new
Platforms 10 to 13 into use. The
application is to cover all terminating
platforms.
N/A
08/07/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/07/2014
Current
Within the High Level platforms, the
designed radii will be: Platform 9:
between 300 m and 320 m; Platform 8:
338 m; Platform 5 335 m; Platform 4:
265 m and 403 m; Platform 2: between
250 m and 253 m; Platform 1: 247 m and
354 m. There is a length of straight
approximately central to each platform and
a length of curve at London end and country
end. The extent of straight for each
platform is approximately: Platform 9:
51m; Platforms 8 and 7: 82 m; Platforms
6 and 5: 184 m and 178 m; Platforms 4
and 3: 70 m; Platforms 2 and 1: 31 m.
The length of straight is longest for
Platforms 5 and 6 and decreases toward
the platforms at the extreme of the High
level tracks (Platforms 1 and 9). The extent
and degree of curvature is least for
Platforms 5 and 6 and maximum for
Platforms 1 and 2. "Clear route" analysis
has been run on tracks 1-9 and platform
stepping distances confirmed as within
prescribed limits for the High level
platforms. The new platforms at London
Bridge feature an uncluttered design with
Track on approach to the buffers is curved.
If the rolling stock approaches the buffer
stop lights positioned in the centre of the
track, then at approximately 10 m, the
driver would lose sight of the buffer stop
lights. This is due to the driver's position
being within the left hand half of the driving
cab, and much of the rolling stock having
centre gangways.
Page56
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GMRT2141
Three
2.4.1.1 b)
14-048-DEV
Class 700 (Thameslink EMU) - Resistance
to Roll-over.
Class 700/0 (Thameslink EMU eight-car
unit) and Class 700/1 (Thameslink EMU
twelve-car unit) trailer cars (TOSW_12,
TOSW_8, TOS2_12, TOS3_12,
TOSLW_12, TOSLW_8). This deviation is
for a project requiring authorisation for
placing in service under the Railways
(Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
GIRT7016
Four
3.1.1 Platform Height
and Trains
14-032-DEV
Finsbury Park Station Platform 3 (old
Platform 1) - platform height.
GMRT2473
Two
B5.1.2
14-086-DEV
Class 387 Door Throughway.
GKRT0075
Two
3.3.5.5 d)
Signage
14-106-DEV
GMRT2176
One
5.1, 5.2
Air Quality and Lighting Environment for
Traincrew Inside Railway Vehicles
14-121-DEV
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Class 700 (Thameslink EMU) vehicles are
designed as lightweight vehicles with high
payload, in terms of a whole life, whole
system optimisation. In combination with
the conventional high floor level, and
consequently high centres of gravity, this
design leads generally to disagreement with
the 21Â° criterion of GM/RT2141.
Resistance to roll-over induced by
overspeeding was calculated according to
GM/RT2141 with multi body simulation
software. Here, the trailer cars are
predicted to infringe the 21Â° rollover limit
of GM/RT2141 Issue 3. In crush-laden
condition, the most critical vehicles are
predicted not to overturn up to 19. 5Â° cant
deficiency (non-compliant by less than 1.
5Â°). All pantograph and motor cars
comply with 21Â° limit. The design has
been optimised with respect to weight
reduction in the new bogie and carbody
design. Moreover, the interior layout has
been designed to carry more passengers
during rush hours. Notwithstanding,
measures to lower down the centres of
gravity as much as possible were
introduced during the vehicle design
process: Classes 700/0 and 700/1 have a
lower floor height (1100 mm) in comparison
Finsbury Park to Alexandra Palace Capacity The platform height within the existing,
Improvements Project. Finsbury Park
interim and final stages exceed the
Station Platform 3 (old Platform 1).
maximum allowable of 915 mm, the worst
case being 952, 952 and 944 mm in the
existing, interim and final stages
respectively. These are 37, 37 and 29 mm
greater than the 915 mm target height. The
platform within this area of non-compliance
cannot be lowered due to the construction
of the platform (steel deck with GRP
surface between Ch 4120 and 4150). There
is no action plan being put in place due to
the disproportionate costs associated with
the magnitude of work to bring the steel
deck platform area into conformity with the
standard.
To comply with this clause would require
the doorway to be enlarged by
approximately 10 mm. This would require
the car body design to be changed, and new
structural validation of the car body design
the Railways (Interoperability) Regulations would be needed. Door header gear would
2011.
have to be moved upwards and the door
design altered. New interior trim would be
needed for the new installation. This would
add significant cost to the units.
The impact of a deviation from the 21Â°
11/04/2014
criterion of GM/RT2141 was investigated in
detail, and a summary of the findings is
described in the document `Deviation
Against 21Â° Limit of GM/RT2141 (Class
700, Thameslink EMU)', [Doc-ID: EN1
A6Z00035402944 000 B]. The investigation
shows that, based on the design limits and
provision instructions from the RGS
(GC/RT5021, GE/RT8075, GK/RT0075),
the lower roll-over resistance does not
introduce an additional risk of such extent
as to be unacceptable. It is shown that the
differences in terms of overspeed remain
negligible for the worst case. A substantial
margin of overspeeding remains between
intervention of AWS or TPWS, respectively,
and the predicted overturn. Therefore, the
possibility of train overspeed (and hence
rolling over in a curve) is reduced to a level
that is as low as reasonably practicable.
Furthermore, the vehicles in question which
do not comply with GM/RT2141 are
intermediate cars which show a lower
sensitivity for wind effects than leading cars
complying with the 21Â° requirement,
whether both leading and intermediate cars
comply with the GM/RT2142 requirement
regarding resistance against overturning in
A snapshot has been taken from Track
07/04/2014
Design Handbook NR/L2/TRK/2049 Issue
12 to be used as a visual aid and illustration
purposes showing the dimensions relating
to the recess value. (See attached
documents for application with diagram on).
A full stepping analysis has been carried out
to all passenger stock and is compliant to
group standard. There is no worsening of
the platform heights to its current position
today.
N/A
19/02/2014
Rolling Stock
13/03/2014
Current
N/A
11/02/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
A door throughway height of 1900 mm (in 09/07/2014
accordance with GM/RT2473) permits a
92nd percentile male to board the train
without ducking. The proposed alternative
action would result in a minimum door
throughway height of 1880 mm, which
permits an 87th percentile male to board
the train without ducking. The nominal
height of the throughway of 1890 mm
permits a 90th percentile male to board the
train without ducking. Note that neither
throughway height permits the standard
design case 95th percentile male to board
the train without ducking. A door
throughway height of 1880 mm permits a
>99th percentile female to board the train
without ducking. Note that, once the door
threshold is passed, the minimum ceiling
height is 206 mm. All anthropometric data
is taken from People Size 2008 and
includes a 40 mm shoe correction.
N/A
25/06/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
Up Slow Permissible Speed Warning
Indicator (PSWI) position approaching
Thornton Heath Station.
40 PSWI (UVS9M13CHU) on Up Victoria
Slow at on approach to Thornton Heath
Station.
Currently, a permanent PSWI is installed at
a compliant position on signal T64 at the
start of the 60 mph line speed. As per
GK/RT0075. An Automatic Warning
System (AWS) is provided 171 metres from
signal T64, acting as the AWS for both the
signal and the PSWI. This was resulting in
a horn vice bell warning to drivers when T64
was displaying a green aspect, thus causing
confusion. As a result, T64 Signal is
currently restricted to double yellow.
N/A
31/07/2014
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
18/09/2014
Current
Sheffield Tram-Train Cab Air Quality.
99001 - 99007; 99101 - 99107; 99201 99207.
See Appendix.
Deceleration distances shown in the
01/10/2014
standards is extremely pessimistic.
Calculating the deceleration distance
required, to reduce to the required speed
shows sufficient distance. See supporting
information for calculations. At assumed
braking rate of 8%g (passenger trains),
approximately 295 m deceleration distance
required to reduce speed from 60 mph to
40mph. At assumed braking rate of 6%g,
approximately 400 m deceleration distance
required to reduce speed from 60 mph to 40
mph. Line speed on approach to the 60
mph PSR at T64 is maximum of 30 mph/40
mph. Freight trains are not expected to
attain a speed greater than 40 mph due to
30 mph approach. Based on a four-car unit
and acceleration rate of 6. 5%g, maximum
attainable speed would be approximately 55
mph, only 5 mph greater than speed that a
train could be expected to brake to a stand
in accordance with GK/RT0075 Appendix B
and permitted to be used for deceleration
distance in Section 3. 2. 3. 3 b). Analysis of
track circuit data conducted by the Route
over two separate weeks before and after
the T64 YY restriction was introduced has
shown the average speed of trains through
the affected section of line to be 28. 12 mph
See Appendix.
12/11/2014
N/A
04/09/2014
Rolling Stock
03/10/2014
Current
Page57
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2461
One
6.29.1 and 9.3.1
14-092-DEV
Class 387 Sanding on Trailing Units.
Four-car Class 387/1 Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs) and four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an
option on the current contract). This
2011.
The deviation requests enhanced
performance which is non-compliant with
the standard as written, but consistent with
the objectives of the standard.
N/A
25/06/2014
on behalf of, Southern
Railway
Rolling Stock
25/07/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Five
2.1.3
and Trains
14-135-DEV
Curvature of Platform Extensions at Strood
Station.
This deviation relates to Strood station in
Kent (all platforms).
N/A
13/10/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
GMRT2130
Three
2.9.1.1 a)
14-019-DEV
Fire compliance of Rollers on Balfour Beatty This deviation applies to Balfour Beatty
Overhead Line Electrification (OLE)
OLE Installation Modules fitted to wagons
Modules.
VTG 95382 and VTG95385.
N/A
24/01/2014
Balfour Beatty Rail Ltd
Rolling Stock
14/02/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Five
6.2
and Trains
14-170-DEV
Chippenham Station, Platforms 1 and 2 reduced platform width at lift shaft and
stairs.
The extension of Platform 1 will be used
only by twelve-car trains as all trains stop at
the same stopping position at the extreme
country end of the platform. The extension
of Platform 2 will be used by all trains of
eight-cars or more (these currently form
about 35% of the weekday train service).
The extension of Platform 3 will be rarely
used as this platform is predominantly used
by short (3 or 4 car) trains for the Medway
Valley line shuttle service which stop
towards the country end of the platform,
near the entrance, where the platform is
essentially straight. Usage of the
extensions will therefore be focussed
primarily on peak times when the longer
formations are used. Signal sighting
constraints apply only to the extensions of
Platforms 2 and 3 with new banner
repeating signals being provided to achieve
a satisfactory reading distance. The design
of the platform extensions (and widening of
Platform 3) achieves standard offsets in
compliance with GC/RT5212. However,
recognising that the platforms are on a tight
curve, it has been agreed to provide "Mind
the Gap" warning messages on the platform
surfaces. With the exception of the short
Medway Valley services (which use the
Surfaces and materials shall have fire
properties as set out in Appendix A. The
materials used for the rollers and tensioning
drums on the tensioning and access
modules have been selected specifically for
their frictional and wear characteristics
which are integral to the performance of
each module's intended function. The
design of the modules and their
performance has been developed and
evolved over a number of years. Altering
the materials would negate the experience
that has been gained and jeopardise the
performance of the modules. Materials
used on the contact surfaces of rollers and
tension drums on the modules (listed
below) do not meet the materials
requirements of the standard (minimum
limiting oxygen index of 28%). The drums
and rollers have steel centres/axles and are
mounted in steel frames. Grooved plastic
pads on the tensioner drums, rollers on the
tensioner' - Performance: Oxygen index
(ISO 4589-1/-2) 25%; HB/HB according to
UL 94 (3/6mm thickness). Rollers on the
drum stands and main masts (Ertalon 66
SA black) - Performance: Oxygen index
(ISO 4589) 26%; HB/HB according to UL
94 (3/6mm thickness). Rollers at either end
As an Outside Party funded structure, it
would not be possible to fund the provision
of a compliant solution. The advantages for
both the passenger public and the station
itself by making Chippenham an Access for
All station mean that a viable solution must
be found. The extent of the non-compliant
section of platform has been kept to its
absolute minimum to mitigate as much risk
to the public as possible. To minimise the
disruption to the public by decreasing the
clearance, the lift shaft has been designed
to be narrower than a standard lift shaft.
Whilst still maintaining the sixteen person
capacity, the narrower shaft allows for an
increased clearance to the platform edge.
Despite the narrow clearances, which
cannot be avoided, the risk to passengers is
deemed to be acceptable. It is believed that
any potential safety risk associated with the
reduced clearances will be reduced to an
acceptable level.
Sand will only be dispensed during a brake 14/08/2014
application (step 2, full service or
emergency) by units on which the leading
vehicle detects wheel slide. As such,
trailing units will only dispense sand if they
detect wheel slide and have sufficient sand
available. The likelihood of sanding on
trailing units occurring is lower, as the
leading unit will condition the railhead and
so the trailing units are likely to experience
wheel slide or slip to a lesser extent. This
functionality has been developed to
increase the safety of the railway in
conditions of extremely poor rail head
adhesion or where the sanding system on
the leading unit does not function correctly
(due to a fault or having run out of sand),
having a positive impact on overall system
performance. When sand is deployed on
the leading unit of a train, sixteen axles will
have passed over the sand, dispersing it on
the rail head, prior to the trailing unit
deploying further sand (assuming that the
training unit is experiencing slide). Any
sand deployed by the final unit in a train will
be dispersed on the rail head by fourteen
axles. Therefore, the amount of sand
deposited and the number axles following
the deposition points will be the same as if
19/12/2014
Phase 2 (EKR2) Project, the platforms at
Strood station are to be lengthened at the
London end to accommodate twelve-car
trains in place of the current ten-car
maximum. This is required to facilitate
service lengthening of Southeastern metro
services to twelve-car operation on this
route as the networker train fleet used does
not have selective door operation capability.
The platforms can only be extended at the
London end because of the existence of a
major junction layout at the country end of
the platforms. At the London end of Strood
station, the line curves sharply through
approximately 90 degrees in order to enter
Strood Tunnel (2127 m long). This curve
starts within the length of the existing
platforms, and therefore the platform
extensions will also be on a curve as there
is no practical opportunity to straighten out
the layout sufficiently to achieve a 500 m
radius curve. The actual track radius,
through each of the proposed platform
extensions, is as follows: Platform 1
(Down North Kent) - 240 m; Platform 2 (Up
North Kent) - 225 m; Platform 3 (Up Strood
Loop) - 270 m (210 m where existing length
of platform is being widened). The
The alternative provisions detailed in
03/03/2014
Section 11 (Proposed alternative
provisions) will ensure that, when possible
sources of ignition are present on the
machines from electrical systems and
combustion engines, trained operators are
present, equipped with fire extinguishers
and able to address any issues with the noncompliant materials. They will also ensure
that this condition will only occur when the
machine is removed from the operational
railway by being within a possession.
This non-compliance relates to horizontal
19/03/2015
clearance between the platform edge and
the edge of the new lift shaft on Platforms 1
and 2 at Chippenham Station. The
permanent deviation has been amended to
reflect the dimensions in the attached
"proposed general arrangement plan". The
lift shaft on the central platform provides
clearance of 2531 mm on the Up Main and
2548 mm on the Down Main. The stairs on
the central platform also require a deviation
from the original standard. The stairs
provide clearance of 2780 mm on the Up
Main and 2835 mm on the Down Main.
N/A
15/12/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/01/2015
Current
Chippenham Station - Final installation of
new lift, shaft and stairs.
Page58
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Five
11.1.4.1 Provision of recess Interface between Station Platforms, Track
beneath platform edge
and Trains
14-108-DEV
Re-opening of Lea Bridge Station provision of recess
Lea Bridge Station. ELR: SDC. Mileage:
6m 25ch.
Minor impact in regards to safety, no effect
to performance: The overhang will still be
present but not to the extent required in
GI/RT7016. Please note that the route has
requested that a 760 mm offset is used
rather than the normal 730 mm, to provide
clearances for W10 and W12, this affects
the remaining overhang. Compliant
stepping distances will be provided, an
overhang will be present with a minimum
proposed dimension of 160 mm. The
platform extensions will be compliant.
N/A
01/08/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
12/11/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2
and Trains
14-028-DEV
Brookmans Park Station - mid platform
fencing.
Brookmans Park Station.
The Fire Safety Engineer, Station Capacity
Planner, Route Asset Manager Buildings
and Route Safety Improvement Manager
have all extensively checked and approve
the designs and derogation. The derogation
is also supported by the Customer Service
Safety Business Partner for First Capital
Connect (FCC) who manages the station.
They are confident that it does not import
unacceptable risk to any station users. Fire
Safety Engineer, Station Capacity Planner,
Route Asset Manager for Buildings and
Route Safety Improvement Manager have
been involved in the development and
checking of designs, which they approve,
and support this derogation application.
The FCC Customer Service Safety
Business Partner supports this application
for derogation. For reasons of fire safety
and pedestrian flow, this is the best possible
option for our fenceline to take.
N/A
11/02/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
GMRT2130
Four
All clauses.
14-015-DEV
Issue 4 for Class 68 UK Light locomotive.
Class 68 UK Light locomotives
N/A
17/01/2014
Services Limited
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GMRT2400
Five
2.4.1.1
Running Mode
Addition of drain at the base of the fuel
tank.
To fit a drain plug to the fuel tank, thus
having an opening in the fuel tank below the
maximum fuel level. For the following TSU
vehicles: DR 97501DR 97502 DR 97503
DR 97504DR 97505DR 97506DR 97507DR
97508. This deviation is for a project
Regulations 2011.
2011. The Class 68 UK Light project is
already in an advance stage, with the firsts
units already built and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in late January.
The design and assessment of the UK Light
locomotive has been based on the
requirements of GM/RT2130 Issue 3 as
amended by derogation 12/115/DGN which
has already been granted. Reassessment
work would therefore be necessary to
demonstrate compliance with GM/RT2130
Issue 4 at this late stage in the project.
GM/RT2130 Issue 4 was issued in
December 2013 but does not come into
force until 01/03/2014. This is after the date
that the Vossloh Class 68 UK Light
Locomotives Final Technical File is
expected to have been submitted to the
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) for granting
authorisation (an interim issue of the
Technical File containing GM/RT2130 Issue
3 assessment was already submitted to the
ORR on August 2013). However, it is
unknown whether GM/RT2130 Issue 4 will
be listed as a NNTR by the UK Department
for Transport (DfT) prior to the coming into
Clause 16. 3 of BS EN 14033-1: 2011
mandates "All openings in the fuel tank
shall be above the maximum fuel level".
Without a drain plug fitted to the fuel tank,
there would not be the facility to routinely
remove any condensation build-up. Due to
the weather conditions in the United
Kingdom and the working routines in which
On-Track Machines are operated
throughout the winter months, fuel tanks are
highly susceptible to condensation
contamination. The machine's fuel tank will
quite often be manually re-filled from a
barrel, which carries a high risk of water
contamination. There is a necessity to
drain the water from the tank to reduce the
risk of damage to the fuel system.
The project is planning to re-open Lea
08/12/2014
Bridge Station, which was closed in 1985.
The new station will have a footbridge (reusing the old station deck spanning the
tracks), two lifts and be extended to
accommodate eight-car trains. The old
platforms are still present and in reasonable
condition (with the copers removed). They
have the existing OLE support structures
and other services in the platform which
make it not reasonably practicable to
demolish them. As such, the old platforms
from the closed station are to be reused and
extended. When the new copers and
surface are installed, there will not be a 300
mm recess beneath the platform edge; the
existing construction of the platform is a
brick front wall which it is not reasonably
practicable to demolish to construct
platform compliant to this clause.
Accompanying this application are details of
the proposed overhang dimensions. This
was identified as part of the design process
and identified that it would be uneconomical to demolish due to its good
condition and the presence of numerous
OLE mast foundations in the platform
structure.
Brookmans Park Station: As part of
08/04/2014
fatality mitigation works to combat railway
suicide which, over the last 5 years and
year to date, has resulted in 281 deaths on
the London North Eastern (LNE) and East
Midlands Routes, Network Rail has decided
to utilise the guidance of the Network Rail
National Suicide Prevention Steering Group
to implement mid-platform fencing at a
number of stations. The national guidance
was issued following the implementation of
mid-platform fencing at 10 stations,
including Southall (Certificate No.
12/198/DGN), Hayes and Harlington
(Certificate No. 12/231/DGN) and Goring
and Streatley (Certificate No. 13/089/DEV),
which were granted deviations. The
introduction of 247 metres of 1. 4 m high
grey galvanised mid platform fencing at the
location is intended to restrict the access by
passengers to the fast line edge of the track
so as to discourage suicide, access where it
is necessary (e. g. in an emergency
stopping service) is maintained through the
introduction of 2. 5 m wide gates which will
not be locked and clearly identified by
signage. Where the fenceline stops before
the platform end, hatching and signage will
be provided to direct passengers to the
31/01/2014
standard.
Plasser & Theurer have a large number of
05/06/2014
machines currently in service on Network
Rail infrastructure, compliant to Issue 4
(and earlier versions of GM/RT2400) where
fitting a drain to the base of the fuel tank
was permitted and has not caused an issue.
There are no impacts of the alternative
action proposed.
N/A
23/04/2014
Plasser UK Ltd
Rolling Stock
24/04/2014
Current
RGS Title
Page59
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GCRT5112
Two
7.1.3
14-153-DEV
Bottesford Station - Installation of footbridge Bottesford Station, Station Road,
to enable removal of a foot crossing, bridge Bottesford, Leicestershire, NG13 0GT.
support on Platform 1.
Installation of footbridge to enable removal
of a foot crossing between Platforms 1 and
2.
The severity/impact at Bottesford Station in
connection with the proposed footbridge
install works is considered generally very
low for the use/operational aspect of the
finished project; furthermore, an inherent
risk identified by the Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR) will have been removed,
with extensive platform and lighting
upgrades already being carried out as part
of the overall scheme to generally improve
functionality of the station also. A recent
footfall survey carried out as part of the
Scheme Feasibility clearly suggests a
negligible effect to the general and more so
"less able" user; this has been
demonstrated to and accepted by the
Department for Transport (DfT). The safety
justification is primarily the removal of an
inherent risk identified by the ORR in
connection with the foot crossing that the
proposed footbridge will permanently
replace.
Following a territory wide review of all level 07/10/2015
crossings undertaken by the ORR,
Bottesford Station, which has operational
vehicular, bridleway and foot crossing
points, was identified as a site requiring
swift improvements to minimise/eliminate
risk at the site by carrying out a scheme of
enhancements at the station generally and
to all of the crossings on site in particular
also. The vehicular and bridleway crossing
enhancement works have already been
carried out with great success, with only the
footbridge install works, which removes use
of the foot crossing point, now remaining.
Note: the drawings and details provided
forming part of this Submission, are as
follows: 3D Model Photos; Drawing Nos
NG8143-101 and 102; C114050-TG-00-XXDR-C-1001, 1002 and 1003. Details to
satisfy the apt standards for the deviation
being sought are captured on Drawing Nos
NG8143-101 and 102, with 3D Model
Photos supplied to add perspective at the
location in question also.
N/A
29/10/2014
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/01/2015
Current
GERT8000-HB12
Two
3.2
Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES)
14-036-DEV
LNE Route - 'Flexible Train Arrival Point'
National.
This can equate to an estimated 50,000
Pounds Sterling in lost production.
02/09/2015
could equate to an estimated Âœ50,000
Pounds Sterling increase in production each
shift. As part of the initial study, a risk
assessment has been performed, involving
stakeholders from route operations,
National Delivery Service (NDS),
Freightliner, RSSB and HO Operations. As
possession will not be granted until the HO
train is at the FTAP, then no personnel will
be on or near the line whilst the train is in
motion. There is a risk that the HO train
this have been assessed and mitigated,
principally by driver briefing and the use of
countdown markers on the approach to the
FTAP (see FTAP proposal document).
31/12/2017
11/02/2014
Network Rail
Management
28/07/2015
Current
GMRT2473
Two
B11.4
14-091-DEV
Class 387 - Emergency brake override
indication.
Regulations 2011.
There are considered to be no negative
09/07/2014
impacts of the proposed design as it is a
continuation of the existing Class 377
design, to which drivers are already
accustomed. The design adequately warns
the driver that an emergency brake override
has been made.
N/A
25/06/2014
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GIRT7016
Four
7.3, 7.4
and Trains
11-048-DGN
Loughborough station: island Platform 2/3:
minimum platform width and distance of
isolated column from the platform edge.
22/03/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/07/2011
Current
Four
6.3.1
and Trains
11-182-DGN
West Croydon Station, Platform 1 - Buffer
stop overrun.
It is not thought reasonably practicable to 19/08/2011
provide a compliant solution. The design
option that has been progressed is believed
to be the most cost effective solution to the
problem, meeting both time constraints for
delivery and the requirements of the Train
Operating Company. Site constraints at the
northern end of the station cannot be
modified or removed easily, and the close
proximity of the railway boundary to
Platform 3 restricts construction options.
Restrictions on the scope, budget and
timescale of the Project (all works to be
completed prior to the 2012 Olympic
Games) necessitate a non-compliant but
acceptably safe solution. Option Selection
Report (Extracts) Three options were
developed and reviewed in order to address
the station capacity issues at Loughborough
by extending the existing platforms and
providing a new DDA compliant footbridge
with lifts. Option 1 Involved the demolition
of the existing road over bridge (SPC/75)
and construction of a new road bridge and
adjacent fully DDA compliant footbridge.
By removing the constrains that the current
road bridge represents, enables all three
platforms to be extended to both the North
and South accommodating 10 car trains
On the basis of the proper risk assessments 15/12/2011
having been undertaken, the Project Team
(together with the affected operators) is
satisfied that the risks to all passengers on
the adjacent platforms and on a train
entering the station are ALARP.
N/A
GIRT7016
To comply with this requirement extra
functionality would have to be added to an
existing indicator, or an additional indicator
would have to be added to the driver's desk.
In either case, changes to the units'
schematics and wiring would be needed to
illuminate the indicator when an emergency
brake application had been overridden. The
change would make the cab desk different
from the existing Class 377 fleet and would
require additional training for the driver; the
additional desk indicator could be confusing
to drivers used to the existing Class 377
desk.
Loughborough station: island Platform
The platforms at Loughborough station are
2/3: minimum platform width and distance to be extended as part of the 2012 Olympic
of isolated column from the platform edge. project. The station has been identified
Platforms 2/3 are separate at the Country
under the 'Access for All' scheme as
(Nottingham) end, and are linked to
requiring platform extensions to
Platform 1 by a footbridge with stepped
accommodate longer trains and improving
access. In addition, a supervised public
access by the construction of a new DDA
barrow crossing allows access to Platforms footbridge. Within the scope of this project,
2/3 for disabled users.
Platforms 1, 2 and 3 are to be extended by
132. 5m, 137m and 90m so that their
operational lengths will be 240m, 240m and
148m respectively. Because of the existing
geometry of the track, the width of the
island Platform 2/3 (which will be joined
together) will taper from 6000mm to a
mimimum of 4460mm. The length of the
non-compliant width is 43. 21m. Site
constraints to the southern end of the
station (overbridge SPC/75) and listed
station buildings (Loughborough Station is
Grade 2 listed - including canopies and all
station buildings) require the platforms to be
extended to the north only. . It is not
reasonably practicable to provide a fully
compliant solution. To provide such a
solution would require re-alignment of the
Up and Down Slow lines (adjacent to
Platform 3); but the track slues by
themselves would not provide a compliant
Application for deviation against clause 6.
Existing platform dividing wall will continue
3. 1 of GI/RT7016 with respect to buffer
to encroach upon overrun zone. However,
stop overrun at West Croydon Station.
the vast majority of the zone will be
Platform 1 is required to be extended by
permanently fenced off from all passengers
11m at the Country end, thereby requiring
with no thoroughfare permitted. The
the buffer stop (and 20m x 10m buffer stop remainder and vast majority of the buffer
overrun zone) to be moved back by the
overrun zone will be securely enclosed by
same distance. The existing adjacent
the platform dividing wall and adjacent
platform dividing wall between Platforms 1 palisade fencing, preventing any
and 3 already lies partly with in the overrun thoroughfare.
zone (4. 2m from the track centreline), but
the wall curves towards Platform 1 at the
Country end, and this distance will be
reduced to 3. 2m at the far end of the 20m
zone.
N/A
26/10/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
Scope
Page60
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
GERT8035
One
B6.1.1 and B8.3.2
11-009-DGN
Crewe - Shrewsbury (bi-directional).
Crewe - Shrewsbury (bi-directional).
For modular routes it is sometimes possible
to justify reduced capacity wrong directional
signalling as an alternative to pilotman
working on the grounds of improved route
flexibility and fault tolerance. The business
case for this functionality is marginal and
suppressing every normal direction AWS
adds significant equipment, increases
complexity and is power hungry.
GERT8035
One
6.1.1 and Figure 1
11-046-DGN
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4.1
GIRT7016
Four
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Wrong direction signals will not be fitted
07/10/2011
with AWS but this will be mitigated against
by fitment of TPWS to all stop signals. A
HAZID was undertaken to look at several
options and the recommendation was:
AWS not to be provided for wrong direction
signals along with AWS Gap and
commencement signs. Cancellation boards
to be provided for isolated permanent
magnets associated with PSRs, AOCLs and
ABCLs The attached report considers
various options including full compliance to
GE/RT8035. The conclusion of this report
was that the chosen option would provide
the best balance against cost reduction
versus reduction in safety. A key part of the
proposal is that all stop signals are to be
fitted with TPWS. Another consideration is
that the number of trains travelling in the
wrong direction is lower (as it is intended
that the bi-directional signalling is only used
for perturbed working and planned
engineering works not timetabled moves).
This reduces the risks associated with not
providing AWS as it reduces the number of
trains approaching the signal. As these
moves are also no more than 50mph and
the signal is parallel with the higher
linespeed right-direction signal, any overrun
Non provision of AWS for shunt class route Signal NT1274 for the route from NT6072 at The provision of AWS would be a
The destination signal is fitted with TPWS 11/05/2011
approach to NT1274 from NT6072 at Ebbw Ebbw Junction.
significant technical challenge since the
to manage any SPAD and is provided with a
Junction
correct position is in the middle of a
full overlap. The proposed move under a
crossover and alternative positions would
shunt class move "2-white lights" itself
require complex suppression. The detailed should be taken as caution, which achieves
reason why compliance is not reasonably
the same caution reminder as the provision
practicable at this location are: The AWS AWS itself is supposed to achieve. The
could not be installed meeting the
only "difference" experienced by the driver
longitudinal tolerances set out in this
will be non-provision of an AWS audible
standard due to the existence of Switches
signal and the AWS may remain at the
and Crossings in the route To place the
caution visual display even thought NT1274
AWS in the cross over would require
is displaying a green aspect. (There is no
excessive amendments to the "through
running move up to NT6072 and hence
bearers" to accommodate bearer spacing
trains will have reversed leading to a power
for AWS fitment such that bearer separation up test of the AWS causing a cautionary
could not be achieved without renewing the display).
crossover. Placement of the AWS in the
crossover will require special constructs for
multiple AWS suppression controls.
Placement of the AWS between facing tips
would necessitate a reduction in the AWS
distance (and time) for the main running
approach (itself a non compliance) and
multiple AWS suppression controls.
N/A
21/01/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
22/09/2011
Current
N/A
22/03/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
28/04/2011
Current
Interface between Station Platforms, Tracks 11-030-DGN
and Trains
Clapham Junction (proposed platform 1,
currently existing platform 2) - provision of
recess beneath platform edge.
Clapham Junction (proposed platform 1,
currently existing platform 2) - provision of
recess beneath platform edge.
Currently, Platform 2 at Clapham Junction
(over the area of interest) has a refuge zone
with an average width of 250 mm - it is
therefore non-compliant. To create the
proposed Platform 1 for the East London
Line, the Kensington Bay line will have to be
realigned. The resultant horizontal track realignment and minor reconstruction works
along the platform will make about a 90 m
length of the proposed Platform less
compliant regarding the size of the refuge
zone (although it will be more compliant for
a 50 m length of the platform).
Relatively minor - the depth of the (already) 11/04/2011
non-compliant refuge along a 90 m length
of existing platform will be reduced, but the
depth along a 50 m length of the platform
will be increased. The change in the depth
of the refuge is detailed in the attached
table. The arrangements are not thought to
provide an unacceptable risk to the safety of
passengers.
N/A
16/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
7.2.1 and 11.1.4
and Trains
Bushey Station Platform 3 (former Down
Fast Line Platform): minimum platform
width, and width of recess beneath
platform.
Bushey Station: minimum platform width,
and width of recess beneath platform.
Bushey Station is located on the junction of
the West Coast Mainline (LEC1) and the
DC lines (CWJ) between Euston and
Watford Junction Station. The former Down
Fast line platform, Platform 3, has been
disused for over a decade. It is proposed to
reinstate this platform into operational use
when maintenance works are being
undertaken on the WCML.
Due to site constraints, it is not reasonably 21/10/2011
Low risk to passengers. Based on London
Midland figures, the number of passengers
alighting at Platform 3 will be less than 40
(see attached data on current passenger
usage). The reduced width is deemed to be
adequate for the number of passengers
likely to alight on the proposed noncompliant length of the platform.
N/A
26/08/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
14/09/2011
Current
4.3.1
Trapping
The aim of the project is to bring back into
operational use the existing disused
Platform 3 at Bushey Station. The
reinstatement of this platform will require a
minimum usable platform length of 88m to
accommodate four-car trains. Trains are
planned to stop at the station only when the
Slow lines are blocked every other week to
enable maintenance to be undertaken on
the WCML. The stopping services are
expected to be: Monday to Friday, 3 trains
after 22: 00; Saturday, 3 trains after 20:
00; Sunday, 5 trains hourly between 0700
and 1200. Compliant stepping distances
will be provided in accordance with
GI/RT7016 and also the design of the
platform reinstatement will comply with
requirements of GE/RT8025. At the
southern end of the station, Platform 2 is
approximately 750mm higher than Platform
3 and there is an existing brick retaining
wall separating the two (refer to Photos 1
and 2). Due to the constraint of the site, an
18. 0m length at the southern end of
Platform 3 will have a width of less than
3000mm, the minimum width will be
2200mm. The position of the existing
platform riser wall in relation to the track
does not have sufficient clearance to
The existing infrastructure is noncompliant. However, minor alternations to
the track layout are being made as a
consequence of track renewals work being
carried out over the Spring Bank Holiday
weekend. To make the overlap through 383
points reverse compliant would require
additional route locking through HK track
since it is currently only 117 yards long.
The interlocking for the area is regarded as
being in poor condition due to wiring
condition and the local engineer's
assessment is that alterations to the
geographical interlocking are not
practicable. Although track renewals work
is being carried out, no interlocking
alterations are being made as the layout is,
effectively, like for like in signalling terms.
Enforcing compliance with standards would,
effectively, result in postponement of the
track renewal until the complete interlocking
renewal is carried out, which is currently
proposed for 2016.
GKRT0064
One
This is an existing deficiency which has not 21/06/2011
led to any incidents over many years. In
reality because 383 is a double ended set of
points, to swing them from normal to
reverse requires track circuits clear JU. HK.
EG. (HL. EF or 380 Reverse). For a
hazard to arise requires following trains
along the route with 383 reverse where the
first stops with the rear on HK track (which
is very unlikely). In all other circumstances
there is always a sufficient overlap
available, although it is not proven in the
signal aspect. VC765 signal is fitted with
TPWS TSS and OSS (latter for main line
approach only). Line speed is 60mph up to
VC765 dropping to 45mph from the signal
for the route through 383 reverse. The TSS
(alone) would be effective for a 12%g train
SPADing at up to 30mph. The OSS is
effective for the main line approach at line
speed even to the short overlap for 12%g
trains and the route from Herne Hill has a
15mph crossover on the approach to
VC765.
N/A
05/05/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/05/2011
Current
11-146-DGN
Reduced Overlap on VC765 signal at Tulse Overlap on VC765 signal through 383
Hill
points reverse.
Page61
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2000
Three
6.6.3 and Appendix H1(a)
11-034-DGN
Derogation King Class steam locomotive
number 6023 `King Edward II'
Locomotive on all lines, as agreed by the
NRAB and subsequently by the Licensed
Operator: Ex GWR "King Edward II" TOPS
No. 8823 Painted No. 6023 Class / Power
Classification BR(W): 8P Wheel
Arrangement 4-6-0 Maximum Speed 75
mph.
It would not be practical to revise the
Railway Group Standard (RGS) to include
steam locomotives, due to their wide
diversity of design from modern traction
units and the general scarcity of technical
information now available to prove their
compliance or otherwise. In a number of
recent re-issues of RGS, specific
to be sought. Steam Locomotives are in a
minority group, and subject to the
restrictions in GM/RT2000 for "Heritage
Vehicles".
01/04/2011
application. The preserved steam
introduction in 1930, and continued until its
withdrawal from revenue service in 1962.
N/A
21/02/2011
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Rolling Stock
18/03/2011
Current
GKRT0192
One
2.1.1.3
11-103-DGN
Position of signal 4823 at Feniton Station
relative to Level Crossing.
Signal 4823 at Feniton Station and Level
Crossing.
Signal 4823 (formerly F1) is located on
Feniton platform, and protects Feniton MCB
Level Crossing in the Down direction. It is
positioned 21 m from the level crossing,
less than the 25 m minimum required. Full
renewal of all crossing equipment (lights
barriers etc) is planned and options to
achieve compliance considered were: Achieve compliance by moving 4823 back
by 4 m, requiring a new signal post and
equivalent platform extension to maintain
current operational capability. This has an
estimated cost of Âœ250,000, and would
still result in the level crossing being within
the standard overlap of 4823. Achieve
compliance by moving 4823 back clear of
the platform (approx. 350 m), requiring a
new signal post and new distant signal.
This has an estimated cost of Âœ150,000,
would limit operational capability to turn
back services at Feniton, and cause the
Level Crossing to be closed for an
increased amount of time.
N/A
27/05/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
25/08/2011
Current
GMRT2000
Three
6.6.3 and Appendix H1
11-148-DGN
Derogation Steam Locomotive
The road is moderately used, seeing
23/09/2011
between 800 and 1000 vehicles a day.
There are currently 18 daily scheduled
services in the Down direction through
Feniton, 12 of which stop at the station.
Stopping Services: Track Circuit CMG will
provide train detection 150m on the
approach to 4823. When a train is
detected, the Road traffic Lights will
illuminate automatically in a normal
sequence with Amber followed by flashing
reds. An alarm will be provided to the
signaller when the Road Traffic Lights are
initiated, but the barriers will not lower
without the signaller's intervention. Under
normal operation it is likely that the signaller
will choose to lower the barriers once the
Road Traffic Lights have been initiated, to
prevent confusion to road users. The
subsequent risk of a road vehicle/pedestrian
incursion at the same time as a SPAD is
very low. Non-Stop Services: A distant
strike-in treadle is provided 107 s before the
Feniton Crossing, alerting the Signaller to
the need to initiate the manual crossing
closure procedure. The subsequent risk of
the road closure sequence not being
completed at the same time as a SPAD is
very low.
Operation of the following preserved Steam It would not be practical to revise the RGS As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
24/10/2011
locomotive is one of 862 locomotives of its
Operator. GWR 57xx Class 0-6-0PT Steam traction units and the general scarcity of
class which ran safely over the British
Locomotive TOPS No. 98452 Painted No.
technical information now available to prove railway infrastructure since its introduction
L94 (7752) Class / Power Classification 4F their compliance or otherwise. In a number by the Great Western Railway in 1930 and
Wheel Arrangement 0-6-0T Maximum
continued until its withdrawal from revenue
Speed 45 mph.
exemptions for steam locomotives, shown service with London Transport in 1971. The
locomotive is intended for Heritage
withdrawn, increasing the number of nonOperation only. In order to achieve
compliances for which derogation has now compliance with RGS the cost would be
to be sought. Steam Locomotives are in a prohibitive and such engineering change
Vehicles".
N/A
01/09/2011
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Rolling Stock
06/10/2011
Current
GKRT0044
One
5.1.3
Controls for Signalling a Train onto an
Occupied Line
11-209-DGN
Platform Sharing at Peterborough Station.
Existing Signals P421, P423, P466, P468 & The total distance from the signals
P470 controlling movements into existing
controlling the movements to the second
and new platforms. New Signal P799.
train to the commencement of the platform
shall not be greater than 600m as per
existing non-compliance 04-010-NC
(Tracker No 4652). Two new platforms are
to be provided at Peterborough which will
require new permissive moves to be
undertaken from new and existing signals.
4 existing platforms are to be altered in
length. These platforms require permissive
moves today from existing signals and
some will have new permissive moves from
new signals. The most appropriate position
for the protecting signals (taking account of
the line speed of the main lines) is for the
signals to be greater than 600m from the
platforms. Compliance would either require
extra signals leading to non standard aspect
sequences with delayed clearance or the
prohibition of platform sharing.
24/02/2012
N/A
22/12/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/01/2012
Current
GKRT0044
One
5.1.3
Occupied Line
11-174-DGN
Permissive moves into Nottingham platform Nottingham Station permissive movements The position of the protecting signals is
4.
into platform 4 from signals TN4961,
fixed by the topography of the area and the
TN4963, TN4965 & TN4967.
only compliant solutions are not to provide
the new Platform 4 or to prohibit permissive
moves using the new platform.
A Risk Assessment has been completed for 07/12/2011
the permissive working which confirmed
that the risk from the proposed method of
working is acceptable. There is adequate
sighting on the approach to platform for a
train to stop short of the platform due to the
low speed of 15 mph. The alternative of not
providing call-on moves from these signals
would result in having to authorise non
signalled movements in the event of having
movements enter the platform when
occupied during perturbed working. The
position light routes could also be used in
accordance with the rule book in degraded
situations when there is a track circuit
failure in the platform instead of the risks
associated with authorising the driver to
pass a signal at danger.
N/A
25/10/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/11/2011
Current
GMRT2141
Three
Clause 2.1.5
Resistance of railway vehicles to derailment 11-040-DGN
and roll-over
Resistance to derailment - Use of Computer MATISA B66 UC tamping machines.
Simulation in lieu of UK Ride Tests.
Vehicle Numbers: 75501, 75502
No impact on safety. VAMPIRE computer 03/05/2011
ride simulation and analysis is an
established methodology. A similar
approach has been used for two other
machines with simulation validated against
ride tests in Switzerland (see derogations
04/169/DGN and 10/133/DGN) and for eight
other machines with simulation validated
against ride tests in Austria (see
derogations 02/097/DGN, 03/283/DGN,
03/284/DGN, 03/326/DGN, 05/033/DGN,
05/041/DGN, 06/128/DGN, and
09/194/DGN).
N/A
24/02/2011
Rolling Stock
18/03/2011
Current
Static validation of vehicle model against
?Q/Q test. On-track ride tests to validate
resistance to derailment. The on-track plant
would have to be transported by road to the
UK. Transport by road of such a heavy
machine would be difficult and may involve
dismantling the machine and reassembly in
the UK. This would pose considerable
practicable difficulties, increase timescales
and impose prohibitive additional costs.
A DA and a permissive working workshop
has been undertaken and signal sighting
has been completed, and the risks were
deemed to be ALARP. Following the
upgrade works, the station will fall into four
distinct parts: Â· P1/2 Â· P4 Â· P5 Â·
P6/7.
Page62
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0212
One
2.1.3.1
Signalling Lockout Systems to Protect
Railway Undertaking Personnel
11-099-DGN
Utilisation of key enabled staff lockout
system at Croft.
Croft No3 Sidings is located next to the UP
Nuneaton Line, there are two "Staff
Lockout" Key Enabled LOD(T) type switch
panels, located in metal cabinets at either
end of Croft No3 Sidings.
There are two "Staff Lockout" instruments 08/07/2011
currently provided, one at each end of Croft
No. 3 Sidings, the Railways Undertakings
Personnel obtain the key from the signaller
at Croft SB and take the protection at one
end of the Sidings. The protection is
handed back once they have reached the
other end and have completed the
inspection of the side of the train closest to
the Up Nuneaton Line (they do not require
the protection to inspect the other side of
the train adjacent to Croft No. 6 Sidings).
The key is returned to the signaller after
use. The only change to the working
practice will be introduction of the locked
boxes at lineside and requirement for the
railway undertaking staff to contact the
signaller by telephone.
N/A
26/05/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
23/06/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
5.1.2.4
Signals
11-156-DGN
This non-compliance application relates to
EK5126 signal at Margate station only.
Margate station is within the area of the
East Kent Resignalling Phase 1 Project
which is undertaking a full resignalling of
the area bounded by Sittingbourne, Minster
and Kearsney stations and all signalling
equipment in the area is new. The existing
track layout in the Margate area is not being
significantly altered.
This non-compliance application relates to
EK5126 signal at Margate station only.
Margate station is within the area of the
East Kent Resignalling Phase 1 Project
which is undertaking a full resignalling of
the area bounded by Sittingbourne, Minster
and Kearsney stations and all signalling
equipment in the area is new. The existing
track layout in the Margate area is not being
significantly altered.
28/09/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
20/10/2011
Current
Eight
18.2
Preparation and movement of trains:
General
11-057-DGN
Class 390 - Use of the `Snow Brake' during Continued use of the `Snow Brake', an
Snow Conditions
integral function of the Class 390
`Pendolino' trainset braking system, as an
alternative to undertaking the `Running
brake test during snow conditions'.
The fact that the divergent route reads up 10/11/2011
to the buffer stops in a terminal platform
precludes the use of a position light junction
indicator in order to comply with the
requirements of Network Rail Company
Standard NR/L2/SIG/19609 as was
identified during a review of draft scheme
plans by the Network Rail Major Schemes
Review Panel (see item 142 on the East
Kent Phase 1 Signalling Renewals MSRP
Meeting Minutes version 3. 4) and so a
standard alphanumeric indicator was
substituted. This was designed to provide
an indication only for the divergent route
due to the readability performance of a
category 2 device being insufficient for use
with an unrestricted main aspect sequence
at this particular location. This
configuration was compliant with the
standards in force at the time at which the
scheme received Approval in Principle
(June 2009). The requirement to display a
route indication for all routes from a signal
provided with a standard route indicator
when at least one of those routes leads into
a platform was introduced with the
publication of GK/RT0045 in February 2010
by which time detailed control table design
and signal erection had commenced. The
For the reasons set out above, it is not
20/05/2011
considered to be any impacts on the
continued use of the Snow Brake function.
N/A
GERT8000-TW1
N/A
31/03/2011
Management
10/05/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
4.2.3
and Trains
11-116-DGN
Chilterns Route track realignment/speed
improvements - Alterations to existing
platforms height and offset
The "Staff Lockout" system at Croft is used
to protect Railways Undertakings Personnel
from traffic on the Up Nuneaton Line while
they inspect trains in the adjacent Croft No.
3 Sidings, due to the lack of adequate safe
clearance between the Up Nuneaton Line
and Croft No. 3 Sidings. The system is
existing and controlled from Croft SB but it
is planned to transfer control to East
Midlands Control Centre. Replacement of
the system with a key release system would
require replacement of the system and
change to the application rules affecting the
railway undertaking who currently take
protection at one end of the line, walk
through and return protection from the
second instrument. The project believe it is
not reasonably practicable to achieve
compliance; The risk associated with the
current LOD(T) system is believed ALARP
and has had no safety irregularities.
Current operating staff are familiarised with
the LOD (T) system for their protection and
it gives greater flexibility when walking from
one end of a coupled train to the other
protected. OC&S have stated a LOD (E)
system would be very restrictive to the
current train timetable (7 minute headway)
and it will also pose problems with the
Phase 1 Project the lines through Margate
station are to be resignalled. Trains
approaching in the Up direction may be
routed into either along the Up Thanet line
to platform 3 (a through line) or into the
terminal Up Bay line (platform 4). The new
signal which shall control this junction (to
be numbered EK5126) is to be provided
with a standard alphanumeric route
indicator which shall display a route
indication only for the divergent route into
terminal platform 4. This is non-compliant
with part c) of GK/RT0045 clause 5. 1. 2. 4
as all the routes lead to station platforms.
EK5126 signal is positioned on a straight
section of line and has been assessed
during the signal sighting process as being
visible from the signal in rear which is 780m
away and the line speed on the approach is
80mph. The divergent route into terminal
platform 4 is to be approach controlled from
red. A standard route indicator is a
category 2 device which means that it is
required to be readable at 250m from the
signal at a maximum speed of 60mph.
Clause 5. 1. 3. 3 of GK/RT0045 requires
that, where practicable, junction signals are
arranged so that a driver can read the route
At the introduction of the Class 390 fleet,
Virgin Trains Drivers were trained on the
use of the Snow Brake function in addition
to the Rule Book running brake test, during
snow conditions. However, in September
2005 a Traction Bulletin was issued to
Drivers allowing the sole use of the Snow
Brake function, as shown as Attachment 1.
This Traction Bulletin was issued following
informal discussions between RSSB and
Virgin Trains, and the use of the Snow
Brake facility continues to be re-briefed to
Drivers each year in preparation for winter
operations. Overview of the Class 390
Braking System: The Class 390 trainsets
are modern ac electric multiple units,
designed, manufactured and maintained by
Alstom Transport for Virgin Trains. The
trainsets incorporate both friction and
dynamic braking systems, with the friction
braking system being fully rated for the
trainsets design speed of 140 mph. The
friction braking system generally consists of
three brake discs on each trailer axle, plus
two brake discs per motored axle; the
actual quantity and disposition of àctive'
brake discs is provided in Attachment 2.
The brake pads are actuated by Knorr
Bremse `Compact' brake callipers, which
An objective of the Evergreen 3 (EG3)
project is to raise line speeds between
Aynho Junction and Marylebone Station.
To achieve this increase, the track will be
realigned through a number of stations on
this route. The platforms on these stations
have heights and/or offsets that in the main
do not comply with the requirements of
GI/RT7016 with respect to height (915 mm)
and offset (730 mm). In improving the
geometry of the track to raise line speeds
on the route the project has sought to
achieve the necessary gauging clearances
and also minimise the increase in stepping
distances. Whilst gauging clearances need
to be provided for the existing Class 165
and 168 stock running at higher speeds, the
gauging changes are primarily to provide a
diversionary route for the West Coast Main
Line freight container flows (in particular
W9 gauge traffic). The scope of the project
does not provide a reasonable opportunity
to rebuild all of the existing platforms.
In achieving the desired track geometry for
the speed increases and provide for W9
container traffic it has not been reasonably
practicable to realign the track so as not to
increase the platform stepping distances at
locations on the platforms listed in section
7.
N/A
23/06/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/07/2011
Current
The following table shows the change in
Average stepping distances X, Y and Z for
each platform +ve values indicate an
increase in average stepping distance. The
worst case for Class 165 and 168 vehicles
is given, shaded cells are >50mm increase.
X (Horizontal) Y (Vertical) Z (Diagonal):
Wembley Station Up: X 18; Y -4; Z 4
Wembley Station Down: X 22; Y 17; Z 24
South Ruislip Up: X 49; Y 40; Z 57 South
Ruislip Down: X 21; Y 35; Z 38 West
Ruislip Down: X 5; Y 52; Z 52 Gerrards
Cross Up: X -7; Y 12; Z 10 Gerrards
Cross Down: X 5; Y 11; Z 11
Beaconsfield Up: X 19; Y 4; Z 11
Beaconsfield Down: X 47; Y 6; Z 22 High
Wycombe Up: X 1; Y 6; Z 4 High
Wycombe Down: X -18; Y -5; Z -10
Sudbury and Harrow Up: X -18; Y -76; Z 74 Sudbury and Harrow Down: X 68; Y
28; Z 65 Northolt Park Up: X 9; Y 21; Z
23 Northolt Park Down: X 5; Y 17; Z 17
Denham Up: X 20; Y 19; Z 24 Denham
Down: X 8; Y 18; Z 19 Denham Golf Club
Up: X 18; Y 11; Z 17 Denham Golf Club
Down: X 8; Y 4; Z 7 Seer Green and
Jordans Down: X 18; Y 24; 28 Seer
Green and Jordans Up: X 1; Y 17; Z 15
Sudbury Hill Harrow Down: X 2; Y 2; Z 2
10/08/2011
Page63
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
GCRT5033
Two
2.1.1.4 and 2.3.1.2
Terminal Tracks - Requirements for Buffer
Stops, Arresting Devices and End Impact
Walls
11-202-DGN
Huntingdon station bay platform 1 - Buffer
stop arrangement
A new DfT compliant footbridge is to be
installed at the station to provide improved
access to station facilities. The location to
be installed is within 20 m of the buffer stop
location. A deviation has previously been
submitted and agreed (Ref. 11/028/DGN Tracker No. 8527). A condition of this
derogation (see section 9) was to replace
the existing fixed buffer stop with a energy
absorbing sliding buffer. A buffer stop risk
assessment was included with this deviation
and has been attached for information. The
design has determined that, owing to the
limited occupancy, the rate of retardation
must be greater that that stated in the
standard.
Clause 2. 1. 1. 4: Four-car units will
decelerate at a maximum rate of 0. 364g
(greater than the 0. 25g permitted by
Railway Group Standards). Eight-car units
will decelerate at an average rate of 0. 192g
(greater than the 0. 15g permitted by
Railway Group Standards). Clause 2. 1. 1.
4: The available occupancy is limited to 8
m. This cannot be increased by moving the
new buffer closer to the exit signal due to
existing restricted standage for eight-car
units. Major signalling and track works
would be required. The occupancy cannot
be increased behind the existing buffer as
this would require the platform to be
reconstructed and reconfiguration of OLE
structures. The proposed footbridge and
existing station buildings would also be
affected. Clause 2. 3. 1. 2: Proposed track
radius for section behind the buffer stop is
2445 m.
GMRT2000
Three
11-020-DGN
Derogation for Ex BR standard class 7
steam locomotive, TOPS No 98700
`Britannia'
GIRT7033
Two
B10
11-153-DGN
GIRT7016
Four
6.3.1
and Trains
GKRT0075
One
3.2.3.1
Signage
11-136-DGN
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Clause 2. 1. 1. 4: The limits of
21/03/2012
deceleration in Group Standards are
specified for passenger safety/comfort
reasons. However, the current operating
rules at Huntingdon do not permit
passenger stock to enter the bay with
passengers on board. Therefore, in the
event of a buffer overrun, the stock will be
empty with only train crew on board. Whilst
designed with a higher deceleration rate
than the normal limits, the new sliding
friction buffer will still bring the train to rest
in a fully controlled manner and will offer
significant safety improvement over the
existing (defective) fixed buffer. Clause 2.
3. 1. 2: The proposed track radius of 2445
m is relatively flat, the corresponding
versine over the 8 m buffer occupancy
length is only 3 mm, therefore the
occupancy length of track can be
considered to be nominally straight and is
within installation tolerance of straight track
(+/-15 mm between 10 m offsets or
difference between overlapping 20 m
chords). The proposal to implement a
sliding buffer stop offers a significant safety
improvement on the existing fixed buffer
stop which is in poor condition. The present
use of the bay platform is for empty trains
Operation of the following preserved Steam GM/RT2000, Issue 3, October 2000;
As indicated in this document. The
11/03/2011
Paragraph 6. 6. 3, (page 8) & Appendix "H", preserved steam locomotive is of a type
paragraph H1(a), (page 36), stipulates that that ran safely over the British railway
Operator. Ex British Railways "Britannia"
a derogation must be obtained for the
infrastructure since its introduction in 1951
TOPS No. 98700 Painted No. 70000 Class Engineering Acceptance of Non Compliant and continued until its withdrawal from
/ Power Classification: 7P6F Wheel
vehicles for limited use on heritage and
revenue service in 1966, and subsequently
Arrangement 4 - 6 - 2 Maximum Speed 75 special train services. This application is
operated on the national railway network in
mph.
submitted in accordance with this
preservation from 1991 until 1997. The
Mandatory Requirement.
locomotive is intended for Heritage
N/A
14/12/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/01/2012
Current
N/A
07/02/2011
DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd
Rolling Stock
18/02/2011
Current
Termination boards at a high risk low
adhesion site
National.
N/A
28/09/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
23/02/2012
Current
Hungtingdon station Platform 1: location of
new structures at terminal tracks
Huntingdon station Platform 1: location of
new structures at terminal tracks.
N/A
16/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
N/A
04/08/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
25/08/2011
Current
The standard currently shows a
'commencement board' for a site of low
adhesion, but there is nothing that refers to
a termination board (picture of sign
attached). There are currently a number of
sites on the Western route where both a
commencement board and termination
board are located to inform drivers of the
extent of a site of low rail adhesion.
Without the termination board, the driver
will have no visible (line side) indication of
where the site of low rail adhesion will end.
Huntingdon Station is a Grade II Listed
Structure (Main station buildings and
canopy on Platform 1/2) and the necessary
Listed Building Consents and Approvals are
required. The Planning Officers from
Huntingdonshire District Council have
advised Network Rail that the original
proposed design and configuration of the
footbridge were unacceptable. The layout
of the proposed footbridge has been
amended in line with their requirements:
planning consents would not be granted
without their requests/changes being
implemented. The existing site constraints
and the amendments required by the
Planning Officers mean that the footbridge
would be non-compliant to clause 6. 3. 1 of
GI/RT7016. The new lift and its enclosure
is to be located within 8 m of the buffer stop
on Platform 1, and a corner of the lift
enclosure is positioned in line with the edge
of Platform 1 to give the necessary
structure clearances and platform width to
the main platform and through line (Up
Slow) on Platform 2. To reduce the impact
on the visual amenity of the listed station
buildings and canopy on Platform 1/2, the
Planning Officers require the new footbridge
to be located as far away as possible from
Advance Warning Indicators on approach to Advance Warning Indicators on Down Relief The speed increases on the Down Relief
DR169, Long Dyke area, Cardiff.
approaching Long Dyke
from 40mph to 75mph when a high speed
connection from the Down Main converges
with the Down Relief. The speed on the
Down Relief subsequently reduces to
40mph on the approach to Cardiff
approximately 1400m after the
commencement of the 75mph. During the
short stretch of 75mph line speed there is a
divergence to the Up Relief (down direction)
and the Down Main at 40mph. The position
of the AWI for the reduction in speed on the
Down Relief is at Splott Road overbridge,
however the AWI for the divergence should
be placed at the 75mph commencement
board. This would lead to a multitude of
boards and extra suppressed AWS.
In preparation for this autumn (2011), the 20/04/2012
Western route is looking to inform drivers of
a low rail adhesion risk site (both lines) at
Camborne station. For this to be effective,
the driver needs to be made aware of the
location where the low adhesion conditions
commence and the location where the risk
site ends. The installation of the
commencement and termination boards at
Camborne is as a result of a risk
assessment into Truro and Camborne level
crossing arrangements. Removal of the
termination board would not assist train
drivers.
It is not reasonably practicable to provide a 12/07/2011
compliant solution at this site: this is due
to the physical restraints at the site and the
requirements of the Planning Officers of
Huntingdonshire District Council. These
preclude the construction of a new
footbridge anywhere else than proposed
within the confines of the station. The site
constraints include existing platform lengths
and widths, location of OLE and station
facilities: the constraints at the northern
end of the station meant that the
construction of a new bridge to the south of
the existing footbridge is the only viable
option. Alternative solutions were
considered: in summary these were;
Relocation of the buffer stop to terminate
the track further to the south and away from
the new structure (minimum 20 m overrun
zone) - rejected on the grounds of cost,
approval timescales and the need for
additional specialist works (P-Way,
Signalling and Network Change).
Constructing a new footbridge and lifts
within the footprint of the existing one:
rejected as Listed Building
Consent/Planning Approval would not being
granted and cost - this option would require
the use of a large-span temporary
The proposal reduces the requirements for 23/09/2011
suppressed AWS on approach to the AWI
(which would have complex controls and
lead to drivers receiving unnecessary AWS
warnings). Train approaching from the
Down Relief have a linespeed of 40mph and
only 320m to accelerate before the reach
the combined AWI. If the route has been
set through the divergence then the driver
will have either of received flashing aspects
or will have received a steady read with
approach release from red at the
divergence. In the unusual event that a
train approaches from the Down Main via
the 75mph crossovers and is routed back
through the divergence, then the junction
signal is approach released from red and
hence trains should not be approaching at
speed.
Page64
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0045
One
5.2.3.1
Signals
11-010-DGN
Provision of flashing aspect sequences on
approach to ME25, ME94, ME159 and
ME189 as part of Evergreen 3 project.
Â· ME25 - 75mph approach permissible
speed, 60mph permissible speed at
divergence Â· ME94 - 100mph approach
permissible speed, 25mph permissible
speed at divergence Â· ME159 - 85mph
approach permissible speed, 25mph
permissible speed at divergence Â· ME189 100mph approach permissible speed,
25mph permissible speed at divergence.
The junction signalling principles adopted
10/03/2011
by the project and proposed as alternative
practice have been arrived at after driver
consultation and qualitative risk assessment
following a Chilterns route-wide review of
junction signalling.
N/A
20/01/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/02/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
2.3.2.5
Signals
11-134-DGN
Use of letter `X' in alphanumeric route
indicators to denote a move against the
normal direction (SN289)
SN289 at 17 652m on route MLN1
If the permissible speed range restrictions
of 5. 2. 3. 1 are applied by the project then
for a number of junction arrangements the
only applicable junction signalling methods
will be approach control from red or splitting
distants. This affects both existing flashing
aspect junction signalling being altered by
the project and new junction signalling. For
ATP-fitted trains, approach control from red
junction signalling is extremely restrictive
and therefore disruptive to both the existing
and the proposed timetable following the
Evergreen 3 project. GK/RT0045 clause 5.
2. 6. 1 suggests splitting distants should
only be applied in exception cases. To
avoid the disruptive effect of ATP, the
Evergreen 3 project would require the
application of splitting distant in more than
exceptional cases. Note that ATP
continuously supervises train speed,
enforcing reductions in speed
commensurate with the aspect sequence.
ATP speed supervisory data is updated at
trackside loops fitted on approach to
signals. ATP loops cannot extend more
than 300m on approach to signals, and
system obsolescence means this restriction
cannot be addressed. Although junction
signals can be released from red with trains
Network Rail have previously used a
miniature X to denote a move towards a
limit of shunt and a standard X to denote a
move onto a line in the reverse direction.
The inability to use X would lead to potential
confusion due to the changes between Up
and Down on the route.
SN289B(M): 'X' adopted as this is a main 23/09/2011
route towards a fixed red signal with
subsidiary shunt aspect (SN293) on the Up
Relief. This move is against the normal
direction of travel and is to be used by
goods trains or light engines to get into
Dawley Up Goods Loop only. Other
legends were considered but 'U' and 'R'
could both be confusing here with other
routes/lines. SN289B(M) route is noncompliant to one clause of GK/RT0045 The
indications to drivers in this area have been
considered and agreed by the TOC/FOC
representatives. These indications present
the least possible confusion to drivers and
that 'X' is commonly used to indicated
routes to 'Wrong Direction' signals. The
use of the 'X' legend has historically been
associated with wrong direction moves and
no risks of misinterpretation have been
identified.
N/A
29/07/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
25/08/2011
Current
GKRT0192
One
2.1.1.3
11-120-DGN
Position of stop signals at Brandon and
Nantwich level crossings
Brandon MCB-OD Up Approach (Engineer's
Line Reference ETN 86 miles 29 chains;
Modular Signalling pilot scheme being
undertaken by Signalling Solutions Limited)
signal EN 8066 situated on the Up Platform
at Brandon Station and signal EN 8064
situated in parallel with signal EN 8066.
This crossing is being converted to MCBOD operation from MCB with the provision
of an Obstacle detector.
Having signals at the end of platforms on
12/01/2012
these approaches is similar to the current
signalling arrangements. As adequate
sighting exists to allow the signal to be
positioned at the end of the platform, this
then gives crossing closure times which are
not excessive. It is considered that this
reduces the risk of a SPAD at a level
crossing protecting signal leading to a
collision with a road vehicle, whilst keeping
the road closure time to sensible limits. It
should be noted that any risks which might
arise due to the signaller not instigating the
lower process and failing to properly
undertake crossing clear checks do not
apply since the crossings will incorporate
automatic crossing clear checks in the form
of an Obstacle Detector.
N/A
28/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
15/12/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1 b)
and Trains
11-070-DGN
Thirteen stations: Chessington South,
Bookham, Effingham Junction, Clandon,
London Road (Guildford), Sunbury,
Hampton, Teddington, Norbiton, Vauxhall,
Guildford, Raynes Lane, Wandsworth
Common.
The scope of the derogation applies to:
Station Platform End to be Extended
Minimum Width proposed for Operational
Use Length of Platform <
2,500mmChessington
South1Country2,350mm3mBookham2DNL
ondon2,150mm9mEffingham
Junction2DNCountry2,000mm43mClandon
2DNLondon2,450mm55mLondon Road
(Guildford)2DNCountry2,000mm49mSunbu
ry2DNCountry2,250mm43mHampton2DNL
ondon2,000mm49mTeddington2UPCountry
2,000mm14mNorbiton1UPLondon2,000mm
49mVauxhall7UPCountry2,000mm19m8DN
London2,374mm3mGuildford2DNCountry2,
000mm19mRaynes
Park1UPCountry1,755mmLess than
1mWandsworth
Common2UPCountry2,000mm34m1
Minimum width at last set of passenger
doors
The crossing approaches have been
designed with the signal less than 25 m
away from the crossing edge, where the
station platform is on the approach to the
level crossing; the crossing is relatively
busy and the signal can be adequately
sighted in accordance with GE/RT8037.
The rationale is that being able to put the
signal at the end of the platform and allow
the crossing to close when the train
approaches to within 100 m minimises the
road closure time of the crossing which
would otherwise be excessive for stopping
trains. Providing a compliant signal
position would require the signal to be on
the approach to the platform, requiring
stopping trains to slow down on the
approach to the signal, before then
traversing at a low speed to the platform to
then stop and perform station duties.
Calculation of the closure time with the
signal at the end of the platform has shown
that the closure time will be 1 minute 3
seconds which would rise to an estimated 5
minutes if the signal was placed on the
approach to the platform. Where the
crossing is busy, extended closure times
will increase traffic congestion (reducing
Network Rail's reputation and possibly
A number of stations within this
programme are very tightly constrained by
existing topography and infrastructure.
Many platforms can only be extended at
one end due to the presence of 'immovable'
constraints, including tunnels, bridges and
third party retaining walls, at the other. A
good number of these platforms are also
tightly constrained at the end which can be
extended, by existing topography, station
buildings, legal boundaries and the
curvature of the line. In a number of cases,
despite best endeavours, it has not been
possible to fully comply with the
requirements of GI/RT7016 Interface
between Station Platforms, Track and
Trains, with respect to platform width.
A HAZOP risk assessment has been jointly 04/08/2011
undertaken by Network Rail and South
West Trains to evaluate the possible risks
of extending platforms at the stations listed
at reduced width, and to consider possible
additional operational controls to mitigate
those risks. The risk assessment took into
account operator knowledge of passenger
footfall and pedflow at each location.
Network Rail and South West Trains have
subsequently jointly concluded and agreed
that the risks associated with the proposed
extensions at a width not fully compliant
with GI/RT7016 are, in fact, tolerable and
can be maintained ALARP by adopting and
implementing the additional mitigating
operational controls identified through the
HAZOP risk assessment process.
N/A
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/07/2011
Current
Page65
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
7.3.1
and Trains
11-023-DGN
Biggleswade station - platform width of
double faced platforms.
Biggleswade station - platform width of
double faced platforms (see General
Arrangement drawing
60163109/BIW/CIV/DR-125 Rev. 06). At
present, Biggleswade station has two 168 m
long island platforms that serve the Dn
Fast/ Slow and Up Fast/Slow. The
platforms are connected by a stepped
footbridge located about 40 m from the
country end. The widths of these platforms
vary from 7. 3 m (Dn) / 8. 3 m (Up) down to
about 6. 0 m. Both platforms are to be
extended at both ends to provide an overall
length of 245m. The extensions are
proposed to be achieved by a combination
of island and single faced platforms that will
integrate with the existing track layout.
Biggleswade Station has two island
Platforms serving the Down Fast/Slow and
the Up Fast/Slow on the ECML. It would
not be practicable to provide a compliant
solution. Mitigation measures for
controlling the risks arising from the noncompliant solution are described in the
application. The extensions to the island
Platforms are non-compliant to GI/RT7016
as follows: Down / London end:
substandard over a 50. 9m length tapering
from 6000mm to 4700mm. Down /Country
end: substandard over a 4. 7m length
tapering from 6000mm to 5700mm. Up /
London end: substandard over a 17m
length tapering from 6000mm to 5300mm.
Up /Country end: substandard over a 15.
4m length tapering from 6000mm to
5200mm.
N/A
15/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
Revised 16/11/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
2.3.2.5
Signals
11-122-DGN
Use of letter 'X' in alphanumeric route
normal direction
19 signals on the Thameslink Route Kentish Town to Loughborough Junction.
N/A
28/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
GMRT2473
One
B12
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles.
11-188-DGN
Power Door Mk3 Trainsets with Manually
Operated SDO System.
10-off MK3 trainsets operated by Chiltern
Railways comprising of DVT + GFW + (5-6)
x TSO + cl 67 Where DVT = Driving Van
Trailer GFW = Galley First Wheelchair TSO
= Trailer Standard Open cl 67 = Class 67
locomotive.
N/A
03/11/2011
Chiltern Railway Company
Ltd ("Chiltern Railways")
Rolling Stock
20/01/2012
Current
GERT8000-HB7
One
Section 6
General duties of a Controller of Site Safety 11-056-DGN
(COSS)
Minor work where the safe system of work
involves lookout(s).
All Network Rail Managed Infrastructure.
Chiltern Railways plans to introduce 4-off
Mk3 trainsets into service from March 2012.
This fleet will be grown with passenger
demand with a maximum of 10-off Mk3
trainsets by the end of the Chiltern Railways
franchise in 2021. These trainsets will be
unique for Mk3 trainsets due to the
installation of powered bodyside doors to
reduce boarding times, improve safe access
to these vehicles and aid accessibility.
These trainsets will be limited to specific
routes by their NRAP certificate due to
widened footsteps. Chiltern Railways has
included a guard operated Selective Door
(SDO) System in the train design to allow
selected doors to be opened, should the
trains be required to stop in service at short
platforms. This Derogation seeks
permission to use a manual SDO system
following risk assessments and ORR
consultation. GM/RT2473 requires
installation of a fully automatic SDO system
to control the opening of doors and limit the
opening to doors that are on a short
platform. All other fleets that have
automatic SDO systems in use on the UK
mainline network benefit from: Economies
of scale from use on fleets of over 500
vehicles (Southern class 377 & South
The derogation will allow TVP holders to
continue to access the infrastructure to
carry out necessary but occasional track
visits, including undertaking minor work
whilst under the protection of lookouts(s).
Network Rail standard NR/L2/OHS/020
Track Visitor Permits describes in full the
safety arrangements that will be followed.
Without a derogation, a line blockage for a
safety tour for example may be required,
thereby either preventing the person from
undertaking the tour (in the event that a line
blockage is not available), or prevent the
tour from being undertaken under any
protection with lookouts.
The lines speeds are 75mph on the slow
20/12/2011
lines and 125mph on the fast lines. There
is relatively low risk to passengers using the
station. Biggleswade is to be served by 2
Thameslink TPH all day supplemented by 2
GN TPH at peak times which run fast
between Kings Cross and Biggleswade.
Peak services will be timetabled to use the
Down Slow. Thus, concurrent alighting of
passengers on both Down Fast and Down
Slow Platforms at peak times is unlikely to
occur. A static analysis has been
undertaken using anticipated passenger
number for 2016 + 35% - allowing for
platform edge exclusion zones to both the
Fast and Slow platforms. This analysis has
confirmed that the non-compliant 4. 7m
wide Down London end platform (worst
case) provides acceptable passenger
densities under normal, perturbed and
'Train on Fire' scenarios. Note that the
'Train on Fire' scenario assumes a worse
case of a crush loaded train occurring with
Peak period passenger numbers on the
Platform on its arrival. Given the commuter
use of the station, few passengers will
depart during the PM peak and so this
analysis is pessimistic as it assumes no
passengers will egress the station before all
It is not considered appropriate for the 'X'
16/08/2011
legend to be amended on this project given
that: - Driver training / route learning videos
are being provided to reinforce all indicator
legends. During scheme development
consultation with train operators identified
that 'X' is an appropriate indication. The
use of the 'X' legend has historically been
associated with wrong direction moves and
no risks of misinterpretation have been
identified.
The proposed alternative action will allow
06/02/2012
Chiltern Railways to bring the Mk3 trainsets
with powered doors into service as planned
and for them to be used at short platforms
following platform specific risk assessments
and ORR consultation. The manually
operated SDO system is reasonable since:
The fleet is small (4 trainsets at present with
an expected maximum of 10 trainsets as
the fleet grows), and the cost of a fully
automatic SDO system is not justified by
the cost given the relatively small fleet and
the reduced life compared to a new train. A
derogation would not have been required to
operate Mk3 HST vehicles with slam doors
using the CDL SDO system since this has
"grandfather rights". However, a derogation
is required to operate the Mk3s with
powered bodyside doors, although these
are fully compliant with GM/RT2473 in all
other respects and offer significant safety &
accessibility improvements compared to
existing Mk3 vehicles. Other vehicles fitted
with manually operated SDO systems
operate over these routes. These fleets
include Classes 170, 172/2 and 172/3,
although the function of the SDO system is
different.
The details of how a TVP holder will have 20/05/2011
safe access the infrastructure when walking
or working will continue to be in accordance
with NR/L2/OHS/020 Track Visitor Permits.
TVP use is constantly monitored by the
NCCA and reported to Network Rail by the
National Competency Control Agency
(NCCA) on a monthly basis. Network Rail
Safety and Compliance have also recently
completed a survey into the use of TVPs by
frequent users of the process; the survey
confirmed that the use of TVPs is in
accordance with NR/L2/OHS/020 Track
Visitor Permits. The non-compliance is not
considered to import risk. As stated,
Network Rail has an on-going safety
initiative to reduce the number of personnel
that hold PTS with a corresponding safety
benefit of reducing risk of incidents arising
from limited experience/use of the
competency. Where occasional track visits
are required, all risks are controlled by the
company procedure. The details of how a
TVP holder will have safe access the
infrastructure when walking or working
(minor work) will continue to be in
accordance with NR/L2/OHS/020 Track
Visitor Permits. The Track Visitor Permit
holder: may apply for up to 12 TVPs in a
N/A
31/03/2011
Network Rail
Management
10/05/2011
Current
Page66
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0060
Four
C7.1.1 and Appendix 2,
Table 3 Ref 9
Interlocking Principles
11-100-DGN
Non proving of flank points on approach to
Queen Street Station
Queen Street Station Routes CQ60, CQ62,
CQ64, CQ68, CQ70, CQ72, CQ74, CQ59,
CQ251 , CQ57 and CQ249. Points 747A &
B and 748 A & B (Crossovers in Queen
Street Tunnel)
The Glasgow Queen Street Axle Counter
Renewal Project is seeking to apply less
restrictive controls to enable train
movements in the event of failure of one
end of a crossover. Compliance would
remove the opportunity to manage failures
without recourse to instructing drivers to
pass signals at danger or the expensive
provision of PoSA signals.
08/07/2011
N/A
27/05/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
23/06/2011
Current
GIRT7033
Two
Section AK, B10 to B10.2
11-162-DGN
Station approach countdown markers in the South West Trains proposes the design of a
South West Trains, Network Rail Wessex
new sign not currently included in RGS
route.
GI/RT7033 as required by section B10 of
that RGS for the use on the South West
Trains Network Rail Wessex Route.
South West Trains (in association with
Wessex Route) is seeking ways to reduce
station overruns where misjudgement of
braking distance is a factor. Sign AK102
allows for markers from 300m on the
approach to a location (with additional
markers up to 600m if required). These
signs are considered insufficient distance
from the station to give drivers advance
information of a station that could be
difficult to stop at.
10/11/2011
N/A
04/10/2011
South West Trains
Control Command and
Signalling
20/10/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2
and Trains
11-013-DGN
Bletchley Station Platform 5 - horizontal
curvature.
Platform 5 of Bletchley Station is due to be
extended as part of the Bletchley
Remodelling project. The proposed design
will substantially slacken the current
minimum radius from 108m to 675. 6m the physical constraints of the site do not
allow further easing of the radius without
major reconstruction works.
Bletchley Station, Platform 5 - horizontal
track alignment through stations. Physical
site constraints south of Platform 5 prevent
the construction of a cost-effective
compliant solution. The constraints include
the location of S_C, and two bridges.
22/12/2011
N/A
24/01/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
3.1.1 and 3.2.1
and Trains
Bicester North Station Down Platform:
Platform height and offset.
Bicester North station down platform
(Platform 1).
It is intended to permit the signalling of
trains over the detected end of a failed
crossover. The status of the failed end
(flank protecting end) will be unknown to the
signaller and the signalling system will
prevent signalled routes over the failed
points and the approach to a controlling
signal where flank protecting points are in
its overlap. All affected signals will be fitted
with TPWS TSS. The operational
arrangements currently permit the signaller
to instruct drivers to pass signals at danger
for movements over a detected end of a
failed crossover; this proposal will
regularise these movements by provision of
a signalled move. In the event that the
failed points are clamped to permit
movements of trains over them, the
operation of track circuits over the failed
points shall be placed in the aspect controls
of the signals reading over the detected
ends. The Signaller instructions will be
amended to prevent movements over a
failed end while signalling a train over a
detected end. It should be noted that the
down direction line speed is 20MPH and
although the up direction line speed is
50MPH, the attainable speed from a
standing start in the station (15mph in
South West Trains views the use of station
approach markers as one of the measures
for mitigating against station overruns
where misjudgement is a factor. South
West Trains is continuously reviewing its
Professional Driving Policy and route
learning documentation over affected routes
to brief locations that may be difficult to
stop at. Section 13 of this form provides
some relevant statistics where overruns
have generally reduced since the
introduction of station approach markers to
provide a reference point for Drivers to
judge their braking. Proposed locations for
station approach signs The current
proposals for the signs at Kempton Park
and Claygate are recommendations from
the South West Trains Autumn
Preparedness Group. Both these locations
had a high instance of station overruns
during the leaf fall season in 2009. It is
proposed that these signs become
permanent installations. Design of sign
AK102 has been used as a basis for the
station approach signs - although
dimensions have been modified to allow
inclusion of a place name. The station
approach sign to have a white reflective
background (Class 1 reflectivity or better)
The proposed solution improves the current
situation, and the residual non-compliance
will not pose an unacceptable risk to the
operation of the railway. Whilst the
proposed solution is not compliant, it does
substantially reduce the severity of an
existing non-compliance: the approach
does not require major reconstruction
works.
It is not deemed reasonably practicable to
provide a compliant solution. It is proposed
to perpetuate existing deficiencies but in
many cases the severity of these will be
much reduced. Although the severity of the
risk is quite variable, the works will reduce
the existing risks posed by non-compliant
platform heights and offsets. The risk to
passengers is, therefore, deemed to be
acceptably low. Following the completion of
the works, the non-compliant length of the
platforms will range from less than 10m to
the full length of the platform. In terms of
platform height, the non-compliance ranges
up to 100 mm. The existing noncompliances are not an immediate and
important cause for concern, and the
project will reduce the scale of the existing
non-compliances.
N/A
17/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
2.3.2.4
Signals
Use of alternative characters in standard
route indicators at Crewe Station.
Gantry signals at Crewe Station.
The Evergreen 3 (EG3) project will raise
10/03/2011
linespeeds between Aynho Junction and
Marylebone station. To achieve the
increase in line speed, the track will be
realigned through a number of existing
platforms, and some minor adjustments will
be made to the copers. At present, the
stations have non-compliant heights or
offsets. The project will reduce the severity
of the non-compliances but will not
eliminate them all. Within the scope of the
project, it would not be reasonably
practicable to provide a compliant solution
at all the stations affected. However the
project will reduce the severity of the
existing non-compliances; in some cases it
will remove them altogether. The scope of
the project does not cover the rebuilding or
resurfacing of station platforms. For
Bicester North Down platform, the lateral
offset has been changed in the area
between chainage 14950 and 14990. The
project is still endeavouring to improve the
situation in this area. Clause G4. 1 of
GC/RT5212 is applicable to alterations to
existing infrastructure, and states that a)
that where today there are normal
clearances, the alteration does not make
clearances reduced or special reduced, and
Where alphanumeric route indicators are
Drivers on these routes are familiar with this 22/06/2011
used, letters or numbers would have to be type of indicator and there have been no
used where the use of forward or backward complaints.
slashes provide a more intuitive display of
the route for drivers at this location.
N/A
05/05/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/05/2011
Current
11-087-DGN
Page67
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
7.3.1 (a)
and Trains
11-024-DGN
N/A
15/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.4.2
,Interface between Station Platforms,,
,Track and Trains,
11-204-DGN
N/A
15/12/2011
Northern Rail Limited
Infrastructure
10/01/2012
Current
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4.1
and Trains
11-141-DGN
Flitwick Station - width of platform extension Flitwick Station - width of platform extension It is proposed to extend Platform 2 (double Low risk. A Risk Assessment of the
11/04/2011
at the London end of the existing Platform
at the London end of the existing Platform
face) of Flitwick Station to accommodate 12- proposed arrangements has been carried
2/3.
2/3.
car trains. The proposed extension is
out by Atkins (see attached documents).
towards London between the Down Slow
This shows that, although the proposed
(70mph) and the Up Fast (110mph). These extension design is narrower than required
two roads converge towards London and,
by clause 7. 3. 1 (a) of GI/RT7016, it meets
without substantial construction works, it is the requirements of clause 7. 3 of
not possible to provide a compliant 6000
GI/RT7016 for normal and perturbed
mm wide platform for the last 15. 371 m
operation. Although the proposed extension
extension. Over this last 15. 371 m, the
design is narrower than required by clause
platform tapers from 6000 mm to 5250 mm. 7. 3. 1 (a) of GI/RT7016, the platform area
Details are illustrated on drawing number
is compliant with clause 7. 1 of GI/RT7016
N280-CAR-DRG-CV-000061 Rev A06.
for normal and perturbed operation in that
the proposed width provides sufficient
space to prevent overcrowding with the
maximum anticipated usage. During a
special event such as the detraining of a
fully loaded train (perturbed operation), the
reduced platform extension area offers
adequate holding space to accommodate
passengers over the recommended limit of
0. 28m2 per passenger. It should be noted
that, in the event that Platforms 2 and 3 are
operational at the same time, the platforms
would pass the assessment. The
assessment allows for the location of
lighting columns and station name signs on
the centreline between Platforms 2 and 3.
No other platform furniture will be located in
Kirk Sandall, New Shelter Panels
The Island platform is 5000 mm wide. The If we comply with the RGS, then it is
The actions will ensure that there is a
10/02/2012
shelter currently gives 2500 mm clearance impossible to provide a shelter which
reasonable clearance from the platform
each side and the shelter does not provide provides any sort of protection from the
edge at the shelters longest point (2000
any protection to passengers. The panels
elements from either side. The proposal
mm), whilst giving the passengers the
will protrude 500 mm each side so
outlined solution best suits compliance and chance to shelter from conditions in behind
clearance will now be 2000 mm each side
provides a solution for passenger protection the new panels. Passengers when seated
and provide passengers with protection
at a station which is particularly exposed.
inside the shelter will be sat 2300 mm from
from the elements.
the platform edge.
Cardiff Queen Street Station, Platform 5 Cardiff Queen Street Station, Platform 5:
As part of the Cardiff Area Resignalling
Low risk to passengers. Relatively short
22/12/2011
reduced depth of clearance under platform reduced depth of clearance under platform Project (CASR), a number of enhancements non-compliant lengths, and low line speed
edge.
edge.
are being provided to support an increase in of proposed Up Llandafff Loop (20mph).
train frequency. A key part of these
enhancements is the plan to reinstate the
disused platform at Cardiff Queen Street
Station (to the West Side) to be named
platform 5. The new platform will support
the proposed Up Llandaff Loop line. The
current platform spans two subways: Â·
Passenger Subway - CAM (1 m 9. 5 ch) 200
mm substandard over a length of 5 m Â·
Luggage Subway - CAM (1 m 13. 75 ch)
200 mm substandard over a length of 4 m
At these locations, the front face of the
passenger subway is built into the front face
of the platform. Due to the requirements of
the new P-way alignment, the platform wall
will be reconstructed to provide a compliant
300 mm overhang but, due to their location,
it will only be possible to provide a 100 mm
recess over the length of the subways.
N/A
18/08/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
14/09/2011
Current
GERT8000-HB15
One
7.2
Duties of the machine controller (MC) and
on-track plant operator
11-089-DGN
HB15 - Warning sounds given by OTP
All OTP operators to make only one short
blast on the horn as warning of impending
movement to staff on the track, irrespective
of whether the machine is to move forwards
or backwards.
Many items of OTP, such as 360Ã¸
excavators and MEWPs, have a revolving
superstructure. Whilst the chassis will have
a forward and reverse direction, this is not
readily apparent to workers near by on or
near the track. At present, if more than one
item is on site, they could have their chassis
orientated such that one of them gives one
blast when moving towards one end of the
site and the other gives two blasts when
moving towards the same end of the site. If
they are working close together, then the
track workers may not be able to easily
distinguish which machine gave the warning
and they run the risk of relying on the sound
suggesting the machine is moving away
rather than towards them.
Changing to one blast brings simple clarity 04/07/2011
that a movement of an item of OTP is about
to take place and staff need to visually
check if the movement will affect them
rather than relying on an audible indication
that may not readily distinguish the direction
the OTP may be about to move.
N/A
13/05/2011
Amey Fleet Services Ltd
Management
14/06/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
2.4.5.7
Signals
11-194-DGN
Reduced Readable Distance of Dual Legend This non-compliance application relates to
OFF Indicators at Faversham, Margate and Faversham, Margate and Ramsgate
Ramsgate Stations.
stations. These stations are within the area
of the EKR1 Project which is undertaking a
full resignalling of the area bounded by
Sittingbourne, Minster and Kearsney
stations and virtually all signalling
equipment in the area is new. The specific
equipment affected is listed below:
Faversham: Â· Platform 1: EK4332/4339
R(1) and EK4332/4339 R(2) Â· Platform 3:
EK4335/4336 R(1) and EK4335/4336 R(2)
Â· Platform 4: EK4333/4338 R(1) and
EK4333/4338 R(2). Note that a pair of
identical OFF indicators are already in
service on platform 2 at Faversham having
been installed as part of the EKR1 Project's
stage works in 2009 and will remain in
operation following commissioning of the
new signalling system. These indicators
are the subject of derogation certificate
number 09/218/DGN. Margate: Â·
Platform 1 - EK5109/5122 R(1) and
EK5109/5122 R(2) Â· Platform 2 EK5111/5120 R(1) and EK5111/5120 R(2)
Â· Platform 3 - EK5118/5113 R(1) and
EK5118/5113 R(2). Ramsgate: Â·
Platform 1 - EK4982/5178 R(1) and
EK4982/5178 R(2) Â· Platform 2 -
Two potentially compliant options were
identified to meet the requirement to be
capable of displaying both legends
simultaneously as below: Â· Option 1:
Utilise pairs of standard BR 1651 Part 2
Indicators to form the required indications
stacked vertically. Â· Option 2: Utilise
pairs of standard BR 1651 Part 2 Indicators
to form the required indications grouped
horizontally. All the indicators are to be
installed beneath existing platform canopies
which places a restriction on the available
headroom without extensive alterations to
the canopies. It should be noted that the
canopies were constructed in the 19th and
early 20th centuries and that both
Faversham and Ramsgate stations have
listed building status. Site survey identified
that option 1 is not possible without either
altering the height of the platform canopies
or reducing the clearance between the
underside of the indicators and the platform
surface to a non-compliant figure. The
former course of action is not reasonably
practicable for cost and listed building
consent reasons and the latter could result
in head injury to passengers and staff and
also to the lower legend becoming obscured
by people on the platform. Option 1 was
The impact of the reduced readable
15/12/2011
distance has primarily been mitigated by
careful consideration of the interface
between the OFF indicator position and
routine operations on the platforms affected
as detailed below. Car stop marker boards
are provided at various points along the
platforms to optimise stopping positions for
trains of less than 12 cars (the maximum
formation being used only during peak
hours) taking account of signal visibility,
position of canopies/platform waiting
facilities for passengers and platform
access routes such that shorter formation
trains will generally use the central sections
of the platforms which are well covered by
the OFF indicators as noted above. As part
of the briefing of their staff on the changes
to the signalling system being
commissioned at Christmas 2011
Southeastern shall include guidance on the
need to stand in a position from which an
OFF indicator, appropriate starting signal
(or banner repeater where provided) can be
clearly read when dispatching trains. Train
services on this route are currently
comprised of the following types of trains:
Electrostar (class 375) units from which the
guard can dispatch the train from
N/A
14/11/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
15/12/2011
Current
Scope
Nature and Degree
Page68
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
GKRT0064
One
4.1.1
Trapping
Shunt route overlaps for routes into Holgate York Station, Holgate Loop and Reception
Loop and Reception sidings - York
sidings. Shunt routes from Y216 / Y218 /
Y628, Y630 to Y614 / Y616 / Y618 / Y622
GKRT0045
One
4.1.4.5
Signals
11-135-DGN
Non-standard aspect sequence between
Sittingbourne station EV14 and EV18
signals EK4303, EK4301 and EV14/EV18 at signals
Sittingbourne
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2 and 6.5.3
and Trains
11-177-DGN
Corbridge Station, platforms 1 and 2:
clearance of structures to the edge of the
platform.
Corbridge Station, platforms 1 and 2:
clearance of structures to the edge of the
platform.
GKRT0045
One
5.1.2.6
Signals
11-173-DGN
Non provision of route indicators on shunt
signals leading to Riverside Sidings,
Northampton
GIRT7016
Four
7.2 and 7.4
and Trains
11-151-DGN
Leagrave Station Platform 2 Extension:
Platform Width
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Shunt signals Y614, Y616, Y618 and Y622
in York Station are not currently provided
with signal overlaps, which is consistent
across all of York Station. Provision of
shunt overlaps would require a review of the
train detection in an otherwise unaffected
part of the layout and operational
restrictions on a freight line restricted to
15mph. The area where these signals are
positioned is not directly affected by the
junction remodelling works, but there will be
additional shunt routes reading up to these
signals, enabled by the new layout. There
are currently shunt moves provided from
Y212 to all signals mentioned in Section 3
and from Y216 / Y218 to Y622. New shunt
routes are proposed, over the new line, as
detailed below: From Y628 / Y630 signals
to all four signals. From Y216 / Y218 to
Y614, Y616, Y618From Y216 / Y218 to
YY622 (alternate routes). Provision of
signal overlap for the routes from the new
shunt signals would introduce
inconsistencies across similar route classes
throughout the York Station interlocking
systems. In particular, existing but
unaffected routes to the same destination
would have controls inconsistent with the
new signals. Additionally it would create
The line on either side of and through
Sittingbourne station is presently provided
with continuous three aspect signalling with
isolated four aspect sequences. As part of
the East Kent Resignalling Phase 1 (EKR1)
Project the line east of Sittingbourne
towards Faversham is to be resignalled with
a fringe created between the existing
Sittingbourne signal box and the new East
Kent Signalling Centre (EKSC) immediately
east of Sittingbourne station. In order to
provide the required headways between
Sittingbourne and Faversham continuous
four aspect signalling is to be provided on
this section. A three to four aspect
transition is therefore to be created at the
east end of Sittingbourne station (in the
Down direction of traffic). There are
currently three main aspect colour light
signals controlling the Down direction exits
from Sittingbourne station which read into
the resignalled area all of which are
presently three aspect signals and are listed
below: : EV14 - Down Passenger Loop
(platform 3) starting signal EV16 - Down
Main (platform 2) starting signal EV18 Down Goods Loop exit signal These three
signals are effectively parallel and are the
last signals in the Down direction which will
NEC2/73 footbridge links platforms 1 and 2
of Corbridge Railway Station. The
footbridge is adjacent to the western face of
railway overbridge NEC2/72, including a
link span between the overbridge to
footbridge NEC2/73. The condition of
Corbridge Station footbridge is such that it
has to be replaced. The bridge is currently
closed to the public. The staircase on
Platform 1 is supported on scaffolding to
allow public access from road level to the
platform, and the stairs on Platform 2 are
supported on scaffolding. To meet planning
requirements and site constraints, it is
proposed to reconstruct the footbridge on a
like-for-like basis, but using steel rather
than wrought iron. In constructing a like-forlike replacement, the width of the existing
platforms limits the clearance between the
platform edge and the footbridge. The
existing (non-compliant) platform edge
clearances are 1798 mm and 1998 mm on
platforms 1 and 2 respectively.
There are no planned increases of line
16/08/2011
speed or frequency of shunt moves into or
out of Reception Sidings and Holgate Loop.
Proposed layout alterations simplify the
access and provide additional conflict free
routes, which is improving the overall risk
profile. The safety benefit of providing
shunt overlaps would be marginal and
cannot justify the impact on operational
flexibility. Signals Y614 / Y616 / Y618 are
on sidings and Y622 is on a non-running
line. In case of overrun at these signals,
movements on adjacent passenger lines are
protected via 762 crossover. According to
control tables, permissive working is
allowed towards these signals. No
restriction is imposed in the Signal Box
Instructions to prevent such moves and
hence it can be argued that a shunt overlap
is not required.
N/A
29/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
The aspect sequence is more restrictive
23/09/2011
than required by GK/RT0045 and ensures
that a green aspect on any of the three
signals reading into the resignalled area
from Sittingbourne station (EV14, EV16 and
EV18) means that the line is clear to the
same point. Analysis of the December
2010 weekday working timetable has
identified that there are no scheduled
departures from EV14 or EV18 signal
towards Faversham with all through
passenger and ECS services
(approximately 85 daily trains in total)
scheduled to use the Down Main (platform
2). It is not believed that there are any
significant differences in the weekend
timetables nor are there any significant
changes in usage planned within the
expected duration of this non-compliance.
Passenger services can be diverted through
platform 3 (and hence will use EV14) at
times of perturbation, however, the
opportunity to do so is constrained by the
use of the platform to terminate and reverse
the Sheerness branch services, which
typically occupy platform 3 for 52 minutes
every hour off-peak. Southeastern services
are unable to use the Down Goods Loop as
it is not electrified. There are no regularly
Minor: the existing (admittedly non22/03/2012
compliant) platform clearances will not be
reduced. Relatively low risk: the like-forlike replacement does not worsen the
existing platform clearances.
N/A
04/08/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
25/08/2011
Current
N/A
23/11/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/01/2012
Current
Â· Signal RY1216 is located on the Down
Northampton Fast ELR ref HNR, approx. 66
1/4 MP. Â· Signal RY1220 is located on the
Down Goods Loop ELR ref HNR, approx.
66 1/4 MP.
RY1216 and RY1220 are existing signals.
Compliance requires provision of
alphanumeric miniature indicators for all
seven routes from signals RY1216 and
RY1220, plus the addition of a further MI to
signals RY1028, 1030, 1036 and 1038.
Provision of indicators is constrained by SSI
capacity; in order to complete the work
there would be a requirement to adjust the
SSI interlocking boundary at great cost
(Northampton interlocking is at full capacity,
having 55 TFMs today). The Northampton
Re-control Project is converting the hand
points at Riverside Sidings to Clamplock
operation, thus affecting the controls from
position light ground signals RY1216 and
RY1220.
Signalled in accordance with standards
24/05/2012
circa 1991. The signal route already exists
today. The project is providing clamplock
electrical detection rather than hand points
and consider this a betterment. Compliant
with standards applicable at the time the
existing signalling was brought into service.
The provision of clamplocks with full
detection rather than handpoints and the
sidings are fully track circuited for signaller
indication purposes only. The likelihood
and consequence of incident through nonprovision of miniature indicators for these
routes is seen as low, therefore further risk
reduction measures are not necessary. No
incident reports have been recorded.
N/A
25/10/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/11/2011
Current
Platform 2, Down Slow, line speed 85mph.
It is proposed that the first 6. 3m of the
single face platform extension at the C/E
will taper from 2500mm to 2319mm at the
platform end. Platforms are constructed but
are not in use: they are due to come into
operation in 2012. It is not considered
reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution Platform 2: A 239. 5m
platform has been provided for 12 car class
377 trains (243m long). The area of noncompliance will affect the first 7. 3m of the
1st carriage.
Extensive reconstruction would be required
to provide a compliant solution. With the
train stopping 1m beyond the stop board,
only the first passenger door will be in an
area of platform where the width is below
2500mm.
The majority of the platforms comply with
21/10/2011
GI/RT7016. The Designed Platform
Extensions comply with sizing requirements
in normal and perturbation scenarios. The
affected area affects the first door only of
the 1st carriage where passenger density
will be at its lowest. The non-compliant
areas will have strip lighting mounted on
solid fences so as not to create pinch
points.
N/A
09/09/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
Page69
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2 b)
and Trains
11-140-DGN
Down Barry Platforms 6 and 7: location of
buildings and structures on platforms.
The signal CF2947 is to be positioned at
170. 5mp -92m serving Down Barry
(Platform 7 side
As part of the Cardiff Area Signalling
scheme, it is necessary to install a
cantilever structure on Platforms 6 and 7.
The proposed position of this structure will
not provide the minimum lateral clearance
of 2500 mm. The proposed clearances are
2478 mm and 2412 mm for platforms 7 and
6 respectively.
The restricted space on the platform
15/12/2011
precludes the provision of a compliant
solution. Low risk. The proposed
arrangements will not introduce an
unacceptable risk to passengers using the
platform. The non-compliances are 22 mm
on platform 7 and 88 mm on platform 6
over a length of 610 mm. The line speed
through the station is 20 mph, the track is
straight and there is good visibility at the
location. The risk to passenger safety has
been assessed to be insignificant.
N/A
18/08/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2
and Trains
Carshalton Station: Platforms 1 and 2:
horizontal radius of platforms.
Carshalton Station: Platforms 1 and 2:
horizontal radius of platforms.
The Sussex Train Lengthening Project
seeks to increase passenger capacity by
increasing train lengths from 8 to 10-cars.
Platforms, including those at Carshalton,
need to be extended to accommodate these
longer trains. The useable length of
Platform 1 is to be extended from 173. 6 to
201m, and Platform 2 from 182. 6 to 201m.
The extensions will be constructed at the
London end. The existing mean horizontal
radii of Platforms 1 and 2 are about 728.
8m and 685m respectively. The proposed
extensions will replicate the existing
horizontal alignments on the Up Portsmouth
(Platform 1) and Down Portsmouth
(Platform 2), and so will not be compliant
with the requirement for a minimum 1000m
radius. The construction of a compliant
solution would necessitate a complete
reconstruction of the station, additional land
take and the repositioning of the North
Street (B277) under bridge at the London
end of the station. Such a solution is not,
therefore, reasonably practicable.
It would not be reasonably practicable to
10/06/2011
provide a compliant solution: the
realignment of the tracks to provide a
compliant solution for the platform
extensions would require: Extensive track
horizontal realignment, Reconstruction of
both station platforms, Reconstruction of
under bridges, and Relocation of services
within the station limits. The noncompliance does not represent an
unacceptable risk to passenger comfort and
safety. The non-compliant poses little risk to
passenger safety. The works will provide
compliant stepping distances for the trains
that stop at the station. At the interface
between the existing and new platforms, the
existing non-compliance stepping distance
will either be eliminated or reduced. There
is adequate visibility (by direct means or
CCTV screens/mirrors) along the station for
the safe dispatch of trains.
N/A
24/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2011
Current
GMRT2000
Three
Please refer to `Supporting
Paper for CTRL MPV OLE
Inspection Issue 1' for a list
of affected RGSs.
11-206-DGN
Limited operation of Windhoff Channel
Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) Multi-Purpose
Vehicles (MPVs) for inspection of the
Overhead Line Equipment (OLE) in the
Ashford station and immediate surrounding
area.
The issue of RSSB Deviation 11/053/DGN
on 17/05/2011 allowed the CTRL MPVs to
operate unladen (without modules fitted) at
low speed in the Ashford station area to
access Ashford works and the Class 395
(`Javelin') depot for wheel turning. Network
Rail has subsequently requested the MPVs
to be approved with modules fitted to allow
the OLE in the Ashford station area to be
inspected, this being the only section of
overhead line (OLE) on Network Rail
infrastructure in the area. This derogation
seeks acceptance of deviations from the
verification requirements of GM/RT2000
and other RGSs to allow the MPVs to
operate, whilst carrying modules in the
Ashford station area. The increased mass,
additional routes and implications of
operating the MPVs as On-Track Machines
are considered in the document `Supporting
Paper for CTRL MPV OLE Inspection Issue
1'.
Complying with RGSs would require a
significant amount of verification work and it
is likely that this would result in a number of
modifications. Such modifications are not
considered necessary as it is considered
that the risks associated with noncompliance or not fully verifying
performance can be adequately controlled
given the small number of vehicles (four,
operating as two pairs) and the limited
geographical scope of operation. As well as
resulting in significant costs, this
assessment and any modification work
would also require a considerable amount
of time to complete. Network Rail would
like to use the MPVs as soon as possible to
allow the inspection work to be undertaken.
Given that the Windhoff Tranche 1 and
28/03/2012
Tranche 2 MPVs operated by Network Rail
have safely operated on Network Rail
infrastructure for the past ten years, and the
CTRL MPVs are very similar to these
vehicles, it is not anticipated that any
adverse impacts on 3rd parties will occur as
a result of this deviation. The MPVs will
operate with modules fitted, as they do on a
routine basis on CTRL infrastructure. The
gauging issues have been agreed between
Network Rail's gauging team following a
Clear Route analysis with the largest
module fitted.
N/A
19/12/2011
Rolling Stock
20/01/2012
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2 b)
and Trains
11-062-DGN
Permission to remove old and install new
waiting shelter in the same location as
existing shelter.
Side of existing shelter is 2. 0 to 2. 4m from Compliance would create a very narrow
platform edge. Southern Railway wish to
waiting room providing insufficient benefit to
replace the existing with a new shelter on
justify a replacement.
the same footprint.
N/A
14/04/2011
Southern Railway Ltd
Infrastructure
11/05/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
5.2.3.1
Signals
11-017-DGN
Flashing aspects applied to Clarborough
Junction
Single yellow flashing aspect on TN8368
signal (distant to Clarborough Junction).
The ELR,s, line names and approximate
mileages of the area affected is as follows:
Â· ELR: MAC3 and TYB1 Â· Up Worksop,
67 Miles, 68 Â« Miles Â· Up Cottam, 68 Â«
Miles, 69 Â¬ Miles
passengers are not using this shelter due to 13/06/2011
its open nature and ultimately delaying train
departures due to rush to end of train from
comfortable shelter This would not be an
attractive option for customers due to tunnel
appearance and capacity would be greatly
reduced
Passenger trains approaching the junction 10/03/2011
will not be routed through the divergence
and the flashing aspects would aid in the
management of misrouting. Heavy freight
trains expect to take the divergence and the
early advice that the junction is set will
assist drivers in managing the gradient
through the tunnel.
N/A
03/02/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/02/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.4.2 and 7.2.1
and Trains
11-165-DGN
Clapham Junction Station Platform 16 Clapham Junction Station Platform 16 As part of the Sussex Route Surburban
location of platform furniture; useable width location of platform furniture; useable width Train Lengthening project, Platform 15
of single faced platforms.
of single faced platforms.
(Down Brighton Slow Line) at Clapham
Junction is to be extended to accommodate
10-car trains (presently it accommodates 8car trains). Platforms 15 and 16 make up a
double-faced island platform except for a
short single-faced section of Platform 15 at
the London end. It is necessary to raise the
level of the copers on Platform 15 to
provide a compliant stepping distance. This
requires the introduction of a step on the
island platform (15/16) and an
accompanying protective fence. As a
consequence the width of the first 30m of
Platform 16 will be less than 2. 5m: the
minimum width will be 2. 0m. Similarly, the
distance of a 30m length of the fence from
the edge of Platform 16 will be less than 2.
5m. The speed of trains through Platforms
15 and 16 will remain at 20mph.
Within the scope of the project (timetable
15/12/2011
and cost) it is not reasonably practicable to
provide a compliant solution. The degree of
risk to users of the network associated with
the non-compliance is low. Relatively low:
the risk to users of the network is deemed
to be acceptable. The overall objective of
the Sussex Route Suburban Train
Lengthening project is to increase
passenger capacity and reduce
overcrowding whilst maintaining or
improving safety. The works at Clapham
Junction will provide an extended platform
that is compliant with regard to stepping
distances, passing and lateral clearances.
Currently, Platform 15 is non-compliant with
regard to both horizontal and diagonal
stepping distances. These noncompliances will be eliminated and thereby
improve safety, and outweigh any risks
generated by the introduction of a narrow
platform.
N/A
11/10/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
Currently MAR is applied; however, this
unduly restricts the approaching freight
trains as the approach to the junction has a
steep rising gradient profile of 1: 120 and 1:
243. Freight Operating Companies (FOCs)
operating in the area have raised issue with
this for performance and safety reasons. A
further consideration is the locality of
Clarborough tunnel (602 metres long) which
restricts the view of the junction signal until
the train exits the tunnel which is at 355
metres on approach to the junction signal.
All trains routed through the divergence are
fully loaded freight services to Cottam
Power Station.
Page70
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2161
One
6.1.1 Seated Drivers, Case
(b)
Vehicles
11-200-DGN
Class 319 - Visibility from Driving Cab
Class 319 wiper modification.
FCC expects a significant improvement in
03/02/2012
the reliability of the windscreen wiping
system. These changes will result in greatly
improved driver visibility with less
distraction, due to the wiper blade and arm
no longer striking the GRP window surround
or lifting off the windscreen.
N/A
08/12/2011
Rolling Stock
20/01/2012
Current
GKRT0064
One
5.1.1 and 5.1.2
Trapping
Remove the requirement to flank protect the All existing and proposed interlockings on
overlap of Western Route interlocking
the Great Western route affected by the
renewal and electrification schemes.
interlocking renewal project and the
electrification schemes.
This measure is expected to achieve a
20/07/2011
marginal secondary risk reduction due to
the reduced complexity of interlockings.
The measurable primary risk from train
collision is already negligible. There is not
a measurable history of overrunning trains
coming into contact with other overrunning
trains. NR's primary objective is to reduce
data and interlocking complexity. This is to
be achieved by this compliance application
alongside others thus allowing greater
intellectual focus to be placed upon the
locking of the wheeled path and conflicting
routes. A further secondary benefit will be
the marginal reduction in conflicting routes
(those whose overlaps would currently
conflict) and thus there will be more
opportunity for signallers to clear signals.
N/A
27/05/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
23/06/2011
Current
GMRT2141
Two
5.4.1
11-109-DGN
Roll Over Cant Deficiency for MATISA
B66UC Tamper
The MATISA B66UC Continuous Action
Tamper will comply with the lower value of
minimum cant deficiency specified for
freight vehicles. The exact minimum value
of cant deficiency applicable to the B66 is
still being determined, however it is
currently indicated to be approximately 17
degrees.
First Capital Connect (FCC) proposes to
improve the reliability of the windscreen
wiper system by the following. Â·
Development of the existing wiper motor to
improve sweep consistency, wiper arm
security, and the prevention of GRP/blade
impacts Â· Replacement of the wiper arm
with a more robust design that incorporates
an anti-life device Â· Replacement of the
existing blade with an improved version to
provide more effective cleaning of the
windscreen statically and at speed. Due to
this change to `cab facilities', a review of
GM/RT2161 was undertaken by Interfleet
Technology Limited. During this review, a
sightline drawing was produced which
shows a dimensional representation of the
Class 319 windscreen to GM/RT 2161
section 6. 1. 1. Case (a) is obscured by the
top of the existing desk. Case (b): The
view of signals at 6. 0 m height above rail is
obscured by the existing destination
indicator and sunblind. And in the event of
rain, the wiper system will not clear the top
section directly below the sunblind. The
new wiper system follows the almost
identical sweep area as the existing system
apart from a very small area at the top
sweep arc (see drawing ITL-T28627-001 at
The measure has already been discussed
at CCS Standards Committee in the context
of the withdrawal of GK/RT0064 and related
RGS. The Committee has approved the
withdrawal of the measure, but this has not
yet been given effect. The Committee
decided to withdraw the measure because
safe design of track and signalling, together
with decisions about need for measures to
provide flank protection and to prevent and
mitigate overruns, is solely the
responsibility of the Infrastructure Manager,
and therefore outside the scope of RGS as
set out in Chapter 4 of the RGS Code, Issue
3. Network Rail is currently engaged on a
project to renew interlockings on the Great
Western Mainline. As part of this project
Network Rail have identified benefits in
being able to exercise its design
responsibilities unconstrained by the
specific requirements of the measure so far
as they relate to the provision of flank
protection of overlaps, using its own
standards and design procedures. The
principal benefit is to permit a significant
reduction in the complexity of interlockings
(leading to a marginal risk reduction).
There is a small potential benefit in
permitting a reduction in the number of
In order to fully comply with the
requirement, a fundamental re-design of the
machine would be required. It is not certain
that a compliant design could be produced
whilst at the same time maintaining the
weight saving advantages of a three bogie
design. This is also likely to have an effect
on the production quality of the machine.
Alterations to the vehicle design would also
invalidate previous demonstrations of
compliance against other Railway Group
Standards, such as GM/RT2149, and other
areas of this standard where the principles
of approval have been long established on
previous MATISA machines. For example,
the use of a three point suspension system
meaning side bearers can be omitted from
the leading and trailing bogies thus allowing
compliant dQ/Q results to be achieved
whilst providing a sufficiently stiff vehicle
body to maintain the accuracy of track
alignment.
The alternative actions are not expected to 11/07/2011
have any significant impact. The Y25
derivative bogies used on the MATISA
B66UC and the operating rules set out by
the Rule Book for the machine are
consistent with those for a freight vehicle.
Also, its maximum speed is 60mph which is
consistent with the requirements of the
proposed clause. Please refer to the
attached document for further detail. Box
instruction to give clear interpretation of the
requirement to route set through the wrong
direction move, including for following
trains.
N/A
03/06/2011
Rolling Stock
24/06/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2
and Trains
11-071-DGN
Eight stations: London Road (Guildford),
Cobham & Stoke D'Abernon, Hinchley
Wood, Hampton, Hampton Wick, Norbiton,
Raynes Park, Vauxhall.
Eight stations: London Road (Guildford),
Cobham & Stoke D'Abernon, Hinchley
Wood, Hampton, Hampton Wick, Norbiton, existing topography and infrastructure.
Raynes Park, Vauxhall.
third party retaining walls, at the other end.
A good number of these platforms are also
Trains, with respect to platform curvature.
Retro-fitting of selective door opening
systems onto the Class 455 rolling stock
presently servicing the route has been
investigated, but has not yet been able to be
demonstrated to be failsafe. In all cases,
our design objective has been to maximise
platform width whilst maintaining compliant
stepping distances. A HAZOP risk
assessment has been jointly undertaken by
Network Rail and South West Trains to
evaluate the possible risks of extending
platforms at the stations listed on curves
03/08/2011
Trains, with respect to platform curvature.
Minor. All stepping distances are
compliant. Network Rail and South West
Trains have subsequently jointly concluded
and agreed that the risks associated with
the proposed extensions at on curves not
fully compliant with GI/RT7016 are, in fact,
tolerable and can be maintained ALARP by
adopting and implementing the additional
mitigating operational controls identified
through the HAZOP risk assessment
process.
N/A
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/07/2011
Current
Page71
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0045
One
5.2.3.3
Signals
11-149-DGN
Junction signalling arrangements in the
Down direction at Hitchin
Flashing aspect sequence approaching
K699 signal at Hitchin
The flashing double yellow would need to
be displayed on K679 signal which currently
displays a flashing single yellow for the
south junction when 689 is set for the
divergent route. This would lead to a noncompliance with 5. 5. 1. 1 d) of the standard
as it would be an overlapping flashing
aspect sequence. The alternative would be
to provide an alternative method of junction
signalling for either K689 or K699, however
there are physical constraints preventing
splitting distants and the use of MAR
(approach release from red) at either
junction would be operationally restrictive
and not enable the planned timetable to be
delivered.
A driver being signalled through the south 07/10/2011
junction from Down Fast to Down Slow will
receive a normal aspect sequence which is
fully compliant. Additionally the routing will
be confirmed by 689 PRI which can display
a Position 0 or Position 1 arrow. A driver
being signalled through the north junction
from the Down Fast to either the Down Slow
or the Down Flyover will receive a steady
double yellow on 679, a Position 0 arrow on
689 PRI, a flashing single yellow on 689, a
Position 1 or 2 arrow on 699 PRI (note that
697 PRI can not also be illuminated). The
arrangements enables: - trains on the
Down Fast to be signalled into the Down
Slow platform quickly to clear the Down
Fast for following trains, trains on the Down
Fast to be signalled via the north junction to
the Down Flyover with minimal loss of
speed hence clearing the Down Fast
quickly, drivers to clearly establish which
junction they are being routed through.
There is sighting of K689 from K679.
N/A
02/09/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
22/09/2011
Current
GKRT0192
One
2.1.1.3
11-101-DGN
Position of signal 4698 at Sherborne Station Signal 4698 at Sherborne Station and Level Signal 4698 (formerly UM118) is located on
relative to the Level Crossing.
Crossing.
Sherborne up platform, and protects
Sherborne MCB Level Crossing in the Up
direction. It is positioned 8 m from the level
crossing, less than the 25 m minimum
required. Full renewal of all crossing
equipment (lights barriers etc) is planned
and options to achieve compliance
considered were: - Moving 4698 back by 17
m, requiring a new signal post and
equivalent platform extension to maintain
current operational capability. This has an
estimated cost of Âœ350,000, and would
still result in the level crossing being within
the standard overlap of 4698. Moving 4698
back clear of the platform (approx. 400 m),
requiring a new signal post and new distant
signal. This has an estimated cost of
Âœ150,000, would limit operational
capability to turn back services at
Sherborne, and cause the Level Crossing to
be closed for an increased amount of time.
N/A
27/05/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
25/08/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
2.4.5.2
Signals
11-179-DGN
Non-standard Legends for OFF Indicators
at Ramsgate Station.
N/A
26/10/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/11/2011
Current
GMRT2000
Three
11-053-DGN
Derogation for limited low speed running of
Windhoff Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL)
Multi-Purpose Vehicles (MPVs)
The road is moderately used, seeing
23/09/2011
approximately 2000 vehicles movements a
day. There are currently 22 daily scheduled
services in the Up direction through
Sherborne, 21 of which stop at the station.
Stopping Services: Track Circuit CJG will
provide train detection 190m on the
approach to 4698. When a train is
detected, the Road traffic Lights will
illuminate automatically in a normal
sequence with Amber followed by flashing
reds. An alarm will be provided to the
signaller when the Road Traffic Lights are
initiated, but the barriers will not lower
without the signaller's intervention. Under
normal operation it is likely that the signaller
will choose to lower the barriers once the
Road Traffic Lights have been initiated, to
prevent confusion to road users. The
subsequent risk of a road vehicle/pedestrian
incursion at the same time as a SPAD is
very low. Non-Stop Services: A distant
strike-in treadle is provided 118 s before the
Sherborne Crossing, initiating the Road
Traffic Lights and Auto-Lower of the
barriers. Note that the proportion of nonstop services is currently very low (1 per
day). The subsequent risk of the road
closure sequence not being completed at
OFF indicators provided at Ramsgate
Compliant indications would result in the
The standard only permits the use of "UP" 07/12/2011
station.
OFF indicators for both directions reading
and "DN" as directional identifiers for OFF
"OFF UP" since the direction changes in the indicator legends. Movements leaving
middle of the platform with up lines
either end of the platforms at Ramsgate are
departing both ends.
Up direction movements and hence
compliance with the standard would result
in either: the legends for both directions
being identical (and hence useless) or a
need to define a Down departure direction
which would cause confusion or drive a
change of line designations across a
significant area. Compliance is therefore
not considered to be appropriate in this
case. Alternative directional identifier
legends have been proposed which provide
clarity as to the direction in which a
movement has been authorised for this
location. The direction description elements
of the OFF indicator legends will not be
compliant with GK/RT0045. However, they
will provide a clear identification of the
direction of the movement which has been
authorised. Compliant legends cannot be
used as trains leaving either end of
Ramsgate station are travelling in an Up
direction and GK/RT0045 only permits the
use of "UP" and "DN" as directional
identifiers. The alternative directional
identifiers proposed have been selected so
This derogation applies to Windhoff CTRL Design scrutiny and verification of
Please refer to `Supporting Paper for
17/05/2011
MPVs (vehicle numbers DR 97011 to DR
compliance with all applicable RGSs is
Windhoff CTRL MPV Derogation' for the
97014) to allow low-speed movement over considered not to be reasonably practical
details of the deviation.
Network Rail infrastructure between the
due to the unavailability of all necessary
CTRL chord to Ashford Works and the
design information for the vehicles, which
Class 395 depot. The maximum speed of
have been in service for 7 years.
movement will be limited to 25mph. Please Derogation is therefore granted against a
refer to `Supporting Paper for Windhoff
number of RGS in relation to the full
CTRL MPV Derogation' for the details of the application of the Engineering Acceptance
deviation.
process, and some technical provisions (all
are detailed in `Supporting Paper for
Windhoff CTRL MPV Derogation'). Full
compliance would require significant effort
to re-generate design information, which
would not be commensurate with the limited
operations covered by this certificate.
N/A
25/03/2011
Rolling Stock
15/04/2011
Current
GCRT5021
Four
2.8.2.1
Track System Requirements
11-001-DGN
Existing freight siding near Gerrards Cross
station on the NAJ2 line - Track Gradient
An existing freight siding near Gerrards
Cross station on the NAJ2 line. The siding
is approximately 210m in length and
following realignment, approximately 87m
of it will have a gradient of 1 in 210. The
siding gradient is falling towards the
connection with the mainline.
N/A
11/01/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/01/2011
Current
An existing freight siding near Gerrards
Cross station is to be designated a turnback
siding and used for daily timetabled
turnback movements of empty coaching
stock. The vertical and horizontal alignment
of the siding will be adjusted to reduce the
number of changes in geometry, though the
maximum gradient will remain unchanged
at 1 in 210. Other works affecting the
siding but not directly related to this
derogation include partial renewal of track
and sleepers.
The safety risk of a train running away due 28/03/2011
to the non-compliant gradient is significantly
reduced by the operational change (use of
siding by multiple units instead of freight)
and permanent way change (re-design of
trap points) proposed by the project. No
further mitigating works are considered
reasonably practicable.
Page72
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GKRT0060
Four
C7.4
11-172-DGN
Non provision of distant signal replacement Modular Signalling Schemes.
switch or train detection on modular
signalling routes.
GMRT2000
Three
6.6.3, Appendix H1(a)
11-051-DGN
GIRT7033
Two
Sign AD01m
GIRT7016
Four
6.5
and Trains
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Modular signalling is designed to be
deployed on secondary routes which cannot
justify conventional power signalling due to
low density traffic patterns and rural
business. These will generally be classified
no higher than a Conventional TENS route
and typically unclassified. Distant signal
replacement will be undertaken by the
action of replacing the home signal (the
distant signal will act as an auto-distant)
and not by the use of a separate device (for
Modular signalling this would be a control
on the VDU screen) or track section. The
cost of compliance has been estimated at
up to Âœ10k per scheme.
The controls applied to distant signals for
04/01/2012
Modular Signalling will be: All lamps in
signals ahead proved lit (the stop signal)
Any separate track sections up to the stop
signal proved clear (this would generally be
where a berth track is present for approach
control purposes; this track section would
also act as a replacement track section for
the distant which, in the view of the RSSB,
would be a suitable method to be compliant
with GK/RT0060 Clause C7. 4). The distant
would display a yellow aspect if the
associated stop signal was at red and a
green aspect if the stop signal was at green.
The distant signal would be replaced when
the stop signal is replaced which would
either be as a result of the train passing the
stop signal (normal signal disengagement),
the forward route being 'pulled' or the
application of SGRC (SGRC is being
provided with one button per signalling
island).
N/A
25/10/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/11/2011
Current
Derogation Steam Locomotive 34046
`Braunton'
Operation of the following preserved Steam It would not be practical to revise the RGS
Operator: Ex Southern Railways
Locomotive `Braunton' TOPS No. 98746
Classification 7P5F Wheel Arrangement 4-6- of recent re-issues of RGS, specific
2 Maximum Speed 75 mph.
restrictions in GM/RT2000 for `Heritage
Vehicles'.
As indicated in West Coast Railway's
04/05/2011
Appendix 7 of this document. The
preserved steam locomotive is of a type
that ran safely over the British railway
and continued until its withdrawal from
revenue service in 1965. The locomotive is
intended for Heritage Operation only. In
order to achieve compliance with RGS, the
cost would be prohibitive and such
engineering change would also destroy the
locomotive's fundamental nature and
authenticity as a `heritage' vehicle. Making
the locomotive compliant would, in many
instances, be impractical because of the
bulk and location of the locomotive boiler.
N/A
24/03/2011
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Rolling Stock
15/04/2011
Current
11-132-DGN
Miniature speed signs on gantry at London
Bridge.
Speed signs on gantry at mileage 2M 10CH The current compliant signs are providing a
approaching London Bridge Station.
distraction to drivers by having a greater
visual impact than the signal aspects. The
Signal Sighting committee consisting of
Network Rail, Southeastern and Southern
have requested the change.
Existing arrangements are compliant but
23/09/2011
L120 is a multi SPAD signal with 9 incidents
recorded in RSSB SPAD history. It is
proposed that reducing the size of these 10
speed signs will improve the readability of
the 10 signals on the gantry. Additionally
the chequered borders will be removed from
L120 signal which have been demonstrated
to reduce the long range visibility of the
signal by removing the contrast supplied by
a black backboard.
N/A
29/07/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
25/08/2011
Current
11-143-DGN
Letchworth Station: clearance of isolated
column to platform edge
Letchworth Station: clearance of isolated
column to platform edge.
The Up platform at Letchworth Station is to N/A
be extended by 51. 6m to accommodate 12car train services to/from London Kings
Cross. The platform is to be 2. 75m wide
along its length: the width is restricted by
the topography of the site (it is located in a
cutting). OLE mast EC55/22 is located in
the Up cess, 23m within the proposed
London end of the extension at the base of
the cutting slope. The mast lies within the
footprint of the proposed extension and
supports a cantilever from which is
suspended the 25kV OLE for the Up line.
As it stands, the mast will have a 1933mm
clearance to the edge of the proposed
platform. The line speed on the Up line is
85mph. Due to the topography of the site, it
is impracticable to provide a compliant
solution.
27/10/2011
N/A
18/08/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
14/09/2011
Current
and Trains
Arlesey station; platform width.
It is proposed to extend both the Up slow
and Down slow platforms at Arlesey station
by about 80 m at the Country end to
accommodate 12-car Thameslink services.
The station booking office is located at the
Northern end of the Up Platform (P1). The
existing clearance between the booking
office and the platform edge is 2. 0 m over
a length of 12 m between the southern end
of the office and the top of the ramp. The
speed on the adjacent line is 80 mph. The
proposed extension (built immediately north
of this section) will have a compliant 3. 0 m
width. By extending the platform to the
north of the building the restricted area that
is currently largely un-trafficked may
become a limited thoroughfare and
therefore it was felt appropriate that
derogation should be sought as a result of
the change in usage.
15/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
Alexandra Palace Station.
Relatively low. There are three points
11/04/2011
through which people enter the station:
From Arlesey town / Drop off at station
forecourt. From the station car park From
the down platform to the rear of which is
turning circle used a drop off point and
waste ground used for limited parking.
Planning permission has recently been
granted to a private developer for a new 390
space car park. It is proposed that new
access routes are provided to give direct
access onto the platform extension for
passengers arriving via the station forecourt
or car park. Therefore, during southbound
(am) peak only, those passengers arriving
via the downside entrance wanting to
access the new section of Up platform are
likely to pass in front of the booking office walking from South to North facing
oncoming traffic: see attached pedestrian
flow diagram. Passenger audit and static
analysis has been undertaken to model
passenger flows. The results indicate that
for 2016 +35%, the passenger flow is about
3. 4 persons per minute for the 15 min (am)
peak. This is quite low, but to further
mitigate the risk alternative access routes
with way finding signs, and no waiting
zones on the front of the building will be
Low severity. The minimum radii of the
10/02/2012
proposed Platform 0/1 is 750-790 m; this
curve extends over the southern 80 m end
of the Platform before transitioning into a
straight alignment to the north. Over the
length of the non-compliant (radii) Platform,
the platform edge offsets will be aligned to
provide compliant stepping distances.
N/A
and Trains
Arlesey station; platform width. See
General Arrangement drawing
60163109/ARL/VUV/DR/110 Rev P06
Schematic Drawing; Photos 1; Pedestrian
Flow Routes. Arlesey station consists of
two 165 m platforms serving the Down and
Up slow lines. The platforms are connected
by a footbridge located about 120 m from
the London end. The station has two
entrances / exits - one on each platform.
The entrance to the Down platform is
located at the northern end of the platform
adjacent to the top of the ramp. It leads to
an area of waste ground and an adjacent
road which is used as a drop off / pick-up
point for passengers. The entrance on the
Up platform is similarly located to the north
of the station footbridge about 150 m from
the London end, and provides both stepped
and ramped access. The station booking
office is positioned immediately to the rear
of the platform between the station entrance
and the top of the ramp. The location of the
booking office restricts the width of the
northernmost section of platform to 2. 0 m
over a length of 12. 0 m. To the east of the
booking office and up-side entrance is a
small forecourt area and station access
road with a turning circle for cars. The
Alexandra Palace Station - enhanced
capacity of Platforms. ELR: ECM1, 4 m
1716 yards Platforms 0/1: Proposed Up
Slow 1 and Up Slow 2 lines. London
bound: track radii of 750 m-790 m over the
southern 80 m of the proposed platforms.
Line speed 35/60 mph. Operational length
of platforms 170 m.
N/A
09/11/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
11-191-DGN
Scope
It is proposed to enhance the capacity of
Alexandra Palace Station through (a) the
construction of an additional platform
serving the proposed Up Slow 2 line, and
(b) the modification and remodelling of the
existing platform 1 serving the Up Slow 1
line. The site is constrained by the track
geometry imposed by the multi-span
overbridge ECM1/30, Buckingham Road, to
the north of the station. The provision of a
compliant solution would require extensive
permanent way realignment and
reconstruction of this overbridge.
Page73
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1b and 2.1.2
and Trains
11-072-DGN
Epsom Station
Epsom Station
GKRT0045
One
5.2.2
Signals
11-016-DGN
Junction Signalling on approach to Cowlairs Junction signal is CC52 controlled from
West Junction from Queen Street Station.
Cowlairs SC via Cowlairs SSI on approach
to Cowlairs West Junction from Queen
Street Station.
Trains, with respect to platform width and
platform curvature. Retro-fitting of selective
door opening systems onto the Class 455
rolling stock presently servicing the route
has been investigated, but has not yet been
able to be demonstrated to be failsafe. In
all cases, our design objective has been to
maximise platform width whilst maintaining
compliant stepping distances. A HAZOP
risk assessment has been jointly
undertaken by Network Rail and Southern
Trains to evaluate the possible risks of
extending platforms at Epsom Station at
The current arrangements are compliant;
however, a proposed increase in line speed
immediately on approach to the junction
signal would require introduction of flashing
aspects or approach release from red.
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1 (b)
and Trains
Harlington Station - platform width of
extension at the London end of Platform 2.
Harlington Station - platform width of
extension at the London end of Platform 2.
GCRT5112
Two
7.1.2
11-195-DGN
North face of the new West Hampstead
Thameslink Station - piled foundation.
North face of the new West Hampstead
Thameslink Station Building located on the
SPC1 line (Hendon Line) between 3m1540y
and 3m1570y (see drawing N280-HYDDRG-AR-000001), particularly the pile
group at the intersection of gridlines 4 and
A (see drawing N280-HYD-DRG-CV000010).
GKRT0064
One
4.3.2
Trapping
signal, Chessington South station.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
24/06/2011
third party retaining walls, at the other. A
good number of these platforms are also
Trains, with respect to platform width and
curvature. Width - Minor: Terminal width
equal to or greater than 2. 0m Curvature Minor: All stepping distances are
compliant Network Rail and Southern
Trains have subsequently jointly concluded
and agreed that the risks associated with
the proposed extensions at a width and on
curves not fully compliant with GI/RT7016
are, in fact, tolerable and can be maintained
ALARP by adopting and implementing the
additional mitigating operational controls
identified through the HAZOP risk
The controls will remain as they are today 10/03/2011
to limit the operational impact of signalling
controls. It seems unnecessary to provide
additional signalling controls in this
instance, as the approach speed to the
signal is only 50mph, 10mph greater than
the speed of the diversion. The line speed
on the approach to the signal is currently
50mph and it is proposed to remain at
50mph up to a point 195m on the approach
to the junction signal, where it will step up
to 60mph. The driver will have clear route
information displayed at the junction signal
before he has an opportunity to accelerate
to the increased line speed of 60mph. The
40mph divergence is over 738 crossover
from the Up E&G line to the Down E&G
line, 273 metres beyond CC52 signal. The
signal sighting exercise is still to be
completed, but we know that the minimum
sighting distance for CC52 signal will be
more than the distance of 195m on the
approach to the signal, where the 50mph
speed restriction will step up to 60mph.
Given the requirement to make the
signalling junction controls as unrestrictive
as possible while still maintaining a safe
railway, it is likely that any approach release
from red at CC52 signal would be stepped
It is proposed to extend Platform 2 (single
A Risk Assessment of the proposed
11/04/2011
face) of Harlington station to accommodate arrangements has been carried out by
12-car trains. The proposed extension is
Atkins (see attached documents). Although
towards London between the Down Slow
the proposed extension design is narrower
(70mph) and the Up Fast (110mph). These than required by clause 7. 2. 1 (b) of GI/RT
two roads converge towards London and
7016, the platform area is compliant with
without substantial construction work it
clause 7. 1 of for normal and perturbed
would not be possible to provide a
operation, in that the proposed width
compliant 2500 mm wide platform for the
provides sufficient space to prevent
last 6. 8 m of the extension. Over this last overcrowding with the maximum anticipated
6. 8 m, the width will taper from 2500 mm
usage. It is not reasonably practicable to
to 2150 mm. Details are illustrated on
provide a compliance solution. However
drawing number N280-CAR-DRG-CVthe risk associated with the proposed non000111 Rev A06.
compliant solution is deemed to be
acceptable, and a number of mitigation
measures will be put in place to reduce the
risk. During a special event such as the
detraining of a fully loaded train (perturbed
operation), the reduced platform extension
area offers adequate holding space to
accommodate passengers over the
recommended limit of 0. 28m2 per
passenger.
N/A
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2011
Current
N/A
03/02/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/02/2011
Current
N/A
15/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
During the installation of one of the piled
foundations to the new West Hampstead
Thameslink Station Building, one of the
450mm diameter piles could not be
installed in the designed location due to
unforeseen obstructions within the ground.
The piled foundation was redesigned and
reconfigured to support the loads applied by
the building, but the altered design led to
one pile within the group now being located
within 4. 5m of the nearest cess rail (see
pile P51 on drawing N280-HYD-DRG-CV000010). The volume of reinforcing steel
required for the pile to resist the mandated
impact load in GC/RT5112 could not be
accommodated in this pile: a compliant
solution would have required the installation
of a larger and deeper pile.
Very low. The affected pile (pile P51) is
20/12/2011
one of 49No. piles that form the foundation
of the building. All other piles are located 4.
5m or further from the nearest cess rail.
The piles are protected by the existing
reinforced concrete retaining wall which
runs parallel to the running line, the
compressible filler and a concrete arch
behind the retaining wall. In the event of a
collision due to the derailment of a train, the
retaining wall and concrete arch will bear
the brunt of the impact, with the wall also
acting as a robust kerb to protect the pile
and guide the derailed train back towards
the intended direction of travel. In the event
of an impact, 48 of the piles supporting the
station lie outside the zone where it is
deemed necessary to design for impact
loading. Pile 51 is 3. 9m away from the
nearest rail and an impact that would
compromise its integrity would not result in
the catastrophic failure of the building.
N/A
15/11/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
Chessington South station is located at 13m Signal W421 has an existing reduced
73ch on the ELR MPC. The reduced
overlap of 89m. The speed on approach to
overlap is associated with W421 signal.
the signal is 15mph which commences
352m on approach to the signal and
therefore there is an existing noncompliance. The scheme is proposing to
move the signal resulting in the overlap
being reduced further to 61m. The new
position of the signal means that the 15mph
speed will commence 380m on approach to
the signal which reduces the magnitude of
the non-compliance. Moving the
commencement of the permissible speed
would not be acceptable due to the
operational impact. Moving the signal
further is cost prohibitive due to the
proximity of S&C beyond the signal.
21/06/2011
conducted as per the requirements of
GK/RT0064 and considered to be ALARP.
begins 380m on approach to the signal with
the non compliance only 20m short of the
proposed by the risk assessment.
N/A
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/05/2011
Current
Page74
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0044
One
5.1.3
Occupied Line
11-049-DGN
Permissive moves from BD1 signal on the Permissive moves from BD1 signal
approach to Barrhead Station from Glasgow controlled from Barrhead SB.
In order to provide adequate braking in this
3 aspect signalled area, the signal ideally
should be 784 metres from the
commencement of the bay platform. To
bring the signal within 600m would require
an extra 4 aspect signal, since relocation of
the platform starter BD2 which protects the
single line is not possible.
At present there are no trains that use this 11/05/2011
Call-On facility. The speed over the
crossover onto the Down Barrhead is
15mph and the turnout into the bay platform
is 5mph, so in the event that a driver forgets
that his movement authority is on a Call-On
aspect he would not be accelerating
towards the first train and would be able to
stop short of any collision. Visibility into the
bay platform is good. The advantage of a
regular 3 aspect sequence, with full braking
between BD1 and the next signal on the Up
Barrhead, BD2, outweighs the risk
associated with the rare use of the
permissive movement.
N/A
22/03/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
28/04/2011
Current
GERT8080
One
5.2.11 and 5.2.17
Train Radio Systems for Voice Related
Messaging Communication
11-113-DGN
Derogation ex-LMS Railway Black 5 class
steam locomotive no.44932
Vehicles".
The locomotive holds a current derogation 16/08/2011
certificate against GE/RT8080 and
GM/RT2161. The preserved steam
the British Railway infrastructure since its
introduction in 1934 and continued until its
The locomotive has operated safely since
1968 to the present day apart from when
under routine maintenance. The locomotive
would be limited to a maximum of 15,000
miles per year. There is always a secondman (fireman) and often a traction inspector
on the footplate who will be trained and
assessed as competent to operate the radio
if necessary. With consideration of the
foregoing, the level of risk is considered to
lie within acceptable bounds.
N/A
17/06/2011
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
GMRT2161
One
7.2 (j)
Requirements for Driving cabs of Railway
vehicles
11-114-DGN
Derogation ex-LMS Railway Black 5 class
steam locomotive no.44932 primary
controls and instruments
Vehicles".
The locomotive holds a current derogation 19/08/2011
certificate against GM/RT2000 (covering
GMRT2161), Ref. 08/243/DGN. The
preserved steam locomotive is of a type
that ran safely over the British Railway
and continued until its withdrawal from
revenue service in 1968. The locomotive
has operated safely since 1968 to the
present day apart from when under routine
maintenance. The locomotive would be
limited to a maximum of 15,000 miles per
year. There is always a second-man
(fireman) and often a traction inspector on
the footplate who will be trained and
assessed as competent to operate the radio
if necessary. With consideration of the
foregoing, the level of risk is considered to
lie within acceptable bounds.
N/A
17/06/2011
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Rolling Stock
29/07/2011
Current
GMRT2461
One
6.4
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple
Unitsand On-Track Machines
11-054-DGN
Class 156 sanding in brake step 2.
The Brake Step 2 modification was fitted
on this Class 156 fleet pre leaf fall in 2008.
A TNC has been in place whilst results from
in service experience were gained. The aim
was to improve the current sanding system
by extending the use to Brake Step 2 (from
just Emergency and Brake Step 3). This
has safety benefits as drivers are taught in
leaf-fall to use steps 1 and 2 for normal
braking, without this modification they
would be unable to apply sand whilst using
this technique. NXEA (London Eastern
Railway) has nine Class 156 units operating
rural routes in Norfolk, Suffolk, Camb's and
the Marks Tey branch line in Essex. Class
156 units are tread braked and have no
automatic WSP brake control system
(which if fitted would enable auto sanding).
The design and modification cost for such a
system to enable compliant sanding in all
brake steps would be high (no comparable
system exists currently on this type of unit).
It is now proposed to convert the TNC to a
derogation using the supporting information
attached.
Impacts have been measured since the
modification in 2008 (see attached letter).
These results are presented to support the
application for the derogation.
N/A
24/03/2011
London Eastern Railway Ltd Rolling Stock
(trading name: National
Express East Anglia)
15/04/2011
Current
Scope
The scope includes the operation of the
following preserved Steam Locomotive on
all lines, as agreed by the NRAB and
subsequently by the Licensed Operator. Ex
LMS Railway Black 5 locomotive: TOPS
No. 98532 Painted No. 44932 Class /
Power Classification: 5P5F Wheel
mph. The locomotive holds a current
derogation certificate against GE/RT8080
and GM/RT2161, certificate number
08/243/DGN. The two standards have been
identified as having particular relevance to
the GSM-R programme. The original
submission which was made in January
2009 did not fully anticipate the implications
of GSM-R fitment, therefore this application
is submitted in order to clarify the
conditions and provide reassurance that the
appropriate issues are being considered by
WCR as the operator and Network Rail who
are designing the installation. GE/RT8080
requires a more detailed explanation of the
impact of GSM-R. For GMRT2161, the
issues and mitigations accepted in the
original derogation remain relevant. The
installation itself will require certification via
a NoBo and VAB as well as satisfying the
requirements of the ORR.
The scope includes the operation of the
following preserved Steam Locomotive on
all lines, as agreed by the NRAB and
subsequently by the Licensed Operator. Ex
LMS Railway Black 5 locomotive: TOPS
No. 98532 Painted No. 44932 Class /
Power Classification: 5P5F Wheel
mph. The locomotive holds a current
derogation certificate against GE/RT8080
and GM/RT2161, certificate number
08/243/DGN. The two standards have been
identified as having particular relevance to
the GSM-R programme. The original
submission which was made in January
2009 did not fully anticipate the implications
of GSM-R fitment, therefore this application
is submitted in order to clarify the
conditions and provide reassurance that the
appropriate issues are being considered by
WCR as the operator and Network Rail who
are designing the installation. GE/RT8080
requires a more detailed explanation of the
impact of GSM-R. For GMRT2161, the
issues and mitigations accepted in the
original derogation remain relevant. The
installation itself will require certification via
a NoBo and VAB as well as satisfying the
requirements of the ORR.
Class 156 units x nine (18 vehicles)
operated by NXEA (London Eastern
Railway) to permit manual sanding in Brake
Step 2.
13/05/2011
Page75
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2: Horizontal track
alignment through station
platforms
and Trains
11-075-DGN
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/07/2011
Current
Four
Part 7 Usable width of
platforms section 7.2.1 part and Trains
b
11-047-DGN
Due to cost and time implications, it is not 04/08/2011
possible to reconstruction some part of the
station to achieve compliance with the
relevant standard. The current 8-car trains
will continue to stop at their present position
and, therefore, will still not be compliant in
terms of the curvature; however, the
proposed new 10-car trains will be
comprised of Class 377 trains, which have
on-board look back monitors and cameras
that will enable the driver to dispatch trains
without the aid of DOO Cameras or extra
platform dispatch staff. Furthermore, the
risk of approaching trains encroaching on
passengers will be mitigated by providing
warning of approaching trains via prerecorded PA announcements. The
proposed platform extensions on the Up
Slow and Down Slow lines (ELR: VTB1,
approx. 6m 53ch) to be non-compliant in
accordance with GI/RT 7016 Clause 2. 12.
In this instance, since the proposed new 10car Class 377 trains, which has on-board
look back monitors and cameras, will be
operated on this route, the operation of train
dispatch will remain as existing, I. e.
current 8-car train dispatch arrangement.
The Train Dispatch methods currently
employed will be unaffected by these works
It is not reasonably practicable to provide a 13/06/2011
compliant solution because this would
require the reconstruction of the structural
support to an existing building. Although
passenger numbers will increase,
pedestrian modelling using 'Legion' software
shows low usage at the extreme north ends.
This is not surprising as the ends are
distant from the exit/entrance, and the trains
do not terminate at St Pancras (so the
platforms do not fill up at the northern end
in anticipation of a train). There should not
be a problem with a detraining perturbation
as the platform is wide enough to readily
accommodate all the passengers from a
packed train, and there is ample open
space to the north (ramp) side of the
constriction. The column has a circular
cross-section, and pedestrian flow will be
smooth past the face of the column. Low
risk to passenger safety - there is a low risk
of overcrowding in the area concerned, and
it only affects the end door of a train so that
there is little effect on the platform PED
flow.
N/A
GIRT7016
Streatham Common Station Platform 1 and Streatham Common Station Platform 1 and Sussex train lengthening Project is for the
Platform 2.
Platform 2.
extension of existing station platforms on
the Sussex suburban route (ELR: VBT1),
from existing 8-carriage platforms to
extended to 10-carriage platforms without
reducing the number of trains able to utilise
the route. Streatham Common Station is
situated approximately 6miles 48chains
from London. Existing length of Platform 1
is 163. 29m, to be extended to 201m of
usable platform length. Existing length of
Platform 2 is 168. 09m, to be extended to
203m of usable platform length. Platform
1and 2 are to be extended towards the
country end of the station. Existing
horizontal alignment through platform 1 and
2 has reverse curves, at the country end of
the platform ends. The left hand curves
then tie into Switches and Crossings.
Existing left hand curve radius 544. 558m
that ties into Switches and Crossings points
2A on the Up Slow and existing curve radius
565m on the Down Slow. The proposed
horizontal curves, which follow the existing,
will not meet the requirements of Clause 2.
1. 2 of GC/RT7016, which requires that
platform shall not be located on horizontal
curves with radii less than 1000m. Due to
the junction at the London End, it is not
St Pancras Station; Thameslink Platforms A St Pancras Station; Thameslink Platforms Network Rail inherited the low-level station
and B: reduced platform width
A and B: reduced platform width
at St Pancras from Union Railways. The
station has only been used and approved
for 8-car trains, but it is proposed to
introduce 12-car trains from December
2011. The proposed frequency of service is
16 trains per hour. The end passenger door
of such trains will open on the far side of a
pillar where the platform width is restricted
locally to 2. 1m. Photographs are provided
of Platform A [plat wall derogation]
(southbound) and B [Pillar derogation]
(northbound). It is not reasonably
The columns that give rise to the restricted
platform width cannot be moved without
major construction works - they support the
St Pancras Midland station structure above,
- as the cost of such works would be
grossly out of proportion with the minor
risks presented by the locally narrowed
platforms.
N/A
22/03/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
Appendix C.1.1
Signals
11-158-DGN
Use of Standard Alphanumeric Indicators at SN324 - 20 108m, SN326 - SN326 20
SN324 and SN326 with theoretical 80mph 115m, HLL.
approach.
N/A
29/09/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
20/10/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.5 and 7.2.1
and Trains
Whilst the enhanced readability of PLJIs is 10/11/2011
advantageous in many situations, there is
no advantage gained here due to the curved
tunnel approach with limited signal visibility.
These signals are only visible from approx.
220m (there is a Banner Repeater signal in
rear of each of the signals affected). The
tunnel environment aids signal readability
due to the lack of daylight and visual
distraction. The distant and banner
repeater signals acting as countdown
markers for the main signals. Both signals
will have ATP loops on approach, and in
use for ALL trains. SN324C(M): A
standard indicator is currently used on this
signal. Due to the addition of a third route
at Heathrow Tunnel Junction, it is not
possible to retain the existing junction
signalling unchanged. The position of this
signal is cramped due to it being in the cut
and cover part of the Heathrow Tunnels
squeezed between the tunnel wall and the
kinematic envelope. There is insufficient
space to use PLJIs (nos. 1 and 4 would now
be required). It is proposed to use a
Standard Indicator on this signal for all
three routes. SN326C(M): This signal
currently has a position 4 PLJI for the main
route crossing to the Down Airport (up
It would not be reasonably practicable to
27/06/2011
provide a compliant solution, and the risk to
passengers associated with the noncompliance are deemed to be very low. A
compliant solution, would either require an
order under the Transport and Works Act to
facilitate permanent land acquisition (which
would extend the works programme and
increase cost) or a major increase in the
scope of the works associated with track
realignment. Either of which would be
costly and threaten the viability of the
proposed works. The severity of the noncompliance is minor. The length of the
extension is 9. 24m, and passenger flows
over this length will be low. At Mitcham
Eastfield station, the track and platform
layout of the extended platform will give
compliant stepping distances, passing and
lateral clearances. The TOC has confirmed
that the number of passengers arriving and
departing from the non-compliant length of
platform will be low because of its location
relative to the station entrance, and also the
entrances/exits at other stations served by
the same train service. 8-car trains will
continue to stop at their present position.
The 10-car trains will comprise Class 377
trains with on-board cameras with look back
N/A
23/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2011
Current
Mitcham Eastfields Station Platform 2
London End: platform width, and distance
of isolated lighting column from platform
edge.
Scope
Nature and Degree
The project proposes to use Standard
Indicators (performance category 2) on
signals SN324 and SN326 when the
approach speed is theoretically 80mph.
The permitted speed reduces approximately
200m in advance of the signals to 50mph.
Whilst it would be technically feasible to
widen the tunnel sections in this area to
gain the space required for PLJI, it would be
necessary to remove the existing tunnel roof
to do so. If the tunnel was enlarged a
complicating issue is the waste site through
which the tunnel is constructed - with
methane barriers between the waste and
the tunnel. Track access is limited due to
the intensive HEx service. These works
would be prohibitively expensive and
disruptive. A reduction of speed has also
been considered, but the 80mph is
necessary for Crossrail and Heathrow
Express service/time table resilience.
Mitcham Eastfields Station Platform 2
The Sussex Route Suburban Train
London End: platform width, and distance Lengthening program seeks to increase
of isolated lighting column from platform
passenger capacity by increasing train
edge.
lengths from 8 to 10-cars. Platforms,
including the one at Mitcham Eastfield
station, need to be extended to
accommodate these longer trains. With the
construction of the platform extension at the
London end of Platform 2, the useable
platform width is restricted to a minimum of
2. 0m over a length of 9. 24m.
Furthermore, within this length, the distance
of lighting column to the edge of the
platform will be 1. 696m. Although this
column is at the very end of the platform,
and should not impede passenger flow,
bulkhead lighting will be fitted on the
platform fence line and supported on GRP
portal frame type structures. This will allow
the lighting to be maintained without the
need for possessions and also avoid any
land take or land acquisition. It would not
be reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution, as such a solution
would require extensive modification (if not
the reconstruction) of an existing footbridge.
Page76
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
Certificate Number
Title
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2132
One
All clauses. FCC has
On-board Energy Metering for Billing
identified the following
Purposes
categories of compliance
against each of GM/RT2132
requirements. A full clause
by clause matrix compliance
assessment is included in
the attached (draft) report
reference
TE/07/REPORT/00015.
Clause compliance status
Compliance count % Noted
59 13.55% Not applicable
27 6.21% Comply 170
39.08% Do not comply 39
8.97% Comply (see
comments) 44 10.11% Do
not comply (see comments)
25 5.75% Energy measuring
capability not installed 71
16.32%
11-065-DGN
Derogation request for First Capital Connect Included with this submission is FCC (draft)
(FCC) against GM/RT2132
technical report TE/07/REPORT/00015
Ènergy meter compliance review for FCC
units fitted with energy meters'. This report
details a clause-by-clause compliance
status against GM/RT2132 for the 15 FCC
units equipped with energy meters which
were installed in 2008.
To comply with the group standard would
require substantial re-work of the present
energy metering installations on the Class
319, 313 and 365 (15 units in total). By
undertaking a clause-by-clause review of
GM/RT2132, FCC identified a loss
correction factor work package to provide a
factor to be applied to the energy meter
readings. This significant charge was the
only realistic option available to us to
achieve the 01/04/2011 opt-out of the washup.
FCC has always intended to present the
21/09/2011
true energy consumption of the meters
hence the procurement of the test run.
When the correction factor equation has
been agreed, the energy meter readings will
be fed into the equation to give a true
energy usage figure. The DeltaRail report
(draft issue 4) illustrates the stable
characteristic of the correction factor
equation so it is our belief we are presenting
a true representation of the energy being
used.
N/A
15/04/2011
Limited
Rolling Stock
09/09/2011
Current
GKRT0044
One
Part B, 5.1.3
Occupied Line
11-178-DGN
Excess Call-On Distance from EK5126
Signal at Margate.
Margate Station - EK5126 signal to
Platform 4.
Network Rail already has a national noncompliance (certificate number 04/010/NC)
which extends the maximum required
distance between the signal controlling the
movement of the second train and the
platform to 600m. The protecting signal is
positioned to provide good signal visibility
and compliant braking distances for through
trains. Compliance would require one of the
following: - relocation fo the signal to a suboptimal position, the prohibition of platform
sharing which would be operationally
restrictive, Provide an additional signal
between EK5126 and the platform, Extend
the platform towards Ramsgate, Provision
of a mid-platform signal.
N/A
26/10/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/11/2011
Current
GKRT0060
Four
C5.2Appendix 1 Control 9
and Appendix 2 Controls
7/8/9
11-124-DGN
Shunt route controls into Holgate Loop and
Reception sidings - York.
York Station, Holgate Loop and Reception
sidings. Shunt routes from Y216 / Y218 /
Y628, Y630 to Y614 / Y616 / Y618 / Y622.
Shunt signals Y614, Y616, Y618 and Y622
in York Station are not currently provided
with signal overlaps, which is consistent
across all of York Station. New routes
reading up to these signals are provided
from new signals Y628 / Y630 and existing
signals Y216 / Y218. Such routes will not
be able to comply with requirements of
Clause C. 5. 2. Provision of shunt overlaps
would require a review of the train detection
in an otherwise unaffected part of the layout
and operational restrictions on a freight line
restricted to 15mph.
N/A
28/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
5.1.3.3 and 5.1.3.4
Signals
11-144-DGN
Provision of route indicators on WH1019,
Signal Numbers WH1019, WH1014,
WH1014, WH1034, WH3005, WH3010,
WH1034, WH3005, WH3010, WH3016 &
WH3016 & VS3022 (Thameslink Core Area) VS3022.
The majority of the Thameslink Core route
is contained within tunnels, where clearance
is tight and we have been unable to install
Standard Indicators (SI) on the junction
protecting signal. All new signals have
been signal sighted and the site restrictions
limit the project to the use of Miniature
Indicators (MI) instead. Compliance with 5.
1. 3. 3 would require that the junction
signals were held at red until the Category 5
MI is guaranteed to be readable (65m).
This would restrict the speed of trains and
increase the number of trains approaching
red aspects with the potential of SPADs.
It is considered that the only practicable
07/12/2011
means of achieving compliance would be to
relocate EK5126 signal towards Margate
such that its overlap required 2325
crossover locked normal. This is
considered to be unduly operationally
restrictive given the low level of usage of the
call-on class route and therefore a noncompliance is sought to permit the use of
call-on class movements from EK5126
signal for platform sharing purposes with
the signal in excess of 600m from the
platform for the life of the installation. The
signal is 285 metres further from the
platform than the standard (and 85m further
than the existing national non-compliance)
permits. The new interlocking has been
designed in accordance with modern
principles and consequently requires a first
train to be detected within the platform and
for the second train to have been occupying
the berth track section at EK5126 signal for
a period of time (GUD occupied for 25
seconds) to obtain the proceed aspect for
the call on class route. The initial speed of
the train entering the route is therefore
controlled to an appropriate level. The
subsidiary aspect on EK5126 signal can
only be cleared for call on class routes and
There are no planned increases of line
16/08/2011
speed or frequency of shunt moves into or
out of Reception Sidings and Holgate Loop.
Proposed layout alterations simplify the
access and provide additional conflict free
routes, which is improving the overall risk
profile. The safety benefit of providing
shunt overlaps would be marginal and
cannot justify the impact on operational
flexibility. Signals Y614 / Y616 / Y618 are
on sidings and Y622 is on a non-running
line. In case of overrun at these signals,
movements on adjacent passenger lines are
protected via 762 crossover. According to
control tables, permissive working is
allowed towards these signals. No
restriction is imposed in the Signal Box
Instructions to prevent such moves and
hence it can be argued that a shunt overlap
is not required.
The previous standard GK/RT0031 gave the 07/10/2011
category rating for the MI's as category 3 100m viewable distance. We consider it
appropriate to not approach control these
signals because: - The Core Route line
speed is a maximum of 30mph. Inadequate
clearances for alternative indicators
Performance and SPAD risk from applying
standard The distance from the sighting
point of the signal to the AWS is an
adequate distance to bring a train under
control. The signal size / type as signal
sighted is adequate at this line speed and
provide suitable reading distance. 100m
sighting distance in use today along the
route. the route indicators are in limited
natural daylight. the route indicators will
not be used for normal running. This was a
requirement of the sighting committee who
were satisfied with the readable distance of
the indicators. A HazID (attached) did not
identify any additional risks in this
approach.
N/A
24/08/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
22/09/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
3.1.1.4
Signals
11-081-DGN
New junction signal M140 signal protecting
Newton Station
In order to provide adequate braking
distance from the proposed M140 signal
and a consistent aspect sequence for
drivers, it is proposed that the signal will be
918m from 24b points over which a
diverging route is proposed. Compliance
would require either an extra signal (and
associated 4 aspect sequence or approach
controls) or a significant reduction in speed
to allow the signal to be braking distance
from M156, the position of which is fixed by
the platform and crossovers. The line
speed for both the straight ahead and
diverging route is 50mph, dropping to
40mph immediately beyond 24 points
crossover. There are no controls on the
aspect for the diverging route (Main Aspect
Free).
With the move to 3 aspect signalling on the 27/07/2011
Kirkhill lines it was considered beneficial to
regularise the signal spacing up to Newton
Station, which was originally out of the
scope of the GSSR project. During scheme
plan reviews the positioning of the junction
signal and the signal spacing was
discussed. Upon further scheme plan
development the option presented was
found to be the only feasible solution, within
the geographical and financial constraints.
A following project is looking to introduce an
additional crossover between M140 and 24
points. The draft scheme plan suggests
that this would reduce the distance from the
signal to the first facing points to
approximately 680m, less than the 800m
stipulated by the standard. The speed
profile for each route from M140 is the
same; therefore there is no risk of a driver
forgetting the indicated route and over
speeding for the diverging route. As the
existing junction signal, M142, is being
converted to an elevated shunt signal,
which is preset by routes from M140, the
driver of a train approaching the facing
points has a reminder of which route he has
been given. Any loss of detection of the
points, or SPAD by another train, after the
N/A
21/04/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/05/2011
Current
RGS Title
Scope
Approach to Newton Station from Glasgow
on the Up Kirkhill line. The new junction
signal shall be numbered M140.
Page77
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GCRT5112
Two
7.1.2.3
11-147-DGN
Edinburgh Waverley Station; Platforms 8
and 9 Market Street Footbridge Support
Columns; Design of Structures to Resist
Collision Loads
Edinburgh Waverley Station; Platforms 8
and 9, Market Street Footbridge Support
Columns; Design of Structures to Resist
Collision Loads.
26/08/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
14/09/2011
Current
Four
6.5 and 7.2.1
and Trains
Gipsy Hill Station extension to Platform 1
(London End) - platform width and location
of isolated columns supporting lighting.
Gipsy Hill Station extension to Platform 1
(London End) - platform width and location
of isolated columns supporting lighting.
N/A
15/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
5.1.2.5
Signals
11-180-DGN
Non provision of route indications for shunt
moves from Salford Crescent Station
platform starter signals
Salford Crescent Station at approx. 1_
miles on MVE1. Signals MP505 & MP507.
Relatively low as the infrastructure adjacent 02/04/2012
to the columns does shield the columns
from impact. The design achieves a
resistance to collision loads of 440kN at 3.
0 m above ground (against 500kN
specified) and 400kN at 1. 2 m above
ground (against 200kN specified). It is
considered that the risk of a train derailment
itself is minimal and, in the extremely
unlikely event this should occur, the
mitigating factors, described in section 9 Proposed alternative actions render the
chances of a derailment leading to bridge
collapse to be extremely small. The
Corporate Social Responsibility profile of
the company is also increased by
maintaining the integrity of Edinburgh
Waverley Station as a listed building, and
by retaining the serviceable parts of the
station - as opposed to being replaced
unnecessarily. The proposed solution will
minimise the impact on station users, in
particular limiting the amount of time that
the New Street car park lift is out of action
for disabled access. All of the above will be
achieved with a minimal risk due to the
factors detailed earlier in this form. In
particular, it is felt that the low line speeds
together with the design against
It is not thought reasonably practicable to 10/06/2011
provide a compliant solution. The cheapest
compliance solution would require the
compulsory purchase of additional land.
Although the proposed solution is noncompliant it should not unduly compromise
passenger safety. Passengers waiting for
trains in the morning peak spread out along
the platform. The station entrance (once
refurbishment is complete) will be at the
opposite end of the platform, with the
waiting room and canopied area about half
way along. Overcrowding at the London
end is therefore unlikely. The proposed line
speed at both platforms will remain at 50
mph. The scheme will be developed so that
the track and design of the extended
platform at Gipsy Hill will be compliant with
the requirements for stepping distances,
passing and lateral clearances. Usage by
arriving and departing passengers will be
low due to the location of the extension
relative to the station entrance and the
entrances/exits at other stations served by
the same train services. 8-car trains will
continue to stop at their present position
and 10-car trains will comprise Class 377
trains with on-board look back monitors.
Warning of approaching trains can be made
The sidings are used to park tampers and to 07/12/2011
occasionally turn back Northern Trains
empty stock when margins do not exist
within Salford Crescent Station. FOCs do
not currently use this siding. The safety
implications of not providing new MIs are
considered to be negligible. The existing
non-provision is being perpetuated. No
additional risk is being imported. No call-on
class routes exist at these signals. It should
also be noted that the sidings to which the
shunt routes apply are very rarely used.
N/A
GIRT7016
By inspection, the current bridge dating
from 1901 is non-compliant with clause 7.
1. 2. 3. The bridge is to be replaced in
2011/12 and it will not be possible to locate
support columns out with the hazard zone
or to achieve the design load resistance
specified in clause 7. 1. 2. 3. As the
existing bridge is to be taken out of
passenger use in October 2011; no
immediate action is planned. In
constructing the new bridge, it is not
reasonably practicable to comply for the
reasons (refer to attached drawing C1555200-019-rev00 and photos 1-4 to crossreference column numbers with locations):
Space constraints mean that support
columns 1, 2 and 3 cannot be moved
further from the cess rail. It is not possible
to bear the bridge directly onto the main
train shed wall between platforms 9 and 10,
as the ability of the wall and foundations to
sustain this cannot be confirmed. Due to
pile congestion, the columns cannot be
designed to withstand the necessary
loading. Due to the station's Grade A listed
status and location within a World Heritage
Site, the new bridge is subject to strict
architectural guidelines which require a slim
and unobtrusive structure. OLE clearances
Lengthening Project seeks to increase
passenger capacity through the introduction
of 10-car trains in place of 8-car trains.
This requires the construction of platform
extensions at a number of stations including
Gipsy Hill Station. To construct the 46. 84
m long extension at the London end of
Platform 1, the useable platform width is
restricted to a minimum width of 1. 8 m.
The location of lighting columns along the
extension will also be non-compliant: to
mitigate this bulkhead lighting will be
installed within the platform fence line and
supported on GRP portal frame type
structures. This will allow the lighting to be
maintained without the need for
possessions or land acquisition. Because
of the limited land available, it would not be
reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution: such a solution would
require either an Order under the Transport
Works Act for compulsory land acquisition
(with associated cost and programme risk)
or the slewing of the Up Crystal Palace Line
by about 200 to 700mm towards the six
foot. Platforms 1 (Up Crystal Palace) and 2
(Down Crystal Palace) are linked via a
footbridge at the Country end of the station.
The existing signals are not provided with
MI and the destination is a fan of 2 sidings
of equal length. The destination is
unaffected by the alteration. Provision of
indicators would require alterations within
the interlocking, additional cable cores,
alterations within the location cases for
signals which are only being relocated.
N/A
26/10/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
17/11/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
2.1 and 3.2
and Trains
11-115-DGN
Blackfriars Station Platforms 1 and 2 Horizontal alignment
Horizontal alignment at ends of platforms at The extreme end of the trains stopping at
the platforms will be on platforms where the
track radius is less than 1000m. A 10m
length at the Northern end and a 28m
length at the Southern end will be on curves
with a radius of 400m.
Due to the constrained nature of the site, it 02/11/2011
is not reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution. The provision of such a
solution would require major construction
works. The proposed solution should not
give rise to any unacceptable risk to
passengers. The platform edge position will
be compliant for both height and offset.
Stepping distances will be compliant for all
types of train using or likely to use the
station, except for a small (2mm)
exceedance with the Cl319 whose footstep
position is non-compliant. A gauge analysis
has been carried out which has shown that
there will be adequate clearances although
those for W6A have a reduced clearance
(see attached information) The location of
train dispatch equipment and the means of
dispatching trains have been agreed with
the TOC (First Capital Connect).
N/A
23/06/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
N/A
Current
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2,7.2.1 and 11.1.4
and Trains
11-187-DGN
Finsbury Park Station: minimum horizontal Finsbury Park Station: Platform 1 curve, useable width of platform and
minimum horizontal curve Platform 5 minimum width of recess beneath platform. useable width of platform Platforms - 0, 3
and 5 - minimum width of recess beneath
platform.
Low risk - see attached risk assessment.
27/02/2012
The risk to passengers generated by these
non-compliances is deemed to be
acceptably low. The proposed substandard
width area of platform 5 is relatively small
and would not be readily used during the
normal operation of the platform. In
addition, the sub-standard width area is to
the departure end of the platform and, as
such, the position of door opening would be
in an area of acceptable platform width.
Additional mitigation measures such as
warning signage can be adopted if
considered necessary to advise of the
platform width restrictions.
N/A
03/11/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
The capacity of Finsbury Park Station is to
be enhanced by: (a) extending Platforms 3
and 5 and (b) extending and refurbishing
the currently disused island platform 0/-1.
To cater for twelve-car trains, the platforms
are to be extended to a length of 245 m.
The site is constrained by the existing track
geometry and boundaries of the station.
The station is elevated above the
surrounding ground and, at the north and
south of the station, the lines are carried
over a series of bridges over two main
roads. Extending the platforms (in either
direction) will affect the adjacent highways.
Extending the platforms at the northern end
of the station will have the least
requirements for reconstruction works, but it
would be impracticable to provide a
compliant solution. Due to the constraints
on the site, it would be impracticable to
provide a compliant solution. Details of the
proposed arrangements are provided in the
attached risk assessment. The
refurbished/extended Platform -1, serving
the Up Goods lines, occupies a 525 m
radius curve at its northern end to a 935 m
curve at its southern end; these curves are
separated by a 75 m long straight section.
The width of the proposed extension to
Page78
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0045
One
5.1.2.6 b)
Signals
11-008-DGN
Non-provision of route indicator on ME508
independent position light signal on the
Down Main at Marylebone Station.
The application relates to ME508
independent position light signal on the
Down Main at Marylebone Station. ME508
is a turnback signal for the purposes of
moving empty stock between platforms to
form service trains with two routes: to
independent position light signal ME502
which precedes ME508; to Platform 6.
An existing independent position light
signal ME508 with two routes from it has no
route indicator for either route. It will not be
provided with route indicators by the
Evergreen 3 project, which is altering the
interlocking and adjacent signals. The
signalling layout at Marylebone station was
designed and commissioned in the early
1990s. Due to the continued development
of standards, a number of signalling
elements of the layout does not conform to
current standards. It is not reasonably
practicable to retrospectively apply current
standards to the whole layout. The
Evergreen 3 project is addressing a
previous route indicator non-compliance at
signal ME10, introduced by a previous
project. As a consequence of this work, the
project has also taken action to fit route
indicators to related existing independent
position light signals, retrospectively
applying current standards. However, one
independent position light signal will remain
without route indicators for any routes from
it with no alteration to its form or controls.
N/A
19/01/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/02/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
2.3.2.5
Signals
11-133-DGN
Use of letter `X' in alphanumeric route
normal direction. (SN324 & SN326)
SN324 at 20 108m, SN326 at 20 115m on
route HLL.
N/A
29/07/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
25/08/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4.1
and Trains
11-005-DGN
Birmingham New Street station (platforms
Birmingham New Street station (platforms
10/11 and 12) - provision of recess beneath 10/11 and 12) - provision of recess beneath
edge
edge. The affected cables on Platform
10/11 'A' will be renewed between the
Platform Relay Room and the inspection
chamber at the east end next to signal
NS161. It is anticipated that the equipment
affected would be limited to signals, track
circuits and TPWS cables. The affected
cables on Platform 12 'A' will be
disconnected and pulled back to an
inspection chamber (that is unaffected by
the works), where it will be re-routed onto
the tray on the platform face and then back
out to the lineside equipment. It is
anticipated that the equipment affected
would be limited to signal, track circuits and
TPWS cables.
Compliance is not proposed and a
10/03/2011
derogation is sought to perpetuate the
existing non-provision of route indicators at
independent position light signal ME508.
This is an existing deficiency to current
standards. A single existing independent
signal, ME508, will remain without route
indicators for any of the routes from it.
Clause 5. 1. 2. 6 b) only permits the nonprovision of route indicators if all of five
criteria are satisfied. In the case of ME508,
it satisfies all but criteria iii); there is
technically a significant difference in the
distance to the next signals (buffer stop)
between the two routes from ME508.
Considering compliance with 5. 1. 2. 6 b)
then: I. There are no routes from ME508
or any subsequent routes preceded by
ME508 that end in a limit of shunt. ii.
Since all exit signals are preceded by
ME508 with aspect controls that require the
preceded signals to be OFF, there is no
SPAD risk (except in the case of an
emergency replacement. ) iv. All routes
from ME508 and following preceded signals
that do not have similar infrastructure
characteristics (e. g. to Wall Siding) will
have new route indicators provided at the
preceded signal in accordance with
SN324C(M): The 'X' indication in a
23/09/2011
standard indicator is currently used on the
main route continuing on the Down Airport
(up direction). This route is used
infrequently due to the constraint it places
on Down Airport / Down Main capacity.
Due to the addition of a third route at
Heathrow Tunnel Junction, it is not possible
to retain the existing junction signalling
unchanged. The Standard Indicator with
'U', 'D' & 'X' was considered to be the
optimum solution with the 'X' retaining the
same meaning it currently has.
SN326C(M): This signal currently has a
no. 4 PLJI for the main route crossing to the
Down Airport (up direction). This route is
used infrequently due to the constraint it
places on Down Airport / Down Main
capacity. Due to the addition of a third
route at Heathrow Tunnel Junction, it is not
possible to retain the existing junction
signalling unchanged. Standard Indicator
with 'U', 'D' & 'X' was considered to be the
optimum solution with the 'X' as SN324.
The indications to drivers in this area have
been considered and agreed by the
TOC/FOC representatives. These
indications present the least possible
confusion to drivers and that 'X' is
West Midlands Re-signalling project, which 11/04/2011
starts after the completion of Gateway,
would in all probability recover most of the
existing infrastructure, and so it would not
be cost effective to provide a compliant
solution at this time. The route of the
cables would be re-assessed by the West
Midlands Re-signalling project. Minor.
There are already cable trays and cables
laid on the platform faces beneath the
recess on all platforms within New Street
Station. This arrangement has not led to
any problems. It would not be reasonably
practicable to provide a compliant solution,
partly because in all probability the existing
cables would be replaced as part of the
works for the following West Midlands Resignalling project. The positioning of cables
on trays in the recess beneath platform
edges is an existing practice at New Street
station, and this arrangement has not led to
any problems to date. Without this
diversion, there would be a substantial
increase in the risk of cable strikes and
disruption to station operations.
N/A
13/01/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
GMRT2453
One
B5.2
Registration of Rail Vehicles and Mandatory 11-045-DGN
Data Requirements
The proposed approach for seeking
04/05/2011
recognition of the "base host" vehicles on
RSL will save a significant amount of work
that would otherwise have cost and project
delay impacts with no gain in engineering or
operational safety. Recognition is first
sought for the "base host" train. The
Engineering Acceptance process is to be
applied to the modifications required to
convert the vehicles to form the AIT. The
approach of separating these activities
provides for clarity in the understanding of
the impact of the changes that are to be
made to the "base host" vehicles to produce
the AIT.
N/A
15/03/2011
Tube Lines Ltd
Rolling Stock
15/04/2011
Current
Derogation for the recognition and return to
operational status of 1972 Tube Stock
vehicles without the production of an
Engineering Acceptance Certificate.
Four vehicles of 1972 Tube Stock have
been nominated for modification and
inclusion into an Asset Inspection Train
(AIT) for use on the network traversed by
London Underground trains.
As part of the Gateway project, piling works
and the construction of foundations are
required at the 'A' end of Platforms 8/9,
10/11 and 12 at Birmingham New Street
Station. This affects parts of the existing S
and T cables laid in routes within the station
platforms, and there will be a high risk of
cable strikes during the construction works
if these cables are not diverted. Due to the
constraints and complexity of the existing
layout at New Street station, there is
insufficient space to divert the cables to a
location that would be both compliant and
be clear of the required construction works
in a cost-effective manner. The noncompliant arrangements arise from the site
constraints on the diversion of the existing S
and T cables. Some of the new piles lie
along the route of the existing S and T
cables. Laying new cables along the
platform face in cable trays (to replace the
existing cables in the sub-platform routes)
would be beneficial in that all the
operational cables will be diverted away
from the station refurbishment works.
There are existing cables on the platform
face, and so the current situation would not
be worsened. The proposed arrangements
would significantly reduce the risk to the
The vehicles concerned are not currently
registered and, as such, their recognition on
the RSL is sought. This recognition is
sought for the vehicles in their original
configuration prior to the application of the
modifications required to form the AIT. The
vehicles have not operated since 1998, but
the train type has been in continuous
operation from that time to the present date
and is recognised by RSL. This derogation
application concerns the return to
operational status of the "base host"
vehicles of the AIT without the presentation
of an Engineering Acceptance Certificate.
All outstanding London Underground (LUL)
and Tube Lines (TLL) safety modifications
will be completed to bring the vehicles into
line with the 2008 configuration of the other
vehicles in the class that are currently
operating. The modifications to be
undertaken to convert the vehicles for use
as the AIT will be subject to a separate
Engineering Acceptance process. Brief
details of the project are provided below:
Following modification, the AIT train will be
capable of measuring infrastructure
parameters on the London Underground in
much the same way (and using similar
technology) as does Network Rail's New
Page79
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GKRT0045
One
5.1.2.4.c)
Signals
11-154-DGN
Hayes Station, SN281 non-provision of SI
route indication for straight on route
SN281 - 17 135m - approx. 10 1/2 mp - Up Standards require a SI into a bay platform,
Relief, MLN1
however the main line route speed is 60mph
which would require the signal to be
approach controlled to ensure readability.
GKRT0192
One
2.1.3.7
11-019-DGN
Management of SPAD risk at DR162
protecting Moreton AHBC level crossing.
Signal DR162 protecting Moreton AHBC
level crossing. ELR is BML2.
GERT8035
One
B8.3.6
11-118-DGN
Non-provision of AWS suppression on East Westerfield to Oulton Broad South on the
Suffolk Route following conversion from
East Suffolk Route.
RETB
GMRT2461
One
9.1, 9.3.1
and on-track Machines
11-137-DGN Revised 21-11- Fitting manually operated sanders with
2011
sanding rate of 2kg/wheel/min to classes
14X and 153 units.
National - class 14X and 153 units
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Although other indications could be
10/11/2011
provided this signal has been considered by
the Signalling Design team and Signal
Sighting Committee. In the wider context of
the Stockley Scheme Plan, it is felt that no
indication for the straight route at 60mph
has a clear meaning and a 'B' for the
25mph entry to the Bay is the clearest
arrangement. This also complies with 5. 1.
2. 4. b). Another signal [for a slow speed
approach] shows "UR" for this destination.
The equipment on SN281 signal is
restricted due to it being on a drop cage
from a gantry therefore a double indication
would be difficult. U and R individually
would not uniquely define the destination. It
is suggested that the standard should be
amended to permit omission of SI
indications for highest speed route even if it
is through a platform. Amend 5. 1. 2. . 4. .
c) to say "If all routes are into a terminus
station. " The indications to drivers in this
area have been considered and agreed by
the TOC/FOC representatives. These
indications present the least possible
confusion to drivers.
N/A
28/09/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
20/10/2011
Current
There have been two previous category A 27/07/2011
SPaDs at DR162 signal since 01/01/1985.
These occurred on 04/09/1986 and
22/08/2002 with the latter SPaD attributed
to the train driver failing to react to caution
aspect displayed on DR164 signal. The DA
identified three possible solutions as listed
below. 1. Move Signal and extend platform,
estimated Âœ340,499 2. SPAD prediction
system 3. Provision of TPWS Based on
their predicted risk reduction, it was
possible to estimate the worthwhile spend in
each case. Note that, in each case, this
figure is the 'whole-life' spend that can be
justified on safety grounds and covers the
current cost of maintenance and operational
costs that the mitigation might incur as well
as initial purchase and fitment costs. When
the risk assessment was carried out, the
current standard Network Rail figures for
safety investment analysis was a VPF of
Âœ1. 652 million and a 1. 5% discount rate,
a mitigation that would eliminate the risk
and have an expected life of 30 years would
be worth a spend of Âœ1,150. A mitigation
that only reduces the risk or has a shorter
lifetime would have a commensurately
lower worthwhile spend. The risk of a
SPAD at DR162 signal was estimated to be
The East Suffolk Line, between Westerfield When the line was last resignalled in the
16/08/2011
Junction (near Ipswich) and Oulton Broad
mid 1980s, this mode of AWS was adopted
(near Lowestoft) which is a distance of 44
and it is not considered that continuing in
miles 9 chains, is presently worked by
this mode, presents an unacceptable risk.
RETB (Radio Electronic Token Block). The The present service is less than one
route has two sections of bi-directional
passenger train in each direction, because
double track (Westerfield to Woodbridge
of the length of single line section
and Saxmundham to Halesworth) amount
limitations. However, the new loop at
to 21 miles 45 chains. The remainder of the Beccles will permit one train an hour. A risk
route is single line (Woodbridge to
assessment has been carried out a SDG in
Saxmundham and Halesworth to Oulton
accordance with GE/RT8035 clause B8. 3.
Broad amounting to 22 miles 54 chains.
6.
The system is controlled from
Saxmundham Signal box. Currently the
only worked signals are at Saxmundham,
associated with the protection of two
Manned Barrier level crossings and one at
each interface, reading away from the
RETB sections, fringing with traditional
signalling systems. Other then that, all
signals are in the form of fixed 'block limit'
marker boards (where drivers are required
to stop and exchange 'radio' tokens) and
their associated distant signals, which are
retro reflective 'distant boards'. Apart from
that, the line also has 23 automated level
crossings (Locally Monitored) fitted with
signalling equipment, each preceded by a
distant board. All the existing speed
Both types of units considered here have 4 There are three consequences of adopting 21/11/2011
axles only. The group standard was written the proposed alternative: The sand
to accommodate conventional 2 car units
delivery rate will give an enhanced braking
with a total of eight axles. For Classes 14X rate in low adhesion conditions equivalent
& 153 units, without a complete redesign
to an increase of 3% g above the prevailing
and rebuild, it is not possible to comply.
adhesion level. Due to the reduced number
The stopping distance under low adhesion of axles on the units under consideration the
conditions is naturally lengthened, and it
train will stop with all wheels likely to be on
can get out of driver's control, unless
the sand deposited by the same train. There
mitigations are considered. The option not is a risk that train detection may be lost.
to fit sanding for braking is not acceptable The increase in adhesion following the
due to the risks described below. Two
deposition of sand by these units is in line
incidents occurred just over three months
with that seen on all other multiple units
apart, in each case a class 142 unit collided fitted with sanders. Sand in traction mode
with a stationary train in a platform, when
is proposed to be operated in accordance
the class 142 unit was permitted to occupy with procedures and training that are
a part of a platform already occupied by
already in place for multiple units. Loss of
another train in normal working. On
train detection has been investigated under
03/10/2009 unit 142016 forming 2D11
controlled conditions during test runs at
passed signal T895 at danger and collided High Marnham between 18-22 July 2011.
with 1S07, an IC 225 set, in platform 4 at
The output from those controlled test runs is
Darlington station. Damage was minor and presented in a matrix table of sand laying
no serious injuries occurred. The cause
rate in grams/metre vs effective train shunt
was rail contamination with leaf residue
resistance. Prior the test, correct operation
believed to have been exacerbated by the
of the track circuit was confirmed by a drop
IC225 set on the approaches to Darlington shunt test. Correct operation by the vehicle
station following high winds carrying leaves is confirmed if the drop shunt is within 0. 5
from far away to the site of the station
ohms (RT/E/S/11752 Train Detection
approach which did not have a history of
Section 1. 2. 2 Track Circuit Occupied).
N/A
03/02/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/03/2011
Current
N/A
28/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
N/A
04/08/2011
Network Rail
Rolling Stock
09/09/2011
Current
DR162 signal is located on the Up Main
line at the London end of platform 1 at
Moreton Station in Dorset. DR162 is
located 19. 5m from Moreton AHBC
crossing, which is less than the allowed
distance under clause 2. 1. 3. 7.
Compliance would require either relocation
of the signal (including extension of the
platform), or only allowing a train to
approach DR162 with the crossing closed to
road traffic from DR164 (1754m in rear).
Road closure times would be excessive,
leading to potential crossing abuse.
Page80
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
7.2. b)
and Trains
Brentford station: width of single faced
platform (1).
Brentford station: width of single faced
platform (1).
The Up platform of Brentford station is to
be extended by 36. 3 m towards the London
end. Because of land/cost constraints, a
27. 2 m length of the extension will have a
width of less than 2. 5 m; the minimum
width will be 1773 mm. An extension of the
London end of the platform is restricted by
the existing land boundaries and it would
not be reasonably practicable to acquire the
additional land to construct a compliant
solution. A previous proposal to extend the
platform at Country End was rejected
because of the increase in passenger flow
that would occur through existing narrow
platform under the overbridge (Tracker
application No. 7659).
Although the minimum width is only 1773 11/04/2011
mm, the findings of the HAZOP show that
the risk to passenger safety is acceptably
low. The narrow section of the platform will
affect passengers alighting/joining two train
carriages. As shown by the HAZOP, the
risk to passengers is acceptably low.
N/A
07/03/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2 b) and 8.1 b)
and Trains
11-142-DGN
Caerphilly Station - new support to existing
footbridge
Caerphilly Station, new support to existing
footbridge.
The restricted space at the station does not 22/12/2011
make it reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution. Low risk - the scale of
the non compliance for clearance is 185
mm to either platform face and up to 270
mm vertically. The proposed bay platform
1 is provided with a buffer stop, and so
trains will be travelling towards a stop at a
maximum permissible speed of 25mph.
The existing Platform 1 (Proposed Platform
2), servicing the Dn Rhymney has a 50 mph
line speed. The length of platform affected
is 305 mm (based on the proposed 305x305
UC being confirmed at GRIP 5-8). The
track is straight coming from the Cardiff
direction with good sighting changing to a
2050 m radius curve at the bridge. The
reduced headroom will be highlighted to the
public via signage and black and yellow
barrier tape. It is considered that there is
an insignificant risk to passenger safety.
N/A
18/08/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
14/09/2011
Current
GMRT2000
Three
6.6.3, Appendix H1(a)
11-050-DGN
Derogation Steam Locomotive - A3 Class
4472 `Flying Scotsman'
As part of the Cardiff Area Resignalling
Renewal scheme a new bay platform is to
be provided at Caerphilly Station. There is
an existing footbridge spanning the station
that is owned by a Third Party. The bridge
does not provide rail passengers access to
the platforms; it is a means for non-rail
passengers to cross the tracks without
accessing the station. The bridge has a
clearance between the existing platform
edge and its support in excess of 2500mm,
and a clearance between the platform level
to the underside of the lowest structural
member in excess of 2500mm. It is
proposed to install a new platform and
relocate the footbridge support to the centre
of this to give clearances of 2315mm to
each side of the support to the platform
edge. See attached drawing 5091070-RLSCSE-0006-A02. This will also provide a
minimum headroom to the bay platform
side of 2230mm - increasing to 3046mm
over a 1000mm length. The length of the
platform affected will be kept to a minimum
and will comprise the width of the column
(outline design sizes 305x305 UC). During
construction, hoardings will be required to
undertake the works but this will have no
effect as this area of the platform is nonOperation of the following preserved Steam It would not be practical to revise the RGS
Operator. LNER/BR À3' class steam
locomotive no. 4472 `Flying Scotsman'.
TOPS No. 98872 Painted No 4472 Class / their compliance or otherwise. In a number
Power Classification 7P6F Wheel
mph.
Vehicles".
N/A
24/03/2011
West Coast Railway
Company Ltd
Rolling Stock
15/04/2011
Current
GKRT0064
One
6.3
Trapping
Restoration of trapping protection - York
Station.
York Station. 767 points, protecting main
lines from unauthorised movements out of
Holgate Loop. York Station. 776 points,
protecting main lines from unauthorised
movements out of Reception Sidings.
04/05/2011
introduction in 1923 and continued until its
compliance with RGS the cost would be
"heritage "vehicle. Making the locomotive
Trap protection arrangements are currently There will be no increase in traffic, however 16/08/2011
in place in the south end of York Station, for the layout implemented by proposed
unauthorised moves from Holgate Loop or junction re-modelling works improves
Reception Sidings, by means of trap points operational flexibility, enabling additional
767, respectively 776. These trap points
routes over the trap points. Automatic
are not currently provided with restoration
restoration is not justified, as the sidings are
alarm or automatic restoration.
infrequently used and mainly for locomotive
or on-track machine movements.
Ergonomic assessment for the proposed
alterations has determined the impact on
signallers' workload as neutral, with
potential improvements due to enhanced
layout flexibility and additional conflict-free
moves. Provision of restoration alarms
where these have not been originally fitted
may have a negative impact, which is not
justified by the potential safety benefit.
N/A
28/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
GKRT0042
One
6.1
Absolute Block
Castleton East Junction - non provision of
signal repeater override device
Castleton East Junction - Up direction block The Up Main block controls at Castleton
section from Rochdale West Signalbox.
East Junction are to be amended in
connection with the Rochdale Resignalling
project. The minor change to the Up Main
block at Castleton involves the conversion
of the Up Main Distant from a semaphore
signal to a LED colour light signal and
combination with the Rochdale West starter
to form a 3 aspect colourlight signal called
TH7300. The current absolute block
systems in the area in Castleton, Vitriol
Works and Rochdale signalboxes do not
include override provisions and the
provision would be an expensive provision
for this change, which is only a stage on the
route to conversion to Track Circuit Block
(TCB).
N/A
23/02/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
24/03/2011
Current
Certificate Number
11-037-DGN
Control of risk due to failure of Block
20/04/2011
Indicators caused by aspect or lamp failure,
is managed by application of Rule Book
GE/RT8000/TS3 Regulation 8. 3. 2.
Page81
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
6.5.3
and Trains
11-007-DGN
Lancaster station; London end of Platform
4: location of isolated columns on
platforms.
Lancaster station; London end of Platform
4: location of isolated columns on
platforms. The Line Speed through the
platform is 30mph.
13/01/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
Four
2.1.2, 6.3.1,7.2.1 and
11.1.3
and Trains
11-069-DGN
Gravesend Station platforms 1, 2 (new
platform) and 3 (existing platform 2)
Gravesend Station platforms 1, 2 (new
platform) and 3 (existing platform 2) ELR
HDR Mileage: 23m 51ch
N/A
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2011
Current
GERT8082
One
4.2.5.4 and 4.3.3.2 Table
4.3
11-186-DGN
Cab Mobile v2, Pre defined message
acknowledge - FTN/GSM-R Project
National.
It is not deemed reasonably practicable to 11/04/2011
provide a compliant solution. Low severity.
The non-compliant section in front of an
Isolated single OLE Mast is about 1 m long
within the proposed 22 m long extension to
Platform 4. The clearance of the isolated
column to the platform edge will be 1. 76m
for the 1m section. The design for the
southern extension to the existing Platform
4 reduces the clearance between the face of
an existing OLE Headspan mast and the
proposed coper edge of the new length of
platform to 1. 76 m - below the minimum of
2000 mm, as stipulated in GI/RT7016.
However, the severity of the resulting noncompliance is mitigated by virtue of the
isolated structure pinch-point being sited at
the extreme southern end of the platform,
which only serves the leading Service Door
of an 11 Car Pendolino Train: the pinchpoint is, therefore, remote from the normal
pedestrian circulating areas. Furthermore,
the line speed of the adjacent running line is
30mph. The service doors of the Pendolino
can only be operated by Train Crew
members. The arrangements are such that
the risk of persons being caught by the
slipstream of passing high speed trains in
the narrow area between the OLE Mast
Due to the physical constraints of the
11/07/2011
station it is impracticable to provide a
compliant solution to GI/RT7016. A
HAZOP risk assessment has been jointly
undertaken by Network Rail and
Southeastern to evaluate the possible risks
associated with deviation from clauses 7. 2.
1, 2. 1. 2 and 11. 1. 3, and to consider
possible additional operational controls to
mitigate those risks. A separate technical
buffer stop risk assessment GC/RT5633
has been carried out by the designer in
accordance with standards. The risk
assessments took into account operator
knowledge of passenger footfall and
pedflow at each location. Network Rail and
Southeastern have subsequently jointly
concluded and agreed that the risks
associated with the proposed deviations
from GI/RT7016 are, in fact, tolerable and
can be maintained ALARP by adopting and
implementing the additional mitigating
operational controls identified through the
HAZOP risk assessment process. The
output of the risk assessments is set out in
Appendices C and D of the attached
document. Southeastern, as Duty Holder,
fully supports and endorses this application
(see Appendix E of attached document).
No impact - the function is carried out as
12/01/2012
effectively and is compliant with the TSI.
N/A
GIRT7016
The standard requires platforms to be
constructed so that, normally, isolated
columns for new lighting, signs and other
equipment or alterations to these will be a
minimum of 2500mm from the platform
coper edge where the line speed is less
than or up to 100mph. Where particular
site constraints prevent this, isolated
columns for new lighting, signs or other
equipment or alterations to such items shall
be located not less than 2000mm from the
platform edge. To service the needs of 11
Car Pendolino Trains which are to be
operated from 12/06/2011, Platform 4 at
Lancaster has to be extended southwards
by 22m. Currently, there is an OLE
Headspan support Mast situated in the area
of the proposed platform extension, and
under the current proposals this mast,
which supports a transverse catenary from
which is suspended the 25kV OLE for all 4
main West Coast running lines through the
station, will end up with its nearest face less
than 2000mm from the proposed new
platform edge. Its existing position to the
coper edge will be 1. 76m. The resulting
pinch-point will be at the extreme southern
end of the platform and will be adjacent to
the Service Door of 11 Car Pendolino Trains
Clause 7. 2. 1 - Platform Width (Platform 1
only). The last 40m of the extension to
Platform 1 will taper from 2. 5m to 2. 1m,
and the short linking walkway between
Platform 1 and the new Platform 2 will be 2.
0m wide only. Platforms 2 and 3 are
compliant with respect to width, however.
Clause 2. 1. 2 - Platform Curvature
(Platforms 1, 2 and 3). The new island
platform and the extensions to the existing
platforms will all have a radius in places of
below 1,000m, and as low as 270m at the
Country end for approximately 90m of the
platform length. Stepping distances are
compliant throughout, however, for all
classes of rolling stock operated by
Southeastern over the route. (Note: The
vertical stepping distance for Class 319 is
not compliant at 254mm. But although this
class is cleared for the route, there are no
timetabled services utilising this stock.
)Clause 6. 3. 1 - Buffer Stop Over Run
(Platform 1 only). The distance between
the road over bridges at either end of the
station is not sufficiently long enough to
achieve a clear 20m between the new buffer
and the Windmill Street tunnel face. The
maximum possible clear distance is 14m.
Clause 11. 1. 3 - Platform Cross Falls
Cab Mobile v2 can also receive and send
the Acknowledgement in the CONNECT (4.
2. 5. 4). Pre-defined message acknowledge
does not include the Functional ID (4. 3. 3.
2 Table 4. 3). 4. 2. 5. 4: It is not practical
to constrain Cab Mobile v2 to only send the
Acknowledge in the Disconnect or Release
Complete given that Acknowledgement in
the CONNECT is a desirable feature and
supported by the network. 4. 3. 3. 2 Table
4. 3: The functional ID is sent in the
SETUP and thus also sending the functional
ID with the Acknowledge (I. e. in the
DISCONNECT or CONNECT) would serve
no purpose. It is thus not practical to incur
the cost/timescale impact of enhancing
enhance Cab Mobile v2 to support this.
N/A
02/11/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
15/12/2011
Current
GKRT0064
One
4.3.2
Trapping
signal, Epsom station.
Epsom station is located at 14m 18ch on
the ELR RPE. The reduced overlap is
associated with W464 signal.
Signal W464 has an existing reduced
overlap of 114m. The speed on approach
to the signal is 20mph which commences
352m on approach to the signal and
therefore there is an existing noncompliance. The scheme is proposing to
move the signal resulting in the overlap
being reduced further to 103m. The new
position of the signal means that the 20mph
speed will commence 363m on approach to
the signal. Moving the commencement of
the permissible speed or increasing overlap
to 180m would not be acceptable due to the
severe operational impact. Moving the
signal further is cost prohibitive due to the
proximity of S&C beyond the signal.
21/06/2011
conducted as per the requirements of
GK/RT0064 and considered to be ALARP.
begins 363m on approach to the signal with
the non compliance only 37m short of the
proposed by the risk assessment.
N/A
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
26/05/2011
Current
GKRT0045
One
3.1.1.4
Signals
EN8061 Signal at Brandon - Distance from
Facing Points
New EN8061 main colour light signal on the
Down Main at Brandon, 138. 660km on ELR
'ETN' and facing points 3008A/B (Proposed
new nomenclature used) 830m beyond
EN8061.
The positioning of the signals is constrained
by the position of the station, level crossing
and existing junctions. Relocation of the
points would result in changes to the
standage and significant other
consequential works.
The risk being managed is that a driver
16/08/2011
forgets the junction indication and exceeds
the speed restriction at the turnout. It is
believed that the distance limit is "arbitrary"
and that the risks should be assessed on a
site by site basis.
N/A
28/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
11-117-DGN
Page82
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2100
Four
6.5.2.2
11-201-DGN
Structural strength of burst through door
panels
Replacement vestibule door for No. 2 end
on ScotRail class 156 diesel multiple units
featuring a burst through element. The
design is described in drawings UR-EG30001 Issue P2, UR-EG-3000 Issue P32
Issue P2, UR-EG-30003 Issue P3, UR-EG30004 Issue P2 and UR-EG-30005 Issue
P3.
The new Emergency Egress Panel
06/03/2012
Assembly is specifically designed to aid
egress in the event that a Class 156 vehicle
is involved in an incident that leads to the
internal doors on a vehicle requiring
opening against gravity. The new panel
assembly is designed to comply with
recommendation 76 (option 3) of the Cullen
enquiry into the Southall and Ladbroke
Grove accidents. The design is described
in drawings UR-EG-30001 Issue P2, UREG-3000 Issue P32 Issue P2, UR-EG30003 Issue P3, UR-EG-30004 Issue P2
and UR-EG-30005 Issue P3.
N/A
09/12/2011
First ScotRail
Rolling Stock
20/01/2012
Current
GKRT0045
One
Section 5.2.3.1 a) - Table
23
Signals
11-121-DGN
Flashing aspect approach to SN202 for
route to Up Poplar
SN202 B(M) route. Up Relief to Up Poplar
at Acton West Junction.
In order to comply with recommendation 76
(option 3) of the Cullen enquiry into the
Southall and Ladbroke Grove accidents, the
vestibule door is to be equipped with a burst
through panel to aid egress in the event that
a Class 156 vehicle is involved in an
incident that leads to all internal doors on a
vehicle requiring opening against gravity.
Compliance with the requirements of
GM/RT2100 Issue 4 are as follows: "6. 5.
2. 2 Interior glazing shall withstand without
failure the following ultimate load cases.
Where both sides of the glazing are
accessible by passengers or traincrew, the
load cases shall be applied to both sides
independently. The glazing shall remain
intact and in position throughout the
application and removal of the loads. The
ultimate load cases are: A concentrated
perpendicular load of 2. 5 kN applied over
an area of 0. 1 m x 0. 1 m at any position
on the surface. A pressure of 2. 5 kPa
applied over its entire surface plus a
concentrated perpendicular load of 0. 8 kN
applied over an area of 0. 1 m x 0. 1 m at
any position on the surface. " Compliance
with the above requirements would
necessitate a stiffer rubber section resulting
in either difficulty or inability to remove the
As part of the Crossrail Programme of
works capacity increases are required at
Acton Yard to allow freight trains to leave
and joint the Great Western Relief Lines
quicker and with a certain level of grade
separation such that passenger services
can be time tabled. Part of this works is to
allow a 30 mph route onto the Up Poplar
and subsequently Reception 1 at Acton
Yard. The divergence will be 30mph
(constrained by track geometry) and the Up
Relief at the point of divergence is to
become 80 mph for Multiple Units and 60
mph for other trains [this speed will start 1
mile plus 6ch before the divergence].
Compliance would either require the turnout
speed to be raised to 40mph or the
passenger line speed to be reduced to
75mph.
N/A
28/06/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/07/2011
Current
GIRT7033
Two
B10.1
11-105-DGN
Trial of replacement GSM-R sign instructing GSM-R operational areas
drivers not to utilise the SG button
Most trains using the divergence should be 16/08/2011
approaching at 60 mph as Up Poplar is a
Goods Line and most non-passenger trains
will not run at the "MU 80" mph speed.
Risks have been reviewed as part of the
SAT/DA process in consultation with the
TOC/FOC representatives and they have
deemed the risks of the layout and junction
signalling on the layout to be So Far As
Reasonably Practicable. A 30 mph
Advance Warning Indicator will be provided
at braking distance on approach with
Automatic Warning System inductor. The
AWI will not be at a signal. The AWS for
the AWI will be suppressed when SN202 is
cleared for other routes; therefore the AWS
will draw attention to the AWI when
SN202B set and remind train drivers that
the speed associated with the flashing
yellows is 30 mph.
In GIRT7033, DA01 is an existing sign for It is a new sign intended for evaluation. No 20/07/2011
contacting a signaller by telephone number. safety risk is identified as result of
The GSM-R numbering scheme is different evaluating this sign. Should the driver
to the plated numbers on the sign and so a press the SG button, the correct signaller
new sign is required. In GSM-R, the most will be sent the Standing at Signal
common of communication with the
message.
signaller is by pressing the "SG" button.
This sends a "Standing At Signal" message
to the signaller. Routeing of this message
to a signaller is normally automatic, ie the
system uses the Train Describer
information to route the message/call to the
controlling signaller. There are, however,
some occasions when the message/call is
not routed to the correct signaller (e.g..
when the train is not correlated with TD
information or is in a non-TD area). In
these cases, a sign containing an 8 digit
telephone number may be provided (CT7
Number sign). In order to achieve the
required 50 metres reading distance for an
8-digit number, the CT7 Number sign is
necessarily large. No sign currently exists
which is appropriate for GSM-R to provide
for this circumstance.
N/A
27/05/2011
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
23/06/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1b and 7.3.1b
and Trains
11-073-DGN
Charing Cross Station platforms 1, 2 and 3
ELR XTD
N/A
20/04/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/05/2011
Current
Charing Cross Station platforms 1, 2 and 3 Clause 7. 3. 1b - Platform Width, Dual
ELR XTD Mileage 0m 0ch
Face (Platforms 1 and 2) Operational length
of Platforms 1 and 2 to be extended (dual
face) by 7m, at a constant width of 2. 85m.
Clause 7. 2. 1b - Platform Width, Single
Face (Platform 3 only) Operational length of
Platform 3 to be extended (single face) by
44m, at a constant width of 1. 45m.
Charing Cross is perhaps the most tightly
constrained station within the Kent
programme. The front of the station sits
upon The Strand. The rear sits upon the
Hungerford Bridge, across the River
Thames; six terminal tracks and associated
platforms (three islands) built out onto the
bridge. Theoretically, the 'options' for
extending the existing platforms at a
compliant width are either at the London
end, into the concourse, or at the Country
end, splaying the tracks and widening the
bridge. The former is not possible as the
London end is constrained by the concourse
area and beyond that by the Grade II listed
station facade and The Strand. Congestion
on the concourse area during the peak
periods is already currently an issue at this
station. The latter, rebuilding the
Hungerford Bridge, is not only cost
prohibitive but would require long term
Due to the physical constraints of the
16/09/2011
station it is impracticable to provide a
compliant solution to GI/RT7016. A
HAZOP risk assessment has been jointly
undertaken by Network Rail and
Southeastern to evaluate the possible risks
associated with deviation from clauses 7. 3.
1b and 7. 2. 1b and to consider possible
additional operational controls to mitigate
those risks. The risk assessment took into
account operator knowledge of passenger
footfall and pedflow at each location. The
risk assessment also took into account that
existing Platforms 5 and 6 at Charing Cross
taper to a narrower width today than what is
being proposed for Platforms 1 and 2, at 1.
9m. Network Rail and Southeastern have
subsequently jointly concluded and agreed
that the risks associated with the proposed
deviations from GI/RT7016 are, in fact,
tolerable and can be maintained ALARP by
adopting and implementing the additional
mitigating operational controls identified
through the HAZOP risk assessment
process. The output of the risk assessment
is set out in Appendix C. Southeastern fully
supports and endorses this application (see
Appendix E). Network Rail and
Southeastern have jointly concluded and
Page83
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2
and Trains
11-168-DGN
Clapham Junction Station Platform 15:
horizontal track alignment through station
Platforms
Clapham Junction Station Platform 15:
horizontal track alignment through station
Platforms.
The Sussex Train Lengthening Project will
extend the station platforms on the Sussex
suburban route (ELR: VBT1) to accept tencarriage trains. The useable length of
Platform 15 is to be extended from 165. 9 m
to 203 m: the extension will be towards the
London end of the station. The existing
horizontal alignment through Platforms 14
and 15 has left hand curves at the London
end, reversing into right hand curves and
then reversing again into left hand curves at
the Country end of the platforms. The left
hand curves tie into Switches and
Crossings both at the London and Country
ends of the platforms. The existing
horizontal track alignment along the
proposed extension of the London end of
Platform 15 has a maximum radius of 952
m; thus without realigning the track, the
platform extension will have a radius of
curvature of less than 1000 m. To provide
a compliant horizontal curve flatter than
1000 m would necessitate a complete
reconstruction of the Platform, including the
relocation of the existing subway access
and staircase and lift to the existing
footbridge.
Low severity: marginal non-compliance of
less than 1000 m radius over a length of
about 40 m. Passenger safety will not be
significantly affected by the noncompliance.
22/03/2012
N/A
14/10/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
GMRT2100
Three
15.3, 17.2
Structural Requirements for Railway
Vehicles
11-052-DGN
GM/RT2100 Fatigue Life of Equipment
Derogation
This derogation applies to ÈU' series rail
grinders, supplied by Harsco Rail Limited.
The vehicle numbers are as follows:
Machine No. EU1: Driving vehicle 79266;
Driving vehicle 79276; Potential middle
trailer vehicle Not required. Machine No.
EU2: Driving vehicle 79267; Driving
vehicle 79277; Potential middle trailer
vehicle 79287 Machine No. EU3: Driving
vehicle 79268; Driving vehicle 79278;
Potential middle trailer vehicle 79288.
Machine No. EU4: Driving vehicle 79269;
Driving vehicle 79279; Potential middle
trailer vehicle 79289. Machine No. EU5:
Driving vehicle 79270; Driving vehicle
79280; Potential middle trailer vehicle
79290
The components that this derogation
applies to are the tripcock beam and the
bogie mounted laser profile measurement
bracket. To enable the laser profile
measurement bracket to comply with the
10. 000. 000 cycle fatigue requirement, the
component mounting bracket stiffnesses
would need to be increased, which would
generate additional stresses in the bogie
frame. Analysis of the bogie frame
stresses, and likely need for subsequent
bogie modifications would be prohibitively
expensive to undertake and is not
considered necessary given the alternative
actions proposed. Increasing the bracket
stiffness would also alter the dynamic
behaviour of the otherwise known and
accepted Y series bogie by stiffening the
frame. To enable the tripcock beam to
comply with the 10. 000. 000 cycle fatigue
requirement, the beam would need to be redesigned with an increased thickness
and/or depth, which would result in the
beam being outside of the allowable loading
gauge.
N/A
24/03/2011
Harsco Rail Ltd
Rolling Stock
15/04/2011
Current
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2
and Trains
Wandsworth Common Station Platform 1
and Platform 2: horizontal alignment of
platforms.
Wandsworth Common Station Platform 1
and Platform 2: horizontal alignment of
platforms.
The impact of the alternative action is
04/05/2011
considered as follows: Safety The safety
implications of not complying with the 10.
000. 000 cycle fatigue life are negligible.
The components that do not meet the 10.
000. 000 fatigue requirement will be
replaced at a frequency greater than the
predicted life of the component. The
component life will be predicted from the
accelerations measured during strain gauge
testing on laser profile bracket and the
tripcock once the machine has been
authorised into service, and if the
components do not survive 10. 000. 000
cycles, an appropriate component
replacement period will be specified in the
VMI. This proposed approach is consistent
with the requirements of GM/RT2100 Issue
4, which although not applicable to on-track
machines, it is applicable to passenger and
freight vehicles and is therefore an accepted
industry method for controlling equipment
fatigue. Cost The impact on cost of the
proposed alternative actions are
significantly lower than if the components
were re-designed to meet the 10. 000. 000
cycle requirement. In other words, being
forced to comply fully with the standard
would appear to be grossly
The existing average radii through
Relatively low. Passenger safety will not
04/05/2011
Platforms 1 and 2 are approximately 646 m be compromised by the proposed solution.
and 649 m respectively. It is proposed that The current Train Dispatch methods will not
the proposed extensions are constructed on be affected by the proposed construction
these existing radii, and so will not comply works, any impact/changes will be agreed
with the requirement for a minimum radius with the operator. Stepping distances along
of 1000 m. It would not be reasonably
the extension will be compliant. The
practicable to provide a compliant solution. proposed extensions provide compliant
To provide compliant horizontal curves
stepping distances, and at the interface
(flatter than 1000 m) to the platform
between the proposed and the existing
extensions would necessitate a complete
copers the existing non-compliant stepping
reconstruction of the station, and require
distances will either be removed or reduced.
additional land take.
N/A
15/02/2011
Network Rail
Infrastructure
09/03/2011
Current
GMRT2044
Four
5.4.1 a)
Unit 317 722, Difference between Service
and Emergency Brake Pressures.
Unit 317 722.
AT/VI3174, Issue 2A, `VOI, Class 317
Electrical Multiple Unit (EMU), C4
Overhaul', Job No. V*S 0029 for the Class
317 Greater Anglia fleet, requires a brakes
test, as summarised in Table 1 below. This
shows that the emergency brake pressure
can be 39% higher than the service brake
pressure on the MS vehicle type (see 3 Max
and Emergency Max), this being the highest
differential for the fleet. [See Table - Class
317/3, 317/5. 317/7 and 317/8 Pressure
Setting Table for Brake Test - Table 1
Extract from AT/VI3174, Issue 2A, `VOI,
Class 317 EMU, C4 Overhaul', Job No. V*S
0029] For the Class 317 fleet, the unit
differential of brake force between the step
3 service brake and the emergency brake is
calculated using the following: Vehicle
weight information: Â· DTS - 31. 4t Â·
DTC - 31. 6t Â· MS - 51. 3t Â· TS - 30. 2t
Total unit weight = 144. 5t. Nominal brake
cylinder pressure differences between step
3 brake pressure and emergency brake
pressure: Â· DTS - 35% Â· DTC - 35% Â·
MS - 35% Â· TS - 34%. Calculation to
determine overall unit braking performance:
[(31. 4 x 35) + (31. 6 x 35) + (51. 3 x 35) +
(30. 2 x 34)] / 144. 5 = 34. 8% overall effect
on train braking performance. For Class
N/A
10/10/2013
Abellio Greater Anglia Ltd
Rolling Stock
01/11/2013
Current
13-167-DEV
The alternative proposal will retain
27/11/2013
compatibility and standardisation of the
`Post C4 Brakes Test', for unit 317 722 with
the rest of the Greater Anglia fleet. This
alternative proposal will: Not have any
detrimental effect on the safety of the
railway system Retain the technical
compatibility of the railway system, now
and in the future Not have any implications
associated with cost and service
performance, including reliability and
availability Not have any implications
associated with other essential
requirements, such as environmental
protection and health.
Page84
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GKRT0075
Two
2.3.3
Signage
13-162-DEV
Carmuirs East Jnc to Grangemouth Jnc,
Signal section CEJ10 to GH6, Carmuirs
CEJ10 to GH6 braking distance for trains at East Junction to Grangemouth Junction,
40 mph Appendix A.
Scotland Route. LOR : SSC109, ELR :
PMT.
GIRT7016
Five
7.2.1
and Trains
13-241-DEV
Hendon Station, Platform 3 - reduced
platform width at mid platform fencing.
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1
and Trains
13-239-DEV
Elstree and Borehamwood station, Platform Platform 3, Elstree and Borehamwood
3 - reduced platform width at mid platform Station, Allum Lane, Elstree, WD6 3LS.
fencing.
GMRT2473
Two
All clauses.
13-223-DEV
Derogation for the power operated
passenger doors as fitted to new Class
377/7 Electric Multiple Units (EMU).
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Current standards for gradient of 1: 200 in
Appendix A. 1 table, required braking
distance of 990 m for trains at 40 mph.
Existing Carmuirs East Jcn Signal CEJ10 to
Grangemouth Jcn Signal GH6 is a threeaspect signal section that has a braking
distance of 922 m on a gradient of 1: 210
which is 68 m short. To achieve
compliance with current standards either,
signals would require to be repositioning
add signalling controls, adding an additional
signal or line speed reduction. Moving
CEJ10 towards Falkirk Camelon Station
would convert the signal from a remote
platform starter to a platform starter, and
require CEJ10 AWS magnet to be moved
and fitted with special suppression circuitry.
It would also reduce the braking from CEJ9
which is on the limits of minimum spacing.
CEJ9 signal rear is optimally positioned for
freight train standage issues on the Up
Grahamston line (clear of Larbert Junction
S&C) so could not be moved. Moving GH6
away from Falkirk Camelon Station would
compromise braking to GH4 signal for the
50 mph line speed. Other compliant
technical options considered have included
the introduction of an isolated four-aspect
sequence that would convert CEJ9 signal to
The severity/impact at Hendon Station is
considered generally low. The reduced
platform width affects the fast lines only.
The fast line platform is only used during
slow line closures and during perturbed
working. To assist in suicide prevention,
mid-platform fencing is being installed at
5No Stations on the East Midlands route,
namely: Hendon, Radlett, Mill Hill
Broadway, Cricklewood, and Elstree and
Borehamwood.
Required braking distance between CEJ10 14/11/2013
and GH6 signals is only deficient by 68 m
per current GK/RT0075. Signal sighting of
both signals is compliant with current
standards. CEJ10 signal has 212 m
sighting, sufficient to give additional
sighting at 40 mph to allow the driver to
take action a minimum of 68 m on
approach to signal thus mitigating short
spacing to GH6 signal. It is not considered
reasonable to attempt modify the current
infrastructure to achieve compliance with
current standards. This is on the grounds
that there is little safety justification
proportionate to the expenditure required to
deliver compliance. There is no SPAD
history at GH6. Only one SPAD recorded at
CEJ10 in 2005, due to driver error. As
such, there have been no SPADs or driver
complaints related to signal spacing issues
since that time, since 1997 when the
signalling system was commissioned.
Scotland Route has considered this site and
the options to deliver signal spacing
compliance. It is considered that the risks
arising from this deviation are very low.
Freight trains have been running over this
section of line at speeds of 40 mph since
1997 without any recorded issues. Current
To assist in suicide prevention, mid24/06/2015
platform fencing is being installed at 5No
Stations on the East Midlands route,
namely: Hendon, Radlett, Mill Hill
Broadway, Cricklewood, and Elstree and
Borehamwood. The proposed gated midplatform fencing will prevent access to the
fast lines, which are only used in times of
engineering work or disruption. There has
been a significant increase in the average
cost per incident, this is thought to be due
to an increase in suicides in high impact
locations, and during the peak of passenger
travel. Due to obstructions both on and
within the platform construction, the
platform fencing cannot be positioned to
provide the compliant 3 m clearance from
coping stone edge to fence. This noncompliance varies from 2941 mm at the
country end, 2970 mm at various positions
and 2990 mm in one location on Platform 3.
This can be seen on accompanying as built
Drawing No C1290-BCS-DRG-CV-000101
Rev Z01, and on the attached as built
photographs Ref. 17054 Hendon. doc.
This replaces Tracker No. 15644.
N/A
10/10/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
31/10/2013
Current
N/A
17/12/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/05/2015
Current
To prevent suicides at 5No Stations on the 23/04/2014
East Midlands Route, namely: Hendon,
Radlett, Mill Hill Broadway, Cricklewood,
and Elstree and Borehamwood. The
proposed gated mid-platform fencing will
prevent access to the fast lines, which are
only used in times of engineering work or
disruption. The installation of fencing at
Purley and Harrow and Wealdstone (see
attached photos) has proved effective in
preventing suicides since their
commissioning in 2008/2010 respectively.
In order to maintain the majority width
(minimum 3 m) on the operational "Slow"
sides of the affected Platforms at Elstree
and Borehamwood Station (I. e. the
platforms at which the trains consistently
stop to allow passenger embarkation /
disembarkation) and in line with Train
Operating Company (TOC) / safety
expectations and "best linear fit" to fully
consider evasion of underground service or
above ground Lighting, drainage channels,
shelters, Driver Only Operation (DOO)
mirrors etc. , the residual width of platform
left adjacent the "Fast" lines is reduced
down to a non-compliant width, as can be
seen on the accompanying Drawing
NopC1290-BCS-DRG-CV-000501 Rev P01.
Class 377/7 units (8 x 5 car units), power
The Department for Transport (DfT) have
As compliance is being demonstrated in line 22/01/2014
operated doors. This application is for a
published an updated list of Notified
with the standards applied on recent builds,
project requiring authorisation for placing in National Technical Rules (NNTRs), which
there are not expected to be any adverse
service under the Railways (Interoperability) now includes GM/RT2473 Issue 2, replacing impacts.
Regulations 2011.
Issue 1 as referenced in the previously
published list of NNTRs. The Class 377/7
project is already at an advanced stage of
production and, with the exception of
elements dedicated to running under
Overhead Line Electrification (OLE), the
design is as close to identical to the Class
377/6 units as is feasible, in order to aid
maintenance and spares holding.
Therefore, the design and assessment of
the passenger doors has been based on the
requirements of the superseded standard.
An assessment of the changes of
GM/RT2473 from Issue 1 to Issue 2
indicates that, whilst the changes are minor,
there has been no consideration of the
derogations that have been granted against
Issue 1.
N/A
17/12/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
N/A
05/12/2013
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
Platform 3, Hendon Station, Station Road,
Hendon NW4 4PT.
Based on the drawings / details in
existence that reflect the proposed fencing
layouts at Elstree and Borehamwood
Station (copy attached), full compliance is
unachievable and, therefore, in the absence
of a deviation being granted, then the
scheme in its entirety will be undeliverable.
The severity / impact at Elstree and
Borehamwood Station is considered
generally low, given the reduced platform
width affects the fast lines only, and there
are currently no services whatsoever
"Stopping Off", whereby the
embarkation/disembarkation of passengers
would not be an issue; however,
consideration by virtue of additional gated
access points along the lengths of the
general fence line could be incorporated at
cost within the scheme, to be used /
managed / policed only by the Train
Operating Company (TOC) / station
management staff under emergency
situations or engineering works and thereby
built into the Station Management Strategy
Plan.
Page85
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GKRT0045
Three
5.2.3.1
Signals
13-234-DEV
Flashing aspects for P468 signal at
Peterborough.
Signal 468 4(M) and 5(M) flashing aspects
Compliance could be maintained by
routes, reading from the Up Fast to
continuing to use approach release from red
Platform 2 or 3, controlled by Peterborough on P468. This control currently causes
PSB.
trains proceeding from the Up Fast to
Platform 2 or 3 to decelerate to P468 at red
before the aspect is released to proceed
over 1243 and 1242 points. The controls
currently have a risk of anticipation and that
required trains to accelerate towards the
points after the signal clears due to 1243
points being 700 m from P468 signal. Train
Operating Companies have raised these
issues from performance and safety
perspective, and requested the controls are
amended.
GIRT7016
Four
3.1.1 and 3.2.1
and Trains
13-143-DEV
Kew Gardens Station Platform 1 - platform
edge position
Kew Gardens Station Platform 1. Kew
Gardens Station Platform 2 will not receive
raised portions due to the tight curvature at
the location of the raised portion.
GMRT2400
Five
All clauses
Running Mode
Advance stage deviation for Plasser 94x4/4S Tamper.
Plasser & Theurer 09-4x4/4S Tamping
Machine Number 99 70 9128 001-3. The
application is for a project requiring
2011.
GKRT0075
Two
2.3.1
Signage
Minimum Braking Distances MLN1 for
Reading Outer Relock.
Â· Reading Outer Relock & Immunise
(RORI) West, B&H Project Area Â· Reading
Outer (West) MLN1 41m 60ch to 51m 50ch
Â· Up Main - T832 (Appendix B&C), T824
(Appendix B&C), T816 (Appendix B), T808
(Appendix B), T800 (Appendix B), T792
(Appendix B), T784 (Appendix B) Â· Down
Main - T821 (Appendix B&C), T829
(Appendix B&C), T837 (Appendix C), T845
(Appendix C) Â· Up Relief - T786 (Appendix
B), T794 (Appendix B), T802 (Appendix B),
T810(Appendix B), T818(Appendix B),
T826(Appendix B), T834(Appendix B) Â·
Down Relief - T831 (Appendix B), T823
(Appendix B). Â· Reading Outer (B&H) BHL
38m 70ch to 56m 09ch Â· Up Westbury T2856 (Appendix B).
13-014-DGN
Nature and Degree
With input from DfT and DPTAC, LUL, has
assessed all 248 platforms served by S
Stock to see where, through the application
of reasonable effort, compliance with the
Rail Vehicle Accessibility (RVA) Regulations
(2010) at the two nominated S Stock
doorways can be achieved. This is the
equivalent platform length of approximately
29 metres. Compliance with GI/RT7016
Clauses 3. 1. 1 and 3. 2. 1 results in a
stepping distance both horizontally and
vertically greater than maximum permitted
offset set by the RVA Regulations (2010).
Platform copers elsewhere on Platform 1 at
Kew Gardens have been moved back in
places to accommodate S Stock. The
scope of introduction of S Stock by LUL
does not provide reasonable opportunity to
rebuild all of the existing platform. The
revised profile of the platforms will prevent
certain current stock (that is currently
permitted elsewhere on the network but not
on the Richmond Branch) and possibly
some future stock from achieving
compatibility to use this Branch if this is
requested by a Train Operating Company
(TOC) at some stage in the future. There
are designed special reduced clearances
following these RVAR platform modification
Due to it being notified as an National
Technical Rule (NTR) by the competent
authority in the UK, this standard has
become applicable to the project following
completion of the machine but prior to it
being Authorised into service. The design
of the machine is compliant to Issue 4 of
that have been excluded by issue 5 of
align it with the prevailing Euronorm EN 14
033 and demonstrating compliance with the
assessment. Therefore, complying with the
new standard at this late stage of the
project would require a huge amount of rework and incur an unfeasibly long delay.
To make signals compliant would require
significant changes to the layout and
position of all signals on the routes. It is not
considered reasonably practicable to make
compliant with the standard requirements
as the costs of moving signals and further
driver route knowledge outweighs any
safety benefit, and would delay roll out of
ERTMS and electrification on the route.
See attached Signalling Compliance
Approach Western Mainline Signalling
Renewal, and Tracker 11067 Supportive
Information.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
The flashing aspect sequence will reduce
28/02/2014
the risk of trains accelerating towards the
divergence after receiving a delayed aspect
release on the junction signal, as majority of
diverging trains will be signalled with the
flashing aspects rather than Main Aspect
Red (MAR). The SPAD risk from
anticipation on P468 is reduced. Flashing
aspects exist for a range of different turnout
speeds on this route, including lower
speeds, and driver route knowledge is
acceptable as the primary means of speed
control for this junction, which has little
potential for confusion with other junctions
in this area. Provision of PSWI with AWS
arrangement is considered to adequately
manage the over-speed risk at the junction,
and assist with driver route knowledge as to
what speed the flashing sequence relates.
Provision of MAY-FA can have an impact
on SPAD risk the signal after the junction.
Controls and TPWS have been provided in
line with current RGS to manage these
risks. In addition to the reduced SPAD and
derailing risk due to accelerating to excess
speed, the performance benefit of this
arrangement has been estimated at 90 s
when compared to current MAR
arrangements. Future S&C renewal is
The proposal is to make a portion of Kew
20/01/2013
Gardens Platform 1 on the Network Rail
Richmond Branch higher and closer to
trains than standard, in order to provide
level access to one particular type of rolling
stock using the branch - the new LU S
stock. Similar amendments to other
platforms on the branch will form a
subsequent derogation submission. The 29
m long level access portion is designed to
serve particular doors on the train,
matching similar raised platforms on other
stations the stock calls at. However, the
platform is used by both LUL and
conventional railway rolling stock, and the
design therefore retains compatibility to all
vehicles that are authorised to use the
branch. Group Standard GI/RT7016
requires offsets (in the plane of rail) of Y =
915 mm X = 730 mm for straight and level
track. The LUL RVAR Standard requires
offsets (in the plane of rail) of Y = 950 mm
X = 711 mm for straight and level track.
Along a 29 m length at Kew Gardens
Platform 1, localised platform coper
adjustments will be undertaken so that the
step from a S Stock to the platform is less
than 75 mm horizontally and 50 mm
vertically. The table below shows the
The machine will enter into service with the 27/11/2013
same level of compliance as all other ontrack machines in the UK as GM/RT2400
Issue 5 is not yet in force as a Railway
Group Standard.
N/A
13/12/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
N/A
Current
N/A
05/09/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
N/A
11/10/2013
Plasser UK Ltd
Rolling Stock
01/11/2013
Current
As there will be no change to the
20/03/2013
operational railway, maintaining the current
signal positions (and non-compliance) is
considered to have a minimal impact. As
detailed within Risk Assessment Report Reading Outer Re-signal and Immunise
(RORI) - Appendix C, each signal identified
by SDG Service Braking Model has been
reviewed and considered as part of the risk
assessment process in the development of
the scheme, and it has been concluded that
current signal position is acceptable. It is
not considered reasonably practicable to
make compliant with the standard
requirements as the costs of repositioning
signals and further driver route
knowledge/learning outweighs any safety
benefits of moving signals a few metres.
Speeds and Signals were reviewed as part
of the introduction of HSTs in the late
1970s. Revision of speed was considered
unnecessary and unacceptable from a
performance point of view. See attached
Signalling Compliance Approach Western
Mainline Signalling Renewal, section 3. 1
(Signal positions, spacing and sighting),
and Tracker 11067 Supportive Information.
N/A
01/02/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/02/2013
Current
Page86
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.16.2.2 b) and 6.2.3
and Trains
13-056-DGN
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4
and Trains
13-140-DEV
GIRT7016
Four
6.4.2, 7.2.1, 7.3.1
and Trains
13-092-DEV
GIRT7016
Four
8.1 b)
and Trains
13-078-DEV
Birkenhead North Station DDA Footbridge - As part of the DfT. National programme for
Island Platform lateral clearances and stair step-free disabled passenger DDA
widths.
Compliance, the "Access for All" initiative,
the project remit is to replace the existing
station footbridge, Structure Number
CWK2/8, at Birkenhead North Station,
which provides the only access to the island
platform 1 and 2. The proposed new
replacement footbridge will incorporate stepfree access to the platforms via DDA
compliant lifts, and also provide access to a
newly constructed car park adjacent to the
station. Working in partnership with DfT,
Network Rail, and Merseytravel PTE, the
local devolved concession organisation, it
has been mutually agreed that this project
is to be designed and delivered by
Merseyrail as a TOC delivered
enhancement scheme. Due to the very
limited width of the existing island platform,
and the constrained railway land footprint
available at this location, there is insufficient
space to meet the dimensional
requirements of (a) GI/RT7016 regarding
usable platform width, (b) the DfT CoP
regarding the width of the stair access to
the platform, (c) NR/SP/ELP/27228
regarding the dimensions of the lift car. In
respect of GI/RT7016, the new bridge will
Thirsk Station (Down Line) Platform Two This scheme is the result of an initiative led
Platform Recess.
by the Department of Transport (DfT) to
bring about the specification, design,
construction and entry into service of routes
to accommodate larger intermodal traffic
freight trains. W12 2nd Generation and
W6a lower sector gauges are required to
enable the movement of 9'6" high
containers on standard height wagons
without any operating or speed restrictions.
The platform alterations are a direct result
of a gauge improvement portfolio across a
number of projects to clear for W12 2nd
Generation and W6a lower sector gauges.
This deviation application applies to the
Down Platform (No. 2) Thirsk Station only,
and specifically non-compliance to the safe
recess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
have moderate effect on the recess. The
deviation application is required as Network
Rail does not plan to resolve the existing
non-compliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of Civils works,
to the existing coper positions, as well as
track work. Safe Recess (Clause 11. 1. 4,
Sub-clause 11. 1. 4. 1) The existing recess
"Z" will be affected by the proposed works,
but this effect is extremely limited. Overall,
the existing platform is mostly compliant
Apsley Station Platforms 2 and 3 - Suicide
London Midland is implementing a joint
Reduction Fencing and Reduced Platform
industry suicide prevention initiative at eight
Width.
of its stations on the West Coast Main Line
(WCML) to "fence-off" the fast line
platforms at the stations it operates on the
West Coast South route. The deviation
sought relates to platforms 2 and 3 at
Apsley Station. Platform 2/3 at Apsley is a
double-face platform. Platform 2 is on the
Up Fast Line, has an eight-car capacity,
and the line speed is 125 mph. Platform 3
is in the Down Slow Line, has a twelve-car
capacity, and the line speed is 100 mph. A
report was commissioned to identify and
make recommendations regarding any
safety issues that might arise out of the
proposals. It was identified that, due to the
existing platform dimensions at Apsley
Station, the erection of a fence on the island
platform (Platforms 2 and 3) effectively
divides the platform into two single-faced
platforms and converts an existing noncompliance with Clause 7. 3. 1 of
GI/RT7016 into a new non-compliance with
Clause 6. 4. 1 for the final 13. 5 metres
platform length at the southern end. A
workshop was held on 30/04/2013 to
consider the report referred to above and,
having considered the options set out in the
Shiplake Station Platform 1 - Driver
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors
Operation Only (DOO) mirrors headroom.
Scheme to renew the existing DOO Mirrors
at 34 Stations in the Thames Valley Area.
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
To ensure compliance major reconstruction
and remodelling of the station and related
track, signalling, telecoms, and third rail
traction power railway infrastructure would
need to be undertaken requiring an
investment of at least cÂœ8m- Âœ10m
over and above the level of funding
available for the core remitted footbridge
replacement and enhancement scheme.
The proposed footbridge stair width, and
width of the existing platform alongside the
new footbridge, will not be reduced relative
to the existing dimensions, and existing
signal sighting not adversely affected in
relation to present conditions. Line speeds
adjacent to the platform are relatively low
(Platform 1 - 15 mph, Platform 2 - 60 mph,
increasing from 35 mph just before the
station) and there is no regular booked
freight traffic over this route (freight speed
limits are 15 and 20 mph respectively). See
attached extract from Network Rail
Sectional Appendix within the Approval in
Principle Form 001 design submission
document, produced to Network Rail Form
001 template, referenced as Doc Ref:
NG8106/BIR Form 1 Date: February 2013,
appended to this application. The area of
reduced platform width alongside the
footbridge stair will only be used for access
to the front car of trains, and for access to
and from the proposed lift. Note: it may
be possible to place a three-car stop sign
west of the new footbridge, so the areas of
reduced platform width will only be used by
the extreme end doors and service door of a
discrete number of daily peak hours six-car
train services; however, this measure is not
Impact: The impact of the proposed
alternative solution is low, as it maintains or
betters the existing situation. The risk and
impact to the various stakeholders is
assessed in more details within the risk
assessment, Appendix D. The analysis has
taken into account the most frequently used
platform length. Most trains stop within this
length of platform; chainage 1005 m to
1150 m. Operationally, the station has a
total of 188,484 entries and exits per
annum, or 516 people per day (Office of
Rail Regulation (ORR) estimates).
Stepping distances have been considered
and there are minor changes (in many
cases improvements) as a result of the
platform alterations, which are supported by
the affected railway undertakings.
Rationale: Project Scope: In order to
achieve the objectives of the project, as
stated above, it is deemed to be
unreasonable for the project to incur such
alteration costs when the proposed
alternative works could be classed as a
platform modification. To correct the
existing non-compliances, the project would
incur significant additional costs. The
reduced recess of 270 mm, occurs on a
part of the platform within the section of
London Midland's proposals at Apsley
enable the implementation of a worthwhile
mitigation measure that will discourage
suicides. Although this location is not a
"hot-spot" for such events, the density of
traffic on the WCML is such that the impact
in terms of significant delays and
disruptions is proportionately greater than
most other routes on the GB Mainline
Railway. Suicides have an emotional
impact not just on the families affected, but
also seriously affect front line railway staff
involved in them, as well as those called to
deal with the immediate aftermath. London
Midland's proposals, for which this deviation
is being sought, allow the retention of the
existing operational capacity of the station
at Apsley, and also suitably mitigating the
impact of the proposed suicide reduction
fencing in the event that an emergency
evacuation is required of trains longer than
the operational capacity of platform 2 (eightcars). The erection of suicide reduction
fencing at Apsley provides an incidental but
significant safety benefit in discouraging
access to the fast line platforms during
"normal" operation, in an area of the
platforms where the combined platform
width presents an existing non-compliance.
No action has been taken as the existing
mirror has been in situ for at least 10 years
with no known problems.
10/06/2013
N/A
04/04/2013
Merseyrail Electrics 2002
Ltd
Infrastructure
08/05/2013
Current
15/05/2014
N/A
30/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
27/08/2013
N/A
21/06/2013
London and Birmingham
Railway Company
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
17/09/2013
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
Within the scope of the project, it would not
compliant solution at the station platform. It
is not deemed as a reasonable opportunity
to comply with the standard as the costs of
compliance would place unreasonable costs
on the project and industry. However, the
existing non-compliances. The cost of a
compliant solution (design and execution)
would be difficult to quantify; however, the
cost of simply building a compliant solution
would be circa Âœ1,000,000. This does not
take into account the possessions, waste,
compensation and additional service costs,
which could easily estimated to be circa
Âœ1,500,000. The cost of our alternative
non-compliant solution (design and
execution) is circa Âœ210,000.
Providing the minimum distance to the
platform edge of 3. 0 m required by
GI/RT7016 Clause 6. 4. 2 on the affected
section of platform 2 would involve
substantial re-engineering of both the track
layout and platform structures, not just of
Platforms 2/3 but also Platforms 1 and 4.
The costs of such re-engineering would be
grossly disproportionate to the benefits of
the proposed suicide reduction measures.
London Midland's proposed alternative
provisions substantially mitigate the risks
presented by the proposals, enabling the
realisation of the benefits of proposed
suicide reduction measures and therefore
an improvement in the overall level of
safety.
Shiplake Station Platform 1 (single line
railway between Twyford and Henley) - (2 x
mirrors). The existing mirrors on Platform 1
at CS 2/3 and CS 3/4/5 in the Twyford
direction were identified during the survey
that the height from the underside of the
mirror housing to platform level was less
than 2500 mm, which is below the
minimum requirement as stated in
GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1. It has been
confirmed that new mirrors cannot be raised
to achieve the minimum height clearance
whilst maintaining a compliant image.
CS2/3: The new mirror height is 2. 4 m
compared to the original mirror height of 2.
2 m; the mirror is 1650 mm from the
platform edge, thus erecting a barrier to the
edge of the mirror would force the
passengers close to the platform edge.
There are also two additional car stops on
the platform CS 4/5/6, plus CS 7 which is
used during the Henley Regatta week;
erecting a barrier would affect access to the
train doors. CS4/5/6: The new mirror
height is 2. 2 m compared to the original
mirror height of 1. 9 m; the mirror is 780
mm from the platform edge. There is also a
CS 7 which is used during the Henley
Regatta week, erecting a barrier would
Page87
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
13-150-DEV
Signals TEB1361 and TEB1363 in close
proximity to Berwick level crossing.
This application applies to signals TEB1361
and TEB1363 which will be positioned 8 m
and 5 m respectively from Berwick MCB
level crossing.
Placing new signal TEB1361 at 25 m from
the crossing is not possible due to the
presence of the station buildings and the
'Out of Hours' station exit. The first location
that TEB1361 could occupy is at 29 m from
the crossing - this would necessitate
moving the stopping position plus a
platform extension of circa 28 m, the total
cost being Âœ420,000. The position for
signal TEB1363 is designed to be in parallel
with TEB1361, and allows a three-car train
to stand between it and the stopping
position in the up direction. To enable
TEB1363 to be installed at 25 m from the
level crossing, the platform would have to
be extended by a similar amount to that
described for TEB1361 above and with a
similar cost. As an alternative to placing
TEB1361 in a compliant position,
configuring the signalling system to allow
movement authorities to pass the signal in
rear (TEB1359) only when the level
crossing is closed to road traffic was
considered. It was discounted as it would
delay trains approaching the station until
the crossing was closed, and increase the
crossing closure time affecting road users
adversely.
N/A
10/10/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/02/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Four
8.1 b)
and Trains
13-079-DEV
Wargrave Station Platform 1 - Driver Only
Operation (DOO) Mirror headroom.
Wargrave Station - The existing mirror on
Platform 1 was identified during the survey
that the mirror height from the underside of
the mirror housing to platform level is 1950
mm, which is below the minimum
requirement of 2500 mm as stated in
confirmed that a new mirror cannot be
raised to achieve the minimum height
clearance whilst maintaining a compliant
image. The new mirror height is 2440 mm
(which is better than the old mirror) and is
1900 mm from the platform edge. This is a
single line railway (Twyford to Henley); the
Mirror is in the Twyford direction, CS 2/3,
there is also CS 4/5/6 in the same direction
and an S CS in the Henley direction, thus
erecting a barrier to the edge of the mirror
would force the passengers quite close to
the platform edge, and also could affect the
access to train doors for trains stopping at
the other two-car stops. The mirror is 1900
mm from the platform edge thus erecting a
barrier to the edge of the mirror would force
the passengers quite close to the platform
edge, and also could affect the access to
train doors for trains stopping at the other
two-car stops.
The `Stowmarket Controls' are designed
27/02/2014
such that an overrunning train should only
reach the crossing after it has gone through
a full light sequence (i. e. 3s amber lights
followed by 5s red lights). In addition, the
barriers will be lowered at the end of the
light sequence, which is consistent with a
normal operating sequence; this is
primarily to ensure a consistent user
experience. The TSS loops provided at
signals TEB1361 and TEB1363 will mitigate
the start-away SPAD risk by virtue of
minimising the speed and distance of an
overrunning train starting from rest at the
station. In addition, on occupying the
replacing track section, the red road lights
will operate immediately in line with
standard controls. The Up direction car
stop marks will be located so that the driver
of a train reversing on signal TEB1363 will
have good sight of the signal. This signal
will only be used at times of perturbation
and not as part of normal timetabled
operation and, therefore, there will be
greater supervision of the move by the
signaller. The analysis of the proposed
arrangements and consideration of the
alternatives is detailed in document
reference RAR-NWR-119966-64195276
01/08/2013
mirror has been in situ for at least ten years
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
2.1.2
and Trains
13-118-DEV
It is not reasonably practical to comply with
the existing requirement in the current RGS
of not placing platforms on horizontal
curves with radii less than 1000 m.
Compliant track radii would require re
alignment of both the up and down lines.
This is considered not reasonably practical
due to: The upside would encroach on the
exclusion zone around the High Pressure
gas main. Northern Gas Networks have
indicated that they would formally object to
this proposal (see Appendix C). Relocating
the high pressure gas main would cost in
the region of 450k Pound Sterling; track realignment would be costly (estimated to be
in the region of Âœ500k Pound Sterling)
and cause disruption to the busy Caldervale
line between Bradford, Halifax, Manchester
Victoria and York to Blackpool services.
The total cost of diverting the gas main and
increasing the track radius to 1000 m
through the station would therefore be in the
region of Âœ950k Pound Sterling which
equates to an increase of 17% of the capital
cost of the station.
The impacts of the proposal to maintain
12/11/2013
track curvature would be: Safety of the
railway system: minimal as conductor
sight lines for four-car DMUs only would be
affected. It should be noted that a mixture
of two, three and four-car DMUs will serve
the station. Technical compatibility of the
railway system: No effective impact stepping distances are compliant with the
requirements of clause 3. 3. 1 of
GI/RT7016. The new station will not
prevent the planned line speed increases
(as part of the Northern Hub works) or
electrification in the future. In the event that
longer trains are required to stop at the
station in the future, selective door opening
could be deployed as a cost-effective
solution to eliminate the issue. Costs and
service performance: track and platform
curvature will have no effect on service
costs and performance. The impacts will
have no direct effect on Metro as a
Passenger Transport Executive. The
station, when built on the existing track
curvature, will impact on Network Rail's
infrastructure and has the support of the
Route Asset Manager Track. Please see
letter of support in Appendix A.
N/A
21/08/2013
West Yorkshire Passenger
Transport Executive,
Network Rail, Northern Rail
Limited
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2
and Trains
13-087-DEV
Proposed Low Moor New Station (New Up
The deviation applies to track curvature
and Down Side Platforms) - platform radius. through a proposed new station at Low
Moor situated on the railway between
Halifax and Bradford Interchange (ELR:
MRB) at 37 miles 650 yards. The proposed
new rail station is located at OS GRID Ref.
SE 164 283, immediately west of
Cleckheaton Road Bridge. Please see
Appendix B. The site is brownfield area and
comprises of rough ground lying between
New Works Road to the north and Ogden's
Yard to the south. There are two tracks (Up
and Down Main). The track alignment is
shown in Appendix B which shows (starting
at the low mileage end), the horizontal
alignment following a reverse curve into a
left hand curve with an existing radius of
between 730 m and 800 m where the
proposed platforms are situated. The
curved track alignment is constrained by a
tunnel at each end. The topographical
survey shows the existing cant peaks at 100
mm at CH165 and averages 80 mm
through the area of the proposed platforms.
The line speed is currently 55 mph. The
existing track consists of flat bottom rail
seated on concrete sleepers. There is no
overhead or 3rd rail electrification present
and no signal present within the vicinity of
Goring and Streatley platforms 2 and 3 140 m of 1. 4 m high grey galvanised
distance of fencing from platform edge.
fencing to restrict access to the main line
side of the island platform (platforms 2 and
3) at Goring and Streatley. There will be
four sliding gates within the fence to allow
access and egress where necessary
between the main lines and relief lines.
These gates can be left open in the rare
occasions where services need to call on
the main line platforms at the station and or
when the station is unmanned.
Twenty metres of fencing on Platform 3 will
be closer to the platform edge than the
standard dictates by virtue of being between
2300 mm and 2500 mm from the platform
edge where the adjacent line speed is 100
mph. For 18 m of the total 20 m, the fence
is also between 2400 mm and 3000 mm
from the main line Platform 2 where the line
speed is 125 mph. The main line platforms
are little used (normally used only during
diversions as a result of engineering work
on the Relief Lines) and the fence will
restrict public access to this side of the
platform when the main lines are not being
used by stopping services. Access to the
area of Platform 2 where clearance is less
than standard will therefore be minimal. On
both sides of the platform, there is sufficient
space for two and three car turbo units to
stop in the station without any of the doors
being in the 'derogation area', so passenger
access and egress into and out of this area
should be limited. For Class 180 and sixcar turbos, which also call at the station,
only one set of doors would open into the
area. The area of reduced width is at the
far end of the platform away from the
station footbridge and has no canopy, so is
not an area where people tend to dwell.
A fence is planned to be added along the
12/08/2013
island platform at Goring and Streatley
which serves the Down Relief and Up Main
Lines. The purpose of the fence is to
achieve a greater degree of physical
separation between the lightly used main
line platform face and the highly used relief
line platform face. There have been 66
fatalities at the 19 stations in the four-track
section between Paddington and Didcot
Parkway since 2006, the majority of which
involved a member of the public stepping
from the island platform into the passage of
a train on the adjacent main lines.
Providing the fence will make it less easy
for the public to access the main line side of
the fence (which is generally not used) and,
more importantly, make it visibly clearer
should someone access that side so that
preventative action can be taken. The
Country-End half of the station platform is
currently divided in a similar fashion by a 1
m high metal barrier, which is currently out
of compliance by the same amount as the
new fence will need to be, as it is being
replaced in the area of reduced width at the
country end of platform. Details of the
proposed new fence are as follows: The
total platform length is 154 m and the mid-
N/A
18/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
Page88
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2461
One
9.1
and On-Track Machines.
13-068-DGN
Railway Undertaking, RSSB Member
All Class 377/1, Class 377/2, Class 377/3,
Class 377/4 units.
There are no impacts with complying with
the current RGS requirement. This
deviation requests enhanced performance
which is non-compliant with the standard as
written, but consistent with the objectives of
the standard.
In the condition where the leading unit has 19/07/2013
a sand level of below 20%, sanding will be
enabled on both the leading and trailing
units. If the leading vehicle in either unit
detects wheel slide, sand will be dispensed
by that unit. If the leading vehicle detects
wheelspin, and the driver selects `Sand in
Traction', sand will be dispensed by that
unit. As such, both units will dispense sand
if both detect wheel slide and have sufficient
sand available. The likelihood of this
occurring is low, as the leading unit will
condition the railhead and so the trailing
unit is unlikely to experience wheel slide.
Wherever sand is applied, there will always
be at least eleven axles, and usually fifteen
axles, after the initial sand deposition point.
Therefore, it is considered that there is no
negative impact in terms of contamination
of the railhead, and so compatibility with the
railway system is unaffected.
N/A
03/05/2013
Selhurst Traincare Depot
Rolling Stock
24/05/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4
and Trains
13-129-DEV
on the project and industry. However, the
existing non-compliances. The cost of a
which could easily be estimated to be circa
30/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
One
2.2.1
Purposes
13-114-DEV
The impact of the proposed alternative
05/06/2014
solution is low, as it maintains or improves
the existing situation. The risk and impact
to the various stakeholders is assessed in
more details within the Risk Assessment,
Appendix D. The analysis has taken into to
account the most frequently used platform
length. Most trains stop within this length of
platform; chainage 1030 m to 1105 m.
Operationally, the station has a total of
574,596 entries and exits per annum or
1575 people per day (Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR) estimates). Stepping
distances have been assessed for relevant
rolling stock. In achieving a standard
platform offset (with tolerances) for 2. 6 m
wide containers, stepping distances have
increased. Class 14x units usually stop at
the straight section of platform where
stepping distances are not affected by
curvature. In order to achieve the
objectives of the project, as stated above, it
is deemed to be unreasonable for the
project to incur such alteration costs when
the proposed alternative works could be
classed as a platform modification. To
correct the existing non-compliances, the
project would incur significant additional
costs. Overall, the "safe space" dimension
N/A
01/11/2013
N/A
GMRT2132
Thornaby Station (Down Line) Platform Two This scheme is the result of an initiative led
- Platform Recess.
Down Platform (No. 2) at Thornaby Station
only, specifically non-compliance to the safe
recess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
have a negligible effect on the recess. The
deviation application is required as Network
Rail do not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of Civils works,
track work. The existing recess dimensions
range from 255 mm to 339 mm and are
mostly around 300 mm. The proposed
recess dimensions range from 277 mm to
396 mm and are improved in most cases.
Deviation against clause 2.2.1 of
Deviation for class 375/6 dual voltage units
GM/RT2132 to allow DC metering only on
to be metered on DC collection points only.
class 375/6 stock where AC equipment is
maintained and operational but not in use.
N/A
16/08/2013
Southeastern
Rolling Stock
04/10/2013
Current
GERT8035
Two
Clause 2.6.8.2
13-010-DGN
Derogation to GE/RT 8035 Issue 2 Automatic Warning System (AWS) for
Windhoff MPV on-track machines.
The TPWS/AWS installed on these
20/03/2013
machines would have the same
functionality as on all relevant self-propelled
Windhoff machines supplied to the UK. The
annual mileages covered by On-Track
Machines when transiting is significantly
lower than for locomotives and multiple
units. Almost all transit moves are
undertaken outside peak traffic hours. The
reliability of the current design of equipment
is extremely good and the lack of ability to
separately isolate AWS is not seen as
causing any significant increase in risk.
N/A
17/01/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Control Command and
Signalling
21/02/2013
Current
GMRT2473
Two
B6.1
13-236-DEV
Class 323 External Passenger Door Closing This deviation applies to all Class 323s
Forces.
operated by London Midland.
N/A
18/12/2013
Porterbrook Maintenance
Ltd
Rolling Stock
17/01/2014
Current
GERT8030
Four
Appendices F and H, and
All clauses
Requirements for Train Protection and
13-044-DGN
Use of TPWS equipment compliant with
GE/RT8030 Issue 2 for ten Class 70
locomotives.
The consequences of the higher door
30/01/2014
closing forces are discussed below, and
include a justification that the affect upon
passenger safety is acceptable. A history of
Class 323 passenger door safety: London
Midland record all accidents reported by
passengers, station staff or train crew, and
the information is held on a database.
London Midland has carried out a search
stretching back five years to establish how
many accidents have been attributed to
trapping in doors, and the events relating to
each accident. Since November 2008,
there have been 38 recorded accidents
involving people becoming trapped in the
passenger doors on London Midland's
Class 323 fleet. From the limited
information given in the `Comments' field in
the accident report, it is difficult to interpret
a clear picture of exactly what happened:
what were the sequence of events and what
were the causal factors with each accident.
The information consists mainly of
allegations and statements from
passengers. There is no evidence to
support or disclaim the events as recorded.
We do not know at what door position the
accident occurred. Therefore, it is prudent
not to form firm conclusions. Nevertheless,
The equipment is proven to be compatible 21/05/2013
with UK infrastructure and does not
introduce any new safety risks.
N/A
28/03/2013
GE Transportation
Control Command and
Signalling
18/04/2013
Current
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard clause
of GE/RT8035 Issue 2 as identified in 6b
above, for the following MPV vehicles:
Type 1 (SOPB): 99 70 9131 010 - 9 99 70
9131 013 - 3 99 70 9131 021 - 6 99 70
9131 022 - 4 99 70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2
(HOPB): 99 70 9131 001 - 8 99 70 9131
005 - 9 99 70 9131 006 - 7 99 70 9131 011 7. Type 5 (SORB): 99 70 9131 014 - 1.
Up to 10 (ten) new Class 70 locomotives to
be manufactured by GE prior to September
2014 for unspecified operators.
Metering the AC component of the vehicles
mentioned in part 7 would be of no benefit
as Southeastern do not use (or intend to
use) the AC equipment for energy collection
for the class 375/6 fleet.
TPWS equipment that is validated as
compliant with the requirements of
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 is not available. The
two suppliers of TPWS equipment are
developing and testing suitable equipment
but it will not be available during the
construction and delivery programme for
these machines. The functionality required
to achieve compliance with the
requirements of clause 2. 6. 8. 2 of
GE/RT8035 Issue 2 forms part of the new
generation TPWS equipment and is not
currently available. The impact of
complying with the current RGS
requirement would be to significantly delay
the project to introduce this type of machine
to the UK.
The deviation applies to the external
passenger door control system (specifically
the Electronic Door Control Unit, the
EDCU). Software variables within the
EDCU control a number of parameters,
including opening and closing forces. Each
pair of bi-parting passenger doors is
controlled by an individual EDCU. New
software (version F0) has been written and
is required to be installed to the EDCUs, to
replace the existing software (version E2).
The purpose of the new software is to
increase the door closing forces to
overcome problems with door failing to
close in service. As built, Class 323s were
fitted with an analogue type of door control
unit, referred to here as the Analogue
EDCU. The Analogue EDCU operated the
doors with closing forces in excess of the
maximum figures specified with
GM/RT2473 Issue 2. However, the door
system on these EMUs was not designed to
comply with this standard: Class 323s
were built in 1992 / 1993, and GM/RT2473
was introduced ten years later, in 2003.
Over time, the Analogue EDCU became
obsolete as more advanced electronic door
control systems were developed. In 2009,
the door equipment OEM, Faiveley,
Production of TPWS equipment that is
validated as being compliant with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 is not yet available.
The need to await availability is estimated
to add an additional four to six month delay
in project delivery and large costs of
integration design and installation. In
addition, this delay has major ramifications
due to the timescales imposed by other EU
Directives. The attached additional
explanation provides more details of this.
Page89
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4
and Trains
13-137-DEV
Moorthorpe Station (Down Line) Platform
Two - Platform Recess.
on the project and industry. The cost of a
Âœ2,500,000. The cost of Network Rail's
alternative non-compliant solution (design
and execution) is circa Âœ100,000.
30/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
13-149-DEV
Hampden Park level crossing.
12/03/2014
alternative solution is low, as it maintains
the existing situation. The risk and impact
to the various stakeholders is assessed in
more detail within the risk assessment,
Appendix D. The analysis has taken into
account the most frequently used platform
length. Most trains stop within this length of
Over this length, the recess overall is
improved. Operationally, the station has a
total of 200,258 entries and exits per annum
or 549 people per day (Office of Rail
Regulation estimates). Stepping distances
have been assessed for relevant rolling
stock. The stepping distances will remain in
the stepping triangle with a maximum
worsenment of 51 mm horizontal and 45
mm vertical. Where most trains stop, there
is a betterment of 28 mm horizontal and, in
most cases, less than 10 mm effect on
vertical. Rationale: In order to achieve the
objectives of the project as stated above, it
is deemed to be unreasonable for the
project to incur such alteration costs when
the proposed alternative works could be
classed as a platform modification. To
correct the existing non-compliances, the
project would incur significant additional
TPWS will achieve some mitigation against 27/02/2014
a potential overrun of the signal by at least
reducing the speed of an overrunning train
and, in some circumstances, will stop the
train before it reaches the crossing. It has
been selected in the absence of the other
available control measures being suitable
for the crossing, given its level of usage and
misuse. The analysis of the proposed
arrangements and consideration of the
alternatives is detailed in document
Version 3, "Hampden Park MCB Level
Crossing Renewal, Crossing and Signalling
Assessment".
N/A
GKRT0192
This scheme is the result of an initiative led
This deviation applies to the Down platform
(No. 2) Moorthorpe Station only.
Specifically, it is a non-compliance to the
safe recess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
have negligible effect on the existing recess.
The deviation is required as Network Rail
does not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of civils works
track work. The existing recess "Z" will be
affected by the proposed works, but this
effect is extremely limited. Overall, the
existing platform is 100% non-compliant
over its "usable" operational length; the
This application applies only to signal
TEB1378 which is proposed to be located
23 m from the crossing edge.
N/A
10/10/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
06/02/2014
Current
GMRT2400
Five
All clauses
Running Mode
Issue 5 for High Output OLE Construction
System (HOPS) Multi-Purpose Vehicles
(MPVs).
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard
GM/RT2400 Issue 5 for the following MPV
vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): Â· 99 70 9131
010 - 9 Â· 99 70 9131 013 - 3 Â· 99 70
9131 021 - 6 Â· 99 70 9131 022 - 4 Â· 99
70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2 (HOPB): Â· 99
70 9131 001 - 8 Â· 99 70 9131 005 - 9 Â·
99 70 9131 006 - 7 Â· 99 70 9131 011 - 7.
Type 3 (SNPB): Â· 99 70 9131 015 - 8 Â·
99 70 9131 018 - 2 Â· 99 70 9131 020 - 8
Type 4 (HNPB): Â· 99 70 9131 003 - 4.
Type 5 (SORB): Â· 99 70 9131 014 - 1.
The MPVs will be compliant with
16/01/2014
GM/RT2400 Issue 4, subject to the
deviations 12/160/DGN and 12/161/DGN
which have already been granted. Windhoff
Bahn does not perceive an inacceptable risk
since that what is demonstrated being in
compliance with the requirements of
GM/RT2400 Issue 4 until December 2013 is
also still valid after that date.
N/A
11/10/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Rolling Stock
01/11/2013
Current
GKRT0045
Two
2.2.1.10 and 2.2.1.11
Signals
13-015-DGN
Performance Category for Colour Light
Signals at London Bridge (Medium-Range
Signals).
Permit use of medium range colour light
signals for signals in the London Bridge
area. London Bridge re-signalled area
including all lines from stations: Charing
Cross/Cannon Street/Farringdon/London
Bridge Platforms 8-16, to stations:
Deptford, St Johns, Brockley and Queens
Road Peckham'.
The Department for Transport (DfT) plan to
publish an updated list of NTRs in midOctober 2013, which is expected to replace
GM/RT2400 Issue 4 by Issue 5.
GM/RT2400 Issue 5 was issued in
September 2013 but does not come into
force until 07/12/2013l; however, once the
DfT publish the updated National Technical
Rule (NTR) list, GM/RT2400 Issue 5 will
become the mandatory NTR and
compatibility and the open points in the
Technical Specifications for Interoperability
(TSIs) can no longer be satisfied by
compliance with GM/RT2400 Issue 4. The
HOPS project is already at an advanced
stage, with the first units already completed
and expected to arrive for commissioning in
the UK in early November. The design of
the machine is compliant to Issue 4 of
that have now been excluded by Issue 5 of
align it with the prevailing Euronorm EN
the Issue 5 would require a complete new
assessment and potentially design changes.
Therefore, complying with the new standard
at this late stage of the project would
Use of signals to Category 1 or 2 are not
the most appropriate solution at London
Bridge due to the risk of read-across and
read-through there.
The workshop recommended two types of 20/03/2013
signal: medium-range, narrow-beam and
medium-range, wide-beam. Note that
medium-range, wide-beam signals achieve
the same performance as conventional
filament lamp signals fitted with a
spreadlight lens, which have been in use for
a significant period. Medium-range, widebeam colour light signal: Â· 400 m,
performance, up to +/-10 degrees off axis
with a gradual reduction in intensity outside
of this range. Medium-range, narrow-beam
colour light signal: Â· 400 m, performance
up to +/- 3 degrees off axis with a sharp
drop in intensity outside this range. The
medium-range signals will be developed via
the product acceptance process and adhere
to Network Rail Standard `Product
Introduction and Change' NR/L2/RSE/100/05, Issue 1.
N/A
01/02/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
21/02/2013
Current
GMRT2461
One
9.1
13-180-DEV
Additional sanding devices on 11th axle as Class 700 trains.
permissible by TSI CCS (2012/88/EC) while
complying to the overall sanding rates as
defined by GM/RT2461.
Class 700 trains are eight-car and twelvecar units in fixed formation, consisting 20 m
cars. On Class 700, a first active sanding
device is placed in front of the third axle and
a second active sanding device is placed in
front of the eleventh axle in direction of
driving, whereas the above clause does not
allow a second active sanding on the train.
The recommended sanding rate
approaching, but not exceeding, 2kg/minute
per rail will be distributed and the maximum
quantity of sand dispensed will be compliant
to GM/RT2461. For operation in braking
mode, sand shall be delivered to the
railhead by the leading vehicle only for all
train formations (including multiple
formations), at a location forward of the
third axle and after the second axle, in the
direction of travel. There are different
concepts described in GM/RT2461 and the
Technical Specification for Interoperability
(TSI) Control Command and Signalling
(CCS) concerning the sanding rate and
amount of active sanding devices. The
Group Standard GM/RT2461 limits the
number of active sanding devices to one
device per unit and rail. It also
recommends a sanding rate approaching,
but not exceeding, 2kg/minute per rail. The
Safety of the railway system: The lower
28/01/2014
sanding rate recommended by the TSI CCS
insures that no signal devices are isolated
by a too high amount of sand. The second
active sanding device allows a more even
distribution of sand on the track will
therefore improve the performance during
low adhesion condition. Technical
compatibility: This solution is compliant to
TSI CCS.
N/A
01/11/2013
Rolling Stock
05/12/2013
Current
Signal TEB1378 would require a new
substructure which would necessitate works
on the platform and shortening the available
platform length to maintain the stopping
distance from the signal. To preserve the
operational length of the platform, it would
need to be extended, which would
necessitate relocation of the reversing
crossover at the south end of the station.
As an alternative to relocation of signal
TEB1378, configuring the signalling system
to only allow trains to pass the signal in rear
when the crossing has been closed to road
traffic was considered. It was discounted
as it would increase the crossing closure
time unacceptably.
Page90
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
8.1
and Trains
13-082-DEV
Midgham Station, Platform 2 - Driver Only
This issue is at Midgam Station, Platform 2.
Midgham Station, Platform 2, Car Stop S:
It was identified during the survey that the
existing Mirror height from the underside of
the Mirror housing to platform level was 2.
15 m, which is below the minimum
requirement of 2500 mm as stated in
GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1. The new mirror
was installed at a height of 2. 50 m.
However, during commissioning, Network
Rail could not get a compliant image at this
height, and the mirror was therefore lowered
until a compliant image could be viewed;
this was at a height of 2. 36 m (note this is
an improvement to the old mirror).
No action has been taken, as the existing
01/08/2013
at a height of 2. 15 m with no known
problems and the new mirror is an
improvement to the situation.
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4
and Trains
13-133-DEV
Dinsdale Station (Down Line) Platform Two - Seven Sisters Station / Platform 2
Platform Recess.
temporary hoarding only.
N/A
30/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1 and 7.4.1
and Trains
13-086-DEV
Stepping distances: Stepping distance
29/10/2013
analysis has been carried out for the
potentially affected trains. The worst case
stepping distance will be marginally
improved and the typical stepping distance
will be marginally worsened. The propose
platform edge position will be compliant in
terms of height and offset. Impact: The
impact of the proposed alternative solution
is low. The risk and impact to the various
stakeholders is assessed in more details
within the Risk Assessment, Appendix D.
The analysis has taken into to account the
most frequently used platform length. Most
trains stop within this length of platform;
chainage 1025 m to 1075 m. Operationally,
the station has a total of 28,378 entries and
exits per annum or 78 people per day
(Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) estimates).
Rationale: Project Scope: "This scheme
is the result of an initiative led by the
Department of Transport (DfT) to bring
about the specification, design, construction
and entry into service of routes to
accommodate larger intermodal traffic
Streatham Hill Station, Platform 2 extension Streatham Hill Station: Station platform - The proposed extension of 24 m will be 2. The Sussex Route Suburban Train
09/09/2013
(Down Slow line at Country end) - platform Platform 2 (Down Slow line at Country end). 5 m wide, except for a section of 4 m where Lengthening project seeks to increase
width.
Platform 2 is to be extended at the Country it will be 2425 mm due to the wall
passenger capacity over selected routes by
end. The proposed platform extension
alignment. The platform extension is on the increasing train lengths from eight to ten
works will maintain the existing track
country end of the Down Platform 2 and is cars. This requires platform extensions on
alignment. Due to the presence of an
24 m long affecting the front coach. The
the Slow Lines at a number of stations
existing retaining wall that supports a
exit to/from the platform is via a footbridge including Streatham Hill. Streatham Hill
cutting slope, it will not be possible to
where the stairs face London and
station comprises two platforms as follows:
comply with the minimum width
passengers movement from trains is
Platform 1 - Up Slow; Platform 2 - Down
requirements of Clause 7. 2. 1b of 2. 5 m
generally from the middle coaches of the
Slow. The main station entrance is located
and derogation from the Railway Group
train.
on a footbridge structure that abuts a road
Standard will be required.
over bridge at approximately the country
end of the station with inter platform access
via a footbridge staircase starting towards
the middle of the platform.
N/A
12/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
GERT8000-TS2
Three
3.3.2
Track Circuit Block Regulations
13-038-DGN
Permissive Working - National
National
MPVs are not currently listed as an
authorised vehicle permitted to operate
under 'Permissive Platform Arrangements'.
The current rules associated with the
operation of multi-purpose vehicles (MPVs)
prohibit them from being operated in
accordance with 'Permissive Platform
Arrangements'.
N/A
18/03/2013
Network Rail
Management
09/04/2013
Current
GMRT2132
One
2.2.6, 2.2.8 a) & b), 2.3.2,
2.3.5, 2.6.3, A1.1, A1.2 and Purposes
A1.3.
13-217-DEV
Class 357 Energy Metering
74 x Class 357 EMU Units (357001 - 046
and 357201 - 228).
The proposed energy metering system for
the class 357 Electrostar units utilises the
existing traction control electronics to
provide the measurements, with new
software to assimilate and record the data.
The RGS was written principally with
discrete meters in mind, and so some
features of the traction electronics cannot
exactly replicate the functions of a standalone meter. Some data assimilation
functions are stated as being completed onboard but must be completed off-board.
Removal and retesting of the Voltage
Measurement Transformer (VMT), Current
Measurement Transformer (CMT) and
electronics for the Energy Calculation
Function (ECF) would not be practical and
would be prohibitively expensive. The
deviation presents the technical argument,
test data and component accuracy for the
existing train components as an alternative.
All efforts have been made to ensure that
the solution complies with the standard but
this has not been possible for certain
clauses. The changes required to be fully
compliant would require hardware upgrade
and software change meaning the solution
would be prohibitively expensive, add
hardware and complexity to the train and
N/A
19/11/2013
c2c Rail Ltd
Rolling Stock
13/03/2014
Current
would be difficult to quantify, however the
This derogation is to enable MPVs to be
13/05/2013
included in the list of authorised vehicles
able to occupy a permissive platform line
(as per Rule Book Module TS2, Clause 3. 3.
2). Platform lines 1, 2, 3 ECS (MPV), 5, 9
and 0. Over the past three years, MPVs
have been operating under trial conditions
to allow MPVs fitted with CCTV cameras for
examinations of switches and crossings (S
and C); this approach reduces the need for
placing track workers at risk in complex
track areas if the optical camera train is not
utilised and inspections are undertaken on
foot. In addition to the CCTV MPV, other
MPVs have also (under trial conditions)
been allowed to occupy platforms under
'Permissive Platform Arrangements', in
order to allow greater flexibility in the
timetabling of MPVs for seasonal
preparedness. This flexibility allows more
track miles to be treated (Railhead), in turn
reducing the consequences of Poor
Railhead incidents including SPADs. A
permanent change in the Rule Book would
provide the benefits of these trials to be
appreciated across the industry. More
areas treated less risk of SPADs and station
overruns. Track inspections in complex
areas utilising the optical MPV removes the
None - Data for billing purposes is still
22/05/2014
available at the required accuracy and
frequency.
Page91
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8035
Two
2.8.5.1
13-004-DGN
11/01/2013
First / Keolis Transpennine
Express
Control Command and
Signalling
21/02/2013
Current
Three
Clause 5.7, bullet point 3.
Shunting
13-242-DEV
We know, from previous incident
20/03/2013
frequency, that the reduced
acknowledgement period increases the
likelihood of late AWS cancellations and
subsequent emergency stops. RSSB
research has shown that unnecessary AWS
interventions reduce driver confidence in the
system. Reducing the AWS
acknowledgement time means less time for
the driver to view and consider a fixed
signal aspect, or speed sign, etc. , before
acknowledging the warning. It is therefore
desirable to afford the maximum time to the
driver before cancelling the AWS enabling
greater assimilation of the signal / sign
being viewed. It should also be noted that,
at many signals on the West Coast Main
line, the prevailing distance from the AWS
magnet to the fixed signal exceeds the 180
metres laid out in GE/RT8035. The impact
of 2. 7 seconds, compared to the two
seconds, is mitigated by the additional
distance provided between these signals
and the AWS equipment. Furthermore
many signals and permanent speed
restrictions on the routes these units will
operate are fitted with TPWS to mitigate
any driver error on approach. Any marginal
increase in operational risk, should the
This proposed alternative will reduce the
21/02/2014
risk of ill health claims against FGW and
reduce the risk of injury to all colleagues
who operate on a depot. Safeguards have
been included in the proposed instructions
that, if any system is not in place, Shunter
to authorise the movement or depot
protection system not operating, the driver
will operate the horn as a warning before
restarting a movement into a shed or
building. Risk assessments undertaken
have indicated that the risk is categorised
as low, with the following controls in place:
Depot Protection Procedure (SMS-1875-00
SPM Depot Operating Instructions)
Production support / shunter on door of
shed Depot protection warning lights Depot
protection bell / siren sounded during
movements Personal track safety of all
colleagues operating in the area Track
awareness briefings for all colleagues
operating in the area Regular safety briefs.
N/A
GERT8000-SS2
AWS caution acknowledgment period for
The derogation being sought would apply to Experience has shown that the rate of
Class 350/4 operated by First Transpennine Class 350 / 4 EMUs operated by First
occurrence of late to cancel AWS/TPWS
Express
Transpennine Express.
incidents increases when the AWS
acknowledgement period is set at two
seconds. The response of the brakes is
almost instantaneous. It is now intended to
construct the new Class 35/4 EMU with a
maximum speed capability of 110 mph.
These units will be operated by First
Transpennine on the West Coast Mainline
from Manchester, Liverpool to Glasgow /
Edinburgh and return. The construction and
introduction of this fleet will increase
capacity on the afore-mentioned route,
furthermore allowing FTPE to cascade
Class 185s currently on this route to the
Transpennine route, again dramatically
enhancing capacity. Under the current
requirements of clause 2. 8. 5. 2
(GE/RT8035), it would be required to
introduce these units with a two second
AWS audible warning cancellation
timescale. This would introduce
inconsistency with the reset timescales of
the other FTPE traction fleets (others being
2. 7 seconds). This inconsistency will result
in late AWS cancellations occurring on the
Class 350/4 units in service. These late
cancellations will introduce safety risk and
Entering a shed or building - Non-sounding The deviation only applies across First
There have been concerns raised by Health
of the warning horn before restarting.
Great Western (FGW) depot buildings that and Safety representatives relating to
have depot protection systems in operation. shunters and fleet operatives being exposed
The deviation applies to the rule requiring
to high noise levels when drivers use the
the warning horn to be used as a warning
warning horn upon entering depot buildings.
before restarting and entering a shed or
Depot Operating Instructions require the
building.
Shunters to be at shed doors to: operate
depot protection and· authorise a train into
the shed. Operation of the warning horn is
to warn personnel in the area that a train is
entering the shed; this safety feature is
adequately covered by the shunter on the
door, verbally warning his colleagues in the
area and operation of the depot protection
system. The depot protection system gives
an audible and visual warning that
movements are taking place. It is believed
that sounding the warning horn, in addition
to the above requirements, introduces an
unnecessary hazard to shunters and fleet
colleagues, causing a risk of ill health
injuries.
N/A
20/12/2013
First Greater Western Ltd
Management
04/02/2014
Current
GMRT2466
Three
3.5.2
Railway Wheelsets
13-113-DEV
Railway Wheelsets
All wheelsets used on Network Rail
managed infrastructure that are of a
monobloc all steel construction with an
interference fit between wheel and axle.
N/A
15/08/2013
N/A
12/07/2013
Freightliner Ltd
Rolling Stock
02/08/2013
Current
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
13-029-DGN
Heyworth LC: Deficient position of signal
D856 relative to crossing.
Heyworth LC, ELR: ECM2, Mileage:
162m55ch, Linespeed: 125mph, D856 on
the Up Main controlled from Doncaster
PSB.
The standard mandates that electrical
testing is performed on all wheelsets in
accordance with applicable standards.
Introduction of this additional requirement
would entail the development of test
equipment and the revision of existing
maintenance instructions. The likely costs
involved are deemed to be disproportionate
to the benefits expected.
The project is remitted to renew Heyworth
LC from MCG to MCB-OD crossing type as
part of a scheme to reduce the number of
signal boxes in the LNE area. The existing
LC protecting signal D856 is in a noncompliant position 26 m from the Heyworth
LC. To comply would require D856 moving
by at least 24 m to a position 50 m from the
crossing. A move is technically possible,
but would introduce a certain degree of
unfamiliarity and additional route
learning/familiarisation that may introduce
risk, as drivers are familiar with the current
position of the signal. The estimated total
cost of Âœ215k is fairly high when compare
to alternative proposal and would worsen
the existing distance (844 m) to Barcroft LC
which this signal also protects.
The project is not affecting level crossing
31/05/2013
interface between train driver and crossing
from that which currently exists. D856 has
been in this non-compliant position for
many years with no known SPAD issues. If
the signal was at 50 m from the crossing,
the train would have to be travelling at 20
mph to give 5 seconds red road lights
before train arrives at the crossing. The
Stowmarket treadle is positioned such that
a train travelling up to 50 mph will still give
at least 5 seconds of red road lights before
train arrives at the crossing, thus improving
SPAD mitigation. Using statistical data
from the Signal Assessment Tool (SAT) the
probability of a SPAD travelling 50 m is only
7% less than travelling 26 m. This minor
increase in probability of the SPAD reaching
the crossing would only slightly improved
SPAD risk at the crossing if a compliant
signal position was provided. This
additional risk of a collision on the crossing
will be mitigated by longer warning times
provided by `Stowmarket' controls and
overrun treadles when train approaches at
red signal.
N/A
28/02/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
16/05/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1
and Trains
13-240-DEV
Mill Hill Broadway Station, Platform 3 reduced platform width at mid platform
fencing.
Platform 3, Mill Hill Broadway Station,
Station Road, Mill Hill, NW7 2JU.
Based on the drawings / details in
existence that reflect the proposed fencing
layouts at Mill Hill Broadway Station (copy
attached), full compliance is unachievable
and, therefore, in the absence of a deviation
being granted, then the scheme in its
entirety will be undeliverable. The severity /
impact at Mill Hill Broadway Station is
considered generally low, given the reduced
platform width affects the fast lines only and
there are currently no services whatsoever
"Stopping Off" whereby the
embarkation/disembarkation of passengers
would not be an issue, however
consideration by virtue of additional gated
access points along the lengths of the
general fence line could be incorporated at
cost within the scheme, to be used /
managed / policed only by the Train
Operating Company (TOC) / station
management staff under emergency
situations or engineering works and thereby
built into the Station Management Strategy
Plan.
To prevent suicides at 5No Stations on the 23/04/2014
East Midlands Route, namely: Hendon,
Radlett, Mill Hill Broadway, Cricklewood,
and Elstree and Borehamwood. The
proposed gated mid-platform fencing will
prevent access to the fast lines, which are
only used in times of engineering work or
disruption. The installation of fencing at
Purley and Harrow and Wealdstone (see
attached photos) has proved effective in
preventing suicides since their
commissioning in 2008/2010 respectively.
In order to maintain the majority width
(minimum 3 m) on the operational "Slow"
sides of the affected platforms at Mill Hill
Broadway Station (I. e. the platforms at
which the trains consistently stop to allow
passenger embarkation/disembarkation)
and in line with TOC / safety expectations
and "best linear fit" to fully consider evasion
of underground service or above ground
lighting, drainage channels, shelters, Driver
Only Operation (DOO) mirrors etc. , the
residual width of platform left adjacent the
"Fast" lines is reduced down to a noncompliant width, as can be seen on the
accompanying Drawing NopC1290-BCSDRG-CV-000301 Rev P01.
N/A
17/12/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
05/03/2014
Current
Scope
Nature and Degree
Page92
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
13-151-DEV
Havensmouth level crossing.
This application applies only to signal
Placing new signal TEB1429 at 25 m from
TEB1429 which is proposed to be located 4 the crossing is not possible as after
m from the crossing edge.
considering stopping positions, a platform
extension of 20 m at a cost of Âœ15,000
per linear metre would be required, and the
total cost of Âœ300,000 is considered too
high. Configuring the signalling system to
allow movement authorities to pass the
signal in rear (TEB1427) only when the level
crossing is closed to road traffic is
considered unacceptable due to the length
of travelling time from the signal to the
station combined with the platform dwell
time.
The `Stowmarket Controls' are designed
27/02/2014
such that an overrunning train should only
reach the crossing after it has gone through
a full light sequence (I. e. 3s amber lights
followed by 5s red lights). In line with
Network Rail standards, it is not proposed
to lower the barriers in conjunction with the
control. Havensmouth crossing is, due to
the road width, proposed to be a two-barrier
crossing and, therefore, automatically
lowering the barriers presents a risk of
trapping users. It is considered that the
infrequent application of the control and the
nature of the crossing use will mean that
operating the lights without lowering the
barriers is unlikely to create or compound
crossing misuse. The analysis of the
proposed arrangements and consideration
of the alternatives is detailed in document
Version 3, "Havensmouth MG Level
Crossing Renewal, Crossing and Signalling
Assessment".
N/A
10/10/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
31/10/2013
Current
GMRT2472
One
B5.2.1, B5.2.2, B5.2.3 and
B5.2.4.
Data Recorders on Trains - Design
Requirements
13-048-DGN
Derogation against event recorder crash
protection requirements in GM/RT2472
Issue 1.
The requirements set out in GM/RT2472
20/05/2013
Issue 1, Section B5. 2, are designed to
ensure that the stored data is retrievable
following physical damage as the result of a
crash. However, testing against the FRA
crashworthiness requirements has already
demonstrated that the integrity of the data
recorder is maintained whilst subjected to
the possible consequences of a crash.
Therefore, it is believed that the impact of
the use of the Wabtec TTX-IDR-03 data
recorder will be minimal. GE
Transportation's previous and extensive
experience with this model of data recorder
means that it has been possible to integrate
it into the design of the new locomotive in a
manner that offers the following benefits:
Â· the design and installation is already
proven on other locomotive designs; Â·
eliminates the risk of interference with other
train systems that a new data recorder
could introduce; Â· eliminates the risk of
design errors that integrating an unfamiliar
item of equipment could introduce; Â·
reduces design costs and testing
requirements for the installation.
N/A
28/03/2013
GE Transportation
Rolling Stock
19/04/2013
Current
GMRT2100
Five
6.5.2.2
13-117-DEV
Rail vehicle interior construction - loading
requirements for glazed elements.
Extension of derogation Ref. 08/191/DGN
In derogation Ref. 08/191/DGN (granted),
for up to twenty more Class 70 locomotives the use of a Wabtec Railway Electronics
manufactured and supplied by General
TTX-IDR-03 data recorder was proposed;
Electric in 2013-2014.
which, whilst it is currently in use
throughout the USA, has not undergone
testing against the crash protection
requirements set out in Section B5. 2 of
GM/RT2472. In order to establish its
suitability for use in the USA, the data
recorder has been tested and shown to be
compliant with the crashworthiness
requirements in the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) standard 49 FRA Part
229 - Locomotive Event Recorders: Final
Rule. A copy of the test report for the TTXIDR-03 data recorder is attached. In order
to demonstrate compliance with the crash
requirements of GM/RT2472, this model of
data recorder would have to undergo
testing, at a cost of approximately
Âœ59,400 (2009 figures). This cost is
made up of Âœ45,000 to undertake a full
suite of tests, and Âœ14,400 to purchase
nine data recorders on which to perform the
tests. Note that nine data recorders was the
quantity previously used to complete the
suite of tests against GM/RT2472 on the QTron data recorder. In addition, being
forced to fix RGS compliant OTMRs would
Hitachi Class 800 / 801 vehicles, to be used GM/RT2100 Section 6. 5. 2 is ambiguous
on Great Western and East Coast services. and open to interpretation, particularly the
use of the word "without failure" in the first
sentence of Section 6. 5. 2. 2. The
sentence states "Interior glazing shall
withstand without failure, the following
ultimate load cases". It is Hitachi's
contention that laminated glass may
perfectly well withstand the specified
ultimate static loads with the glass intact
and in position although it may be cracked
or crazed. This would not be the case if
toughened glass were to become cracked or
crazed. In these circumstances, a
toughened glass panel would form small
glass "dices" and lose any ability to contain
load or provide "containment" of passengers
or their luggage in impact conditions.
Hitachi intend to interpret the word "failure"
in these circumstances such that laminated
glass may be allowed to crack or craze
whilst the ultimate loads are applied or
removed, providing that the glazed panel
provides integrity, "containment" and
remains securely retained by its fixings.
Hitachi believes that the proposed deviation 27/11/2013
and interpretation complies with the aims of
the Railway Group Standard and does not
affect the safety of the railway system now
or in the future.
N/A
20/08/2013
Hitachi Rail Europe Ltd
Rolling Stock
01/11/2013
Current
GMRT2100
Five
6.2.1.2 and 6.2.4.1-3
13-156-DEV
Supply of seats for 20 new Class 350
Â· 10 x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Electric Multiple Units (EMU) to a preExpress Â· 10 x Class 350/4 for London
existing design in accordance with Siemens Midland.
Strategy for the Introduction of Additional
Vehicles to an Existing Design, 27/01/2012
Issue 1.
arising from the introduction of the revised
seat fixing arrangements of the alternative
seating arrangements.
N/A
10/10/2013
Siemens plc
Rolling Stock
01/11/2013
Current
Nature and Degree
This is an update to derogation
12/171/DGN (which has already been
granted against GM/RT2100 Issue 4) to
reflect that GM/RT2100 has been up-issued
to Issue 5 since the previous derogation
was granted. There have been no technical
changes to either the nature of the noncompliance or the requirements against
which the derogation is being sought.
Siemens are in the process of supplying of
twenty new four-car EMUs that, with the
exception of certain internal layout
differences and other minor changes, will be
identical to the existing Class 350/2
(`Desiro') EMUs presently operated by
London Midland. A strategy outlining
approach to be taken in the assessment of
the new units, including the methodology
and actions required to meet the approvals
requirements for the introduction of the new
EMUs of an existing design into passenger
service, has been approved by the Rolling
Stock Standards Committee at its meeting
held on 17/02/2012. The strategy requires
consideration of new standards and
changes to existing standards made in the
period between the introduction of the
original vehicles and the present. The
strategy and some particularly high risk (to
20/11/2013
Page93
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
Part 2, Clause 2.1.2
and Trains
13-175-DEV
London Bridge Station - Platforms 10 and
11, 12 and 13, 14 and 15 - platform
curvature.
This issue applies throughout London
Bridge Station (both High and Low Level).
For Platforms 14 and 15, the length of sub1000 m radius is approximately 165 m. For
Platforms 12 and 13, the length of sub-1000
m radius is approximately 160 m. For
Platforms 10 and 11, the length of sub-1000
m radius is approximately 25 m.
Within the Low Level platforms 14 and 15,
the designed radii will be between 700 and
704 m. There is a length of straight in front
of the new buffer stops at the London end
and a length of 1000 m/1004 m radius
curve at the country end. For Platforms 12
and 13, the radii are 750 and 753 m and,
again, there is a length of straight
(approximately 60 m) in front of the buffers
stops. Platforms 10 and 11 contain a short
length (circa 25 m) of 520 m radius at their
eastern end. Clear route analysis has been
run on Low Level tracks and platform
stepping distances have been confirmed as
acceptable for Low Level platforms. This
layout will be installed with new
components throughout incorporating track
lateral resistance measures where
necessary. The new platforms will be
designed to the proposed track alignment
design throughout. The proposed new track
and platform alignment is not significantly
different from the layout that exists today,
meaning that station personnel and
maintenance staff will be alert to the risks
associated with curved platforms. It is
believed that the current deviation delivers a
solution with minimum safety risk.
The physical constraints of the London
Bridge Station area and the requirement to
install 9No High Level platforms, 6No Low
Level platforms and a new station building
to accommodate twelve-car length trains
drives some platform lines to be designed
on radii that are tighter than the standard
requires. Refer to Track team derogation
application against NR/L2/TRK/2049 Ref
KO2-RS-DEV-029. Platform widths have
been designed to maximise pedestrian
access and egress for current and
anticipated passenger forecasts.
09/12/2013
N/A
29/10/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/11/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2
and Trains
13-124-DEV
Paddington Station realigned Platforms 12
and 14 - reduced platform width at column.
ELR: MLN1 Mileage: From 0m 0000y To The clearance to the Train Shed Column is
0m 0440y Paddington Station realigned
currently non-compliant and is unchanged.
Platforms 12 and 14.
All the dimensions are to be verified at
GRIP Stage 5. The design of the platform
modifications has been based on diverting
passengers away from the 2 m restriction at
the Train Shed Column. The length of the
restriction is not more than 5 m in length.
Supported by signage, the intent is for
passengers to only walk through the 2 m
restriction when alighting from the front
door of a train, when they will be protected
from the platform edge by the stationary
train. A much wider pedestrian route is
provided to the opposite side of the column,
significantly improving the existing situation.
The clearances from the proposed edge of
Platform 14 to the following existing
structures will be less than the 2500 mm
required by Railway Group Standard
GI/RT7016: Train Shed Column - 2. 00 m
proposed (2. 00 m existing).
04/12/2014
N/A
28/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/11/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
8.1 b)
and Trains
13-077-DEV
Cookham Station, Platform 1 (Marlow
direction) - Driver Only Operation (DOO)
Mirror headroom.
Project Ref. 118833 - Mirrors Scheme to
renew the existing DOO mirrors at 34
Stations in the Thames Valley Area. This
issue is at Cookham Station, Platform 1
(Marlow direction).
01/08/2013
mirror had been in situ for at least 10 years
with no known problems, and the new
mirror is an improvement in height.
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
GMRT2461
One
Clause 8.5 - System testing Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
facility Clause 9.1 - Delivery and On-Track Machines.
to the rail head Clause 9.3.1
- Braking mode.
13-011-DGN
N/A
15/01/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Rolling Stock
15/02/2013
Current
GORT3056-E
Two
E4.2
13-028-DGN
Operation of the test facility from the
20/03/2013
driving cab requires the driver to actuate the
test from the cab and then check that sand
has been discharged to the rail head.
However, this can be done as part of the
normal train preparation as is current
practice. The requirements of GM/RT2461
regarding sanding positions with regard to
wheelsets and sand deposition rates were
based on ensuring that the train applying
sand, and the train following the train
applying sand would be detected, I. e.
would operate track circuits. However, the
other key requirement is that the sanding
system is effective. In considering the
impact, the Project has reviewed the history
of the fitment of sanding systems to the
Class 142 DMU fleet (two-car MU with a
total of four axles). Extensive testing was
carried out to investigate the effect of
sanding with regards to track circuits for
these units. These tests supported the
derogation for these lightweight units with a
reduced number of wheel sets. The Project
has concluded that, under transit
arrangements, the impact of the MPV
design with sanding devices to the leading
wheel set at significantly increased axle
loads (20 tonnes), compared to the Class
01/03/2013
consequence and perishable goods. These
subject have taken place with all the main
Freightliner, Direct Rail Services, GBRf and
Colas. Due to a specific incident in 2012
involving high consequence goods, a new
N/A
17/01/2013
Network Rail
Management
05/02/2013
Current
Movement of Freight Trains
Cookham Station - The existing mirror on
Platform 1: it was identified during the
survey that the mirror height from the
underside of the mirror housing to platform
level is 2200 mm which was below the
minimum requirement of 2500 mm as
stated in GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1. The
mirror is 1250 mm from the platform edge,
thus erecting a barrier to the edge of the
mirror would block the access to the waiting
room and station exit.
Derogation to GM/RT 2461 Issue 1 This application is to permit nonThe MPV test facility is situated in the
Sanding system for Windhoff MPV on-track compliance with the RGS standard clauses drivers cab, not on the underframe, and the
machines.
of GM/RT2461 Issue 1 as identified in 6b
basis of the Network Rail High Output OLE
above, for the following MPV vehicles.
Construction System (HOPS) Project
Type 1 (SOPB): Â· 99 70 9131 010 - 9 Â· design is to utilise read-over (existing)
99 70 9131 013 - 3 Â· 99 70 9131 021 - 6
design systems and equipment that are
Â· 99 70 9131 022 - 4 Â· 99 70 9131 023 - proven in application wherever possible. To
2. Type 2 (HOPB): Â· 99 70 9131 001 - 8 comply with the standard will entail a
Â· 99 70 9131 005 - 9 Â· 99 70 9131 006 - number of design changes to be
7 Â· 99 70 9131 011 - 7 . Type 3 (SNPB): implemented, with no significant
Â· 99 70 9131 015 - 8 Â· 99 70 9131 018 - improvement in safety or functionality. The
2 Â· 99 70 9131 020 - 8. Type 4 (HNPB):
MPVs have four axles only. Two powered
Â· 99 70 9131 003 - 4.
axles are fitted to one bogie and two nonpowered axles are fitted to the other bogie.
The axles of the powered bogie are fitted
with sanding units outboard of each wheel.
The group standard was written to
accommodate conventional two-car units
with a total of eight axles. Without a
complete redesign and re-build of the
MPVs, it is not possible to comply with the
requirements of the standard. The stopping
distance under low adhesion conditions is
naturally lengthened, and it can get out of
driver's control, unless mitigations are
considered. The option not to fit sanding for
braking is therefore not acceptable. (See
also previous approved derogation
(11/137/DGN) which described two low
National.
permissible speed of the train and wagons.
priority (but not necessary a higher speed).
class 3, with a suitable route briefing pack,
the trains can be managed differently on the
network, and treat with higher priority where
allowed.
Page94
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GMRT2473
One
B6.1
13-040-DGN
Replacement header gear for Class 319
vehicle passenger door system.
As a result of both obsolescence and
reliability issues, Porterbrook Leasing
Company Ltd commissioned IFE Automatic
Door Systems (part of the Knorr-Bremse
Group) to redesign the passenger door
header gear for the class 319. The
deviation applies only to the door opening
and closing forces associated with this
redesign.
GMRT2466
Three
2.9.1
Railway Wheelsets
13-045-DGN
Derogation to use steel grade - ER9 for a
wheel material.
GMRT2307
One
4.6
Self contained electrical power supply
systems fitted to infrastructure support
vehicles
13-073-DEV
Use of voltages higher than Low Voltage
(LV).
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2
and Trains
13-089-DEV
Langley station, platforms 2 and 3 distance of fencing from platform edge
GERT8075
One
All clauses.
13-153-DEV
Advance stage deviation for AWS/TPWS on Plasser and Theurer 09-4x4/4S Tamping
Plasser 09-4x4/4S Tamper.
Machine Number 99 70 9128 001-3.
Nature and Degree
The redesign incorporates a new sliding
cylinder which actuates the opening and
closing of the doors; the function is
identical to the previous design with the
exception of the forces; both incorporate a
pushback system. The peak closing force
of the new sliding cylinder is 327N and the
peak opening force is 389N; the pushback
force is 128N. Whilst the closing and
opening forces of this cylinder is above the
stated 300N peak force, the pushback force
of 128N is within the specified 150N limit in
6c above; this would act to limit the
clamping force when the doors were shut
(or close to being shut). The redesign is an
improvement on the existing design where
the close force of the cylinder is 341N and
push back is 143N. The opening force has
remained the same at 389N. After
discussion with the current supplier of door
header gear, it was stated that, in order to
comply with group standards, we would
need to redesign the pneumatic system and
include a control module with an obstacle
detection system as well as changing the
door cylinder from the existing duplex
design to a conventional cushion type. This
would have added considerable extra
complexity to the door system with the
Extension of scope of derogation Ref.
To achieve derogation 09/037/DGN, the
09/037/DGN (which was to Issue 2 of this
project worked to GM/RT2466 Issue 2
standard) to include up to twenty more
(August 2008) and complied with the suite
Class 70 freight locomotives to be
of European Standards it identified. This
manufactured by GE Transportation in 2013- provided some degree of "future proofing" at
2014 for undisclosed operators, and to
that point in time for the design and, as a
cover Issue 3.
consequence, avoid both potential
difficulties with material sourcing for the
initial fleet and redesign work for any followon orders. The only material that is
approved in GM/RT2466 Issue 2 for the EN
suite of standards is ER8. However, the
project wishes to use ER9 because it has
similar performance characteristics to the
material AAR M-107 Class B, which GE
Transportation uses as their standard
material for this application. It also assists
GE Transportation in their development of a
common bogie for both the UK and
mainland Europe, as ER9 is an already
approved material in Europe. GE
Transportation wants to use ER9 for this
application for the production of the new
class 70 locomotives. GM/RT2466 Issue 2
does not permit a `mix and match' between
different suites of standards, therefore it is
not permissible to simply apply AAR M-107
Class B material whilst using EN
requirements for the remainder.
Applies to portable electrical tools used in
The size and capacity of the electrical tools
the ROBEL MMU vehicles and the electrical means it is not practical to power them
supply to power them. An MMU consists of using a RLV or ELV supply.
three semi-permanently coupled bogied
vehicles with a driving cab at each end.
168. 4 m of 1. 4 m high fencing grey
galvanised fencing to restrict access to the
main line side of the island platform
(platforms 2 and 3) at Langley; of this 168.
4 m, 11 m would be out of compliance and
is what the derogation relates to. There will
be four sliding gates within the fence to
allow access and egress where necessary
between the main lines and relief lines.
These gates can be left open in the rare
occasions where services need to call on
the main line platforms at the station and or
when the station is unmanned, such as
overnight.
The non-compliance lies solely on the main
line side of the platform (Platform 2) where
the clearance would be between 2300 mm
and 3000 mm for the first 11 m of the fence
line. As the staircase on the island platform
is already out of compliance with the
standard, the new fence will create an area
of 18 m in length, which will be between
2100 mm and 3000 mm from the platform
edge. The main line side of the island
platform is little used (normally used only
during diversions as a result of engineering
work on the Relief Lines) and the fence will
restrict public access to this side of the
platform when the main lines are not being
used by stopping services. Access to the
area where clearance is less than standard
will therefore be minimal. Sixty six fatalities
have occurred at the nineteen stations
between Paddington and Didcot Parkway
since 2006. The majority of these fatalities
involved a member of the public accessing
the main lines via the island platform. The
introduction of these fences has proved a
successful anti-fatality mitigation at
locations where they have been introduced
across the rail network to date and is
endorsed and supported by the National
Fatality Prevention Steering Group.
The application is for a project requiring
2011. The Department for Transport (DfT)
Interoperability help note on 'Dispensations
from Notified National Technical Rules' sets
out how an industry process can be used by
projects to obtain deviations from a national
rule. The process for obtaining deviations
from RGSs in accordance with the RGS
Code is recognised as an established
industry process in this context. Due to it
being notified as a Notified Technical Rule
(NTR) by the competent authority in the UK,
this standard has become applicable to the
project following completion of the machine
but prior to it being authorised into service.
The design of the machine incorporates
AWS/TPWS equipment which is compliant
to GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035
Issue 2 subject to deviations 12/176/DGN
and 12/177/DGN due to equipment
compliant to the standards current at the
time of construction not being available.
Complying with the new standard at this
late stage of the project would require
significant additional work and incur a
sizable delay.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
A cost benefit analysis has been
20/05/2013
undertaken to understand the order of
change required to reduce injuries as a
result of door trap incidents to ALARP. This
concluded that in the very worst case and
for a fifteen year remaining life of the
vehicles that there was no case to redesign
the doors. As such, the approach taken
was one to remove obsolescence issues
and use the synergy created to gain any
performance benefits of the change. There
is no impact to the railway system as a
result of the proposed change.
Implementing the new door header gear will
result in a system which is more compliant
to the current Railway Group Standard than
the existing design. It is expected that there
will be a reliability benefit from fitting the
new door header gear.
N/A
26/03/2013
First Capital Connect Ltd
Rolling Stock
19/04/2013
Current
The impacts will be minimal, since the
20/05/2013
performance characteristics of ER9 are
similar to R9T and AAR M-107 Class B,
both of which are, or have been, approved.
The rim and web mechanical characteristics
(including minimum rim hardness) have
some comparatively better properties when
using ER9 rather than ER8. ER9 is harder
than ER8 and has a higher Ultimate Tensile
Strength (UTS) and yield strength, and
therefore is more resistant to Rolling
Contact Fatigue (RCF) and wear.
N/A
28/03/2013
GE Transportation
Rolling Stock
19/04/2013
Current
There are no safety implications of using
04/09/2013
this alternative supply as it reflects modern
standard electrical practice in construction
sites. Additionally, this reflects common
practice in continental Europe on this type
of machine.
A fence is planned to be added along the
12/08/2013
island platform at Langley which serves the
down relief and up main lines. The purpose
of the fence is to achieve a greater degree
of physical separation between the lightly
used main line platform face (Platform 2)
and the highly used relief line platform
(Platform 3) because Langley is a suicide
`hot spot'. Langley station has witnessed
three fatalities in the past four years. The
majority of the 66 fatalities at the 19
stations in the four track section between
Paddington and Didcot Parkway which have
occurred since 2006 involved a member of
the public stepping from the island platform
into the passage of a train on the adjacent
main lines. Providing the fence will make it
less easy for the public to access the main
line side of the fence (which is generally not
used) and, more importantly, make it visibly
clearer should someone access that side,
so that preventative action can be taken.
Details of the proposed fence are as
follows: 157. 4 m of the fence line would
be within compliance11 m of would be new
fence would be out of compliance. The
fence would contain four sliding gates to
allow access and egress between the main
and relief sides of the island platform where
The machine will enter into service with
27/11/2013
AWS/TPWS equipment identical to that
fitted to the majority of rolling stock in the
UK as GE/RT8075 is not yet in force as a
Railway Group Standard and equipment
fully compliant to GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and
GE/RT8035 Issue 2 has only recently
become available.
N/A
05/06/2013
Plasser UK Ltd
Plant
15/08/2013
Current
N/A
18/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
N/A
10/10/2013
Plasser UK Ltd
Control Command and
Signalling
31/10/2013
Current
Page95
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
8.1 b)
and Trains
13-084-DEV
Didcot Station, Platform 5 - Driver Only
This issue is at Didcot Station, Platform 5.
Didcot Station - The existing mirror on
Platform 5 is canopy mounted and it was
identified during the survey that the mirror
height from the underside of the mirror
housing to platform level is 2. 20 m, which
is below the minimum requirement of 2500
mm as stated in GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1.
19/08/2013
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
GORT3440
Two
2.2.1.1 and 2.3.2.1
Steam Locomotive Operation
13-058-DEV
Steam locomotive operation (TOPS 9851)
Any operation of Class 8F steam
locomotive 48151 registered on TOPS as
98851 on Network Rail's managed
infrastructure.
This locomotive 48151 would have to be
restricted to a maximum permissible speed
of 35 mph to comply with Table A of
GO/RT3440 Issue 2. Historically, 48151
has operated on Network Rail's managed
infrastructure at speeds up to 50 mph, and
further journeys have been contracted by
West Coast Railways with Network Rail and
planned on this basis.
N/A
15/04/2013
West Coast Railway
Company
Management
21/05/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.3.1.1
and Trains
13-026-DGN
Lewes station, Down Siding - Equipment in
overrun risk zone.
Lewes station. The deviation applies to the
construction of a set of steps and
installation of a ticket vending machine
within the 20 m overrun from the buffer
stops to the down siding at Lewes Station
(as shown on drawings: 5437/02/06 and
5437/02/07). New access steps: Located
in Area A "High" risk zone. New Ticket
Vending Machine: Located in Area A
"High" risk zone. The Down Siding can only
be accessed by use of a Ground Frame and
there are very few movements that will be
approaching the buffer stops during normal
operating hours.
This deviation is to prevent a number of
11/06/2013
planned trains being cancelled, leading to
financial and reputational loss for the
industry with no identified safety benefit,
though if more of this type of locomotive
were to be permitted to operate, there
would, over time, be an increased risk of
damaged track causing derailment requiring
increased inspection and maintenance to
prevent it. A control in this case is therefore
the fact that only one locomotive is
involved.
The position of the gate line is dictated by
The existing layout is shown on drawing
12/03/2013
its position in relation to the existing over
5437/02/06. The risk weighting factor
bridge stairs (a minimum run off of six
(calculated using the methodology in
metres is required from the bottom of the
Appendix A of GI/GN7616 - Guidance on
stairs to avoid queuing up them) and also
Station Platform Geometry Issue One
the need for visibility for platform staff to
December 2010) is 81. 28. The proposed
dispatch trains. The position of the existing layout is shown on drawing 5437/02/07.
ramp and steps from the platform would
The risk weighting factor (calculated using
mean passengers exiting the gates would
the methodology in Appendix A of
have to make a 90 degree turn to exit the
GI/GN7616 - Guidance on Station Platform
station which would cause congestion on
Geometry Issue One December 2010) is 81.
both the ramp and platform and also
28. The analysis shows that the risk within
obscure the view for train dispatch.
the buffer stop overrun remains the same
and is unaffected by the proposals.
N/A
26/02/2013
Southern Railway
Infrastructure
06/03/2013
Current
GKRT0094
One
All clauses in GK/RT0094
Issue 1.
13-159-DEV
Advanced stage deviation to GK/RT0094
Issue 1 for High Output OLE Construction
System (HOPS) MPVs.
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard
GK/RT0094 Issue 1, for the following MPV
vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): Â· 99 70 9131
010 - 9 Â· 99 70 9131 013 - 3 Â· 99 70
9131 021 - 6 Â· 99 70 9131 022 - 4 Â· 99
70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2 (HOPB): Â· 99
70 9131 001 - 8 Â· 99 70 9131 005 - 9 Â·
99 70 9131 006 - 7 Â· 99 70 9131 011 - 7.
Type 5 (SORB): Â· 99 70 9131 014 - 1.
GERT8075
One
All requirements in
GERT8075 Issue 1.
13-152-DEV
Derogation for the manufacture and supply
of new Class 350 Electric Multiple Units
(EMU) with AWS/TPWS equipment
manufactured in accordance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue
2.
GIRT7016
Four
6.5.3
and Trains
13-123-DEV
Paddington Station Country end of
realigned Platform 12 - reduced platform
width.
publish an updated list of NTRs in midOctober 2013, which is expected to replace
GE/RT8080 Issue 1, GE/RT8081 Issue 1
and GE/RT8082 Issue 1, with GK/RT0094
Issue 1. GK/RT0094 Issue 1 was issued in
March 2013 and came into force in June
2013. Once DfT publish the updated
Notified Technical Rule (NTR) list,
GK/RT0094 Issue 1 will become the
mandatory NTR and the UK Global System
for Mobile communications for Railways
(GSM-R) requirements can no longer be
satisfied by compliance with GE/RT8080
Issue 1, GE/RT8081 Issue 1 and
GE/RT8082 Issue 1. The High Output
(OLE) Construction System (HOPS) project
commenced in late 2011 and the GSM-R
equipment was procured early in the
project. This equipment was procured
against GE/RT8080, GE/RT8081 and
GE/RT8082 and is the same as being fitted
under the Network Rail managed National
GSM-R project. The HOPs project is at an
advanced stage, with the first units already
completed and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in early
November. The design and assessment of
the GSM-R equipment for the HOPS Multi10 x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Express 10 x Class 350/4 for London
publish an updated list of NNTRs on
Midland.
11/10/2013, which is expected to replace
2, with GE/RT8075 Issue 1. GE/RT8075
Issue 1 was issued in September 2013 but
does not come into force until 07/12/2013.
This is after the date that the units are
expected to have been granted
authorisation by the Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR). GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and
GE/RT8035 Issue 2 will not be withdrawn
until 07/12/2013. However, once the DfT
publish the updated NNTR list, GE/RT8075
Issue 1 will become a mandatory NNTR and
the open points in the TSIs regarding
AWS/TPWS can no longer be satisfied by
compliance with GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and
GE/RT8035 Issue 2. The Class 350/3 and
350/4 project is already at an advanced
stage, with the first units already built and
expected to arrive for commissioning in the
UK in early November. A draft version of
the Technical File has already been
submitted to the ORR for review. The
design and assessment of the AWS/TPWS
equipment for the Class 350/3 and 350/4
fleets has been based on the requirements
of GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035
ELR: MLN1 Mileage: From 0m 0000y To The gantry column will be approximately
0m 0440y Paddington Station Country end 200 mm within the 2000 mm minimum
of realigned Platform 12.
required in the standard. There will be a
section of handrail over a length of platform
14 at the country end not longer than 5 m
and will taper from approximately 1800 mm
(at gantry column) to 1500 mm at top of
platform ramp.
standards.
18/12/2013
N/A
10/10/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Control Command and
Signalling
31/10/2013
Current
standards.
20/11/2013
N/A
10/10/2013
Siemens plc
Control Command and
Signalling
31/10/2013
Current
The remaining leg of Signal Gantry 1 will
02/12/2014
be 1. 80 m from the edge of Platform 14. It
is assumed that this column may be
considered to be 'isolated' and therefore
require a minimum 2000 mm clearance
from column to the platform edge as per
Railway Group Standard GI/RT7016.
Retaining the gantry for use as a cable
bridge, as well as enabling retention of
SN29, is preferable to installing a UTX in an
area where it would not be possible to
provide a position of safety for maintenance
staff.
N/A
28/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/11/2013
Current
Page96
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GERT8075
One
All clauses.
13-222-DEV
Derogation for the supply of AWS and
TPWS equipment fitted to new Class 377/7
Electric Multiple Units in accordance with
2.
Equipment fitted in each cab of 8 off fivecar Class 377/7 units, I. e. 16 AWS/TPWS
systems. This application is for a project
Regulations 2011.
The Department for Transport (DfT) have
published an updated list of Notified
National Technical Rules (NNTRs), which
now includes GE/RT8075 Issue 1, replacing
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 requirements for the
Train Protection and Warnings System
(TPWS) and GE/RT8035 Issue 2 Automatic
Warning System (AWS), as referenced in
the previously published list of NNTRs. The
Class 377/7 project is already at an
advanced stage of production, and with the
exception of elements dedicated to running
under OLE, the design is as close to
identical to the Class 377/6 units as is
feasible, in order to aid maintenance and
spares holding. Therefore, the design and
assessment of the AWS/TPWS equipment
has been based on the requirements of the
superseded standards. Consequentially, reassessment work would be required to
demonstrate compliance with GE/RT8075
Issue 1, and individual derogations sought if
non-compliances are to be found.
As compliance is being demonstrated in line 28/01/2014
with the standards applied on recent builds,
there are not expected to be any adverse
impacts.
N/A
05/12/2013
Control Command and
Signalling
09/01/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4
and Trains
13-142-DEV
Pegswood Station (Down Line) Platform
Two - Platform Recess.
would be circa Âœ800,000. This does not
which could easily estimated to be circa
30/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
Three
See details of RGS clauses Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
in Appendix 1.
13-009-DGN
N/A
17/01/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Rolling Stock
15/02/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
6.2.2
13-022-DGN
These MPVs will be compliant with the
(TSI) requirements, including the
Locomotive and Passenger TSI. In
addition, they will be compliant with all
applicable Notified National Technical Rules
(NNTRs) to cover open points and specific
cases, and ensure compatibility with the GB
mainline system. They will also operate off
trans-European Network (TEN) routes and
therefore the complete suite of RGSs is
applicable. Within these RGSs, there are a
significant number of requirements that are
not directly related to TSI open points,
specific cases or compatibility. These
requirements have equivalent or
comparable requirements within the suite of
TSIs, therefore compliance with these RGS
also possible that, due to the differences in
the detail of the requirements, conflicts
might exist that either prevent full
compliance with both the TSI and RGS
clauses, or necessitate a more complex
Elstree and Borehamwood station platform The lift shaft, lift machine room, and
For the installation of a new footbridge and
2-3 - reduced platform width at lift shaft and footbridge stair on Platform 2-3 at Elstree
lifts at Elstree and Borehamwood station
stairs
and Borehamwood station will have reduced following design iterations, a derogation
clearance on the Platform 2 side only.
against platform width is required. For
linespeeds less than 100 mph, the
minimum clear dimensions to the platform
edge to the nearest face of the building
structure shall be 2500 mm, only 2440 mm
will be provided over limited lengths. The
Access for All works at Elstree and
Borehamwood Station require the
installation of a new footbridge and lifts on
all platforms. The central island platform,
Platforms 2 and 3, are of limited width. If
the 3000 mm required clearance on
Platform 3 is provided, the clear platform
width on Platform 2 will be 2440 mm a
reduction of 60 mm below the requirements
of the standards.
The impact of the proposed alternative
08/04/2014
solution is low, as it maintains the existing
situation. The risk and impact to the
various stakeholders is assessed in more
details within the risk assessment, Appendix
D. The analysis has taken into to account
the most frequently used platform length.
Most trains stop within this length of
Operationally, the station has a total of
1,904 entries and exits per annum or five
people per day (Office of Rail Regulation
(ORR) estimates). Stepping distances have
been assessed for relevant rolling stock.
The stepping distances will remain in the
stepping triangle with a maximum
mm vertical. In some locations, stepping
distances will be improved by up to 42 mm
horizontal and 12 mm vertical. In order to
achieve the objectives of the project as
stated above, it is deemed to be
existing non-compliances, the project would
incur significant additional costs. Overall,
the "safe space" dimension between the
22/03/2013
control and safety and will also not require
any further ongoing actions or operational
constraints.
N/A
GMRT2000
This scheme is the result of an initiative led
Down Platform (No. 2) Pegswood Station
only and, specifically, non-compliance to
the safe recess ("Z"). In principle, the works
will have moderate effect on the recess.
The deviation application is required as
Network Rail does not plan to resolve the
existing non-compliance. The proposed
design comprises both an element of Civils
works, to the existing coper positions, as
well as track work. The existing recess "Z"
will be affected by the proposed works, but
this effect is extremely limited. Overall, the
existing platform has a 100% non-compliant
recess over its "usable" operational length;
Derogation to GM/RT2000 Issue 3 for the
Type 1 (SOPB): Â· 99 70 9131 010 - 9, Â·
MPVs of the Network Rail High Output OLE 99 70 9131 013 - 3, Â· 99 70 9131 021 - 6,
Construction System (HOPS)
Â· 99 70 9131 022 - 4, Â· 99 70 9131 023 2. Type 2 (HOPB): Â· 99 70 9131 001 - 8,
Â· 99 70 9131 005 - 9, Â· 99 70 9131 006 7, Â· 99 70 9131 011 - 7. Type 3 (SNPB):
Â· 99 70 9131 015 - 8, Â· 99 70 9131 018 2, Â· 99 70 9131 020 - 8 . Type 4 (HNPB):
Â· 99 70 9131 003 - 4. Type 5 (SORB): Â·
99 70 9131 014 - 1.
The action taken as previously described
22/03/2013
has been undertaken to try to achieve
compliance or minimise the effect of the
required derogation. Minor degree - A
reduction of 60 mm below the requirements
of NR/L2/TRK/2049 and GI/RT7016 will be
provided over a limited length of platform.
The reduction covers the 6 m length of the
lift shaft and LMR and approximately 5 m of
platform adjacent to the lower flight of the
stairs.
N/A
13/02/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/03/2013
Current
and Trains
Page97
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GIRT7016
Four
8.1 b)
and Trains
13-081-DEV
Shiplake Station Platform 1 - Driver
Operation Only (DOO) mirrors headroom.
12/09/2013
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
13-032-DGN
Balne Lowgate LC: Deficient position of
signal D862 relative to crossing.
Balne Lowgate LC, ELR: ECM2, Mileage:
165m22ch, Linespeed: 125mph, D862 on
the Up Main controlled from Doncaster
PSB.
Shiplake Station Platform 1 (single line
railway between Twyford and Henley) - (2 x
mirrors). The existing mirrors on Platform 1
at CS 2/3 and CS 3/4/5 in the Twyford
direction were identified during the survey
that the height from the underside of the
mirror housing to platform level was less
than 2500 mm, which is below the
minimum requirement as stated in
confirmed that new mirrors cannot be raised
to achieve the minimum height clearance
whilst maintaining a compliant image due to
obstruction by the canopy. CS2/3: The
new mirror height is 2. 4 compared to the
original mirror height of 2. 2 m; the mirror
is 1650 mm from the platform edge, thus
would force the passengers close to the
platform edge. There are also two
additional car stops on the platform CS
4/5/6, plus CS 7 which is used during the
Henley Regatta week; erecting a barrier
would affect access to the train doors.
CS4/5/6: The new mirror height is 2. 2 m
compared to the original mirror height of 1.
9 m; the mirror is 780 mm from the
platform edge. There is also a CS 7 which
is used during the Henley Regatta week,
The project is remitted to renew Balne
Lowgate LC from MCG to MCB-OD
crossing type as part of a scheme to reduce
the number of signal boxes in the LNE area.
The existing LC protecting signal D862 is in
a non-compliant position 23m from the
Balne Lowgate LC. To comply would
require D862 moving by at least 27m to a
position 50m from the crossing. A move is
technically possible, but would introduce a
certain degree of unfamiliarity and
additional route learning/familiarisation that
may introduce risk, as drivers are familiar
with the current position of the signal. The
estimated total cost of Âœ215k is fairly high
when compare to alternative proposal.
31/05/2013
from that which currently exists. D862 has
from the Signal Assessment Tool (SAT), the
red signal. Further information on impact
can be found in the supporting Risk
Assessments.
N/A
28/02/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
16/05/2013
Current
GERT8000-HB8
Two
2.2
IWA, COSS or PC blocking a line
13-065-DGN
Engineers' Possession Reminder (EPR)
Line Blockages
30/04/2013
Network Rail
Management
21/05/2013
Current
One
9.3.1
13-066-DGN
FGW 150 Step 2 Sanding
The use of EPR to provide additional
11/06/2013
protection is predicted to be possible
without introducing any significant new risks
or materially increasing the existing residual
risks associated with the four existing
methods of additional protection mandated
within the Rule Book. Furthermore, it
involves a minimal amount of procedural
change for the COSS, IWA and PC roles
and, in the case of signallers, they will be
utilising equipment and procedural
arrangements with which they are already
familiar for other purposes. The potential
benefits of using EPR by comparison with
other methods of additional protection have
been identified as follows: A reduction in
the number of ground staff required to work
on or near the line to provide protection. A
reduction in the time required to apply and
remove the protection because all the
resources necessary are located in close
proximity within the same signalling
location. This potentially increases the
number of line blockage opportunities
available for carrying out work that affects
the safety of the line. Removal of reliance
on signalling technicians who may not be
available to deal with line blockage
disconnections if called to deal with faults
There is a theoretical risk of a unit coming 03/06/2013
to rest on a quantity of sand that could
prevent the track circuit being shunted.
However, since the introduction of step 2
sanding, there have been no Wrong Side
Track Circuit Failure (WSTCF) attributed to
step 2 sanding on Class 150 (or any other
class operated by FGW with step 2
sanding). This monitoring has been
conducted with Network Rail's Regional
Fleet Engineer and Network Rail's Seasonal
Specialist. WSTCF has been reported for
other reasons, including rail head
contamination with sand deployed by
Mobile Operations Managers (MOMs), leaf
and cement from building works. These
other reports give confidence that this is
robust. These periodic meetings with
Network Rail will continue.
N/A
GMRT2461
National. Will apply anywhere on the
The derogation will apply to the use of
Network Rail managed infrastructure where Engineers' Possession Reminder (EPR) as
EPR is provided.
an alternative means of providing additional
protection for line blockages. In signalling
centre areas using Visual Display Units
(VDU) based signalling systems, modern
day axle counter train detection and working
under Track Circuit Block signalling
regulations. " The current rules concerning
line blockages mandate four methods of
additional protection: detonators,
disconnections, T-CODs, and tokens. In
signalling centre areas using axle counter
train detection and working under Track
Circuit Block signalling regulations, it is not
practicable to use T-CODs or tokens.
Moreover, with the introduction of clearer
line blockage rules in December 2010 and
Network Rail's continuing policy of
encouraging the use of line blockages in
preference to safe systems of work using
lookout warning, there has been a
significant increase in the number of line
blockage requests (between 25-135% on
EMCC workstations) which has highlighted
limitations with the other methods of
additional protection available. In the case
of disconnections, the average time for
completing the process between the
This deviation applies Class 150 vehicles
FGW 150 units have been operating with
operated by First Great Western (FGW).
Step 2 sanding from 2008, this provided the
Current fleet size is 78 fitted vehicles, and
Drivers with a consistent as provision of
this would apply to any future Class 150
sanding when compared to the Class 158
vehicles FGW may operate.
and 166 also operated by FGW. When the
classes 143 and 153 were fitted with
sanders, these were also configured to step
2 sanding as soon as reasonably
practicable (as authorised by11/137/DGN).
Sand provision in step 3 and emergency is
not compatible with the defensive driving
techniques practiced by FGW Drivers. All
FGW Diesel Multiple Unit (DMU) traction is
currently able to apply sand in brake step 2;
this consistency allows a driver to respond
with confidence to a low adhesion incident
and apply sand before an incident develops.
N/A
30/04/2013
First Great Western Limited Rolling Stock
24/05/2013
Current
Page98
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
GMRT2307
One
Clause 4.1.1 (99 70 9131
Self contained electrical power supply
010 - 9, 99 70 9131 008-3, systems fitted to infrastructure support
99 70 9131 009-1) Clause
vehicles
4.4 (99 70 9131 010 - 9, 99
70 9131 008-3, 99 70 9131
009-1) Clause 6.4 (all
vehicles quoted in Section
7) Clause 6.5 (all vehicles
quoted in Section 7) Clause
6.6 (all vehicles quoted in
Section 7)
13-215-DEV Revised 23-01- Derogation to GM/RT2307 Issue 1 for the
2014
MPVs and Wagons of the Network Rail
High Output OLE Construction System
(HOPS).
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4
and Trains
13-017-DGN
GMRT2483
One
C2.1C2.3.1Appendix 3
Tables 2, 3, 5, 7 and
10Appendix 4 Table 11
Visibility Requirements for Trains
13-093-DEV
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
13-030-DGN
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard clauses
above (RGS Clause), for the following:
MPV vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): Â· 99 70
9131 010 - 9. Type 3 (SNPB): Â· 99 70
9131 015 - 8 Â· 99 70 9131 020 - 8. Type 5
(SORB): Â· 99 70 9131 014 - 1. Wagons:
Type KFA re-certified as On-Track
machines: Â· 99 70 9131 008 - 3 Â· 99 70
9131 009 - 1 Â· 99 70 9131 019 - 0.
Nature and Degree
The MPVs and work modules being
delivered to the Project are based on
current in-service vehicles that provide the
functionality required. However, it is
acknowledged that the bonding criteria for
the three vehicles of the concrete
mixing/batching plant as well as specific
vehicle inter-connectors differ from those
defined in GM/RT2307 Issue 1. `Bonding
methods': Within HOPS, three vehicles are
equipped with concrete mixing/batching
plant modules. These modules are boughtin proprietary equipment which comply with
the EU Machinery Directive. The
comprehensive protection system provided
on each of these modules does not use an
RCD as required by the Standard. In
consequence and in contrast to the
generator applications of all other vehicles
within HOPS, the bonding method used on
these three vehicles does not feature a
three-phase a. c. with the star point
connected to the vehicle frame. Pilot
Protection (Inter-vehicle connection):
Within HOPS, two vehicle pairs and one
three-vehicle formation feature inter-vehicle
connections at a voltage of 110/230/400V
for work equipment fitted to the modules on
these permanently coupled vehicles. The
Selhurst Station - extension of platforms;
Selhurst Station is located approximately 9 Sussex Train Lengthening Project involves
reduced platform recess.
miles 31 chains from London. Equipment
the extension of platforms on the Sussex
involved: station platforms, bridge girders. suburban route (ELR: BTH2) to accept tencarriage length trains (from eight-carriages).
Selhurst Station is sited some 9 miles 31
chains from London. The useable length of
Platform 1 (Down Slow) is to be extended
on the London End by 26. 350 m and
Platform 2 (Up Slow) is to be extended by
43. 950 m to 203 m. This involves
extending the platform over a 20 m length
of the existing girders of an underline
bridge. It is not reasonably practicable to
provide a compliant solution: in order to
comply with all of the RGS requirements the
existing bridge decks forming Dagnall Park
underbridge VTB1 55A would require
reconstruction. The site is constrained by
the current track geometry and the current
railway corridor boundaries. The track
layout and geometry constraints to the
immediate north and south of the station
are carried by a series of arches and
underbridges on the North by Dagnall Park
Road Underbridge, and on the South by
A213 Selhurst Road Underbridge. It is only
possible to extend towards the North over
Dagnall Park Road Bridge. The proposed
platform extensions at these locations are
Use of TSI/EN Compliant Head, Marker and Use of Interoperable constituent head,
GM/RT2483 is not compatible with the
Tail Lights on GB non-TENs Routes.
marker and taillights compliant with the
requirements of the CR Loc and Pas TSI,
Conventional Rail Locomotive and
which contains clauses from EN 15153-1:
Passenger Technical Specification for
2013. Head, marker and taillights designed
Interoperability (CR Loc and Pas TSI) and to meet the requirements of the TSI (for
EN15153-1: 2013 on all applicable
running on GB TENs Routes) and EN
vehicles, when replacing headlamps fitted
15153-1 2013, certified as Interoperable
to both vehicle ends.
Constituents, do not comply with the
requirements of GM/RT2483. The previous
head lamp designs which comply with
GM/RT2483 are Tungsten Halogen Bulb
and High Intensity Discharge (HID)
technology. Continued compliance to
GM/RT2483 for head lamps would preclude
the use of LED head lamps which are being
specified for vehicles running on GB TENs
Routes. Continued compliance to
GM/RT2483 would preclude the use of
standard components already available
from a number of European Union (EU)
manufacturers. Cost, reliability
improvements and power savings from the
use of LED headlamps would not be
realised (supplied by BMAC): Tungsten
Halogen Bulb: 1000 hours life, 55w or 70w
power consumption dependant on fitment
HID: 6000 hours, 42w power consumption
LED Headlamp: 47393 hours life, 20w
power consumption. Costs for a light unit
Henwick Hall LC: Deficient position of signal Henwick Hall LC, ELR: TCW1, Mileage:
The project is remitted to renew Henwick
S878 relative to crossing.
172m20ch, Linespeed: 75 mph, S878 on Hall LC from MCG to MCB-OD crossing
the Up Selby controlled from Selby West
type as part of a scheme to reduce the
SB.
number of signal boxes in the LNE area.
The existing LC protecting signal S878 is in
a non-compliant position 26 m from the
Henwick Hall LC. To comply would require
S878 moving by at least 24 m to a position
50 m from the crossing. A move is
technically possible, but would introduce a
certain degree of unfamiliarity and
additional route learning/familiarisation that
may introduce risk, as drivers are familiar
with the current position of the signal. The
estimated total cost of Âœ215k is fairly high
when compare to alternative proposal.
Lead SC
Deviation Status
`Bonding methods': Vehicles 99 70 9131 16/01/2014
010-9, 99709131008-3 and 99709131009-1
are connected to each other electrically
using a protective conductor system (IT
system) in accordance with German
industry standard DIN VDE 0100-410: 200706; thus, RCDs are not required because
personnel protection is guaranteed by the
protective conductor system. In
consequence, it is considered that the risk
is controlled to As Low As Reasonably
Possible (ALARP) level and is equivalent or
better than would be the case if an RCD
based protection system had been fitted.
Pilot Protection (Inter-vehicle connection):
Due to the screwed connection, the
unintentional disconnection of the specific
inter-vehicle connectors is prevented and is
only undertaken by competent staff using
tools for the purpose. It is therefore
considered that the risks are controlled to
ALARP and are no greater than they would
have been had a pilot protection system
been fitted. The system and procedure
used is similar to previous derogations
01/265/DGN, rail grinders and 03/038/DGN,
track measuring machines.
N/A
14/11/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Plant
12/12/2014
Current
Low severity issue. Passengers waiting for 03/04/2013
trains in the morning peak spread out along
the platform. The station entrance is at the
opposite end of the platform, with the
waiting room and canopied area about half
way along. The maximum platform length
proposed to have non-compliant
recess/refuge provision is approximately 24
m. The maximum distance from a
compliant refuge will therefore be no greater
than approximately 12 m. The noncompliance is at the opposite end of the
platform from the station entrance, beyond
the waiting room and canopied area which
are about half way along.
N/A
13/02/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/03/2013
Current
Head, marker and tail lamps complying
14/08/2013
with the requirements CR Loc and Pas TSI
are required to be installed on new rolling
stock for operation on GB TENs routes, I. e.
the majority of higher speed lines including
West Coast Main Line (WCML), East Coast
Main Line (ECML), Midland Mainline (MML),
Great Western Main Line (GWML), etc.
The requirements of the CR Loc and Pas
TSI, EN 15153-1 2013 differ from
GM/RT2483 in the following respects: C2.
1 and C2. 3. 1 (c) and (d): The TSI EN
lighting arrangement of two lower head
lights with full/dimmed headlight differs
from the day time and night time headlight
arrangement specified in GM/RT2483.
Tables 2 and 5: The GM/RT2483
maximum day and night time headlight
luminosities in the vertical plane above 2
degrees up are not specified in the CR Loc
and Pas TSI or EN 15153-1 2013, and
therefore are not required parameters for
the TSI/EN headlights. Tables 3 and 7:
The minimum full and dimmed headlight
luminous intensities are only specified by
EN 15153-1 2013 over beam spread in the
horizontal plane, not above and below
horizontal as required by GM/RT2483. The
GM/RT2483 headlight colour is specified as
31/05/2013
from that which currently exists. S878 has
Assessments.
N/A
24/06/2013
First Greater Western Ltd,
Rolling Stock
All Train Operating
Companies operating on GB
non-TENs routes
02/08/2013
Current
N/A
28/02/2013
Network Rail
16/05/2013
Current
Control Command and
Signalling
Page99
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GKRT0094
One
3.20.1 and 7.1.1
13-035-DGN
GMRT2461
One
9.3.1
13-074-DEV
GKRT0044
One
5.3.2c, 5.3.2e, 5.3.3a
Occupied Line
13-051-DGN
Operational use of GSM-R Handheld as
Operational use of a GSM-R OPH in driving The impact of complying with current RGS
mitigation against a failed fixed GSM-R cab cabs as a mitigation measure against
requirements for the transportable radio
radio.
failure of the fixed cab mobile radio.
would be: Â· 3. 20. 1 - Full compliance
would result in a need for the CT3 number
of the existing fixed cab mobile radio to be
removed from the network by the TEC
before the OPH could be provisioned on the
network. This would negatively impact on
the speed of deployment of the equipment
and increase the risk of a negative impact
on performance. Also, in situations where a
maintainer is not readily available, the
programming of the CT3 number into the
OPH would need to be carried out by a
driver who, currently, is not trained to
undertake this function. This would be a
new procedure and may be prone to error
as the raw CT3 number need to be
understood by the driver; e. g. Cab A of
unit 323001 would be 31632300101. This
is considered an unnecessary complication
and likely to cause confusion. Â· 7. 1. 1 Full compliance would need an OPH to be
connected to the main GSM-R antenna of
the train. This would introduce a
disproportionately high cost against a
relatively small radio performance benefit
due to the costs involved in modification of
the train cab environment; additionally, this
Class 14x and 153 Sanding in Brake Step 1. Class 14x units are operated by: First
The sanders on Class 14x and 153 units
Great Western (8 class 143 units)Northern are outside the requirements of RGS
Rail (79 class 142, 23 class 144 units)Arriva GM/RT2461 and derogation 11/137/DGN
Trains Wales (15 class 142, 15 class 143
was approved to allow them to be fitted.
units). Class 153 units are operated by:
The deviation will be time limited trial and
Northern Rail (18 units)First Great Western run for two years from approval. Monitoring
(14 units) Arriva Trains Wales (8
during this time will be based upon pass/fail
units)Greater Anglia (7 units).
criteria that there will be no increase in
Wrong Side Track Circuit Failures (WSTCF)
in autumn directly attributable to step 1
sanding These units (except for a few Class
153 units which remain to be installed) were
fitted with sanders between 2011 and 2012.
The system is very similar to earlier sander
systems fitted to Class 15x units, except
that sand is applied ahead of the leading
axle. Sand can be initiated by the driver in
step 2 and 3 braking or is automatically
discharged in emergency. Because the
vehicles concerned do not have Wheel Slide
Protection (WSP), sand can be applied
irrespective of rail head conditions.
Additionally, sand can be activated by the
driver during traction when wheel slip
occurs. The system fitted to Class 14x and
153 units allows the driver to apply sand on
demand in the event of a deep slide in all
brake step positions. This change to the
sander logic was made in response to a
PN226(3C) and (4C) Route Controls PN226(3C) and (4C) - Lancaster South.
Permissive routes have been provided from
Lancaster South.
New call on routes on an existing signal.
PN226 signals into platforms 4 and 5. The
call-on routes have been requested by the
operator for consistency with existing route
(1C) to the Down Platform, for use as
contingency in time of perturbation.
Complying will lead to a fair amount of nonstandard design within the interlocking. As
the current interlocking is Westpac, it does
not support all the controls as standard and
will require the controls to be free wired to
meet requirement of the current RGS. This
non-standard design will lead to
inconsistency with other permissive routes
at Lancaster 232, 234, 235, 239, 240, 241,
242, 245, 248 and 249 signals. This
inconsistency would also introduce a
technical complexity and cost that is
considered disproportionate to the risk
being managed by the controls. Estimated
cost to provide fully compliant controls
would be in the order of Âœ330k (design
Âœ120k, installation and testing Âœ180k
(including materials), project costs Âœ30k).
GMRT2141
Three
D2
13-043-DGN
Dynamic modelling for the Class 70 dieselelectric locomotives, rather than testing on
Network Rail infrastructure.
Scope
Extension of derogation Ref. 09/160/DGN
to the manufacture and supply of up to
twenty more Class 70 diesel-electric
locomotives by GE Transportation in 20132014.
Nature and Degree
With consideration of the foregoing, the
08/07/2013
level of impact / risk is considered to lie
within acceptable bounds because: Â· 3.
20. 1 - The use of the OPH is expected to
be infrequent (see Appendix B) due to the
predicted reliability of the installed fixed cab
radio. Operational rules permit a train to
operate without a radio in some
circumstances. Therefore, it is safer and
has performance benefits to run with an
OPH than with no radio. Operational rules
and procedures for the use of the OPH will
be implemented across the Network
stipulating that the OPH should be CT2
registered if an OPH is to be used, therefore
reducing the risk of non-identification / miscommunication. Signallers will be fully
briefed on the operational use of OPH
radios by drivers. This includes the unique
engine number that the OPH will have, I. e.
000xxxA; therefore, highlighting the identity
in advance and, if necessary voice
protocols, will be used to establish the
identity of the caller. Â· 7. 1. 1 - To support
a case for the operational use of OPHs as a
mitigation measure for failure of a fixed cab
mobile using its own antenna, a number of
test runs using similar performing (2 watt)
handheld equipment and laptop data
In the same manner as set out in
25/09/2013
temporary non-compliances 11/184/TNC
and 11/185/TNC, is it proposed that each
TOC applicant, in conjunction with Network
Rail, monitor track circuits during the trial
period for the trial units. WSTCFs are
normally investigated and root causes
established, and it is proposed that existing
processes for WSTCF investigation are
utilised for the duration of the trial. The
objective is to gather sufficient evidence to
support an application for a permanent
derogation for brake step 1 sanding at the
end of the two year trial period. However, it
is considered that the likelihood of a
WSTCF caused by sand applied during
braking in step 1 on class 14x and 153 units
is extremely low because: No WSTCFs
caused by sand have been reported since
sanders were fitted to class 14x and 153
units. The trials undertaken at High
Marnham to support the derogation to fit
sanders showed that the likelihood of track
circuits not being shunted was low. Step 1
sanding is likely to be used early in the
braking curve, when the sand deposition
rate per meter of track is low. The risk of
WSTCF occurs when the train comes to a
rest on sand laid at low speed. If drivers
New permissive routes will be classified as 23/05/2013
Èmergency Use Only' (PP-X) in the section
appendix. This will limit the use of
permissive working, and only allow to be
used for contingency and not booked
moves. The principle is that provision for
emergency use is better than no route at all
or calling trains past a red signal.
Emergency (PP-X) use of the call-on routes
require the signaller to contact the driver
prior to setting, so mandating 5. 3. 3 a) by
procedure. This will be recorded as a
matter of course in box instruction that shall
also include instruction that 5. 3. 2 c) shall
be applied by signaller. Call-on moves
were assessed during the SORA process
(see SORA report Appendix F) where it was
agreed: "DA Representatives concluded
that these routes are only for contingency
use under the control of the signaller (better
to have a signalled move than calling past a
signal at stop) and no further mitigation
measures need to be put in place. " There
have been no reported incidents associated
with current controls in use at Lancaster.
Derogation 09/160/DGN was granted to
N/A
permit GE Transportation to use a validated
dynamic model of the class 70 locomotives,
in place of undertaking real UK on-track
tests. This was subsequently done, and the
Class 70s have been in service operation
with Freightliner since late 2009. It is now
requested to extend the derogation to cover
additional new class 70 locomotives which
GE Transportation will be building in 20132014, and to include issue 3 of GM/RT2141,
as the original derogation was granted
against issue 2. This will enable the 2009
modelling and assessment / scrutiny to be
re-used for the new locos, avoiding UK
based on-track ride testing.
20/05/2013
Lead SC
Deviation Status
N/A
11/03/2013
First ScotRail Ltd
Control Command and
Signalling
21/03/2013
Current
31/07/2014
05/06/2013
Arriva Trains Wales/Trenau Rolling Stock
Arriva Cymru Ltd, First
Greater Western Ltd,
Abellio Greater Anglia Ltd,
Northern Rail Ltd
28/06/2013
Current
N/A
28/03/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
18/04/2013
Current
N/A
28/03/2013
GE Transportation Ltd
Rolling Stock
19/04/2013
Current
Page100
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2149
Three
B10.2
13-179-DEV
Class 700 (Thameslink EMU) shoegear
height.
subclasses.
None, providing that structure clearance is
provided in accordance with
NR/GN/ELP/27010 5. 9 for a minimum
dynamic shoegear height of 25 mm ARL.
27/01/2014
N/A
01/11/2013
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
GMRT2000
Three
6.6.3 - Vehicles for heritage Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
or special services only6.8.6
- Vehicles for heritage or
special services only
Appendix H Requirement for
Engineering Acceptance of
non-compliant Vehicles for
limited use on heritage or
special service trains.
13-230-DEV
Derogation in accordance with GM/RT2000 The deviation applies to three battery
Clauses 6.6.3 for Tyne and Wear Battery
locomotives owned and operated by Tyne
Locomotives.
and Wear Metro, currently used for the
purposes of shunting Metro units around the
depot, and for rescuing in-service stranded
Metro units, for example due to Overhead
Line Electrification (OLE) failure. This
deviation is required to allow these
locomotives to run on the part of Network
Rail Infrastructure between Pelaw Metro
Junction and Sunderland, including Boldon
loop and Burdon Road sidings at
Sunderland, between Sunderland and South
Hylton, the Boldon to Port of Tyne branch
and the refuge off the main Sunderland line.
13/12/2013
SGS CORREL Rail Ltd on
behalf of, DB Regio Tyne
and Wear Ltd
Rolling Stock
17/01/2014
Current
Four
7.2.1
and Trains
13-224-DEV
Finchley Road and Frognal Station,
Platform 2 - reduced width of platform
extension.
The normal operating procedures for
02/04/2014
dealing with a failed Metro unit is for the
following unit to couple up and move it to
the depot. If this is not possible, for
example due to a failed OLE power supply
(e. g. lines down or power supply failure),
then they will need to be rescued by a
locomotive with an independent power
source. On most of the Tyne and Wear
system, this is conducted by these battery
locomotives that have a compatible
mechanical, electrical and pneumatic
coupling system. This deviation is being
requested such that this procedure can be
extended to the Network Rail infrastructure
as detailed in Section 7 above, if similar
circumstances were to occur here. The
battery locomotives are being used and
stored in the Tyne and Wear maintenance
facility at South Gosforth. They are being
maintained by the same trained staff and
under the same maintenance controls and
structure as the Metro stock. Certification
shall remain valid as long as the
maintenance procedures remain unchanged
within the scope of the certification (I. e.
maintenance to ensure the continued
compliance with Railway Group Standards),
at the same facility as the Metro stock, and
The provision of additional platform
13/02/2014
dispatch staff maintains the current safe
method of train dispatch and does not
materially affect the future operation of the
station. Extending the current train dispatch
arrangements to cater for five-car operation
will necessarily increase the OPEX costs for
the Station Operator, LOROL; these
additional costs are being accounted for in
the renegotiation of the current franchise
arrangements which will come into force
when five-car operations commence.
N/A
GIRT7016
This deviation relates to the Class 700
'Thameslink EMU' non-compliance with the
swept envelope for shoegear as defined in
Clause B10. 2 and Appendix B of
GM/RT2149. Complying with the
requirements by raising the shoegear height
would cause extremely poor contact
between the conductor rail and the
shoegear. It is important to note that, if the
shoegear is set higher in order to comply
with GM/RT2149, then the following risks
arise: The shoes will lose contact with the
third rail and thus prevent the Class 700
'Thameslink EMU' from being powered if
static, and cause unreliable operation if
moving. When moving the shoes would
periodically lose contact with the third rail,
which will cause significant arcing and the
electrical interference generated as a result
of this may give rise to signalling
compatibility issues. Drawing number
M59134-02-LT provides the assessment of
the shoegear against the swept envelope
defined in Appendix B of GM/RT2149. This
assessment includes: the maximum lateral
movement derived for Cases A and B
(defined in Clause B10. 2) for any vehicle
condition, vertical movements for any
relevant vehicle condition (I. e. load or wear
Clause 6. 6. 3 allows applications for
derogations for non-compliant vehicles with
an annual mileage not exceeding 15,000
miles to be submitted as a single request.
The battery locomotives were manufactured
in 1989. The requirement is for the
operating lines of these locomotives to be
extended to include the section of Network
Rail infrastructure used by Metro trains
between Pelaw Metro Junction and
Sunderland, and from Sunderland to South
Hylton in the event of an OLE failure, rather
than hiring locomotives. In addition,
various loops and sidings (see Section 7 Scope of deviation) may be required as
refuge for the failed train or as a potential
alternative route for dispatch of trains for
refurbishment. The cost of either procuring
a compliant shunter (which would be a
unique design as batteries are required for
running with no OLE in tunnels) or making
the existing shunters compliant would be
disproportionate to the occasional use for
which they would be required. Clause 6. 8.
6 and associated appendix give special
arrangements due to the special
circumstances of operating a heritage or
special service. It allows, under certain
circumstances, that a maintenance and an
The only method of complying with the
current RGS requirement would be to
introduce Automatic Selective Door
Opening at this location. Early consultation
with LOROL determined this was not a
preferred option as: Dwell times would
increase to an intolerable level and impact
on the service frequency and punctuality
Platform passenger flows would be
markedly affected, at the London end of the
platform Train evacuation times would not
be acceptable in the event of a fire. As the
use of ASDO did not have the support of
LOROL, the option was not pursued.
N/A
10/12/2013
London Overground
Capacity Improvement
Project
Infrastructure
07/01/2014
Current
GMRT2176
One
5.1
Air Quality and Lighting Environment for
Traincrew Inside Railway Vehicles
13-042-DGN
Extension of scope of derogation against
the requirement for cab fresh air flow.
N/A
28/03/2013
GE Transportation
Rolling Stock
19/04/2013
Current
The deviation applies to 16 m of the
proposed 20. 35 m platform extension (final
length to be developed in detailed design),
on the Up Line at the country end of
Platform 2 at Finchley Road and Frognal
station. Over the 16 m length there will be
a reduced platform width of 2025 mm
tapering to a compliant width. All relevant
Guidance Notes within GIGN7616 Issue 1
have been considered prior to the
submission of the deviation request. The
platform extension is required due to the
introduction of five-car Class 378 operations
on the London Overground network which
will commence on the North London Line in
2015. The extension is required as the
existing platform is only long enough for a
four-car CL378 unit. As part of the approval
in principle of the design, a gauging and
stepping analysis has been conducted and
Track Form A produced for this platform.
The Form A has been reviewed and signed
by the Network Rail Gauging Engineer and
Track RAM for Anglia and shows that there
is no worsening of the existing gauging and
stepping values at this location and that all
values are within the 'stepping triangle'
albeit towards the upper end of the range.
A copy of this report is included with this
This deviation application seeks to extend
the scope of derogation 09/213/DGN to the
manufacture and supply of twenty more
Class 70 locomotives by GE
Transportation.
Whilst the Class 70 locomotives are
No other impact identified.
normally driver only operated, the cab has
provision for a second man and is therefore
required to meet 120 m3 per hour. The air
flow testing conducted by GE
Transportation has concluded that the rate
of 120 m3 of fresh air per hour is only
achieved at speeds of 23 mph and above.
The measured air flow when stationary is
approx. 27 m3/hr and increases with speed.
In order to comply with this requirement,
GE Transportation will have to undertake
notable modifications to the HVAC system,
which will have a significant cost and
timescale impact on GE Transportation's
delivery targets. GE Transportation has
already delivered vehicle numbers 7000170030 to the UK market, which have been
in service without significant complaint
about this issue. Increasing air flow
through HVAC unit will also have knock-on
effects in terms of compliance with the cab
noise level limits in the Noise Technical
Specification for Interoperability (TSI),
which may further increase the suite of
modifications required. It may also cause
excessive draughts in the cab at higher
speed.
20/05/2013
Page101
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GMRT2100
Five
2.1.1.4, 2.1.2.1, 2.1.5.1c);
3.1.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1.1,
3.3.3.1a); 5.2.2, 5.3.2,
5.3.3.2, 5.3.3.3, 5.3.4;
6.5.2.1, 6.9.1.2.
13-155-DEV
Derogation for the manufacture and supply
of new Class 350 Electric Multiple Units
(EMU) with vehicle bodyshell structures,
bogies and glazing manufactured in
accordance with GM/RT2100 Issue 3.
Supply of 20 new four-car EMUs.
GMRT2130
Three
2.12.3.2 and 2.12.7
13-047-DGN
Derogation related to fire containment on
main engine.
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.3
and Trains
13-126-DEV
GMRT2100
Three
Sections 6,7,8,9,10 and 12. Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
13-046-DGN
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Siemens are in the process of supplying 20
new four-car EMUs that, with the exception
of certain internal layout differences and
other minor changes, will be identical to the
existing Class 350/2 (`Desiro') EMUs
operated by London Midland. The new
EMUs shall be operated by London Midland
(10 four-car units) and First Transpennine
Express (10 four-car units) along their
respective operational routes. Derogation
12/014/DGN has already been granted for
this project, against the same requirements
in GM/RT2100 Issue 4. Because
GM/RT2100 has been up-issued to Issue 5
since the previous derogation was granted,
Siemens need to up-issue this derogation to
meet the ORR requirement for authorisation
to place in to service against the latest
NNTR list. There are no changes to the
standards requirements that are the subject
Extension of derogation 09/186/DGN, to
The locomotive design is compliant to the
add up to an additional twenty new Class 70 fire detection and prevention requirements
locomotives, for use by unspecified
in the Loc+Pas TSI and SRT TSI, for a
operators (I. e. not just Freightliner as was diesel freight locomotive. Therefore, this is
the case for the initial locomotives 70001 - considered to fulfil the essential
70030). These will be built by GE
requirements in the Interoperability
Transportation in 2013-2014.
directive, in this regard. The risk is also
similar to that on the existing UK diesel
freight locomotive fleet. Compliance to the
clauses in the RGS would incur significant
redesign (e. g. increased thermal insulation
and sealing etc. of the engine cabinet), and
face practical difficulties, given the limit
space and weight available within the
existing loco design. Major redesign would
also invoke significant reassessment, on a
loco that is otherwise considered to be an
èxisting authorised design' within the
Loc+Pas TSI. Such changes would also
potentially have other knock-on effects, e. g.
increased heat within the engine cabinet.
The proposed new EMUs are mechanically 20/11/2013
similar to the existing Class 350/2 EMUs
operated by London Midland, which were
manufactured in 2008-2009 and were
proven to be demonstrably compliant with
GM/RT2100 Issue 3. Given that the Class
350/2 fleet is a relatively modern design and
the proposed additional vehicles will be very
similar to these vehicles, it can be
concluded that the introduction of the
additional trains on London Midland and
First Transpennine Express routes will not
introduce any adverse risks to third parties,
and the risks to passengers will be
comparable to existing trains. Siemens
confirm that they have not raised any
concerns regarding the structural integrity of
the Class 350/2 fleet currently in passenger
service. Please refer to `Supporting Paper
for LM TPE Class 350 Issue 1' for full
details.
N/A
10/10/2013
Siemens plc
Rolling Stock
01/11/2013
Current
For derogation 09/186/DGN, evidence was 20/05/2013
provided as to why GE Transportation
believes that there is no practical difference
between the fire risk management
philosophy currently accepted on the fleet of
over 450 Class 66/67 locomotives that are
already in operation in the UK and the
proposed arrangement on the Class 70
locomotive. See discussion paper attached
to derogation 09/186/DGN for further detail.
N/A
28/03/2013
GE Transportation
Rolling Stock
19/04/2013
Current
Richmond Station platforms 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Richmond Station platforms 4, 5, 6 and 7.
N/A
28/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
Derogation from GM/RT2100 to comply
with EN standards.
Fleet of heavy haul freight diesel-electric
locomotives to be manufactured and
supplied by General Electric (GE) in 2013
and 2014, to the maximum number of
twenty locomotives. This derogation is to
extend the scope of an existing derogation,
09/209/DGN, which originally gave
exemption to specific load cases and
requirements of GM/RT2100 Issue 3 for
thirty locos for Freightliner (applying EN
12663 and EN 15227 instead). The
requested extension is to cover up to a
further twenty class 70 locomotives, for
operation by unspecified operators.
Note there is an existing deviation
11/10/2013
(10/118/DGN) - for RVAR works the risks
and Mitigations are as follow: Cause
Consequences Mitigations Risk estimation
Platform Gradient out of regulation at RVAR
Hump - too shallow Not all RVAR door
areas are covered by canopy. Rain / water
does not run away to drainage. Ponding of
water when wet. Potential freezing. Slips
and falls on water / ice - Minor injuries. Fall
towards / into PTI Gap - Potential fatality
(normally minor injury). - Design for Kew
Gardens Platform 1 is within regulationsRichmond RVAR Hump design improves
the Platform Gradient closer to regulations
than current. Where not within regulation
the gradient is not expected to cause
significant ponding. - One third of
Richmond platforms RVAR areas are
covered by a canopy. - Gradients generally
fall away from platform edge / PTI gap.
Where the gradient is towards, the gradient
is improved on existing and is not
considered significant - NR approved nonslip surface, tactiles and nosing stones used
Better - Minor Platform Gradient out of
regulation at RVAR Hump - too steep Not
all RVAR door areas are covered by
canopy. Rain / water falls too fast into
The locomotive design is compliant with
20/05/2013
the structural crashworthiness requirements
of EN 15227 and the load cases of EN
12663, and consequently with anticipated
structural requirements of the Loc+Pas TSI
and GM/RT2100 Issue 5. If this derogation
request is granted, then GE Transportation
will be able to provide its prospective UK
operators with more Class 70 locomotives,
based on the design that is already in
service.
N/A
28/03/2013
GE Transportation
Rolling Stock
19/04/2013
Current
Existing situation: The cross falls gradient
of the existing Richmond platforms within
the area of the proposed Rail Vehicle
Accessibility Regulations (RVAR) works
already contravene Railway Group
Standards (they are not within limits 1: 20
to 1: 80) and are as follows: Platform 4 approximately 1: 85 to 1: 3000Platform 5 approximately 1: 45 to 1: 150Platform 6 approximately 1: 40 to 1: 1250Platform 7 approximately 1: 40 to 1: 210. Proposed
situation: To provide 'step-free' access at
platform level under RAVR, it is proposed to
adjust the coper height and offset for
Platforms 4, 5, 6 and 7 within the RVAR
area, and re-surface the platform area to
suit. As a result, the platforms cross fall
gradient change as follow: Platform 4 approximately 1: 110 to 1: 700 (nosing
height adjustment range from -31mm to 2mm, horizontal adjustment range from
23mm to 63mm)Platform 5 - approximately
1: 40 to 1: 150 (nosing height adjustment
range from -10mm to 2mm, horizontal
adjustment range from 47mm to
72mm)Platform 6 - approximately 1: 30 to
1: 110 (nosing height adjustment range
from 20mm to 35mm, horizontal adjustment
range from 30mm to 72mm)Platform 7 Whilst GM/RT2100 Issue 5 now includes
reference to EN 15227 and EN 12663, other
aspects are different to those applied in
2009 to the existing design, and the project
entity wishes to use the clause in Section 10
of GM/RT2100 Issue 5 which permits new
vehicles to be built to an existing authorised
design up June 2017. As the èxisting
design' had derogation 09/209/DGN applied
to it, it is considered appropriate to formally
extend that derogation to cover the new
locomotives. GE Transportation plans to
manufacture and supply more Class 70
locomotives based on the existing design
(existing design being for vehicle numbers
70001 - 70030). This existing design was
built with consideration to GM/RT2100
Issue 3 and was granted derogation
09/209/DGN. To comply with the latest
issue of the standard (GM/RT2100 Issue 5),
GE Transportation will need to significantly
modify the current design, and / or
undertake new testing (e. g. for windows
and windscreens, etc. ), leading to
significant additional costs and timescale
issues. This derogation request therefore
seeks the extension of the scope of the
existing derogation (09/209/DGN) on the
existing design for the manufacture of the
Page102
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
GMRT2130
Three
MPVs (Base vehicle,
including Open-line and InPossession cabs), Wagons
(In-Possession cabs on
wagons): Â· Clause 2.1
Vehicle fire performance
categories Â· Clause 2.2
General requirements
(except clause 2.2.4) Â·
Clause 2.3 Safeguarding
continued operation in the
event of fire Â· Clause 2.7
Equipment cubicles and
equipment cases Â· Clause
2.9 Material fire
performance categories and
selection Â· Clause 2.10
Layered materials and
assemblies (except clauses
2.10.6 & 2.10.7). MPVs &
Wagons (Working
equipment, including Work
Modules and Welfare
Modules): Â· All clauses.
13-013-DGN Revised 25-10- Derogation to GM/RT2130 Issue 3 for the
2013
(HOPS).
GIRT7016
Four
6.3.2.1
and Trains
13-019-DGN
Euston station platform 18 - reduced buffer
stop overrun risk zone
GORT3056-A
Two
A2.1
Introduction and Classification of Freight
Trains
13-027-DGN
National.
GKRT0045
Three
5.2.3.1
Signals
13-054-DGN
Flashing aspects for P468 signal at
Peterborough.
Signal 468 4(M) and 5(M) flashing aspects
routes, reading from the Up Fast to
Platform 2 or 3, controlled by Peterborough on P468. This control currently causes
PSB.
trains proceeding from the Up Fast to
Platform 2 or 3 to decelerate to P468 at red
before the aspect is released to proceed
over 1243 and 1242 points. The controls
currently have a risk of anticipation and that
required trains to accelerate towards the
points after the signal clears due to 1243
points being 700 m from P468 signal. Train
Operating Companies have raised these
issues from performance and safety
perspective, and requested the controls are
amended.
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
control and safety and will not require any
further ongoing actions or operational
constraints.
12/03/2013
N/A
28/01/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Rolling Stock
04/10/2013
Current
The unoccupied rooms behind the platform 26/04/2013
end wall have a zero weighting as per risk
assessment process outlined in
GC/RC5633 and GI/GN7616, and therefore
have zero impact on the risk assessment
process with regards risk of fatality to
passengers, staff and members of the
public (please see report attached).
Furthermore, the southern end of platform
18 is rarely frequented by members of the
public. The existing combined roof
support/OHLE column is the last column of
the trainshed roof. All the other columns
are within the derailment risk zone,
approximately 1. 5 m from the nearest rail.
Moving the buffer stop back by 11 m will
bring the second till last column out of the
overrun risk zone and into the derailment
risk zone and bring the last column from 17
m to 6 m behind the buffer stop face. The
proposed Buffer stop arrangement is
already in use on platforms 5 and 6 at
Euston with similar stopping tolerances.
The buffer stop will reduce the trains speed
by the same amount as the current buffer
stop arrangement within a reduced sliding
distance. The rooms behind the platform
end wall are unoccupied as detailed within
the reports attached. The southern end of
01/03/2013
permissible speed of the train and wagons. consequence and perishable goods. These
priority (but not necessary a higher speed). subject have taken place with all the main
class 3, with a suitable route briefing pack, Freightliner, Direct Rail Services, GBRf and
the trains can be managed differently on the Colas. Due to a specific incident in 2012
network, and treat with higher priority where involving high consequence goods, a new
allowed.
N/A
13/02/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
06/03/2013
Current
N/A
17/01/2013
Network Rail
Management
05/02/2013
Current
N/A
28/03/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
18/04/2013
Current
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard clauses
above (RGS clauses) for the following
vehicles. MPV vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB):
Â· 99 70 9131 010 - 9 Â· 99 70 9131 013 3 Â· 99 70 9131 021 - 6 Â· 99 70 9131 022 4 Â· 99 70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2 (HOPB):
Â· 99 70 9131 001 - 8 Â· 99 70 9131 005 9 Â· 99 70 9131 006 - 7 Â· 99 70 9131 011 7. Type 3 (SNPB): Â· 99 70 9131 015 - 8
Â· 99 70 9131 018 - 2 Â· 99 70 9131 020 8. Type 4 (HNPB): Â· 99 70 9131 003 - 4.
Type 5 (SORB): Â· 99 70 9131 014 - 1.
Wagons: Type KFA: Â· 99709131002-6
Â· 99709131004-2 Â· 99709131008-3 Â·
99709131009-1 Â· 99709131012-5 Â·
99709131016-6 Â· 99709131017-4 Â·
99709131019-0. Type JNA: Â· NLU
29024.
In travelling/transit mode, these MPVs will
be compliant with the Technical
Specifications for Interoperability (TSI)
requirements, including the Locomotive and
Passenger TSI. In addition, they will be
compliant with all applicable Notified
National Technical Rules (NNTRs) to cover
open points and specific cases, and ensure
compatibility with the GB mainline system
(Network Rail managed infrastructure).
GMRT2130 is a listed NNTR and the
application for derogation (12/167/DGN)
originally sought non-compliance with
Clause 2. 9. The current application has
been expanded to include additional clauses
as detailed in 6b above (Clause
requirements). Within GMRT2130 Issue 3,
there are a number of requirements that are
neither related to TSI Open points/Specific
cases nor compatibility with the GB system.
These requirements have comparable
requirements within the suite of TSIs,
therefore compliance with these RGS
Geographical scope is the southern end of
The project seeks to replace the existing
Euston platform 18. Existing platform 18
buffer stop and install the new unit 11 m
buffer stop and secondary units. Proposed closer to the terminal wall. This brings
new equipment is a Modular Sliding Friction existing structures, specifically some
Buffer Stop currently as used at Euston
unoccupied rooms, inside the overrun risk
platforms 5 and 6. Please refer to attached zone. It also brings an existing roof support
drawing Ref. BBRTS DWG No. 141977.
column closer to the buffer stop face.
Please see attached drawing B90308-DRGCIV0002 for details of the areas affected
and the attached reports. Our requirements
to become compliant, without a derogation,
would entail major station or track
restructuring. As part of the Grip 3 report, a
risk assessment has been carried out that
supports the proposal.
21/05/2013
divergence after receiving a delayed aspect
release on the junction signal, as majority of
diverging trains will be signalled with the
flashing aspects rather than MAR. The
SPAD risk from anticipation on P468 is
reduced. Flashing aspects exist for a range
of different turnout speeds on this route,
including lower speeds, and driver route
knowledge is acceptable as the primary
means of speed control for this junction,
which has little potential for confusion with
other junctions in this area. Provision of
PSWI with AWS arrangement is considered
to adequately manage the over-speed risk
at the junction, and assist with driver route
knowledge as to what speed the flashing
sequence relates. Provision of MAY-FA can
have an impact on SPAD risk the signal
after the junction. Controls and TPWS have
been provided in line with current RGS to
manage these risks. In addition to the
reduced SPAD and derailing risk due to
accelerating to excess speed, the
performance benefit of this arrangement
has been estimated at 90 s when compared
to current MAR arrangements. Future S&C
renewal is planned to include improvements
Page103
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GKRT0045
Three
5.2.3.1 (a)
Signals
13-053-DGN
Flashing aspects for HM567 on the Down
Main in the Mirfield East Junction area.
Junction signal HM567 flashing aspects
route over crossover 2071A/B. Down Main
in the Mirfield East Junction area on ELR:
MVN2, 31m50ch.
on HM567. This control currently causes
trains approaching with a diverging route
set to decelerate excessively before
accelerating over the points. The controls
currently have a risk of anticipation and
acceleration towards the next signal that
could be at red. The permissible speed
over the crossover of 60 mph is not used,
reducing performance.
N/A
28/03/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
18/04/2013
Current
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
13-031-DGN
Burn Lane LC: Deficient position of signal
S875 relative to crossing
Burn Lane LC, ELR: TCW1, Mileage:
170m70ch, Linespeed: 75mph, S875 on
the Dn Selby controlled from Selby West
SB.
The project is remitted to renew Burn Lane
LC from MCG to MCB-OD crossing type as
part of a scheme to reduce the number of
signal boxes in the LNE area. The existing
LC protecting signal S875 is in a noncompliant position 23 m from the Burn Lane
LC. To comply would require S875 moving
by at least 27 m to a position 50 m from the
crossing. A move is technically possible,
but would introduce a certain degree of
unfamiliarity and additional route
learning/familiarisation that may introduce
risk, as drivers are familiar with the current
position of the signal. The estimated total
cost of Âœ215k is fairly high when compare
to alternative proposal.
21/05/2013
next signal after receiving a delayed aspect
release on the junction signal, as the
majority of diverging trains will be signalled
with the flashing aspects rather than MAR.
The SPAD risk from anticipation on HM567
is reduced. Flashing aspects exist for a
range of different turnout speeds on this
route, including moderate speeds. Existing
linespeed on the approach to HM567 is only
5 mph below the lower limit of the
permissible speed approaching a
divergence of 40 mph or greater, as detailed
in table 23. The proposed use of flashing
aspects in this situation is compliant with
Network Rail Company standard
NR/L2/SIG/19609, Issue 1, section 10. 1.
1(e). Under MAY-FA, the driver will receive
earlier notification of a divergent route set
than under the existing MAR controls.
Therefore, the severity of the proposed noncompliance is minimal and driver route
knowledge is acceptable as the primary
means of speed control for this junction,
which is considered to have adequate
physical separation from other use of
flashing aspects on the route. Provision of
MAY-FA can have an impact on SPAD risk
31/05/2013
from that which currently exists. S875 has
the signal was at 50 m from the crossing
Assessments.
N/A
28/02/2013
Network Rail
Control Command and
Signalling
16/05/2013
Current
GERT8000-TS1
Seven
13.2.4
General Signalling Regulations
13-064-DGN
Engineers' Possession reminder (EPR) Line National. The deviation will apply
Blockages
anywhere on Network Rail managed
infrastructure where EPR is provided. The
deviation will apply to the use of Engineers'
Possession Reminder (EPR) as an
alternative means of providing additional
protection for line blockages. In signalling
centre areas using VDU based signalling
systems, modern day axle counter train
detection and working under Track Circuit
Block signalling regulations.
N/A
30/04/2013
Network Rail
Management
21/05/2013
Current
GORT3440
Two
2.2.2.1
Steam Locomotive Operation
13-059-DEV
Maximum Speed for Steam Locomotive
98466.
The use of EPR to provide additional
11/06/2013
protection is predicted to be possible
without introducing any significant new risks
or materially increasing the existing residual
risks associated with the four existing
methods of additional protection mandated
within the Rule Book. Furthermore, it
involves a minimal amount of procedural
change for the COSS, IWA and PC roles
and, in the case of signallers, they will be
utilising equipment and procedural
arrangements with which they are already
familiar for other purposes. The potential
benefits of using EPR by comparison with
other methods of additional protection have
been identified as follows: A reduction in
the number of ground staff required to work
on or near the line to provide protection A
reduction in the time required to apply and
remove the protection because all the
resources necessary are located in close
proximity within the same signalling
location. This potentially increases the
number of line blockage opportunities
available for carrying out work that affects
the safety of the line. Removal of reliance
on signalling technicians who may not be
available to deal with line blockage
disconnections if called to deal with faults
A maximum speed of 35 mph unduly limits 11/06/2013
the operation of this locomotive to very
restricted diagrams. The locomotive has
been registered for operation at RSL since
May 1996, having operated without incident
on NRCI on a number of occasions. The ex
BR (W) fleet of 210 locomotives of this
class frequently operated diagrams
requiring 50 mph maximum speeds in
passenger traffic with no records of
derailments due to poor riding. The
locomotive has undergone various
assessments in 2007: Â· Safety and
satisfactory performance completed on
02/11/2007 by an accredited Vehicle
Acceptance Body having been fitted with
TPWS and OTMR. Â· Since the locomotive
has been de-registered for some time, it
was subject to a trial run as required by
GM/RT2003 on 01/11/2007. Â· Assessed
for ride quality and braking performance,
and for maximum speed on 01/11/2007:
the tests carried out showed that brake
systems were functioning and performing
satisfactorily; the ride performance was
excellent at all speeds up to 50 mph. A
derogation has been granted (Ref.
07/093/DGN), accepting the locomotive for
operation at a maximum speed of 45 mph
N/A
15/04/2013
West Coast Railway
Company
Management
21/05/2013
Current
Any operation of Class 94xx Steam
Locomotive 9466 registered on TOPS as
98466 on Network Rail's managed
infrastructure.
Please note that this application is in
connection with previous temporary noncompliance Ref. 12/075/TNC (Tracker No.
10547). The current rules concerning line
blockages mandate four methods of
additional protection: detonators,
disconnections, T-CODs, and tokens. In
signalling centre areas using axle counter
train detection and working under Track
Circuit Block signalling regulations, it is not
practicable to use T-CODs or tokens.
Moreover, with the introduction of clearer
line blockage rules in December 2010 and
Network Rail's continuing policy of
encouraging the use of line blockages in
preference to safe systems of work using
lookout warning, there has been a
significant increase in the number of line
blockage requests (between 25-135% on
EMCC workstations) which has highlighted
limitations with the other methods of
additional protection available. In the case
of disconnections, the average time for
completing the process between the
signaller and signalling technician is 15
minutes and the process is vulnerable to
disruption or abandonment if the signalling
technician is called upon to attend to faults
and failures. Where detonators are used,
This locomotive 9466 would have to be
restricted to a maximum permissible speed
of 35 mph to comply with Table A of
GO/RT3440 Issue 2. Historically, 9466 has
operated on Network Rail's managed
infrastructure at speeds up to 45 mph, and
further journeys have been contracted by
West Coast Railways with Network Rail and
planned on this basis.
Page104
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Scope
GIRT7016
Four
2.1
and Trains
13-177-DEV
Installation of additional platform and track
at Whitby Station - platform curvature.
The Deviation relates to the re-instatement
of a station platform and associated track at
Whitby Station where the radius of the
curve will be less than 1000 m.
GERT8030
Four
Appendix F and Appendix H Requirements for Train Protection and
Warning System
13-012-DGN
TPWS enhanced functionality for three
Class 66 locomotives converted for use in
the UK.
GIRT7016
Four
3.1
and Trains
13-176-DEV
Richmond Platforms 4 to 7 - platform edge
position.
GMRT2130
Three
2.5.4b).
13-214-DEV
Derogation to GM/RT2130 Issue 03 for the
(HOPS).
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
At present, Whitby Station is a single track,
single platform terminus of the Network Rail
single line branch from Middlesbrough. The
NYMR service cannot meet demand nor
offer a full range of journey opportunities to
potential travellers unless the number of
services is increased. Funding for this work
has been obtained from national funding
agencies keen to stimulate the economy of
Whitby through the enhancement of tourist
related rail services into the North York
Moors National Park and from Network Rail
itself. To do this requires the
commissioning of a second platform and
options appraisals show that the only
meaningful option is the reinstatement of
the demolished part of the former Platform
2 in its original location. The rebuilt
platform will have a fractionally greater
radius compared with the existing Platform
1 currently used by all services. The
reinstated platform would normally be used
by NYMR trains but would be accessible to
other users. Northern Rail are the franchise
operator and will continue normally to use
Platform 1. Occasional charters (currently
around 2 - 3 per year) visit Whitby and may
use either platform depending on
circumstances. Northern Rail normally
Fitting of TPWS equipment to three Class
TPWS equipment that is validated as
66 locomotives, numbers 92 70 0066 747-1, compliant with the requirements of
92 70 0066 748-9 and 92 70 0066 749-7 to GE/RT8030 Issue 4 is not available. The
allow operation in the UK. It is proposed to two suppliers of TPWS equipment are
fit these three locomotives with TPWS
developing and testing suitable equipment
equipment compliant with Issue 2 of
but it will not be available during the
GE/RT8030.
conversion and delivery programme for
these three locomotives. The impact of
complying with the current RGS
requirement would be to delay significantly
the introduction to service of these three
locomotives, with a consequent effect upon
the ability of GB Railfreight to provide
traction for UK railfreight services. Were
the equipment available, a considerable
amount of design and re-engineering would
be required prior to fitment, particularly
within the cab area, leading to these three
locomotives having a significantly different
cab arrangement to the remainder of the
fleet in the UK.
The speed restriction over the reinstated
12/11/2013
terminal platform line will be 10 mph.
Trains entering the platform will have been
stopped at the end of the single line section,
to allow operation of the Ground Frame
controlled points. Trains leaving the station
will stop once clear of the loop again to
allow operation of the Ground Frame. The
end throw of the Mark 1 vehicles on the
inside of the curved platform will result in
the end doors being closer to the platform
edge. The centre doors of these vehicles
are permanently secured out of use. Train
despatch will be from the guard to driver
with assistance from other competent
persons with monitoring, sighting, and
relaying of hand signals as necessary. The
guard's location towards the rear of the
train, adjacent to the brake van, where the
platform curvature is greatest will ease
sighting distance. Northern Rail trains will
normally continue to use Platform 1, where
their vehicles are on the outside of the
curve, although occasional use of the new
platform is possible. The end doors on
Classes 153, 155, 156 and 158 units and
14x vehicles currently used by Northern Rail
will also be closer to the platform edge
through the curvature, while these vehicles
The TPWS equipment fitted to these three 20/03/2013
locomotives would be identical to that fitted
to the remainder of the fleet of Class 66
operated by GB Railfreight. The applicant
believes that the TPWS equipment is in fact
identical to all other Class 66s owned and
operated by other freight companies in the
UK. Given the number of occasions when
Class 66s are hired from one freight
operator to another, or when one FOC
driver drives another FOC's locomotive as
part of their normal duties, consistency
between locomotive fleets is important. As
these Class 66s will be operated as part of
a nationwide fleet, use of consistent TPWS
equipment minimise the risk of confusion
and errors, particularly in emergency
situations. A consistent TPWS MMI,
buttons and indicator lights is considered to
offer the clearest interface to drivers.
N/A
29/10/2013
North Yorkshire Moors
Railway Enterprises Plc
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
N/A
31/01/2013
GB Railfreight Ltd
Control Command and
Signalling
21/02/2013
Current
Richmond Platforms 4 - 7.
The proposal is to make a portion of
11/12/2013
Richmond Platforms 4-7 on the Network
Rail Richmond branch higher and closer to
trains than standard, in order to provide
level access to one particular type of rolling
stock using the Branch - the new LU S
stock. A similar amendment to Kew
Gardens Platform 1 on the branch was
approved in an earlier deviation submission.
The 29 m long level access portion is
designed to serve particular doors on the
train matching similar raised platforms on
other stations the stock calls at. However,
the platforms are used by both LU and
conventional railway rolling stock, and the
design therefore retains compatibility to all
vehicles that are authorised to use the
Branch. Railway Group Standard
GI/RT7016 requires offsets (in the plane of
rail) of Y = 915 mm X = 730 mm for straight
and level track. The LU RVAR standard
requires offsets (in the plane of rail) of Y =
950 mm X = 711 mm for straight and level
track. Along a 29 m length at Richmond
Platforms 4-7 localised platform coper
adjustments will be undertaken so that the
step from an S Stock to the platform is less
than 75 mm horizontally and 50 mm
vertically. The table below shows the
Although the cab floor fire barriers have not 07/02/2014
been demonstrated as compliant to
GM/RT2130 requirements, the risks to onboard staff are considered to be adequately
controlled because: Â· DIN 5510 fire
barriers are fitted (note it is not possible to
directly equate these to UK fire resistance
durations due to different nature of the
standards). Â· The fire sources directly
under the cabs are small - diesel cab
heaters only. Â· Self-monitoring fire
detection and suppression systems are
fitted. Â· Limited numbers of people on
board, and they are all trained staff. Â·
Train speed is limited to 60 mph, hence
train can be stopped in around 30 seconds.
Â· Direct communication is available
between all staff locations and the driver.
Â· Manual fire extinguishers are fitted to the
vehicles, which can be used if necessary.
Therefore, even in the unlikely event of a
failure of the fire detection/suppression
system, there will be sufficient time to stop
and evacuate the train before the floor
barrier is compromised.
N/A
29/10/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
13/11/2013
Current
N/A
14/11/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
With input from DfT and Disabled Persons
Transport Advisory Committee (DPTAC),
LU has assessed all of the 248 platforms
served by S Stock to see where through the
application of reasonable effort, compliance
with the RVAR (2010) at the two nominated
S Stock doorways can be achieved. This is
the equivalent platform length of
approximately 29 metres. Compliance with
Clause 4. 2. 3 of GI/RT7016 results in a
stepping distance both horizontally and
vertically greater than maximum permitted
offset set by the RVAR (2010). The
platform listed in Section 6 has heights
and/or offsets that largely do not comply
with the requirements of GI/RT7016 with
respect to height (915 mm) and offset (730
mm). All platforms have datum plates
fitted. Platform copers elsewhere on the
platform have been moved back to
accommodate S Stock. Under the platform
copers, cable brackets have been found to
infringe the lower sector structure gauge
(Figure 1 GC/RT5212) by up to 50 mm and
have been recessed into the platform wall
where necessary to accommodate S Stock.
S Stock has been designed to meet LU
Standard S1156 platform offset of 711 mm
and height of 950 mm. The scope of
This application is to permit nonThe Multi-Purpose Vehicles (MPVs) have
compliance with the RGS standard clauses been designed to be compliant with
above (RGS clauses), for the following.
(TSI) requirements, including the
MPV vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): Â· 99 70 Locomotive and Passenger TSI, and are
9131 010 - 9 Â· 99 70 9131 013 - 3 Â· 99
closely based on the existing MPV design
70 9131 021 - 6 Â· 99 70 9131 022 - 4, Â· which is EN 14033 compliant. This design
99 70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2 (HOPB): Â·
is based on fire performance in accordance
99 70 9131 001 - 8 Â· 99 70 9131 005 - 9
with DIN 5510-2. Changes to the cab
Â· 99 70 9131 006 - 7 Â· 99 70 9131 011 - design to meet full GM/RT2130 compliance
7. Type 3 (SNPB): Â· 99 70 9131 015 - 8 would invalidate the previously assessed
Â· 99 70 9131 018 - 2 Â· 99 70 9131 020 - design, not only with respect to fire safety
8. Type 4 (HNPB): Â· 99 70 9131 003 - 4. but also other requirements. It is
Type 5 (SORB): Â· 99 70 9131 014 - 1.
considered that using the current design, as
Wagons: Â· KFA 99709131019-0. This
detailed below, is adequate to control the
risks and that the significant additional work
to achieve full GM/RT2130 compliance is
the Railways (Interoperability) Regulations not beneficial. This principle is consistent
2011.
with the previously granted deviation,
13/013/DGN, which permits use of DIN
5510-2 for fire properties of materials.
Page105
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GIRT7016
Four
11.1.4
and Trains
13-136-DEV
GIRT7016
Four
8.1 b)
and Trains
13-076-DEV
Moorthorpe Station (UP Line) Platform One - This scheme is the result of an initiative led
Platform Recess.
This deviation applies to the Up Platform
(No. 1) Moorthorpe Station only.
Specifically, it is a non-compliance to the
safe recess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
have negligible effect on the existing recess.
The deviation is required as Network Rail
does not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of civils works,
track work. The existing recess "Z" will be
affected by the proposed works, but this
effect is extremely limited. Overall, the
existing platform has a compliant recess of
13% over its "usable" operational length;
Newbury station, platform 1- Driver
Operation Only (DOO) Mirror headroom.
This issue is at Newbury station, Platform 1.
GMRT2161
One
6.1.1 & 6.2.6
Vehicles
13-085-DEV
Deviation for windscreen wiper swept area
on Class 70 locomotive.
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1
and Trains
13-225-DEV
South Acton Station, Platform 1 - reduced
width of platform extension.
Scope
All Class 70 locomotives.
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Âœ2,500,000. The cost of Network Rail's
alternative non-compliant solution (design
and execution) is circa Âœ100,000.
12/03/2014
alternative solution is low, as it essentially
maintains the existing situation. The risk
and impact to the various stakeholders is
assessed in more details within the Risk
Assessment, Appendix D of the
supplementary information. The analysis
has taken into account the most frequently
used platform length. Most trains stop
within this length of platform; chainage
1020m to 1100m. Operationally, the station
has a total of 200,258 Entries and Exits per
annum or 549 people per day (ORR
Estimates). Stepping distances have been
assessed for relevant rolling stock. The
stepping distances will remain in the
stepping triangle with a maximum
mm vertical. In some locations, stepping
distances will be improved by up to 12 mm
horizontal and 39 mm vertical. Rationale:
In order to achieve the objectives of the
project, as stated above, it is deemed to be
existing non-compliances the project would
incur significant additional costs. The
17/10/2013
N/A
30/08/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
11/09/2013
Current
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
The design modification proposed by GE
18/07/2013
Transportation will lead to an increase in
the reliability of the windscreen wipers while
providing the best swept areas of the
wipers, without undertaking major redesign
of the cab structure / windscreen. It
provides a reliability improvement over the
existing design. The new design is only
marginally non-compliant, and is
considered to present no greater risk than
on other vehicles where similar derogations
have been granted in the past. Please refer
to the attached document for further details.
N/A
06/06/2013
GE Transportation
Rolling Stock
28/06/2013
Current
The provision of additional platform
21/02/2014
dispatch staff maintains the current safe
method of train dispatch and does not
materially affect the future operation of the
station. Extending the current train dispatch
arrangements to cater for five-car operation
will necessarily increase the OPEX costs for
the Station Operator, LOROL; these
additional costs are being accounted for in
the renegotiation of the current franchise
arrangements which will come into force
when five-car operations commence.
N/A
10/12/2013
London Overground
Capacity Improvement
Project
Infrastructure
07/01/2014
Current
Newbury Station - The existing Mirror on
Platform 1 is canopy mounted and it was
identified during the survey that the mirror
housing to platform level is 2160 mm, which
is below the minimum requirement of 2500
mm as stated in GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1.
The mirror is 1750 mm from the platform
edge thus erecting a barrier to the edge of
the mirror would force the passengers to
less than 1250 mm from the platform edge.
GE Transportation has recently been
working to increase the reliability of the
windscreen wipers on the Class 70
locomotives. Part of the existing problem is
that tolerance build ups can lead to the
wider blades striking the edge of the
windscreen. During the development of the
modification, it was identified that the
sightline requirements for cases A and C
(as described above) do not pass through
the area of the windscreen that is wiped by
the windscreen wipers when viewed from
the same point in the reference cube. (The
sightlines do pass through the windscreen
itself, and they do pass through the wiper's
swept area if viewed from different points in
the reference cube). The attached paper
provides additional explanation. To date, in
the three years that Class 70s have been in
service, there have been no recorded
complaints or problems for drivers in
respect to the RGS sightlines not passing
through the swept area (problems have
related to the faults with the wipers
themselves). The changes proposed by GE
Transportation to increase the wiper arm
and wiper blade length, whilst reducing the
angular sweep of the arms, will provide
improvements in reliability, whilst having a
The deviation applies to a platform
The only method of complying with the
extension of some 27. 5 m (final length to
current RGS requirement would be to
be developed in detailed design), on the
introduce Automatic Selective Door
Down Line at the London end of Platform 1 Opening at this location. Early consultation
at South Acton station. The minimum
with LOROL determined this was not a
platform width will be 2. 4 m. All relevant
preferred option as: Dwell times would
Guidance Notes within GI/GN7616 Issue 1 increase to an intolerable level and impact
have been considered prior to the
on the service frequency and punctuality
submission of the deviation request. The
Platform passenger flows would be
platform extension is required due to the
markedly affected, at the London end of the
introduction of five-car Class 378 operations platform Train evacuation times would not
on the London Overground network, which be acceptable in the event of a fire. As the
will commence on the North London Line in use of ASDO did not have the support of
2015. The extension is required as the
LOROL, the option was not pursued.
existing platform is only long enough for a
four-car CL378 unit. As part of the approval
in principle of the design, a gauging and
stepping analysis has been conducted and
Track Form A produced for this platform.
The Form A has been reviewed and signed
by the Network Rail Gauging Engineer and
Track RAM for Anglia and shows that there
is no worsening of the existing gauging and
stepping values at this location and that all
values are within the 'stepping triangle'
albeit towards the upper end of the range.
A copy of this report is included with this
submission. Similarly, copies of relevant
Civils drawings of the proposal are included
Page106
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
Lead SC
Deviation Status
GMRT2141
Three
E.2.1 Test conditions E.5
Performance requirements
13-178-DEV
01/11/2013
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
Two
All requirements in
GM/RT2473 Issue 2.
13-157-DEV
The method of multi linear regression was 27/01/2014
recently investigated within the European
railway dynamics research project
DynoTRAIN. It will be introduced in the
revised EN 14363 (prEN 14363: 2013,
`Railway applications - Testing and
Simulation for the acceptance of running
characteristics of railway vehicles - Running
Behaviour and stationary tests') to the
assessment of rolling stock dynamic
behaviour at different track geometry levels.
Moreover, the method was already
introduced in the clarification document
ERA/TD/2012-17/INT (European Railway
Agency, Interoperability Unit, Running
Dynamics Applications of EN 14363: 2005 Modifications and Clarifications) for the
same purpose (see Clause 4. 4. 8 and
Annex A of the corresponding document).
According to the documents mentioned
above, the multi linear regression is a
suitable method to estimate the result of a
vehicle assessment even if the test
conditions do not meet the requirements to
reflect the vehicle's dynamic behaviour in
the operating conditions completely.
Therefore, the safety, the technical
compatibility, the performance and other
properties of the railway system will not be
20/11/2013
arising from the introduction of the revised
seat fixing arrangements of the alternative
seating arrangements.
N/A
GMRT2473
N/A
10/10/2013
Siemens plc
Rolling Stock
01/11/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
8.1 b)
and Trains
13-083-DEV
Resistance to Derailment - Use of Multiple Class 700 `Thameslink EMU' and all its sub- As the Class 700 needs to comply with the
Regression for Technical Conformity in lieu classes.
Locomotives and Passenger Rolling Stock
of UK On-track Tests.
Conventional Rail Technical Specification
for Interoperability (CR TSI LOC PAS) (
2011/291/EU, Commission Decision
26/04/2011 concerning a technical
specification for interoperability relating to
the rolling stock subsystem - `Locomotives
and passenger rolling stock' of the transEuropean conventional rail system'), a full
vehicle testing in accordance with EN14363:
2005 ( Railway applications - Testing and
Simulation for the acceptance of running
characteristics of railway vehicles - Running
Behaviour and stationary tests ) is required,
which will not be possible in UK due to the
absence of required test zones on routes
accessible with the Thameslink gauge.
Therefore, on-track tests according
EN14363: 2005 are scheduled to be
performed outside UK. Complying with
GM/RT2141 Appendix D or Appendix E
would call for additional dynamic on-track
ride tests in UK. Limited accessibility of
Thameslink routes for vehicle testing
introduces a project risk in terms of delay in
the approval and homologation process due
to the resulting late availability of the
generated test report.
Supply of seats for 20 new Class 350
Â· 10 x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Electric Multiple Units (EMU) to a preExpress Â· 10 x Class 350/4 for London
existing design in accordance with Siemens Midland.
Strategy for the Introduction of Additional
Vehicles to an Existing Design, 27/01/2012
Issue 1.
Siemens are in the process of supplying of
twenty new four-car EMUs that, with the
exception of certain internal layout
differences and other minor changes, will be
identical to the existing Class 350/2
(`Desiro') EMUs presently operated by
London Midland. A strategy outlining
approach to be taken in the assessment of
the new units, including the methodology
and actions required to meet the approvals
requirements for the introduction of the new
EMUs of an existing design into passenger
service, has been approved by the Rolling
Stock Standards Committee at its meeting
held on 17/02/2012. The strategy requires
consideration of new standards and
changes to existing standards made in the
period between the introduction of the
original vehicles and the present. The
strategy and some particularly high risk (to
Hungerford Station, Platform 1 - Driver Only Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors
Hungerford Station - The existing mirror on
Scheme to renew the existing 59 DOO
Platform 1 was mounted on a post and was
mirrors at 34 stations in the Thames Valley identified during the survey that the mirror
Area. This issue is at Hungerford Station,
Platform 1.
housing to platform level was 2200 mm,
which is below the minimum requirement of
2500 mm as stated in GI/RT7016 Section 8.
1. The new mirror was commissioned on
12/01/2013 with the intention of raising the
clearance height from the underside of the
mirror to platform to 2500 mm. However, a
compliant image could not be achieved at
this height, therefore the mirror was lowered
until a compliant image was achieved. The
new clearance from underside of mirror to
Platform is now 2320 mm, which is an
improvement on the old mirror. Due to the
mirrors proximity to the platform edge,
would force the passengers to less than
1250 mm from the platform edge.
01/08/2013
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
8.1 b)
and Trains
13-080-DEV
Cholsey Station, Platform 3 - Driver Only
Operation (DOO) Mirror headroom
Scheme to renew the existing DOO mirrors
This issue is a Cholsey Station, Platform 3.
01/08/2013
with no known problems. The new mirror is
installed at a greater height (2. 30 m) than
the old (2. 06 m).
N/A
06/06/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
10/07/2013
Current
GMRT2400
Four
3.25.12
Engineering design of on-track machines
13-008-DGN
Non-provision of lifeguards on an OTM
operating as lead vehicle in a possession.
This application applies to existing KFA
and Falcon wagons modified and reclassified as OTMs to form part of the
Network Rail High Output OLE Construction
System (HOPS) that will be hauled in train
formation when travelling to and from site,
and either hauled or propelled when working
in a possession or work site. This
application applies to the following vehicles
when propelled as the leading vehicle. KFA
wagons: Â· 99709131002-6 Â·
99709131004-2 Â· 99709131008-3 Â·
99709131012-5 Â· 99709131016-6 Â·
99709131017-4 Â· 99709131019-0 Â·
99709131009-1 (not to be fitted with
lifeguards). Falcon wagon: Â·
99709131007-5.
Installation of an on-track plant type device 04/03/2013
that meets the requirements of RIS-1530PLT Issue 4 may pose a risk when the
vehicles are in travel mode outside
possession. In order to mitigate this risk,
the design will be retractable or removable.
Evidence of compliance with RIS-1530-PLT
when the machine is working within a
possession and other standards when
travelling outside a possession will be
submitted to the NoBo/DeBo/CP in support
of demonstrating conformance of the
vehicles to all required standards. The use
of this alternative action is considered to
deliver an equivalent level of control and
safety that will not require further actions or
operational constraints.
N/A
17/01/2013
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Plant
07/02/2013
Current
Scope
Nature and Degree
Cholsey - The existing Mirror on Platform 3
(car Stop 2/3/4) was identified during the
survey that the Mirror height from the
underside of the Mirror housing to platform
level was 2060 mm, which is below the
minimum requirement of 2500 mm as
stated in GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1. It has
been confirmed that a new mirror cannot be
raised to achieve the minimum height
clearance whilst maintaining a compliant
image, although the new mirror height is
2300 mm, an improvement on the old
mirror. Due to the mirrors location on the
platform, erecting a barrier would force the
passengers to less than 1250 mm from the
platform edge.
The retro design and fitting of lifeguards
compliant with the standard would be
extremely difficult since the wagons are
fitted with traditional freight bogies which
were not designed as a leading bogie to
carry lifeguards. The associated costs with
the design and testing of a compliant retro
fit lifeguard are also considered prohibitive
and for these reasons, it is considered
unreasonable to comply with the quoted
RGS clause.
Page107
Deviations Register
RGS Number
RGS Issue Number
RGS Clause
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Title
GIRT7016
Four
7.2.1 (b) and 7.4.1
and Trains
13-002-DGN
Streatham Common Station, Platform 2 (Up Streatham Common Station: Station
Slow line at Country end.) - platform width. platform - Platform 2 (Up Slow line at
Country end).
GMRT2130
Three
3.1.1
13-041-DGN
Derogation against GM/RT2130 to exhaust
the APU through the underframe.
Existing Class 70 locomotives (7000170030) and a further build of up to twenty
more Class 70 locomotives manufactured
and supplied by General Electric in 20132014 to be operated on Network Rail
infrastructure when outside a possession.
GMRT2149
Three
B10.3
13-067-DGN
Railway Undertaking, RSSB Member
Class 377/2, Class 377/6 (if converted for
DV operation) and Class 377/7 fleets. (It
should be noted that the design of the APC
receiver is the same as that fitted to Class
377/5, Class 378 and Class 379 units).
GIRT7016
Four
2.1
and Trains
13-226-DEV
GKRT0192
Two
2.1.1.3 a)
13-034-DGN
Scope
Nature and Degree
Lead SC
Deviation Status
Lengthening project seeks to increase
passenger capacity over selected routes by
increasing train lengths from eight to ten
cars. This requires platform extensions on
the Slow Lines at a number of stations
including Streatham Common. Streatham
Common station comprises four platforms
as follows: Platform 1 - Down Slow.
Platforms 2/3 - Up Slow/Down Fast.
Platform 4 - Up Fast. The main station
entrance is located on the Down side at
approximately the middle of the station with
inter platform access via a footbridge
located towards the Country end. A
footbridge (bridge No. 39 at 6m 50ch)
provides a secondary access on the Up side
onto Greyhound Lane. At the London end
of the station, the junction with the
Streatham Spurs is at the end of the Slow
Lines platforms. At the Country end, the
railway is crossed by an overbridge (bridge
No. 40 at 6m 51ch - Greyhound Lane)
which comprise two spans over the Slow
and Fast Lines respectively with a tapered
pier in the interval between the Up Slow and
Down Fast lines. The interval between the
Up Slow and Down Fast reduces beyond
the overbridge. Platform 2 is to be extended
Due to the location of the APU and with the
limited amount of space available as a
result of compliance with locomotive gauge,
routing the APU exhaust so that it
discharges in a location which is compliant
with GM/RT2130 Clause 3. 1. 1 is difficult
and introduces a number of additional risks.
These are discussed in detail in the
supporting paper attached to 09/038/TNC.
The overall objective of the Sussex Route 10/07/2013
Suburban Train Lengthening project is to
increase passenger capacity and reduce
overcrowding while maintaining or
improving safety. At Streatham Common,
the scheme will be developed to ensure that
the track and platform design of the
extended platform will be compliant with the
requirements for stepping distances,
passing and lateral clearances. The length
of platform with limited width is at the
country end of the station beyond the
position of the main station entrance.
N/A
03/01/2013
Network Rail
Infrastructure
08/05/2013
Current
The circumstances under which the APU
03/09/2013
will be required to operate are very limited,
and the impact on the railway is considered
to be negligible. This is discussed in detail
in the supporting paper attached to
09/038/TNC. It is also noted that many
OTMs exhaust much larger engines to the
underframe, such as MPVs.
N/A
28/03/2013
GE Transportation
Rolling Stock
19/04/2013
Current
03/05/2013
Rolling Stock
24/05/2013
Current
Willesden Junction High Level Station
Platform 5.
This APC receiver has been designed to be 19/07/2013
dimensionally set-up in exactly the same
way as the now obsolete version. This setup is in-line with the manufacturer's
recommendations, and adjusting this set-up
height may introduce the risk of the receiver
not functioning correctly. When the inservice conditions of the bogie (and
subsequently APC receiver) are analysed
for gauging purposes and compared to the
APC gauge as defined in Appendix C of
GM/RT2149, both a lateral infringement of
17. 25 mm and a vertical infringement of 24
mm to the gauge line is experienced.
Lateral Infringement: GE/GN8573
Guidance on Gauging, Part E, defines a
lower sector vehicle gauge that can be used
by vehicle manufacturers to ensure
compliance with the relevant Railway Group
Standards. After considering all appropriate
static and dynamic movements (including
tolerances and vehicle maintenance), if the
vehicle and components on

Deviations Register

Transcription

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